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Other #: 353972B

Davis - Memorandum on Monitoring and Evaluation for Future Transmigration Projects

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Robert Sadove (AEPLS)

DATE: June 21, 1978

FROM: Gloria Davis GD

SUBJECT: Memo on Monitoring and Evaluation
for Future Transmigration Projects

Monitoring and evaluation appears to be a sizeable component of our present transmigration program. Loan 1318-IND allocates US\$1.85 million for this activity alone. With this degree of commitment it is important that monitoring and evaluation be done in a way useful to the Government of Indonesia, the Department of Transmigration, project level administrators and the Bank.

This memo provides some of the background material needed for a general discussion of this topic. It begins by reviewing those monitoring systems involved in Trans I and very briefly summarizes their problems. In the end it invites comments on two questions which must be answered in planning the nature of monitoring and evaluation in future transmigration projects.

- (a) what is to be monitored?
- (b) by whom?

The Experience of Trans I

The following organizations all do some form of monitoring and evaluation related to transmigration programs.

National Level

1. BAPPENAS - Indonesia's National Planning Organization

In April of 1977 BAPPENAS began a monitoring system for projects which have a value of over Rp 300 million or have a foreign exchange component of US\$750,000 or more, this includes all Bank funded transmigration programs. The system is intended to provide an early warning of programs failing to attain targets, and to promote sector integration and national planning. Project managers are required to complete quarterly forms specifying targets and expenditures. Problem projects are tagged and referred to the directorates involved.

Transmigration Department Systems

2. The Directorate General of Transmigration

The DGT has several reporting systems for all transmigration projects under its authority.

- (a) Weekly and monthly reports on births, deaths, community organizations, crop yields, etc. are collected on all projects under DGT supervision

(106 projects in February 1978). This material is compiled for government records, annual reports and the like.

- (b) Conditions requiring immediate attention are not noted through any formal monitoring system. Instead letters are sent from the field offices to the appropriate directorates. Fertilizer shortages and conflicts of authority between agencies are examples of problems which would be referred to specific directors for action and resolution.
- (c) Supervision is done by the directorates responsible for the activities involved. For example, supervision of construction standards is done by Persiapan, the Project Preparation Directorate.

None of these monitoring functions is linked to an overall evaluation program, though, of course, policy decisions arise from the experience of the directors which is in turn based on the quality of information which they receive.

3. FAO/UNDP - Department of Transmigration

N. A. Hameed an FAO economist working in the Transmigration Office has prepared a monitoring and evaluation system which could be used for all transmigration projects. So far system has not been implemented because DGT lacks the money, manpower and commitment to carry it out. The effort has also been diffused by the fact that non-standard projects (including all Bank projects) have their own idiosyncratic requirements for monitoring and evaluation.

Monitoring and Evaluation for TRANS I (See Attachment from Appraisal Report)

4. Long-term Social and Economic Monitoring

According to the appraisal report (1119b-IND), the objective of long-term monitoring was to provide "regular information on the socio-economic aspects of development and progress of the settlers and the settlement area" over a five year period. Topics to be studied included base line materials on the migrant's condition in Java; agricultural adaptation; market development; social adaptation, and the effect of leadership and community organization on community growth.

At appraisal it was determined that DGT would contract this service to the Center for Rural Sociological Research at Bogor Agricultural University. The specifics of the studies to be conducted were to be determined by a Research Advisory Board consisting of representatives from the various ministries and universities concerned with rural sociological studies.

Following successful negotiation of the loan agreement CRSR-Bogor submitted a project proposal which was rejected (1) by BAPPENAS because of staff duplication and high salaries, (2) by DGT in consultation with the Bank because the proposal left sampling, methodology and staff deployment unspecified. Shortly thereafter (Spring 1977) DGT appropriated Rp 12,000,000 to allow CRSR to begin a preliminary study which would provide baseline information while the proposal was reworked. CRSR understood that this study would serve as evidence of their capacity to continue the study and lead to the release of contract funds. The ensuing survey had serious methodological problems and as of June 1978 the contract for the research funds (Rp 400 million) had still not been signed. (This project will be discussed again in section II).

5. Health Monitoring and Evaluation

According to the appraisal report the innovative aspects of the health delivery system "required careful monitoring and evaluation of disease prevalence levels, social acceptance and utilization rates, and cost-effectiveness of alternative interventions. Short-term information needs for immediate corrective action would be met through regular recording and reporting of routine health service statistics. Long-term information for assessing project performance and outcome and for developing criteria of social acceptance and cost-effectiveness of rural health interventions would be provided by special studies."

At this point, standard (and relatively reliable) monitoring is being provided by the Department of Health. Supervision has been done by a consulting physician from the Bank. No long term or special studies have been proposed.

6. Short-Term Monitoring and Evaluation System

This system was intended to provide the day to day monitoring which would anticipate and prevent problems. The appraisal report recommended that a consulting team be hired to provide the ~~for~~ technical assistance needed to design a system suitable for administration by the PMU (project management unit). It also recommended periodic supervision of the PMU by the technical assistance team. Several firms submitted bids for this contract but the successful bid was from an Indonesian group, P.T. Unisystems, who had written their proposal in conjunction with the US based management firm PAS. Prior to the signing of this contract several things happened:

- (a) serious doubts were raised about the ability of the P.T. Unisystems to carry out the contract without the help of PAS, thus bringing into question the role of Unisystems itself;

- (b) BAPPENAS stopped the contract over the question of local salaries;
- (c) SCET, a French consulting team brought in to provide technical assistance began to define its role in terms of monitoring and supervision.

This contract has not, and is not likely to be signed.

7. Consulting Services and Supervision

Technically SCET International contracted to provide consulting services to the PMU (Project Management Unit) on such things as water supply, personnel management and civil engineering. Over the past year, however, they have been frustrated in their advisory role and as the only western team regularly in the field they have become the group which the resident staff relies upon for field reports and evaluation of project development. Under these circumstances the role of P.T. Unisystems has come to look increasingly redundant, hence the decision not to go ahead with the Unisystems contract.

The inability of SCET to provide technical assistance even when it was needed raises several interesting points. Clearly DGT was ambivalent about SCET from the first:

- (a) they may have been resistant to outside intervention;
- (b) more realistically, SCET was brought in too late to be useful.
 - (i) From the Indonesian point of view SCET was critical of, and tampering with plans which had already been laid.
 - (ii) In addition, the DGT itself lacked the flexibility to respond quickly to consultant suggestions even when they were positive, and they no doubt anticipated the impatience this would generate.

In retrospect it seems unrealistic for the Bank to have assumed that a high powered consulting firm could be laid over a relatively weak administrative institution without considerable tension resulting between the two.

There are several serious problems implicit in the preceding discussions:

- (a) the monitoring and evaluation system was designed to acquire information on bank projects alone; as such
 - (i) it did not arise out of needs perceived by DGT;
 - (ii) it did not build the institutions within DGT necessary to make it work. As evidence of this

- (a) no provisions have been made to fund or call together the research committee;
 - (b) there is no point of articulation between the requirements of this project and the larger needs of DGT.
2. It provides a system of data collection, but assumes, perhaps mistakenly, that

- (a) synthesis will occur at the lower levels;
- (b) that it will make a difference when received. When the institutions collecting the material are exogenous to those responsible for decisions this is hardly inevitable. At this point neither IPB nor SCET have the kind of feedback role implied by the notion of monitoring.

The Problem for Trans II

In determining who should do monitoring and evaluation in the future several questions arise:

- (a) what local resources are available?
 - (i) what is their capacity?
 - (ii) what should their relationship with expatriate consultants be?
- (b) what are the unintended consequences of working within the local sector?

The idea of using indigenous organizations to provide monitoring and evaluation services is a good one. However, Indonesian resources are extremely limited and for this reason there have been serious problems both with P.T. Unisystems and IPB. The problems are of scale, communications and capacity.

Universities and consulting firms which would have been scratching out a living four years ago are now given enormous contracts (the IPB contract alone is for US\$1 million). Most of this money is sunk into data collection, analysis remains poor. The reasons are obvious: few institutions have the capacity to apply for contracts; even within the best organizations, not enough high quality staff is available; and few Indonesian organizations have experience doing synthetic work on this scale. Furthermore, those who are doing monitoring and evaluation have not generally been involved in development work and have only a limited knowledge of what is needed. On the other hand, contracting groups have not been quick to work out satisfactory consulting arrangements. P.T. Unisystems essentially required PAS to do both design and implementation; and IPB has not hired consultants in spite of the fact that a foreign exchange component in the loan is provided for this purpose.

Finally, bank funded contracts for sociologically oriented evaluation studies in academic sectors are having several unintended consequences:

- (a) they have focussed on the best universities in Indonesia which are already over committed, further straining manpower there;
- (b) they have pulled the best social scientists out of teaching and into administrative work, thus, in a sense, killing the geese that were laying the golden eggs;
- (c) they have priced other development agencies completely out of the picture, and caused considerable resentment in so doing.

For all these reasons the use of indigenous institutions will be an important one to discuss. A number of issues are intertwined in this discussion:

- (a) the degree to which of monitoring and evaluation is internal or external to the agencies involved;
- (b) the extent to which the Bank, and individual Bank projects in particular must take into consideration the allocation of scarce manpower resources in the country as a whole;
- (c) the kind of monitoring to be done, its content and scale;
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Your comments on this and other related issues are solicited.

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