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Ghana Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (Credit 1854-GH) Implementation Completion Report

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IDA/SecM97-342

FROM: The Vice President and Secretary

July 16, 1997

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF GHANA

COCOA REHABILITATION PROJECT (Cr. 1854-GH)

Attached is a report entitled "Implementation Completion Report: Republic of Ghana: Cocoa Rehabilitation Project" (Credit 1854-GH) dated June 30, 1997 (Report No: 16818) prepared by the Africa Region.

Distribution

Executive Directors and Alternates President's Executive Committee Senior Management, Bank, IFC and MIGA

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Report No. 16818

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF GHANA

COCOA REHABILITATION PROJECT (Credit 1854-GH)

June 30, 1997

County Department 10 Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

			(Cedi per U	S\$1.00				
1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
160	278	341	343	368	437	649	957	1200	1596

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER

January 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB	African Development Bank
AgSAC	Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit
BADEA	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
COCOBOD	Ghana Cocoa Board
CRETEC	Cocoa Research and Extension Technical Committee
CRIG	Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana
CRP	Cocoa Rehabilitation Project
CSD	Cocoa Services Division
CSSVD	Cocoa Swollen Shot Virus Disease
DCA	Development Credit Agreement
DFR	Department of Feeder Roads in the Ministry of Roads and Highways
EFA	Extension Field Assistant
ERP	Economic Recovery Program
FY	Fiscal Year
GOG	Government of Ghana
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
LBC	Licensed Buying Company
MOFA	Ministry of Food and Agriculture
MRH	Ministry of Roads and Highways
MUV	Manufacturing Unit Value Index
ODA	Overseas Development Administration (U.K.)
PÁ	Project Agreement
PBC	Produce Buying Company Ltd.
PD	Procurement Division
PPMRD	Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Research Department
PY	Project Year
SAC	Structural Adjustment Credit
SAR	Staff Appraisal Report

Vice President	Jean Louis Sarbib	
Country Director	Serge Michailof	
Technical Manager	Jean Paul Chausse	
Task Team Leader	Gotz Schreiber	

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF GHANA

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COCOA REHABILITATION PROJECT (Cr. 1854-GH) MAY 25 2023

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF GHANA

COCOA REHABILITATION PROJECT (Cr. 1854-GH)

Preface

This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project in Ghana for which IDA Credit 1854-GH in the amount of SDR 31.3 million (US\$40.0 million equivalent at appraisal) was approved on December 1, 1987, and made effective on November 15, 1988. Cofinancing was provided by the African Development Bank/African Development Fund (ADB/ADF), the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), the European Union (EU), and the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) of the United Kingdom.

The credit was closed on June 30, 1996, two years after the original closing date of June 30, 1994. Final disbursement took place on September 25, 1996, at which time a balance of SDR 13.1 million (US\$18.2 million equivalent at closing) was canceled.

The ICR was prepared by a joint FAO/CP World Bank mission¹ which visited Ghana in February 1997, revised by G. Schreiber (AFTA3), and reviewed at a meeting chaired by S. Michailof, Country Director for Ghana. The borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by arranging field visits and meetings, providing data as well as comments on the mission's aide-memoire. Advance copies of this document were provided to the borrower and the cofinanciers for review and comments. The Department for International Development (formerly ODA) of the United Kingdom has endorsed this report. To date, no formal comments have been received from the borrower or the other cofinanciers.

¹ H. Trupke (Mission Leader, FAO/CP), L. Campbell (Bio-Resources Engineer, World Bank, consultant), and C. Carlier (Tree Crops Specialist, World Bank, consultant).

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF GHANA

COCOA REHABILITATION PROJECT (Cr. 1854-GH)

Evaluation Summary

Introduction

i. The Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (CRP) was the third IDA-financed cocoa project in Ghana. Based on a cocoa sector study carried out by the Bank in 1980, the project was first identified in 1981, and a prefeasibility study was undertaken in the same year. Further preparatory work was suspended due mainly to an unfavorable economic environment. The project was re-identified in 1985, prepared in 1986, and appraised in 1987. Credit 1854-GH in the amount of SDR 31.3 million (US\$40.0 million equivalent at appraisal) was approved on December 1, 1987, and became effective on November 15, 1988. Total project costs were estimated at US\$128.0 million, with co-financing to be provided by the African Development Bank (US\$33.0 million) and other co-financiers (US\$18 million) and counterpart contributions of US\$16.1 million by the Government of Ghana (GOG) and US\$20.9 million by the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD).

Project Objectives and Components

ii. The project objectives were clear, realistic and very relevant to the country and the sector. They were to: (a) support the sectoral policy reforms agreed under the first Structural Adjustment Credit, and (b) increase cocoa yields and production to stabilize output at about 300,000 tons per year, mainly through the rehabilitation of 300,000 ha of existing cocoa and the replanting of about 57,000 ha. This was to be achieved by: (i) maintaining producer price incentives; (ii) improving the institutional efficiency of COCOBOD; (iii) improving cocoa evacuation and quality control; (iv) implementing a road rehabilitation program; and (v) strengthening cocoa research. The project comprised nine components: technical services for cocoa production; farm extension services; seed production and distribution; Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease control (CSSVDC); research; farm input supply; internal cocoa marketing; monitoring and evaluation; and road program.

iii. Project conditions focused on the gradual privatization of farm input marketing, streamlining of COCOBOD's cocoa buying and handling operations as well as improved organization of extension and demand orientation of research. Implementation of the project's policy and institutional reform agenda received a strong boost with the coming into effect in June 1992 of the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (AgSAC) which strongly underpinned, and in some cases went beyond, the CPR's objectives.

Implementation Experience and Results

iv. Performance in implementing the various project components was mixed. The components aiming at <u>improving the technical services</u> for cocoa production and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the cocoa <u>extension services</u> were implemented broadly as designed, but the pilot program for the unification of cocoa extension services with those of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture was not implemented. <u>Seed production and distribution</u> were improved. Seed pod production was scaled to match actual demand of about 2.2 million pods per year. The arrangements agreed to for distribution of seed pods were followed, but pods are still sold at a highly subsidized price.

v. Under the <u>CSSVD program</u> 17,930 ha of diseased cocoa trees were to be cut out and 17,330 ha replanted. Due to repeated changes in financing arrangements for the component, only about 5,000 ha were cut out from 1988/89 to 1993/94. From July 1994 onwards, a "Cordon Sanitaire" program was initiated, separating the areas of mass infection from those of scattered outbreaks. The European Union provided STABEX funds (about US\$4.2 million) for incentive payments, and IDA financed vehicles and equipment. During the two years until project closing another 8,056 ha were cut out, bringing the total to 13,050 ha (about 73% of the SAR estimate); to date, only 3,810 ha have been replanted under the program.

vi. The main thrust of the <u>research component</u> was to strengthen the capacity of the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) to deliver the necessary scientific and technical support to the cocoa industry, which was broadly achieved. Research/extension linkages have been strengthened, but there still is much need for improvement as regards translating research findings into appropriate extension messages.

vii. Under the <u>farm input supply component</u> COCOBOD began, as planned, to phase out subsidies in 1988/89, but no action was taken to privatize the marketing channel. To comply with policy reforms supported by AgSAC after 1992, COCOBOD initiated a process of identifying private companies to take over the marketing of inputs, but eventually aborted this process and instead sold all its input stocks to the Coffee, Cocoa and Sheanut Farmers Association (CCSFA), effectively making CCSFA the sole distributor for cocoa production inputs in the country. COCOBOD continued to import and distribute inputs on behalf of the CCSFA until June 1995. Funding was provided by CCSFA from sales receipts, and shortfalls due to the continuation of below-cost sales have been covered from the compensation fund which is administered by CCSFA. CCSFA still subsidizes inputs at between 40 and 85 percent, thus not only depleting the compensation fund, which was designed for price stabilization, but also effectively preventing the emergence of a competitive private input marketing system while sustaining an active black market and cross-border trade in essential agro-chemicals.

viii. At appraisal it was considered premature to attempt the immediate privatization of <u>domestic cocoa</u> <u>marketing</u>, and emphasis was placed instead on enhancing the efficiency of COCOBOD's purchasing, evacuation, storage, inspection and infestation control activities. A marketing strategy was to be formulated and agreed upon at the mid-term review. Following the appraisal recommendations, purchasing operations were streamlined, vehicles and equipment procured and 16 new transit sheds built. In March 1992, COCOBOD was required under AgSAC to introduce competition into the internal marketing of cocoa beans. By 1995/96, 11 private Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) were operating; procuring about 101,000 tons of beans, equivalent to about 25 percent of total deliveries. Enhanced private involvement is constrained by LBC difficulties in accessing working capital and by lack of vehicles, equipment and facilities. The purchase of jute sacks for an estimated US\$4.7 million did not materialize due to unusually protracted procurement difficulties.

ix. To strengthen COCOBOD's policy analysis capacity, its Policy Planning, Monitoring and Research Department (PPMRD) was reorganized as planned, a <u>Monitoring and Evaluation</u> Unit was established and a Management Information Service and data bank were set up. Only two of the four major studies planned have been completed, however, leaving the information base for sectoral monitoring and policy formulation very weak.

x. The <u>roads program</u> was not carried out as planned. When the project was prepared, COCOBOD had its own budget for maintenance and rehabilitation of roads in cocoa producing areas and for the construction and maintenance of low-standard feeder roads to cocoa producing villages ("cocoa roads"). By the time of appraisal, GOG had instructed the Department of Feeder Roads (DFR) of the Ministry of Roads and Highways to take over full responsibility for cocoa feeder roads, and implementation of the roads component was assigned to it. DFR subsequently raised major objections concerning the technical standards of the cocoa roads and the proposed emphasis on spot improvement and maintenance. When these issues were resolved after about three years, the roads targeted for spot improvement and maintenance had deteriorated so much that most required complete rehabilitation. Even then, DFR failed to act expeditiously in preparing work programs for tendering and approval by IDA. At credit closing, only 275 km of roads and three bridges were completed under the IDA credit. ADF financed the rehabilitation of 404 km of roads, and COCOBOD funded the rehabilitation of 450 km of the 750 km of roads targeted for using labor-based contractors. None of the planned 60 km of new feeder roads and 80 km of new tracks had been constructed, but 22 (of the 25 planned) steel bridges supplied by ODA were installed. With an aggregate of 1,129 km, the roads component achieved only 38 percent of the 3,000 km planned.

xi. The project suffered implementation difficulties throughout its history. Co-financing arrangements were only finalized in October 1989, resulting in a start-up delay of several components. Major problems included frequent changes in the senior staff of COCOBOD and the generally low staff morale throughout the organization, because of the ongoing restructuring and retrenchment associated with the privatization and/or discontinuation of many of COCOBOD's traditional activities. In the absence of clearly defined responsibilities for project management, coordination and execution, the decision making process was extremely cumbersome. Performance improved following a change in COCOBOD management in early 1994, causing IDA to agree to two successive one-year extensions of the credit closing date to June 1996 to complete various civil works, order outstanding equipment and provide continued support to the CSSVDC program. Nevertheless, US\$18.2 million remained undisbursed when the credit closed and were canceled. GOG's and COCOBOD's combined contributions of US\$14.9 million fell substantially short of the US\$37 million expected at appraisal, and total project cost have been re-estimated at US\$87.1 million.

xii. The Bank failed to ensure sufficient political support and project ownership within the implementing agencies. Project management and implementation arrangements were not sufficiently well defined, and the technical specification for the roads component were established without taking into account the views of the technical staff of the implementing agency. Arrangements for project supervision changed during implementation and were not always fully effective.

xiii. The failure of COCOBOD to put in place effective arrangements for project management, establish a workable system for the procurement of goods and services and adhere consistently to the Bank's procurement guidelines substantially impeded implementation and in particular procurement. Another major problem was the persistent failure to achieve agreement among concerned agencies on implementing agreed project components, notably the roads component and the unification of agricultural extension services. COCOBOD also made inadequate efforts to foster the privatization process, especially for input supplies. The transfer of responsibility for input supply from COCOBOD to CCSFA must be considered more a circumvention, rather than implementation, of the agreement to privatize input marketing. DFR's failure to act in a timely manner resulted in substantial further deterioration of the road system in the cocoa areas and a drastic shortfall of implementation and disbursements under the roads component. The Borrower did well, however, in implementing the agreements regarding COCOBOD's restructuring and, after 1992, opening domestic cocoa marketing to the private sector.

xiv. The outcome of the project has to be assessed against the background of world price developments for cocoa, changes in the macro-economic environment, as well as preceding and contemporary operations in support of economic recovery and/or specifically of the cocoa subsector in Ghana. The central project objective, stabilizing cocoa production at about 300,000 tons per annum, was already within reach in 1988/89, the year the credit became effective, when production (or purchases by COCOBOD) totaled just over 300,000 tons. Substantial increases in the administratively fixed producer prices (113 percent in real terms) implemented during 1984/85-1987/88 had already revived farmer interest and induced considerable new plantings of cocoa trees, resulting in the surge of production in the late 1980s. Thereafter, sharply falling international prices and failure to adjust producer prices adequately for domestic inflation caused a substantial decline in real producer prices, and cocoa production remained essentially stagnant from 1988/89 through 1994/95 at around 300,000 tons per year. World market prices began to rise again in 1993/94, and as the producers' share of the fob price was also

increased from 25 percent 1993/94 to almost 45 percent in 1995/96, growers again responded to the improved production incentives, and the 1995/96 crop, also favored by excellent weather, totaled 403,850 tons.

xv. The project's production objective was to be achieved through the rehabilitation of existing cocoa plantings, new plantings, and replantings under the CSSVDC program. By project closing, about 250,000 ha had been placed under improved management, and 39,000 ha had been replanted. In the absence of reliable statistics on cocoa acreage, age of trees and yields, estimates of incremental production due to measures taken under the project are necessarily very crude. Moreover, the output response to these measures has also been significantly affected by the sharp variations in farmers' price incentives prior to and throughout the project period. Nevertheless, the incremental cocoa production attributable to the combined effect of project measures and to improved producer incentives after 1993/94 is estimated at about 100,000 tons p.a. at present and might rise to about 115,000 tons per year by the year 2002 (at full maturity of the newly planted trees). In this respect, the outcome of the combined measures taken under the project and the subsequent AgSAC has, thus, been satisfactory. This is reflected by a re-estimated ERR of 24% against an appraisal estimate of 23%.

xvi. Many, but not all, of the institutional objectives have been achieved. COCOBOD has been significantly streamlined, research and extension activities have been strengthened and focused, and extension-research linkages have been strengthened. Progress towards promoting the emergence of an effective private input marketing system has not been satisfactory. As a result of actions taken in the context of AgSAC, private sector involvement in domestic cocoa marketing, on the other hand, has progressed significantly beyond what was expected at appraisal. And a feeder road maintenance management system has been established, aimed at ensuring adequate and timely funding of maintenance of the roads rehabilitated under the project.

xvii. The poor implementation experience does not allow a satisfactory rating for this project. While measures taken and investments implemented under the project have strengthened institutional capacity, physical facilities and service performance in the subsector, the production effect was muted until significant policy reform measures to improve farmers' production incentives were implemented in the context of AgSAC.

Summary of Findings, Future Operations, and Key Lessons Learned

xviii. The most important findings are that: (a) for projects which envisage a multiplicity of policy and institutional changes, from the beginning local commitment and project ownership has to be ensured from both policy makers and implementing agencies; (b) project management, implementation and procurement arrangements must be clearly defined and agreed upon by all parties; (c) extraneous factors, such as major changes in international commodity prices, exchange rates, inflation rates, climatic conditions, etc., can be crucial for the success or failure of have paramount effects and supersede the impact of the project per se; and (d) complex multi-component projects require periodic multi-disciplinary supervision missions.

xix. While the investments in staff development, physical facilities and rural roads appear sustainable, overall sustainability of the project is not certain. The opportunities created by the partial liberalization of domestic cocoa marketing and COCOBOD's withdrawal from input marketing have not yet been fully taken up by private entrepreneurs. GOG remains committed to liberalization, but further action will be needed to ensure that the progress made on the institutional front and in marketing and pricing policy is sustained. This concerns, for example, the arrangements between COCOBOD and CCSFA for financing, importing and marketing agrochemicals and the regulatory constraints on fertilizer imports, but also the institutional and policy environment for private involvement in cocoa marketing. GOG has indicated its intent to merge COCOBOD's extension service with that of MOFA, to take action in support of more private sector involvement in domestic cocoa marketing, and to increase the farmers' share in the fob price to at least 60 percent within two or three years.

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF GHANA

COCOA REHABILITATION PROJECT (Cr. 1854-GH)

PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

A. STATEMENT AND EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES

Introduction

1. The project was the third IDA-financed cocoa project in the country. The first two, the Eastern Cocoa Project (Cr. 205-GH) and the Ashanti Cocoa Project (Cr. 1181-GH), were implemented during 1970-1979 and 1975-1982, respectively, with the main aim to replant and rehabilitate about 50,000 ha of cocoa. Both suffered from low farmer participation owing to inadequate returns at prevailing producer prices. In 1983 the Government of Ghana (GOG) initiated a series of policy reforms, including in the cocoa subsector, aimed at removing constraints and promoting the export earning industries. IDA supported these reforms through three projects: (i) First Reconstruction Import Credit, (ii) Export Rehabilitation Project, and (ii) First Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC-I). The subsequent Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (CRP) was not only to help implement key policy agreements already reached under the earlier credits, but also to address major investment and institutional constraints in the sector.

2. Based on a cocoa sector study carried out by the Bank in 1980, the project was first identified in 1981, and a prefeasibility study was carried out in the same year. Further preparatory work was suspended due mainly to an unfavorable economic environment and unresolved policy issues. The project was re-identified by the Bank in 1985, prepared in 1986 and appraised in 1987.

Project Objectives and Components

3. The main project objectives were to: (a) support the policy reforms in the cocoa sector agreed under the first Structural Adjustment Credit, and (b) increase cocoa production and yields to stabilize output at an annual level of about 300,000 tons, mainly through the rehabilitation of 300,000 ha of existing cocoa and the replanting of about 57,000 ha. This was to be achieved by: (i) maintaining producer price incentives; (ii) improving the institutional efficiency of COCOBOD, notably in extension, seed production, disease control, and by gradually privatizing input distribution; (iii) improving cocoa evacuation and quality control; (iv) implementing a road rehabilitation program; and (v) strengthening cocoa research. The project comprised nine main components:

- (i) <u>Technical Services for Cocoa Production</u>, including the reorganization, decentralization and training of staff of the Cocoa Services Division (CSD) of the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD);
- (ii) <u>Extension Services for Improved Technology</u>, through reorganization, training, technical assistance as well as provision of vehicles, equipment and buildings, including the renovation of the Bunso Cocoa College, 17 farmer training centers and 150 staff houses;
- (iii) <u>Seed Production and Distribution</u>, by improving existing and establishing new seed gardens, staff training, and reorganizing seed distribution on commercial principles;

- (iv) <u>Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease Control (CSSVDC)</u>, mainly through the cutting out and replanting of about 17,000 ha with CSSVD-resistant varieties against incentive payments to farmers, and including training, technical assistance, vehicles and equipment;
- (v) <u>Research</u>, mainly by providing assistance to the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) through staff development, rehabilitation and up-keep of facilities, and the establishment of an 'on-farm' farming systems research unit;
- (vi) <u>Farm Input Supply</u>, to gradually introduce a subsidy removal and privatization program for cocoa inputs and including the import of agro-chemicals;
- (vii) <u>Internal Marketing</u>, to enhance efficiency of the marketing system by introducing a commercial approach and encouraging competition, including rationalization of buying system and stations, provision of vehicles, equipment, training and technical expertise;
- (viii) <u>Monitoring and Evaluation</u>, by establishing an M&E Unit within the PPMR Department of COCOBOD and additional units in the Cocoa Services Division (CSD) and the Produce Buying Company Ltd. (PBC), including the provision of training, equipment, expertise, equipping a library, and funding for several studies; and
- (ix) <u>Road Program</u>, consisting mainly of 3,000 km of spot improvement partly by labor-intensive methods, a recurrent maintenance program increasing from 600 km in Project Year 1 to 2,100 km in Project Year 5, as well as the construction of 60 km of new roads, 80 km of tracks and two major bridges.

4. The project objectives were clear, realistic and at the time most relevant to the country and the sector. A major underlying assumption, however, proved to be incorrect. At appraisal it was forecast that international cocca prices would gradually increase from about US\$2,000/ton in 1986/87 to US\$2,360 at credit closing. These forecasts proved to be flawed, as incremental production in Indonesia, Malaysia and Ivory Coast, resulting from new plantings made in the late 1970s and early 1980s, substantially exceeded growth in world demand during the second half of the 1980s, with a depressing effect on world prices. At the time of appraisal, COCOBOD's and GOG's share in the fob export price was about 70 percent, implying the availability of ample funds for project counterpart financing and other cocca sector support measures by government. The low farmers' share of the fob price, on the other hand, was considered a major obstacle to further production increases and to be addressed under the project. The official farmgate price at that time stood at ¢ 85/kg - about US\$550/ton equivalent or about 28 percent of the world market price.

5. Designed to achieve a rapid rehabilitation of the cocoa sector, the project was quite demanding for the Borrower. It attempted to address a wide range of institutional reforms, including reorganization of COCOBOD and retrenchment of staff, and policy issues (e.g., divestiture, elimination of input subsidies, privatization of input marketing) simultaneously with a number of geographically dispersed physical action programs. For the five-year project, Credit 1854-GH in the amount of SDR 31.3 million (US\$40.0 million equivalent at appraisal) was approved on December 1, 1987, and became effective on November 15, 1988. Total project costs were estimated at US\$128.0 million, with co-financing to be provided by ADB/ADF (US\$33.0 million) and other co-financiers (US\$18 million) and counterpart contributions of US\$16.1 million and US\$20.9 million, respectively, by GOG and COCOBOD.

6. Implementation of the policy and institutional reform agenda supported by the project received a strong boost with the coming into effect, in June 1992, of the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (AgSAC). AgSAC

supported, inter alia, a program of actions to: (a) rationalize the operations and reduce operating cost of COCOBOD, (b) abolish the monopsony of the Produce Buying Company Ltd. (PBC), a COCOBOD subsidiary, in the purchase of cocoa from farmers and implement a program for private sector entry into domestic cocoa marketing, (c) improve the transparency of determination of prices, fees and taxes applicable in the cocoa sector, and gradually increase the share of the export price received by cocoa growers, and (d) eliminate government control of fertilizer marketing margins and phase out public commercial participation in farm input marketing.²

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES

7. Overall Achievement. The central project objective, increasing cocoa yields and production so as to stabilize output at an annual level of about 300,000 tons, was already within reach in 1988/89, the year the credit became effective, when production (or sales to COCOBOD) totaled 300,155 tons - almost 50 percent more than the average recorded for the preceding four years. Indeed, despite temporary setbacks in 1991/92 and 1993/94, cocoa production averaged slightly over 300,000 tons per annum for the entire period from 1988/89 through 1996/97. Although some of this increase may be attributable to the major publicity drive by COCOBOD rekindling farmers' interest as well as to enhanced contacts of CSD and CRIG staff with farmers, the major impetus for the rise in output came from the improvement of the macro-economic and sectoral policy framework, including substantial increases in growers' prices from 1985/86 onward (see paras, 43ff).

Cocoa Produc	ction, 1985/86-1996/97
Year	Production (tons)
1984/85	174,813
1985/86	219,937
1986/87	227,765
1987/88	187,360
1988/89	300,155
1989/90	308,178
1990/91	293,352
1991/92	242,817
1992/93	312,123
1993/94	254,654
1994/95	309,455
1995/96	403,850
1996/97	335,000 prelim.

Ratio of

Cocoa Producer Prices in USS.

Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire

0.75

0.62

0.50

0.58

0.52

0.79

0.86

0.83

0.61

0.72

1.02

1984/85

1985/86

1986/87

1987/88

1988/89

1989/90

1990/91

1991/92

1992/93

1993/94

1994/95

Moreover, producer prices in neighboring Togo and Côte d'Ivoire were sharply reduced in 1988/89 and 1989/90, respectively, largely eliminating the price incentives for cross-border sales of cocoa.³

8. It is not clear, therefore, what portion of the increased production (over 403,000 tons in 1995/96, some 335,000 tons in 1996/97) can be attributed directly to the project.⁴ Nevertheless, with renewed farmer interest, by project closing about 250,000 ha -- or about one quarter of Ghana's entire cocoa area - had been placed under improved management (SAR target for "rehabilitation": 300,000 ha), and replanting (including 3,810 ha under the CSSVDC program) has reached 38,867 ha against an appraisal estimate of 57,000 ha.

9. In contrast, performance in implementing the various components (see para. 4(i)-(ix)) designed to support the achievement of the overall objectives has been mixed, as described in more detail below, bearing in mind that start-up of all activities was affected by the late finalization of the financing plan (see para. 29).

⁴ Neither the cocoa survey, which is to provide an updated inventory of the country's cocoa a ee stock, nor the study of socioeconomic aspects of cocoa farming, which would permit a proper assessment of farmers' i arious support measures, have been completed as yet (see para. 24 and Table 7).

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² All three AgSAC tranches were released and the credit was fully disbursed on January 23, 1996.

³ In Togo, the farmgate price was reduced from CFAF 300/kg in 1987/88 to CFAF 225/kg /89 season; in Côte d'Ivoire, it was halved from CFAF 400/kg in 1988/89 to CFAF 200/kg for 1989/90.

Technical Services for Cocoa Production. At the time of appraisal, the Cocoa Services Division (CSD) 10. of COCOBOD was responsible for extension, seed production, disease control and input supply. The aim of this project component was to reorganize CSD to enhance its efficiency, ensure effective supervision, allow better use of limited numbers of skilled staff, promote specialization, and reduce costs. The reorganization was carried out fully in line with the SAR proposal, and CSD with its headquarters in Accra now operates 6 regional offices and 39 district offices (reduced from 101). In 1993, further efforts were made to reduce staff, mostly at district level, and additional cuts took place in 1994 with the divestment of input marketing. During the project period, overall CSD staffing was reduced from 16,128 to 3,432. Although a consultant employed for 18 months to identify training needs of extension staff and develop training curricula did not produce satisfactory assessments and recommendations, CSD formulated a staff development program and identified essential staff training needs. However, due mainly to problems in the decision making process, only 13 senior staff benefited from training abroad (in management, M&E, plant protection, seed production, etc.) for a total of 124 person/weeks. As proposed, a small M&E unit was established in CSD and is functioning as a useful management tool; the absence of reliable up-to-date baseline information on essential physical and socio-economic parameters of the country's cocoa sector constitutes a significant impediment to sector analysis and policy formulation (see also para. 8, fn. 4, and para. 24).

11. <u>Extension Services for Improved Technology.</u> CSD's cocoa extension service was reorganized, placing emphasis on direct contact with farmers. The CSD districts were divided into 1,465 units of approximately 1,200 ha of cocoa each.⁵ Each unit was further divided into 16 sub-units individually visited by an Extension Field Assistant (EFA) on one unchanging day in four-week working cycles. The T&V method of extension has been adopted, farmer contacts are made by utilizing target or contact farmers, and the extension/research linkages have been substantially improved (see para. 20). Farmers are represented on the management committee of CSD and CRIG.

12. 702 EFA's were trained at Bunso Cocoa College for a total of 2,937 staff-months. To ensure adequate staff mobility, a total of 110 4WD vehicles and 1,900 motorcycles were procured under the project; the latter were given out on a loan/purchase basis to field staff. In addition, 18 trucks and 4 buses were received by CSD.

13. The program for rehabilitating and renovating the classrooms, dining and dormitory buildings, providing improved teaching equipment and upgrading of roads at Bunso Cocoa College was satisfactorily implemented. The college now can accommodate up to 400 students for each of its 4-months training sessions. The building contractors generally performed well. One contractor experienced cash flow problems towards the end of his contract and was able to complete only about 90 percent of his obligations; the college authorities expect to finish the work (two classrooms and two dormitories) with COCOBOD resources. Only six of the 17 farmer training centers were improved, and none of the staff houses were renovated, as this was no longer perceived as an urgent need. Reallocating funds not needed for this subcomponent and for storage facilities which were no longer required due to the liberalization of internal cocoa marketing, IDA agreed to finance the completion of COCOBOD's regional office in Kumasi, but delays in awarding contracts and poor contractor performance prevented completion of this work by project closing.

14. The component also envisaged a pilot program for the unification of cocoa extension services with the general agricultural extension service of the Ministry of Agriculture (now Ministry of Food and Agriculture - MOFA), whereby MOFA was to be made responsible for cocoa extension in half of the CSD districts of Volta Region and CSD for non-cocoa crops in half of Brong-Ahafo Region, beginning in 1989. The main reasons for the non-implementation of this sub-component are the continuing insistence of COCOBOD on the need for a

⁵ As much as 40 percent of this overall total "cocoa area" is, however, no longer planted to cocoa, as a result of past neglect, CSSVD, and the devastating fires of 1983.

separate extension service to address sector specific issues and CSD staff resistance fearing a downward adjustment of their wages to those of MOFA which are, at present, about 35 percent lower. Despite repeated public announcements by GOG of its intention to unify agricultural extension services, this issue remains unresolved and the extension services of MOFA and CSD continue to operate in parallel.

15. Seed Production and Distribution. Anticipating rising demand for seed under the replanting and new planting program, CSD's seed production potential was to be increased from about 1.9 million pods annually to about 3.2 million pods per year. Adjusting to lower than appraised demand, CSD has increased the production of the existing seed garden (mainly by expanding the area of the garden by 60 ha) to about 2.2 million pods per year and has established a new seed garden in 1990 with 24 ha (against an SAR estimate of 80 ha) in the Westerm Region. Total 1995/96 output amounted to 2.2 million pods, of which 1.9 million were distributed. The proposed pilot irrigated seed garden to determine the feasibility of increased pod production throughout the year was not established because of disagreement with IDA over the scope and cost of major elements of this facility and, hence, the economic justification of the proposed investments. The training program was implemented as planned, including that of the newly appointed seed garden coordinator. The arrangements suggested in the SAR for distribution of seed pods were followed, but pods are still sold at a highly subsidized price of \note 10 against a corresponding dry weight market price of \note 46 and actual estimated production cost of \note 260.

16. <u>Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease Control (CSSVDC)</u>. A total of 17,930 ha of diseased cocoa trees were to be cut out and 17,330 ha to be replanted. Affected farmers were to receive a cutting-out and replanting grant, in three tranches, equivalent to four years' loss of production; the rates were to be adjusted each year in line with changing producer prices. The financing arrangements for this component were changed several times during the project period. The original DCA specified an amount of US\$5.0 to be provided for incentive payments. At a donors' meeting in October 1989 it was decided to reallocate these funds to the roads component, with the funding for CSSVD control to be fully provided by COCOBOD. The mid-term review mission in March 1992 recommended to transfer these funds back to the CSSVDC program since they were not being disbursed under the roads component, while the falling international cocoa prices made it difficult for COCOBOD to finance the program from its own resources. In a subsequent revision, however, funding for incentive payments was again eliminated from the IDA credit.

17. From 1988/89 to 1993/94, COCOBOD cut out about 3.6 million affected trees (on about 5,000 ha). From July 1994 onwards a "cordon sanitaire" program was initiated, separating the areas of mass infection in the Eastern Region from areas with only scattered outbreaks of the disease. Given the urgent need to accelerate the CSSVDC program in this belt, the European Union (EU) agreed to provide STABEX funds for incentive payments, ⁶ while IDA financed vehicles and equipment. During the remaining two years until credit closing, another 8,056 ha (some 12.1 million trees) were cut out, bringing the total to 13,050 ha or about 73 percent of the SAR estimate. At the same time 3,810 ha have been replanted under the program. The surge in activities from 1994 onwards can be partly attributed to better management, but mostly to the provision of adequate funding for incentive payments to farmers and the restoration of the real value of these payments from 1994/95 onward.⁷

⁶ A total of ECU 3.4 million was to be provided and to be released in two tranches of ECU 1.7 million each. The first tranche was released in 1994, and the second is expected to be released during 1997.

⁷ The incentive payment for the initial year of cutting out remained unchanged at ¢120,000/ha from 1991/92 through 1993/94, thus declining from 48% of the producers' cocoa price in 1991/92 to 39% of the producers' price in 1993/94 (and from 27% of the world market price for cocoa in 1991/92 to less than 10% of the world market price in 1993/94), but was restored to 48% of the producers' price and about 24% of the world market price for cocoa in 1994/95, 1995/96 and 1996/97 (¢336,000/ha in 1994/95, ¢403,000/ha in 1995/96, ¢576,000/ha in 1996/97).

18. <u>Research.</u> The main objective of this component was to strengthen CRIG's capacity to deliver the necessary scientific and technical support to the cocoa industry, mainly by (a) reorganizing its work program, (b) strengthening staff capacity, (c) rehabilitating and upgrading of facilities, and (d) establishing an "on-farm" farming systems research unit (FSU). Whereas training, technical assistance, consultancies, vehicles and equipment were mostly funded by ODA, IDA financed infrastructure rehabilitation. The work of the institute was reorganized into research thrusts, considerably improving the problem-orientation and multi-disciplinarity of research, and the new FSU has added the required farming systems perspective.

19. Satisfactory progress was made in rehabilitating physical plant and equipment, including the laboratories, a plant quarantine house, electricity supply, a new print shop, and library acquisitions. Occasional delays occurred in the rehabilitation program and the acquisition of equipment, but by credit closing most of the appraisal targets were achieved. The procurement process for establishing the quarantine facility was unduly protracted, and the resulting delays prevented the contracted works to be completed before the credit closing date. COCOBOD is now financing its completion. The technical assistance program supported by ODA was particularly successful, and CRIG now has a well trained (in-house and overseas) and highly motivated complement of senior professional, technical and administrative staff.

20. Effective research/extension linkages have been established. These are coordinated by the Cocoa Research and Extension Technical Committee (CRETEC), comprising appropriate staff from both CRIG and CSD, which meets three to four times a year. The joint CSD/CRIG trials and outreach programs also foster close collaboration. Nevertheless, there is still much room for improvement as regards translating research findings into extension messages appropriate for prevailing on-farm socio-economic conditions as well as assessing the relevance and impact of research on the farming community.

Farm Input Supply. Over a five-year period, from 1988 to 1992, COCOBOD was to gradually remove 21. input subsidies and privatize first retailing, then wholesaling and finally importation, allowing the private sector sufficient time to develop a wide retail network with a minimum disruption in the supply system. COCOBOD initiated, as planned, the subsidy removal process, but no action was initiated to privatize the marketing channel. Under pressure to comply with policy reforms being supported by AgSAC, COCOBOD initiated a process of identifying a substantial number of private companies to take over the marketing of inputs, but eventually (in 1993/94) aborted this process and instead sold all its input stocks to the Coffee, Cocoa and Sheanut Farmers Association (CCSFA),⁸ effectively making CCSFA the sole distributor for cocoa production inputs in the country, CSD continued to import and distribute inputs on behalf of the CCSFA until June 1995. Funding was provided by CCSFA from sales receipts, and shortfalls due to the continuation of below-cost sales have been covered from the compensation fund which is administered by CCSFA.⁹ Since July 1995, CCSFA has been solely responsible for the entire procurement and distribution process, but CSD continues to assist with demand forecasting and the leasing of some of its storage facilities. In 1996, it also assisted with arranging the procurement of imported inputs. CCSFA continues to subsidize inputs at levels estimated to range between 40 and 85 percent, thus not only depleting the compensation fund, which was originally designed for price stabilization, but also effectively preventing the emergence of a competitive private input marketing system while sustaining an active black market and cross-border trade in essential agro-chemicals.

⁸ All cocoa farmers are registered as members of so-called "societies" for the purpose of selling their cocoa at the cocoa buying centers established throughout the country, and CCSFA is the national umbrella organization of all these societies.

⁹ This fund is periodically replenished by COCOBOD through payments intended to compensate cocoa growers for increases in export prices beyond those anticipated at the time the producer prices are established prior to the annual cocoa purchasing season. It is meant to provide additional revenue to cocoa growers.

22. Internal Cocoa Marketing. At appraisal it was considered premature, in view of the very poor state of the road system and the weakness of the private sector, to attempt the immediate privatization of the cocoa marketing system. Therefore, in designing this project component, emphasis was placed on enhancing the efficiency of the Produce Buying Company (PBC – a wholly owned subsidiary of COCOBOD) in cocoa buying, storing and handling, and of the inspection, grading and infestation control activities. The domestic cocoa marketing arrangements would be reviewed and a marketing strategy formulated and agreed upon at the time of the mid-term review. Following the appraisal recommendation, the capacity threshold for autonomous societies (cocoa buying centers, see para. 21, fn. 7) was raised from 50 tons to 70 tons of cocoa bought, 656 societies were closed, and 830 were converted into sub-societies. To facilitate efficient produce evacuation from the producing areas, 40 tractors as well as tarpaulins were procured and 16 new transit sheds were built. The purchase of jute sacks for an estimated US\$4.7 million did not materialize due to unusually protracted procurement difficulties. The M&E unit has been established and is functioning as planned, the haulage/logistics manager has been employed locally instead of internationally, the cost accountant has been hired, and five officers of PBC were trained.

23. In March 1992, COCOBOD was required under AgSAC to introduce competition into the internal marketing of cocoa beans. By January 1993 two private companies had been licensed to commence purchasing cocoa from farmers alongside PBC, and four others had been granted provisional licenses. By credit closing, 11 such Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) were operating. In 1995/96, they procured about 101,000 tons of beans, equivalent to about 25 percent of total deliveries. Enhanced private competition to PBC is constrained by LBC difficulties in accessing sufficient working capital and by lack of vehicles, equipment, tarpaulins, bags, scales and storage facilities.¹⁰

24. <u>Monitoring and Evaluation</u>. To strengthen COCOBOD's policy analysis capacity, its Policy Planning, Monitoring and Research Department (PPMRD) was reorganized as planned, and within it a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was established and a Management Information Service and data bank were set up. Three officers were trained abroad in commodity pricing and two in MIS, monitoring and evaluation. The PPMRD and its M&E Unit are considered by COCOBOD management to perform satisfactorily, but suffer from equipment and mobility constraints. The post of manager of the M&E Unit is currently vacant. Of the four major studies to be undertaken, only two were completed by the time of credit closing (see Table 7), leaving the information base for sectoral monitoring and policy formulation very weak.

25. <u>Road Program.</u> This component was not carried out as planned. When the project was prepared, COCOBOD had its own budget for maintenance and rehabilitation of roads in the main cocoa production areas and for the construction and maintenance of low-standard feeder roads to cocoa producing villages ("cocoa roads"). By the time of appraisal, GOG had instructed the Department of Feeder Roads (DFR) of the Ministry of Roads and Highways to take over full responsibility for cocoa feeder roads, and implementation of the roads component was assigned to it, using contractors under LCB/ICB procedures. Not having been involved in the design of the project, DFR subsequently raised major objections, arguing that the technical standards of the cocoa roads were inadequate and that the proposed emphasis on spot improvement and maintenance was inappropriate for the existing condition of these roads and the climatic condition in the project areas. DFR also disagreed with COCOBOD and IDA on various operational proposals, including those concerning technical assistance. When the contentious issues were finally resolved after about three years, the roads targeted for spot improvement and for maintenance had deteriorated so much that most required complete rehabilitation at substantially higher cost than appraised.

¹⁰ The ICR for the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (Report No. 16502, dated May 2, 1997) provides details.

26. By the time of credit closing, 275 km of roads and three bridges (instead of the two bridges originally planned) were completed under the IDA credit at a combined cost of US\$13.5 million. The cost of the three bridges constitutes 54 percent of the cost of the civil works funded by IDA. Under the same program 22 (out of 25 planned) steel bridges supplied by ODA were installed. The ADF financed the rehabilitation of 404 km of roads at a cost of US\$12.5 million. All contracts were awarded through ICB, with COCOBOD contributing the equivalent of US\$3.55 million as counterpart funding. COCOBOD also financed with US\$6.0 million equivalent the rehabilitation of 450 km out of the 750 km of roads targeted for using labor-based contractors. Budgetary constraints prevented work on the remaining 300 km. The contracts for the labor-based contractors were let through reserved procurement procedures which IDA did not support, but which COCOBOD considered necessary to sustain this technology. With an aggregate of 1,129 km, the roads component achieved only 38 percent of the 3,000 km planned.

27. None of the expected 60 km of new feeder roads and 80 km of new tracks were constructed. Although bids were received for contracts under this sub-component, no construction was initiated due to concerns over high unit costs and the environmental impact of some of the proposed roads.

28. At appraisal GOG had agreed that routine and recurrent maintenance would be locally financed and included in the approved annual operating programs of DFR. The extent to which this was achieved could not be judged because of the inability of DFR to distinguish those roads under routine and recurrent maintenance for the specific purpose of evacuating cocoa. In 1997, DFR is expecting sufficient funding to undertake the routine and recurrent maintenance of about 9,000 km of feeder roads, but could not specify the priority ones in the cocoa areas.

C. IMPLEMENTATION RECORD AND MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT

Implementation Record

29. Although the IDA credit became effective in November 1988, co-financing arrangements were only finalized in October 1989, resulting in a substantial reallocation of IDA resources from agricultural components to the roads component, with other cofinanciers funding more of the agricultural activities. This shift was partially reversed, following the mid-term review, with a DCA revision in 1993 which reallocated funds from the roads component to the CSSVDC program and for the procurement of essential equipment needed to support the liberalization of domestic cocoa marketing. A further reallocation was effected in 1994, when the EU agreed to finance the incentive payments under the CSSVDC program with STABEX funds, with IDA resources shifted to the funding of vehicles, equipment and civil works.

30. The project suffered implementation difficulties from the start and throughout its history. Among the problems were frequent changes in the senior staff of COCOBOD (three different Project Coordinators and three different Chief Executives during the project period). This was compounded by the generally low staff morale throughout the organization, because of the ongoing restructuring and retrenchment associated with the privatization and/or discontinuation of many of COCOBOD's traditional activities (conditioned in part by the first Structural Adjustment Credit, effective in FY87, and subsequently the AgSAC, effective FY92).

31. In the absence of clearly defined responsibilities for project management, coordination and execution, the decision making process leading to implementation was extremely cumbersome. This affected in particular the procurement of goods and services, as roles and responsibilities for procurement were not properly delineated. This, together with frequent non-adherence to Bank procurement guidelines, repeatedly slowed project implementation to a virtual stand-still. By March 1992 (mid-term review), only about US\$3.0 million were disbursed, against an appraisal estimate of US\$27.0 million. Performance improved following the installation of

new COCOBOD management in early 1994, causing IDA to agree to a one-year extension of the credit closing date to June 1995. IDA subsequently agreed to a second one-year extension to June 1996 to complete various civil works and order outstanding equipment and to provide continued support to the CSSVDC program. Nevertheless, US\$18.2 million (SDR 13.1 million equivalent), most of it allocated for civil works, equipment and materials, remained undisbursed when the credit closed in June 1996 and was eventually canceled. Although IDA had recommended canceling part of the unused credit earlier, GOG did not agree, expecting improvements in COCOBOD's procurement administration in the final project years which, however, did not materialize.

32. As indicated by COCOBOD, the ODA allocation of US\$11.9 million mostly for TA, training, vehicles, equipment and civil works was fully utilized. ADB/ADF funds amounting to US\$19.5 million were mostly used for procuring cocoa inputs (US\$12.5 million), for extension, training and consultancies (US\$4.9 million) and for the improvement of internal marketing (US\$2.5 million). A BADEA contribution of US\$4.1 million was used mainly in support of cocoa extension. GOG's and COCOBOD's contributions, a combined US\$14.9 million, fell substantially short of the US\$16.1 million and US\$20.9 million, respectively, expected at appraisal -- due largely to the significant depreciation of the Cedi over the project period, and partly to the fact that the incentive payments under the CSSVDC program were mostly financed by the EU with STABEX funds and the substantial shortfall in the road program.

33. Including the estimated counterpart contributions of US\$14.9 million from GOG and COCOBOD combined, total project cost have been re-estimated at US\$87.1 million, about 68 percent of the SAR estimate (see Tables 8A and 8B).

Major Factors Affecting the Project

34. <u>Factors not Generally Subject to Government Control.</u> Project appraisal and the first few years of implementation took place during a period of continuous and substantial decline in real world cocoa prices. International cocoa prices stood at about US\$2,000 per ton in 1986/87, but by 1992/93 they had fallen to about US\$1,120/ton, sharply reducing the profitability of cocoa production and dampening the interest of all stakeholders to invest in the industry. Although GOG attempted to stabilize its fiscal revenues from cocoa exports by sharply reducing the growers' share in the fob export price in 1992/93 and 1993/94 (see Table at para. 43), declining revenues from cocoa exports accruing to GOG and COCOBOD in turn contributed to the poor disbursement history of the project.

35. Factors Subject to Government Control. As a result of GOG's decision to abolish exchange rate controls, the Cedi depreciated steeply from ¢160 per US\$ at appraisal to nearly ¢1,600 per US\$ at credit closing, thus considerably improving incentives for producers of export commodities. However, the very high rate of domestic inflation from 1992 until the present, largely caused by lack of fiscal discipline, has considerably eroded the incentives provided by the liberalized exchange rate regime. Moreover, the export monopoly of CMC, COCOBOD's marketing subsidiary, and the substantial decline both in the farmers' share of the fob price and in real producer prices from 1991/92 through 1993/94 (attributable to the failure of the administratively determined producer price to keep pace with changes in domestic inflation and the exchange rate and to GOG's attempt to protect fiscal revenues from cocoa exports in an environment of declining world cocoa prices) combined to cause a severe erosion of producer incentives during critical years of project implementation. Since 1994/95, the Borrower has, however, taken steps to raise farmgate prices and to effect a significant improvement in the profitability of cocoa production.

36. <u>Factors Generally Subject to Implementing Agency Control.</u> The failure of COCOBOD to establish appropriate project management and implementation mechanisms substantially slowed down project implementation and in particular the procurement of goods and services. The fact that, at the time the credit was

closed and the grace period for disbursements had expired, disbursement requests amounting to over US\$7 million could not be processed by IDA due to late or improper procurement or late submission of reimbursement claims is telling evidence of this failure. COCOBOD also made very inadequate efforts to foster the privatization process, especially for input supplies. Although it adhered to the agreed program of phasing out input subsidies, the manner in which it complied with the agreement to withdraw from input marketing (i.e., handing over of all of its cocoa inputs to CCSFA, and providing continued assistance to CCSFA in input procurement) has effectively created a new monopolistic input supply system and is crowding out private importers and distributors. With CCSFA marketing its supplies far below costs, this also continues to fuel an active illicit domestic and cross-border trade in cocoa production inputs (see para. 21).

37. Subsequent to the protracted discussions on road improvement and rehabilitation specifications, DFR – as implementing agency for the road component – should have taken decisive action by preparing work programs on an annual priority basis, for tendering and approval by IDA. Failure to act in a timely fashion resulted in substantial further deterioration of the road system in the cocoa areas, much higher costs for eventual rehabilitation, and a drastic shortfall of implementation and disbursements under the roads component.

D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

38. The program of public sector withdrawal from commercial activities has not progressed to the expected stage. The opportunities created by the partial liberalization of domestic cocoa marketing and the withdrawal of COCOBOD from input marketing have not yet been fully taken up by private entrepreneurs. This is due to a combination of reasons, including the manner in which responsibility for input marketing was shifted from COCOBOD to CCSFA (see paras. 21 and 36), lack of capital, facilities, logistics and training/experience in the private sector (see para. 23), remaining regulatory constraints,¹¹ and slow growth of effective demand and poor rural transport infrastructure in most parts of the country. While GOG remains committed to its liberalization policy, further action will be needed to ensure that the progress made on the institutional front and in marketing and pricing policy is sustained. This concerns, for example, the arrangements between COCOBOD and CCSFA for financing, importing and marketing agro-chemicals and the regulatory constraints on fertilizer imports.

39. The investments in physical facilities and staff development appear sustainable. There is some uncertainty about the future of the CSSVDC program once the allocated STABEX funds have been fully drawn, but the program will be considerably smaller in future since most of the backlog has been cleared and the sanitary belt established. The proposed transfer of CRIG to the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), recommended by consultants in a recent study of Ghana's cocoa sector, would likely imply changes in the manner of its funding, and care will need to be taken to ensure continued adequate financing of this important institute and its activities. The rural roads component appears sustainable now that due priority for maintenance is accorded by DFR in its strategic maintenance plan to roads in the main cocoa production areas.

E. BANK PERFORMANCE

40. The performance of the Bank was not of uniform quality throughout the project cycle. Up to the time of appraisal, it failed to ensure sufficient political support and project ownership within the implementing agencies. Project management and implementation arrangements were not sufficiently well defined, and the technical specification for the roads component were established without taking into account the views of the technical staff of DFR, the implementing agency for this component.

¹¹ The major impediment concerns regulations on "approved fertilizers" that can be imported and marketed in Ghana; this has constrained the development of a private network of agricultural input providers. This issue has been reviewed and is now being addressed by GOG.

41. Arrangements for project supervision changed during the course of implementation and were not always fully effective. From credit effectiveness through the mid-term review (March 1992), four full supervision missions were fielded from Headquarters. Thereafter, responsibility for day-to-day supervision was assigned to the Resident Mission in Accra, while visiting HQ-based staff focused on specific project aspects, particularly the roads component and agricultural aspects. No comprehensive supervision mission from HQ took place between March 1992 and March 1995 (see Table 13), and supervision visits from other cofinanciers rarely coincided with those by IDA. This may have contributed to IDA's failure to press more forcefully for effective remedial action to redress the serious deficiencies in project management. IDA responded well to the Borrower's needs by extending the credit closing date twice by one year and reallocating funds among components to respond to changing priorities and other financiers' program preferences during the project life. Attempts to secure Borrower agreement to partial cancellation of credit funds that were evidently not going to be utilized were unsuccessful (see para. 31).

F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE

42. The main weakness of the Borrower -- specifically of COCOBOD, the main implementing agency -- was its failure, until the very end of the project, to put in place effective arrangements for project management. This was coupled with the persistent failure to establish a workable system for the procurement of goods and services and to adhere consistently to the Bank's procurement guidelines. Some improvement took place starting in 1994, but was insufficient to overcome the huge accumulated disbursement gap and prevent a sizable portion of the credit from having to be canceled at credit closing. Another major problem was the persistent failure to achieve agreement among concerned agencies on implementing agreed project components, notably the roads component and the unification of agricultural extension services. And the transfer of responsibility for input supply from COCOBOD to CCSFA must be considered more a circumvention, rather than implementation, of the agreement concerning the privatization of input marketing. The Borrower did well, however, in implementing the agreements regarding COCOBOD's restructuring and downsizing and, once the requisite support was forthcoming in the context of the AgSAC program, opening domestic cocoa marketing to the private sector.

G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME

43. The outcome of the project has to be assessed against the background of world market price developments for cocoa, changes in the macro-economic environment (including the sharp depreciation of the Cedi), as well as preceding and contemporary operations in support of economic recovery and/or specifically of the cocoa subsector in Ghana. As indicated, production (or rather sales to COCOBOD) had already reached the project "target" of 300,000 tons in 1988/89, the year the project became effective. The substantial increases in producer prices implemented each year during the period 1984/85-1987/88 as part of GOG's Economic Recovery Program (and following the devastating bush fires of 1983/84) had already revived farmer interest and induced considerable new plantings of cocoa trees, resulting in the revival of production in the late 1980s. Adjusted for domestic inflation, the increase in the producer price from Cedi 30,000/t in 1984/85 to Cedi 150,000/t in 1987/88 represented

		const.		% of
	current	1989/90	current	ICCO
	Cedi/kg	Cedi/kg	US\$/t	price /
1984/85	30.0	114	601	26.7
1985/86	56.6	177	693	33.5
1986/87	85.0	192	641	32.2
1987/88	150.0	254	796	50.1
1988/89	165.0	223	649	52.3
1989/90	174.4	174	556	43.8
1990/91	224.0	181	626	52.2
1991/92	251.2	185	616	56.0
1992/93	258.0	156	440	39.3
1993/94	308.0	151	346	24.8
1994/95	700.0	229	630	43.8
1995/96	840.0	205	542	37.4
1996/97e	1200.0	183	629	43.3

an increase of 113 percent in real terms. Thereafter, sharply falling international prices and failure to adjust producer prices adequately for domestic inflation caused a substantial decline in real producer prices (in Cedi terms), and by 1993/94 they had fallen to 68 percent of their 1988/89 level. In the face of deteriorating price incentives, cocoa production remained essentially stagnant for the six years from 1988/89 through 1994/95 at around 300,000 tons per year. World market prices began to rise again in 1993/94 and have fluctuated around US\$1,400/ton for the past two years. As the producers' share of the fob price was also increased in several steps from 25 percent 1993/94 to almost 45 percent in 1995/96, growers have again responded to the improved production incentives, and the 1995/96 crop, also favored by excellent weather, totaled 403,850 tons.¹²

44. The project's production objective was to be achieved through the rehabilitation of existing cocoa plantings, new plantings and replantings under the CSSVDC program. Reliable statistics on cocoa acreage, age of trees and yields are not available (see also para. 8, fn. 4), and estimates of incremental production due to measures taken under the project are therefore very crude. Moreover, the output response to these measures has also been significantly affected by the sharp variations in farmers' price incentives prior to and throughout the project period. Nevertheless, the incremental cocoa production attributable to the combined effect of project measures and to improved producer incentives and increased use of agro-chemicals after 1993/94 is estimated at about 100,000 tons p.a. at present and might rise to about 115,000 tons per year by the year 2002 (at full maturity of the newly planted trees). The outcome of the combined measures taken under the project and the subsequent AgSAC has, thus, been satisfactory. This is reflected by a re-estimated ERR of 24% against an appraisal estimate of 23% (see Table 9).

45. Many, but not all, of the institutional objectives have been achieved. COCOBOD has been significantly streamlined, research and extension activities have been strengthened and focused, and extension-research linkages have been strengthened. Progress towards promoting the emergence of an effective private input marketing system has not been satisfactory (see para. 21). As a result of actions taken in the context of AgSAC, the involvement of the private sector in domestic cocoa marketing, on the other hand, has progressed significantly beyond what was expected at the time of appraisal. The impact of the project on rural transport infrastructure has been far less than anticipated (see paras. 25-28), and poor road conditions in the areas left uncovered will have a negative effect on cocoa production/marketing.

46. Although aggregate cocoa production has exceeded the level identified as the central objective of the project, the poor implementation experience does not allow a satisfactory rating for this project. While measures taken and investments implemented under the project have strengthened institutional capacity, physical facilities and service performance in the subsector, the production effect was muted until significant policy reform measures to improve farmers' production incentives were implemented in the context of AgSAC.

H. FUTURE OPERATIONS

47. The Government remains committed to enhancing the incentive framework for cocoa production. Indepth assessments of remaining regulatory impediments to the growth of private input marketing (seeds, fertilizers, agro-chemicals, livestock pharmaceuticals, etc.) have been carried out, and recommendations to address these issues, developed at a recent national workshop, are now under review by MOFA and other concerned ministries. COCOBOD has been placed under the supervision of the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, and its farm extension service is about to be merged with that of MOFA (see para. 14). GOG is endeavoring to decrease the share of PBC in domestic cocoa marketing to 50 percent by the year 2000 and to increase the farmers' share in the fob price to at least 60 percent within two or three years (which would bring the growers' share closer to the levels of 80 percent and more currently obtained by growers in Nigeria, Cameroon, Indonesia and Malaysia).

¹² Preliminary estimates are for a 1996/97 crop of about 335,000 tons.

48. COCOBOD intends to apply a stringent staff policy with the main aim to further reduce operational costs. The need to improve CRIG's capacity to translate research findings into readily acceptable extension messages has been recognized and is being followed up. A feeder road maintenance management system has been established under the ongoing National Feeder Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project (Cr. 2319-GH), aimed at ensuring the adequate and timely funding of maintenance of the roads rehabilitated under the project

49. Key indicators by which the project can be monitored and evaluated in the future are: (i) area under cultivation, area planted with genetically superior hybrids, and yields; (ii) incidence of disease; (iii) quantities of cocoa exported; (iv) producer's share in the fob export price; (v) share of LBCs in internal cocoa marketing; (vi) number of private retailers of cocoa inputs; (vii) COCOBOD's staffing and operating cost; and (viii) revenues generated for GOG and COCOBOD. The impact of the planned merger of CSD extension services with those of MOFA needs to be carefully monitored.

50. The M&E system now in place is considered adequate for the purposes of the project but would benefit from a closer interaction between the M&E unit at PPMRD and the smaller but technically more specific units in PBC and CSD. Within the framework of GOG's Economic Recovery Program and the Medium-Term Agricultural Development Strategy, the project was only one of many, and its impact cannot be measured in isolation. A possible OED evaluation would therefore have to be broad-based and could possibly take place in about five years, i.e., when most of the other IDA credits extended in support of agricultural and private sector development will have closed.

I. LESSONS LEARNED

51. <u>Project Objectives</u>. For the multiplicity of policy and institutional changes envisaged, the project had insufficient leverage and support at the political and executive levels. For an agency with an annual turnover on the order of US\$300-400 million, efficient and speedy implementation of a project which was viewed by many of the agency's staff as threatening their jobs and which entailed a comparatively small amount of financial assistance was not high on the list of priorities. It was only with the advent of AgSAC, which had the required support at highest level within Government, that the situation started to improve – four years after project effectiveness. At appraisal and during negotiation more emphasis should have been given to participation and consensus building – key to local commitment and project ownership.

52. The substantial devaluation of the Cedi during the project period, the gradual recovery of cocoa prices on the world market and the increase in the farmers' share of the fob price triggered a significant production response in the last two years of the project. This demonstrates that extraneous factors can be crucial for the success or failure of a project. In this particular case, it also highlights the need for greater care in the use and interpretation of commodity price projections (see para. 4).

53. <u>Project Financing</u>. The lack of clear financing arrangements at the time the credit became effective seriously affected project start-up (see para. 29). Especially for projects which involve a multiplicity of donors, the financing plan has to be firmed up prior to effectiveness and a mechanism put in place to coordinate the activities of the various donors.

54. <u>Project Management.</u> The absence of clear lines of authority and responsibility and of an effective mechanism to coordinate project activities was a major hindrance to timely and adequate project implementation, and particularly to efficient procurement of goods and services. From the beginning, firm organizational arrangements have to be in place. In this case, the situation called for a Project Coordinator with adequate authority and a Project Coordinating Committee comprising the Chief Executive of COCOBOD and the heads of


the various Divisions/Departments and subsidiaries responsible for the respective project components, their financing as well as procurement. While successive supervision missions may have recognized and identified this lacuna as a major obstacle to effective implementation, corrective action was not taken.

55. <u>Supervision</u>. Complex multi-component projects cannot be effectively supervised by a lone staff member at the Resident Mission, but require periodic multi-disciplinary supervision missions. And supervision of operations supported by multiple cofinanciers would be more effective if carried out jointly by teams from the cofinancing agencies.

PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 1: Summary of Assessments

A.	Achievement of objectives	Substantial	Partial	Negligible	Not Applicable
	Macro policies				
	Sector policies		\checkmark		
	Financial objectives		\checkmark		
	Institutional development		\checkmark		
	Physical objectives		\checkmark		
	Poverty reduction		\checkmark		
	Gender issues				\checkmark
	Other social objectives				\checkmark
	Environmental objectives				\checkmark
	Public sector management		\checkmark		
	Private sector development		\checkmark		
	Other (specify)				
1	B. Project sustainability	Likely (@)	Unlikely (B)	<u>Uncertain</u> (⊕) ✓	
	C. Bank performance	Highly satisfactory	Satisfactory	Deficient	
	Identification				
	Preparation assistance		\checkmark		
	Appraisal			\checkmark	
	Supervision		\checkmark		



N.B. Project implementation suffered from numerous deficiencies and some key physical objectives were only partially achieved. Hence, the overall outcome is considered unsatisfactory. However, as indicated in the text, the macro-economic and sectoral policy framework has, during the project period, substantially improved. In particular, supporting institutional and policy measures taken in the context of the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (Cr. 2345-GH) have considerably strengthened the incentive framework for cocoa producers and the instituional arrangements in the cocoa sub-sector, strongly underpinned the program objectives of the CRP. It is therefore, almost impossible to assess the outcome of the project, if production growth is taken as the overall objective, in isolation.

Loan/credit title	Purpose	Year of approval	Status
Preceding operations			
1. 1777-GH	Structural Adjustment I	1987	Completed
2. 1801-GH	Agricultural Services Rehabilitation	1987	Completed
3. 1976-GH Forest Resource Management		1989	Ongoing
4. 1996-GH	Private SME Development	1989	Completed
5. 2005-GH	Structural Adjustment II	1989	Completed
6. 2040-GH Rural Finance		1989	Completed
7. 2180-GH Agricultural Diversification		1991	Ongoing
8. 2236-GH	Private Investment Promotion	1991	Completed
9. 2247-GH	National Agricultural Research	1991	Ongoing
10. 2319-GH	National Feeder Roads	1991	Ongoing
Following operations			
1. 2345-GH	Agricultural Sector Adjustment	1992	Completed
2. 2346-GH	National Agricultural Extension	1992	Ongoing
3. 2426-GH	Environmental Resource Management	1993	Ongoing
4. 2441-GH	National Livestock Services	1993	Ongoing
5. 2502-GH	Enterprise Development	1993	Ongoing
6. 2555-GH	Agricultural Sector Investment	1994	Ongoing
7. 2665-GH	Private Sector Development	1995	Ongoing
8. 2713-GH	Fisheries Subsector Capacity Building	1995	Ongoing
9. 2718-GH	Private Sector Adjustment	1995	Ongoing

Table 2: Related Bank Loans/IDA Credits

Steps in project cycle	Date planned	Date actual/ latest estimate
Identification (Executive Project Summary)	-	December 1985
Preparation		May 1986
Appraisal	-	April/May 1987
Negotiations	October 1987	October 1987
Letter of development policy (if applicable)		
Board presentation	November 1987	December 1, 1987
Signing	December 1987	February 18, 1988
Effectiveness	March 1988	November 15, 1988
Midterm review (if applicable)	November 1990	March 1992
Project completion	June 30, 1993	June 30, 1996
Loan closing	June 30, 1994	June 30, 1996

 Table 4: Loan/Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US\$ thousands)

	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95 ¹	FY96	FY97 ²
Appraisal estimate	9.9	15.0	21.9	29.8	37.1	40.0	40.0	40.0	44.9
Actual	0.7	2.7	3.1	5.0	6.5	16.1	21.7	24.7	25.8
Actual as % estimate	7	18	14	17	18	40	54	62	57
Date of final disbursement		September 25, 1996							

^{1/} The credit closing date was extended twice by one year from June 30, 1994, to June 30, 1996.

 $^{2\prime}$ For reasons of comparison the US\$ equivalent of the Credit were kept constant throughout the implementation period. At Credit closing, however, the actual US\$ equivalent for the originally allocated SDR 31.3 million was used to match the indicated undisbursed balance. The change in value is due to the depreciation of the US\$ against the SDR.

Key implementation indicators in SAR/President's Report	Estimated	Actual	
I. Physical	a constant		
1. Target cocoa production	300,000 t/year	403,850 t/year 1/	
2. Cutting out (CSSVDC)	17,930 ha	13,050 ha	
3. Replanting (CSSVDC)	17,300 ha	3,810 ha	
4. Planting	40,000 ha	35,059 ha	
5. Road Program	3,000 km	780 km	
a) Spot Improvement	750 km	450 km	
b) Routine maintenance up to PY 5 (peak)	2,100 km	? 2/	
c) New Roads	60 km	-	
d) New Tracks	80 km	-	
e) Bridges	2 units	3 units	
5. Renovation of Bunso Cocoa College	1 unit	1 unit	
6. Renovation of FTCs	17 units	6 units	
7. Staff housing	150 units	-	
8. Seed garden expansion	80 ha	24 ha	
9. Pilot irrigated seed garden	1 unit	-	
II. Organizational			
1. Reduce CSD district offices from 191 units to	39	39	
2. Reorganize CSD extension services	-	1,465 extension units established	
3. Reduce PBC buying stations from 3218 to	1,730	1,730	
4. Establish M&E units in PPMRD, CSD and PBC	3 units	3 units	

Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation

¹⁷ In 1995/96.
 ²⁷ Cannot be singled out from overall national program.

Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation

Not applicable

Study	Purpose as defined at appraisal/redefined	Status	Impact of study
1. Cocoa Survey	To update information on tree stock	Ongoing	
2. Socio-economic aspects of cocoa farming	To ascertain farm level dynamics and assess response to support measures	Ongoing	
3. Streamlining of COCOBOD	To define appropriate organizational structure, management system manpower requirements and office facilities	Completed	Internal reorganizations and reduction of staff
4. Cocoa pricing	To develop incentive oriented producer pricing system	Completed	Development of new pricing methodology and upward adjustment of producer's share in f.o.b. price

Table 8A: Project Costs

	Appra	isal estimate (US\$M) ^{1/}	Actual/latest estimate (US\$M)			
Item	Local costs	Foreign costs	Total	Local costs	Foreign costs	Total ¹	
1. Research	2.0	4.5	6.5	1.1		6.7	
2. Extension & Training	5.2	5.7	10.9			13.4	
3. Seed Production	0.9	0.4	1.3			0.3	
4. Input Supply	3.4	21.6	25.0			15.2	
5. Internal Marketing	7.6	13.1	20.7			12.2	
6. CSSVD Control	10.6	0.6	11.2			4.3	
7. Head Office & Management	2.5	2.0	4.5			0.1	
8. Road Program	19.0	28.9	47.9			34.9	
TOTAL	51.2	76.8	128.0			87.1	

¹ Data provided tby the Borrower were insufficiently detailed to allow a breakdown into local and foreign cost.

	Apprai	sal estimate (I	US\$M)	Actual/latest estimate (US\$M)			
Source	Local costs	Foreign costs	Total	Local costs	Foreign costs	Total ¹	
IDA	14.2	25.8	40.0		-	25.8	
ADB/ADF	-	33.0	33.0			28.4	
ODA	-	12.9	12.9			11.9	
BADEA		5.1	5.1			4.1	
EU	-	-	-			2.1 ²	
Government	16.1		16.1			14.9 ³	
COCOBOD	20.9	-	20.9				
TOTAL	51.2	76.8	128.0				

Table 8B: Project Financing

 ¹ Data provided by the Borrower were insufficiently detailed to allow a breakdown into local and foreign cost.
 ² At appraisal no participation by the EU was foreseen. The figure reflects only the first tranche on an EU contribution of ECU 1.7 million towards the control of the CSSVD. The second tranche of ECU 1.7 million which has already been approved but was not released during the project period.

³ No separate accounts were kept for GOG and COCOBOD cofinancing, and it is not entirely clear whether all taxes and duties have been accounted for.

Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits

		<u>1988/89</u>	<u>1989/90</u>	<u>1990/91</u>	<u>1991/92</u>	<u>1992/93</u>	<u>1993/94</u>	<u>1994/95</u>	<u>1995/96</u>	<u>1996/97</u>	<u>PY 10</u>	<u>PY 15</u>	<u>PY 25</u>
Project Costs	mill. ¢	2,519	5,892	6,439	26,598	19,787	32,867	15,347	12,339	6,700	6,700	6,700	6,70
Total area under cocoa	ha								1,100,000	1,100,000	1,100,000	1,100,000	1,100,00
Area under trad. management	ha	1,091,739	1,072,408	1,056,109	1,042,851	1,026,387	1,013,319	912,882	811,137	809,137	807,137	797,137	777,13
Area rehabilitated, cumulative	ha	-	10,000	20,000	30,000	40,000	50,000	150,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,00
Area replanted, annual	ha	8,261	9,331	6,299	3,258	6,464	3,068	437	1,745	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,00
Area replanted, cumulative	ha	8,261	17,592	23,891	27,149	33,613	36,681	37,118	38,863	40,863	42,863	52,863	72,86
Incremental Costs Traditional Mgmt.	mill. ¢	-	4,022	7,921	11,732	11,547	11,400	23,963	30,418	30,343	30,268	29,893	29,14
Incremental Costs Rehabilitation	mill. ¢	-	3,439	6,878	10,317	13,756	17,195	51,585	85,975	85,975	85,975	85,975	85,97
Incremental Costs Replanting	mill. ¢	12,247	15,567	13,031	9,950	16,548	14,340	12,158	14,844	16,526	17,504	20,997	28,48
Total Costs	mill. ¢	14,765	28,919	34,268	58,597	61,638	75,802	103,054	143,576	139,544	140,447	143,564	150,303
Average Yield, traditional area	kg/ha	250	255	260	265	265	265	285	300	300	300	300	300
Average Yield, rehabilitated area	kg/ha	-	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450
Incremental Yield, replanted area	kg/ha	-	-	-	-	150	220	312	402	435	495	598	608
Incremental Output Traditional	1000 t	-	5.4	10.6	15.6	15.4	15.2	32.0	40.6	40.5	40.4	39.9	38.9
Incremental Output Rehabilitation		-	2.0	4.0	6.0	8.0	10.0	30.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0
Incremental Output Replanting		-	-	-	-	1.2	3.9	7.5	10.9	14.6	18.1	26.8	39.4
Total Incremental Output	1000 t	-	7.4	14.6	21.6	24.6	29.1	69.4	101.5	105.1	108.5	116.7	128.3
Incremental Benefits - Trad.	mill. ¢	-	9,384	18,482	27,375	26,943	26,600	55,914	70,974	70,799	70,624	69,749	67,999
Incremental Benefits - Rehab.	mill. ¢	-	3,500	7,000	10,500	14,000	17,500	52,500	87,500	87,500	87,500	87,500	87,500
Incremental Benefits - Replant.	mill. ¢	-	-	-	-	2,169	6,786	13,058	19,100	25,615	31,746	46,937	69,494
Total Benefits	mill. ¢	-	12,884	25,482	37,875	43,111	50,886	121,472	177,575	183,914	189,871	204,186	224,994
Net Stream	mill. ¢	(14,765)	(16,036)	(8,786)	(20,723)	(18,526)	(24,916)	18,418	33,999	44,370	49,424	60,622	74,691
Economic Rate of R	eturn (EF	RR)	24.3%										

Underlying assumptions for ERR calculation:

Project life 25 years.

All costs and benefits are in constant end-1996 prices.

Project cost were adjusted to 1996 constant prices by using the GDP deflator.

A farmgate export parity price for cocoa of \$ 1,750/kg (US\$1,096.5/ton equivalent in actual end-1996 Cedis) was used.

A SCF of 0.8 was used; duties were netted out.

In the absence of an operational plan, 5% of total project costs are used as basis for project operating costs after the completion of the investment phase.

The total area under coccoa is assumed to have remained unchanged at 1.1 million ha throughout.

 It is estimated that by 1996 about 250,000 ha had been put under improved farm management (rehabilitation). This acreage is assumed to have increased gradually during the initial project years, but very rapidl; y in 1994/95 and 1995/96 in response to substantially improved producer prices and availability of farm inputs.

No detailed analysis on production responses is available. For the purpose of the economic analysis, average yields on rehabilitated areas are estimated at 450 kg/ha, yields on replanted areas are estimated to rise from 150 kg/ha in year 5 after planting to 300 kg/ha in year 6, 450 kg/ha in year 7, 525 kg/ha in year 8, 600 kg/ha in year 9, and 650 kg/ha in year 10 and thereafter. The average yield on traditionally managed areas is estimated at 250 kg/ha in year 1 of the project, and to increase gradually, as shown here, due to improving price incentives and farm management, to 300 kg/ha in year 8 and thereafter.

Replanting is estimated to continue at a rate of 2,000 ha per year, as old trees are being replaced.

Based on these assumptions, the ERR (including all project costs) has been reestimated at 24.3%, against an appraisal estimate of 23%. As indicated in the text, it is not
possible to net out the impact of the project from all other measures which have created a more favourable incentive framework for cocoa production in the past few years.

Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants

Agree- ment	Section	Covenant type	Present status	Original fulfillment date	Revised fulfillment date	Description of covenant	Comments
CA	2.02 (b)	1	С	1		Borrower to open special account A (for parts A-J of project)	
CA	2.02 (b)	1	С			Borrower to open special account B (for part K-roads of the project)	
CA	3.02 (a)	1	с			Borrower to open a commercial bank account in the name of DFR Cocoa account for part K of the project	
CA	3.07	5	CP	12/89		Borrower to cause Cocobod to eliminate farm input subsidy	Subsidy eliminated in June 1990. However, indirect subsidies continue
CA	3.07	5	c	11.15.89 11.15.90 5.31.90 11.15.91 11.15.92		Cocobod to: a) introduce private retailing of inputs in Eastern Region b) introduce private retailing of inputs in Central and volta Regions c) announce permission to private sector to engage in input retailing, d) introduce private retailing in Ashanti and Brong Ahafo Regions e) introduce privatize bulk delivery and retailing in Western Region	Private retailing covering the entire country introduced in August 1990, but mostly carried out by CCSFA.
CA	3.08 (i)	5	NC			Borrower not to change Chief Executive and Deputy Chief Executive without prior approval of IDA	Changes took place without prior approval
CA	3.08 (ii)	5	NC			Borrower not to change Director General of DFR without prior approval of IDA	Was changed without prior approval
CA	4.01 (b) (iii)	1		June 30 annually		Borrower to submit audit reports, including audits of statements of expenditures, by June 30 following end of previous fiscal year	
CA	7.01 (a)	3	с			Signing of Subsidiary Loan agreement between borrower and Cocobod, as conditions of effectiveness	an markin ar
CA	7.01 (b)	3	С		Đ	Fulfillment of conditions of ADF loan agreement, BADEA loan agreement, and UK grant agreement, as conditions of effectiveness	10 / J. Ac
CA	7.01 (c)	4	С			Deposit by the borrower of DFR Cocoa account in an initial amount of US\$ 1 million in cedis equivalent, as conditions of effectiveness	
CA	7.01 (d)	5	С		5	Submission by borrower to IDA of Cocoa producer price arrangements satisfactory to IDA, as conditions of effectiveness	
CA	7.01 (e)	1	С			Submission by borrower to IDA of its audit report for 1985 and 1986, as conditions of effectiveness	i.
CA	7.01 (f)	5	C			Appointment by Cocobod of personnel for following positions, as condition of effectiveness a) Executive director of CRIG b) Deputy chief executive for Finance and Administration c) Deputy executive director (operations) of CSD d) Technical manager for extension e) Haulage manager of PBC f) Head of M&E unit at headquarters	

Agree- ment	Section	Covenant type	Present status	Original fulfillment date	Revised fulfillment date	Description of covenant	Comments
Sch 2, PA	1	5	С	July 1, annually		Cocobod to submit to IDA by July 1 of each year its budget and annual work program	
Sch 2, PA	2	9	С	August 9, annually		Cocobod and IDA to exchange views on (a) Cocobod's corporate plan; (b) farm input privatization program; (c) Cocobod's internal marketing policy and strategy; and (d) program of CSSVD control	
Sch 2, PA	3	9	CD	November 1, 1990		Cocobod and IDA to conduct mid-term review of project implementation.	Delayed due to delay in overall project. Completed in March 1991
Sch 2, PA	5	5	С	January 1, 1990		CSD to reduce to thirty-nine the number of districts which it operates	
Sch 2, PA	6 (a)	5	CD	June 30, 1988		CSD to discontinue its involvement in sale and distribution of farm inputs	August 1990
Sch 2, PA	6 (b)	5	NC	January 1, 1989		CSD to undertake pilot extension programs.	Unification of extension planned for 1997
Sch 2, PA	7 (a)	5	С			CSD to make hybrid seed available only to farmers who agree to apply improved agroeconomist practices and to prepare seedling in polybags	
Sch 2, PA	7 (b)	2	NC			CSD to sell seeds and seedlings at prices not less than the prevailing market prices for equivalent dry weight of beans	Price still highly subsidezed
Sch 2, PA	9	5	с	April 1, 1988		CRIG to establish Management Committee	
Sch 2, PA	10	5	С	June 30, 1988		CRIG to establish a research policy subcommittee of the management committee	
Sch 2, PA	11	5	CD	March 31, 1988; June 30, 1991; thereafter every 5 years		CRIG to undertake periodic external assessments of its research program, and provide such information to Cocobod.	Second assessment only in July 1992
Sch 2, PA	12	9	С			M&E unit to be established in the PPMRD	
Sch 2, PA	17	5	с	January 1, 1990		 PBC to: a) review role and function of its buying centers; b) close down all buying centers with annual purchases of less than 25 tons (656); c) convert all buying centers with annual purchases of 25-50 tons into sub-societies (830) 	

Covenant Class

1 - Accounts/audit

2 - Financial performance/generate revenue from beneficiaries

3 - Flow and utilization of Project funds

- A Counterpart funding
 5 Management aspects of the Project or of its executing agency
 6 Environmental covenants
- 7 Involuntary resettlement
- 8 Indigenous people
- 9 Monitoring, review and reporting
- 10 Implementation
- 11 Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource allocation
- 12 Sectoral or corss-sectoral regulatory/institutional action
- 13 Other

Status

С	- Complied with
CD	- Compliance after Delay
NC	- Not Complied with

SOON

- Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time - Complied with Partially - Not Yet Due CP

NYD

Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements

The most significant lack of compliance occurred in respect of adherence to procurement procedures.

Stage of project cycle	Act	ual
	Weeks	US\$
Preparation to appraisal	202.7	213.6
Appraisal	27.5	67.7
Negotiations through Board approval	2.9	7.3
Supervision	154.0	419.7
Completion	13.5	45.0
TOTAL	400.6	753.3

Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs

					Performance rating		
Stage of project cycle	Month/ year	Number of persons	Days in field	Specialized staff skills represented	Implemen- tation status	Develop- ment objectives	Types of problems
Through appraisal					1		
1. Pre-preparation (FAO)	5/86	6	21	A, FA, ISS, RS ¹ , T		-	•
2. Preparation (FAO)	/86	3	19	A, FA, ISS		-	
3. Pre-appraisal	2/87	7	20	A, E, ExS, FA, RE, TE	-	•	-
4. Appraisal	5/87	4	21	E, FA, RE, TE	-		-
Appraisal through Board approval	8/87	1	22	Е			-
Board approval through effectiveness	•	-	-	-	-	•	-
Supervision							
1.	3/89	3	3	AgE, E, RS ^{1/}	-		-
2.	8/89	4	13	A, AgE, E, TE	3	3	Training, Studies
3.	4/90	4	15	AgE, E, HE, TE	2	2	Management
4. PS - R ^{2/}	11/90	3	17	A, HE, TE	2	2	Management
5. PS - R ^{2/}	2/91	3	18	AgE, HE, TE	2	2	-
6. Mid-term review	3/92	4	25	A, AgE, E, T	3	3	Procurement, Studies
7. PS - R ^{2/}	6/93	1	19	TE			Procurement
8. PS - R ^{2/}	3/94	1	20	TE			Procurement
9. PS - CSSVD ^{3/}	9/94	1	10	Т	-	-	Procurement
10.	3/95	3	8	A, AgE, T	S	S	Management & Covenant Compliance
11.	3/96	2	9	Α, Τ	S	S	Procurement & Covenance Compliance
Completion	2/97	3	15	AgE, RE, T			-

A = Agronomist/Agriculturalist; AgE = Agricultural Economist; E = Economist; ExS = Extension Specialist; FA = Financial Analyst;
 HE = Highway Engineer; ISS = Input Supply Specialist; PO = Project Officer; RE = Rural Engineer; RS = Research Specialist;
 T = Tree Crops Specialist; TE = Transport Engineer.
 ¹⁷ Research Specialist ODA
 ²⁷ Supervision of roads component in conjunction with supervision of National Feeder Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project (Cr. 2319 GH).
 ³⁷ Supervision of CSSVD control program.

REPUBLIC OF GHANA

COCOA REHABILITATION PROJECT (CRP) (Cr - 1854 GH)

Project Implementation Completion (ICR) Mission

Aide - Memoire

A. INTRODUCTION

1. This is the aide-memoire of a joint FAO/CP, World Bank mission¹ which visited the country from 7 to 21 February 1997 to prepare the ICR for the above captioned project. The findings of the mission are based on the review of documents available at the World Bank offices in Washington and Accra, information provided by the Borrower, field visits and discussions with farmers and representatives of the private sector.

B. THE PROJECT

Background

2. The project was the third IDA-financed cocoa project in the country. Based on a cocoa sector study carried out by the Bank in 1980 the project was first identified in 1981 and was followed by a prefeasibility study in the same year. Further preparatory work was suspended due mainly to an unfavorable economic environment and unresolved policy issues. The project was reidentified by the Bank in 1985, prepared in 1986 and appraised in 1987.

3. With the effectiveness on June 3, 1992, of the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (AgSAC) in the amount of SDR 57 million (US\$80 million equivalent at the time of appraisal) most of the institutional and policy objectives of the CRP were underpinned or even superseded. All three tranches were released and the credit was fully disbursed on January 23, 1996.

Project Objectives and Components

4. The main objectives of the project were to: (a) support the policy reforms in the cocoa sector agreed under the first Structural Adjustment Credit; and (b) increase cocoa production and yield to stabilize output at an annual level of about 300,000 t mainly through the rehabilitation of 300,000 ha of existing cocoa and the replanting of about 57,000 ha.

To translate these objectives into a program of concrete actions the project was to finance the following nine main components:

(i) Technical Services for Cocoa Production, (ii) Extension Services for Improved Technology, (iii) Seed Production and Distribution, (iv) Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus

¹ H. Trupke (Mission Leader - FAO/CP), C. Carlier (Tree Crop Specialist, WB Consultant) and L. Campbell (Bio-Resources Engineer, WB Consultant).

Disease Control (CSSVDC), (v) Research, (vi) Farm Input Supply, (vii) Internal Marketing, (viii) Monitoring and Evaluation, and (ix) Road Program.

5. The project objectives were clear, realistic and most relevant to the country and the sector. The project was rather demanding for the borrower as it attempted to tackle a wide range of institutional reforms, and numerous of policy issues simultaneously together with the implementation of geographically widely dispersed physical action programs.

6. The five year project for which Credit 1854-GH in the amount of SDR 31.3 million (US\$40.0 million equivalent at appraisal) was approved on 12/1/87 and made effective on 11/15/88. Total project cost were estimated at US\$128.0 million with co-financing provided by ADB/ADF (US\$33.0 million), other co-financiers (US\$18 million) as well as counterpart contributions of US\$16.1 million and US\$20.9 million by GOG and COCOBOD respectively.

Implementation Experience and Results

7. The ultimate objective namely, to increase cocoa production and yield to stabilize output at an annual level of about 300,000 tons was reached and exceeded already in 1992/3 with over 312,000 tons, at a time when IDA disbursements amounted to less than 16% of the credit amount. This can partly be attributed to the major publicity drive by COCOBOD rekindling farmers' interest as well as enhanced contacts of CSD and CRIG with farms. The major production thrust, however, can be attributed to the improvement of the macro-economic policy framework which resulted in substantial increases in farm gate prices, due mainly to the devaluation of the Cedi. In addition, supported by AgSAC, the rationalization of COCOBOD led to an increased farmers' share in the f.o.b price further improving the incentive framework for cocoa production.

8. It remains therefore not clear which proportion of the ever since increasing production (over 400,000 tons in 1995/96) can solely be attributed to the project. Nevertheless with renewed farmer interest, about 330,000 ha were rehabilitated (SAR: 300,000 ha), and replanting (including 3,810 ha under the CSSVDC program) has reached 38,867 ha against an appraisal estimate of 57,000 ha.

9. In contrast the performance in implementing the various components has been mixed: The components aiming at <u>improving the technical services</u> for cocoa production and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the cocoa <u>extension services</u> were implemented broadly following the SAR outline. Only the pilot program for the unification of cocoa extension services with those of MOFA was not attempted. Seed production and distribution was improved. Pod production was scaled down against appraisal estimates to more realistic demand figures of about 2.2 to 2.5 million pods. The pilot irrigated seed pod garden to determine the feasibility of increased pod production throughout the year was never started because of disagreement with IDA on the justification of the proposed investment and the value of the results. Seed pod distribution was substantially improved but pods are still sold at a highly subsidized price.

10. The <u>CSSVD program</u> covered an extremely important aspect of the industry. Under the component a total of 17,930 ha of diseased cocoa trees were to be cut out and 17,330 ha be replanted. Affected farmers were to receive a cutting out and replanting grant equivalent to 4 years loss of production in three tranches. There was considerable confusion in the earlier years of the project over the financing of that component. COCOBOD, however, maintained the program and has cut out about 5,000 ha during the period 1988/89 to 1993/94.

11. From July 1994 onwards a "Cordon Sanitaire" program, separating the areas of mass CSSVD infection in the Eastern Region from the scattered outbreak areas, was initiated. Realizing the urgent need to accelerate the CSSVDC program in this belt the European Union (E.U.) agreed to provide STABEX funds (ECU 1.7 million) for incentive payments and IDA provided some vehicles and equipment. During the remaining two years up to project closing another 8,056 ha were cut out, bringing the total to 13,050 ha or about 73% of the SAR estimate. At the same time 3,810 ha have been replanted under the program.

12. The main thrust of the <u>research component</u> was to strengthen the capacity of CRIG to deliver the necessary scientific and technical support to the cocoa industry. Whereas training, technical assistance, consultancies, vehicles and equipment were mostly ODA financed, some infrastructure rehabilitation was provided by IDA and the rest directly financed by COCOBOD. The quality of research has considerably improved, it is now demand driven, problem oriented and multidisciplinary. As planned, a farming systems unit was established which added the required farming systems perspective including economic issues to the research program. Most of the physical works have been successfully completed.

13. The technical assistance program was particularly successful and CRIG now has a well trained (inhouse and overseas) and highly motivated complement of senior professional and technical and administrative staff. Research/extension linkages have been strongly established and are mainly operating through the Cocoa Research and Extension Technical Committee as well as joint CRIG/CSD field programs.

14. Under the farm input supply component COCOBOD has, as planned, initiated the subsidy removal process in 1988/89, but no action was taken to privatize the marketing channel. Under the pressing demand of AgSAC, however, COCOBOD rather abruptly sold in July 1990 all its input stocks to the Coffee, Cocoa and Sheanut Farmers Association (CCSFA) and made them effectively the sole distributor for cocoa inputs. CSD continued to import and distribute inputs on behalf of the CCSFA until June 1995. From July 1995 onwards CCSFA became solely responsible for the entire procurement and distribution process and CSD now only assists with requirement forecasting and the leasing of some stores. CCSFA continues to subsidize inputs at levels estimated to range between 40 and 85%, thus not only depleting the compensation funds, which was originally designed for price stabilization, but also preventing the emergence of a competitive private input marketing system.

15. In order to enhance the efficiency of <u>internal cocoa marketing</u>, and following the appraisal recommendation, 656 buying centers (societies) were closed, and 830 converted into sub-societies. An M&E Unit was established in the PBC. Under the IDA Credit 40 tractors for produce haulage were bought as well as tarpaulins. The procurement of jute sacks for an estimated US\$4.7 million did not materialize due to protracted procurement difficulties.

16. In March 1992, COCOBOD was required under AgSAC to introduce competition into the internal marketing. By credit closing a total of 11 Licensed Buying Companies (LBC's) were operating, procuring about 101,000 tons equivalent to about 25% of total deliveries. Enhanced private competition to PBC is constrained by difficulties in accessing working capital, lack of vehicles, equipment, tarpaulins, bags, scales and storage facilities.

17. To strengthen COCOBOD's overall policy analysis capacity, its Policy Planning, Monitoring and Research Department (PPMRD) had been reorganized as planned and within it a <u>Monitoring and</u> <u>Evaluation Unit</u> established and a Management Information Service and Data Bank set up. The training program was partially executed and about 50% of the study program completed. The PPMRD and its M&E Unit are considered by COCOBOD management to perform satisfactory but are still suffering from equipment and mobility constraints. The post of manager of the M&E Unit is presently vacant and a new incumbent would require training.

18. The implementation of the roads program was assigned to the Department of Feeder Roads (DFR) of the Ministry of Roads and Highways using contractors under LCB/ICB procedures. This component was not carried out as planned. The DFR was not involved in the design of the project and subsequently raised objections to the concept of carrying out only spot improvement on the selected roads which were found to be in a very poor state. The DFR claimed that the design were not suitable for the existing condition of the roads and the climatic condition of the project areas. In addition to the objections raised on the technical proposals, the DFR did not agree with the Bank and COCOBOD on the operational proposals including technical assistance. By the time the contentious issues were finally resolved after about three vears the target roads for spot improvement and for maintenance had so deteriorated that most required complete rehabilitation at substantially higher cost than appraised. To worsen the situation, the original amount allocated to the road component was reduced from US\$41.6 million to US\$35.61 million at the project implementation stage. At credit closing, 275 km of roads and 3 bridges instead of the two bridges originally planned were completed under the IDA credit at a cost of US\$13.5 million. At the same time, the ADF financed the rehabilitation of 404 km of roads at a cost of US\$12.5 million. All the contracts were awarded through, ICB, to which COCOBOD contributed the equivalent of US\$3.55 million as counterpart funds. In addition, COCOBOD financed the rehabilitation of 450 km out of 750 km of roads targeted using labor-based contractors at US\$6.0 million. Budgetary constraints prevented work on the remaining 300 km. The contracts for the labor based contractors were let through reserved procurement procedures which IDA did not support. This was however, necessary to sustain the new technology. The total rehabilitation program funded by both IDA and ADF thus achieved only 679 km and 3 bridges. The road component completed which adds up to 1,129 km represents only 38% of 3,000 km originally planned.

19. None of the expected 60 km of new feeder roads and 80 km of new tracks had been constructed by the DFR. Even though bids were received for contracts covering this sub-component, they were aborted on the advice of the bank due to (a) lack of funds and (b) the banks requirement for environmental impact assessment which was not possible at the time. However, the number of bridges on major rivers was revised from 2 to 3 and they were satisfactorily completed. The cost of the 3 bridges constitutes 54% of the cost of the civil works funded by IDA. Under the same program, 22 steel bridges supplied by ODA were installed.

Major Factors Affecting the Project

20. Although the project had been made effective in November 1988 co-financing arrangements were only finalized in October 1989, resulting in a start-up delay of most components. The project suffered implementation difficulties from the start. Among the problems were frequent changes in the senior staff of COCOBOD and a generally low staff moral throughout the organization, because of the ongoing restructuring and retrenchment program involving privatization of many of COCOBOD's traditional activities.

21. Furthermore in the absence of clearly defined project management, coordination and execution responsibilities, the decision making process leading to implementation was extremely cumbersome. This affected in particular the procurement of goods and services as roles and responsibilities for procurement were not properly delineated, which together with frequent non-adherence to Bank procurement guidelines slowed down the implementation process to a virtual stand still. Performance only improved starting in early 1994 with the coming in of new management, leading the Bank to agree to two successive extensions

of the Loan closing date. In spite of these two extensions a balance of US\$19.7 million (SDR 13.7 million equivalent) remained undisbursed at loan closing on June 30, 1996.

22. The performance of both, the Bank and the Borrower was weak throughout much of the project cycle. Through to appraisal the Bank failed to ensure political backing and project ownership of the implementing agencies. Project management and implementation arrangements were not sufficiently well defined and the technical specification for the roads component were established, disregarding the Borrower's indicated requirements. Project supervision was erratic and mostly only partial and earlier Bank missions failed to spot and rectify the serious project management deficiencies. The Bank, however, responded well to the Borrower's financial needs by extending the loan closing date twice by one year.

23. The main weakness of the Borrower was its failure to establish a workable system for the procurement of goods and services. On the other hand the Borrower did well in implementing the numerous conditionalities regarding COCOBOD's restructuring and the opening up of input supply and internal cocoa marketing to the private sector.

Assessment of Outcome

24. The outcomes of the various project components were mixed. Only about 38% of the roads component, which in financial terms represented the main thrust of the project, were completed and the program suffered from very substantial cost overruns. Procurement for goods and services was protracted resulting in a considerable implementation delay and a final disbursement shortfall of 42% in SDR terms reflecting mainly the lower that anticipated provision of equipment and materials to CSD and PBC as well as an under-performance in COCOBOD's civil works program.

25. The main achievements, which can be directly attributed to the project are the enhancing of CRIG's research capacity and capability and the CSSVD control program. The institutional and policy reform process, which was initiated by GOG and underpinned with donor support, was continued under the project but the major thrust for a further advancement can mostly be attributed to AgSAC.

Summary of Findings, Future Operations, and Key Lessons Learned

26. The most important findings are that: (a) for projects which envisage a multiplicity of policy and institutional changes, from the beginning local commitment and project ownership has to be ensured from both, policy makers and implementing agencies, (b) programs which promote divestiture and liberalization would need to be accompanied by measures in support of private sector entry, (c) extraneous factors, such as changes in world market commodity prices, exchange rates, climatic conditions etc. can have paramount effects and supersede the impact of the project per se.

27. Overall the project appears sustainable. The government remains strongly committed to enhance the incentive framework for cocoa production. It is essential that the momentum gained under the various support programs is maintained in the future including the promotion of further divestiture and liberalization of internal cocoa marketing and input supply.


28. The key lessons to be drawn from project implementation experience are that (a) inadequate project management, coordination and implementation - including procurement - arrangements can seriously affect project outcome and should be clearly defined at appraisal, (b) especially for projects which involve a multiplicity of donors the financing plan has to be firmed-up prior to effectiveness, (c) attempting to instigate a major institutional change such as the unification of CSD with MOFA extension services, within

the framework of a minor project component is unrealistic, (d) lack of consensus between the Bank and the Borrower on key technical parameters such as road construction and improvement specifications and TA requirements can be detrimental to implementation, and (e) Bank supervision should be more problem-solving oriented, and regular multi-disciplinary supervision is required for complex projects.

C. FOLLOW UP

29. Upon return to Rome, the mission will prepare the ICR including the required statistical tables for submission to the Bank and the Borrowers by early April. The Borrower has been advised by the mission on the need to prepare its own assessment to form an integral part of the final report.





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DECLASSIFIED September 8, 1997

OED EVALUATIVE MEMORANDUM ON IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

Ghana: Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (Credit 1854-GH)

The Ghana Cocoa Rehabilitation project (CRP), supported by Credit 1854-GH for SDR 31.3 million (US\$40.0 million equivalent) was approved in FY88. The credit was closed on June 30, 1996, two years after the original closing date. A total of SDR 13.1 million (US\$18.2 million equivalent) was canceled. Cofinancing was provided by the African Development Bank (AfDB) for US\$33.0 million, UK Overseas Development Administration (ODA) for US\$12.9 million, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) for US\$5.1 million. The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) was prepared by the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Programme (FAO/CP) for the Africa Regional Office. UK/ODA and AfDB have endorsed the findings of the ICR, but no comments have been received from the other cofinanciers or the Borrower.

The objectives of the project were to: (i) support the sectoral policy reforms agreed under the first Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC); and (ii) increase cocoa yields and production to stabilize output at about 300,000 tons per year. This was to be achieved by: (i) maintaining producer price incentives; (ii) improving the institutional efficiency of the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), particularly its extension, seed production, and disease control activities, and by privatizing input supply; (iii) improving cocoa marketing and quality control; (iv) implementing a road rehabilitation program; (v) tackling Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease (CSSVD); and (vi) strengthening cocoa research.

Performance in implementing the project's various components was mixed. The project was not declared effective until almost a year after approval because of delays in finalizing the cofinancing arrangements, while COCOBOD never established a workable system for procuring goods and services or adhered consistently to the Bank's procurement guidelines. The components aimed at improving the technical services for cocoa production (including seed production and distribution) and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the cocoa extension services were implemented broadly as designed, but the pilot program for the unification of cocoa extension services with those of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture was not implemented. Progress under the CSSVD program was slow and only picked up when increased incentives were paid late in the implementation period. Although there were delays in completion of physical facilities, progress was made in improving research at the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana, particularly through the ODA-financed technical assistance. COCOBOD established a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, but only two of the four studies planned were undertaken and the information base for sectoral monitoring and policy formulation remained weak. The roads program was not carried out as planned. At the time of preparation COCOBOD had its own program for construction and maintenance of feeder roads in cocoa producing areas. By appraisal this responsibility had been

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Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation given to the Department of Feeder Roads (DFR). Agreement between DFR, COCOBOD (which continued to provide funds to DFR) and IDA on construction and maintenance standards took three years to resolve. The program implemented had a different composition from that appraised and amounted to US\$35 million, as against a plan of US\$48 million.

COCOBOD initiated a process to identify private companies to take over input supply. However, it then sold all its stocks of inputs to the Coffee, Cocoa, and Sheanut Farmers Association (CCSFA), which then, <u>de facto</u> became the sole distributor for cocoa inputs in the country. Thus, in practice no privatization occurred. CCSFA continues to subsidize inputs, contrary to the objective of creating a competitive input supply system. At appraisal it was considered premature to attempt the immediate privatization of cocoa marketing, and emphasis was placed on improving the efficiency of the Cocoa Buying Company, COCOBOD's marketing subsidiary. Some improvements were achieved. In 1992, under the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (AgSAC - Credit 2345-GH), COCOBOD was required to introduce competition. By 1995/96, 11 Licensed Buying Companies were operating, which only bought about 25 percent of the crop.

Between project appraisal in 1987 and completion in 1996, the Ghanaian cedi has devalued from 160 per US\$ to 1,600, with the decline being most rapid since 1992. At appraisal the producer price was only about 30 percent of the world price and the objective was to increase this share. However, the administered price system mitigated against this, especially since 1992, as nominal price increases were overtaken by the decline in the exchange rate. The project's target delivery of 300,000 tons was reached in 1989/90, but varied thereafter as real prices and relative prices in neighboring countries fluctuated widely. The ICR reestimated the ERR as 24 percent, compared to 23 percent at appraisal. But this is based on very crude estimates of the incremental production attributable to the project. Furthermore, the ICR indicates that these production increases were within reach in 1988, when the project was approved, and are largely a response to better prices attributable to AgSAC.

The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) concurs with the ICR ratings of institutional development as modest, sustainability as uncertain, and Bank performance as satisfactory. Since most of the relevant sectoral policy reforms were not achieved, despite the satisfactory ERR, the ICR rates the overall project outcome as unsatisfactory. OED rates it as marginally unsatisfactory because of the strength of the production improvements.

The ICR provides a clear and concise description of the implementation of a complex project and is rated as satisfactory. However, it might have examined more deeply the relationship between the CRP, the AgSAC, and the earlier SACs, given that little progress was made on the major policy initiatives until the advent of the AgSAC.

The principal lesson from the project is that, where the aim is to induce changes by a major semiindependent agency with strong political support, attempting to do so primarily through a project implemented by that agency may not be an effective approach. Government as a whole may have limited ability to push for change unless it has appropriate means to do so, such as through the conditionality in a Structural Adjustment Credit (or similar operation) for which a central ministry is the lead agency:

An audit is planned.

ngt

.

This PIF was posted on September 8, 1997

OED ID :	C1854
Type :	EVM
Country :	Ghana
Project Description :	Cocoa Rehabilitation
Sector :	AX / Agriculture
Subsector :	AP / Perennial Crops
Lending Instrument :	Specific Investment
L/C :	C1854
	·

Operations Evaluation Department PROJECT INFORMATION FORM

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A1. General Project Information

OED ID : C185	4	3. Key Dates	
Type: EVM			Original Latest
Country : Ghan	а		
Project Description : Coco	a Rehabilitation	Departure of Appraisal Miss	hannan an a
		Approval	12/01/87
Sector : AX / /	Agriculture	Signing/Agreement	02/18/88
Subsector: AP / I	Perennial Crops	Effectiveness	05/18/88 11/15/88
Lending Instrument : Speci	fic Investment	Physical completion	06/30/93 06/30/96
L/C : C185	4	Closing	06/30/94 06/30/96
		ICR receipt in OED	06/30/97
		Review date	08/15/97
		EVM/PAR approval	09/08/97
1. Reviewer: John E	nglish	4. Key Amounts (\$US mi	llion)
			liiony
2. Do you agree with the	assigned Yes	Original Commitment	40
primary Sector and Su	O No	Total Cancellation	16.72
		Total project cost	1
Sugg. Sector:		Original	128
Sugg. Subsector:		Latest	87.1
5. Cofinanciers	First	Second Th	hird
Name	African Development		ADEA
Original Commitment (\$US	and the second	12.9	5.1
Total Cancellation (\$US mil	in a second s		1
		la la companya da la	Lannaan
	ost among component types	7. Applicable disbursement	profile (no. of years):
(\$US million):		8.5 years	
Physical	57.6	8. Number of supervision m	issions: 11
Technical assistance	10		
Balance of payments	0	9. Name(s) of primary authors	or(s) of ICR (indicate if
Line of credit	0	not known):	
Other	19.5	H. Trupke (FAO/CP)	
11. Names of managers			
	At entry	At exit	
Task manager	Arie Chupak	Gotz Schreiber	
Division chief	Anand Seth	Jean-Paul Chausse	
Department director	Caio Koch-Weser	Serge Michailof	and a second s
Doputation: director			

A2. Project Objectives Evaluation

1.	Were the project objectives revised during implementation?	No	3. Did the project include a monitoring and evaluation system for the implementation phase?	Yes
	If Yes, did the Board approve the revised objectives as part of a formal restructuring?			
	Date of Board approval		If Yes, rate the extent to which the sys of the following five criteria for a good	stem met each M&E system:
	e: If objectives were revised, bas sequent sections on the revised of		Clear project and component objectives verifiable by indicators	Not Available
2.	Taking into account the country	's level of	A structured set of indicators	Not Available
2.	development and the competen implementing agency, to what e project design have the followin	ce of the xtent did the	Requirements for data collection and management	Not Available
	project design have the followin	g characteristics.	Institutional arrangements for capacity building	Substantial
	Demanding on Borrower / Implementing Agency	High	Feedback from M&E	Not Available
	Complexity	Substantial		
	Riskiness	Substantial		
4.	For this particular project, rate t of the project's objectives:	he importance		
Phy	sical	Substantial	Institutional	High
	ancial (interest rates; pricing /	Substantial	Social	Not Applicable
	f policies; cost recovery		Environmental	Not Applicable
	nomic		Private sector development	Modest
	Aacro-economic policies fiscal; monetary; trade)	Modest	Other (specify):	
(noodi, monotary, addoy			

B1a. Outcomes — Relevance

 Indicate the extent to which ead objectives was relevant in terms Borrower's current country or set 	h of the project's of the Bank's / ectoral objectives:	2. Summary Rating of Relevance	
Physical Financial (interest rates; pricing / tariff policies; cost recovery	Substantial High	Rate the extent to which, as a whole, the project's goals were consistent with the Bank's strategies, taking account of the relevance and importance of each of the project's objectives:	Substantial
Economic			
Macro-economic policies (fiscal; monetary; trade)	Substantial	Average rating	Substantial
Sector policies	Substantial		
Institutional	Substantial		
Social	Not Applicable	If your overall rating differs from the aver please comment on reasons for this diff	erage rating,
Environmental	Not Applicable	please comment on reasons for this diff	erence.
Private sector development	Substantial		
Other (specify):	And an		

B1b. Outcomes — Efficacy

 Indicate the extent to which each of the following objectives was in fact accomplished: 		2. Summary Rating of Efficacy	
Physical Financial (interest rates; pricing / tariff policies; cost recovery	Modest Modest	Rate the efficacy of the project, taking account of the importance of the objectives and the extent to which they were accomplished:	Modest
Economic			
Macro-economic policies (fiscal; monetary; trade)	Modest	Average rating	Modest
Sector policies	Modest		
Institutional	Modest		
Social	Not Applicable	If your overall rating differs from the aver	rage rating,
Environmental	Not Applicable	please comment on reasons for this diffe	erence:
Private sector development	Negligible		
Other (specify):	Accessed and an		

B1b. Outcomes — Efficacy (cont'd)

J. Male the extent to which t	aut of the following factore	affected the achievement of this proje	
World markets / prices	Negative	Performance of contractors / consultants	Positive
Natural events Cofinancier(s) performance	Not Applicable		<u> </u>
	Negative		Not Applicable
		Other (specify):	

B1c. Outcomes — Efficiency

1. Is an Economic Rate of Return (E available for this project?	ERR) Yes No	If No, is a Financial Rate of Return (FRR) available?	○ Yes ○ No
If a rate of return is available, provide th	e following information	n (in percent):	
	Point Value	Weighted Range Average	Coverage / Scope
At Appraisal O Not Available Not Applicable	+23 %	From :	+100 %
At Completion O Not Available Not Applicable	+24 %	From : [] To :	+100 %
 2. Was another measure of efficiency provided? If Yes, then answer the following: Measure used Coverage / scope of measure Comparison to 	○ Yes ● No	 If no measure of efficiency was provided for this project, would it h been reasonable to expect one? If Yes, explain: 	ave O Yes O No
appraisal estimate 4. Rate the quality of the economic a Soundness of analysis	nalysis according to th	ne following criteria: Overall rating of quality of analysis	Modest
Conduct of sensitivity / risk analysis Consideration of institutional constraints to achieving results	Substantial Substantial	Average rating	Modest
Extent to which benefits accrue to target population	Not Applicable	If your overall rating differs from the ave please comment on reasons for this diffe	rage rating, erence:
Consideration of environmental externalities	Not Applicable		
Consideration of fiscal impact Consideration of alternatives to meeting objectives	Substantial Not Applicable		

.

B1c. Outcomes — Efficiency (cont'd)

5. Summary Rating of Efficiency		
Rate overall to what extent the project accomplished its goals efficiently:	Substantial	If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference:
Average rating		

B1d. Outcomes — Summary

1. SUMMARY OUTCOME RATING	iound relevant	
Rate the project's outcome (i.e., the extent to which it ach objectives), taking account of its relevance, efficacy, and	efficiency:	Marginally Unsatisfactory
Average rating		Marginally Satisfactory
If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference:	was 24%, it failed to objectives, "Projectives, "Projectiv	oject ERR, as reestimated by the ICR, to achieve the other of its major t failed to achieve most of its major s, but had some substantial development

B2. Sustainability

Technical viability	Highly Positive	Policy environment	Negative
Financial viability	Negative	Institution / management	Negative
Economic viability	Positive	effectiveness	Inegative
Social conditions	No Effect	Local participation	Not Applicable
Environmental concerns	No Effect	Other (specify):	
Government commitment	Positive		
Rate the probability of maintai achievements generated or ex	ning the project's relevant expected to be generated:	development	Uncertain
Rate the probability of maintai achievements generated or ex Average rating	ning the project's relevant of projected to be generated:	development	Uncertain Unlikely

Туре :	EVM
	Type :

B3. Institutional Development

×

Legal / regulatory system Sectoral capacity Other (specify): Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis Management Skills upgrading MIS Other (specify): MIS Other (specify):	Modest Substantial Modest Substantial Negligible Not Applicable	Average rating If your overall rating differs from the aver please comment on reasons for this diffe	Modest rage rating, erence:
Sectoral capacity Other (specify): Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis Management Skills upgrading MIS	Substantial Modest Substantial	If your overall rating differs from the aver	rage rating,
Sectoral capacity Other (specify): Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis Management Skills upgrading MIS	Substantial Modest Substantial	If your overall rating differs from the aver	rage rating,
Sectoral capacity Other (specify): Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis Management Skills upgrading	Substantial Modest Substantial	If your overall rating differs from the aver	rage rating,
Sectoral capacity Other (specify): Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis Management	Substantial	If your overall rating differs from the aver	rage rating,
Sectoral capacity Other (specify): Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis	Substantial		
Sectoral capacity Other (specify): Agency capacity	Substantial	Average rating	Modest
Sectoral capacity Other (specify):	Modest	Average rating	Modest
Sectoral capacity	Modest	Average rating	Modest
Sectoral capacity	Modest		
Sectoral capacity	Modest		
I a surf / an available in a sure based	Not Applicable	organizational, and financial resources:	Linder
Financial intermediation	Not Applicable	effectively use its human,	Modest
Civil service reform	Not Applicable	the project resulted in improvement of the country's/sector's ability to	
Economic management	Not Applicable	Rate the extent to which, as a whole,	
National capacity			
 For this particular project, rate it the following Institutional Development 	ts efficacy in achieving opment objectives:	6. SUMMARY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT RATING	
		NGO Capacity	Not Applicable
Restructuring / privatizing of an organization	Yes		<u> </u>
Elimination of an existing organizatio	n No	Other (specify):	
Establishment of a new organization	No	MIS	Substantial
		Skills upgrading	Substantial
		Management	Substantial
activities include each of the foll	lowing:	Planning / policy analysis	Substantial
3. Did the project's Institutional De	velopment	Agency capacity	
		Other (specify):	-
Institutional Development object	tives? O No	Sectoral capacity	High
If not, did the project contain components with significant	Yes	Legal / regulatory system	Not Applicable
O If we had the project contain		Financial intermediation	Not Applicable
		Civil service reform	Not Applicable
		Economic management	Not Applicable
Institutional Development?	No	National capacity	

C1. Bank Performance

Involvement of government	Substantial	Overall rating on identification /	O-P-T-T-
Involvement of beneficiaries	Modest	preparation	Satisfactory
Project consistency with Bank strategy for country	High	Average rating	Satisfactory
Grounding in economic and sector work (ESW)	High	If your overall rating differs from please comment on reasons for t	the average rating, his difference:
Other (specify):			
 Indicate the extent to which the Ba 	ank took account of the	e following during project appraisal:	
Technical analysis (inc. alternatives)	Substantial	Overall rating on appraisal	Satisfactory
Financial analysis (inc. funding provisions, fiscal impact)	Substantial	Average rating	Satisfactory
ERR/FRR cost-benefit analysis	Substantial Substantial		
Institutional capacity analysis	Modest	If your overall rating differs from comment on reasons for this difference of the second sec	
Social and stakeholder analysis	Substantial		
Environmental analysis	Substantial		
Risk assessment (inc. adequacy of conditionalities)	Modest		
Incorporation of M&E indicators	Substantial		
Incorporation of lessons learned	Modest Substantial		
Readiness for implementation	oubstantia		
Suitability of lending instrument			
 Considering the identification / pre rate the overall quality of the proje 	paration and appraisal ct at the time of Board	l processes discussed above, approval (Quality at Entry):	Unsatisfactory
	t supervision in the foll	owing areas:	
Indicate the extent of Bank project			
	Modest	Overall rating on supervision	Satisfactory
Reporting on project implementation progress Identification / assessment			Satisfactory Satisfactory
Reporting on project implementation progress Identification / assessment of implementation problems	Modest	Overall rating on supervision Average rating If your overall rating differs from	Satisfactory
Reporting on project implementation progress Identification / assessment of implementation problems Use of performance indicators Enforcement of Borrower	Modest Substantial	Overall rating on supervision Average rating	Satisfactory
Reporting on project implementation progress Identification / assessment of implementation problems Use of performance indicators Enforcement of Borrower provision of M&E data	Modest Substantial Modest	Overall rating on supervision Average rating If your overall rating differs from	Satisfactory
 Indicate the extent of Bank project Reporting on project implementation progress Identification / assessment of implementation problems Use of performance indicators Enforcement of Borrower provision of M&E data Advice to implementing agency Enforcement of Ioan covenants / exercise of remedies 	Modest Substantial Modest Substantial	Overall rating on supervision Average rating If your overall rating differs from	Satisfactory
Reporting on project implementation progress Identification / assessment of implementation problems Use of performance indicators Enforcement of Borrower provision of M&E data Advice to implementing agency Enforcement of Ioan covenants /	Modest Substantial Modest Substantial Substantial	Overall rating on supervision Average rating If your overall rating differs from	Satisfactory
Reporting on project implementation progress Identification / assessment of implementation problems Use of performance indicators Enforcement of Borrower provision of M&E data Advice to implementing agency Enforcement of Ioan covenants / exercise of remedies Flexibility in suggesting /	Modest Substantial Modest Substantial Substantial	Overall rating on supervision Average rating If your overall rating differs from	Satisfactory

C1. Bank Performance (cont'd)

5. SUMMARY RATING OF BANK PERFORMANCE	
Rate the Bank's overall performance, taking account of identification / preparation, appraisal, and supervision activities:	Satisfactory
Average rating	Satisfactory
If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference:	

C2. Borrower Performance

 Rate the extent to which gov supported project implementation 	ernment / implementing a ation:	gency performance on the following dime	nsions
Factors generally subject to gov	vernment control		
Macro policies / conditions	Modest	Administrative procedures	Modest
Sector policies / conditions	Modest	Cost changes	Substantial
Government commitment	Substantial	Implementation delays	Substantial
Appointment of key staff	Modest	Other (specify):	
Counterpart funding	Substantial		
Factors generally subject to imp Management	Modest	Use of technical assistance	High
Staffing	Substantial	Beneficiary participation	Not Applicabl
Cost changes	Substantial	Other (specify):	
Implementation delays	Modest	[1

C2. Borrower Performance (cont'd)

3. Summary Rating of on Project Implemer	Borrower Performance	5. SUMMARY RAT PERFORMANC	TING OF BORROWER E
Overall rating	Unsatisfactory	Overall rating	Unsatisfactory
Average rating	Unsatisfactory		
If your overall rating different please comment on rease	rs from the average rating, ons for this difference:	Average rating	Unsatisfactory
		If your overall rating of please comment on r	differs from the average rating, reasons for this difference:
4. Rate Borrower comp covenants / commitr Unsatisfactory	pliance with loan ments:		

D. Special Themes

 Indicate whether each of the fol concerns was a major project en 	lowing social nphasis:	3. Did the project place a major emphasis on poverty alleviation?	YesNo
Gender related issues Settlement / resettlement Beneficiary participation Community development Skills development Nutrition and food security Health improvement Other (specify):	No No No Yes No No	If Yes: Was this a Poverty Targeted Intervention? Did it emphasize broad-based growth with labor absorption? Did it emphasize human development (education, health, or nutrition)? Did it emphasize the provision of a social safety net?	 Yes ○ No Yes ○ No Yes ○ No Yes ○ No
2. Did the project have an unintend unexpected effect on social con regardless of the project's object No If Yes, was the effect positive o	cerns, tives?	4. Indicate whether each of the follow concerns was a major project employed with the follow concerns with the follow concerns was a major project employed with the follow concerns was a major project employed with the follow concerns was a major project employed with the follow concerns with the follow concerns with the follow concerns with the follow concerns with the	

D. Special Themes (cont'd)

5. Did the project have an unintended or unexpected effect on environmental concerns, regardless of the project's objectives?		7.	Rate the priority of the project for audit
No If Yes, was the effect positive o	r negative?	8.	Rate the priority of the project for impact evaluation
 Indicate whether each of the fo development (PSD) concerns w emphasis: Improvement in legal or incentive framework designed to foster PSD (e.g., trade, pricing) 	llowing private sector vas a major project No		
Restructuring / privatization of public enterprises	No		
Financial sector development	No		
Direct government financial and / or technical assistance to the private sector	No		
Other (specify):			

E. Rating of ICR

Analysis		Future orientation		
Coverage of important subjects	Satisfactory	Plan for future project operation	Not Applicable	
Recalcualtion of ERR or FRR Soundness of analysis Internal consistencies	Satisfactory Satisfactory	Performance indicators for the project's operations phase	Not Applicable	
		Plan for monitoring and evaluation of future operations		
Evidence complete / convincing Adequacy of lessons learned	Satisfactory Satisfactory	Borrower / cofinancier inputs		
Aide-memoire of the ICR mission	Satisfactory	Borrower input to ICR	Not Available	
		Borrower plan for future project operation	Not Available	
		Borrower comments on ICR	Not Available	
		Cofinancier comments on ICR	Not Available	
2. SUMMARY RATING OF ICR		If your overall rating differs from the aver please comment on reasons for this diff	erage rating, erence:	
Rate the quality of the ICR:	Satisfactory			
Average rating	Satisfactory			

E. Rating of ICR (cont'd)

OED	ID :	C1854
Туре	:	EVM

 Rate the quality of borrower par project completion process on the project project project	ne following:		
Analysis	Not Available	Focus on lessons learned	Not Available
Concern with development impact	Not Available	Self-evaluation	Not Available
nternal consistency	Not Available	Evaluation of Bank	Not Available
Evidence to justify views	Not Available		An

F. Summary of Ratings

ctory	Marginally Unsatisfactory Uncertain Modest
Dry	
l	Modest
l	
and a second	Satisfactory
ctory	Unsatisfactory
	Satisfactory
puide definition of a r	levant objectives, but had some substantial development marginally unsatisfactory outcome, best describes the is, but did not have the option and , therefore, chose
1	luide definition of a

G. Overall Judgements / Miscellaneous Comments

1.	Enter any overall	judgements or rationales and miscellaneous comments below.	
----	-------------------	--	--

The ICR might have examined the relationship between this project and related adjustment operations more closely. As the ICR does note "while measures taken and investments implemented under the project have strengthened institutional capacity, physical facilities and service performance in the subsector, the production effect was muted untilsignificant policy reform measures to improve farmers' production incentives were implemented in the context of AgSAC (Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit, approved in FY92) (para xvii). This raises the issue as to whether the Bank might not have made more effective use of this linkage earlier. The PCR (prepared in 1991) for the First and Second Adjustment Credits (SACI, approved in FY87, and SACII, approved in FY89) raises the same issue: "Parallel crdits also had a potentially important role to play in sustaining and deepening dialogue between the Government and the Bank on specific issues. For example, the emphasis on the coccoa sector was much less in SACII than SACI because the institutional and marketing reform elements were subsumed under the Coccoa Rehabilitation Project. In the event, the planned study on the reform of coccoa marketing was not carried out and a key opportunity for further dialogue on reducing COCOBOD operating costs was thereby missed. In the face of fiscal pressure, this effectively prevented full achievement of the SAC II objective of improving coccoa producer incentives." (para 62)

This suggests that a lesson from the project is that the Bank should look more closely at issues related to "local commitment and project ownership". The experience in the CRP suggests that it is important, when dealing with a significant sector where one actor, in this case COCOBOD, is predominant and has substantial political clout, to ensure that other actors, such as the Ministry of Finance, which can provide some pressure for change on the major agency, have some effective levers to do so, such as a SAL or AgSAL, where they are the lead agency. This is an issue for the overall country stategy, rather than the performance of the appraisal, which was rated deficient in the ICR.

THE WORLD BANK GROUP

ROUTING SLIP		er 4, 1997	
	NAME	97 CED 5 UN 0:00	ROOM. NO.
	Robert Picciotto, DGO	97 SEP-5 AN 8:20	G 7-121
Thr	ough: Mr. Roger/Slade, Acting Manager, OF	EDST DGO	G 7-035
			H
	URGENT	PER YOUR REQUEST	
	FOR COMMENT	PER OUR CONVERSAT	ΓΙΟΝ
	FOR ACTION	NOTE AND FILE	
./	FOR APPROVAL/CLEARANCE	FOR INFORMATION	
v	FOR SIGNATURE	PREPARE REPLY	
	NOTE AND CIRCULATE	NOTE AND RETURN	
	Statistics and Statistics (control control control control of the line		
	No comments have been received from the	e Region. Please sign the at	tached EVM.
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	OM	ROOM NO. G 7-013	EXTENSION 31024
Jon	in English, Task Manager, OEDST	07-013	51024

THE WORLD BANK/IFC/M.I.G.A. OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: August 27, 1997

TO: Mr. Serge Michailof, Country Director, AF¢10

FROM: Roger Slade, Acting Manager, OEDST

EXTENSION: 35050

SUBJECT: GHANA: Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (Credit 1854-GH) Implementation Completion Report

1. Attached is a draft Evaluative Memorandum (EM) from the Director-General, Operations Evaluation, which is based on OED's review of the Implementation Completion Report (ICR). We would appreciate receiving any comments you might have by September 3, 1997.

2. Based on this review, we intend to include the following ratings in OED's database:

	OED	ICR
Outcome	Marginally Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Sustainability	Uncertain	Uncertain
Institutional Development	Modest	Partial
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory

3. Except for the rating of the overall outcome, these ratings agree with those in the ICR. While the project failed to achieve most of its major relevant objectives, it had some limited development results, reflected in part in the reestimated ERR of 24 percent. The outcome is therefore, rated as "marginally unsatisfactory", rather than "unsatisfactory", which would imply that the project failed to achieve all its major objectives and is not expected to have any substantial development results, which is belied by the reestimated ERR.

4. The ICR provides a good account of the implementation and outcome of the project, and is rated as satisfactory. However, it might have examined the relationship between this project and related adjustment operations more closely. As the ICR notes "while measures taken and investments implemented under the project have strengthened

institutional capacity, physical facilities and service performance in the subsector, the production effect was muted until significant policy reform measures to improve farmers' production incentives were implemented in the context of the AgSAC (Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit, approved in FY92)" (para xvii). This raises the issue as to whether the Bank might not have made more effective use of this linkage earlier. The PCR (prepared in 1991) for the First and Second Structural Adjustment Credits (SAC I, approved in FY87, and SAC II, approved in FY89) raised the same issue: "Parallel credits also had a potentially important role to play in sustaining and deepening dialogue between the Government and the Bank on specific issues. For example, the emphasis on the cocoa sector was much less in SAC II than in SAC I because the institutional and marketing reform elements were subsumed under the Cocoa marketing was not carried out and a key opportunity for further dialogue on reducing COCOBOD operating costs was thereby missed. In the face of fiscal pressure, this effectively prevented full achievement of the SAC II objective of improving cocoa producer objectives." (para 62).

5. This suggests that a lesson from the project is that the Bank should look more closely at issues related to "local commitment and project ownership". The experience in the CRP suggests that it is important, when dealing with a significant sector where one actor, in this case COCOBOD, is predominant and has substantial political clout, to ensure that other actors, such as the Ministry of Finance, which can provide some pressure for change on the major agency, have some effective levers to do so, such as a SAC or AgSAC, where they are the lead agency. This is an issue for the overall country lending strategy, rather than the performance of the appraisal, which is rated deficient by the ICR.

6. This ICR review was prepared by John English and reviewed by Christopher Gibbs.

Attachment

cc: Ms. Salop (MDOPS), Mr. McCalla (AGRDR), Mr. Schreiber (AFTA2).

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The World Bank Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A.

Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation DECLASSIFIED MAY 2 5 2023 WBG ARCHIVES

OED EVALUATIVE MEMORANDUM ON IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

Ghana: Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (Credit 1854-GH)

The Ghana Cocoa Rehabilitation project (CRP), supported by Credit 1854-GH for SDR 31.3 million (US\$40.0 million equivalent) was approved in FY88. The credit was closed on June 30, 1996, two years after the original closing date. A total of SDR 13.1 million (US\$18.2 million equivalent) was canceled. Cofinancing was provided by the African Development Bank (AfDB) for US\$33.0 million, UK Overseas Development Administration (ODA) for US\$12.9 million, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) for US\$5.1 million. The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) was prepared by the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Programme (FAO/CP) for the Africa Regional Office. UK/ODA and AfDB have endorsed the findings of the ICR, but no comments have been received from the other cofinanciers or the Borrower.

The objectives of the project were to: (i) support the sectoral policy reforms agreed under the first Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC); and (ii) increase cocoa yields and production to stabilize output at about 300,000 tons per year. This was to be achieved by: (i) maintaining producer price incentives; (ii) improving the institutional efficiency of the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), particularly its extension, seed production, and disease control activities, and by privatizing input supply; (iii) improving cocoa marketing and quality control; (iv) implementing a road rehabilitation program; (v) tackling Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease (CSSVD); and (vi) strengthening cocoa research.

Performance in implementing the project's various components was mixed. The project was not declared effective until almost a year after approval because of delays in finalizing the cofinancing arrangements, while COCOBOD never established a workable system for procuring goods and services or adhered consistently to the Bank's procurement guidelines. The components aimed at improving the technical services for cocoa production (including seed production and distribution) and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the cocoa extension services were implemented broadly as designed, but the pilot program for the unification of cocoa extension services with those of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture was not implemented. Progress under the CSSVD program was slow and only picked up when increased incentives were paid late in the implementation period. Although there were delays in completion of physical facilities, progress was made in improving research at the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana, particularly through the ODA-financed technical assistance. COCOBOD established a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, but only two of the four studies planned were undertaken and the information base for sectoral monitoring and policy formulation remained weak. The roads program was not carried out as planned. At the time of preparation COCOBOD had its own program for construction and maintenance of feeder roads in cocoa producing areas. By appraisal this responsibility had been

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given to the Department of Feeder Roads (DFR). Agreement between DFR, COCOBOD (which continued to provide funds to DFR) and IDA on construction and maintenance standards took three years to resolve. The program implemented had a different composition from that appraised and amounted to US\$35 million, as against a plan of US\$48 million.

COCOBOD initiated a process to identify private companies to take over input supply. However, it then sold all its stocks of inputs to the Coffee, Cocoa, and Sheanut Farmers Association (CCSFA), which then, <u>de facto</u> became the sole distributor for cocoa inputs in the country. Thus, in practice no privatization occurred. CCSFA continues to subsidize inputs, contrary to the objective of creating a competitive input supply system. At appraisal it was considered premature to attempt the immediate privatization of cocoa marketing, and emphasis was placed on improving the efficiency of the Cocoa Buying Company, COCOBOD's marketing subsidiary. Some improvements were achieved. In 1992, under the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (AgSAC - Credit 2345-GH), COCOBOD was required to introduce competition. By 1995/96, 11 Licensed Buying Companies were operating, which only bought about 25 percent of the crop.

Between project appraisal in 1987 and completion in 1996, the Ghanaian cedi has devalued from 160 per US\$ to 1,600, with the decline being most rapid since 1992. At appraisal the producer price was only about 30 percent of the world price and the objective was to increase this share. However, the administered price system mitigated against this, especially since 1992, as nominal price increases were overtaken by the decline in the exchange rate. The project's target delivery of 300,000 tons was reached in 1989/90, but varied thereafter as real prices and relative prices in neighboring countries fluctuated widely. The ICR reestimated the ERR as 24 percent, compared to 23 percent at appraisal. But this is based on very crude estimates of the incremental production attributable to the project. Furthermore, the ICR indicates that these production increases were within reach in 1988, when the project was approved, and are largely a response to better prices attributable to AgSAC.

The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) concurs with the ICR ratings of institutional development as modest, sustainability as uncertain, and Bank performance as satisfactory. Since most of the relevant sectoral policy reforms were not achieved, despite the satisfactory ERR, the ICR rates the overall project outcome as unsatisfactory. OED rates it as marginally unsatisfactory because of the strength of the production improvements.

The ICR provides a clear and concise description of the implementation of a complex project and is rated as satisfactory. However, it might have examined more deeply the relationship between the CRP, the AgSAC, and the earlier SACs, given that little progress was made on the major policy initiatives until the advent of the AgSAC.

The principal lesson from the project is that, where the aim is to induce changes by a major semiindependent agency with strong political support, attempting to do so primarily through a project implemented by that agency may not be an effective approach. Government as a whole may have limited ability to push for change unless it has appropriate means to do so, such as through the conditionality in a Structural Adjustment Credit (or similar operation) for which a central ministry is the lead agency.

An audit is planned.

THE WORLD BANK GROUP

ROUTING SLIP DATE: August 26, 1997		26, 1997	
NAME		ROOM. NO.	
	Roger Slade, Acting Manager, OEDST		G7-035
Thr	ough: Mr. Christopher Gibbs, Panel Member	1	
	URGENT	PER YOUR REQUEST	
	FOR COMMENT	PER OUR CONVERSAT	ION
	FOR ACTION	NOTE AND FILE	
1	FOR APPROVAL/CLEARANCE	FOR INFORMATION	
	FOR SIGNATURE	PREPARE REPLY	
	NOTE AND CIRCULATE	NOTE AND RETURN	
RE	MARKS: The above ICR package is attached for you	ur signature.	
	OM in English C. 2	ROOM NO. G 7-013	EXTENSION 31024

THE WORLD BANK/IFC/M.I.G.A. OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: August 25, 1997

TO: Hernan Levy, Deputy Chair, ICR Review Panel

FROM: Christopher Gibbs, Senior Evaluation Officer, OEDD1

EXTENSION: 3-1735

SUBJECT: ICR Review - Ghana - Cocoa Rehabilitation Project - Cr. 1854

I have reviewed the ICR review prepared by John English and recommend that it be cleared and sent to the Group Manager for distribution to the Region. I concur with the review's ratings and have made editorial recommendations which are marked on the attached copy of the draft.

cc: John English (OEDST)

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The World Bank Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A.

Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation MAY 2 5 2023

OED EVALUATIVE MEMORANDUM ON IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

Ghana: Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (Credit 1854-GH)

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(You might have to explain what GU Stabor is.)

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Since projectappraical in 1987,

Since the project was appraised in 1987, the Ghanaian cedi has devalued from 160 per US\$ to 1,600 per US\$ at credit closing, with the decline being particularly rapid since 1992. At appraisal the producer price was only about 30 percent of the world price and the objective was to increase this share. However, the administered price system mitigated against this, especially since 1992, as nominal price increases were overtaken by the decline in the exchange rate. The project's target delivery of 300,000 tons was reached in 1989/90, but flugtuated thereafter as real prices and relative prices in neighboring countries fluctuated widely. Based on this crop performance the ICR reestimated the ERR as 24 percent, compared to 23 percent at appraisal. varied

The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) concurs with the ICR ratings of institutional development as modest, sustainability as uncertain, and Bank performance as satisfactory. Since most of the significant objectives were not achieved, despite the satisfactory ERR, the ICR rates the overall project outcome as unsatisfactory. OED rates it as marginally unsatisfactory because of the strength of the ERR.

relevant sectoral policy reforms voduction in provements

The ICR provides a clear and concise description of the implementation of a complex project and is rated satisfactory. However, it might have examined more deeply the relationship between the CRP, the AgSAC, and the earlier SACs, given that little progress was made on the major policy initiatives until the advent of the AgSAC. (from whom? government or producers, a both :)

The principal lesson from the project is that, where the aim is to induce changes by a major semiindependent agency with strong support, attempting to do so primarily through a project implemented by that agency may not be an effective approach. Government as a whole may have limited ability to push for change unless it has appropriate means to do so, such as through the conditionality or components in a Structural Adjustment Credit (or similar operation) for which a central ministry is the lead agency.

An audit is planned.

project (?)

Between project appraisal in 198? and project completion in 1996 the Chanaian cedi has dwalned from 160 per US dollar to 1600, with the decline being most capid since 1992

-dwelo	inally msatisfact	djutives and	d had av is	mont of actuice its major actuice its major s expected to have mings.	velwant
	Estimated	tehral	- hilbin u	cach year appraises	
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Tredinical survice improvement ok. Pilot extr. poop, not ok sud podr. improved und sud sale still subscridiced ut of not ok. UHND. upont supply privatized (?) unt hele mits but wet studies

or not of. mixed hat wet missidy . where. not ole.

120

SUGGESTION FOR TWO OF PARA DEALING WITH ERR - PARA.5 (**)

THE WORLD BANK/IFC/M.I.G.A. OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE:

TO: Mr. Serge Michailof, Country Director, AFC10

FROM: Roger Slade, Acting Manager, OEDST

EXTENSION: 35050

SUBJECT: GHANA: Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (Credit 1854-GH) Implementation Completion Report

1. Attached is a draft Evaluative Memorandum (EM) from the Director-General, Operations Evaluation, which is based on OED's review of the Implementation Completion Report (ICR). We would appreciate receiving any comments you might have by

2. Based on this review, we intend to include the following ratings in OED's database:

	OED	ICR
Outcome	Marginally Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Sustainability	Uncertain	Uncertain
Institutional Development	Modest	-Modest Partial
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory

limited

3. Except for the rating of the overall outcome, these ratings agree with those in the ICR. While the project failed to achieve most of its major relevant objectives, it had some-substantial development results, as reflected in the reestimated ERR of 24 percent. The outcome is therefore, rated as "marginally unsatisfactory", rather than "unsatisfactory", which would imply that the project did not have substantial failed to achieve all development results, which is belied by the reestimated ERR.

dijcepiers

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4. The ICR provides a good account of the implementation and outcome of the project, and is rated satisfactory. However, it might have examined the relationship between this project and related adjustment operations more closely. As the ICR notes "while measures taken and investments implemented under the project have strengthened institutional capacity, physical facilities and service performance in the subsector, the

production effect was muted until significant policy reform measures to improve farmers' production incentives were implemented in the context of the AgSAC (Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit, approved in FY92)" (para xvii). This raises the issue as to whether the Bank might not have made more effective use of this linkage earlier. The PCR (prepared in 1991) for the First and Second Structural Adjustment Credits (SAC I, approved in FY87, and SAC II, approved in FY89) raises the same issue: "Parallel credits also had a potentially important role to play in sustaining and deepening dialogue between the Government and the Bank on specific issues. For example, the emphasis on the cocoa sector was much less in SAC II than in SAC I because the institutional and marketing reform elements were subsumed under the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project. In the event, the planned study on the reform of cocoa marketing was not carried out and a key opportunity for further dialogue on reducing COCOBOD operating costs was thereby missed. In the face of fiscal pressure, this effectively prevented full achievement of the SAC II objective of improving cocoa producer objectives." (para 62).

5. This suggests that a lesson from the project is that the Bank should look more closely at issues related to "local commitment and project ownership". The experience in the CRP suggests that it is important, when dealing with a significant sector where one actor, in this case COCOBOD, is predominant and has substantial political clout, to ensure that other actors, such as the Ministry of Finance, which can provide some pressure for change on the major agency, have some effective levers to do so, such as a SAC or AgSAC, where they are the lead agency. This is an issue for the overall country lending strategy, rather than the performance of the appraisal, which is rated deficient by the ICR.

Attachment

cc: Ms. Salop (MDOPS), Mr. McCalla (AGRDR), Mr. Lite Semeiber ()

ICR/PCN REVIEW PANEL

Date: 8/21/97 TO: MR. C. GIBBS , ICR/PCN Panel Member

Re: ICR/PEN GHANA - CR. 1854

Attached please find the ICR package referenced above for your review, as per ICR/PCN processing guidelines. Upon completing your review, please return package to Aracely for loging and forwarding to the corresponding task manager. The originating task manager would be expected to resubmit the final package for your initials within the prescribed 7 working days from this date.

Signed: /mmmlen

THE WORLD BANK GROUP

ROUTING SLIP		DATE: August 15, 1997	
	NAME		ROOM. NO.
Mr.	Roger Slade, Acting Manager, OEDST		G 7-035
	URGENT	PER YOUR REQUEST	
	FOR COMMENT	PER OUR CONVERSAT	ION
	FOR ACTION	NOTE AND FILE	
~	FOR APPROVAL/CLEARANCE	FOR INFORMATION	
~	FOR SIGNATURE	PREPARE REPLY	
	NOTE AND CIRCULATE	NOTE AND RETURN	
to tl	Implementation Completion Report MARKS: Please find attached for your approval a dine Board on the above ICR, together with a micountry Director. This ICR was reviewed by John English.		
	OM ristopher Gibbs, OEDST	ROOM NO. G 7-029	EXTENSION 31735

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The World Bank Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A.

Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation

DECLASSIFIE MAY 2 5 2023 WBG ARCHIVES

OED EVALUATIVE MEMORANDUM ON IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

Ghana: Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (Credit 1854-GH)

The Ghana Cocoa Rehabilitation project (CRP), supported by Credit 1854-GH for SDR 31.3 million (US\$40.0 million equivalent) was approved in FY88. The credit was closed on June 30, 1996, two years after the original closing date. A total of SDR 13.1 million (US\$18.2 million equivalent) was canceled. Cofinancing was provided by the African Development Bank (AfDB) for US\$33.0 million, UK Overseas Development Administration (ODA) for US\$12.9 million, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) for US\$5.1 million. The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) was prepared by the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Programme (FAO/CP) for the Africa Regional Office. UK/ODA has endorsed the findings of the ICR, but no comments have been received from the other cofinanciers or the Borrower.

The objectives of the project were to: (i) support the sectoral policy reforms agreed under the first Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC); and (ii) increase cocoa yields and production to stabilize output at about 300,000 tons per year. This was to be achieved by: (i) maintaining producer price incentives; (ii) improving the institutional efficiency of the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), particularly its extension, seed production, disease control activities, and by privatizing input supply; (iii) improving cocoa marketing and quality control; (iv) implementing a road rehabilitation program; (v) tackling Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease (CSSVD); and (vi) strengthening cocoa research.

Performance in implementing the project's various components was mixed. The project was not declared effective until almost a year after approval because of delays in finalizing the cofinancing arrangements, while COCOBOD never established a workable system for the procurement of goods and services or adhered consistently to the Bank's procurement guidelines. The components aimed at improving the technical services for cocoa production (including seed production and distribution) and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the cocoa extension services were implemented broadly as designed, but the pilot program for the unification of cocoa extension services with those of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture was not implemented. Progress under the CSSVD program was slow and only picked up when increased incentives were paid using EU Stabex funds, late in the implementation period. Although there were delays in completion of physical facilities, progress was made in improving research at the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana, particularly through the ODA financed TA. COCOBOD established a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, but only two of the four studies planned were undertaken and the information base for sectoral monitoring and policy formulation remains weak. The roads program was not carried out as planned. At the time of preparation COCOBOD had its own program for construction and maintenance of feeder roads in cocoa producing areas. By appraisal this

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responsibility had been given to the Department of Feeder Roads (DFR). Agreement between DFR, COCOBOD (which continued to provide funds to DFR) and IDA on construction and maintenance standards took three years to resolve. The program actually implemented had a different balance of types than that appraised and amounted to US\$35 million, as against a plan of US\$48 million.

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Since the project was appraised in 1987, the Ghanaian cedi has devalued from 160 per US\$ to 1,600 per US\$ at credit closing, with the decline being particularly rapid since 1992. At appraisal the producer price was only about 30 percent of the world price and the objective was to increase this share. However, the administered price system mitigated against this, especially since 1992, as nominal price increases were overtaken by the decline in the exchange rate. The project's target delivery of 300,000 tons was reached in 1989/90, but fluctuated thereafter as real prices and relative prices in neighboring countries fluctuated widely. Based on this crop performance the ICR reestimated the ERR as 24 percent, compared to 23 percent at appraisal.

The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) concurs with the ICR ratings of institutional development as modest, sustainability as uncertain, and Bank performance as satisfactory. Since most of the significant objectives were not achieved, despite the satisfactory ERR, the ICR rates the overall project outcome as unsatisfactory. OED rates it as marginally unsatisfactory because of the strength of the ERR.

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An audit is planned.

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Attachment

cc: Ms. Salop (MDOPS), Mr. McCalla (AGRDR)

This PIF has not been posted

OED ID :	C1854
Туре :	EVM
Country :	Ghana
Project Description :	Cocoa Rehabilitation
Sector :	AA /
Subsector :	AP / Perennial Crops
Lending Instrument :	Specific Investment
L/C :	C1854

Problems

| ERRORS | * These must be fixed before the PIF can be posted * Section Question Error ------A1 3.9 No answer

Operations Evaluation Department PROJECT INFORMATION FORM

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.

A1. General Project Information

OED ID : C1854		3. Key Dates	
Type : EVM		Origi	nal Latest
Country : Ghana		Departure of Appraisal Mission	04/15/87
Project Description : Cocoa	Rehabilitation	Approval	12/01/87
		Signing/Agreement	02/18/88
Sector: AA /	annial Cases	Effectiveness 11/15	Lannanananan
	Perennial Crops	Physical completion 06/30	
Lending Instrument : Specif		Closing 06/30	
L/C : C1854	1	ICR receipt in OED	06/30/97
		Review date	08/15/97
		EVM/PAR approval	
			LJ
1. Reviewer: John Ei	nglish		
		4. Key Amounts (\$US million)	
2. Do you agree with the a primary Sector and Sub	assigned Yes	Original Commitment	10
primary Sector and Sub	osector?	Total Cancellation	40
	U	Total project cost	
Sugg. Sector:		Original	128
Sugg. Subsector:		Latest	87.1
			La manana ang
5. Cofinanciers	First	Second Third	
Name	African Development	UK/ODA BADEA	
Original Commitment (\$US r		12.9 5.1	
Total Cancellation (\$US milli	la anna anna anna anna anna anna anna a	1 1	
	st among component types	7. Applicable disbursement profile	(no. of years):
(\$US million):		8.5 years	
Dhusiaal	67 0		
Physical Technical assistance	57.6	8. Number of supervision missions	: 11
Balance of payments			
Line of credit	0	9. Name(s) of primary author(s) of	ICR (indicate if
Other	19.5	not known):	
	I	H. Trupke (FAO/CP)	
11. Names of managers			
The manues of managers			
T 1	At entry	At exit	
Task manager	Arie Chupak	Gotz Schreiber	
Division chief	Anand Seth	Jean-Paul Chausse	
Department director	Calo Koch-Weser	Serge Michailof	

A2. Project Objectives Evaluation

1.	Were the project objectives revised during implementation?	No	 Did the project include a monitoring and evaluation system for the implementation phase? 	Yes
	If Yes, did the Board approve the revised objectives as part of a formal restructuring?			
	Date of Board approval		If Yes, rate the extent to which the syste of the following five criteria for a good M	em met each &E system:
Not sub	e: If objectives were revised, base sequent sections on the revised of	the ratings in jectives.	Clear project and component objectives verifiable by indicators	Not Available
2.	Taking into account the country's	level of	A structured set of indicators	Not Available
2.	development and the competence implementing agency, to what ex project design have the following	e of the	Requirements for data collection and management	Not Available
	project accign have the relief		Institutional arrangements for capacity building	Substantial
	Demanding on Borrower / Implementing Agency	High	Feedback from M&E	Not Available
	Complexity	Substantial		
	Riskiness	Substantial		
4.	For this particular project, rate th of the project's objectives:	e importance		
Phy	vsical	Substantial	Institutional	High
Fina	ancial (interest rates; pricing /	Substantial	Social	Not Applicable
	f policies; cost recovery		Environmental	Not Applicable
	nomic		Private sector development	Modest
(Macro-economic policies fiscal; monetary; trade)	Modest	Other (specify):	
	Sector policies	High		

B1a. Outcomes — Relevance

 Indicate the extent to which eac objectives was relevant in terms Borrower's current country or set 	s of the Bank's /	2. Summary Rating of Relevance	
Physical Financial (interest rates; pricing / tariff policies; cost recovery	Substantial High	Rate the extent to which, as a whole, the project's goals were consistent wi the Bank's strategies, taking account of the relevance and importance of each of the project's objectives:	ith
Economic			
Macro-economic policies (fiscal; monetary; trade)	Substantial	Average rating	Substantial
Sector policies	Substantial		
Institutional	Substantial		
Social	Not Applicable	If your overall rating differs from the a please comment on reasons for this of	average rating,
Environmental	Not Applicable	please comment on reasons for this c	umerence.
Private sector development	Substantial		1
Other (specify):	Survey and a second		

B1b. Outcomes — Efficacy

1. Indicate the extent to which eac objectives was in fact accomplise	h of the following shed:	2. Summary Rating of Efficacy	
Physical Financial (interest rates; pricing / tariff policies; cost recovery	Modest Modest	Rate the efficacy of the project, takin account of the importance of the objectives and the extent to which th were accomplished:	
Economic			
Macro-economic policies (fiscal; monetary; trade)	Modest	Average rating	Modest
Sector policies	Modest		
Institutional	Modest		
Social	Not Applicable	If your overall rating differs from the please comment on reasons for this	average rating,
Environmental	Not Applicable	please comment on reasons for this	umerence.
Private sector development	Negligible		
Other (specify):	S		

B1b. Outcomes — Efficacy (cont'd)

each of the following factors aff	ected the achievement of this proje	ect's objectives:
Negative	Performance of contractors /	Positive
Not Applicable		
Negative		Not Applicable
1	Other (specify):	
]
	Negative Not Applicable	Not Applicable War / civil disturbance

B1c. Outcomes — Efficiency

1. Is an Economic Rate of Return (E available for this project?	RR) Yes No	If No, is a Financial Rate of Return (FRR) available?	○ Yes○ No
If a rate of return is available, provide th	e following informatior	n (in percent):	
	Point Value	Weighted Range Average	Coverage / Scope
At Appraisal O Not Available Not Applicable	+23 %	From : []	+100 %
At Completion O Not Available Not Applicable	+24 %	From :	+100 %
Was another measure of efficiency provided? If Yes, then answer the following: Measure used Coverage / scope of measure Comparison to appraisal estimate	Yes ● No	 If no measure of efficiency was provided for this project, would it h been reasonable to expect one? If Yes, explain: 	ave O Yes O No
4. Rate the quality of the economic a	nalysis according to th		
Soundness of analysis Conduct of sensitivity / risk analysis Consideration of institutional constraints to achieving results	Modest Substantial Substantial	Overall rating of quality of analysis Average rating	Modest
Extent to which benefits accrue to target population	Not Applicable	If your overall rating differs from the ave please comment on reasons for this difference of the second seco	rage rating, erence:
Consideration of environmental externalities	Not Applicable		
Consideration of fiscal impact Consideration of alternatives to meeting objectives	Substantial Not Applicable		

B1c. Outcomes — Efficiency (cont'd)

5. Summary Rating of Efficiency		
Rate overall to what extent the project accomplished its goals efficiently:	Substantial	If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference:
Average rating		

B1d. Outcomes — Summary

1. SUMMARY OUTCOME RATING		
Rate the project's outcome (i.e., the extent to which it ach objectives), taking account of its relevance, efficacy, and	ieved relevant efficiency:	Marginally Unsatisfactory
Average rating		Marginally Satisfactory
If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference:	was 24%, it failed	project ERR, as reestimated by the ICR, I to achieve the other of its major ect failed to achieve most of its major as, but had some substantial development

B2. Sustainability

Technical viability	Highly Positive	Policy environment	Negative
Financial viability	Negative	Institution / management	Negative
Economic viability	Positive	effectiveness	negative
Social conditions	No Effect	Local participation	Not Applicable
Environmental concerns	No Effect	Other (specify):	
Government commitment	Positive		
Rate the probability of maintai	ning the project's relevant	development	Uncertain
2. SUMMARY SUSTAINAB Rate the probability of maintai achievements generated or ex Average rating	ning the project's relevant	development	Uncertain Unlikely

Operations Evaluation Department	Thing one Yes	⊖ Yes	OED ID : C	
Project Information Form	Thing two	⊖ No	Type :	EVM

B3. Institutional Development

×

1. Was this project directed privatily toward institutional Development objectives: • For this particular project, rate the relevance of the following institutional Development objectives: 2. If not, did the project contain composed to the project relevance of the following institutional Development objectives? Not Applicable 2. If not, did the project contain composed to the following: • Yes institutional Development objectives? Not Applicable 3. Did the project's Institutional Development activities include each of the following: • Agency capacity High 3. Did the project's Institutional Development activities include each of the following: • Agency capacity High 6. Substantial Mis Substantial Mis No Substantial Mis Substantial Mis Substantial No Substantial Mis Substantial Mis Substantial No Substantial Mis No Substantial Mis Substantial Mis Substantial No Substantial Mis No Applicable Civil service reform Nof Applicable Nof Applicable <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th>				
National capacity Economic management Not Applicable Civil service reform Not Applicable Sectoral capacity Financial intermediation Not Applicable Sectoral capacity High High 3. Did the project's Institutional Development objectives? No 3. Did the project's Institutional Development activities include each of the following: Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis Substantial Substantial Substantial Other (specify): Management Substantial Substantial Other (specify): Management Substantial Substantial MIS Substantial Other (specify): Management Substantial Substantial MiS Substantial Other (specify): Modest Civil service reform Not Applicable Rate the extent to which, as a whole, the project resulted in improvement of the collowing institutional Development objectives: Not Applicable Average rating Verage rating Modest Planning / policy analysis Substantial Mis <	primarily toward		4. For this particular project, rate the r following Institutional Development	elevance of the objectives:
Economic management Not Applicable 2. If not, did the project contain components with significant institutional Development objectives? No 3. Did the project's Institutional Development activities include each of the following: Agency capacity 3. Did the project's Institutional Development activities include each of the following: Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis Substantial MIS Substantial Other (specify): Institutional Development activities include each of the following: Establishment of a new organization an organization No Stills upgrading Substantial MIS Substantial Other (specify): Institutional Development activities include each of the following: Establishment of a new organization an organization No Planning / policy analysis Substantial MIS Substantial Other (specify): Institutional Development activities are sixing organization No Yes NGO Capacity Not Applicable Civil service reform Not Applicable Planning /			National capacity	
2. If not, did the project contain components with significant institutional Development objectives? Noi Applicable 2. If not, did the project contain institutional Development objectives? No 3. Did the project's institutional Development activities include each of the following: Agency capacity 3. Did the project's institutional Development activities include each of the following: Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis Substantial Management Substantial Skills upgrading Noi Applicable 6. SUMMARY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT RATING 8. Substantial Noi Applicable 6. SUMMARY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT RATING 8. Substantial Noi Applicable 6. SUMMARY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT RATING 9. Substantial Noi Applicable 10. Hord Applicable 10. Hord Applicable 10. Hord State 10. Hord Applicable 10. Hord Apolicable				Not Applicable
2. If not, did the project contain components with significant institutional Development objectives? Yes Not Applicable 3. Did the project's institutional Development activities include each of the following: Agency capacity High 3. Did the project's institutional Development activities include each of the following: Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis Substantial Establishment of a new organization an organization No No No No 5. For this particular project, rate its efficacy in achieving the following institutional Development objectives: 6. SUMMARY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT RATING 8. Atom and a capacity Not Applicable Not Applicable 6. SUMMARY INSTITUTIONAL Development of the following institutional Development objectives: 6. SUMMARY INSTITUTIONAL Development of the country System with a analysis National capacity Not Applicable Rate the extent to which, as a whole, the project resulted in improvement of the country System with Applicable Civil service reform Not Applicable Average rating Modest Other (specify): organizational, and financial resources: Modest Modest organizational, and financial resources: Modest Modest If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference:			Civil service reform	Not Applicable
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Institutional Development objectives? No Sectoral capacity High Other (specify): Other (specify): Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis Substantial Substantial Management Substantial Skills upgrading Substantial Mis Substantial Other (specify): Imagement Stablishment of a new organization No Restructuring / privatizing of an organization No Stational capacity Yes Sectoral capacity Not Applicable National capacity Not Applicable Civil service reform Not Applicable Other (specify): Modest Other (specify): Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis Substantial Management Modest Agency capacity Modest Other (specify): Imagement Mis Negligible Other (specify): <t< td=""><td>2. If not, did the project contain</td><td>Yes</td><td>Legal / regulatory system</td><td>Not Applicable</td></t<>	2. If not, did the project contain	Yes	Legal / regulatory system	Not Applicable
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Eminitation of viscality of gamma and the instruction of privatizing of an organization Yes NGO Capacity Not Applicable 5. For this particular project, rate its efficacy in achieving the following institutional Development objectives: 6. SUMMARY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT RATING National capacity Economic management Not Applicable Civil service reform Not Applicable Financial intermediation Not Applicable Legal / regulatory system Not Applicable Other (specify): Modest Agency capacity Planning / policy analysis Skills upgrading Substantial MIS Negligible Other (specify): If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference: MIS Negligible Other (specify): Image ment MIS Negligible Other (specify): Image ment MIS Negligible Other (specify): Image ment MIS Not Applicable	Establishment of a new organization	No	MIS	Substantial
an organization Yes NGO Capacity Not Applicable 5. For this particular project, rate its efficacy in achieving the following Institutional Development objectives: 6. SUMMARY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT RATING National capacity Economic management Not Applicable Civil service reform Not Applicable Legal / regulatory system Not Applicable Sectoral capacity Modest Other (specify): Modest Planning / policy analysis Substantial MIS Negligible Other (specify): If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference: MIS Negligible Other (specify): Image: Substantial	Elimination of an existing organization	No	Other (specify):	
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Civil service reform Not Applicable Financial intermediation Not Applicable Legal / regulatory system Not Applicable Sectoral capacity Modest Other (specify):		Not Applicable		
Financial intermediation Not Applicable the country's/sector's ability to effectively use its human, organizational, and financial resources: Modest Sectoral capacity Modest organizational, and financial resources: Modest Other (specify): Agency capacity Modest Average rating Modest Planning / policy analysis Substantial Modest If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference: If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference: MIS Negligible Not Applicable If your overall rating difference: MIS Negligible Not Applicable If your overall rating difference:				
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Sectoral capacity Modest Other (specify):			effectively use its human,	Modest
Other (specify):		hannan annan anna anna anna anna anna a		Lauran
Agency capacity Average rating Modest Planning / policy analysis Substantial If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference: MIS Negligible Other (specify): Image: Comment of the second		wouest		
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Planning / policy analysis Substantial Management Modest Skills upgrading Substantial MIS Negligible Other (specify): Image: Comparison of the second s		L	Average rating	Modest
Management Modest Skills upgrading Substantial MIS Negligible Other (specify): Image: Stantial in the second	Agency capacity			Prevention of the second se
Skills upgrading Substantial MIS Negligible Other (specify): Image: Substantial image: Subs	Planning / policy analysis	Substantial		
Skills upgrading Substantial MIS Negligible Other (specify):	Management	Modest	If your overall rating differs from the ave	rage rating.
Other (specify): Other (specify): Image: Specify model NGO Capacity Not Applicable	Skills upgrading	Substantial	please comment on reasons for this diffe	erence:
NGO Capacity Not Applicable	MIS	Negligible		
	Other (specify):			
Overall ID Efficacy Modest	NGO Capacity	Not Applicable		
	Overall ID Efficacy	Modest		
	c.c.an in minoway			

C1. Bank Performance

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1. To what extent did each of the follo	owing apply during pro	ect identification / preparation:	
Involvement of government Involvement of beneficiaries Project consistency with Bank strategy for country Grounding in economic and sector work (ESW) Other (specify):	Substantial Modest High High	Overall rating on identification / preparation Average rating If your overall rating differs from please comment on reasons for	Satisfactory Satisfactory the average rating, this difference:
2. Indicate the extent to which the Ba	ank took account of the	following during project appraisal:	
Technical analysis (inc. alternatives) Financial analysis (inc. funding provisions, fiscal impact) ERR/FRR cost-benefit analysis Institutional capacity analysis Social and stakeholder analysis Environmental analysis Risk assessment (inc. adequacy of conditionalities) Incorporation of M&E indicators Incorporation of lessons learned Readiness for implementation Suitability of lending instrument	Substantial Substantial Substantial Modest Substantial Modest Substantial Modest Substantial	Overall rating on appraisal Average rating If your overall rating differs from comment on reasons for this diff	Satisfactory Satisfactory the average rating, please erence:
 Considering the identification / pre rate the overall quality of the proje 	eparation and appraisa ct at the time of Board	processes discussed above, approval (Quality at Entry):	Unsatisfactory
4. Indicate the extent of Bank project	t supervision in the foll	owing areas:	
Reporting on project implementation progress	Modest	Overall rating on supervision	Satisfactory
Identification / assessment of implementation problems	Substantial	Average rating	Satisfactory
Use of performance indicators Enforcement of Borrower provision of M&E data Advice to implementing agency Enforcement of loan covenants / exercise of remedies	Modest Substantial Substantial Substantial	If your overall rating differs from comment on reasons for this diff	the average rating, please erence:
Flexibility in suggesting / approving modifications Other (specify):	Substantial	Laurenteen	1

C1. Bank Performance (cont'd)

5. SUMMARY RATING OF BANK PERFORMANCE	
Rate the Bank's overall performance, taking account of identification / preparation, appraisal, and supervision activities:	Satisfactory
Average rating	Satisfactory
If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference:	

C2. Borrower Performance

 Rate the extent to which gov supported project implementation 	ernment / implementing a ation:	gency performance on the following dime	nsions
Factors generally subject to go	vernment control		
Macro policies / conditions	Modest	Administrative procedures	Modest
Sector policies / conditions	Modest	Cost changes	Substantial
Government commitment	Substantial	Implementation delays	Substantial
Appointment of key staff	Modest	Other (specify):	
Counterpart funding	Substantial		
Factors generally subject to imp Management	plementing agency cont Modest	trol Use of technical assistance	High
Staffing	Substantial	Beneficiary participation	Not Applicabl
Cost changes	Substantial	Other (specify):	
	Modest	·	

C2. Borrower Performance (cont'd)

3. Summary Rating of Borrower Performance on Project Implementation	5. SUMMARY RATING OF BORROWER PERFORMANCE
Overall rating Unsatisfactory	Overall rating
Average rating Unsatisfactory	
If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference:	Average rating Unsatisfactory
	If your overall rating differs from the average rating, please comment on reasons for this difference:
 Rate Borrower compliance with loan covenants / commitments: Unsatisfactory 	

D. Special Themes

 Indicate whether each of the foll concerns was a major project er 	owing social nphasis:	 Did the project place a major emphasis on poverty alleviation? 	○ Yes● No
Gender related issues Settlement / resettlement Beneficiary participation Community development Skills development Nutrition and food security Health improvement Other (specify):	No No No Yes No No	If Yes: Was this a Poverty Targeted Intervention? Did it emphasize broad-based growth with labor absorption? Did it emphasize human development (education, health, or nutrition)? Did it emphasize the provision of a social safety net?	 Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
2. Did the project have an unintend unexpected effect on social com- regardless of the project's object No If Yes, was the effect positive of		4. Indicate whether each of the follow concerns was a major project emp Natural resource management Air / water / soil quality Urban environmental quality Other (specify):	

D. Special Themes (cont'd)

Did the project have an unintended or unexpected effect on environmental concerns, regardless of the project's objectives? 7. Rate the priority of the project for audit 5. Medium No 8. Rate the priority of the project for impact If Yes, was the effect positive or negative? evaluation Medium Indicate whether each of the following private sector development (PSD) concerns was a major project 6. emphasis: Improvement in legal or incentive framework designed to foster PSD (e.g., trade, pricing) No Restructuring / privatization of public enterprises No Financial sector development No Direct government financial and / or technical assistance to the private sector No Other (specify):

E. Rating of ICR

Analysis		Future orientation	
Coverage of important subjects Recalcualtion of ERR or FRR Soundness of analysis Internal consistencies	Satisfactory Satisfactory	Plan for future project operation	Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Available Not Available
		Performance indicators for the project's operations phase Plan for monitoring and evaluation of future operations Borrower / cofinancier inputs Borrower input to ICR Borrower plan for future project operation	
	Satisfactory Satisfactory		
Evidence complete / convincing Adequacy of lessons learned	Satisfactory		
Aide-memoire of the ICR mission	Satisfactory		
		Borrower comments on ICR	Not Available
		Cofinancier comments on ICR	Not Available
2. SUMMARY RATING OF ICR		If your overall rating differs from the aver please comment on reasons for this diff	erage rating, ference:
Rate the quality of the ICR:	Satisfactory		
Average rating	Satisfactory		

 Rate the quality of borrower par project completion process on the project completion process on the process of the process of	ticipation in the ne following:		
Analysis	Not Available	Focus on lessons learned	Not Available
Concern with development impact	Not Available	Self-evaluation	Not Available
Internal consistency	Not Available	Evaluation of Bank	Not Available
Evidence to justify views	Not Available		A second of the second s

F. Summary of Ratings

SS ICR	EVM	
Unsatisfactory	Marginally Unsatisfactory	
Uncertain	Uncertain	
Modest	Modest	
Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
	Satisfactory	
to achieve most of its ma	of a marginally unsatisfactory outcome, best describes the	
	ICR Unsatisfactory Uncertain Modest Satisfactory Unsatisfactory between OED ratings to achieve most of its manich is the quide definition	ICREVMUnsatisfactoryMarginally UnsatisfactoryUncertainUncertainModestModestSatisfactorySatisfactoryUnsatisfactoryUnsatisfactorySatisfactorySatisfactory

G. Overall Judgements / Miscellaneous Comments

L En	nter any overall	iudgements or	rationales and	miscellaneous	comments below.	
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The ICR might have examined the relationship between this project and related adjustment operations more closely. As the ICR does note "while measures taken and investments implemented under the project have strengthened institutional capacity, physical facilities and service performance in the subsector, the production effect was muted untilsignificant policy reform measures to improve farmers' production incentives were implemented in the context of AgSAC (Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit, approved in FY92) (para xvii). This raises the issue as to whether the Bank might not have made more effective use of this linkage earlier. The PCR (prepared in 1991) for the First and Second Adjustment Credits (SACI, approved in FY89) raises the same issue: "Parallel crdits also had a potentially important role to play in sustaining and deepening dialogue between the Government and the Bank on specific issues. For example, the emphasis on the cocca sector was much less in SACII than SACI because the institutional and marketing reform elements were subsumed under the Cocca Rehabilitation Project. In the event, the planned study on the reform of cocca marketing was not carried out and a key opportunity for further dialogue on reducing COCOBOD operating costs was thereby missed. In the face of fiscal pressure, this effectively prevented full achievement of the SAC II objective of improving cocca producer incentives." (para 62)

This suggests that a lesson from the project is that the Bank should look more closely at issues related to "local commitment and project ownership". The experience in the CRP suggests that it is important, when dealing with a significant sector where one actor, in this case COCOBOD, is predominant and has substantial political clout, to ensure that other actors, such as the Ministry of Finance, which can provide some pressure for change on the major agency, have some effective levers to do so, such as a SAL or AgSAL, where they are the lead agency. This is an issue for the overall country stategy, rather than the performance of the appraisal, which was rated deficient in the ICR.

ICR/PIF COVER SHEET

DATE:

OED II	D: C1854		Division: 1
	Country:	Ghana	
	Project Description:	Cocoa Rehabilitati	on
	Sector:	01 / Agricultur	re
	Subsector:	01.05 / Perenn. Cr	rops
	Lending Instrument Type	e :	SIL
L/C:		C	21854
	Original IDA/IBRD Commit	ments: 40,000),000 (\$US)
	Total Cancellations:		0 (\$US)
	Key Dates	ORIGINAL	ACTUAL
	Approval		2/01/87
Signing/Agreement			2/18/88
	Effectiveness	11/15/88 1	1/15/88
	Closing	6/30/94	6/30/96
	PCR Receipt in OED		6/30/97

EVALUATOR NAME:

John English

EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

Please confirm the above information, sign and date this sheet and return a photo-copy to Helen Sioris when the EVM/Regional memo/PIF packet is submitted to OED Director.

***** TO BE C	OMPLETED BY EVALUATION OFF:	ICER *****************
*		*
* Date of Review:	/	/ *
*	(mm / dd)	/ yy) *
*		*
* Name of Reviewer:		*
*		*
*		*
* Type of Evaluation:	PCR Review P	AR Review *
*		*
*		*
	are there major difference	es in the judgements *
* from those made in the P	CR Review?	*
*		*
*	Yes	No *
*		*
 * If Yes, please discuss i 	n detail on page 26 of the	PIF *
*		*
*		*
*	ORIGINAL	LATEST *
 Date of Physical C 	ompletion	*
*	(mm/dd/yy) (mm/dd/yy) *
*		*
 Total Project Cost 	. (ŞUS mill)	
*		*
* Applicable Disburs		*
* (see note 11 in th	le PIF, page 31)	· .
*		*
* Number of Supervis	ion Missions:	* ب
*		**************************************
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Sept. 30, 1997