

THE WORLD BANK GROUP ARCHIVES

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AUTHORIZED

Folder Title: OEDDR - Divisional Files - NGOs Nongovernmental Organizations - Volume 1 - Correspondence 01

Folder ID: 1738065

Subseries: Subject Files of the Directors, Operations Evaluation

Series: Records of the Director, Operations Evaluation Department

Dates: 01/01/1995 – 12/31/1995

Fonds: Records of the Office of Operations Evaluation

ISAD Reference Code: WB IBRD/IDA OPE-01-02

Digitized: 03/18/2022

To cite materials from this archival folder, please follow the following format:
[Descriptive name of item], [Folder Title], Folder ID [Folder ID], ISAD(G) Reference Code [Reference Code], [Each Level Label as applicable], World Bank Group Archives, Washington, D.C., United States.

The records in this folder were created or received by The World Bank in the course of its business.

The records that were created by the staff of The World Bank are subject to the Bank's copyright.

Please refer to <http://www.worldbank.org/terms-of-use-earchives> for full copyright terms of use and disclaimers.



THE WORLD BANK

Washington, D.C.

© International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / International Development Association or

The World Bank

1818 H Street NW

Washington DC 20433

Telephone: 202-473-1000

Internet: www.worldbank.org

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AUTHORIZED

OEDDR: NGOs
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS



1738065

R2001-297 Other # 30 Box # 187168B
Non-Governmental Organizations [NGO] - OEDDR - Division Files -
Correspondence - Volume 1

DECLASSIFIED
WBG Archives

see NFO

cc: Messrs./Mmes. Bruno, Koch-Weser, Kaji, Lomax, Serageldin, Baird, Squire,
Alexander, John D. Clark, Aguirre-Sacasa, Thumm, Guerrero, Slade, Penalver,
Albouy, Weaving

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: February 23, 1996

TO: Mr. James D. Wolfensohn, President

FROM: Mr. Robert Picciotto, Director General, Operations Evaluation

EXTENSION: 84569

SUBJECT: **OXFAM Discussion Paper on Impact Evaluation.**

1. Assessing NGO performance and accountability is relatively new. Therefore, it is good news that OXFAM is grappling seriously with the methodological challenges posed by impact evaluation. The discussion paper is promising, as work in progress that identifies directions OXFAM is exploring. It is not based on extensive first-hand evaluation experience.

2. OXFAM defines impact as "the positive and sustainable changes that programmes aim to support poor women and men achieve". The strength of OXFAM's concern for people-centered development comes through clearly in the paper's emphasis on: a) making impact assessment a participatory process, b) making beneficiaries' assessments of impact central to evaluation, c) paying close attention to the differential impacts of development projects on women and men, and d) designing assessment systems that measure changes in the ability of beneficiaries to act for themselves. The Bank can learn from OXFAM's attention to these issues.

3. With respect to tools, the main emphasis of the paper is on qualitative tools that enable beneficiary views to be captured quickly and cost-effectively. This emphasis is justified because these tools are people-centered, and support OXFAM's mission directly. But tools for comparative analysis and strategic planning are also needed if OXFAM is to fulfill the more conventional planning and evaluation functions also identified in the paper.

4. The paper recognizes the competing demands posed by OXFAM's diverse stakeholders and their divergent interests in evaluation. In particular, there is an implicit concern (which we must heed) that the financial muscle of bilateral and multilateral agencies may reorient NGO accountability away from the grassroots, towards criteria defined by donors. Interestingly, the paper recognizes OXFAM's need to evaluate the impact of its advocacy work and empowerment, which would take impact evaluation into areas where evaluation methods are ill-defined.

5. The paper is weak on efficiency grounds. It does not come to grips with the question of what would have happened "without the project". It ignores the issue of accounting for external influences on outcomes. These are thorny issues for evaluators everywhere.

6. On the whole, OXFAM's approach complements OED's current impact evaluation methodology. It adds a participatory dimension which we have only begun to build into our evaluation activities. Hence, there would be merit in exploring collaboration with OXFAM as well as other NGOs that approach performance measurement and accountability seriously. This would be done in a way which supports development of evaluation methods and of evaluation capacities in developing countries.

7. A number of initiatives which involve close collaboration with NGOs are already underway in the Bank, among them OED's evaluation of the role of NGO's in Bank-supported development projects and DEC's review of adjustment operations in which OED is associated. For this reason, I would suggest that you take the opportunity to send the attached letter to Stewart Wallis at OXFAM, seeking partnership with OXFAM in evaluation to improve the economic and social results of development assistance.

Attachment

JAMES D. WOLFENSOHN
President

February 23, 1996

Mr. Stewart Wallis
Overseas Director
OXFAM UK/I
274 Banbury Road
Oxford, England
OX2 7DZ

Dear Stewart,

Peter Nicholl passed me a copy of a recent OXFAM UK/International Discussion Paper on Impact Assessment that he received from you. I recognize that this is a work in progress, but I want to say that it impressed me. I was especially pleased to see the attention OXFAM's paper gives to the role of participation in impact assessment, to listening to beneficiaries, to paying close attention to the differential impact of development projects on women and men, and to designing assessment systems that measure changes in the ability of people to act for themselves. The emphasis the paper places on qualitative measures that capture beneficiary opinion quickly and cost-effectively is commendable.

Sustainable development impact on the ground is the hallmark of success in our business. Like you, I am concerned about development impact assessment. A number of initiatives are now underway in the Bank which involve close collaboration with NGOs, among them is an evaluation of the role of NGOs in Bank-supported development projects and a review of adjustment operations. I also understand from the Director General, Operations Evaluation, Mr. Robert Picciotto, that collaboration between the Operations Evaluation Department, OXFAM and other NGOs with respect to the Bank's impact evaluation activities will be actively explored. I regard these as important developments

So, thank you again for the discussion paper. Please keep me informed of your progress in impact evaluation and any further ideas you may have for NGO-Bank partnerships in improving the economic and social results of development assistance.

Sincerely yours,

James D. Wolfensohn

bcc: Messrs. Peter Nicholl, Robert Picciotto, Lyn Squire, John Clark

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

file

DATE: December 21, 1995

TO: See Distribution

FROM: John D. Clark, OPRPG



DEC 27 1995

EXTENSION: 31840

SUBJECT: **Mr. Wolfensohn's Interaction with NGOs**

Attached please find a note which summarizes the experiences of Mr. Wolfensohn's interaction with NGOs over the first six months of his presidency, identifies follow-up issues, and highlights lessons learned. It is meant to provide guidance to the coordinators of upcoming trips, identify broader institutional lessons, and generally inform Bank staff about the extent and content of Mr. Wolfensohn's interaction with NGOs.

The idea for the note emerged from an initial meeting convened by Maurice Strong to discuss strategies for Mr. Wolfensohn's interaction with NGOs. At this and a subsequent meeting - which included staff from Mr. Wolfensohn's office, the NGO Unit, EXT, the coordinators of Mr. Wolfensohn's trips and some central vice-presidencies -- the NGO Unit was asked to prepare notes summarizing Mr. Wolfensohn's interactions with NGOs.

Please feel free to share with other staff.

Distribution:

Messrs./Mmes.:

Strong, Lomax, Horiguchi, Bassinette (EXC), Jaycox (AFRVP), Cheetham (EAPVP), Kavalski (ECAVP), Serageldin (ESDVP), Choksi (HCOVP), Burki, (LACVP), Koch-Weser (MNAVP), Malloch Brown (EXTDR), Lafourcade (AF4DR), Marshall (AF1DR), Adams (AF2DR), Sarbib (AF5DR), Hope (EA2DR), Haug (EA3DR), Dervis (EC2DR), Huang (EC3DR), Nankani (LA1DR), Segura (LA2DR), Isenman (LA3DR), Sud (MN2DR), Alexander (OPRDR), Katsu (AF4CI), Zulfigar (AF1MW), McGinnis (AF5ML), Falconer (AF2UG), Bottelier (EA2CH), Hamidian-Rad (EA3CO), de Tray (EA3RS), Ebiri (EC2AL), Long (EC2HU), Carter (EC3MO), Hasan (EC3TA), Millan (LA1AR), Mahar (LA1BR), Saez (LA3CL), Carr (LA2HT), Pulley (LA3JM), Dahlman (LA2MX), Knudsen (MNCWG), Pearson (CFASP), Lamb (EXTLD), El Maaroufi (EXTEO), Miyamura (TOKDR), Ahmad (AG1EI), Baird (DECVP), Stephens (EXTCU), Kirby (EXTDR), Martin (EXTIM), Voegele (EA2RS), Cohen (ESDVP), Horvai (EC2DR), Martin-Brown (ESDVP), Sheehan (LA1EU), Shafik (MNAVP), Armitage (PSP), Blarel (SA2AW), Denning, Jorgensen (AFRVP), Jones-Carroll (AFRCA), Bergen, Chinje, Wai (AFREA), Cleaver (AFTDR), Sullivan, Francis, Donnelly-Roark, Kessel (AFTCB), Van Holst Pellekaan, Blackden, Drabo, Grieco (AFTHR), Edstrom (AF1DR), Pomerantz, Mason (AF1C2), Kafka (AF1C3), de Regt (AF1DS), Duncan (AF1HR), Klasen (AF1ZA), Jones (AF2EI), Morris-Hughes (AF4PH), Woodward (AF5HR), De Leva (AF5PH), McCalla (AGRDR), Wagner (AGRAF), M. Koch-Weser (ASTEN), Bennett, Goldberg, Kozel (ASTHR), Lieberman, Malhotra (CGP), Shakow (DCS), Bruno, Ansu (DECVP), Picciotto (DCO), Barrett (EAPVP), Madavo (EA1DR), Piazza (EA2RS), Fisher, Guggenheim (EA3RS), Mills, Proskuryakov (EC3HR), Marc (EC4MS), Van der Oever (EDIDM), Bruns, Edgerton (EDIHR), Sheram (EDINP), Steer, Goodland (ENVDR), Newcombe (ENVCV), Rees, Kjorven (ENVLW), Davis, Narayan, Aronson, Salmen, Jacobs, Sequeira (ENVSP), Maguire (EXTDR), van Praag (EXTEO), Voyadzis, Mitchell, Ishikawa, Hensch (EXTIM), Bergman, Cullen, Simmons (EXTME), Iwasaki (EXTTP), Rischard, Chaparro (FPDVP), Donovan (FRMDR), Rueda-Sabater, Lav (FRMRO), Rachlin (HCOVP), de Ferranti, Feachem, van der Gaag, Merrick (HDD), Lateef (IECDR), Kamel (IECIF), Anderson, Stern (IENDR), Ody (LACVP), Partridge (LATEN), Ecevit (LATSO), van Domelen (LA1HR), Hazelton (LA3NR), Gruss (LEGMN), Ritchie (MN1DR), Gandhi (MN1NE), Aguirre-Sacasa (OEDDR), Slade, Gibbs (OEDD1), Belli, Bhatia, Fernandez, Fumo, Hanan, Hindle, Hino, Malena, Mosse, Pachter, Rajapatirana, Raphaeli, Ruivivar, Wasfy (OPRPG), Squire (PRDDR), Jimenez (PRDPH), Iksander, Fleisig, Webster, Chidzero, (PSD), Husain, Meesook, Nguyen, Williams, Bamberger, Bischoff (PSP), Salop, Drysdale, Hamilton (SASVP), Mitchell (SASCA), Herz (SA1PH), Donoso Clark (SA2PH), Bissel (SA2RS), Annez, Moser (TWURD), Gwilliam (TWUTD).

Mr. Wolfensohn's Interaction with NGOs

BACKGROUND

Since formally taking up office on June 1, 1995, Mr. Wolfensohn has had a high level of interaction with members of civil society, especially non governmental organizations (NGOs). He has traveled to five of the regions where the Bank has operations -- Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, East Asia, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia -- to meet with government, business and civil society, and has also held meetings with NGOs in Washington and in Europe (including in London prior to taking office).

In light of Mr. Wolfensohn's emphasis on interaction with NGOs (and other elements of civil society) for the future of the Bank, it was decided it would be useful to prepare a note which would pull together key lessons of experience from his meetings with NGOs. This would serve to share information among Bank staff who are involved in Mr. Wolfensohn's meetings with NGOs (particularly the regional travel coordinators) or who wish to be informed of them, identify follow-up issues and draw out relevant, Bank-wide institutional lessons for dissemination.

UNITED STATES (Environment)

On April 3, Mr. Wolfensohn met with a group of US environmental NGOs at the suggestion of Al Gore whose office organized the meeting. Participants were: National Wildlife Federation (NWF), Conservation International (CI), International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), World Wildlife Fund-US (WWF-US), Bank Information Center (BIC), Friends of the Earth (FoE), International Rivers Network (IRN), Sierra Club, and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF).

Format/ NGO Issues

By all accounts, this meeting went very well and was viewed very positively by most of the NGOs. The NGOs particularly appreciated Mr. Wolfensohn's frankness, openness and straightforwardness. Mr. Wolfensohn said he was determined to bring the Bank into a new era and that he truly believed the Bank had a purpose. He asked NGOs for a six-month "truce" during which time he would be able to get a sense of the Bank and figure out how to begin changing it. He also appealed to NGOs to work together with the Bank on common goals.

The NGOs made presentations on a number of different issues on which, by their accounts, Mr. Wolfensohn was clearly up to speed and informed. On the issue of *dams and large-scale infrastructure projects*, which one of the participants repeatedly raised, Mr. Wolfensohn eventually said it was too soon for him to have the information he needed to discuss this properly, but suggested talking at a later stage.

Follow-Up

Mr. Wolfensohn invited each of the participants to give him a 1-2 page note outlining their "dreams for the Bank" and to let him know who they think he should meet with in his upcoming trips. NWF and Sierra Club have both sent Mr. Wolfensohn letters to date.

UNITED KINGDOM

On May 19, 1995, prior to formally taking up office, Mr. Wolfensohn met in London with the chairs of Oxfam UK, the outgoing and new directors of Save the Children Fund (SCF) and the NGO Chair of the NGO-World Bank Committee. The meeting was set up by the Bank's London office as part of Mr. Wolfensohn's short visit to the UK.

Format

In opening, Mr. Wolfensohn said that the purpose of the meeting was to establish contact with UK development NGOs prior to his trip to Africa and stressed that Africa was "front and centre" for the Bank. The trip would be a learning experience for him and he was approaching it with a totally open mind. He said that he was looking for a fresh start and to change the learned patterns of behavior which exist on both sides.

NGOs were pleased that Mr. Wolfensohn was visiting Africa so early on and that he is keen to interact with civil society. They welcomed his wish to establish independent sources of information and were encouraged by his frankness.

NGO Issues

Oxfam stressed a desire for *constructive engagement* and its willingness to share with the Bank its' wealth of grassroots field experience. Five specific issues were raised: i) need to involve NGO/community organizations in design of policies and projects; ii) greater *transparency*, especially with respect to the CAS; iii) *equity promotion* to be built into economic reform programs; iv) protection of access to basic *health and education*; and v) need for reduction of *multilateral debt*. Mr. Wolfensohn asked for a written note on these five issues.

Save the Children Fund stressed the need for an *enhanced Resident Representative role* in Bank-NGO interaction and raised concern about eroding parliamentary/public *support for aid* in the North.

Third World Network expressed concern about: i) *Africa's marginal role* in the new world of capital flows; ii) the growing number of African countries which do not receive Bank lending (e.g., Zaire, Liberia, Rwanda) due to the impossibility of working with governments there; and, iii) the *sustainability* of Bank-supported programs in countries like Ghana and Uganda when IDA flows are decreasing but IDA repayments are rising.

Follow-Up

Mr. Wolfensohn had suggested a second meeting on July 11 when he would "report back" on his African tour, but this was not possible due to time constraints. However, NGO

participants did send Mr. Wolfensohn their thoughts in writing and these are being followed-up on by the NGO Unit. In particular, Oxfam has re-iterated their issues in writing and at the June 30 meeting in Washington (see below).

AFRICA

On June 16-26, 1995, Mr. Wolfensohn traveled to five African countries: Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, Malawi, and South Africa. This was his first official visit to the field since taking up his post on June 1.

Format

Mr. Wolfensohn met with representatives of civil society in every country, although this did not necessarily include NGOs each time. The meetings were set up by the Resident Mission with assistance from the country departments. At each meeting, there was a good cross-section of NGO participation, with between 10-15 both local and international NGOs.

Mr. Wolfensohn opened each meeting with an acknowledgment of NGO critiques and by welcoming concrete suggestions from the participants. The NGO critique, he stated, has undermined IDA and without IDA Africa is in trouble. In this sense, the Bank and NGOs are in the same boat. Following these opening remarks, each representative introduced him/herself and their organizations, and made their presentation.

NGO Issues

The *debt* question as well as the issue of *structural adjustment* were principal themes to emerge from discussions. Mr. Wolfensohn committed himself to seriously address the question of debt emphasizing that different options were being explored within the Bank and that he was not yet able to make any decisions. On structural adjustment, he said that although he did not think all adjustment had gone wrong, he was willing to rethink adjustment programs.

Several participants emphasized *perceptions about the Bank*. The institution is viewed as working exclusively with governments and not with people, and as being arrogant. It was pointed out that lack of cooperation and consultation is not a partnership at all. Mr. Wolfensohn reiterated that he was committing the Bank to work in consultation with NGOs.

NGOs were interested in exploring the ability of the Bank and NGOs to work together and specifically raised the question of *financing of NGOs*.

While NGOs recognized that Mr. Wolfensohn's very presence was significant, they also stressed that the ability of NGOs to express themselves is dependant on the *status of civil society*.

Follow-Up

Each of the Resident Missions will establish an NGO liaison officer who will actively interact with the NGO community. This will include holding monthly meetings at the Resident Missions with different groups of NGOs on substantive issues. The first round of meetings

took place in July, and reports are being sent to Mr. Wolfensohn monthly and being circulated to Bank staff. Terms of reference for the liaison positions are being finalized.

A suggested role of the NGO liaison is also to identify for each incoming mission specific NGOs and individuals in civil society that the mission should interact with. *It is vital that the interaction between missions (ESW and lending) and NGOs be actively encouraged*

Increasing Bank-NGO operational collaboration, both in the design and planning stage of projects and in the delivery of projects. It will be important to identify the sectors in which the NGOs have delivery capacity -- credit, agricultural services, education, health -- and then to ensure that they are part of the project.

NGO capacity building. To enhance capacity for NGOs, training opportunities could be identified including Bank training courses on specific sectors, and generic courses on business and financial management. EDI may provide the right institutional setting for these courses and sectoral training courses would enable us to communicate the larger macro and sectoral side of the Bank's work.

While increased operational collaboration and capacity-building support will be useful, the question of whether the Regions should have access to *grant funds for NGOs* needs to be explored.

UNITED STATES (Structural Adjustment)

Format

On June 30, Mr. Wolfensohn met with 17 representatives of US-based NGOs (operational and advocacy) and research institutes to hear their views and concerns on structural adjustment. This was the first in a series of structured, issue-specific meetings which Mr. Wolfensohn has initiated.

Mr. Wolfensohn opened the meeting by stressing that in his first few months he is making a thorough review of the Bank and by expressing a very strong commitment to serious dialogue with NGOs. He stated that he is keen to work together with NGOs on the problems and alternatives to adjustment.

Many NGOs felt that Mr. Wolfensohn's arrival marked a new phase in the Bank's history and in Bank-NGO relations. This was seen as an important event also because NGOs feel that the Bank has not taken them seriously up to now. Many NGOs felt that the Bank's survival depends on the NGO constituency and that the Bank needs NGO sources of grassroots information.

NGO Issues

Many participants harshly criticized the Bank's *adjustment* record, particularly the devastating impact that the emphasis on "rolling back the state" has had on the quality of governance. The weakening of environmental conservation agencies was particularly emphasized.

Most felt that the Bank does not adequately address the *macro-micro linkages* to ensure that the poor have access to the opportunities provided by adjustment as well as to safeguard the poor from the negative effects of adjustment.

Participants stressed the need to *broaden the national debate on adjustment*, to foster deeper *ownership*, and greater *transparency* and responsiveness. Likewise, the need for participation of civil society in planning aid and development strategies - and not just projects and social funds - was also emphasized.

Follow-Up

Mr. Wolfensohn suggested all participants send him their ideas in writing and asked John Clark of the NGO Unit to handle this follow-up. Several NGOs have written to Mr. Wolfensohn and below is an outline of points made and action taken to date:

A group of the NGOs who attended the meeting - Development GAP, Friends of the Earth, Church World Services, Oxfam-America, Oxfam-International, the Institute for Policy Studies, World Vision and World Wildlife Fund - are in the process of developing a proposal for a participatory review of Bank adjustment lending. They have indicated that a detailed proposal is being shared with a range of developing-country NGOs in a consultative and that the group anticipates sharing a tentative draft with the NGO Unit early in the New Year.

World Vision has suggested that a serious and open review of the impact of structural adjustment in at least three countries be undertaken. (This point will also be a part of the broader NGO proposal). The review would be in-country and would include NGOs, government officials and Bank staff. The NGO Unit has discussed this proposal with PSP and DECVP and received a generally positive response. The modalities of how such a study would be conducted have not been discussed. The main issue is whether the client countries will be amenable to such a review, and this will have to be explored.

Oxfam International have made two proposals:

i) The Bank should open up the process of dialogue on the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) to civil society in about half a dozen [un-specified] countries. While agreeing on the need for maximum transparency, at the meeting Mr. Wolfensohn had noted that bringing the CAS into the public domain might not be in the best interests of our client countries, and could result in a document that was dominated by special interest groups to the point of being impossible to implement. However, he did feel it would be future good practice for staff preparing a CAS to have intensive discussions with NGOs and others knowledgeable about poverty was seen to be good practice for the future.

ii) The Bank should review access of the poor to basic education and primary health care services during economic reform again in 5 or 6 countries. Particular concern was raised about cost recovery in the health sector and the impact of user fees on the poor.

MENA (West Bank and Gaza)***Format***

On July 9, 1995, Mr. Wolfensohn met with a group of primarily Palestinian NGOs and some civil society representatives in Gaza.

NGO Issues

The *Bank* was seen as being partial to the Israelis and Hanan Ashrawi (former PLO spokeswoman and now head of her own organization) complained that the meeting could not be held in Jerusalem due to Israeli opposition. Mr. Wolfensohn replied that he is very conscious of the need to remain impartial and that the Bank will take no sides or positions. He had deliberately avoided the issue of Jerusalem in order to maintain credibility on all sides.

Declining funds for NGOs was of major concern to participants. While acknowledging that the Bank cannot support NGOs directly, Mr. Wolfensohn stated that the objective is for a Palestinian government to eventually be supporting NGOs with World Bank funds. Some resources do come from surplus Holst Fund money, but they are simply not sufficient.

NGOs emphasized the need to invest more in *technical/vocational training and capacity-building*. The Dean of Bir Zeit University complained that funding to Universities was scarce and suggested the Bank should be more active in supporting education and helping speed up the donor effort. Mr. Wolfensohn replied that while he would support Mr. Arafat in raising money for private universities, the Bank must focus on *basic education* and on *women*. He did say he would examine the question of training and, when asked, that World Bank technical training programs could go through universities.

Follow-Up

The major outcome of the meeting was a proposal to donors and to the Palestinian Authority to establish an international trust fund to channel additional funds and technical support to the NGO sector in the West Bank and Gaza. This initiative is in recognition of the fact that NGOs have suffered funding losses over the last five years, initially as a result of the Gulf War and then as a result of donor funds being diverted to the PA. Donors would make contributions into a pooled trust fund which the World Bank would establish and administer on their behalf. Trust fund proceeds would be channeled to PVOs and NGOs through an intermediary operating in the West Bank and Gaza.

In a letter to Julia Taft of InterAction dated July 24, Mr. Wolfensohn briefly described the proposal and added that Bank staff will be in close contact with the InterAction West Bank/Gaza Committee during this process given the committee members' considerable experience in designing funds of this type.

In October, a Bank design mission -- which included a team from the US NGO Pact, Inc. (from the InterAction Committee) -- visited West Bank and Gaza, and held extensive discussions with Palestinian and international NGOs and the Palestinian Authority about the design of the Trust Fund. The NGO Trust Fund has been adopted by the Palestinian Authority as one of its Core Investment Projects (even though the TF would not be managed by the PA);

in November, the Ministry of Planning sent out letters to about 30 donors with specific requests to support various Core Projects; 11 of these letters included requests for support to the NGO Trust Fund.

The Bank sent a mission in December to work with a committee appointed by the PA Cabinet to draft an NGO framework law; the mission shared with the committee some examples of good recent NGO framework legislation (Bulgaria, Estonia, South Africa) and will return in Jan/Feb to do further work with the committee. It is hoped that the Bank's input will help the PA put together one of the better NGO laws in the region.

At the time of writing, next steps are further internal review in the Bank followed by a return mission to WBG planned for January to conclude discussions on the design of the Trust Fund. Presuming that fundraising efforts have been sufficiently successful by that time, the Bank would then begin the process of selecting an NGO for the position of Trust Fund Manager (the TFM would select grantees and would administer the grants scheme). The objective is to have the TFM selected in the spring and in situ by the end of the FY.

LAC

In July 1995 Mr. Wolfensohn visited Haiti, Jamaica, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia.

Format

Mr. Wolfensohn met with NGOs in nearly all the countries he visited, except for Colombia (which was a brief visit with government) and Haiti. As in Africa, there were up to 12-15 NGO representatives at each meeting. The Resident Mission decided Mr. Wolfensohn should meet primarily with local NGOs who do not often have the opportunity for such direct contact.

The announcement that the LAC Region would establish NGO liaison posts in each of its resident mission at the Paipa, Colombia Bank-NGO Conference last spring was seen as an "opening" which served to pave the way for Mr. Wolfensohn's arrival.

NGO Issues

Decentralization was the main theme of the discussion with NGOs. There seemed to be perhaps somewhat less criticisms by LAC NGOs than African ones - this may have been due to the fact that JDW met with many environmental NGOs. While Africa has had a history of strong involvement by external or international NGOs, the NGO community in LAC is more grassroots-oriented and community-based. NGOs are significantly involved in implementation in Bank-financed projects.

Although debt was not a big issue, the question of *IDA* was raised in Haiti. Mr. Wolfensohn himself brought it up in his visit to the IBRD-eligible countries.

The NGOs stressed *capacity-building* and wished to receive training.

Finally, they repeatedly emphasized the importance of *sustainable development* and its complexities.

Follow-up

Mr. Wolfensohn's responses to NGO concerns included a commitment to work together as partners and to look at ways to increase operational collaboration. He also agreed to set up a training center at the Resident Mission which will offer training to both government institutions and non-governmental organizations.

AUSTRALIA

On September 10-15, Mr. Wolfensohn traveled to Canberra and Sydney meeting with Government ministers and NGOs. The meetings with NGOs were arranged through the Australian Executive Director's office in collaboration with the Australian Treasury Department.

Mr. Wolfensohn's visit was preceded by a brief article in the business newspaper, the Australian Financial Review (AFR), quoting one of the more strident NGOs as warning of a demonstration in Canberra against the Bank. Despite fears in Washington that this foreshadowed a crisis, the reality was that the NGO in question—Aid Watch—is far from the mainstream of Australian NGOs. The other NGOs to whom the Bank had extended an invitation to meet with Mr. Wolfensohn immediately moved to distance themselves from the publicity-seeking activities of Aid Watch, and to assure both Treasury and Bank that they wanted to engage in a constructive discussion with the new Bank President.

Format

The NGO meeting, which was the first scheduled on Monday, September 11, was held in Canberra and was attended by 10 representatives from Australian NGOs, including Community Aid Abroad (CAA), World Vision, RESULTS, and the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), which is an umbrella grouping. The Australian Alternate Executive Director, Mr. Chris Legg, also attended as did Mr. Pirouz Hamidian Rad of the Papua New Guinea country team.

NGO Issues

The main issues raised by the NGOs were their concern that the Bank adopted a macroeconomic model which dominated dealings with people and *limited consultation*; and they wanted to discern how Mr. Wolfensohn viewed community based organizations, and how he saw them working with the Bank.

Mr. Bill Armstrong of ACFOA said the meeting was "a great opportunity" to meet a new president who was Australian and who had signaled his willingness "to change some things." Mr. Armstrong further raised *debt* and the *use of IDA for debt-servicing*; *transparency* at the Bank and the "*rhetoric-reality gap*"; and *equity and the poverty focus* of the Bank's work.

Mr. Wolfensohn replied that if the Bank was accused of rigidity and of applying a single "macro-model," it was also true that NGOs were frozen in their regard for the Bank. No matter where he went and what he said, "the rhetoric is the same."

Mr. Wolfensohn sought specific proposals from the NGOs on such issues as *multilateral debt*, *indigenous peoples* and *implementation of projects*. He stressed that he was not talking of processes, but of results on the ground. He said he wanted not just the views from NGOs, but also their input on specific areas in which they felt strongest, so their services might be drawn on in the Bank's work. He said that if it was to be a true partnership for the betterment of the poorest countries, NGOs should stop fighting yesterday's battles with the Bank. He initiated closer consultation with NGOs on the implementation of the Papua New Guinea economic reform program. He rejected criticism of the Bank as being locked into a single development model, saying "I'm open to change the model."

The meeting was strongly positive and concluded with Mr. Armstrong, on behalf of the NGOs, saying how much he appreciated Mr. Wolfensohn's openness.

Follow-Up

Specific follow-up from the Bank will include early contact with all the NGOs present to seek their written responses to Mr. Wolfensohn's offers; these responses should be shared with the operational staff from the relevant regional/CVP offices. This should lead to more constructive engagement with the NGOs in the field. Separately, certain Australian nationals in the Bank should be encouraged and assisted to meet with NGO representatives to keep lines open and information flowing.

The Papua New Guinea country team has been very vigorous in organizing briefings and meetings, both formal and informal, with NGOs in Port Moresby and Australia. The Bank is also close to moving "beyond adjustment" and introducing a rural and social action plan, which would involve NGOs directly in channeling resources to the poor outside the city. This would be a major new initiative and a decision (and announcement) is expected early in the new year; the project has not yet been presented to the Board.

CHINA (Gender)

In the one day in which Mr. Wolfensohn participated in the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) on September 15, 1995, he had two meetings with NGOs in Beijing comprising his first and last engagements. This meeting was the second in the structured meeting series.

Format

The first meeting was open to all NGOs (600-800 attended), lasted 45 minutes and was, inevitably, quite general. In the first event, Mr. Wolfensohn was able to explain to NGOs his priorities as the Bank's President. The second one was a 1.5 hour substantive discussion with a carefully selected group of leaders of the main networks and caucuses who had been most active at FWCW - almost all women from developing countries. Seventeen NGO leaders participated (6 African, 5 LAC, 2 from Asia/Pacific, 1 from Eastern Europe and 3 international networks) and the whole Bank delegation attended as observers. This meeting was a chance for the more serious NGOs to convey to Mr. Wolfensohn what they thought are the most important lessons the Bank should take away from Beijing.

NGO Issues

The Open Meeting

Every morning a briefing was held by the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) for all NGO participants at FWCW. Mr. Wolfensohn made a brief presentation to this group, introduced by the chair of WEDO, Bella Abzug (former U.S. Congresswoman). Mr. Wolfensohn referred to the "platform of commitments" - a list of key issues promoted by the NGOs - assuring them that both he personally and the Bank were committed to each of these issues, and that he hoped that the NGOs would come to see that they have a real friend and ally in the Bank. He also recognized that the Bank may have made mistakes in the past, but that he was not prepared to shoulder responsibility for those, though he would be accountable for what the Bank does hence forward. He assured NGOs that he would be making changes in the Bank but that - this early on in his Presidency - he had not yet decided what these changes would be.

In response to questions, he described on-going deliberations concerning *easing multilateral debt burdens*; he explained the importance of *new operational collaboration with NGOs* (saying that the Bank is probably now the foremost partner of NGOs); he asserted that it is wrong to blame Bank *adjustment* programs for all Africa's ills and that a sound economic framework is necessary; he gave an assurance that he has read all the main critical literature about the Bank and has heard the argument that adjustment hurts the poor and especially women, but that he questioned whether this is right; he urged constructive engagement rather than rhetorical attacks, giving as an example his recent meeting with Australian NGOs at which, after a fairly aggressive exchange on the impact of adjustment in Papua New Guinea, a constructive conclusion was reached to work together to study the problems; he expressed regret that - because Bank-financed projects rarely have a sign outside saying "World Bank" - the positive contributions of the Bank are usually overlooked; and he described how farmers in Cote d'Ivoire had expressed thanks to him for the opportunities afforded them by the CFA devaluation.

At this event, a petition was presented to Mr. Wolfensohn, signed by about 1000 NGO participants. It was quite a considered, responsible petition calling on the Bank to increase the *participation* of grassroots movement organizations in economic decision making, do more *gender analysis* in projects/policies, increase *investment in health, education, credit* and other priorities for women, and to increase the *representation of women* in our management.

Meeting with NGO Leaders

At the suggestion of the Bank team, the NGOs had met for an hour beforehand to discuss the issues they wanted to raise. They selected Wangari Maathai (Green Belt Movement, Kenya) to act as lead spokesperson, and agreed on 4 key themes: the *growth model, ethics/values, democracy/participation* and *FWCW follow-up*.

One speaker appreciated the Bank's concerns about *gender equity*, but felt the Bank viewed this as a means to economic growth, rather than an end in itself, and therefore, had a limited approach to the subject. Another developed the theme asking whether the Bank was really prepared to be as radical as its recent rhetoric suggests. Mr. Wolfensohn responded by inviting the NGOs to judge him by his actions. In response to an allegation that the Bank's

actions do not necessarily match its rhetoric, Mr. Wolfensohn indicated some sympathy with this view, commenting that at times he thinks "the Bank is run like a series of feudal empires rather than a rational institution".

In response to a challenge to *fund NGOs*, not just governments, Mr. Wolfensohn described various recent initiatives to do just this (including an institutional fund in four MENA countries, a leadership fund and CGAP). One speaker urged more such cooperation, commenting that this would not only enhance the Bank's credibility in NGOs' eyes, but would also enhance the accountability of NGOs themselves. Mr. Wolfensohn welcomed this viewpoint and explained recent efforts to *enhance collaboration* with NGOs in Africa, following his visit to the regions. He also pointed out that much of this expanded NGO partnership pre-dates his arrival. Later in the meeting when the theme of NGO funding was returned to, Mr. Wolfensohn said that there was some flexibility in how we use reserves and so some expanded Bank support of NGOs might be possible if the Board considered this a priority.

One speaker recognized the importance of economic growth and of the Bank's contribution to economic reform, but expressed a widespread view of women's groups *that women are often marginalized* in the process. *Human values and rights* need to be put alongside economic reforms, especially when these are enshrined in ILO or other internationally ratified standards. In response, Mr. Wolfensohn discussed the dilemma of *conditionality*. On the one hand the Bank is attacked for "imposing" conditions, on the other hand we are told that we should add other, new conditions. In response to another point he also refuted the notion that the Bank promotes a single "development paradigm". A clear framework is necessary for development assistance (otherwise we are just talking about hand-outs), but the model should be country-specific.

One NGO questioned the wisdom of adding further to *debt burdens* through Bank lending. Mr. Wolfensohn explained that IDA is akin to a gift and that IBRD now has a portfolio of some \$150 billion, though only about \$10 billion has been contributed by governments. He used the opportunity to stress the critical importance of the *IDA 11* negotiations and explained that he is currently spending much of his time informing U.S. Congressmen about the importance of honoring the US Government's IDA 10 commitment (though at best this is likely to be reduced by one third). He urged NGOs to stress to governments the importance of defending aid budgets. One speaker stressed the importance of easing the *multilateral debt burden* of low income countries. Mr. Wolfensohn agreed that this is an important subject but said that the unfortunate leak of an internal discussion paper on this subject may have set back the cause.

Returning to the theme of *globalization of markets* (a popular subject among NGOs attending FWCW), one speaker described the despicable conditions in many of the new industries that result from expanded international trade. While wages may be higher in the new Bangladesh textile factories, for example, women workers are exposed to new hardships (such as workplace violence and harassment) which are overlooked by economic analysis.

One speaker who concentrated on *women's health* issues said that she agreed fully with the Bank's position on these issues with the exception that the Bank only speaks of "women's empowerment" in the context of controlling fertility. Unless empowerment embraces women's

roles in the full range of economic activities, the Bank is guilty of holding an old-fashioned view of women, solely in their reproductive roles.

One African speaker, while recognizing the need for economic reform, described an unfortunate side-effect for African governments of the loss of face and public confidence. They have been humiliated by the wholesale privatization of their long-standing institutions at the behest of outsiders and so have lost credibility. She also advocated *a greater Bank accountability to the UN system*. Mr. Wolfensohn responded that many of the privatized institutions were previously run disastrously, resulting in a terrible drain on national resources. While waiting to develop stronger links and coordination with the UN, he expressed "a horror of being coordinated by the UN." He has explained to Boutros-Ghali, who agrees on this.

Finally, the question of *user fees for health/education services* was raised. Economic reforms which undermine the human resource base through such changes is based on flawed economics. Mr. Wolfensohn agreed; he stressed that user fees should only apply to the rich - in order to finance the extension of services to the poor. However, he recognized that it doesn't always work in practice this way and hence agreed that this is an issue that needs more attention.

At the close of the meeting, the NGOs expressed warm thanks to Mr. Wolfensohn for making time for such an extensive discussion in what was clearly a very busy day for him. This extremely positive exchange ended with a sincere round of applause for Mr. Wolfensohn. Afterwards, a number of NGO participants told one of the Bank team members how much they appreciated the meeting and how encouraged they were by Mr. Wolfensohn's messages.

Follow-Up

In response to further questions about how committed the Bank is to make gender a central concern of its work and the importance of conducting gender assessments, Mr. Wolfensohn said that he has asked Ms. Nguyen to submit to him a monthly report on just this subject precisely because he viewed it as a critical issue. He urged NGOs who have suggestions or concerns to relay them to her.

UNITED STATES (Poverty)

This was the third structured, issue-specific meeting with NGOs since Mr. Wolfensohn became President.

Format

In common with the other meetings, a group of poverty specialists from operational NGOs, advocacy NGOs and academic institutions (selected by InterAction in consultation with NGO Unit staff) participated in a two hour session to discuss their views on the poverty record of the Bank and future priorities. The meeting took place at the InterAction office in downtown Washington, DC and was the most constructive yet.

Participants were (in addition to the host): Oxfam-UK, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Freedom from Hunger Foundation, International Center for Research on

Women (ICRW), Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID), Accion, Bread for the World, Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations (FAVDO and FAVDO-DC), Winrock International, Lutheran World Relief (LWR), and Oxfam America.

NGO Issues

Julia Taft (President of InterAction) opened the meeting warmly, including in her remarks praise for Steve Denning's efforts to enhance *Bank-NGO interaction in Africa* and Pierre Landell-Mills' pioneering of NGO consultation regarding the draft CAS (a theme other speakers returned to, suggesting further *piloting of participatory approaches to CASs*).

Mr. Wolfensohn stressed the importance of *growth*, of careful actions to protect the poor during adjustment and of his openness to ideas/experience about possible "modulation" of adjustment so as to better serve poverty reduction. The Bank, he said, must not remain aloof, it needs to become "a people palace." He needs the help of NGOs coming into this palace, because "it is not easy to pass the message down the line" to so many staff.

Oxfam UK observed that 50% of CASs now deals with the *economic participation of the poor* (up from 25% earlier) but that if poverty reduction is our sincere objective, 100% of CASs should do so (including treatment of the poor's access to land, credit, employment, markets, as well as social services). *SALs should also address equity* as a central objective (including anti-poor distortions in markets) rather than the current safety-net orientation. Less emphasis should be given to making labor markets flexible when this means eroding labor standards and the Bank should avoid contributing to the replacement of public monopolies by private monopolies (citing Zambia as an example). Oxfam praised Mr. Wolfensohn's leadership with the *debt* initiative and urged *partnership with civil society at all levels*, from international to the village.

IFPRI called for strengthening governments in areas critical for *food security*, for a renewed commitment to *agriculture*, for investment in vulnerable areas (other than the most profitable land) and for improvements in food marketing, while Freedom from Hunger spoke of the need to make the *provision of basic services* more sustainable (financially, institutionally, socially and culturally). For this, *participatory approaches* are important as well as cost recovery mechanisms where services can be reasonably expected to yield incomes, and attention to minimizing costs per person served (though without skimping on start-up costs).

ICRW called on a more energetic Bank *attack on "the feminization of poverty"* though: (a) systematic research on women's contributions to the economy, on gender impact of SALs, at dissemination by employers, etc.; (b) lending to support enhanced economic activity of women, especially in agriculture and other productive sectors; and (c) stressing gender issues in the policy dialogue with governments.

Both HIID and Accion commented that the Bank gives insufficient attention to the *informal sector*. Accion also stressed the sector's *need for credit*. While praising CGAP, Accion stressed the need to go further, looking at *reforms in the financial sector* which would remove distortion against the informal sector.

Bread for the World advised that -- over 15 years of Bank experience in which successive presidents have described poverty reduction as their major focus -- performance disappoints

because governments (particularly Part II) pull the Bank off track. BFW advised against a perceived stance of blaming Bank staff, and that re-educating the Bank is not the easy solution. BFW also advised that holding at bay the conservative pressure of governments is the key and that this is why it is important that Mr. Wolfensohn re-doubles his efforts to work *with civil society networks* which can help maintain the course. He also advised Mr. Wolfensohn that the US public does not believe that IDA is important to the poor and that for this reason it is urgently necessary to demonstrate good results on the ground. [Mr. Wolfensohn responded that he has never yet been aware of any retrogressive governmental pressure at the Board, that the problem is not at the policy-making stage in the Board, but at implementation. He agreed that expanded partnerships are necessary, but to achieve implementation].

FAVDO, speaking for African NGOs, expressed the *need for NGOs to work on governments* as well as the Bank, to ensure that any reforms gained are sustainable. FAVDO stressed greater attention to transitional periods, citing as an example the demise of the poultry industry after the CFA devaluation.

Winrock International and FAVDO-DC spoke of the lack of resident missions becoming serious about their NGO relations.

Lutheran World Relief stressed that Bank-NGO partnership should not be expected to exclude skepticism. For example, this will help identify where so-called safety nets benefit the elite at the expense of the poor.

Oxfam America reiterated the need for *growth with equity* and hence the need for *more careful poverty assessments* which are fed more systematically into CASs and for PERs to address poverty considerations more carefully.

Mr. Wolfensohn (responding) praised the Bank's work in many initiatives, but observed that such quality is not uniform. He also said that almost any initiative that could be proposed has been attempted, or looked into, somewhere in the Bank, but that excellent work sadly, often remains poorly disseminated. These problems, in part, are because the Bank is run as a series of feudal fiefdoms. He cautioned that much that NGOs seek cannot be achieved swiftly, without years of patient work with governments and that the Bank is often not the determining influence it is perceived as, particularly when there is cultural resistance to the objectives sought (such as equal opportunities).

Mr. Wolfensohn was sympathetic *to using CASs to enhance participation, gender, poverty reduction*, etc., but warned that mechanistic bureaucratic responses would lead to a "tick the box" response. What is needed is "to re-educate the Bank". He sympathized with the calls he had heard for more integrated strategies but pointed out that, in practice, it is easier to make specific gains (like CGAP) incrementally as this contributes to education within the Bank and in governments. He spoke somewhat cynically about the daunting tasks of re-educating the staff. He felt that there was a common view of him being rather old, easily tired and that he'll probably retire in just a few years - so there's an attitude he's picking up of "let's bid our time for the time being until we get a new President."

He agreed with those who found it incredible that the Bank has scaled back its agriculture activities in recent years. He reiterated that tackling the growing gap between rich and poor is a paramount challenge.

The meeting ended warmly, with the NGOs thanking Mr. Wolfensohn for making time to meet with them. It was Bank staff's impression that it was particularly welcomed that he had taken the trouble to go to them (at the InterAction office).

Follow-Up

Mr. Wolfensohn was particularly taken by comments made on the informal sector and asked the NGO Unit to arrange a meeting between Marty Chen (HIID) and DEC to discuss this further. This follow-up meeting was held on October 27.

Following the meeting, David Beckman of Bread for the World subsequently wrote to Mr. Wolfensohn to reiterate the importance of efforts to work with civil society networks.

Mr. Wolfensohn also asked EXT and the NGO Unit to follow up on the issue of RM responsiveness to NGO concerns.

Finally, with regard to the CASs, Mr. Wolfensohn said the Bank would follow up on the NGO suggestion -- perhaps in a few countries. To follow on this, the NGO Unit organized a meeting between a small group of NGOs (Bread for the World Institute, InterAction, Oxfam-Intl and WWF) and several Bank staff to discuss potential approaches to a participatory CAS. The NGO Unit will make a presentation to the Africa Region on November 27.

ECA (Russia, Hungary, Albania and Uzbekistan)

Mr. Wolfensohn traveled to Russia, Hungary, Albania and Uzbekistan from October 23-November 3.

Format

During his trip, Mr. Wolfensohn met with NGO representatives only in Albania where he attended a luncheon with a group of government officials, businessman and NGO representatives. However, in all countries Mr. Wolfensohn did meet with a lot of people outside government, who do not necessarily recognize themselves as NGOs. In Russia, for example, he met with a group of independent intellectuals in the Reform Club "Interaction". In Hungary, he met with parliamentary deputies/independent economists/sociologists to discuss social policy issues. In Albania and Uzbekistan he also met with village communities and private entrepreneurs, while in Uzbekistan he talked to some religious leaders.

NGO Issues

In Albania, three NGO representatives were present: Women's Forum, Family Planning Association, and NGO Forum. All were very articulate and outspoken, but totally non-confrontational. They described their relationship with the government as fair, although there were some complaints that the government only reacts to them, but does not initiate their involvement.

Follow-Up

With respect to the Bank is concerned, the Albanian NGOs have asked the Bank to get them *involved in project preparation*, requested *assistance in training* and some *funds* for family planning/women issues.

The Resident Mission subsequently held a meeting with the head of the NGO Forum who had received documentation on the small grants program and had shared it with about fifteen interested NGOs. The RM also plans to help the Forum with the organization of a round table discussion with major donors to NGOs for early February 1996. This would be followed by a World Bank-NGO round table in early March.

GERMANY

Mr. Wolfensohn visited Germany in November 1995.

Format

Approximately 50 NGOs were invited to attend a meeting with Mr. Wolfensohn which was held on November 20 and was organized and hosted by Dr. Manfred Kulesa of the Joint Church and Development Conference (GKKE). NGOs were asked to self-organize as the Bank did not wish to be in the position to select/exclude NGOs. Reportedly, some NGOs expressed displeasure at the large number of invitees while, at the same time, were concerned that there were not enough NGOs from certain sectors (e.g., environmental NGOs). The majority of the NGOs present were ones which had embarked on a constructive dialogue with the Bank although critics were not missing.

NGO Issues

No set agenda was prepared as the general desire of the NGOs was to get to know Mr. Wolfensohn and to judge for themselves.

An account of the meeting is not yet available.

Follow-Up

N/A

UNITED STATES (Sustainable Agriculture)

On December 13, Mr. Wolfensohn met with the Committee on Agricultural Sustainability for Developing Countries which brings together organizations dedicated to promoting equitable, environmentally sound agriculture in developing countries and which is chaired by Robert O. Blake. These organizations have been pressing the Bank to increase the quantity and quality of its agricultural program, and came to the Bank in order to make their case again.

Format

Mr. Wolfensohn started the meeting by emphasizing the critical role of agriculture in rural growth and poverty reduction. He stressed that neglect of agriculture and rural areas meant that neither rural nor urban poverty could be adequately reduced. He believes that client countries and Bank staff pay far too little attention to these areas. He was disappointed by how rarely any issues related to food supply, agriculture, and rural poverty were raised in the visits he made to countries, either by the clients or by Bank managers and staff. He compared this unfavorably with the attention now given to environmental matters.

NGO Issues

Issues raised by the Committee members were the alarming problems of global *food supply, soil fertility* in Africa, the need for implementation of the Bank's principles on *participation*, the participation of *civil society* in the policy and strategy formulation process of countries, the lack of rigorous implementation of the World Bank's *pesticide policy*, the need for *translation of Bank documents into local languages*, and *the quantity and quality of the Bank's agricultural and rural portfolio*.

Follow-Up

Mr. Wolfensohn assured the Committee representatives that he was very concerned about the same issues, that he wanted to open the Bank to collaboration and suggestions from civil society in general, and the Committee in particular.

LESSONS LEARNED & PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr. Wolfensohn is sending out a very strong signal to Bank management and staff, and to the outside world about working in partnership with NGOs. Obviously, Mr. Wolfensohn's very presence has been a major contributing factor to the success of these visits, since no other president before has been so visibly involved and committed.

It is important to be forward-looking and to prepare the ground for the upcoming Wolfensohn visits to other regions. In these meetings, Mr. Wolfensohn should be able to point to concrete initiatives underway. This is significant for two reasons. First, because Mr. Wolfensohn would be able to see that what he has said and done in previous travels has been absorbed and acted upon by the regions, thus also avoiding the repetition of a routine speech. Second, because it would demonstrate active movement and responsiveness on the part of the Bank. The latter issue is particularly relevant to the Asia trip in early 1996 since by then Mr. Wolfensohn will have been in office for over six months.

For the immediate future, the NGO Unit should be discussing with regions and specific country departments now so that both Headquarters and missions can gear up for Mr. Wolfensohn's upcoming visits and his interaction with NGOs

For the medium to longer term, it is clear that "*missions*" (both the Resident Missions and outgoing missions from HQs) are, and should be, one of the pivotal elements in the Bank's strategy for interaction with NGOs. The RMs are in the position to have direct contact with

NGOs and should be supported in this endeavor. Likewise, missions from Washington to the field -- which in effect represent the Bank to different constituencies -- need to be encouraged to interact with NGOs and need to be supported.

Interaction with northern NGOs should continue to be viewed as a pivotal element in the strategy given the Bank's increasing focus on working with civil society at the local, national and international level. The latter is especially so given the increasingly global focus of NGO networks. As the Bank increases its focus on social sector development, there will be more and more opportunities for dialogue and exchange with those northern NGOs who have been working on these issues for many years. Given the current climate of fiscal conservatism and trends towards reductions of development aid, the Bank will increasingly find the ground between itself and northern NGOs to be reduced. Opportunities for collaboration will present themselves in the coming months and should be actively pursued.

The NGO Strategy Paper, prepared by the NGO Unit and currently being reviewed by management, should be used as an important tool in the articulation and implementation of the Bank's approach vis-à-vis NGOs. The strategy paper will be complemented by a communication strategy on NGOs which is being finalized by EXT.

Specifically, Mr. Wolfensohn likes/prefers to:

- Discuss substantive issues and do so in a small meeting setting. The latter is better suited for this type of interaction as compared with larger settings which are opportunities for speech making.
- Follow-up on points raised by NGOs as well as have NGOs follow up.
- See the Bank working more with NGOs operationally and engaging in more systematic policy dialogue with them. Hence, he wants to use his interaction -- in the field for instance -- to kick off major new initiatives such as NGO liaison staff positions in African RMs., an NGO Trust Fund in West Bank & Gaza, etc.
- Clearly express his irritation at haranguing NGOs who have no desire for dialogue.
- View civil society as a broader sphere of which NGOs are one part.
- Receive brief and concise briefings. For meetings with NGOs, he wants to know the individual's background, the organization's experience with the Bank, and what questions/issue the person is likely to bring up.
- Engage in controversial issues.
- Have flexibility in his schedule to allow for additional meetings if desired.
- Have separate meetings for Elaine Wolfensohn, preferably on areas of special interest to her (for example, education).

- Focus on the key issues which have been highlighted to date: debt, adjustment, environment, RM capacity, enhanced work with NGOs, funding for NGOs, poverty and equity, disclosure, participation and public consultation, strength of civil society, decentralization (LAC).
- Have earlier attention paid to pinpointing civil society leaders to meet with.

- Meet Bank staff wherever he travels. Mr. Wolfensohn expects the Bank Group to cooperate and work through existing offices to maximize results on the ground. It would be wise—indeed, it should be mandatory—for all arms of the Bank Group to coordinate closely in preparation of all future agendas and briefing notes.

file NGO

THE WORLD BANK/IFC/M.I.G.A.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: December 8, 1995

TO: Mr. Roger Slade, Chief, OEDD1

FROM: Christopher Gibbs, OEDD1

EXTENSION: 3-1735

SUBJECT: **NGO Study - Boston Meeting with IDR, Back-to-office Report**

1. As directed, I traveled with you to Boston on December 7 to meet with the principals of International Development Research (IDR) to discuss OED's forthcoming NGO study. IDR is a member of the Bank's NGO Committee and the designated lead agency for OED for consultation with that Committee about the design and implementation of the study. We met with David Brown (President) and Jane Covey (Executive Director). In addition, Laura Renshaw, Policy Analyst with OXFAM USA joined the meeting.

2. The meeting provided a useful opportunity to be reminded of the perspective on the Bank and its activities by thoughtful NGOs: a reality check. The main benefits of the meeting came from the opportunity to build a credible working relationship with IDR; to deepen OED's understanding of how the Bank is perceived, and how this will impact OED's ability to conduct a participatory study; to discuss specific methodological issues; and to outline a proposal for a formal process of consultation with the NGO Committee, to be conducted mainly through IDR's good offices.

3. On methodological issues, the meeting produced limited results. Acknowledging OED's limitations, it appears that OED may well have more experience of evaluation methodology than IDR, and we should not expect to gain dramatic new insights from IDR on this subject. Specifically, we discussed the willingness of OED to complete a formative evaluation (not simply a summative evaluation); the study hypothesis/hypotheses; the need for a counterfactual case; the study instrument; the risk of big country bias; and the identity of legitimate cases and potential respondents.

4. The discussion helped to clarify that OED could be seen outside the Bank as a credible evaluator of Bank work provided the study process was transparently participatory. A multi-stage study design, that makes progress in steps and takes NGOs along as partners, was likely to be the most practical approach, and the likely preference was for a study focused on agriculture and the social sectors (education and health).

5. The discussion also reconfirmed that OED needs to ask NGOs what *they* would like to see the study aim to do, at the outset; how the study could be tailored to help

NGOs fulfill *their* mandates; and, what NGOs believe their strengths are, and how the removal of constraints improves results.

6. NGOs must be formally invited to contribute to the study design and implementation. But NGOs may need reassurance that they can *choose* to participate in the study or not, without fear or favor. OED was advised to consult NGOs widely and to be "inclusive". OED must avoid being captured by any one segment of the NGO community.
7. To respond in these ways will have significant implications for project timing and cost: a genuinely participatory study will take longer and cost more than one that is not.
8. The possibility of an OED partnership in the study with a credible bilateral(s) donor was discussed. The NGOs believed that such a partnership(s) could be beneficial, especially since study findings would support discussion of bilaterals' policies on working with NGOs, a topic of generally high priority to NGOs.
9. Suggestions for peer and external reviewers were made from US and all regions.
10. Specific next steps included:
 - formally invite NGO Committee participation in the study via IDR
 - indicate to NGO Committee what the nature of its engagement will be
 - invite NGO Committee input to design draft: what they would like to see done
 - prepare the design draft
 - hold a one-day study design workshop
 - invite peer reviewers and selected external reviewers to design workshop
 - prepare a revised draft
 - seek regional NGO input to the draft from regional NGO Committee meetings
 - be prepared to tailor design to country circumstances through country design discussion
 - hold case study writer workshop(s): share understanding and protocol
 - pilot the case studies and revise approach
 - complete the case studies
 - hold a case study findings workshop: collective reflection, sharing and extraction
 - consider dissemination of findings via NGO community and EDI

cc: Messrs. [Aguirre-Sacasa](#) and Thumm (OEDDR), and Picciotto (DGO)


file 280

THE WORLD BANK/IFC/M.I.G.A.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: November 28, 1995

TO: Christopher Gibbs, OEDD1

FROM: Roger Slade, Chief, OEDD1 

EXTENSION: 81293

SUBJECT: **NGO Study - Consultative Meeting with IDR, Boston**

1. You will visit IDR, Boston on December 7, 1995 and discuss with its members the potential scope and design of OED's NGO study. (IDR is the designated contact point for the Bank-NGO Committee for the purposes of this study.)
2. You will provide a back-to-office report on your return.

cc: Messrs. Aguirre-Sacasa (OEDDR), Guerrero (DGO)

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

cc: RB/CG/JM
file NGO

DATE: November 1, 1995

NOV 02 1995

TO: Bank-NGO Committee Members

FROM: Myrna Alexander, OPRDR

EXTENSION: 33262

SUBJECT: NGO-World Bank Committee: Summary of Proceedings

1. This is not intended as a full record of the two day Committee meeting held on October 17 and 18, 1995 (minutes are being prepared and will be distributed when finalized). It provides a quick summary of the major issues and some observations.

General Observations

2. Those who have a history with this Committee seem to agree that this year's meeting was in many ways the richest yet. The NGOs had prepared well; they were highly articulate and ready to engage in discussion; developing country NGOs emerged as the strongest voices; and much of the discussion was enriched by the regional meetings held earlier in the year and other country-level or specific issue meetings. All in all, it was a business-like exchange.

3. There were considerable weaknesses, however, which we should work on for future meetings. The Bank's own participation was mixed; often very few Bank staff were present, and sometimes there was limited opportunity for Bank participants to speak (which could well explain why many did not attend more than one or two sessions). And the agenda was too ambitious, with many items which were essentially information reports rather than discussions.

4. As some of you have suggested, we aim to reformat future meetings. We will set aside separate times for information items as distinct from specialized discussions; we will ensure that a working group format allows for more Bank and NGO participants to speak; and we will concentrate during the formal committee meeting on a very small number of items of common interest. Bank participation will be more targeted.

Session with Mr. Wolfensohn

5. Inevitably this was an interesting (and well attended) session which lasted beyond the allotted 90 minutes. NGOs raised five issues:

(a) They underscored their full support for the IDA replenishment (though outlined the reform agenda they advocate) and described their supportive actions to date, including their differences with some Northern NGOs. Mr. Wolfensohn warmly thanked them.

(b) They praised the Participatory Development Learning Group and how this had helped pioneer innovative project approaches, but stressed that new emphasis should be given to participatory development in project design, and CAS preparation. In the

ensuing discussion, NGOs did not see that participation was synonymous with "partnership"--the theme of the President's Annual Meetings speech. This discussion made an impact since the following morning Mr. Choksi was asked to initiate quarterly reports on 12 flagship projects, identified in the regional participation action plans.

(c) NGOs raised concerns about what they perceived as a growing emphasis on the private business sector, with expanding roles for MIGA, IFC, IBRD (and possibly IDA) guarantees; all of which currently falls outside the purview of the Bank disclosure policy and inspection panel. Mr. Wolfensohn agreed that there is a multiplicity of points within the Bank to deal with private sector issues and that coordination is needed. He announced that this was about to change, with the appointment of a single coordinator and the drawing up of a common framework to guide all the Bank Group's work in this area. He also stressed the danger of overstating the importance of private investment over official development assistance. Ninety per cent of FDI, he said, goes to just 12 countries. The role of the private sector in development is often quite limited.

(d) NGOs raised the multilateral debt issue, praising Mr. Wolfensohn's leadership role in considering ways of tackling this problem.

(e) NGOs stressed that gender should be seen as a central issue in policy reforms advocated by the Bank. The World Development Report '95 was seen as not going far enough in describing the different situations of men and women workers. Gender analysis is needed throughout the Bank's work. Mr. Wolfensohn referred to his constructive meetings with NGOs at the Women's Conference in Beijing.

Report on Regional Meetings

6. The feedback on this year's regional meetings was impressive. It is clear that these have re-energized the NGO Working Group (NGOWG), have yielded much information about the impact of Bank-financed operations on the ground (from an NGO perspective), and have been an important vehicle for expressing NGO support for IDA. They have greatly helped the Committee to reach out to a wider constituency of NGOs (an estimated 200-300 in total). A resolve was made to have at least one meeting in Africa, Asia and LAC during Spring '96. In the case of Asia, a proposal was debated about having separate East and South Asia meetings (reflecting the Bank's organizational structure). It was decided to hold a joint SAS and EAP meeting on the grounds that cross-fertilization of ideas between the two regions is useful and it is politically easier for NGOs from some Asian countries to speak out in a wide international setting. The regional meetings will include substantial discussion of the Regional Participation Action Plans. While there are no specific plans to expand NGOWG membership and activities to MNA and ECA, a first step in ECA is to support an NGO conference planned by Caritas Poland. NGOWG urged the Bank to ensure a fuller participation of staff in these meetings, particularly from resident missions throughout the region in question. The experience of the LAC meeting demonstrated the value of organizing the meetings to coincide with other events in which the Bank is participating.

Social Investment Funds

7. This was one of the more substantive discussions, with description of LAC SIFs (Guatemala, Honduras, Chile, Jamaica and Peru) and of the Janasaviya Trust Fund in Sri Lanka. In the latter, criticism was levelled at the Bank for what was perceived as its lack of cooperation

with and interest in the NGO study. The main conclusion for LAC NGOs was that SIFs can be useful tools as long as grassroots actors are fully involved, but they are not agents of social transformation, and should not be seen as substitutes for much-needed social programs and comprehensive social policies. NGOs also proposed a global meeting sometime during 1996 on SIFs.

Participation

8. Though the NGOs were complimentary about the way in which the Participatory Development Learning Group has promoted the issue within the Bank, the NGOs emphasized the importance of securing fuller citizen participation in the formulation of national development strategies. As noted above, the Bank was urged to explore participatory approaches to the drafting of CASs in future. Legitimate questions of sovereignty were recognized, but particularly in African countries the CAS has a far reaching role, in some ways substituting for national development plans. We indicated that we were reviewing our approach to CASs, including possible participatory approaches.

IDA Funding

9. Recognizing IDA's importance, some NGOs felt the Bank is not doing enough to campaign for IDA funding--the Bank in their view is too fatalistic about accepting whatever cuts Congress metes out. NGOWG would issue a press statement criticizing possible US cuts (which they subsequently did).

Bank Funding of NGOs

10. There was a session on CGAP, which is clearly a much welcomed initiative of the Bank. Some formal link between the Committee and CGAP was requested (see below). A brief discussion about further mechanisms for Bank-funding of NGOs was inconclusive or skeptical as this group is more concerned with advocacy and dialogue rather than operational collaboration and funding.

Joint Studies

11. The NGOWG is most interested in conducting joint studies or evaluations with the Bank. In particular, NGOWG has suggested a study program to assess the impact on NGOs of direct Bank financing, including CGAP [though it will not be for 2 years before any such impact will be discernable], and NGOs were very interested in participating in an OED proposal to monitor/evaluate the effectiveness to all parties of Bank-NGO collaboration.

Gender

12. There was a presentation by one of the NGO members on gender issues and how the Bank and the NGO community were addressing these. Specific comments were made on the Bank's approach to gender, as set out in the publication prepared for the Beijing Conference: the impression is that the Bank focusses too narrowly on the economic impacts of addressing gender inequalities, and not enough on the societal and other benefits of such changes. The thesis is that societal changes may lead to even more widespread economic benefits than changes designed to engender equality simply within the economic spheres. More generally, there was a consensus that gender issues had to have a more explicit hearing in Bank and NGO discussions. The Bank

announced that an NGO advisory group on gender was being formed by PSP as a first step in that direction.

NGOWG and Other NGO Fora

13. Both Bank staff and NGO committee members recognized that the Working Group could not, and should not, be the exclusive forum for Bank-NGO interaction. In light of the changes over the years, there has been, in fact, a substantive increase in the number and scope of Bank-NGO exchanges in various sectors--environment, transport, gender, poverty--and with the regions. That should be encouraged as part of the mainstreaming of participation in the Bank's activities. However, there was the danger of duplication and miscommunication. It was agreed that members of the NGOWG would be invited to join as ex officio members of other NGO advisory groups. This would be done in the case of C-GAP, for example, as well as the working group on disclosure, the Inter-Agency Learning Group on Participation, and the Gender Advisory Group. It may also be useful for the Regions to include regional NGO members on their respective Regional Advisory Councils (e.g. the Africa Council of Advisors).

Other Issues

14. Since the original agenda covered a large number of items, we were compelled to cut short the discussion of some important topics including the role of resident missions, the role of the Bank in emergencies and "failed" states. A brief update was provided on these topics.

The Steering Committee and Other Groups

15. Iqbal Asaria (NGO Chair) has now come to the end of his term and is leaving the Committee. He is replaced by Manuel Chiriboga (ALOP, Costa Rica). Other members of the Steering Committee are: Jalal Latif (Africa), Rajesh Tandon (Asia), Paul Spray (Europe), Edwin Zablah (LAC), and Jane Covey (NA/Pacific). In the NGOWG itself, the following NGOs were elected as new members:

PROSHIKA, Bangladesh (replaces NGO Council for Sri Lanka);
Freedom from Debt Coalition, Philippines (replaces Third World Network);
ISODEC, Ghana (replaces FAFD, Senegal);
Swedish Mission Council (replaces Danish Council for N-S Cooperation);
Caribbean Policy Development Center (replaces Caribbean Council of Churches);
Equipo Pueblo, Mexico (fills a vacant seat);
Pan-Asia Regional Coalition, Japan (replaces Church World Service, US).

Future Work Program and Agenda

16. In setting the priorities for the group's work in the coming year, the NGO side of the Committee decided to organize itself about four themes: regional outreach; participation; NGO-Bank relations; and gender. The respective working groups are as follows:

(a) Regional Meetings: Coordinators - Tandon (Asia), Latif (Africa), Chiriboga (LAC) and perhaps Cleary (ECA). A possible MNA meeting will be explored. The main focus will be RPAPs and IDA follow-up; also regional follow-up reports on the Women's Conference. We may explore deepening the involvement of governments in the regional meetings.

- (b) Participation: Tandon coordinates the sub-group, with Latif, Chiriboga, Spray, Verhagen (Nancy Alexander will be invited to join).
- (c) NGO-Bank relations: This will include joint studies, SIFs, NGO-funding, etc. Coordinator will be Jane Covey.
- (d) Gender: coordinated by Ruth Remple and Eudine Barriteau.

17. The next meeting of the Steering Committee was set for July 8-9, 1996, and the next full committee meeting for the week commencing October 14, 1996.

Other Matters

18. The NGOs envisaged a rising budget requirement (because of the increasing numbers and scope of regional meetings) but wanted to raise an increasing share of this from non-Bank sources. OPR would keep its contribution roughly steady in nominal terms. The Regions may also contribute more to the regional meetings (as had AFR and LAC). From now on the NGOWG plan to have a full-time coordinator to assist the Chair (for the next 2 years based in Costa Rica) with part-time assistance to the other steering committee members. The NGOWG aim to produce a quarterly newsletter, to further broaden the NGO constituency involved in the work of the Committee.

Distribution: Messrs./Mmes.

NGOs - J. A. Latif (IAG); R. Tandon (PRIA); M. I. Asaria (TWN);
P. Spray (APRODEV); M. Chiriboga, Chairman (ALOP); K. Malhotra (CAA);

World Bank: H. J. Gruss (LEGMN); R. Picciotto (DGO); J. W. Adams (AF2DR);
I. Husain (PSP); E. Chaparro (FPDVP); Z. Ecevit (LATSO);
D. Ritchie (MN1DR); A. Shakow (DCS); I. Serageldin (ESDVP);
G. Davis (ENVSP); A. Hamilton (SASVP); S. Denning (AFRVP);
A. Williams (PSP); M. Malloch Brown (EXTDR); C. Madavo (EA1DR);
P. Donovan (FRMDR); L. Squire (PRDDR); B. Bruns (ED1HR);
J. Salop (SASVP).

Alternates: R. Slade (OEDD1); Fleisig (PSD); Aguirre-Sacasa (OEDDR);
de Ferranti (HDD); A. Ody (LACVP)

cc: Messrs./Mmes. Sandstrom, Kalantzopoulos (EXC); Choksi (HCOVP);
M. C. Nguyen (PSP); OPR Staff.

MLAlexander:JDClark:mmr

THE WORLD BANK/IFC/M.I.G.A.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: September 28, 1995

TO: Mr. Franciso Aguirre-Sacasa, Director , OEDDR

FROM: Christopher Gibbs, OEDD1

EXTENSION: 31735

SUBJECT: **OED's Proposed NGO Study and the Bank's NGO Committee**

As one step in our effort to make the proposed NGO Study participatory, an opportunity to explain the study and seek input from the Bank's NGO Committee was sought. That request was granted, and I shall make a short presentation about the study at the next meeting on October 18.

I prepared the attached note for circulation to Committee members in advance of the meeting, and as possible talking points. I am sending the note to you for information since, I believe, you will attend that meeting. The note has been cleared by Roger Slade.



OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: September 26, 1995

TO: Roger Slade, Chief, OEDD1

FROM: Christopher Gibbs, OEDD1

EXTENSION: 31735

SUBJECT: **Draft Presentation for the Bank's NGO Committee, October 18**

I have prepared a short outline with the intention that it be circulated to members of the Bank's NGO Committee in advance of its next meeting on October 17-18. We have a spot on the agenda on the 18th. to introduce the study and discuss how the NGO Committee might contribute to it. I believe we have about half an hour allotted for discussion.

I have tried deliberately to be non-specific in the outline, a) because I want the Committee to understand that the study design fairly wide open, and b) because we genuinely don't yet know what the scope and focus of the study will be.

FYI, Mr. Picciotto has just accepted an invitation to become a member of the Committee. He is unavailable for the next meeting, and has asked to be represented by FAS.

I would appreciate your comments. When the outline has been revised, I shall send it to Al Fernandez (who works for John Clark) who will circulate it to Committee members.

OED Study of NGOs and Bank Effectiveness
An Introductory Statement for a Meeting with the Bank NGO Committee
October 18, 1995

Introducing OED

1. OED is the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department. Its Director General, Robert Picciotto, has recently become a member of the Bank NGO Committee. As Director General of Operations Evaluation, Mr. Picciotto reports directly to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors.
2. OED is charged with independently reviewing operational programs and activities to determine whether they are realizing their goals and whether changes are needed to make Bank activities more effective, efficient, and responsive to the needs of member governments. OED also encourages member countries to develop and improve their own evaluation systems.
2. The basic principles of OED's work rest on:
 - its independence, and freedom from bias of its findings
 - the usefulness of its findings to decision makers about current and future activities
 - the credibility of its findings, which must be objective, rigorous and impartial, and
 - the transparency of its evaluation processes.

The Proposed NGO Study

3. In 1995 and 1996, OED intends to assess how NGOs are contributing to the development effectiveness of Bank-supported projects. The study has yet to be designed and the purpose of this presentation is to inform you of that, and to enlist your support for, and participation in, the study.
4. Responsibility for the study rests with OED's Agriculture and Human Development Division. This Division responsible for evaluation of all aspects of agriculture - from rural development to forestry, the green end of the environment spectrum, and human resources development - including education, health, and population programs. These sectors will circumscribe the broad scope of this study.
5. The fact that OED is independent does not mean, however, that it can afford to be isolated. In fact, it will be impossible to complete the proposed NGO study without a high level of participation from the relevant stakeholders in the activities to be assessed.
6. The primary impetus for the study comes from a desire to assess how NGOs in Borrower countries are contributing to the development effectiveness on the ground of Bank-supported projects: what is working? what is not working? and why?
7. The study may need to address a number of issues:

- how NGOs are defined and classified in order to specify the focus of the study
- how NGOs participate in Bank-supported projects regionally, sectorally and functionally
- how NGOs contribute to project preparation and implementation
- which types of project outcome benefit most from NGO participation
- the practical influences and determinants of effective NGO participation
- how to isolate NGO contributions to project performance
- how to validate the study's findings
- how projects lacking NGO participation compare with projects which include NGOs participation

How might the Bank NGO Committee help OED?

7. Members of the Bank NGO Committee could assist OED in several ways, for example by:

- commenting on the study's terms of reference
- providing guidance on the study's relevance, scope, focus, approach and methods
- advising on the conceptual framework for the study or other specific issues
- identifying examples of NGO activities which could serve as case studies to illustrate lessons of broad, practical value
- reviewing and commenting on study findings as they become available
- and, in ways NGO Committee members may define

Probable Timetable

8. An approach paper for the study will be drafted by end of December 1995. The study will be conducted during calendar year 1996.

Contact Point

9. The task manager for this study is Christopher Gibbs, a Senior Evaluation Officer in OED. His manager is Roger Slade, Chief of OED's Agriculture and Human Development Division.

10. Mr. Gibbs can be reached at Bank Headquarters in Room G 7-045, or by telephone at (202) 473-1735. His fax number is (202) 522-3123, and his Internet address is cgibbs2@worldbank.org. You are invited to contact Mr. Gibbs if you have questions, comments, or suggestions about this study.

the NGO

WORLD BANK OFFICE TRACKING SYSTEM
Director General, Ops Evaluation
Routing and Action Transmittal Sheet

=====

TO:	OEDDR, (T-9025)	DATE:	9/13/95
-----	-----------------	-------	---------

=====

=====

SUBJECT DOCUMENT:

From: LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
To:
Dated: Reference No.: DG0950913001

Topic: IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD BANK IN
INDONESIA

=====

=====

ACTION INSTRUCTIONS:	DUE DATE:
----------------------	-----------


 XXX HANDLE 9/15/95
 REVIEW AND RECOMMEND
 FOR YOUR INFORMATION
 DISCUSS WITH _____
 AS WE DISCUSSED
 PREPARE RESPONSE FOR _____ SIGNATURE
 FOR YOUR FILES
 RETURN TO _____
 OTHER: _____

Remarks: FAS - RE: KEDUNG OMBO (INDONESIA PCR) - WHERE ARE WE ON THE
DRAFT RESPONSE TO THE NGO FAX?

*Submitted to RP
9/14*

=====

THE WORLD BANK GROUP

ROUTING SLIP		DATE: September 14, 1995	
NAME			ROOM. NO.
Mr. Francisco Aguirre-Sacasa, OEDDR			G-7-003
<input type="checkbox"/>	URGENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	PER YOUR REQUEST
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	PER OUR CONVERSATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND FILE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FOR APPROVAL/CLEARANCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND CIRCULATE	<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND RETURN
RE: Kedung Ombo PCR			
REMARKS:			
<p style="text-align: center;"> or requested Please find attached, for your clearance, the draft response from Mr. Picciotto on the above subject. </p>			
FROM		ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
Roger Slade, Chief, OEDD1 		G 7-035	81293

THE WORLD BANK GROUP

ROUTING SLIP		DATE: September 11, 1995	
NAME			ROOM. NO.
Mr. Slade			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	URGENT		PER YOUR REQUEST
	FOR COMMENT		PER OUR CONVERSATION
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FOR ACTION		NOTE AND FILE
	FOR APPROVAL/CLEARANCE		FOR INFORMATION
	FOR SIGNATURE		PREPARE REPLY
	NOTE AND CIRCULATE		NOTE AND RETURN
RE: Kedung Ombo PCR			
REMARKS:			
<p>Please prepare a draft response from Mr. Picciotto for my clearance by cob 9/13/95.</p> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;"> <p><i>Dennis</i></p> <p><i>Please handle in consultation with Ted.</i></p> </div>			
NAME		ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
Francisco Aguirre-Sacasa		G7-003	34380

Ted.

R.

INFID

International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development

Jalan Duren Tiga Selatan no. 15 Jakarta 12760 Indonesia
Tel/Fax. 62-21-7995400 Email : infid@nusa.or.id

RECEIVED

URGENT

SEP 11 AM 10:39

11 September 1995

Mr. Robert Picciotto
Director General
Operations Evaluation
THE WORLD BANK
Washington, D.C.
fax: 1-202-522.3200

total page: 1

KEDUNG OMBO PCR

Dear Mr. Picciotto:

As you may already be aware, INFID (formerly INGI) has been following the Kedungombo Dam Case since the resettlement problems were raised until the now. We also attended the June 22nd meeting regarding the Kedungombo and Narmada cases at the Bank. We were also monitoring the preparation of the Project Completion Report. In our communications with Mr. Eberthard Kopp, INFID, together with other NGOs and individual, have raised several issues regarding the PCR.

Several months ago we were informed that the PCR was pending. We would like to learn from you about the current status of the PCR and whether the OED was in the process of auditing it. We would also appreciate to know when the document is to be submitted to the Board.

Your response is highly appreciated, especially because the project affected people are interested in the Bank's own evaluation of the project.

Sincerely yours,

Asmara Nababan
Asmara Nababan
Secretary

DGO
↓
FAS
Where do we stand on this?
Please draft response asap.

9/11

Betty *de NGO 10/4*
11/15
We spoke
Rm

THE WORLD BANK GROUP

ROUTING SLIP		DATE: August 21, 1995	
NAME		ROOM. NO.	
Mr. Francisco Aguirre-Sacasa, OEDD1		G-7003	
Mr. Roger Slade, OEDD1		G-7035	
Ms. Josette Murphy, OEDD1		G-7043	
URGENT		PER YOUR REQUEST	
FOR COMMENT		PER OUR CONVERSATION	
FOR ACTION		NOTE AND FILE	
FOR APPROVAL/CLEARANCE		FOR INFORMATION	
FOR SIGNATURE		PREPARE REPLY	
NOTE AND CIRCULATE		NOTE AND RETURN	
RE:			
REMARKS:			
<p>I would be comfortable with Mr. Slade acting as alternate.</p>			
FROM		ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
Robert Picciotto <i>G</i>		G-7121	31719

THE WORLD BANK/IFC/M.I.G.A.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: August 21, 1995

TO: Mr. John D. Clark, OPRPG

FROM: Robert Picciorro, NGO

EXTENSION: 31719

SUBJECT: NGO World Bank Committee

Thank you for your invitation to join this Committee. I am pleased to accept. I note that the OED study on NGO involvement in the Bank financed activities is part of the "update" session.

I will not be able to attend the second day. I expect that Mr. Aguirre-Sacasa will act as my alternate. He will confirm his availability (or name another alternate) upon his return from leave.

cc.: Messrs./Mmes. Aguirre-Sacasa (OEDDR), Slade, Murphy (OEDD1)

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

RECEIVED

95 AUG 17 AM 10:34

DGO

DATE: August 15, 1995

TO: Distribution

FROM: John D. Clark, OPRPG

EXTENSION: 31840

SUBJECT: NGO-World Bank Committee Meeting

1. The NGO-Bank Committee is a group of approximately 18 senior-level Bank staff and 26 NGO representatives from around the world that meets annually to discuss issues of mutual concern. The Committee has been the official forum for NGO-Bank dialogue since the early 1980s. It is serviced by the NGO Unit of the Operations Policy Department and co-chaired, along with an NGO counterpart, by Myrna Alexander (Director of OPR). Bank membership of the Committee is currently being renewed and we would like to take this opportunity to invite you to serve as a Bank member.

2. The Committee meets once annually for a period of two days. Participation in this annual meeting is the principal commitment in becoming a member. If you are interested in joining the Committee but unable to participate in the full two days, we would ask that you designate an alternate for those sessions that you are unable to attend.

3. A draft agenda for the upcoming 1995 meeting of the Committee is attached. While the content of the agenda may undergo some changes over the coming weeks, the dates of the meetings (October 17-18) are confirmed. Please note that Mr. Wolfensohn will host a reception for the Committee on the evening of Monday, October 16. He will also lead a session from 4:00-5:30 on Tuesday, October 17.

4. A list of NGO members to the Committee is attached. Once completed, a full list of Bank members will be sent to you along with the final version of the agenda. I would be grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible whether or not you are able to join the Committee. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Distribution:

Messrs/Mmes.: Picciotto (DGO); Lomax (EC1DR); Denning (AFRVP); Husain (ESP); Bruns (EDI); Chaporro (FPDVP); Malloch Brown (EXTDR); Madavo (EA1DR); Salop (SASVP); Ritchie (MN1DR); Steer (ENVDR)

08/15/95 5:26pm

CM/JC:epc/c:\wp51\jc\annmtg.mem

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR THE 1995
NGO-WORLD BANK COMMITTEE MEETING

Room H1-200

Monday, October 16

7:00pm Evening Reception - meeting with James D. Wolfensohn

Tuesday, October 17

9:30am Introductions

10:00am Report back on Regional Meetings

10:30am IDA:
- update (Paula Donovan)
- participation issues in IDA projects (NGO papers: Jane Covey, Rajesh Tandon)

12:00 noon Bank funding of NGOs:
- update on Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest - CGAP (WB) (Mohini Malhotra)
- policy issues (NGO paper: Mike Edwards, Antonio Quizon)

1:30pm Lunch

2:30pm Social Policy:
- Bank follow up to Social Summit (David de Ferranti)
- Social and economic policy linkages (including role in adjustment lending, indicators, social spending priorities) (Manuel Chiriboga)
- Response

4:00pm
- 5:30 pm Discussion of major issues of NGO concern with Mr. Wolfensohn

Wednesday, October 18

9:30am Social Investment Funds - (NGO presentations possibly - Guatemala, Chile, Honduras (ALOP), Sri Lanka - CAA, Ghana - Charles Abrughe)

Bank-government-NGO relations in social policy

1:00pm Lunch

2:30pm

- Updates:
- Resettlement
 - Expanding role of resident missions
 - Gender issues/Bank follow-up to Beijing
 - Regional Participation Action Plans
 - NGO Unit products (NGO Strategy Paper, Working with NGOs document)
 - OED's study on impact of NGO involvement in Bank financed activities

08/15/95 5:23pm

CM/JC:epc/c:\wp51\jc\agenda

NGO WORKING GROUP ON THE WORLD BANK
ADDRESS LIST - 1995

AFRICA

FEDERATION DES ASSOCIATIONS DU
FOUTA POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT (FAFD)
Liberté 1
Villa No. 1382
P.O. Box 3865
Dakar, Senegal

Tel: (221) 25 72 33
Fax: (221) 24 24 31

Representative:
Mr. Thierno Kane
Tel: (221) 34 58 93
(Fax & answering machine)

Alternate: not yet designated

Membership elapses end of 1995

* INTER-AFRICA GROUP (IAG)
P.O. Box 1631
Addis Abeba
Ethiopia

Tel: (251-1) 51 87 90
Fax: (251-1) 51 75 54

Representative: Mr. Jalal Abdel Latif
Director of Programmes.
Tel: (251 1) 613 330 Fax: (251 1) 510 064

Alternate: Not yet designated

Membership elapses end of 1997

** Member of the Steering Committee*

KAGISO TRUST (KT)
P.O. Box 1878
Johannesburg 2000
South Africa

Tel: (2711) 403 6319
Fax: (2711) 403 1940 or 403 1941

Representative: Mr. Eric Molobi
Executive Director

Alternate: Mr. Horst Garhard Kleinschmidt
Deputy Executive Director

Membership elapses end of 1999

PAN AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR
DEVELOPMENT (PAID)
P.O. Box 4056
Douala
Cameroon

Tel: (237) 421061
Fax: (237) 424335
Tlx: 6084 KN

Representative:
Laban Nnini Kirya

Alternate: Not yet designated

Membership elapses end of 1996

RURAL DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION OF
PAKISTAN (RDFP)
P.O. Box 1170
Islamabad
Pakistan

Tel: (92-51) 858972 or 851078
Fax: (92-51) 261386
Tlx: 5945ctoib or 5811naiba pk

Representative:
Ms. Ambreen Haider
Director, Women in Development

Alternate: not yet designated

Membership elapses end of 1996

* THIRD WORLD NETWORK/CONSUMERS
ASSOCIATION OF PENANG (TWN)
87, Cantonment Road
10250 Penang
Malaysia

Tel: (604) 373511 or 373612
Fax: (60-4) 368106
Tlx: 40989 cappg
email: cap@geo2.net

Representative: Mohammed Iqbal Asaria
TWN, 336 Pinner Road
Harrow, Middlesex HA1 4LB, UK
Tel: (44-81) 861 2012 or H: (44-81) 427 4145
Fax: (44-81) 861 3113
email: twne@geo2.geonet.de

Alternate: Not yet designated

Membership elapses end of 1995

** Member of the Steering Committee*

EUROPE

AGA KHAN FOUNDATION (AKF)
P.O. Box 435
1211 Geneva 6
Switzerland

Tel: (41-22) 736 03 44
Fax: (41-22) 736 09 48
Tlx: 413 452 akfch

Representative: Mr. Robert d'Arcy Shaw
General Manager

Alternate: Dr. Thomas Dichter
Programme Officer
Institutional Development

Membership elapses end of 1996

*ASSOCIATION OF PROTESTANT
DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN
EUROPE (APRODEV)
c/o Martin Bax
Rue Joseph II, 174
Brussels
Belgium

Tel: (32-2) 231 01 02
Fax: (32-2) 231 14 13
email: aprodev-bru@geo2.geonet.de

Membership elapses end of 1997

** Member of the Steering Committee*

Representative: Mr. Paul Rowland Spray
Head of Aid, Christian Aid
P.O. Box 100, London SE1 7RT, UK
Tel: (44-71) 620 4444 or H: (44-86) 524 7801
Fax: (44 71) 620 0719
email: christian-aid geo2.geonet.de caid gn.apc.org

Alternate: Dr. Volker Kasch
Senior Officer, EZE, Mittelstrasse 37
D - 5300 Bonn 2
Tel: (49-228) 8101212
Fax: (49-228) 8101160

CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS Y PROMOCION
DEL DESARROLLO (DESCO)

Leon de la Fuente 110
Lima 17, Peru

Tel: (51) 14 610984 or 627193
Fax: (51) 14 617309
email: desco@geo2.geonet.de

Representative: Mr. Abelardo Sanchez-Leon
Vice-President

Alternate: Mr. Marcial Rubio Correa
President

Membership elapses end of 1997

FUNDACION AUGUSTO CESAR SANDINO
(FACS)

Apartado 2458
P.O. Box 5
Managua, Nicaragua

Tel: (505) 2 75706 or 75760
Fax: (505) 2 675670
email: facs@nicarao.apc.org

Representative: Lic. Edwin Zablah
General Secretary

Alternate: Lic. Evaristo Gaarcia
Director of Pl. & Pr.

Membership elapses end of 1996

LATIN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS (ALOP)

Apartado 265-1350
San Sebastian, San José
Costa Rica

Tel: (506) 2223245
Fax: (506) 2215114

Membership elapses end of 1998

Representative: Marta Susana Baima de Borri
SEHAS

Bv del Carmen 680 - Villa Siburu
Cordoba CP 5000
Argentina

Tel: (5451) 805031
Fax: (5451) 897541

Alternate: Manuel Chiriboga,
Executive Secretary

NORTH AMERICA AND THE PACIFIC

INTER-CHURCH COALITION ON AFRICA
(ICCAF)

129 St. Clair Ave
Toronto, Ontario M4V 1N5
Canada

Tel: (1 416) 927 1124
Fax: (1 416) 927 7554

Representative: Ms. Ruth Rempel
Co-Chair, Economic Justice Working Group

Alternate: Mr. Perez Morangi,
Co-Chair, Economic Justice Working Group

Membership elapses end of 1998

INTERNATIONAL SAVE THE CHILDREN
ALLIANCE (SCF UK)
Mary Datchelor House
17 Grove Lane
London SE5 8RD
England

Tel: (44 71) 703 54 00
Fax: (44 71) 703 22 78

Representative: Mr. Michael Aaronson
Director, Overseas Department

Alternate: Mr. Michael Edwards
Head of Overseas Information

Membership elapses end of 1998

SECRETARIAT OF THE NGO WORKING GROUP ON THE WORLD BANK

Temporary Address

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF
VOLUNTARY AGENCIES (ICVA)
P.O. Box 216
1211 Geneva 21
Switzerland

Tel: (44 22) 732 6600
Fax: (44 22) 738 9904
email: ngowg@gn.apc.org.

Mr. Delmar Blasco
Secretary

Mr. Marcos Arruda
NGO Coordinator

JUN 08 1995 *[Handwritten signature]*

THE WORLD BANK
Washington, D.C. 20433
U.S.A.

RECEIVED

95 JUN -8 PM 5: 33

JAMES D. WOLFENSOHN
President

DGO

cc: **FMS**

PG

RW

June 1, 1995

[Handwritten arrow]
return

[Handwritten circled '9']
6/9

Ms. Brigid Weinzinger
OIE
Austrian Information Service on
Development Policy
Berggasse 7
1090 Vienna
Austria

Dear Ms. Weinzinger:

Thank you for your letter dated May 16 relating your concerns about the World Bank. As I have stated on other occasions, in my presidency at the World Bank I welcome positive dialogue with different constituencies on ways to improve the effectiveness of the Bank in bettering the lives of the poor.

I agree with many of the priorities you cite. Bank work on the environment, increased attention to gender, a more open Bank, and greater focus on "results on the ground" are important trends in the Bank. At the same time, there is an active dialogue on the issues surrounding structural adjustment and Bank support of economic reform. On these issues, I would note that the messages we have been hearing from developing country NGOs have been very different in tone. Much of the current debate in that part of the NGO community is around the International Development Association (IDA), our long term interest-free mechanism which lends vitally needed resources to the poorest countries. As you also know, IDA funds come from grant contributions—called replenishments—made periodically by richer governments to the World Bank.

Quite recently, a group of developing country NGO leaders attended a meeting at the World Bank with IDA Deputies (the senior government officials from contributing countries who negotiate IDA replenishments every three years) to present their views on the IDA. These highly-experienced, articulate spokespeople represented a broad spectrum of the NGO sector in developing countries. They very strongly and unanimously affirmed their support for the replenishment of IDA to at least the current levels, and preferably more. They also put forth a very thoughtful critique of certain policies and programs, and made some concrete recommendations for improving Bank work in these areas. In particular, they stressed how the Bank could work together with NGOs and others to

ensure true participatory development and promote equity, including gender equity. Their statements were enriched by drawing on their experience at the grassroots level.

While noting this diversity of views, I want to assure you that I am committed to ensuring an increased Bank focus on poverty and expect to push hard in areas where Bank work can be improved. Development assistance is entering a difficult and critical phase, particularly in this country. The current climate is putting at risk the already scarce resources—including IDA—which are available to support the poorest countries and their populations. Without assured resources it will be difficult for the poorest countries to make the progress that we both want to see. I would hope that in questioning the role and function of the Bank you would be prepared to examine the progress made in key areas and be prepared to engage the Bank on the issue of how to improve our effort at poverty reduction.

Sincerely,



James D. Wolfensohn

I will be doing everything
I can to examine all the
issues raised in your
letter and will hope to
build links with supporters
and critics alike -

Best regards

JW.

Austrian Information Service on
Development Policy
Berggasse 7
1090 Vienna
Austria

James Wolfensohn
President
The World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433
USA

Vienna, 16. 5. 1995

Dear Mr. Wolfensohn,

We would like to congratulate you on your new and important function, although your presidency begins earlier than envisioned due to sad circumstances.

The OIE is an Austrian NGO, which among other issues has been working on World Bank policy for quite a long time. We write to you because of the enormous concerns we have about the poor quality of World Bank Projects from a social, environmental and economic point of view. It is not only critics of the World Bank who think so, but according to the OED's Annual Report of Evaluation Results for 1993 only 42 percent of the projects examined may be rated as sustainable according to criteria of the World Bank itself.

*He got me
a copy
✓ done
6/2*

As is broadly acknowledged, the multilateral debt burden of developing countries is a road block to sustainable development. Many Bank loans have merely increased the debt burden of many borrowing nations without contributing to sustainable economic development. The problem of multilateral debt can only be solved if the World Bank cancels the debt of

the poorest countries and considers a debt relief for the others. However, Structural Adjustment Programs should by no means be a condition for these necessary measures. Many studies have shown that it is especially SAPs which are the main cause for hunger and poverty in these countries. And, 20 years after the first UN-Conference on Women was held in Mexico City, SAPs in the 90's are still gender-biased, which means they do not take women and their contributions to development and the economy into account.

The fundamental challenge within the World Bank's structure is a reform of the "culture of approval" or the pressure to lend. As long as the focus of the institution's operations is on quantity rather than on quality there will be no increase in project quality.

The Bank's political power structure is lacking in democracy and transparency. The information policy of the World Bank has been heavily criticized by NGOs all over the world. We therefore ask for public access to all information, involving the affected people, NGOs and the concerned public.

Another necessary and valuable step would be delinking IDA from the Bank. It would be necessary to give poorer developing nations and also representatives of NGOs and the people affected more voice so that IDA can perform its original task of helping the poor with concessional loans and grants.

We have heard that you are well aware of the problems the World Bank is facing, and that you share the views of the Wapenhans Report. By informing you about our concerns, we would like to stress the need for fundamental reforms and express our support for initiatives in that direction.

With compliments


Brigida Weitzinger
(vice-director)

THE WORLD BANK/IFC/M.I.G.A.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: June 2, 1995

TO: OEDD1 Higher Levels and Researchers

FROM: Robert van der Lugt, OEDD1

EXTENSION: 81293

SUBJECT: **NGO Study**

Attached please find for your information the listing of NGO related ratings from the PIF data of the 1993 and 1994 cohorts.

Attachment

cc: Messrs. **Picciotto** (DGO), Aguirre-Sacasa (OEDDR), Guerrero (DGO)

JUN 08 1995

FAS/RS

This is a very titillating rabbit

Early retrieval of all "rahimall"

RECEIVED

95 JUN -5 AM 10: 51

[Handwritten signature]

DGO

me for crisp judgments offered would have a high return.

to me design paper.

G

6/8

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: May 24, 1995

TO: Mr. Toshiko Hino, OPRPG

FROM: Robert van der Lugt, OEDD1

EXTENSION: 31740

SUBJECT: NGO PARTICIPATION IN BANK PROJECTS

1. Please find attached a table of projects with NGO related ratings in 1993 and 1994 evaluation years. As I told you before I have my doubt about the systematic coverage of this query.

2. There are three questions in the PIF related to the participation of NGOs in Bank projects:

First, a query whether NGOs had a positive or negative influence on the achievement of environmental objectives.

Second, a query whether effectiveness of NGO participation had a positive or negative influence on the achievement of social objectives (and we have added the target group of the social objectives when available).

Third, whether NGO participation (local or expatriate) was used as a modality, with a positive or negative impact (in this case not available means that there is no data in ICR) for institutional development.

3. You can retrieve further information on these projects from the OED Evaluation Textbase.

Attachment

cc: Messrs./Mmes. Guerrero (DGO), Battaile (OEDDR) Mahatanankook, Murphy, Sheerin (OEDD1), Johnson (OEDD2)

Projects With NGO-related Ratings, 1993 and 1994 Evaluation Years

OED ID	Title	Reg	Country	Sector Name	NGOs as Positive or	Effectiveness of NGO		NGO participation as	
					Negative Influence	participation as Positive	participation as	participation as	
					on Environmental	or Negative Influence	on Social Objectives	as a modality for	Institutional Development
					Objectives	(Target group *)	(Pos/Neg)	(local, pos/neg)	(expatriate, pos/neg)
					(Pos/Neg)				
C1280	Gujarat water supply and sewerage project	SAS	India	Water & Sanitation	Positive				
C1390	Secondary towns project	AFR	Kenya	Urban		b	Negative	Not Available	
C1499	Second small industries project	SAS	Pakistan	Finance			Negative		
C1514	Kerala social forestry project	SAS	India	Agriculture				Not Available	Not Available
C1523	National agricultural extension project	SAS	India	Agriculture				Not Available	
C1528	First urban project	AFR	Malawi	Urban		a	Negative		
C1529	Fisheries development project	AFR	Zambia	Agriculture		e	Negative		
C1564	Accra district rehabilitation project	AFR	Ghana	Urban	Negative	a	Negative		
C1601	Road rehabilitation and maintenance project	AFR	Ghana	Transport					Positive
C1605	Forestry development project	EAP	China	Agriculture		a	Positive		
C1620	Second forestry project	AFR	Burundi	Agriculture					Positive
C1625	Second water supply project	AFR	Burundi	Water & Sanitation	Positive	d	Positive		
C1646	Second industrial investment credit project	SAS	Pakistan	Finance	Positive				
C1649	Third population and family health project	SAS	Bangladesh	Human Resource			Negative		
C1651	Shrimp culture project	SAS	Bangladesh	Agriculture		a	Positive	Positive	
C2030	Second agricultural sector adjustment program	AFR	Somalia	Agriculture			Positive		
C2212	First social investment fund project	LAC	Honduras	Human Resource			Positive	Not Available	
C2214	Second economic recovery credit	AFR	Zambia	Non-Sector Specific				Not Available	Not Available
C2401	Second social investment fund	LAC	Honduras	Human Resource		a,b	Positive	Positive	
L1644	Tungurahua rural development project	LAC	Ecuador	Agriculture	Positive	a,c	Positive	Positive	
L1990	Second urban and regional development project	LAC	Mexico	Urban		a	Negative		
L1991	Puerto Ila-Chone rural development project	LAC	Ecuador	Agriculture	Positive	a	Positive		
L1997	Northwest rural development project	MNA	Tunisia	Agriculture	Negative				
L2044	Esmeraldas rural development project	LAC	Ecuador	Agriculture	Positive	a	Positive	Positive	
L2236	Jakarta sewerage and sanitation project	EAP	Indonesia	Water & Sanitation	Positive	a,d	Positive		
L2360	Central Visayas regional project	EAP	Philippines	Agriculture		a,d	Positive		
L2373	Second vocational training project	LAC	Paraguay	Human Resource			Positive	Positive	
L2386	Southern conveyor projects for water resources dev	ECA	Cyprus	Agriculture				Not Available	Not Available
L2407	Second Mae Moh lignite project	EAP	Thailand	Energy	Positive				
L2587	Second urban development project	MNA	Jordan	Urban			Positive		
L2620	Lagos solid waste and storm drainage project	AFR	Nigeria	Water & Sanitation				Positive	Positive
L2665	Earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction project	LAC	Mexico	Urban		a,d	Positive		
L2803	Emergency Petroleum Recon.	LAC	Ecuador	Energy		d	Negative		
L2832	Pehuenche hydroelectric project	LAC	Chile	Power	Positive			Positive	
L2859	Agricultural extension project	LAC	Mexico	Agriculture				Not Available	
L2917	Second Felcra land development project	EAP	Malaysia	Agriculture			Positive		
L3247	Structural adjustment loan	ECA	Poland	Non-Sector Specific				Not Available	Not Available
L3306	Emergency recovery project	MNA	Jordan	Human Resource			Positive		

* a Targeting socio-economic status(i.e. poverty)

b Targeting gender

c Targeting ethnicity

d Targeting community type or locale

e Targeting other - profession:artisanal fisherman for the credit component

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

RECEIVED

DATE: May 8, 1995

95 MAY -9 AM 11:38

TO: Mr. James Adams, OPRDR

DGO

FROM: Mark Malloch Brown, EXTDR

EXTENSION: 85914

SUBJECT: NGO Strategy Paper

file NGO
FAS/JM
Please review
9

Thank you for giving us the opportunity to review and comment on the draft NGO Strategy Paper. Attached is a note from Spiros Voyadzis which sums up our NGO Team's comments and suggestions. I fully endorse their comments and look forward to further discussions on the NGO strategy.

However, I must express a concern that this paper is in some ways the Participation Paper revisited in that it only addresses one set of NGO-Bank relations with any completeness.

My own view is that we need to start from a stronger conceptual foundation -- that NGOs are partners in development whom we have underutilized, but that equally, as the current lessons of development suggest, growth and issues of equity involve a much wider set of actors, including, among others, strong-willed governments promoting economic and institutional reform and private sector flows. The NGOs have made the Bank a better, more accountable place. Yet given the finite limit on their role, how do we first develop the right relationship with them which continues to let them be a prod to improved operational effectiveness without deflecting our strategic evolution as an organization? Second, how do we deal with civil society in all this -- a much broader set of players than NGOs with which the latter are in more than occasional conflict? And third, how do we make NGOs the champion of our mission, because if we, our partners, and our impact are "bigger" than the aggregate of NGO activity, then their long-term mission must come to include the promotion of the Bank to their own national constituencies?

Attachment

cc: Messrs. Serageldin (ESDVP); Picciotto (DGO); Choksi (HROVP); Wijnand, Clark, Williams (OPRPG); Voyadzis (EXTIM); Wyss (Paris)

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: May 5, 1995

TO: Mr. Mark Malloch Brown, EXTDR

FROM: Spiros Voyadzis, ~~EXTIM~~

EXTENSION: 32713

SUBJECT: NGO Strategy Paper

1. Together with Jane Kirby-Zaki, Kris Martin, and John Mitchell, we reviewed the draft NGO Strategy Paper. As NGOs are a key target group of EXT's communications efforts, this NGO strategy has a direct bearing on, in particular, the work of our newly created Issues Management Team. I hope that OPR is planning to circulate the paper in draft more widely in the Bank, including to the Regional and Central Vice Presidents, OED, EDI, FRM, and so on. I think that the strategy would benefit greatly from a thorough airing in other parts of the Bank that interact with NGOs.

2. Overall, we found the paper to be a thoughtful piece that is well grounded in the Bank's experience to date with NGOs, particularly at the operational level. We agreed with many of the paper's assessments and recommendations regarding, in particular, operational collaboration with NGOs. However, from our point of view, we believe the paper could go a bit further in acknowledging the role of NGOs in advocacy, which is a reality. As such, shouldn't there be an increased role for EXT's Issue Managers, not only in enhancing outreach to the NGO community, but also in coordinating the policy dialogue with NGOs on strategic Bank-related issues? We firmly believe that the Bank needs to develop a comprehensive communications strategy vis-à-vis NGOs in addition to an operations strategy; we could, if all interested parties were to agree, try to develop such a strategy. Please let us know what you think.

3. Following are our general comments and suggested changes for strengthening this draft of the NGO Strategy Paper.

4. **Part I:** We agree in general with the paper's assessment of the Bank's and NGOs' interest in each other, as described in Part I. We would suggest, however, including more background about the "NGO explosion," why it happened, and where it is likely to lead in the future. As it stands, the paper assumes that the reader fully understands the "NGO phenomenon." Along these lines, we appreciate that one of the Bank's interests in NGOs is helping improve the enabling environment for NGO activity in our member countries. However, we think it should be made more explicit in this and other sections of the paper that we are referring in this

instance to the enabling environment for local NGOs and not international NGOs. As it stands, this distinction is not at all clear.

5. The paper rightly notes that the dichotomy between operational and advocacy NGOs is increasingly blurred, which points up, among other things, the need for all parts of the Bank that interact with NGOs to be communicating consistent messages to both types. We therefore liked very much the idea of convening a Bank-wide advisory group to monitor and review progress in collaboration with NGOs, including our communications and outreach efforts. We would be pleased to have EXT represented in such a Bank-wide network.

6. While we agree that the Bank's overriding interest in NGOs has to be to improve the effectiveness of both our development efforts, we would like to emphasize that the Bank also has an interest in motivating certain influential NGOs to lend increased support for the Bank's work, including IDA. The notion of "third party endorsements" is mentioned later in the paper, but we would like to see included in this first section of the paper some recognition upfront of the influence which NGOs can have over donors, the media, and the general public as yet another element which attracts the Bank to cooperate with NGOs.

7. The paper's description of the NGOs' interest in the Bank seems to be fairly accurate. We would only add a note of realism that some NGOs (mainly international NGOs like Greenpeace and OXFAM America) use their attack campaigns on the Bank in part to further their fund-raising efforts with the public.

8. **Part II:** As Part II of the paper stresses, we agree that forging operational partnerships with NGOs, in close collaboration with governments, has to be at the root of an effective NGO strategy for the Bank. Steps that facilitate expanding operational collaboration with NGOs should be encouraged and supported by Bank management. We would caution, however, that going as far as helping governments "discover attributes of NGOs and contribute to overcoming a mistrust of them" sounds like we are trying to "sell" NGOs to governments. Some qualification would be helpful in this section to clarify that the Bank is not pushing governments to cooperate with every NGO in a country.

9. Further, we think that the Bank should be viewing the expansion of collaboration with NGOs within the wider context of our efforts to work more closely with the broader forces of civil society in our member countries, including academia, media, business, the informal sector, unions, and so on. We question why the notion of civil society has been omitted completely from the paper and would suggest that some treatment of this subject be added. We also note that the strategy makes no mention of the many years of learning and study that the Bank has devoted to participatory development. Given the direct relevance of the participation learning exercise to our work with NGOs, we would therefore suggest that the connection between that exercise and the NGO strategy be discussed in the paper.

10. **Part III:** As noted in Part III of the paper, the Bank should be seeking expanded opportunities to engage with NGOs (as well as with other elements of civil society)

on substantive policy issues of mutual concern. We agree with the set of priority policy issues listed on page seven of the paper, as well as with the guiding principle that successful collaboration -- whether in operations or policy dialogue -- depends on the careful selection of appropriate partners and the setting of clear objectives and procedures at the outset. Where appropriate and feasible, our government partners should also be included. Please note that, as part of their new responsibilities, I intend for EXTIM's Issues Managers to assist others, or to take the lead in, organizing meaningful exchanges between the Bank and NGOs and other audiences on strategic Bank-related issues. I understand that you have already asked our Paris office staff to be involved in promoting increased policy dialogue with European NGOs and other audiences as well. All these efforts will, of course, be greatly facilitated if we all work on the basis of an agreed communications strategy vis-à-vis NGOs.

11. **Part IV:** The six key issues and opportunities for partnership with NGOs discussed in Part IV of the NGO Strategy Paper are well conceived. Again, we agree that NGO selectivity will be one of the key determinants of effective collaboration and successful outcomes. Actively reaching out and listening to, in particular, leading "operationally experienced" NGOs on policy issues should result in a more constructive and balanced dialogue between the Bank and NGOs than in the past. We wonder, however, whether loosening our contractual and procurement procedures just for NGOs might again be going a bit too far. While we are usually all for flexibility, we should be cautious with such "affirmative action" statements, spell out in detail exactly what is being changed, and explain why these changes will not hurt the fundamental integrity of our competitive bidding processes.

12. **Part V:** The final section of the draft NGO Strategy Paper provides a comprehensive framework for building on existing best practices to mainstream further collaboration with NGOs. We agree in principle with the five areas of work identified, including our exploring the opening of an "NGO Small Projects Window." As the Bank looks for new instruments for tackling poverty at the grassroots, we should consider mechanisms that can directly support NGOs' efforts in developing countries. A modest, pilot initiative to direct increased resources to NGO-sponsored operations in sectors beyond those that will benefit from the new Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) is worth considering. In addition to enhancing the Bank's support for poverty reduction, such a facility would help build a network of support for the Bank within the NGO community which other multilateral and bilateral development agencies already enjoy. It is probably no mere coincidence that the NGOs that are publicly supporting IDA have also received funding for their work from the Bank (WWF, CRS, World Vision, etc.) Having said that, however, shouldn't we await the first results of the CGAP?

13. Regarding the strategy for promoting operational collaboration, we are sure that the NGO Unit is best placed to decide on a suitable plan of action. We would nevertheless like to suggest one additional area of work which the NGO Unit and OED might undertake jointly, namely the evaluation and appraisal of a few key NGO projects to determine what is really working well and what is not. Mr. Robert Picciotto and I have recently exchanged some views on this matter. Indeed, there has to date been little independent assessment of NGO effectiveness and impact to demonstrate that NGOs are the best channels for reaching and

assisting the poor, as we tend to say. We think that the Bank is well placed to contribute to the dearth of evaluative information in this area, and we would encourage the NGO Unit and OED to consider undertaking a program to study some NGO projects that are likely to bear useful best practice lessons. We would likewise like to see the Bank reciprocate and open up some of its own projects to NGO evaluation and analysis. The results of this work study would be valuable not only for the design and implementation of Bank-financed projects involving NGOs, but also for our advice to governments on working with NGOs.

14. We have noted, in particular, the paper's proposals regarding (a) outreach to NGOs, and (b) strengthened management of the Bank's response to criticisms and external concerns, both of which have direct bearing on EXT's work. Regarding outreach to NGOs, the proposal to regionalize the Bank-NGO Committee seems like a good one and is fully consistent with EXT's plans to increase the amount and quality of communications going to and coming from our member countries. We assume that the recommendation to hold two (as opposed to, say, four or six) regional or subregional Bank-NGO Committee meetings is based primarily on the availability, or lack, of resources. We would encourage moving the locus of Bank-NGO interaction to developing countries sooner rather than later, however. In addition, just as EXT is encouraging resident missions to interact more with the local press in their countries, resident missions should also begin to play a greater role in engaging with NGOs at the local level. Working closely with resident missions, we are trying to report out more stories of good Bank projects from the field, and we would be pleased to help develop stories about good NGO-associated, Bank-financed projects as well.

15. EXT is actively seeking to expand the Bank's communications to NGOs, particularly (although not exclusively) to NGOs in Part I countries and including NGOs beyond the usual cast of characters (reference our strategy to improve Bank relations with U.S. religious groups). Several communications steps that we are planning which we think will be helpful to the NGO Strategy include, among others: (a) arranging high-level briefings between NGO leaders and senior Bank staff, executive directors, and resident representatives; (b) developing more and better information materials about the Bank's work and Bank-related issues of interest to NGOs; (c) exploring (along with the NGO Unit) the development of an electronic newsletter for NGOs and including access to items of interest to NGOs on the Bank's new Internet home page; (d) organizing in-house seminars for Bank staff featuring NGO leaders; (e) exploring options for NGO events to be associated with our Annual Meetings; and (f) (in conjunction with PSP) establishing an informal working group of Bank and NGO staff on poverty reduction issues.

16. In essence, I see a much greater role for EXT in the substantive policy dialogue with NGOs than the NGO Strategy Paper proposes. Issues Managers (whether located in EXT or elsewhere) are meant to facilitate two-way substantive communications and to promote dialogue between the Bank and various external actors, including NGOs, on strategic issues such as poverty reduction, structural adjustment, environmentally sustainable development, gender, debt relief, and so on. This work will be accomplished by creating WDR-type or Issues Teams with all of the relevant parts of the Bank, including the NGO Unit, RVPU, CVPU, resident missions, etc. We would like to suggest that the draft NGO Strategy Paper

be changed to reflect EXT's particular role in this area and perhaps to clarify a division of labor between OPRPG and EXTIM staff with regard to the NGO audience.

17. As for the paper's proposals for strengthened management of the Bank's response to criticism and external concerns, you have already introduced in EXT a whole new arsenal of improved communications tools (boiler room, grassroots outreach, speakers' bureau, ad campaigns, etc.) and strategies for handling major attack campaigns on the Bank. Depending on the issue/region concerned, the relevant parts of the Bank are actively engaged in planning, executing, and following up on strategy. We have noted the paper's suggestion for creating "response groups" in the face of major campaigns, and we would like to acknowledge that this is an excellent idea, which is indeed already being implemented.

cc: Messrs./Mmes. Martin, Mitchell (EXTIM); Maguire, Kirby-Zaki (EXTDR);
Cullen (EXTME); Feather (EXTOP); Stephens (EXTCU);
Walsh (EXTWU); Van Praag (Paris)

Please file:

NGO

WORLD BANK OFFICE TRACKING SYSTEM
Director General, Ops Evaluation
Routing and Action Transmittal Sheet

TO: OEDDR, (T-9025) DATE: 9/13/95

SUBJECT DOCUMENT:

From: LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

To:

Dated:

Reference No.: DG0950913001

Topic: IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD BANK IN
INDONESIA

ACTION INSTRUCTIONS:

DUE DATE:


 XXX HANDLE
 REVIEW AND RECOMMEND
 FOR YOUR INFORMATION
 DISCUSS WITH _____
 AS WE DISCUSSED
 PREPARE RESPONSE FOR _____ SIGNATURE
 FOR YOUR FILES
 RETURN TO _____
 OTHER: _____

9/15/95

Remarks: FAS - RE: KEDUNG OMBO (INDONESIA PCR) - WHERE ARE WE ON THE
DRAFT RESPONSE TO THE NGO FAX?

*Submitted to RP
9/14*

THE WORLD BANK GROUP

ROUTING SLIP		DATE: September 14, 1995	
NAME		ROOM. NO.	
Mr. Francisco Aguirre-Sacasa, OEDDR		G-7-003	
<input type="checkbox"/>	URGENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	PER YOUR REQUEST
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	PER OUR CONVERSATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND FILE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FOR APPROVAL/CLEARANCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND CIRCULATE	<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND RETURN
RE: Kedung Ombo PCR			
REMARKS:			
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>as requested</i></p> <p>Please find attached, for your clearance, the draft response from Mr. Picciotto on the above subject.</p>			
FROM		ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
Roger Slade, Chief, OEDD1 		G 7-035	81293

THE WORLD BANK GROUP

ROUTING SLIP		DATE: September 11, 1995	
NAME		ROOM. NO.	
Mr. Slade			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	URGENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	PER YOUR REQUEST
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	PER OUR CONVERSATION
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FOR ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND FILE
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR APPROVAL/CLEARANCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND CIRCULATE	<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND RETURN
RE: Kedung Ombo PCR			
REMARKS:			
<p>Please prepare a draft response from Mr. Picciotto for my clearance by cob 9/13/95.</p> <p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 50px;"><i>Dennis</i></p> <p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 50px;"><i>Please handle in consultation with Ted.</i></p>			
NAME		ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
Francisco Aguirre-Sacasa		G7-003	34380

R.

INFID

International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development

Jalan Duren Tiga Selatan no. 15 Jakarta 12760 Indonesia
Tel/Fax. 62-21-7995400 Email : infid@nusa.or.id

RECEIVED
SEP 11 AM 10:39

URGENT

11 September 1995

Mr. Robert Picciotto
Director General
Operations Evaluation
THE WORLD BANK
Washington, D.C.
fax: 1-202-522.3200

total page: 1

KEDUNG OMBO PCR

Dear Mr. Picciotto:

As you may already be aware, INFID (formerly INGI) has been following the Kedungombo Dam Case since the resettlement problems were raised until the now. We also attended the June 22nd meeting regarding the Kedungombo and Narmada cases at the Bank. We were also monitoring the preparation of the Project Completion Report. In our communications with Mr. Eberthard Kopp, INFID, together with other NGOs and individual, have raised several issues regarding the PCR.

Several months ago we were informed that the PCR was pending. We would like to learn from you about the current status of the PCR and whether the OED was in the process of auditing it. We would also appreciate to know when the document is to be submitted to the Board.

Your response is highly appreciated, especially because the project affected people are interested in the Bank's own evaluation of the project.

Sincerely yours,

Asmara Nababan
Asmara Nababan
Secretary

DGO
↓
FAS
Where do we stand on this? Please draft response asap.

9/11

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

OCT 24 2022

WBG ARCHIVES

SecM95-751

FROM: The Deputy Secretary

July 21, 1995

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

INDONESIA:

Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project

(Loan 2543-IND)

Attached is a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Picciotto with its accompanying report entitled "Project Completion Report: Indonesia: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project (Loan 2543-IND)" dated June 19, 1995 (Report No. 14636) prepared by the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office.

Distribution

Executive Directors and Alternates
Office of the President
Senior Management, Bank, IFC and MIGA

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

Document of
The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

OCT 24 2022

Report No. 14636

WBG ARCHIVES

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

INDONESIA

KEDUNG OMBO MULTIPURPOSE DAM AND IRRIGATION PROJECT
(LOAN 2543-IND)

JUNE 19, 1995

Agriculture Operations
Country Department III
East Asia and Pacific Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Name of Currency	=	Indonesian Rupiah (Rp)
Appraisal Report US\$1	=	Rp1,100
Economic Analysis (mid 1993) US\$1	=	Rp2,100
PCR Date (April 1994) US\$1	=	Rp2,150

FISCAL YEAR OF THE BORROWER

April 1 - March 31

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

ABBREVIATIONS

BWOU	-	Basin Water Operations Unit
DGWRD	-	Directorate General of Water Resources Development
GOI	-	Government of Indonesia
JIWMP	-	Java Irrigation Improvement and Water Resources Management Project
IHE	-	Institute of Hydraulic Engineering at Bandung
IPEDA	-	Iuran Pembangunan Daerah (land tax)
ISSP II	-	Irrigation Sub-Sector Project II
O&M	-	Operations and Maintenance (of irrigation systems)
PLN	-	Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara (power generation authority)
PRIS	-	Provincial Irrigation Service
R&R	-	Resettlement and Rehabilitation (of affected populations)
SWCU	-	Satya Wacana Christian University

THE WORLD BANK
Washington, D.C. 20433
U.S.A.

DECLASSIFIED

Office of Director-General
Operations Evaluation

OCT 24 2022

June 19, 1995

WBG ARCHIVES

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Indonesia
Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project (Loan 2543-IND)**

Attached is the Project Completion Report (PCR) on the Indonesia—Kedong Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation project (Loan 2543-IND, approved in FY85) prepared by the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office. Part II was prepared by the Borrower.

The principal objective of the project was to increase cropping intensities, yields and production—of rice and other food crops—by developing water storage on the Serang River and constructing new or remodelled structures in four irrigation schemes below the dam. About 87,000 farm families on 60,000 hectares were to benefit from the irrigation; about 5,400 families were to be displaced by the reservoir. Power produced at the dam site for the national grid, water supplied to local villages and towns, and flood control for farmlands and townships below the dam were other expected benefits.

The PCR presents an exhaustive account of the successful irrigation program and the poorly executed, and highly confrontational, resettlement operation. The engineering works were completed on schedule and were of high quality. Cropping intensities have already reached appraisal targets, while area and yield targets were exceeded. While rice prices expected at appraisal proved overoptimistic, municipal water benefits (not assessed at appraisal) turned out to be substantial. On balance, the PCR re-estimates the rate of return at 12.4 percent, still below the 17.4 percent projected at appraisal, but still satisfactory. Two innovative technical operations that would have complemented the main irrigation works were less well implemented and have yet to show positive results.

The slow and painful resettlement process, attracting criticism by local NGOs and the world press, is described in the PCR. The criticism was largely warranted and induced corrective action by the borrower and the Bank. However, subsequent sample surveys of the 5,300 affected families, most of whom elected to relocate locally rather than transmigrate, show that 70 percent had post-project incomes below the average of a nearby group of farmers unaffected by the dam.


The mishandling of the resettlement operation by both Government and the Bank is sternly criticized in the PCR. Neglect of this component at the planning and appraisal stages, misreporting by Indonesian authorities, failure by the Bank to check the situation on the ground, mismatch between domestic policies and practices and Bank requirements, lack of popular participation and weak coordination characterized resettlement operations. On the other hand, the impressive engineering, water supply and agricultural outcomes together with recent (albeit imperfect) progress in meeting resettlement requirements justify a marginally satisfactory outcome rating for the project, since its major objectives were met and the net re-estimated rate of return

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

appears acceptable. Institutional development is rated as modest and the sustainability of both the infrastructure and agricultural improvements is rated as likely given Indonesia's improving operations and maintenance practices.

This project demonstrates that impoundment projects requiring resettlement cannot be appraised simply on the basis of economic and technical criteria. Social criteria are equally important. The mechanisms for consulting, transferring, and compensating the affected households must be handled in careful accord with Bank directives and with the priority they deserve. Given the serious shortcomings with respect to the critical resettlement dimension of the project—and the lack of compliance with Bank operational directives—Bank and borrower performance are rated as unsatisfactory.

An audit is planned.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of several loops and a long horizontal stroke, positioned to the right of the text 'An audit is planned.'

Attachment

INDONESIA

**KEDUNG OMBO MULTIPURPOSE DAM AND IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Ln. 2543-IND)**

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Table of Contents

	Page No.
Preface	i
Evaluation Summary	ii
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE	1
Project Identity	1
Project Background	1
Project Objectives and Description	2
Project Design and Organization	3
Project Implementation	4
Project Results	6
Project Sustainability	8
Bank Performance	8
Borrower Performance	9
Project Relationship	9
Consulting Services	9
Project Documentation and Data	10
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE	11
General Comment	11
Comments on Bank's Review (Part I)	11
Bank's Performance	12
Lessons Learned	12
Relationship between Borrower and the Bank	13
PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION	14
Related Bank Loans and/or Credits	14
Project Timetable	14
Loan Disbursements	15
Project Implementation	16

	Project Costs and Financing	18
	A. Project Costs	18
	B. Project Financing	19
	Project Results	20
	A. Direct Results	20
	B. Economic Analysis	20
	C. Financial Impact	21
	D. Studies	21
	Status of Major Covenants	22
	Use of Bank Resources	24
	A. Staff Inputs	24
	B. Missions	25
Map:	Schematic Map of Project Area	26
Figure:	Water Requirements and Releases in the Kedung Ombo System	27
Annexes:	1. Project Implementation	28
	2. Financial and Economic Analysis	33
	3. Resettlement	56

Map: IBRD 18529

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
INDONESIA
KEDUNG OMBO MULTIPURPOSE DAM AND IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Ln. 2543-IND)

Preface

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project for which Loan No. 2543 in the amount of US\$156 million was approved on May 16, 1985. The Loan was closed on December 31, 1993, two years behind schedule. Most of the Loan (US\$154.6 million) was disbursed and the outstanding balance of US\$1.4 million was cancelled in May 1994.

This PCR was prepared in accordance with the guidelines issued in June 1989. Drafts for Parts I and III were prepared by a mission from the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Programme which visited Indonesia from 7 to 26 April 1994, and were reviewed by the Bank. The PCR is based on the Staff Appraisal Report (No. 5346a-IND), dated April 24, 1985; the World Bank's supervision reports and project files; field visits to the various facilities financed under the project and to two resettlement areas; and discussions with relevant Government officials, beneficiaries, resettled families and concerned NGOs.

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT**INDONESIA****KEDUNG OMBO MULTIPURPOSE DAM AND IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Ln. 2543-IND)****EVALUATION SUMMARY****Objectives**

i. The project objectives were to increase food production and employment from 59,340 ha in the Jratunseluna Basin in Central Java; control flooding in about 10,000 ha of agricultural land and 5,000 ha of urban land; supplement municipal water supplies for about 300 villages and towns in the irrigation area; generate hydro-power; and improve water management. The project provided funds for building a 61m high clay core rockfill dam at Kedung Ombo on the upper Serang River, along with weirs and a barrage downstream; and for constructing/upgrading irrigation and drainage canals for 25,100 ha of rainfed land and 34,240 ha of irrigated lands. The project also envisaged provision of 13.6 million m³ of water for municipal use; installation of power generation facilities (33.9 MVA) and transmission lines; and technical assistance for monitoring, studies and training. New technologies to improve water management were to be introduced through installation of automatic hydro-technical gates on a pilot basis; and establishment of a centre using telemetry to provide timely flood warning and to schedule allocation of water to various irrigation systems. The project involved resettlement of 5,390 families, of which it was anticipated that 90% would transmigrate and 10% would resettle locally. Total project costs were estimated at Rp311 billion (US\$283 million) and in support a Bank loan of US\$156 million was approved in May 1985.

Implementation Experience

ii. Most engineering works related to the irrigation and power generation components were well implemented and completed on schedule. The contractors, consultants and the Project Office worked well and there were no problems between the Bank and GOI. However, some tertiary canals still need to be completed and there are a few problems with the major structures which need to be monitored (paras 5.2 and 5.3). The implementation of the innovative project components (automatic gates and telemetry) proved difficult. Some project staff felt that these technologies were not suitable for Indonesian conditions, and there were problems of construction quality and delays caused by changes in procurement and tendering procedures (para 5.4). Project costs at closing, which was two years behind schedule, were estimated at Rp496 billion, about 60% above the appraisal target but, because of the devaluation of the Rupiah, the US Dollar cost of the project was the same as at appraisal. Most of the loan (US\$154.6 million) was disbursed and US\$1.4 million was cancelled in May 1994.

Resettlement

iii. At the time water impounding had started in April 1989, most of the affected land had been acquired but few of the displaced people had transmigrated. Land prices in the nearby areas had risen and the compensation amounts were not sufficient to purchase land of equal productivity in those areas. In 1989/90, the Bank and GOI also came under severe criticism, both domestically and internationally, for allegedly not preparing a satisfactory resettlement programme. Greater efforts were made to resettle people locally and develop alternative income-generating opportunities such as fishing and aquaculture. The present situation is that 1,161 households have transmigrated, 669 families have been locally resettled on the sites developed by the project, and 3,131 families have resettled themselves in adjacent villages. About 307 families still reside in the Greenbelt - Government acquired land in the immediate vicinity of the reservoir which should not be cultivated (para 5.5). Despite initial difficulties, families who have transmigrated appear to have incomes above those they obtained previously. Families who accepted the initial cash compensation package and resettled themselves, or were resettled locally by the Government, have fewer income earning assets and are likely to have been adversely affected by the project (para 6.3). Because of the complexity of resettlement in this case and its relevance for future resettlement operations, Annex 3 provides a more in-depth treatment of the project's resettlement issues.

Project Results

iv. The reliability and quantity of water supplied to about 60,065 ha have been substantially increased. As a result there has been a substitution of lower value Palawija crops by paddy in the dry season, and yields and cropping intensities have increased. Total paddy production has risen by 380,000 tons (150%) and farm incomes by 35-150% (paras 6.1 and 6.5). The project has also resulted in increased flood protection, power generation, fishing and tourism. The project is economically viable (ERR=12.4%) if all project benefits are evaluated and not just the agricultural and power benefits, as was done at appraisal. The ERR is lower than that estimated at appraisal (17.4%), largely due to the lower economic price of paddy (para 6.6). Recent studies show that no major environmental problems have been created by the project, other than those arising from resettlement (para 6.4).

Project Sustainability

v. Project benefits are likely to be sustainable. Key reforms are being implemented in the irrigation sector which would improve cost recovery and O&M. These reforms are being supported through a number of Bank funded projects (para 7.1).

Lessons Learnt

vi. (a) Large dams can be a viable investment, provided that resettlement aspects are adequately covered and all associated benefits fully exploited. In addition to agriculture and power, an increasingly important source of benefits is the supply of water to medium and large cities where demand for water is growing rapidly.

- (b) Implementation of an involuntary resettlement programme is a difficult and controversial activity. It requires detailed, but flexible and participatory planning, combined with good implementation. Institutional responsibilities, capacities, and responsiveness tend to be particularly problematic and require close attention during design and monitoring during implementation. Sufficient funds need to be allocated to provide adequate productive resources for the resettlers.
- (c) The introduction of new technologies requires strong commitment on the part of the Government and those involved with implementation. There is a need to ensure that these pilot/research activities are properly evaluated and relevant lessons drawn therefrom.

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

INDONESIA

KEDUNG OMBO MULTIPURPOSE DAM AND IRRIGATION PROJECT (Ln.2543-IND)

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

1. Project Identity

Project Name : Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Loan No. : 2543 - IND
RVP Unit : East Asia Region
Country : Indonesia
Sector : Agriculture
Sub-sector : Water Resources Development

2. Background

2.1 GOI gives high priority to developing water resources in order to improve irrigation and promote agricultural growth; ensure adequate municipal water supplies; reduce the risk of floods; and generate electricity. In Java, which has 60% of all irrigated area, the main priorities at the time of appraisal were to: improve irrigation through better operations and maintenance (O&M), and construction of multipurpose storage dams and better tertiary networks; increase municipal water supplies, especially for cities such as Jakarta, Semarang and Surabaya which do not have sufficient good quality ground water; improve flood control works in order to reduce extensive damage to rural and urban areas; and increase hydro power generating capacity. Under the Repelita IV program (1984-89), the GOI had planned to invest US\$4.1 billion (at current prices and exchange rates) in the development of water resources. The bulk of this investment was to complete ongoing works and only limited funds were allocated for undertaking new large scale irrigation projects. The World Bank has been closely involved with irrigation development in Indonesia and under Repelita IV the focus of Bank assistance was on strengthening the irrigation services; improving O&M; and supporting a limited number of large, technically complex projects.

2.2 Among the large scale projects, GOI attached the highest priority to construction of the Kedung Ombo dam on the Serang River, one of the five rivers in the Jratunseluna basin (Central Java). The dam was to be located about 75 km east of Semarang and serve an area which was without water in the dry season but subject to flooding in the wet season. The Bank had supported previous development efforts in the Jratunseluna basin, most of which focused on improving the irrigation, drainage and flood control systems, rather than increasing overall water

availability. The Bank had also provided support for preparation of a master plan of the Jratunseluna basin as well as detailed studies and designs of the Kedung Ombo dam.

3. Project Objectives and Description

3.1 Project Objectives: The major project objectives were to increase food production and employment from 59,340 ha in the Jratunseluna basin; control flooding in about 10,000 ha of agricultural land and 5,000 ha of urban land; supplement municipal water supplies for about 300 villages and towns in the irrigation area; generate hydro-power; and improve water management.

3.2 Project Description: The main project components were:

- a) **Dam and Irrigation Development:** Improvement of infrastructure on the upper Serang River through: construction of a 61 m high clay core rockfill dam at Kedung Ombo, a weir at Sidorejo and a barrage at Klambu; raising of the existing weir at Sedadi; construction or improvement of irrigation and drainage systems on 25,100 ha of rainfed lands and 34,240 ha of irrigated lands, complementing drainage and flood control improvements under the Irrigation XIV Project (Ln.1811-IND); provision of 13.6 million m³ of water for municipal and drinking purposes^{1/} and installation, on a pilot basis, of automatic hydro-technical gates in parts of the Sidorejo irrigation area.
- b) **Power Development:** Installation of a power station at Kedung Ombo (28.5 MVA), and three micro-hydro power stations (1.8 MVA each) at Sidorejo, Sedadi and Klambu, along with sub-stations and power transmission lines.
- c) **Flood Warning and Water Monitoring Centre:** Establishment of a centre to monitor rainfall and water flows in the upper Jratunseluna basin, using telemetry to provide timely flood warning and schedule water delivery to the various irrigation systems in the basin. The centre was to be linked to the Bureau of Meteorology and Geophysics in Semarang for advance warning of rainfall.
- d) **Technical Assistance:** Provision of technical assistance for: training in dam safety, water management and water control monitoring; preparing studies for the proposed Jatigede Dam; monitoring the resettlement programme; and updating maps for reclassification for land tax (IPEDA) purposes.

3.3 Resettlement: Work on assessing the resettlement needs of the project had been under way since 1981^{2/} and indicated that some 5,390 families (23,380 people) would have to be relocated. The affected population was to be offered land compensation as well as the standard package of benefits offered to transmigrants (free land, subsidies, etc.), or, if they chose to

^{1/} This is equivalent to the provisions made in the SAR (0.006 lt/ha/sec for 25,100 ha and 0.009 lt/sec/ha for 34,240 ha).

^{2/} Carried out by the Institute of Ecology, Padjadjaran University, supervised by international consultants.

remain in the area, preferential training and the possibility of working in local public works programmes. The latest survey available at the time of appraisal (1983) showed that 75% of the people wanted to transmigrate, and based on the reported experience of similar projects in Central Java this was expected to rise to 90%. Representatives of the affected villages had visited the proposed transmigration sites in Irian Jaya and Sumatra.

3.4 Project Cost and Financing: Total project costs over the five year implementation period were estimated at Rp311.4 billion (US\$283.1 million). The estimated base cost of civil works was Rp156.6 billion (US\$142.4 million) of which 38% was for the dam and power station and 62% for the downstream irrigation works. Provision for resettlement included Rp28.1 billion (US\$25.5 million) for acquisition of 6,207 ha of land, and Rp0.15 billion (US\$0.15 million) for consultants to monitor the programme. In support of the project a Bank loan of US\$156 million was approved in May 1985 and became effective in November 1985. GOI was to provide US\$105.8 million from its own funds and US\$21.3 million, for the power generating equipment, was to be financed by export credits.

4. Project Design and Organization

4.1 Project Strategy and Scope: The project followed on a number of Bank supported interventions in the irrigation sub-sector and in the Jratunseluna basin. The project was based on a sound strategy of increasing aggregate water availability, to complement past investments in downstream works; improving O&M; and introducing new technologies (automatic gates and telemetry). The importance of and need for the dam and irrigation works were well understood by the project authorities. The new technologies were less well understood and some of the project staff felt that these innovations were not appropriate for Indonesian conditions. The project was large and involved work on a number of rather complex structures, but this was necessary if some of the major problems of the Jratunseluna basin were to be adequately addressed.

4.2 Project Organization and Design: At appraisal, detailed designs had been completed for all the major structures. The main implementing agencies involved were the Jratunseluna River Basin Development Project Office, for the dam and irrigation works; the power generating authority (PLN) for the power component; and the Institute of Hydraulic Engineering (IHE), for training and the Flood Warning and Water Management Centre. Each of these agencies had clearly defined activities to implement and were well experienced in the particular areas of specialization. In addition, the project was assisted by consultants who had a long association with irrigation in Indonesia and in the Jratunseluna basin. The resettlement activities were mostly left to the Government and special committees were set up at provincial and district levels to supervise and coordinate this work. However, the project did not provide any funds for developing infrastructure and other facilities for resettlers. Also, the concept of "affected families" was not clearly defined and no registration was undertaken of individuals eligible for resettlement benefits. This made it difficult to target interventions and fully monitor the situation, especially in cases where younger family members had moved out of their parents' houses or families had split up. For some of the technical assistance components, such as

studies of the Jatigede dam, the project only provided a convenient financing vehicle and these activities had little relevance to overall project strategy.

5. Project Implementation

5.1 Loan Effectiveness and Project Start-up: The Loan was approved in May 1985 and became effective in November 1985 following award of the contracts for construction and supervision of the dam.

5.2 Major Structural Works: Most engineering works were well implemented and completed on schedule. However, some cracks have recently appeared on the crest of the dam and there has been subsidence on the upstream face. An international dam safety panel carried out an inspection in November 1993 and concluded that the cracks were not serious but should be monitored. The Klambu barrage appears to have been built too close to a tight bend in the river and flow conditions are not uniform across the barrage. Since construction, large amounts of silt have been deposited on the left bank creating further irregularities in flows. The situation should be monitored and remedial measures, such as regular dredging, may be required. The power generating and transmission facilities are in place and are performing well, except for the station at Sidorejo weir which was severely damaged by floods in January 1993 and has not yet been repaired.

5.3 Downstream Irrigation and Drainage Works: Downstream works have also been completed except for construction of tertiaries on about 633 ha in Klambu Kanan. These are expected to be completed in 1994/95 with GOI funds. At the time of appraisal only preliminary designs were available and during the course of detailed design and construction some changes were made. The number of minor structures rose as, following appraisal, the Government reduced the size of tertiary irrigation blocks from 100-150 ha to 50-70 ha. Other significant changes were an expansion of the Klambu right canal to allow for the possibility of further downstream area development, and financing for an intake on the left bank of Klambu barrage which would feed a canal taking water to Semarang city. This canal, which will have a head capacity of 3.5 m³/sec, is under construction with Government funds. The total benefiting area is about the same as at appraisal although there is variation in the area irrigated from the different weirs and barrages (Annex 1, Table 2).

5.4 Other Components: The training and technical assistance components were implemented without major problems. However, the innovative project components proved difficult. The construction works associated with the installation of the automatic gates were not of the standard required and a number of remedial works had to be carried out. The system became fully operational only at the end of 1992. With regard to the telemetry component, it was originally envisaged that this component would be implemented by a single contractor who would also oversee operations for a period of four years and train local staff. Following appraisal a number of changes were made in specifications and tendering procedures which caused long delays. Also, the proposed radar linkage with the Bureau of Meteorology and Geophysics was dropped but a link with IHE, Bandung, was provided. Procurement and installation of equipment were only completed in December 1993 and some minor work still

remains to be done to make it fully operational. Thereafter, the system will need to be tested and calibrated and staff adequately trained, which will take some more time.

5.5 Resettlement: By the time that work on the dam was complete and impounding had started (April 1989), the bulk of land required had been acquired and compensation paid - usually in cash at the village itself. Land acquisition was generally well implemented but some 750 families refused to accept payment and the amounts due to them were deposited in the local courts for collection by the persons concerned. The area of land finally acquired was 9,498 ha^{1/} (compared with the SAR estimate of 6,207 ha), of which 70% was in the reservoir area and 30% in the irrigation area. Prices paid for land acquired appear to have followed GOI guidelines and were increased by 10-15% every year. Most of the affected families preferred to resettle locally and only a small proportion had transmigrated. Land prices in the nearby areas had risen and the compensation amounts were often not sufficient to purchase land of equal productivity in those areas. In 1989/90, the Bank and GOI also came under severe criticism, both domestically and internationally, for allegedly ignoring the rights of people living in the area and not preparing a satisfactory resettlement programme.

5.6 The GOI and the Bank responded to these developments by making greater efforts to resettle people satisfactorily. Areas near the reservoir, which were under the jurisdiction of the Forestry Department or set aside for grazing, were obtained and developed to provide land, housing and other facilities. The Loan Agreement was amended in July 1989 to provide funds for this, as well as for improving facilities at the transmigration sites. Efforts were also made to provide extension advice on alternative income-generating opportunities such as fishing and aquaculture. The amounts allocated for developing the resettlement and transmigration sites were increased three more times in subsequent years. Eventually, a total of Rp11.5 billion (US\$5.6 million) was spent on these areas, and most works have been well implemented. The present situation is that of the original families^{2/}, 1,161 households have transmigrated, 669 families have been locally resettled on the sites developed by the project, and 3,131 families have resettled themselves in adjacent villages. Some of the families living in the Greenbelt have refused to move and 34 households have filed cases in the courts. Details are provided in Annex 3.

5.7 Project Costs and Disbursements: The project closed on 31 December 1993, two years behind schedule, mainly because of delays in resettlement activities and the telemetry component. In Rupiah terms, the project costs at closing were estimated at Rp495.5 billion, about 60% above the appraisal target but, because of the devaluation of the Rupiah, the US Dollar cost of the project was the same as at appraisal. Most of the loan (US\$154.6 million) was disbursed and US\$1.4 million was cancelled in May 1994.

^{1/} This includes land for the "Greenbelt" - land in the immediate vicinity of the reservoir which should not be cultivated.

^{2/} Based on a study carried out by Satya Wacana Christian University in 1993. The total number of households on which data are provided is 5,268 as opposed to 5,390 at appraisal. The numbers do not cover families which have formed through splitting up of the original household. There are 414 such split families living in the Greenbelt area and 407 in the Government resettlement area.

5.8 Project Risks: The main project risk identified in the SAR was that of possible implementation delays due to slow land acquisition. As it turned out, land acquisition and dam impounding went ahead on schedule but not enough attention was paid to the welfare of the resettled population. The other major risk identified was poor O&M but this problem appears unlikely to materialize (para 7.1).

6. Project Results

6.1 Irrigation and Drainage: The reliability and quantity of water supplied to about 60,065 ha have been substantially increased as a result of the project and about 87,000 families have benefited. Data on actual water releases from the dam and on diversion at Sidorejo, Sedadi and Klambu were collected and, although there are a number of questions about their accuracy, they strongly suggest that water supplies are generally adequate for planned cropping intensities (Annex 1, Figure 1). Farmers in the benefiting areas confirm the improvement in water supplies since the completion of the project. At present irrigation releases follow a fixed fortnightly schedule but a more flexible system of operations should be possible once the Flood Forecasting and Water Monitoring Centre becomes operational. Higher water supply has enabled farmers to increase cropping intensities from 188% to almost 230%. In addition, there has been a substitution of Palawija crops by paddy in the dry season. The total area planted to paddy is 120,130 ha, compared with 67,480 ha in the without project situation, while the area under Palawija crops dropped from 43,260 ha to 17,270 ha. There have also been significant increases in paddy yields^{1/} as a result of better irrigation and drainage, and total paddy production has consequently risen by 380,000 tons (150%). About 30,000 ha in the lower Serang basin are flood prone and the construction of the dam and other drainage works have increased the flood protection level from a 20 years' return period to a 100 years' return period. Last year, despite the Sidorejo station being out of commission, 76 Gwh of electricity was generated. Fishing and aquaculture in the reservoir have increased, with about 1,000 families involved. Tourism around the reservoir is developing rapidly and last year about 300,000 people visited the area. Water supplied for municipal and industrial purposes is still limited. However, it is expected to rise sharply to over 150 million m³ per year once the canals and structures to take water to Semarang, Demak and Rembang are completed.

6.2 New Technologies to Improve O&M: It is still too early to assess the benefits of the new technologies introduced under the project. The telemetry component needs some more time before it is fully operational and reliable. The automatic gates were initially not constructed to standard and, although these problems have been corrected, the system is still not being operated optimally. Water distribution mostly follows a fixed schedule and is regulated through the use of the manual over-ride gates at the primary intake as well as at secondary and tertiary levels. At field level, farmers sometimes manipulate the small automatic gates by placing stones on the floats. Monitoring of the system is also poor and available data on water releases are not fully reliable. A study was made in early 1992 to assess the new gates and concluded that the investment cost of the new system was not different to that of the traditional systems but that

^{1/} Paddy yields rose to 4.9-5.4 t/ha in the wet season, an increase of 29-50%; and to 5.2-5.6 t/ha in the dry season, an increase of 22-40%. See Annex 2, Table 3.

it was not possible to assess its operational efficiency as the system was not yet functioning properly.

6.3 Resettlement: A monitoring study of the resettled population carried out in 1993 by the Satya Wacana Christian University (SWCU) indicates that 72% of the families are worse off following resettlement. Six years after resettlement, families who accepted the compensation and resettled themselves (59% of the resettled population) earn somewhat less than their neighbors who weren't resettled, with a wide range. Families resettled to sites provided by the government earn nearly 25% less. Incomes have declined because productivity of the replacement lands is lower than land previously cultivated by these farmers. However, the Government has also spent substantial amounts on this group (Rp10-14 million per family compared with about Rp4 million for those who resettled themselves - Annex 1, Table 3) to improve soil fertility and to provide various services such as houses and other infrastructure. Although this group lags behind the others, the corrective action program has begun to show signs of significant success in improving income. With improved farming practices, this group may have sufficient assets to restore incomes to their previous level.

6.4 The two groups that have done relatively well are Transmigrants (22% of the total) and farmers who have remained behind in the Greenbelt (6%). Despite initial difficulties, current incomes of transmigrants is well above those of local residents and groups which have resettled in other ways. Many of those farming in the Greenbelt have good income earning possibilities through agriculture and fishing - they have access to the reservoir and soils are generally good. However, cultivation in the draw down area may not be sustainable in the long run. Additional details are provided in Annex 3.

	Unaffected Local Population	Transmigrants	Govt. Resettled Population	Self Resettled Population	Greenbelt Residents
	Rp/month				
Per caput income	20,000	35,600	15,600	17,700	32,500
Source: SWCU Final Report, December 1993 (Tables 9 & 10).					

6.5 Environmental Impact: Recent studies show that no major environmental problems have been created by the project, other than those associated with resettlement. Despite the intensification of agriculture, water quality is generally good and there appears to be no increase in levels of nitrates in the water. Sediment deposition in the reservoir over the last five years (1989-94) has been 11.5 million m³ compared with a total storage capacity of 723 million m³ and a dead storage capacity of 88 million m³.

6.6 Financial Analysis: At the time of appraisal it was anticipated that farm incomes would rise by 60-145%. Farm models prepared using data collected by the consultants and the project office, as well as information from farmers and agricultural extension officers, show that, in fact, farm incomes have increased substantially by between 49% and 144% (Annex 2, Table 6).

6.7 Economic Analysis: Aggregating the economic value of all project benefits including agriculture, power generation, fishing, tourism, flood control and municipal water supply¹¹, the re-estimated economic rate of return (ERR) for the project is 12.4%. If only agricultural and power generation benefits are considered, as was done at appraisal, the ERR would be 8.5%. These ERRs are well below that calculated at appraisal (17.4%). The lower re-estimated ERR are almost entirely due to changes in prices, particularly the economic price of paddy, which fell, in real terms, by 32% between 1984 and 1993. If real paddy prices had remained at their 1984 levels and if the same conversion factors as in the SAR were applicable to labour (50%) and construction items (80-90%), the ERR would have been unchanged from appraisal, even if only agricultural and power benefits are considered¹².

7. Project Sustainability

7.1 Project benefits are likely to be sustainable. All conveyance and drainage works constructed under the project are to be handed over to the Provincial Irrigation Service (PRIS). Although in some areas PRIS has insufficient funds, the project area is covered by the ongoing Irrigation Sub-Sector Project II (ISSP II) and would be provided about Rp 35,000 per ha which should be enough for proper O&M. With regard to the dam, major structures, and the Flood Warning and Water Monitoring Centre, GOI will provide adequate funding for O&M, some of which may come from other sources. In the case of the dam and appurtenant structures, the annual O&M costs of which are estimated at Rp 800 million annually, the project authorities have requested PLN to pay 50% of this cost, as opposed to 50% of the cost of only the intake and tunnel, as was specified in the Loan Agreement. The Government has also decided to extend to all Java the Irrigation Service Fee which previously was only applicable to some pilot areas. Technical support, including support to a new Basin Water Operations Unit (BWOU), which will be set up to manage the dam and major structures, will be provided by the recently approved Java Irrigation Improvement and Water Resources Management Project (JIWMP).

8. Bank Performance

8.1 Bank performance was generally good, with the exception of resettlement. Strong support was provided during preparation, both in terms of funding and technical supervision. During implementation, supervision of the engineering aspects was good and during the main construction period staff continuity was maintained. Bank performance on resettlement was not satisfactory, however, particularly during project appraisal and early supervision. Concerns over the quality of the resettlement planning that were raised by OPS/AGR were largely ignored. These focused on the lack of an overall organizational framework, financial commitments for local resettlement, and clear connections between the resettlement program and general transmigration programs. Each of these concerns became a major problem during

¹¹ Of these, the most important is municipal water supply, which by the year 2000 would have a social value equivalent to almost 38% of total project benefits (Annex 2, Table 14).

¹² Bank projections now give a range for future commodity prices (at 70% confidence level) as well as a point estimate. If international rice prices were to be at the top of this range, the parity price for paddy would be the same as at appraisal in real terms.

implementation. Project supervision missions did not visit the resettlement sites. Independent monitoring was delayed by more than two years, despite being a key element in the resettlement program. Although deprived of the information sources built into the project's design, the Bank also ignored submissions from local NGOs who were identifying resettlement issues as the project proceeded. After 1989, the Bank paid substantially more attention to resettlement and a number of supervision missions included specialized staff to look at these aspects. The Bank also responded in a flexible and timely manner to requests to amend the Loan Agreement, which over the implementation period was amended a total of four times.

9. Borrower Performance

9.1 Borrower performance has been good as far as the major civil works are concerned. GOI gave high priority to the project, and staff and counterpart funds have been provided in a timely manner. However, the Government did not give sufficient importance to the telemetry component and some decisions took a long time to take and delayed the implementation. There were also a number of cost revisions (in Rupiah terms) on various civil works contracts. The Government did not implement the Loan Covenant regarding cost recovery (para 3.04 of the Loan Agreement) whereby a part of the IPEDA collected was to be allocated for O&M of irrigation works. Presently, farmers in the project area still do not pay any charges to Government for irrigation, drainage and flood protection services but this will change with the extension of the Irrigation Service Fee to all Java. GOI failed to appreciate the dynamic nature of the resettlement process. Lack of an overall resettlement organization led to institutional paralysis when it became clear that most people would not transmigrate, and new programs were needed. Implementation of the local resettlement packages was also handicapped by the lack of an effective resettlement organization. In the early years, local authorities concerned with the resettlement impasse attempted to resolve the matter directly, contravening Indonesian laws and procedural requirements for acquiring land. On the other hand, the project authorities and GOI reacted expeditiously when it became clear that changes were needed in the resettlement program. Good senior staff were assigned to this program, and land and other resources made available to the extent possible.

10. Project Relationship

10.1 The relationship between the Bank and the Borrower during the project period was good and there were no major areas of disagreement.

11. Consulting Services

11.1 **Consultants:** The project used a number of foreign and local consultants for detailed designs, construction supervision, training and studies, and most of them performed well. The project also employed the services of an NGO to help the locally resettled population increase their farm output and incomes. The efforts of the NGO made a significant impact on incomes despite the limited duration of its activities.

11.2 Contractors: The dam was constructed by a foreign contractor working together with a local counterpart. The work was carried out expeditiously and to a good standard as was the work on the major structures and downstream irrigation and drainage works. In the case of the telemetry component, because of delays in awarding the contract there was very little time for implementation and the systems are not yet fully functional.

12. Project Documentation and Data

12.1 The SAR and Loan Agreement, along with technical documents contained in the preparation/feasibility reports, provided sufficient guidance for implementation of most of the engineering works. However, resettlement aspects were not adequately covered. Also, the arrangements for sharing O&M costs with PLN was inadequate and its revision has proved difficult.

12.2 The project office had hired a consultant to prepare a draft PCR. This contained most of the information required regarding project performance and achievements. Along with the various other studies, such as that on resettlement, it provided a good data base for the preparation of this PCR.

P A R T II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

1. General Comments

In general, the contents of Part I match what was actually performed by the project except some minor items described hereafter. For Part III, there is no comment because the presented statistical information is adequate and accurate. The project has complied with all major covenants except Loan Agreement Section LA 5.03 (a): "Ensuring efficient use of water made available by irrigation system constructed under project", which has been delayed due to slow implementation of the telemetry component.

2. Comments on Bank's Review (Part I)

2.1 Para 2.2. Before Kedung Ombo was built, more than 40,000 ha were irrigated by the Sedadi weir. The command area was rehabilitated by PROSIDA project. The area without water in the dry season were only in Juana valley (Kelambu Kanan and Kelambu Kiri) and South Grobogan with a total area of approx. 15,000 ha.

2.2 Para 4.2. Government committees were set up at provincial and district levels to supervise and coordinate resettlement activities and GOI provided funds. Soon after completion of the dam the project provided funds for developing infrastructure and other facilities for resettlers:

- a) three resettlement locations were prepared in Kayen (40 ha), Kedungmulyo (350 ha) and Kedungrejo villages (58 ha), close to the reservoir area; and
- b) three transmigration areas were developed in Muko-muko (Bengkulu), Air Seluma, Air Manjuntio (Sumatera Selatan) and Perkebunan Inti Rakyat (Jambi).

2.3 Para 5.2. Some cracks have recently appeared on the crest of the dam and there has been subsidence on the upstream face. According to an international dam safety panel, the cracks were not serious. A monitoring program for detecting the behavior of the cracks has been carried out, and it was concluded that the subsidence on the upstream face of the dam has stopped. Funds for dredging silt in front of Klambu barrage has been proposed in FY95/96. It will become routine maintenance thereafter.

2.4 Para 5.3. The construction of 633 ha in Klambu Kanan was completed in FY94/95 with GOI funds and is now in the maintenance period of the related contract. The size reduction of tertiary irrigation blocks from 100-150 ha to 50-70 ha was based on design standards issued by DGWRD in 1986.

2.5 Para 5.4. The automatic gates at Sidorejo command area were of the standard required and the installation was supervised by experts from foreign consultant. The gates perform good only in "full supply" condition. When water from Kedungombo reservoir decreases, the gates perform unsatisfactory. The operation of the telemetry system was delayed due to complexity of the tendering process; tenderers were less than required so the tender had to be repeated. The system was not functioning until now because:

- a) the Panel Control Board at Sidorejo, Sedadi and Dumpil weirs were not yet available;
- b) the gate position indicators in Sedadi weir were damaged and need to be repaired;
- c) the potentiometer in Dumpil weir should be produced; and
- d) system components were stolen twice: i) main component in repeater station was stolen in January 1994 but has been found back and reinstalled; and ii) five computers and one transceiver were stolen. Procurement of the missing equipment will be funded under JIWMP loan and will be reinstalled after the material arrives.

2.6 Para 5.5. The remaining 732 families are not willing to move from greenbelt (November 1994), because:

- a) 210 families refused to accept payment;
- b) 108 families accepted payment; and
- c) 414 families have no right to get payment due to changing the family status.

GOI always encouraged the people to move to the resettler area nearby the transmigration area.

3. Bank's Performance

During implementation of the project, the Bank always created a good atmosphere and respected the counterparts (Borrower) willingness to face all problems by optimistic negotiation and good understanding.

4. Lessons Learned

The most important lesson from the implementation of the project is that land acquisition and resettlement arrangements are the most critical point. Subsequently GOI should set up well

trained committees among related agencies and satisfactory resettlement programs and funds.

5. Relationship between Borrower and the Bank

As mentioned in point 3, the relationship between the Bank and GOI was good without any serious problem encountered; for co-financiers as well.

PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION

1. Related Bank Loans and/or Credits

Loan/Credit Title	Purpose	Year of Approval	Status
Projects which have Funded Irrigation Works in the Project Area			
Irrigation I Project ^{1/} (Cr. 127-IND)	Repair of the Sedadi irrigation system.	1969	Completed 1976
Irrigation Projects VII and IX (Ln. 1268-IND and Ln. 1435-IND)	Development of the tertiary system in the upper and lower Sedadi system. Feasibility study and design of Kedung Ombo Dam and related irrigation development. Master Plan for Jratunseluna Basin.	1976 and 1977	Completed 1983 and 1984
Irrigation Project XIV (Ln.1811-IND)	Improvement of flood protection and drainage works in lower Serang and Juana valleys.	1980	Completed 1987
Projects Financing Non-Irrigation Works in the Project Area			
Second National Agricultural Extension Project (Cr.996-IND)	Improve agricultural extension including the project area.	1980	Completed 1987
Seeds II Project (Ln.2066-IND)	Improve seed supply.	1981	Completed 1989
Upland Agriculture and Conservation Programme (Ln.2474-IND)	Carry out soil conservation works including in Kedung Ombo Dam catchment area.	1984	
Projects Aimed at Improving Irrigation O&M and Strengthening Institutions			
Irrigation Projects XV and XVI (Cr.995-IND and Ln.2118-IND)	Strengthen planning, programming and budgeting capacity, and management information systems.	1980 and 1982	Completed 1987 and 1988
Irrigation Project XVII Project and Central and West Java Irrigation Development Project (Loans 2119-IND and 2649-IND)	Improve organization and training of the provincial irrigation services, and develop and demonstrate new techniques.	1982 and 1986	Completed 1989 and 1993

2. Project Timetable

Item	Date Planned	Date Revised	Actual Date
Identification/Preparation ^{1/}			January 25, 1983 ^{2/}
Appraisal Mission			May 3-28, 1984

Item	Date Planned	Date Revised	Actual Date
Loan Negotiations			April 4-11, 1985
Board Approval			May 16, 1985
Loan Signature			June 18, 1985
Loan Effectiveness	September 16, 1985		November 18, 1985 ^{3/}
Loan Closing	December 31, 1991	December 31, 1992	December 31, 1993

^{1/} Feasibility studies and designs for the project were carried out under Irrigation Project VII (Ln.1268-IND) by PROSIDA (the special project agency responsible for most Bank projects) assisted by consultants (Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation). The first studies for development of the areas were started in 1971.

^{2/} Date of Project Brief.

^{3/} Conditions of loan effectiveness were (i) award of construction contract, (ii) award of consultancy contracts. There were some delays in signing the consultancy contract with Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation.

3. Loan Disbursements

Bank Fiscal Year	Semester	Cumulative Disbursements		
		SAR	Actual	Actual as % of Estimated
	 US\$ Million		%
1986	I	3.0	0.00	0
	II	6.0	4.74	79
1987	I	14.0	6.87	49
	II	24.0	11.95	50
1988	I	39.0	19.50	50
	II	58.0	36.81	63
1989	I	78.0	54.91	70
	II	99.0	83.33	84
1990	I	118.0	96.61	82
	II	137.0	108.41	79
1991	I	151.0	120.77	80
	II	156.0	137.14	88
1992	I		139.28	89
	II		148.23	95
1993	I		150.04	96
	II		151.42	97
1994	I		154.22	99
	II		154.58	99

4. Project Implementation

	SAR Estimate	Actual or PCR Estimate	Actual as % of SAR
Main Dam and Appurtenant Structures			
Main Embankment (max. height 61 m, crest length 1,600 m)	1 no.	1 no.	100
Service Spillway (crest length 40 m)	1 no.	1 no.	100
Emergency Spillway (crest length 250 m)	1 no.	1 no.	100
Diversion Tunnel (diameter 4 m, length 325 m)	1 no.	1 no.	100
Intake and Pressure Conduit (diameter 3.8 m, length 270 m)	1 no.	1 no.	100
Power Development			
Power House and Turbine (28.5 MVA)	1 no.	1 no.	100
Micro-hydro Power Plants	3 no.	2 no.	67
Power Lines (150 kV)	30 kms	30 kms	100
Power Lines (20 kV)	30 kms	30 kms	100
Irrigation Development^{1/}			
New Systems^{2/}			
Main Structures			
Sidorejo Weir (height 7 m, width 80 m)	1 no.	1 no.	100
Klambu Barrage (max. height 19 m, width 100 m)	1 no.	1 no.	100
Canals			
Mains	51.8 kms	64.2 kms	124
Secondary	227.6 kms	213 kms	94
Tertiary	1,506.0 kms	n.a. ^{3/}	n.a.
Drains			
Main	7.1 kms	7.0 kms	99
Secondary	129.0 kms	235.3 kms	182
Main System Structures			
Turnouts	116 no.	284 no.	245
Water Control	311 no.	348 no.	112
Other	1,930 no.	544 no.	28
Roads			
Service	121 kms	40.5 kms	33
Inspection	153 kms	168.9 kms	110
Improved Systems^{4/}			
Main System Structures			
Turnouts	166 no.	587 no. ^{3/}	354
Water Control	28 no.	98 no.	350
Other	1,472 no.	1,042 no.	71
Canals			
Main	88.3 kms	103.6 kms	117
Secondary	179.2 kms	148.4 kms	83
Tertiary	1,470.0 kms	n.a. ^{3/}	n.a.

	SAR Estimate	Actual or PCR Estimate	Actual as % of SAR
Drains			
Secondary	230.5 kms	35.7 kms	15
Major Structures			
Sedadi weir (rehab. & raising crest by 0.5m)	1 no.	1 no.	100
Flooding Warning and Water Monitoring System			
Main Control Centre Building	1,000 m ²	1,600 m ²	165
Telemetered Rainfall and Water Level Station	100 no.	121 no.	121
Equipment	1 set	1 set	1 set
Training			
Dam Safety and Construction Methods			
Trainers	15 months	10.5 months	70
Trainees	21 no.	78 no.	371
Overseas Fellowship	15 no.	16 no.	107
Water Management			
Trainers	-	5 months	-
Water Quality Monitoring			
Trainers	24 months	24 months	100
Overseas Training	3 no. for 6 months	6 no. for 3 months	100
Consultants			100
Foreign	532 months	652 months	123
Local	1,309 months	1,217 months	93

^{1/} For scheme-wise details see Annex 1, Table 1.

^{2/} Sidorejo and Klambu Kanan.

^{3/} Data on length of tertiaries is not available. See Annex 1, Table 2.

^{4/} Sedadi and Klambu Kiri.

^{5/} Includes some improvements to existing structures.

5. Project Costs and Financing

A. Project Costs^{1/}

	Appraisal Estimates						Actual					
	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total
	Rp billion			US\$ million			Rp billion			US\$ million		
Civil Works												
Dam and Appurtenances	14.6	27.8	40.4	13.3	25.3	38.6	39.67	46.18	85.85	24.72	28.33	53.05
Power Stations & Transmission	3.1	14.2	17.3	2.8	12.9	15.7	1.36	36.30	37.66	0.71	19.11	19.82
Irrigation												
Sidorejo	7.7	5.3	13.0	7.0	4.8	11.8	33.15	1.72	34.87	18.50	0.98	19.48
Sedadi	3.3	2.2	5.5	3.1	2.0	5.1	19.70	-	19.70	11.53	-	11.53
Klambu Kiri	15.4	9.0	24.4	14.0	8.2	22.2	60.96	-	60.96	33.36	-	33.36
Klambu Kanan	24.7	15.0	39.7	22.5	13.5	36.0	70.75	11.50	82.25	37.58	6.40	43.98
Klambu Barrage	6.4	7.8	14.2	5.8	7.2	13.0	31.72	8.40	40.12	16.74	5.04	21.78
Flood Forecasting Building	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.02	-	1.02	0.51	-	0.51
Resettlement Facilities												
Transmigration Sites	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.78	-	2.78	1.33	-	1.33
Local Resettlement Areas	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.72	-	8.72	4.29	-	4.29
Sub-Total Civil Works	75.20	81.30	154.50	68.50	73.90	142.40	269.83	104.10	373.93	149.27	59.86	209.13
Equipment												
Office, O&M, Hydro, Training & Vehicles	1.0	4.1	5.1	0.9	3.7	4.6	1.85	-	1.85	0.98	-	0.98
Telemetry & Water Quality ^{2/}	4.2	6.5	10.7	3.8	5.9	9.7	3.83	10.82	14.65	1.93	5.05	6.98
IPEDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.18	-	0.18	0.10	-	0.10
Sub-Total Equipment	5.2	10.6	15.8	4.7	9.6	14.3	5.86	10.82	16.68	3.01	5.05	8.06
Consultants	8.4	7.0	15.4	7.6	6.4	14.0	21.61	13.69	35.30	11.92	7.60	19.52
Training	0.2	1.0	1.2	0.2	0.9	1.1	0.37	0.34	0.71	0.18	0.20	0.38
Administration	14.7	-	14.7	13.4	-	13.4	7.12	-	7.12	4.16	-	4.16
Land Acquisition	28.1	-	28.1	25.5	-	25.5	61.78	-	61.78	41.21	-	41.21
Contingencies	44.6	35.1	79.7	40.5	31.9	72.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	176.4	135.0	309.4	160.4	122.7	283.1	366.57	128.95	495.52	209.75	72.71	282.46

^{1/} For year-wise details see Annex 1, Tables 4 and 5.

^{2/} Includes Rp2.39 billion (US\$1.11 million) of foreign currency costs to be paid in 1994/95.

B. Project Financing

	Loan Amount	Revised	Actual	Actual as Prop. of Planned
 US\$ Million			%
Civil Works				
Dam and Power Houses	32.30	39.55	39.47	122
Irrigation Improvement	82.90	81.54	81.35	98
Flood Warning and Water Monitoring Centre	0.40	0.52	0.81	202
Site Development in Bengkulu for Migrants (52)	-	1.33	1.33	-
Development of Resettlement Areas around Kedung Ombo Dam	-	4.32	4.18	-
Sub-Total	115.60	127.26	127.14	110
Equipment and Materials				
Dam, Power Station, Irrigation	2.30	0.89	0.85	37
Flood Warning and Training	9.90	7.28	6.61	67
Strengthening of IPEDA	0.10	0.10	0.10	96
Sub-Total	12.30	8.27	7.56	61
Consultants' Service				
Dam, Kedung Ombo Power Station and Irrigation	9.29	10.98	10.99	118
Micro Power Stations	0.01	-	-	-
Flood Warning and Training	1.32	1.79	1.79	135
Design of Jatigede Irrigation System	4.90	3.03	3.03	62
Updating of Maps and Land Holding Identification, and Improvement of Date Pressing by IPEDA	1.00	0.77	0.77	77
Soil and Water Conservation Study	0.50	0.53	0.53	107
Resettlement Monitoring	0.15	0.12	0.11	71
Resettlement Study	-	2.89	2.29	-
Sub-Total	17.17	20.10	19.50	114
Training (inc. Training for Resettlement)	0.67	0.38	0.38	56
Unallocated	10.26	-	-	-
Total	156.00	156.00	154.58	99

6. Project Results

A. Direct Results

	Unit	Future Without Project SAR Estimate	Future With Project SAR	PCR
Cropped Areas^{1/}				
Irrigated Paddy	'000 ha	35.25	118.68	120.13
Rainfed Paddy	'000 ha	32.23	-	-
Palawija	'000 ha	43.26	17.82	17.27
Total		110.74	136.50	134.40
Cropping Intensity	%	188	230	229
Yields^{2/}				
Wet Season Paddy	t/ha	3.3-4.1	4.0-4.7	4.9-5.4
Dry Season Paddy	t/ha	3.7-4.5	4.2-5.0	5.2-5.6
Maize ^{3/}	t/ha	0.9-1.2	0.9-1.3	0.9-1.3
Production				
Paddy	000 ton	248.3	541.0	639.4 ^{4/}
Palawija	000 ton	65.2	29.8	30.5
Electricity Production	Gwh	-	74	70
Municipal and Drinking Water	million m ³	-	13.6	153.0

^{1/} See Annex 2, Table 7.

^{2/} Yields vary between different sub-project areas. For details see Annex 2, Table 3.

^{3/} Intercropped with soyabean or mungbean.

^{4/} In the without project situation paddy production is estimated at 257,900 tons.

B. Economic Analysis

	Economic Rate of Return
SAR Estimate	17%
PCR Estimate	
Base case (future paddy price Rp306/kg)	12%
High future rice price (future paddy price Rp469/kg) ^{1/}	19%
Low future rice price (future paddy price of Rp179/kg) ^{1/}	7%
Only agricultural and power benefits	9%
Using SAR assumptions for paddy price (Rp453/kg in 1993 prices) and for conversion factors (0.5 for labour and 0.8-0.9 for construction works). Only agricultural and power benefits.	17%

^{1/} Upper and lower bounds of projected future prices. See Annex 2, Table 2 (b).

C. Financial Impact

	Farm Size (ha)	SAR			PCR		
		Without Project	With Project	Increase	Without Project	With Project	Increase
		.. Rp 000 (1993 prices) Rp 000 (1993 prices) ..	(%)	.. Rp 000 (1993 prices) Rp 000 (1993 prices) ..	(%)
Sidorejo							
Small	0.2	88.4	155.4	76	88.7	132.6	49
Medium	0.4	170.3	303.8	78	164.3	251.3	53
Large	0.6	252.1	459.8	82	238.4	376.2	58
Sedadi							
Medium	0.4	189.1	302.0	60	146.4	244.6	67
Large	0.6	284.8	449.4	58	188.0	361.3	92
Klambu Kiri							
Medium	0.4	120.7	289.1	140	106.0	246.7	133
Large	0.6	176.4	431.4	145	149.4	364.3	144
Klambu Kanan							
Small	0.2	74.3	133.9	80	80.3	122.3	52
Medium	0.4	131.7	258.3	96	127.0	225.4	77
Large	0.6	196.2	385.3	96	180.4	332.5	84

D. Studies

Study Title	Purpose	Status	Impact of Study
Feasibility Study of Micro Hydro Plants	Ascertain viability of micro hydro plants at Sidorejo and Sedadi Weirs and Klambu Barrage	Completed	Micro-hydro plants built.
Design of Jatigede Irrigation Systems	Prepare a study on adjustments needed in irrigation works downstream of Jatigede Dam (West Java)	Completed	} } } }

Study Title	Purpose	Status	Impact of Study
Upland Soil and Water Conservation in Jatigede Dam Catchment	Identify critical soil erosion areas in Jatigede Dam catchment area and propose remedial measures.	Completed	} Jatigede } Project under } Preparation } }
Final Report on Environmental Management Plan	Assess environmental problems and recommend solution in Kedung Ombo area.	Completed	Helped identify critical environmental problems
Final Report of Water Quality	Monitor water quality	Completed	Found water quality to be acceptable
Socio-Economic Monitoring and Resettlement Studies	Monitor socio-economic status of people moved to resettlement areas around Kedung Ombo and people living in the Greenbelt area.	Completed	Helped making policy for resettlement

7. Status of Major Covenants

Loan Agreement Section	Description of Covenant	Compliance	Remarks
LA 3.01(b)	Carry out implementation in accordance with Schedule 5.	OK	
LA 3.03(a)	Maintain a panel of dam experts.	OK	
LA 3.03(b)	Submit a copy of dam panel reports.	OK	
LA 3.04	Furnish to the bank by 12/31/88 a plan of action for allocation of a portion of IPEDA collected in irrigation areas to O&M of irrigation works and thereafter implement this plan.	Not complied	Superseded by agreements under ISSP-II.
LA 4.01(a)	Maintain adequate records and accounts.	OK	
LA 4.01(b)	Have the accounts audited and furnish to the Bank a certified copy of audit report within 9 months of the end of fiscal year.	OK	
LA 4.01(c)	Maintain appropriate records for Statements of Expenditure.	OK	
LA 5.01	Propose to the Bank by 04/01/88 appropriate arrangements for monitoring and periodically inspecting the dam.	OK	
LA 5.02	Ensure appropriate measures for soil and water conservation in project area under Ln. 2474-IND.	OK	
LA 5.03(a)	Ensure efficient use of water made available by irrigation systems constructed under project.	Partly complied	Improved water management practices have been delayed due to slow implementation of the telemetry component.

Loan Agreement Section	Description of Covenant	Compliance	Remarks
LA 5.03(b)	Ensure adequate staff employed and funds allocated for proper O&M of project facilities.	Partly complied	See para Part I, para 7.1.
LA 5.03(c)	Inform the Bank by May 1 of each year, approved cost per ha and number of staff for O&M for each of the irrigation systems in the project area.	Not yet due	First due date May 1, 1994.
LA 5.04	Cause access roads to be constructed in the project area in accordance with a timetable.	OK	
LA 5.05	Cause PLN to finance the cost of O&M of power house and 50% of the O&M cost of dam intake and irrigation and power tunnel.	Not complied	The issue is under discussion (see Part I, para 7.1).
LA 6.01	As condition of loan effectiveness (1) sign contract for construction of dam and power house; (2) sign contract for construction supervision.	OK	
SCH 5, para 1	Submit to the Bank, results of surveys of resettlement activities commencing by December 31, 1985.	OK	
SCH 5, para 2	Assign and maintain qualified staff in Project Offices.	OK	
SCH 5, para 3	Cause provincial irrigation service to reorganize its irrigation offices and their operations by 04/01/89.	OK	
SCH 5, para 4	Cause PLN to acquire and install power generation and associated equipment and transmission lines to Kedung Ombo, Sidorejo and Klambu by 07/01/89.	OK	
SCH 5, para 5	Cause Central Java Provincial Government and PLN to enter into an agreement by 07/31/89 setting forth rules and criteria for the use of reservoir water.	OK	
SCH 5, para 6	Take appropriate measures to control the spread of malaria.	OK	
SCH 5, para 7	Furnish to Bank by 12/31/88 a plan for continuously monitoring canal water quality.	OK	Separate unit under the project office has been established.
SCH 5, para 8	Furnish to Bank by 12/31/89 a plan of action for establishing a dam inspection unit in IHE, Bandung.	No longer relevant	Unit has been established by DGWRD.
SCH 5, para 9	Update IPEDA maps and reclassify and reassess lands in accordance with schedule acceptable to Bank	OK	
SCH 5, para 10	Acquire a number of vehicles and motor cycles for the dam and irrigation works.	OK	

8. Use of Bank Resources

A. Staff Inputs

Bank Fiscal Year	Id/Prep	Appraisal	Negotiations	Supervision
..... Staff Weeks				
1982	16.2			
1983	31.3			
1984	25.2	23.5		
1985		52.5	3.1	2.0
1986				9.0
1987				11.4
1988				21.1
1989				32.9
1990				17.9
1991				35.1
1992				21.7
1993				14.1
1994	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>4.0</u>
Total	72.7	86.0	3.1	169.2

B. Missions

Stage of Project Cycle	Month/Year	No. of Persons	SW in the Field	Specialization	Performance Rating										Comments		
					Available Funds		Project Management		Dev. Impact		Overall Status						
Appraisal	May 1984	4	14	ML/IE, IE, A, E													
Supervision 1	May 1986	1	1	IE	2			2		1		1					Lack of counterpart funds; delays in procurement.
Supervision 2	Feb 1987	1	2	IE	1			2		1		1					Delays in procurement of telemetering equipment.
Supervision 3	Jun 1987	1	1	IE	1			2		1		1					-
Supervision 4	Oct 1987	1	1	IE	1			2		1		1					-
Supervision 5	Aug 1988	1	1	IE	1			2		1		1					-
Supervision 6 ^v	Mar 1989	3	5	ME/E, RE, A													Resettlement problems.
					Overall Status	Dev. Objective	Legal Covenant	Management	Avail of Funds	Procurement	Training	T.A	Studies	Environment	Financial	Comments	
Supervision 7	Aug 1989	1	1	IE	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	Resettlement problems; some delays in irrigation works.	
Supervision 8 ^v	May 1990	1	1	IE	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	Resettlement problems; delays in Flood Forecasting and Water Mgmt. Centres	
Supervision 9	May 1991	1	1	IE	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	Resettlement problems; delays in Flood Forecasting and Water Mgmt. Centres	
Supervision 10 ^v	Jun 1991	2	4	E, RE												Resettlement problems	
Supervision 11 ^v	Dec 1991	2	2	A, RE													
Supervision 12	Aug 1992	5	12	2IE, 2RE, A	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	Resettlement problems; delays in Flood Forecasting and Water Mgmt. Centres	
Supervision 13	Apr 1993	4	6	2IE, A, RE	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	Resettlement problems; damage and delays caused by flood in Jan.	
Supervision 14	Dec 1993	4	2	2IE, A, RE	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	Income generating for settled people & Govt. funds for completion of unfinished work.	


Note: A = Agronomist; E = Economist; IE = Irrigation Engineer; ML = Mission Leader; RE = Resettlement/NGO Expert.

^v Special mission to look at the resettlement issue, no Form 590 was prepared.

^v Two resettlement experts visited the project in February and April 1990.

^v No Form 590 prepared.





INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multi Purpose Dam and Irrigation Project
 SCHEMATIC MAP OF PROJECT AREA



DDC 594-190

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Project Completion Report

Figure 1. Water Requirements and Releases in the Kedung Ombo System



INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 1: Project Implementation

Table 1. Irrigation Works: Target and Actual Achievement

	Unit Sidorejo Klambu Kanan Sedadi Klambu Kiri	
		SAR	PCR	SAR	PCR	SAR	PCR	SAR	PCR
Canals									
Main	Km	13.7	13.5	38.1	50.7	41.2	46.6	47.1	57.0
Secondary	Km	73.6	37.0	154.0	111.7	10.0	8.7	169.2	139.7
Drains									
Primary	Km	7.1	7.0	88.0	61.5	-	-	-	-
Secondary	Km	18.0	28.0	111.0	207.3	-	-	164.5	35.7
Structures (Main System)									
Turnouts	no.	64	67	52	217	20	73	145	514
Water Control	no.	126	190	185	35	9	27	19	71
Other	no.	145	200	1,785	344	257	143	957	899

Table 2. Target and Actual Benefitting Areas

 Actual		
	SAR	PCR	Area for which Tertiary System is Complete
 ha		
New Irrigation Areas			
Sidorejo	6,100	6,120	6,120
Klambu Kanan	19,000	17,288	17,288 ^{1/}
Sub-Total	25,100	23,408	23,408
Existing System			
Sedadi	13,910	15,200	15,200 ^{2/}
Klambu Kiri	20,330 ^{3/}	21,457	10,500 ^{4/}
Sub-Total	34,240	36,657	25,700
Total	59,340	60,065	49,108

^{1/} Improvements on 633 ha to be completed in 1994/95.

^{2/} Existing system not improved under the project.

^{3/} Tertiaries were to be constructed for 9,800 ha and improved on 10,500 ha.

^{4/} Tertiaries were constructed on 10,500 ha but need to be improved on 9,957 ha.

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 1: Project Implementation

Table 3. Comparative Statement Showing Benefits of Different Options (and Status of Families Not Relocated)

	Transmigration	Self-Resettlement	Govt. Resettlement	Not Relocated	Total
	Option-1	Option-2	Option-3		
Year of Shifting	1985-91	1985-89	1989-90		
Location	Sumatra, Kalimantan, Irian Jaya	20 villages adjacent to reservoir	0.1 to 9.0 km from reservoir	Still residing in greenbelt	
No. of Resettled Families	1,161	3,131	669 ^{1/}	307 ^{1/}	5,268
Percentage of Total Families	25%	56%	13%	6%	100%
Shifting Assistance Provided	Yes	No	Limited	Will get limited	
Constructed House Provided	Yes	No	Limited (312 houses in K. Mulyo constructed)	No	
Area of Houseplot Provided	0.25 ha	nil (self-purchased)	0.10 ha (0.05 ha for landless)	0.10 ha (0.05 ha for landless)	
Area of Replacement Farmland	0.75 ha + 1.00 ha (free)	nil (self-purchased)	Dry upland of same area as land acquired (Rp160 or Rp200/m ²)	As per Option-3	
Land Title Provided	Yes	No ^{2/}	Yes	n.a.	
Standard of Infrastructure	Fair	Not Provided	Good	-	
Project Expenditure/Family	Rp9.10 million	Rp4.00 million	Rp14.12 million	-	
Extension Service Provided	Yes	Limited	Yes	-	
No. of Draw-down Cultivators	-	2,360	475	-	
No. of Greenbelt Cultivators	-	2,505	462	-	

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 1: Project Implementation

Table 4: Yearwise Project Costs in Current Rupiahs

	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	Total
	(US\$ Million)									
LOCAL CURRENCY COSTS										
Civil Works										
Dam and Appurtenances	3.73	4.89	6.64	8.97	8.78	3.68	2.16	0.82		39.67
Power Stations and Transmission					0.25	0.97	0.14			1.36
Irrigation										
Sidorejo			8.29	8.05	4.28	6.55	1.87	2.92	1.41	33.15
Sedadi			3.73	13.12	1.38	1.49				18.70
Klambu Kiri			5.12	13.91	24.99	5.14	6.04	2.24	3.52	60.96
Klambu Kanan			3.64	6.11	19.74	11.25	11.7	14.87	3.44	70.75
Klambu Barrage			2.07	1.22	5.95	6.73	9.3	6.45		31.72
Flood Forecasting Building						0.11	0.91			1.02
Resettlement Facilities										
Transmigration Sites							2.78			2.78
Local Resettlement Areas						0.87	4.71		3.14	8.72
Sub-Total Civil Works	3.73	4.89	29.49	51.38	85.33	36.79	39.41	27.30	11.51	269.83
Equipment										
Office, O&M, Hydro, Training & Vehicles		0.01	0.18	0.05	0.68	0.84	0.11			1.85
Telemetry and Water Quality			0.78					0.21	2.84	3.83
IPEDA						0.18				0.18
Sub-Total Equipment		0.01	0.96	0.05	0.68	1.02	0.11	0.21	2.84	5.86
Consultants		0.53	7.09	1.36	1.06	2.15	5.41	1.00	3.01	21.61
Training								0.37		0.37
Administration	0.35	0.34	0.50	1.41	1.05	0.96	1.04	0.97	0.50	7.12
Land Acquisition	14.17	4.28	14.00	9.23	1.61	5.30	3.09	4.38	5.72	61.78
TOTAL	18.25	10.05	52.04	63.43	69.71	46.22	49.06	34.23	23.58	366.57
FOREIGN CURRENCY COSTS										
Civil Works										
Dam and Appurtenances	3.29	5.74	9.27	17.03	9.40	1.45				48.18
Power Stations and Transmission					7.28	25.39	3.63			36.30
Irrigation										
Sidorejo			0.83	0.63	0.28					1.72
Sedadi										-
Klambu Kiri										-
Klambu Kanan					6.78	4.72				11.50
Klambu Barrage			1.38	0.56	1.96	3.98	0.52			8.40
Flood Forecasting Building										-
Resettlement Facilities										-
Transmigration Sites										-
Local Resettlement Areas										-
Sub-Total Civil Works	3.29	5.74	11.48	18.22	25.68	35.54	4.15	0.00	0.00	104.10
Equipment										
Office, O&M, Hydro, Training & Vehicles										-
Telemetry and Water Quality 1/								0.78	10.04	10.82
IPEDA										-
Sub-Total Equipment		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.78	10.04	10.82
Consultants		1.80	2.32	2.69	2.92	2.06	1.04	0.25	0.81	13.69
Training								0.34		0.34
Administration										-
Land Acquisition										-
TOTAL	3.29	7.54	13.80	20.81	28.60	37.60	5.19	1.37	10.85	126.95

1/ Includes Rp2.39 billion to be paid in 1994/95.

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 1: Project Implementation

Table 5. Yearwise Project Costs in Current US Dollars

	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	Total
	(US\$ Million)									
LOCAL CURRENCY COSTS										
Civil Works										
Power Stations and Transmission	3.40	3.67	4.03	5.83	4.31	1.97	1.12	0.38		24.72
Irrigation					0.14	0.50	0.07			0.71
Sidorejo			5.00	4.75	2.32	3.49	0.87	1.41	0.68	18.50
Sedadi			2.25	7.71	0.77	0.80				11.53
Klambu Kiri			3.09	8.13	13.70	2.67	3.04	1.08	1.65	33.38
Klambu Kanan			2.19	3.57	10.93	6.03	6.08	7.18	1.62	37.58
Klambu Barrage			1.25	0.72	3.32	3.47	4.86	3.12		16.74
Flood Forecasting Building						0.05	0.46			0.51
Resettlement Facilities										
Transmigration Sites							1.33			1.33
Local Resettlement Areas						0.45	2.34		1.50	4.29
Sub-Total Civil Works	3.40	3.67	17.61	30.71	35.49	19.43	20.17	13.18	5.43	149.27
Equipment										
Office, O&M, Hydro, Training & Vehicles		0.01	0.10	0.03	0.36	0.42	0.06			0.98
Telemetry and Water Quality			0.48					0.10	1.35	1.93
IPEDA						0.10				0.10
Sub-Total Equipment		0.01	0.58	0.03	0.36	0.52	0.06	0.10	1.35	3.01
Consultants										
Training		0.41	4.28	0.85	0.75	1.00	2.71	0.49	1.45	11.92
Administration	0.32	0.30	0.30	0.85	0.81	0.54	0.54	0.47	0.23	4.16
Land Acquisition	13.07	3.78	8.54	5.58	0.93	2.94	1.62	2.11	2.68	41.21
TOTAL	16.79	8.17	31.48	38.00	38.14	24.43	25.10	16.51	11.12	208.75
FOREIGN CURRENCY COSTS										
Civil Works										
Dam and Appurtenances	3.02	3.58	5.62	9.83	5.38	0.79				28.33
Power Stations and Transmission					3.82	13.38	1.91			19.11
Irrigation										
Sidorejo			0.49	0.35	0.14					0.98
Sedadi										-
Klambu Kiri										-
Klambu Kanan					3.80	2.60				6.40
Klambu Barrage			0.63	0.34	1.17	2.38	0.32			5.04
Flood Forecasting Building										-
Resettlement Facilities										-
Transmigration Sites										-
Local Resettlement Areas										-
Sub-Total Civil Works	3.02	3.58	6.94	10.82	14.31	19.15	2.23	0.00	0.00	59.88
Equipment										
Office, O&M, Hydro, Training & Vehicles										-
Telemetry and Water Quality 1/								0.38	4.67	5.05
IPEDA										-
Sub-Total Equipment		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.38	4.67	5.05
Consultants										
Training		1.18	1.35	1.57	1.58	1.04	0.50	0.11	0.29	7.60
Administration								0.20		0.20
Land Acquisition										-
TOTAL	3.02	4.75	8.29	12.19	15.89	20.19	2.73	0.88	4.96	72.71

1/ Includes US\$1.11 million to be paid in 1994/95.

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

Table 1. Financial and Economic Prices (1993) 1/

Item	Financial	Economic
	Prices	Prices
	Rp/kg	
OUTPUT		
Paddy	300	306
Maize	250	177
Soyabean	900	550
Mungbean	1,200	1,200
Sorghum	280	260
INPUT		
Seed		
Paddy	550	459
Maize	650	266
Soyabean	1,200	825
Mungbean	1,500	1,800
Sorghum	400	390
Fertilizer		
Urea	260	338
TSP	340	435
KCI	340	395
Agro-Chemicals		
Pesticides (Rp/lt)	16,000	16,000
Rodenticide	16,000	16,000
Machinery		
Sprayer (Rp/day)	500	500
Tractor (Rp/day)	5,000	5,000
Labour 2/		
Male (Rp/day)	2,250	2,025
Female (Rp/day)	1,700	1,530

1/ Major assumptions are based on SAR for the Groundwater Development Project (Report No. 11424-IND, dated 02/26/1993) using updated prices where appropriate.

2/ Conversion factor of 0.9.

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

Table 2(a). Import and Parity Prices for Non-Paddy Crops

	Maize		Soybean	Sorghum
	Import Parity	Export Parity	Import Parity	Import Parity
	-----US\$/MT-----			
Projected Price 1/ Quality Adjustment	99.7	99.7	234.7	97.5
Freight and Insurance	0.0	-15.0	-11.7	-
	25.0	-10.0	30.0	25.0
CIF or FOB Price	124.7	74.7	253.0	122.5
	-----Rp/Kg-----			
CIF or FOB Price	262	157	531	257
Port Handling & Storage Losses (5%)	13	-8	27	13
Transport: Port/Wholesaler	10	-10	12	10
Wholesaler's Margin	15	-15	30	15
Transport: Mill/Wholesaler	-10	-10	-10	-10
Traders' Margin	-15	-15	-30	-15
Transport: Farm/Mill	-10	-10	-10	-10
Economic Farm-gate Price	265	89	550	260

	Urea	TSP	KCL
	Export Parity	Import Parity	Import Parity
	-----US\$/MT-----		
Projected Price 1/ Freight and Insurance	154.3	134.0	114.7
	-10.0	40.0	40.0
CIF or FOB Price	144.3	174.0	154.7
	-----Rp/Kg-----		
CIF or FOB Price	303	365	325
Port Charging including Bagging	-10	25	25
Ex-Factory or Warehouse Price	293	390	350
Transport to Wholesaler	15	15	15
Storage & Wholesaler Margin	15	15	15
Transport to Farm	15	15	15
Economic Farm-gate Price	338	435	395

¹ Projected price for 2000 (base case) expressed in terms of 1993 constant prices.

Commodity Markets and the Developing Countries, The World Bank, Washington D.C., March 1994.

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

Table 2(b). Economic Price for Paddy 1/

	Unit	Base Case	High 2/	Low 2/
Projected World Price for Rice	US\$/t	273.3	409.4	167.2
Import Parity Price for Paddy	Rp/kg	373	548	236
Export Parity Price for Paddy	Rp/kg	239	389	122
Economic Price for Paddy	Rp/kg	306	469	179

1/ Prices for 2000 expressed in 1993 prices.

2/ Top and bottom of range within which rice prices are likely to stay at 70% probability level.

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

Table 3. Crop Yields

	Sidorejo		Sedadi		Klambu Kiri		Klambu Kanan	
	SAR	PCR	SAR	PCR	SAR	PCR	SAR	PCR
-----t/ha-----								
Wet Season Paddy								
Without Project (% Irrigated)	3.3 (0)	3.6	4.1 (90)	4.1	3.5 (60)	3.7	3.4 (13)	3.6
With Project	4.7	5.4	4.7	5.3	4.6	5.3	4.0	4.9
Dry Season Paddy								
Without Project	-	-	4.5	4.5	4.0	4.0	3.7	3.7
With Project	5.0	5.6	5.0	5.5	4.8	5.6	4.2	5.2
Palawija (Maize/Soyabean)								
Without Project	1.2/0.6	1.2/0.5	1.0/0.5	1.0/0.5	0.9/0.5 1/	0.9/0.5	0.9/0.5	0.9/0.5
With Project	1.3/0.6	1.3/0.6	1.3/0.5	1.3/0.5	0.9/0.5 1/	0.9/0.5	1.3/0.5 1/	1.3/0.5

1/ Maize/Mungbean.

Table 4(a). Crop Budgets
Sidorejo Irrigation Area

Item	Unit	Wet Season Paddy				Dry Season Paddy				Palawija (Maize/Soyabean) 1/			
		Without Project		With Project		Without Project		With Project		Without Project		With Project	
		Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)
REVENUES													
Main Product	Kg	3,600	1,080	5,400	1,620			5,600	1,680	1.2/0.5	750	1.3/0.6	865
By-Products 2/	Kg		54		81				84		38		43
Sub-Total			1,134		1,701				1,764		788		908
COSTS													
Seed	Kg	25	14	25	14			25	14	10	9	15	14
Fertilizer													
Urea	Kg	150	39	250	65			250	65	70	18	100	26
TSP	Kg	75	26	150	51			150	51	40	14	75	26
KCl	Kg			100	34			100	34				
Agro-Chemicals													
Insecticide	L	3.0	48	3.0	48			3.0	48	1.5	24	2.0	32
Rodenticide	Kg	1.5	24	1.5	24			1.5	24	0.5	8	1.0	16
Machinery													
Sprayer	Day	12	6	8	4			8	4	4	2	5	3
Tractors	Day	15	75	13	65			13	65	4	20	4	20
Hired Labour 3/													
Male	MD	24.0	54	25.0	56			25.0	56	17.0	38	18.0	41
Female	WD	19.0	32	20.0	34			20.0	34	19.0	32	20.0	34
Sub-Total			318		395				395		166		210
Gross Margins			816		1,306				1,369		622		698
Family Labour													
Male		96.0		100.0				100.0		68.0		72.0	
Female		76.0		80.0				80.0		76.0		80.0	
Returns per Day to Family Labour 4/			4.7		7.3				7.6		4.3		4.6
Net Economic Returns per Ha 5/			521.0		987.0				1051.0		94.0		108.0

1/ In the without project situation maize and soyabean are grown as separate crops during the first dry season (Feb-June). In the with project situation, maize and soyabean are grown as mixed crops during the second dry season (June-Sept).

2/ 5% of the value of the main crop.

3/ Assumed, in line with the SAR, at 20% of all labour required.

4/ Including both male and female labour.

5/ All inputs valued at economic prices and including economic value of family labour.

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

Table 4(b). Crop Budgets
Sedadi Irrigation Area

Item	Unit	Wet Season Paddy				Dry Season Paddy				Palawija (Maize/Soyabean)			
		Without Project		With Project		Without Project		With Project		Without Project		With Project	
		Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)
REVENUES													
Main Product	Kg	4,100	1,230	5,300	1,590	4,500	1,350	5,500	1,650	1.0/0.5	700	1.3/0.5	775
By-Products 2/	Kg		82		80		68		83		35		39
Sub-Total			1,292		1,670		1,418		1,733		735		814
COSTS													
Seed	Kg	25	14	25	14	25	14	25	14	10	9	12	11
Fertilizer													
Urea	Kg	200	52	250	65	200	52	250	65	70	18	90	23
TSP	Kg	100	34	150	51	100	34	150	51	40	14	70	24
KCl	Kg	50		100	34	50	17	100	34				
Agro-Chemicals													
Insecticide	L	3.0	48	3.5	56	3.0	48	3.0	48	1.5	24	1.5	24
Rodenticide	Kg	1.5	24	1.5	24	1.0	16	1.5	24	0.5	8	1.0	16
Machinery													
Sprayer	Day	6	3	8	4	6	3	8	4	4	2	5	3
Tractors	Day	10	50	12	60	10	50	13	65	4	20	4	20
Hired Labour 3/													
Male	MD	24.0	54	25.0	56	24.0	54	25.0	56	17.0	38	18.0	41
Female	WD	19.0	32	20.0	34	19.0	32	20.0	34	19.0	32	20.0	34
Sub-Total			311		398		320		395		166		195
Gross Margins			980		1,272		1,097		1,338		569		618
Family Labour													
Male		96.0		100.0		96.0		100.0		68.0		72.0	
Female		76.0		80.0		76.0		80.0		76.0		80.0	
Returns per Day to Family Labour 4/			5.7		7.1		6.4		7.4		4.0		4.1
Net Economic Returns per Ha			681.0		952.0		818.0		1019.0		57.0		85.0

1/ In the without project situation maize and soyabean are grown as separate crops during the first dry season (Feb-June). In the with project situation, maize and soyabean are grown as mixed crops during the second dry season (June-Sept).

2/ 5% of the value of the main crop.

3/ Assumed, in line with the SAR, at 20% of all labour required.

4/ Including both male and female labour.

5/ All inputs valued at economic prices and including economic value of family labour.

Table 4(c). Crop Budgets
Klambu Kiri Irrigation Area

Item	Unit	Wet Season Paddy				Dry Season Paddy				Palawija (Maize/Soyabean) 1/			
		Without Project		With Project		Without Project		With Project		Without Project		With Project	
		Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)
REVENUES													
Main Product	Kg	3,700	1,110	5,300	1,590	4,000	1,200	5,600	1,680	0.9/0.5	675	1.2/0.5	750
By-Products 2/	Kg		56		80		60		84		34		38
Sub-Total			1,166		1,670		1,260		1,764		709		788
COSTS													
Seed	Kg	25	14	25	14	25	14	25	14	10	9	12	11
Fertilizer													
Urea	Kg	200	52	250	65	200	52	250	65	70	18	90	23
TSP	Kg	100	34	150	51	100	34	150	51	40	14	70	24
KCl	Kg	50		100	34	50	17	100	34				
Agro-Chemicals													
Insecticide	L	3.0	48	3.5	56	3.0	48	3.0	48	1.5	24	1.5	24
Rodenticide	Kg	1.0	16	1.5	24	1.0	16	1.5	24	0.5	8	1.0	16
Machinery													
Sprayer	Day	6	3	8	4	6	3	8	4	4	2	5	3
Tractors	Day	10	50	12	60	10	50	13	65	4	20	4	20
Hired Labour 3/													
Male	MD	24.0	54	25.0	56	24.0	54	25.0	56	17.0	38	18.0	41
Female	WD	19.0	32	20.0	34	19.0	32	20.0	34	19.0	32	20.0	34
Sub-Total			303		398		320		395		166		195
Gross Margins			862		1,272		940		1,369		543		592
Family Labour													
Male		96.0		100.0		96.0		100.0		68.0		72.0	
Female		76.0		80.0		76.0		80.0		76.0		80.0	
Returns per Day to Family Labour 4/			5.0		7.1		5.5		7.6		3.8		3.9
Net Economic Returns per Ha			553.0		952.0		657.0		1051.0		38.0		47.0

1/ In the without project situation maize and soyabean are grown as separate crops during the first dry season (Feb-June). In the with project situation, maize and soyabean are grown as mixed crops during the second dry season (June-Sept).

2/ 5% of the value of the main crop.

3/ Assumed, in line with the SAR, at 20% of all labour required.

4/ Including both male and female labour.

5/ All inputs valued at economic prices and including economic value of family labour.

Table 4(d). Crop Budgets
Kambu Kanan Irrigation Area

Item	Unit	Wet Season Paddy				Dry Season Paddy				Palawija (Maize/Soyabean) 1/			
		Without Project		With Project		Without Project		With Project		Without Project		With Project	
		Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)	Quantity	Value ('000 Rp)
REVENUES													
Main Product	Kg	3,600	1,080	4,900	1,470	3,700	1,110	5,200	1,560	0.9/0.5	675	1.3/0.5	775
By-Products 2/	Kg		54		74		56		78		34		39
Sub-Total			1,134		1,544		1,166		1,638		709		814
COSTS													
Seed	Kg	25	14	25	14	25	14	25	14	10	9	12	11
Fertilizer													
Urea	Kg	200	52	250	65	200	52	250	65	70	18	90	23
TSP	Kg	100	34	150	51	100	34	150	51	40	14	70	24
KCl	Kg	50		100	34	50	17	100	34				
Agro-Chemicals													
Insecticide	L	3.0	48	3.5	56	3.0	48	3.0	48	1.5	24	1.5	24
Rodenticide	Kg	1.0	16	1.5	24	1.0	16	1.5	24	0.5	8	1.0	16
Machinery													
Sprayer	Day	6	3	8	4	6	3	8	4	4	2	5	3
Tractors	Day	10	50	12	60	10	50	13	65	4	20	4	20
Hired Labour 3/													
Male	MD	24.0	54	25.0	56	24.0	54	25.0	56	17.0	38	18.0	41
Female	WD	19.0	32	20.0	34	19.0	32	20.0	34	19.0	32	20.0	34
Sub-Total			303		398		320		395		166		195
Gross Margins			831		1,146		845		1,243		543		618
Family Labour													
Male		96.0		100.0		96.0		100.0		68.0		72.0	
Female		76.0		80.0		76.0		80.0		76.0		80.0	
Returns per Day to Family Labour 4/			4.8		6.4		4.9		6.9		3.8		4.1
Net Economic Returns per Ha 5/			521.0		824.0		561.0		923.0		38.0		65.0

1/ In the without project situation maize and soyabean are grown as separate crops during the first dry season (Feb-June). In the with project situation, maize and soyabean are grown as mixed crops during the second dry season (June-Sept).

2/ 5% of the value of the main crop.

3/ Assumed, in line with the SAR, at 20% of all labour required.

4/ Including both male and female labour.

5/ All inputs valued at economic prices and including economic value of family labour

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

Table 5(a). Farm Budgets
Sidorejo Irrigation Area

	Small Farms (0.2 Ha)						Medium Farms (0.4 Ha)						Large Farms (0.6 Ha)					
	Without Project			With Project			Without Project			With Project			Without Project			With Project		
	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)
CROPS																		
Paddy (Wet Season)	0.17	138.80	29.24	0.20	261.20	36.00	0.34	277.59	58.48	0.40	522.40	72.00	0.51	416.39	87.72	0.60	783.60	108.00
Paddy (Dry Season)				0.20	273.80	36.00				0.40	547.60	72.00				0.60	821.40	108.00
Maize/Soybeans	0.37	230.10	53.28	0.06	41.87	9.12	0.72	447.77	103.68	0.12	83.75	18.24	1.08	671.65	155.52	0.18	125.62	27.36
Sub-Total	0.54	368.90	82.52	0.46	576.87	81.12	1.06	725.36	162.16	0.92	1153.75	162.24	1.59	1088.04	243.24	1.38	1730.62	243.36
Returns per Day from Farming		4.47			7.11			4.47			7.11			4.47			7.11	
Other Income/Expenditures																		
Off-Farm Income																		
Male		27.00	12		27.00	12		27.00	12		15.75	7		13.50	6		22.50	10
Female		17.00	10		17.00	10		13.60	8		8.50	5		10.20	6		10.20	6
Payments for Water																		
IPEDA 1/		5.00			5.00			10.00			10.00			15.00			15.00	
Water Contributions 2/		0.00			6.00			0.00			12.00			0.00			18.00	
Sub-Total		39.00			33.00			30.60			2.25			8.70			-0.30	
Total Family Income		407.90			609.87			755.96			1156.00			1096.74			1730.32	
Income Per Caput 3/		88.67			132.58			164.34			251.30			238.42			376.16	

1/ Rp25,000 per ha.

2/ 50kg of paddy per ha of irrigated paddy grown. Paid to WUAs for maintenance of the tertiary system.

3/ Average family size 4.6 people.

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

**Table 5(b). Farm Budgets
Sedadi Irrigation Area**

	Medium Farms (0.4 Ha)						Large Farms (0.6 Ha)					
	Without Project			With Project			Without Project			With Project		
	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)
CROPS												
Paddy (Wet Season)	0.39	382.38	67.08	0.40	508.60	72.00	0.55	539.25	94.60	0.60	762.90	108.00
Paddy (Dry Season)	0.18	197.54	30.96	0.40	535.00	72.00	0.05	54.87	8.60	0.60	802.50	108.00
Maize/Soyabean	0.13	74.02	18.72	0.12	74.21	18.24	0.47	267.62	67.68	0.18	111.32	27.36
Sub-Total	0.70	653.94	116.76	0.92	1117.81	162.24	1.07	861.74	170.88	1.38	1676.72	243.36
Returns per Day from Farming		5.60			6.89			5.04			6.89	
Other Income/Expenditures												
Off-Farm Income												
Male		15.75	7		15.75	7		11.25	5		11.25	5
Female		13.60	8		13.60	8		6.80	4		6.80	4
Payments for Water												
IPEDA 1/		10.00			10.00			15.00			15.00	
Water Contributions 2/		0.00			12.00			0.00			18.00	
Sub-Total		19.35			7.35			3.05			-14.95	
Total Family Income		673.29			1125.16			864.79			1661.77	
Income Per Caput 3/		146.37			244.60			188.00			361.25	

1/ Rp25,000 per ha.

2/ 50kg of paddy per ha of irrigated paddy grown. Paid to WUAs for maintenance of the tertiary system.

3/ Average family size 4.6 people.

Table 5(c). Farm Budgets
Klambu Kiri Irrigation Area

	Medium Farms (0.4 Ha)						Large Farms (0.6 Ha)					
	Without Project			With Project			Without Project			With Project		
	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)
CROPS												
Paddy (Wet Season)	0.40	344.98	68.80	0.40	508.60	72.00	0.60	517.47	103.20	0.60	762.90	108.00
Paddy (Dry Season)		0.00	0.00	0.40	547.60	72.00		0.00	0.00	0.60	821.40	108.00
Maize/Soyabeans	0.20	108.63	28.80	0.12	71.06	18.24	0.30	162.95	43.20	0.18	106.60	27.36
Sub-Total	0.60	453.61	97.60	0.92	1127.26	162.24	0.90	680.42	146.40	1.38	1690.90	243.36
Returns per Day from Farming		4.65			6.95			4.65			6.95	
Other Income/Expenditures												
Off-Farm Income												
Male		27.00	12		15.75	7		13.50	6		11.25	5
Female		17.00	10		13.60	8		8.50	5		6.80	4
Payments for Water												
IPEDA 1/		10.00			10.00			15.00			15.00	
Water Contributions 2/		0.00			12.00			0.00			18.00	
Sub-Total		34.00			7.35			7.00			-14.95	
Total Family Income		487.61			1134.61			687.42			1675.95	
Income Per Caput 3/		106.00			246.66			149.44			364.34	

1/ Rp25,000 per ha.

2/ 50kg of paddy per ha of irrigated paddy grown. Paid to WUAs for maintenance of the tertiary system.

3/ Average family size 4.6 people.

Table 5(d). Farm Budgets
Klambu Kanan Irrigation Area

	Small Farms (0.2 Ha)						Medium Farms (0.4 Ha)						Large Farms (0.6 Ha)					
	Without Project			With Project			Without Project			With Project			Without Project			With Project		
	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)	Area (Ha)	Gross Income ('000 Rp)	Family Labour (Days)
CROPS																		
Paddy (Wet Season)	0.21	174.50	36.12	0.20	229.10	36.00	0.40	332.38	68.80	0.40	458.20	72.00	0.60	498.57	103.20	0.60	687.30	108.00
Paddy (Dry Season)	0.01	8.45	1.72	0.20	248.60	36.00	0.02	16.91	3.44	0.40	497.20	72.00	0.03	25.36	5.16	0.60	745.80	108.00
Maize/Soybeans	0.19	103.20	27.36	0.06	37.11	9.12	0.37	200.97	53.28	0.12	74.21	18.24	0.55	298.73	79.20	0.18	111.32	27.36
Sub-Total	0.41	286.15	65.20	0.46	514.81	81.12	0.79	550.25	125.52	0.92	1029.61	162.24	1.18	822.67	187.56	1.38	1544.42	243.36
Returns per Day from Farming		4.39			6.35			4.38			6.35			4.39			6.35	
Other Income/Expenditures																		
Off-Farm Income																		
Male		54.00	24		31.50	14		27.00	12		15.75	7		13.50	6		11.25	5
Female		34.00	20		27.20	16		17.00	10		13.60	8		8.50	5		6.80	4
Payments for Water																		
IPEDA 1/		5.00			5.00			10.00			10.00			15.00			15.00	
Water Contributions 2/		0.00			6.00			0.00			12.00			0.00			18.00	
Sub-Total		83.00			47.70			34.00			7.35			7.00			-14.95	
Total Family Income		369.15			562.51			584.25			1036.96			829.67			1529.47	
Income Per Caput 3/		80.25			122.28			127.01			225.43			180.36			332.49	

1/ Rp25,000 per ha.

2/ 50kg of paddy per ha of irrigated paddy grown. Paid to WUAs for maintenance of the tertiary system.

3/ Average family size 4.6 people.

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

Table 6. Per Caput Farm Incomes

Farm Size (ha)	SAR						PCR		
	1983 Prices		1993 Prices		Increase	1993 Prices		Increase	
	Without Project	With Project	Without Project	With Project		Without Project	With Project		
	'000 Rp		'000 Rp		(%)	'000 Rp		(%)	
Sidorejo									
Small	0.2	45.1	79.3	88.4	155.4	76	88.7	132.6	49
Medium	0.4	86.9	155.0	170.3	303.8	78	164.3	251.3	53
Large	0.6	128.6	234.6	252.1	459.8	82	238.4	376.2	58
Sedadi									
Medium	0.4	96.5	154.1	189.1	302.0	60	146.4	244.6	67
Large	0.6	145.3	229.3	284.8	449.4	58	188.0	361.3	92
Klambu Kiri									
Medium	0.4	61.6	147.5	120.7	289.1	140	106.0	246.7	133
Large	0.6	90.0	220.1	176.4	431.4	145	149.4	364.3	144
Klambu Kanan									
Small	0.2	37.9	68.3	74.3	133.9	80	80.3	122.3	52
Medium	0.4	67.2	131.8	131.7	258.3	96	127.0	225.4	77
Large	0.6	100.1	196.6	196.2	385.3	96	180.4	332.5	84

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

Table 7. Cropping Patterns

	Without Project	With Project	
		SAR (ha)	PCR
Sidorejo			
Total Physical Area		6,100	6,120
Wet Season Paddy			
Rainfed	5,200	-	-
Irrigated	-	6,100	6,120
Dry Season Paddy	-	6,100	6,120
Palawija	11,020	1,830	1,000
Total Cropped Area	16,220	14,030	13,240
Sedadi			
Total Physical Area		13,910	15,200
Wet Season Paddy			
Rainfed	1,200	-	-
Irrigated	12,700	13,910	15,200
Dry Season Paddy	6,300	13,910	15,200
Palawija	4,700	4,170	4,650
Total Cropped Area	24,900	31,990	35,050
Klambu Kiri			
Total Physical Area		20,330	21,457
Wet Season Paddy			
Rainfed	8,230	-	-
Irrigated	12,100	20,330	21,457
Dry Season Paddy	500	20,330	21,457
Palawija	10,200	6,120	6,437
Total Cropped Area	31,030	46,780	49,351
Klambu Kanan			
Total Physical Area		19,000	17,288
Wet Season Paddy			
Rainfed	17,600	-	-
Irrigated	2,550	19,000	17,288
Dry Season Paddy	1,100	19,000	17,288
Palawija	17,830	5,700	5,186
Total Cropped Area	39,080	43,700	39,762
Total			
Project Area		59,340	60,065
Wet Season Paddy			
Rainfed	32,230	-	-
Irrigated	27,350	59,340	60,065
Dry Season Paddy	7,900	59,340	60,065
Palawija	43,750	17,820	17,273
Total Cropped Area	111,230	136,500	137,403

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

Table 8. Exchange Rates and Inflation Rates

	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	
EXCHANGE RATE (Rp/US\$)										
GOI Accounting Rate 1/	1,085	1,135	1,640	1,659	1,789	1,872	1,921	2,075	2,150	
Rate on IBRD Disbursements 2/	1,098	1,564	1,665	1,689	1,831	1,897	1,998	2,058	2,118	
DOMESTIC INFLATORS										
Wholesale Price Indices 3/ (1985=100)	104.25	116.65	131.25	142.35	151.30	160.30	172.80	186.15	191.70 4/	
Inflation Rate (%)	11.89	12.52	8.46	6.29	5.95	7.80	7.73	2.98		
Inflators (to convert current to mid-1993 prices)	1.84	1.64	1.46	1.35	1.27	1.20	1.11	1.03	1.00	
INTERNATIONAL INFLATORS										
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
MUV Index (1990=100) 5/	68.60	80.89	88.84	95.31	94.65	100.00	102.23	106.64	107.17	110.85
Inflation Rate (%)	17.92	9.83	7.28	-0.69	5.65	2.23	4.31	0.50	3.43	-100.00
Inflators 6/ (to convert current to mid-1993 prices)	1.43	1.26	1.16	1.13	1.10	1.06	1.03	1.00	1.00	1.93

1/ Rate fixed every year for converting budgetary allocations into US\$ equivalents for accounting purposes.

2/ Average exchange rate on IBRD disbursements made in the year.

3/ Source: International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1993 (Vol. XLVI) and May 1994 (Vol. XLVII, No. 5).

4/ Wholesale price index at the end of the second quarter of 1993.

5/ G-5 MUV Index. Source: World Bank, International Economics Department, March 1994.

6/ Correction factors to convert split year costs (e.g. 1985/86) to mid 1993 values.

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

Table 9. Economic Project Costs in Constant 1993 Prices

	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	Total
LOCAL CURRENCY COSTS 1/	(Rp. Billion)									
Civil Works 2/	6.86	8.04	43.07	69.19	82.77	43.86	42.71	28.11	11.51	336.13
Equipment 2/		0.02	0.26	0.07	0.84	1.00	0.12			2.31
Consultants		0.87	10.36	1.83	1.34	2.57	6.00	1.03	3.01	27.01
Training								0.38		0.38
Administration	0.64	0.56	0.73	1.90	1.33	1.15	1.15	1.00	0.50	8.96
Land Acquisition	26.06	7.03	20.45	12.43	2.04	6.34	3.43	4.51	5.72	88.00
Sub-Total	33.56	16.52	74.87	85.42	88.32	54.93	53.42	35.03	20.74	462.81
FOREIGN CURRENCY COSTS 3/										
Civil Works 2/	9.09	9.52	16.96	25.16	33.09	42.62	4.81	0.00	0.00	141.26
Equipment 2/										-
Consultants	0.00	3.08	3.30	3.72	3.65	2.31	1.08	0.23	0.61	17.98
Training								0.42		0.42
Administration										-
Land Acquisition										-
Sub-Total	9.09	12.60	20.26	28.88	36.74	44.94	5.88	0.65	0.61	159.66
TOTAL ECONOMIC COSTS	42.65	29.11	95.13	114.30	125.07	99.86	59.30	35.69	21.35	622.47

1/ Current values have been converted to constant 1993 values using the local currency inflators (derived from Annex 1, Table 4 and Annex 2, Table 8).

2/ Excludes cost of construction of flood forecasting building and equipment for telemetry and IPEDA as these have not yet resulted in quantifiable benefits.

3/ Constant 1993 Rupiah values have been derived by converting US\$ values to mid-1993 values, using the foreign exchange inflator, and converting these to Rupiah equivalent using the mid 1993 exchange rate (US\$1 = Rp2,100) (derived from Annex 1, Table 5 and Annex 2, Table 8).

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

Table 10. Actual and Projected Power Generation

	92/93	93/94	94/95	Post 94/95
	-----Mwh-----			
Kedung Ombo Power House	40,330	74,627	70,000	70,000
Sidorejo Power House 1/	2,523	-	2,500	2,500
Klambu Power Plant	1,872	2,104	2,100	2,100
Total	44,725	76,731	74,600	74,600
	-----Rp billion-----			
Economic Value 2/	10.73	18.42	17.90	17.90
Operational & Maintenance Costs 3/	0.69	0.87	0.87	0.87

1/ Damaged in January 1993 and expected to be recommissioned in 1994/95.

2/ Valued at Rp240 (11.4 US cents) per Kwh. This economic value is based on existing tariffs for industrial and residential use, along with an estimate of consumer surplus. Source: SAR for Indonesia: Cirata Hydroelectric Phase II Project, Report No. 11544-IND, dated April 14, 1993.

3/ Includes only O&M of power plants.

INDONESIA: Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project
Annex 2: Financial and Economic Analysis

Table 11. Benefits from Fishing

	Unit	Quantity	Unit Cost Rp	Value 000 Rp
AQUACULTURE (Floating Cages) 2/				
Output (per 4 month cycle)	kg	1,500	1,800	2,700
Inputs (per 4 month cycle)				
Fry	no.	6,000	20	120
Feed	kg	2,250	680	1,530
Other Expenses				200
Gross Income				850
Amortised Cost of Cages 2/				250
Net Income				600
Family Labour	days	30		
Returns/Day of Family Labour				20
Total Economic Benefits	tons	960 3/	360,000 4/	345,600
CAPTURE 5/				
Output (annual catch)	kg	1,200	400	480
Inputs				
Nets (600m x 3m)	no.	2	30	60
Boat	no.	1	100	100
Other Expenses				50
Net Income				270
Family Labour	days	50		
Returns/Day of Family Labour				5.4
Total Economic Benefits	tons	600 6/	140,000 4/	84,000

1/ Model based on a cage 6mx6mx3m over a four months production cycle.

2/ Investment costs are around Rp1.5 million and cages need to be replaced every two years (six production cycles).

3/ There are about 800 cages in the reservoir, producing on average about 400 kgs of fish each cycle. Total annual production is thus about 960 tons.

4/ Net income less cost of family labour (valued at economic prices).

5/ Model based on a single boat enterprise.

6/ About 500 fishermen.

Table 12. Benefits from Municipal Water Supply

(page 1)

Willingness to Pay

Consumer Type	Current Tariffs in Semarang			
	0-15 m ³	16-20 m ³	21-50 m ³	> 50 m ³
 Rp/m ³			
Social Service	170	170	170	170
Special Social Service	170	325	400	450
Household I	175	350	450	900
Household II	320	500	600	1,250
Household III	450	620	865	1,470
Government Offices	320	500	600	1,250
Small Trading Company (Commercial)	0	735	1,715	1,960
Big Trading Company (Commercial)	0	990	2,205	1,450
Small Industry	0	860	1,960	2,205
Big Industry	0	1,225	2,450	2,695
Harbour	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000

Average annual household consumption (5 people x 40 lt/day):

73 m³

Cost for Household Type I:

Rp38,500 per annum

Average Cost/m³:

Rp530

Marginal Cost/m³:

Rp900

Capital Cost

The canals to transport water to Semarang, along with treatment and distribution systems, would cost about US\$64 million. Amortising this over 5 years and assuming annual supply of 153 million m³ (see below), the capital cost per m³ is about Rp200.

O&M Cost

For Central Java, sustainable O&M costs for rural water supply schemes are estimated at about Rp180/m³. (Source: SAR for Indonesia: Water Supply and Sanitation for Low Income Communities Project, Report No. 11777-INS, dated May 26, 1993). For urban supply schemes the O&M costs may be 2-3 times that of a rural scheme.

Economic Benefits

The willingness to pay, at the margin, less investment and O&M cost should give a lower bound approximation of the social benefit of increasing water supply.

	Rp/m ³
Marginal Willingness to Pay	900
less:	
O&M Costs	360
Capital Cost	<u>200</u>
Economic Benefit	340

Table 12. Benefits from Municipal Water Supply

(page 2)

Quantities Supplied

SAR Assumptions

0.009 lt/sec/ha for Sidorejo and Klambu Kanan (25,100 ha)

0.006 lt/sec/ha for Sedadi and Klambu Kiri (34,240 ha)

Annual Supply: 13.6 million m³

Water would be drawn by directly from the canals

Actual

Urban Water Supply to:

	Quantity Required	Source
	(lt/sec)	
Semarang	2,500	Klambu Barrage
Demak	1,500	Klambu Barrage
Purwodadi	150	Sidorejo Main Canal
Rembang	700	Klambu Kanan Main Canal
Total	4,850	

Annual Supply: 153.0 million m³

Economic Value: Rp52.02 billion

Table 13. Flood Control Benefits

Flood Prone Area:	30,000 ha in Lower Serang Basin
Economic Productivity of Flood Prone Area:	Rp824,000 ha ^{1/}
Flood Likelihood:	
Without Project:	1: 20 years
With Project:	1: 100 years
Likely Losses^{2/} :	
Without Project:	Rp618 million
With Project:	Rp214 million
Incremental Benefits:	Rp494 million

^{1/} Based on rice production in the Klambu Kanan area.

^{2/} Assumes 50% of net benefits (equivalent to 27% of output) is lost in the years in which a major flood occurs.

Table 14: Economic Costs and Benefits

	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	1994/95	1995/96	1996/97	1997/98	1998/99	1999/2000	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04 to 2007/08	
(Rp billion)																				
ECONOMIC COSTS																				
Investment Costs 1/	42.65	29.11	95.13	114.30	125.07	99.86	59.30	35.69	21.35										62.25	
Replacement Costs 2/																				
Operational and Maintenance Costs																				
Dam and Appurtenances						0.40	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81
Irrigation Works 3/						0.63	1.26	1.89	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10
Power Stations								0.69	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	
Sub-Total	42.65	29.11	95.13	114.30	125.07	100.89	61.37	39.08	25.13	3.78	3.78	3.78	3.78	3.78	3.78	3.78	3.78	66.02	3.78	
ECONOMIC BENEFITS																				
Incremental Crop Production 4/					7.42	22.26	37.10	44.51	59.35	66.77	74.19	74.19	74.19	74.19	66.77	66.77	66.77	66.77	66.77	
Power Generation 5/								10.73	18.42	17.90	17.90	17.90	17.90	17.90	17.90	17.90	17.90	17.90	17.90	
Fishing 6/							0.09	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	
Tourism 7/								0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	
Municipal and Drinking Water Supply 8/							5.20	5.20	10.40	10.40	15.61	26.01	31.21	41.62	52.02	52.02	52.02	52.02	52.02	
Flood Control 9/						0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	
Sub-Total	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.42	22.75	42.87	61.45	89.18	96.08	108.70	119.10	124.30	134.71	137.69	137.69	137.69	137.69	137.69	
NET ECONOMIC BENEFITS	(42.65)	(29.11)	(95.13)	(114.30)	(117.65)	(78.15)	(18.49)	22.37	64.05	92.30	104.92	115.32	120.52	130.93	133.91	133.91	133.91	71.67	133.91	

Economic Rate of Return 12.4 %

1/ See Annex 2, Table 9.

2/ 10% of all project funded works are assumed to be mechanical or electrical equipment which would need to be replaced after 10 years.

3/ Rp35,000 per ha.

4/ See Annex 2, Tables 4 and 7. Crop production is expected to fall by about 10% after year 2000 when urban water supply reaches its peak.

5/ See Annex 2, Table 10.

6/ See Annex 2, Table 11.

7/ About 300,000 tourists visited the reservoir in 1993/94 and paid an entrance fee of Rp250 each.

8/ See Annex 2, Table 12.

9/ See Annex 2, Table 13.

Table 15. Sensitivity Analysis

 Projected Price			
	SAR	High	Base	Low
 1993 Rp			
Impact of Paddy Price on ERR (PCR Assumptions)				
Economic Price for Paddy	453	469	306	179
ERR %	17.9	18.5	12.4	6.5
Impact on ERR of Change in Assumptions				(%)
Only Agricultural and Power Benefits (SAR Assumptions) ^{1/}				17.4
Only Agricultural & Power Benefits (PCR Assumptions)				8.5
Excluding Drinking Water Benefits				8.7

^{1/} Conversion Factors of 0.8-0.9 for construction and 0.5 for labour; paddy price of Rp453/kg.

Background

1. The Kedung Ombo reservoir, covering about 6,500 ha, was expected to displace 5,390 families (23,380 people). Like the surrounding area, the majority of these people were agricultural. Population densities in the project area were among the highest in Java, ranging from 860 to 1,060 people/sq. km, and sample surveys showed that 55% of the people who would be affected had incomes below the poverty line.

2. Because of the area's socio-political history as well as the scarcity of farmland, it was known from the outset that resettlement would be difficult. The project's environmental impact assessment concluded that "resettlement of displaced people should be considered the most important impact of this project." Project preparation was extensive, involving international consultants, well-respected Indonesian universities, and several government survey and implementation teams. A resettlement plan was approved by the Bank at project appraisal. Preference surveys carried out by the Institute of Ecology, Padjadjaran University, and reviewed by the Satya Wacana Christian University stated that 75-80% of the population wanted to join the transmigration program. During preparation, village representatives visited the proposed sites in Irian Jaya and Bengkulu, and 300 families apparently had already transmigrated before the project was approved by the Bank. Project planners assumed that most of the remainder would change their minds as their neighbors joined the transmigration program; the final resettlement plan called for 90% of the affected area residents transmigrating elsewhere. Only 10% of the population was expected to remain in the project area. A Kabupaten Coordinating Development Committee would help this group enter vocational training programs to prepare them for alternative employment, work on the project, or help place them in local government projects.

3. Compensation for all of the affected people amounted to Rp 25.9 billion (approximately US\$25 million), or about \$1000/person¹. Since transmigration costs were well-known and based on per-family site development costs, the project provided a cash payment to the Transmigration Ministry. Land acquisition costs were included in the project's cost tables. It should be noted, however, that the transmigration program was open to all Indonesians, and in that sense did not constitute a "special" resettlement activity. No funds were allocated for local resettlement other than \$150,000 for monitoring and \$400,000 for upland agricultural planning.

Implementation

4. Problems with the resettlement program began almost immediately, although it was several years before they were brought to the attention of the Bank. The assumption that the majority of the resettlers wished to join transmigration proved to be unfounded. In fact, several families that initially joined the transmigration returned, claiming that rough conditions and inadequate site preparation made farming impossible in the new sites. In the end, about 20%

¹This figure includes compensation for public infrastructure such as roads.

of the families transmigrated, although follow-up studies demonstrated that families who did join were the only group that has restored and improved its income. The local programs to absorb the displaced families did not materialize, aggravating the situation still further. Although there was one attempt to establish a small village to absorb at least some of the people affected by the project, poor soil quality made it economically non-viable and few of the resettlers accepted this option.

5. Compensation was paid to the resettlers following government regulations, and were adjusted annually by 10%-15%. Compensation amounts, however, were 50% or less of the levels needed to purchase replacement lands in the area; rising land costs and delays between property assessments and actual payment account for the discrepancy. Approximately 750 families initially refused to accept the compensation, which was deposited in escrow in a regional court.

6. Although the situation in the field was rapidly deteriorating, Government reports to the Bank indicated that the plan was proceeding on course, and the majority of the people living in the reservoir area were indeed joining the transmigration program. This turned out to be incorrect. *Ex post* analysis revealed that government reporting methodologies were not keyed to the resettlement target group: while the right number of people may have transmigrated from the general project area, there was no way to know from transmigration reports whether they were from the target population that would be affected by the reservoir.

7. Concerns over the resettlement activities were brought to the Bank's attention by Indonesian NGOs as early as 1987, two years before reservoir impoundment, in a carefully assembled chronology prepared by the Legal Aid Society (LBH) of Yogyakarta. LBH also reported several instances of intimidation and pressure being used to convince families to accept the compensation. No actions were taken. This failure to act marked a turning point in the project. Receiving no response from GOI or the Bank, which had been provided with copies of the LBH report, NGOs began an international campaign to draw attention to the deteriorating resettlement situation in Kedung Ombo.

8. Although semi-annual monitoring was to have begun in 1985, there was a two-year delay in the recruitment of an independent monitoring team. Government's reluctance to provide the monitors with permits to visit the field site delayed monitoring still further, and it was not until April, 1988, that the Bank received the consultant's first report. This indicated that 37% of the total land-owning families had refused to accept compensation, and more than half of the total population was still in the reservoir area despite the rapidly approaching date for closing the reservoir gates to begin inundation. When the monitoring team confirmed NGO reports of mounting conflicts in the area and government plans to evict the remaining population, a social anthropologist was sent from Bank headquarters to Indonesia in mid 1989 to review the project and discuss remedial actions with the Government.

9. Assisted by the Bank, the Government prepared a corrective action program. The focus of the corrective action program was on the families remaining in the reservoir area. No special

provisions were made for the majority of farmers who had accepted compensation and resettled themselves locally. The main elements of the corrective action program consisted of: a) continued promotion of transmigration, with increased support for transmigrants; b) development of reservoir fisheries, social forestry, and greenbelt development for communities remaining near the reservoir area; and c) establishment of three new villages on Forest Department lands released by the government.

10. Particular attention was paid to the new villages on government land. As might be expected, the only lands available in this area of Central Java were those that local farmers had difficulty to convert to farmland. Based on the advice from staff of Gajah Mada and Eleven March Universities, considerable investments in site preparation and soil treatments were made to improve the soils. Because project coordination had been weak throughout the early years, DGWRD formed a resettlement unit to ensure proper implementation of the revised resettlement plan. Independent socioeconomic monitoring was contracted from the Satya Wacana Christian University, a prestigious and independent research institute close to the reservoir area.

Current Status

11. At the time that water impoundment began in 1989, most of the affected land had been acquired, but a large number of people still had not moved. Approximately 3,100 families eventually accepted the cash compensation and moved into the neighboring communities. Six hundred and sixty-nine families were resettled onto sites developed by the government. The remaining 307 have remained inside the greenbelt, refusing to move until the courts decided on their claims for better compensation.² The Bank helped broker an agreement to allow these families to remain in the greenbelt area until an equitable, voluntary relocation program could be negotiated. Resettlement is, therefore, fully completed except for the 307 families living inside the greenbelt, who will be encouraged to move on a strictly voluntary basis.

Outcomes

12. Baseline monitoring reports in 1989 indicated an average income decline among the affected population of 30-50%. Family incomes began to recover as the corrective action program took effect, and as families began exploiting alternative income sources in the larger economic environment. A comparative statement showing benefits of different resettlement options in the corrective action program is shown in Annex 1, Table 3.

13. Because baseline income data was not gathered, monitors used a proxy consisting of

² In 1993, Indonesia's Supreme Court ruled in favor of 34 claimants, awarding them their full claim plus 500% for the physical and psychological damages suffered. The government is appealing the case (on the grounds that the award actually exceeded the resettler's request) and a decision is expected shortly.

neighboring communities that were not resettled.³ On average, the approximately 1,150 families who joined the transmigration program have achieved real incomes nearly 50% higher than the incomes of communities from the same area but which were not displaced.

14. The 3,131 families who accepted the compensation and moved to adjacent villages appear to have suffered an initial average income decline of as much as 40% relative to their neighbors. Subsequent improvements have brought them to within about 12%, where incomes appear to have stabilized; nevertheless, a significant proportion of this group remains below the regional poverty line.

15. Families who moved to the government sites also suffered significant initial income declines ranging between 40-60%, and a 1992 survey reported that their incomes were still below the regional poverty line. Nevertheless, between 1991 and 1993, their average income rose and the gap between them and their neighbors had declined to an average of 22%. This trend of rising incomes can be expected to continue as their farms mature. The high incidence of motorcycles, radios, household improvements, and other consumer goods among this group, which matches or exceeds levels in the neighboring communities, suggests that income from seasonal outmigration and wage labor are being under-reported. For both host and resettler communities in the area, non-farm sources of income now account for 30%-50% of family income and reflect the overall trend of a decreasing dependence on family farming throughout Central Java.

16. Economic improvement in the government settlements is likely to continue as the new farms mature and families benefit from growing off-farm employment opportunities. Families who have remained in the greenbelt are also doing well since they benefit from highly productive drawdown agriculture. Reservoir fisheries are producing high incomes for participants in the programs, but input and marketing constraints have limited the entry of new resettler families.

³ Two major sources of distortion are possible with this proxy. First, the scale of resettlement was such that some interactions are likely, caused by rising population densities as host communities absorbed displaced families. Population densities in the surrounding communities are nearly 25% higher than the average found throughout Central Java. Second, part of the resettlers farmed irrigated bottomlands that were flooded by the reservoir, whereas host communities are likely to be on steeper, less fertile hillsides. Thus, estimates of income decline are conservative.

Table 1: Economic Performance of Resettler Communities (1994)

Resettlement Group	# Families	% of Displaced Population	Change in Economic Status* %
Transmigrant	1,161	22	+55
Self-settlers	3,131	59	-12
Government Land	669	13	-22
Greenbelt	307	6	+62
Total	5,268	100	

*measured against unresettled, neighboring villages

Bank Performance

17. Bank performance in the Kedung Ombo resettlement case was less than satisfactory during the 1985-1989 period although it improved thereafter when the gravity of the situation was recognized. The problems with the resettlement approach were signalled as early as 1984 by the Central Agriculture Department (AGR): lack of explicit linkages between resettlement and transmigration, lack of budget for local resettlement programs, and the absence of institutional capacity to manage a large, complex resettlement operation. They were discounted during project processing and were never adequately addressed by the final resettlement program. Particularly important is the counter-evidence to the estimate that 90% of the population would willingly transmigrate.

18. Early supervision was also incomplete, concentrating on the project's physical works to the neglect of the unfolding resettlement disaster. Although reports sent by the Transmigration Ministry to the Bank's resident mission suggested that the program was proceeding well, in fact the people being transmigrated were for the most part not the people being affected by the reservoir. This would have been readily apparent had resettlement been supervised in the field, as evidenced by the fact that it was revealed by the first Bank resettlement mission to visit the site in 1989.

19. Bank performance improved dramatically beginning in 1989, when the Bank first became aware of the gravity of the situation. Progress on the resettlement component began when the Bank raised the issue with senior government officials, and the Bank and Government agreed on a program of corrective actions. Specialist assistance began with the first mission to assess the situation, and has continued regularly until the project's closing. Responsibility for resettlement was assigned to a separate task manager in order to ensure adequate attention, and an experienced Indonesian staff member in the RSI was also assigned to ensure proper

implementation of the corrective action program. Monthly progress reports were sent to the Bank for review.

20. Although disbursements have been completed, the Bank has recommended continued monitoring of progress of the corrective actions and their impact on incomes among the resettlers and their hosts. Although there is an agreement that funds from the ISSP-II project (Loan 3392-IND) can be used to continue support for the NGO that has been providing credit and small enterprise development services for the resettlers who have moved to the government resettlement sites, contracts have been delayed and action has stopped. Provincial and line agency programs are needed to finish the corrective action program under regular GOI budgets.

What Went Wrong?

21. Ex post analysis of Kedung Ombo suggests that four major planning mistakes led to the project's resettlement problems:

a) Quality of Baseline Work -- The most basic flaw in the Kedung Ombo resettlement program was the assumption that up to 90% of the people would join the transmigration program. As a result, project planners had no alternatives available when more than 80% of the people decided to remain. How could reputable research institutions and international consultants make such a mistake?⁴

Throughout the project period, official Bank and borrower documents reiterate claims that many resettlers changed their minds. A careful review of the documents provides a more complex picture. There is no question that several people did, in fact, change their minds. Many of the earliest transmigrants returned with stories of hardship in the new sites and a significant percentage of the resettlers decided it would be better to accept the risks of a known, familiar environment over the challenge of developing a frontier.

Sampling methodologies used in the baseline survey work were highly defective. Most survey interviews appear to have consisted of talks only with village leaders. As official appointees, one of their functions included promoting transmigration from the densely populated areas of Central Java. It is not unreasonable to conclude that outside researchers were told what they wanted to hear and not surprising that contradictory evidence can also be found in the early studies: many interview transcriptions do not support the aggregated findings of willingness to join transmigration. Some of these field interviews contained in the draft resettlement report submitted by the university reported that "interviewed people in the village stated their unwillingness for transmigration....," but these findings were not included with the final preparation report submitted to the Bank.

⁴ An identical situation repeated itself in the Bank-assisted Power X (Saguling) and Power XIII projects. Appraisal reports for the two projects assumed that some 60-80% would join Transmigration programs. In practice, less than 30% did, again creating an emergency resettlement situation. In the case of these two projects, however, corrective actions based on the development of high-production reservoir fisheries appear to have been successful in restoring and in many cases improving resettlers' incomes.

b) Inadequacies of compensation mechanisms. Government officials appear to have followed existing compensation norms and regulations. At the heart of the resettlement problem was the lack of compensation policies and mechanisms to assess property values at levels that would allow resettlers to replace the land and other productive assets that they had lost. Recognition of the need to improve compensation policies as demonstrated in the Kedung Ombo case may have partially influenced GOI's new land acquisition policies (Kepres 55/93), which require compensation to be paid at market rates.

c) Failure to form an overall coordinating body -- The overall coordinating body for resettlement described in the SAR was never formed. Special committees established compensation levels and provided coordination with the transmigration program. However, there was no overall coordinating body endowed with the necessary powers to ensure that programs were properly administered and implemented.

d) Lack of effective local participation -- Local involvement in the project's design and implementation was minimal. Until the corrective action program was developed, the main planning assumption was that resettlers would be slotted into pre-designed programs. Information in the region about what these programs were and what entitlements affected families should have expected was scarce, and institutional avenues for addressing local concerns were non-existent. The impact caused by the lack of an agency field presence and adequate dissemination of information is highlighted by the improvements achieved by NGOs and the project authority through the corrective action program.

Lessons That Can Be Learned from Kedung Ombo

22. The Kedung Ombo project provides a case study to illustrate the findings of the 1994 Bankwide Resettlement Review⁵. Four lessons from the Kedung Ombo case are particularly relevant for the Bank. First, field supervision is essential, particularly in the early years of project implementation. In Kedung Ombo's case, supervision of resettlement aspects came late, after the situation had deteriorated to the point where only salvage operations were possible. Furthermore, it was only when resettlement specialists were incorporated into Bank missions that the Bank's supervision focus moved away from project delays caused by land acquisition to face the need to prepare a resettlement plan for the displaced people.

23. The second lesson concerns the need for Bank decisiveness. Contemporary project records repeatedly report that the situation was "under control" during the 1987-1988 period when all other evidence demonstrates that this could not possibly have been the case. It is significant that when the Bank began taking decisive actions in 1989, Government responded positively and a corrective action program was developed and implemented.

24. The third point concerns the role played by NGOs and the internationalization of the

⁵ Resettlement and Development

Kedung Ombo conflict. NGOs contacted the Bank and GOI as early as 1987 with information that there were major problems with the resettlement operation, much of it subsequently confirmed, but the Bank did not respond to the NGOs or supervise the component for more than a year. This initial lack of interest in dialogue with NGOs contributed to the subsequent polarization of discussion. Had the Bank and project authorities participated in an early, informed discussion of Kedung Ombo with NGOs and other concerned groups, much of the embarrassment and cost suffered by the Bank and borrower subsequently could have been averted.

25. Fourth, Kedung Ombo illustrates the need for matching participatory planning with a focus on implementation. In comparison with many other projects from the same time period, Kedung Ombo had a relatively comprehensive resettlement plan, although, as it turned out, one built on very shaky foundations. Yet the apparently well-designed plan disintegrated soon after project approval and proved to be largely irrelevant to much of the actual resettlement that took place. In fact, project preparation and appraisal should have assessed the acceptability of resettlement proposals to the affected population and local governments, and the ability of project institutions to deliver them alongside construction of the main project.

Were Other Outcomes Possible?

26. Kedung Ombo's case presents a difficult challenge for analyzing alternative approaches to resettlement that might have led to a more successful outcome, even with the benefit of hindsight. Land fragmentation and rural poverty were at such high rates in the project area that land-for-land solutions in and of themselves were never a viable option. In objective economic terms, transmigration was clearly the best option, and even today the families that joined the transmigration program have by far the highest real incomes.

27. From the farmer's perspective, the situation was considerably more complicated. Interviews with the families who opted for the transmigration option suggest that (like elsewhere) the families who joined transmigration were primarily the young, landless or particularly land-poor villagers who had little to lose. For the others, perceived risks were much higher. Older families with multiple plots, families with children attending school, and families with part-time employment outside the reservoir had sound reasons to remain where they were, especially given the difficulty of obtaining reliable information from local authorities. Contrary to project assumptions, transmigration became a less rather than more popular resettlement option over time.

28. Regional economic evolution and the relative (although still early) success of the corrective action program on government lands demonstrate that other options could have been explored more carefully. Had the government lands that were eventually used for the resettlement been part of the plan at the outset, early investments in improved fertility could have prevented the steep income drop for the people who eventually moved there as part of the crash corrective action program. From the early 1980's, regional economic growth in Central Java stemmed primarily from off-farm employment. Had the vocational training, fisheries, and

employment programs been instituted by a local government committed to resolving the problem, many of the resettlers most probably could have taken advantage of new, local opportunities. Furthermore, had planning proceeded under conditions of openness and transparency, much of the fear and uncertainty that led to the rejection of resettlement options would have been diminished.

29. Hindsight reveals three critical turning points in Kedung Ombo's history. Baseline work was defective as much for the process by which information was gathered as because of the information itself. Had initial assessments focused on developing mechanisms to improve local participation and feedback between the government and the resettlers, planning would have been more flexible and the project management structure more responsive to a situation that was highly dynamic from the outset. The second critical juncture was when the first NGO reports were provided to the Bank. While supervision of resettlement should have been taking place on a regular basis, LBH's submission to the Bank was the first documentary evidence that there were major discrepancies between what the Bank thought was happening and what was taking place on the site. Furthermore, not only was an important opportunity to make early interventions lost, but the initial lack of Bank response made NGOs feel as if they had little choice other than to mount the bitter international campaign that ensued. The final turning point is a positive one: perseverance with the corrective action program has begun to show results in the income of the affected families who moved to the new villages. Despite the late start, further corrective action is feasible if preliminary GOI commitments are translated into adequate budget allocations for the responsible central, provincial and local agencies.

UNIT 1: Introduction to the course
UNIT 2: The history of the course
UNIT 3: The structure of the course
UNIT 4: The content of the course



UNIT 5: The objectives of the course
UNIT 6: The methods of the course
UNIT 7: The materials of the course
UNIT 8: The assessment of the course
UNIT 9: The support of the course
UNIT 10: The conclusion of the course

MAP SECTION



INDONESIA
KEDUNG OMBO MULTIPURPOSE DAM PROJECT
LAYOUT OF IRRIGATION AREAS UNDER THE PROJECT

- Diversion Weirs
- Main Canals
- Secondary Canals
- New Irrigation
- Existing Irrigation
- Proposed Dams/Reservoirs
- Levees Under Irrigation XIV
- Drains
- Flood Gates
- Diversion Weirs
- Rivers
- Main Roads
- Railways
- International Boundaries



This map has been prepared by The World Bank's staff exclusively for the convenience of the readers and is exclusively for the internal use of The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. The denominations used and the boundaries shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.



New Working Papers from ODI

78: Financial Integration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: a Study of Informal Finance in Ghana

Ernest Aryeetey

1994 ISBN 0 85003 214 8 £6.00

79: Financial Integration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: a Study of Informal Finance in Tanzania

Mboya S.D. Bagachwa

1995 ISBN 0 85003 215 6 £6.00

The above two papers form part of a report on an ODI project which examines the financial systems of four leading Anglophone African countries. The focus of the research is on the degree of integration of financial markets in these countries, especially the connections between the formal and informal segments of these markets. The constraints facing formal and informal financial institutions, and the effects of liberalisation, are also examined in the project.

80: Devolution of Management in Public Irrigation Systems – Cost Shedding, Empowerment and Performance – a Review

Hugh Turrall

1995 ISBN 0 85003 221 0 £6.00

Presents various approaches to improving both management and cost recovery in public irrigation systems through devolution and various forms of privatisation.

81: Changing Public and Private Roles in Agricultural Service Provision

Diana Carney

1995 ISBN 0 85003 222 9 £6.00

Examines recent changes in the supply of agricultural goods and services with a particular emphasis on privatisation and decentralisation of state functions. Looks at the economic characteristics of the goods and assesses the impact of the change on the poorest members of rural communities. Attempts to draw out lessons for future reform, noting the areas in which knowledge is particularly lacking.

82: Structural Adjustment and Sustainable Development in Mali: a World Wide Fund for Nature Study

James Winpenny et al

1995 ISBN 0 85003 223 7 £6.00

Documents and analyses the recent evolution of Mali's natural environment, considers the explanatory causes and the responsibility of structural adjustment for the observed effects, and makes recommendations on how policies should be reformed if sustainable development is to be achieved.

83: Structural Adjustment and Sustainable Development in Cameroon: a World Wide Fund for Nature Study

James Winpenny et al

1995 ISBN 0 85003 224 5 £6.00

Documents the principal economic adjustment measures taken in Cameroon since the late 1980s and traces their potential environmental impact on the agricultural and forestry sectors by presenting case studies. Also draws implications and makes recommendations for the pursuit of sustainable development in agriculture and forestry.

ORDER FORM

Please send me copy/copies of Working Paper 78	£6.00
Please send me copy/copies of Working Paper 79	£6.00
Please send me copy/copies of Working Paper 80	£6.00
Please send me copy/copies of Working Paper 81	£6.00
Please send me copy/copies of Working Paper 82	£6.00
Please send me copy/copies of Working Paper 83	£6.00

Postage: UK and Europe please add £2.00 for one book (plus £1.00 for each additional book). For other countries please add £3.00 (£1.00 for each additional book). Orders of four copies or more are post free.

I enclose a sterling cheque for £

payable to the *Overseas Development Institute*

Please charge my Access/Visa/Mastercard account by £

Send to (your address):

.....
.....
.....
.....

Access/Visa/Mastercard Number

Expiry Date of Card

Credit Card Billing Address (if different from the above - needed for card authorisation):

.....
.....
.....

Full Name

Signature

Please return the form to:

**ODI Publications, Overseas Development Institute, Regent's College, Inner Circle,
Regent's Park, London NW1 4NS, UK**

Fax: +44 (0) 171 487 7590

NGOS AND OFFICIAL DONORS

In the 1950s and 1960s, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and official donors tended to pursue different development agendas. Beyond support to emergencies, they were usually disinterested in each other's activities and occasionally suspicious of the other's motives. This began to change from the early 1970s when most donors followed the earlier example of countries such as Norway and Canada in directly supporting NGO development programmes. The shift of official funding towards NGOs accelerated in the 1980s. Part of this shift is explained by the growth in emergency assistance in the period but it also reflected a growing recognition of the role of NGO programmes in meeting official aid objectives in areas such as poverty reduction, environmental conservation, health and education.

This Briefing Paper focuses on the various, and changing, ways in which NGOs interact with official donors and discusses possible new directions in the relationship between NGOs and donors. The emphasis is upon development activities, rather than emergency assistance and relief.

The financial contribution

One of the most tangible indicators of growing interaction has been the change in the quantity of funds official aid agencies channel to and through NGOs for their development activities. Figures from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) indicate that the total amount of official aid going to NGOs for development in 1992/93 was US\$2.2bn, while data from the World Bank put the 1992 figure at \$2.5bn. Box 1 discusses why these figures seriously underestimate actual flows.

The financial contribution of donors to NGO development activities is commonly presented in terms of two ratios:

- the proportion of official aid channelled to NGOs
 - the contribution of official aid funds to total NGO income.
- Published OECD data suggest that in aggregate about 5% of all official aid is now channelled to NGOs. Not only are these figures an underestimate, but they fail to capture wide variation among different donors in the share of official aid going to and through NGOs. For individual donors, the ratio ranges from less than 1% for some donors to up to 30% (Table 1).

Published aggregate figures indicate more accurately the growing importance of donor funds to overall NGO income: the World Bank judges that whereas in the early 1970s about 1.5% of total NGO income came from donor sources, by the mid-1990s this share had risen to about 30%. Yet these figures, too, conceal wide variations across donor countries, ranging from about 10% of total NGO income to 80% or more (Table 2).

Also of importance has been the pace at which donors have increased the funds they channel to NGOs. For instance, in the ten years to 1993/94, the United Kingdom increased its official funding of NGOs by almost 400% to £68.7m, raising the share of total aid channelled to NGOs from 1.4% to 3.6%. In the same period, Australia increased

Box 1: NGO income from donor sources: doubts about the accuracy of the aggregate data

There are four major reasons why aggregate and widely quoted figures of official donor contributions to the development activities of NGOs significantly underestimate actual flows.

- Some major donors, such as the US, have not reported even crude aggregate data for a number of years, while OECD figures quoted for other major donors, such as Japan, vary widely from year to year and differ markedly from national published data.
- The aggregate data quoted by the OECD are based solely on figures provided by (some) bilateral donors. Yet a significant proportion of *multilateral* aid is channelled to NGOs. For instance, the World Bank's Social Fund has now supported some 30 initiatives valued at \$1.3bn, a share of which has gone to NGOs. In 1992 alone, the European Commission provided some \$300m directly to NGOs for non-emergency development projects and programmes. Other organisations, such as the UNDP and the Inter-American Development Bank, also have large NGO programmes.
- The published aggregate data usually record only official aid funds to NGOs used to support NGOs' initiatives. Yet a significant, and growing, portion of official aid utilises NGOs to implement official aid projects. This is classified in unpublished OECD data as income through NGOs and is not recorded in the aggregate flows of official aid received by NGOs published by the OECD even though many NGOs count this as part of their total income and include the projects as part of their own overall portfolio. OECD unpublished data estimates this figure very crudely at \$641m. In 1994, the Swedish Government alone provided over \$30m to Swedish NGOs in this manner.
- Most bilateral donor data on NGO income fail to include that portion of bilateral aid budgets which is channelled directly to local NGOs with funds from the respective bilateral aid programmes. Country case studies of Swedish official aid to NGOs in Kenya and Zimbabwe in late 1994 alone revealed a shortfall of some \$10m in official data. Additionally, the new British £2m programme to fund NGOs directly in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania will not be recorded separately in the aggregate aid statistics as official aid to NGOs, even though this is precisely what it is.

its official funding of NGOs from A\$20m to A\$71m, raising the share of total aid going to NGOs from 1% to 6%. Similar expansion occurred in the case of Finland, Norway and Sweden from the early 1980s to the early 1990s.

Funding arrangements

In terms of donor-NGO funding arrangements, there are variations across countries. In Australia, there are 32 different funding mechanisms through which NGOs can obtain funds from the Government. However, the dominant type of NGO activity funded by donors today remains projects and programmes put forward for funding by the NGOs themselves, and utilised for projects and programmes in particular developing countries. In the United Kingdom,

Table 1: The share of official aid going to NGOs: selected donors

Country	% of Official Aid channelled to NGOs	Year
Sweden*	30	1993/94
Switzerland	29	1994
Norway*	25	1992
Canada*	14	1992
Netherlands	10	1993
US	9	1992
Germany	7	1992
Finland	6	1993
Australia	6	1993/94
UK	4	1993/94
Japan	1	1992

Note: * denotes inclusion of emergency aid.

Sources: OECD (1995) *Development Assistance Committee Report 1994*: Paris, OECD, 1995; World Bank (1995) *World Debt Tables 1994-95, Volume 1*: Washington DC, The World Bank; Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) (1995) *NGO Programs Effectiveness Review*: Canberra, AusAID; I. Smillie and H. Helmich (1993) *Non-Governmental Organisations and Governments: stakeholders for development*: Paris, OECD; ODA (1994) *British Aid Statistics, 1989/90 - 1993/94*: London, Government Statistical Service; T. Tvedt (1995) *Non-Governmental Organizations as a Channel for Development Assistance: the Norwegian System*: Oslo, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Swiss Development Cooperation (1994) *Annual Report 1994*: Berne, SDC; and Independent Review of International Aid (1995) *The Reality of Aid*: London: Earthscan.

this is through the Overseas Development Administration's (ODA) Joint Funding Scheme; in Sweden, through the NGO Programme; in Finland, through the NGO Support Programme. Additionally, a small proportion of donor funds are channelled through a range of international NGOs, while most bilateral donors have also provided funds to NGOs specialising in sending volunteers abroad, and to NGOs working on education and information initiatives within donor countries.

All donors have introduced criteria to determine the eligibility of potential projects put up for funding: some use sectoral specialists to review project proposals, others provide funds almost on a self-monitoring basis within general guidelines. Donors vary, too, in the share of total project costs which donors are willing to fund, from 50% or less (the UK) to 75% and upwards (Finland, Sweden). Donors have also differed in the relationship between the level of funds requested by the NGOs and the official funds available: some parliaments (Sweden) have, until very recently, repeatedly voted more funds each year than there are projects available to fund. Others (such as the UK) have to reject a high proportion of projects, because of a shortage of total funds allocated.

Different donors have also applied varying degrees of conditionality on the non-project funds they provide for NGO work. In contrast to the United Kingdom, which has stringent conditions attached to official funds used for development education and information work, other donors,

such as the Scandinavians, have a more permissive approach and even provide funds for activities and campaigns critical of official aid policy.

The role of NGOs in donor programmes

What all these particular funding schemes have in common is that they are official contributions to the NGOs' own development projects and programmes. Increasingly in recent years, however, NGOs have been co-opted to assist official aid agencies execute donors' own projects and programmes. For these types of initiative it is usual for donors to contribute all the funds required to execute these particular projects effectively on a 'sub-contract' basis. Although aggregate data on the amount of official funds channelled to these types of initiative have not been gathered, country studies conducted by the ODI indicate that, in recipient countries with a large and growing NGO presence, 5% and more of total bilateral aid funds are commonly used for these NGO sub-contracted initiatives.

There are three factors which have influenced donors to utilise the skills and services of NGOs to help further their own agenda.

- First, donors have been using NGOs to support their emergency and relief activities for some time, so providing funds for NGO development projects has often been viewed as a natural progression.
- Second, poor performance of official donor programmes in reaching the poor and carrying out successful rural development projects in the late 1960s and 1970s, married with the clear popularity of NGOs for their work in the fields of education and health, and claims by NGOs that they were able to reach the poor and improve their lives, has led donors to turn to NGOs to help them achieve a greater poverty focus in their own aid programmes.
- Third, and relatedly, donors have seen NGOs as a means of getting around obstacles to aid impact caused by inefficient and corrupt governments, as well as a way of reaching people in those countries where they had suspended official aid programmes.

Official donors and southern NGOs

Historically, most official funds have gone to support the work of NGOs based in donor countries, even though the bulk of the funds have been spent in developing countries.

Table 2: The share of total NGO income derived from official funds: selected donors

Country	% of total NGO funds obtained from official aid sources	Year
Sweden	85	1994
Belgium	80	1993
Italy	77	1991
Canada	70	1993
US	66	1993
Australia	34	1993/94
Austria	10	1993
UK	10	1993

Source: as Table 1

An early reason for this was that there were few viable, and effective, indigenous NGOs. Yet over the past 15 years there has been rapid growth in the number, as well as the capabilities of NGOs based in developing countries – *southern* NGOs.

The growth of southern NGOs has varied from country to country but, in general, effective southern NGOs emerged earliest in south and east Asia (such as Bangladesh and the Philippines) and in a number of countries in Latin America such as Chile, Brazil and Nicaragua. Only in the last ten years has there been a rapid growth in the number and importance of indigenous NGOs in Africa and their influence varies markedly across countries.

The donor view which saw increasing merit in working through NGOs, together with the growing strength of southern NGOs, has led more and more donors to supplement their support of northern NGOs with direct funding of southern NGOs. Such donor-NGO initiatives became prominent in the early 1980s and have continued to expand thereafter.

In 1988, the ODA channelled £3.4m to 40 Bangladesh health-related NGOs under the Bangladesh Population and Health Consortium, and over a five year period to 1993 has provided over £5m to a large NGO in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. The United States, Canada, Norway and Sweden are amongst the leading bilateral donors who have all channelled substantial funds to local NGOs, with a heavy concentration in south Asia. The EC and the UNDP have been among the leading multilateral agencies to fund southern NGO activities.

Mirroring the support given to northern NGOs, official funding of southern NGOs has taken two forms: the funding of initiatives put forward by southern NGOs, and the utilisation of the services of southern NGOs to help donors achieve their own aid objectives.

Early moves by donors to fund southern NGOs directly have often been viewed with misgivings by northern NGOs. Yet when donors have embarked on this type of initiative in consultation with their home-based NGOs, and especially when they have used the experience of northern NGO personnel on the ground to assist these direct funding initiatives, the process has often stimulated northern NGOs to assess their own comparative advantage and has been welcomed.

Donor funding of southern NGOs has received a mixed reception from recipient governments. Clear hostility from many non-democratic regimes has been part of more general opposition to any initiatives to support organisations beyond the control of the state. But even in democratic countries, governments have often resisted moves seen as diverting significant amounts of official aid to non-state controlled initiatives, especially where NGO projects have not been integrated with particular line ministry programmes.

The rise of the 'reverse agenda'

The growth in official donor support to NGOs has not always been welcome to NGOs. Reluctance by many northern NGOs to accept large amounts of official aid funds has been based on two mutually-reinforcing ideas: that their development approach was qualitatively different from that of the official aid agencies, and that, as donors continued to apply conditions to funds channelled to NGOs, a rise in donor funding would increasingly be likely to compromise the integrity of NGO approaches to development.

Using NGOs to help achieve donors' own aid objectives only heightened these concerns, though the degree of concern has always varied across different donor countries.

Box 2: NGOs and the World Bank

The World Bank has been subject to sustained criticism by some major NGOs in recent years over its handling of economic policy conditions attached to its structural adjustment loans, especially in Africa, and of its involvement in large projects, such as the Arun Dam in Nepal, which antagonise environmental groups. These twin pressures culminated in a 'Fifty Years is Enough' campaign by some environmental and developmental NGOs to coincide with the Fiftieth anniversary of the World Bank. Yet this public criticism serves to disguise a growing interaction between the World Bank and NGOs.

Until the late 1980s, NGOs played a relatively minor, and indirect, role in the work and activities of the World Bank. In the period 1973–88, NGOs were involved in only 6% of total World Bank-financed projects. Yet by 1990, NGOs were making a direct contribution to 22% of all World Bank-financed projects, and by 1994 to over 50%. Interaction with NGOs is actively encouraged not only in implementation but in the design and planning of projects.

Another change has been the World Bank's growing involvement with *southern* NGOs in its projects. Thus whereas in the period 1973–91, 40% of NGOs involved with the World Bank were international NGOs, by 1994, indigenous NGOs represented 70% of NGOs involved in World Bank-financed projects.

At present, however, and in contrast to most bilateral donors, there are few mechanisms through which NGOs receive funds *from* the World Bank. Of greatest importance to NGOs are the World Bank's Social Funds which channel resources to demand-driven sub-projects proposed by public, private or voluntary organisations (see Box 1).

However, in July 1995 an initiative was announced which could further enhance the role of NGOs in relation to World Bank funding. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest of the Poor (CGAPP) is, according to the World Bank, designed to 'promote the replication and growth of NGO-managed programmes that provide financial services to the poor'. The World Bank has provided an initial capital of US\$100m and other donors together are expected to contribute at least as much. The CGAPP will focus on so-called 'micro-loans' to the informal sector which were pioneered by NGOs and remain a major part of their activities.

Of particular importance is World Bank-NGO interaction in the area of policy discussion and debate. Although an NGO-World Bank Committee was formed in the early 1980s to provide a forum for policy discussion between World Bank and NGO staff, until recently there was little sign that mainstream World Bank policies were influenced by these exchanges.

In recent years, however, the World Bank has joined other donors in exposing itself to both NGO gender and participatory rural appraisal approaches; NGOs have been included in consultations on early drafts of World Bank reports and, although in a more limited way, NGO personnel have been invited to join World Bank economic mission teams.

While both sides would acknowledge that there remain areas of disagreement, both would probably also acknowledge that the degree of interaction and the potential for policy change resulting from World Bank-NGO interaction is much greater today than hitherto.

For example, in most Scandinavian countries, NGOs have received from the state upwards of 80% of income for their projects and most have not felt their integrity threatened as a result. Some major US NGOs, on the other hand, have refused to consider official funding.

Though NGO anxiety about being over-run by the official donor agenda has persisted, the growing role and status of

NGOs has fuelled a different phenomenon, increasingly referred to as the *reverse agenda*. This is the process whereby the approach and methods of the NGOs are now influencing the activities and perceptions of donors and official aid programmes, in some cases as a direct result of donors seeking out NGO ideas.

There are a number of ways in which this has manifested itself. For instance, some of the characteristics of the 'NGO approach' to development – participatory planning, assessing a gender dimension, and concern with the environment – have gradually been incorporated into mainstream donor thinking. Additionally, some donors (such as Australia, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway) regularly seek out the views of NGOs in drawing up particular official bilateral aid programmes: Norway did this in 1993 for their programmes in Ethiopia and Nicaragua. Of particular interest has been the willingness of the World Bank (which has often attracted the hostility of NGOs) to engage in discussions with NGOs and to include some NGOs in the implementation of World Bank projects (see Box 2)

The further expansion of a common agenda?

A direct effect of the growing influence of the reverse agenda has been to increase the common ground between donors and NGOs. No longer is it easy to talk of distinct differences between NGO and donor approaches to development.

One manifestation of a growing common ground has been the way that most donors have broadened their aid objectives. Thus, most donors now include poverty alleviation, concern with the environment and enhancing the status of women as major aid objectives. Perhaps of even greater importance is that most donors now view action to enhance human rights and democratic processes as a constituent part of their development agenda. Additionally, many donors have taken up 'strengthening civil society' as a specific aid objective. This is doubly beneficial to NGOs both because NGOs are seen to constitute an important part of civil society, and because one of the core objectives of NGOs has been to work to 'empower' poor people, especially by strengthening the organisations to which poor people belong.

One concrete result of a growing overlap of objectives is that donors themselves are now increasingly willing to bring those projects and programmes, which for a long time were typically initiated by NGOs, within the umbrella of official aid. It is now not uncommon for donors to take over (and often expand) the funding of projects in the developing countries which were started and have been funded by (usually northern) NGOs.

Though these examples provide evidence of a widening cluster of initiatives where it is no longer possible to make a strong and clear distinction between donors and NGOs in terms of project approach and execution, it is important not to press the common agenda argument too far. Thus a number of NGOs, including a high proportion of the long established and larger northern NGOs and a growing number of southern NGOs, remain wary of these recent developments and are still concerned to maintain their distance from donors. Some argue that the growing convergence of the NGO and official aid agenda could well turn out to be more a convergence of *language* about development than convergence in the overall approach to development. In particular many large international NGOs remain extremely critical of donors' support for economic policy reform (or structural adjustment) programmes.

The future

The common ground between donors and NGOs can be expected to grow, especially as donors seek to make more explicit their stated objectives of enhancing democratic processes and strengthening marginal groups in civil society. However, and in spite of a likely expansion and deepening of the reverse agenda, NGOs are likely to maintain their wariness of too close and extensive an alignment with donors.

In aggregate, the direct funding of southern NGOs by donors, now emerging as a significant form of interaction, is likely to expand in the next few years, even though some donors (such as Norway) may not follow this trend.

Ironically, this expansion could well be accompanied by greater involvement of northern NGOs and northern NGO personnel, by contracting them to help administer and monitor the impact of such funds. This is in part because many officials of donor agencies often do not have the skills and expertise necessary to liaise effectively with the often small and dispersed organisations which make up the southern NGO 'community'. It might be assumed that these trends will result in increased funding of NGOs by donors in the years ahead.

For growing numbers of northern NGOs, such an expansion would help to compensate for what appears to be falling aggregate income from private (non-official) sources (down to \$5.4bn in 1994, compared with \$6bn in 1992). However a new, if very recent, phenomenon is that some donors who have provided large amounts of money to NGOs (Canada, Sweden and Finland) have announced cuts of 10% or more. In contrast, USAID intends to channel 40% of its bilateral resources through NGOs by the end of the century, up from 34% in 1994. In general, however, where donors have started to cut aid to NGOs, this has mainly been due to overall pressure on, and often absolute cuts in, the aggregate aid budget, in some cases reflecting doubts about the entire aid enterprise in the post-Cold War era.

Together these differing trends may enable donors and NGOs to cooperate even more closely than in the past. If a deeper sense of mutual interests and mutual purpose between donor agencies and NGOs does emerge, this might lead NGOs to devote less energy and fewer resources to criticising those aspects of the donor agenda they dislike, and more to building and widening the common ground they increasingly share.

© Overseas Development Institute 1995 ISSN 0140-8682

This and other ODI Briefing Papers are on ODI's World-Wide Web pages on the Internet at: <http://www.oneworld.org/odi/>

Briefing Papers present objective information on important development issues. Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce material from them for their own publications, but as copyright holder, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication.



cc: FAS
cc: PG
RW
NGO
VP'S OFFICE

June 23, 1995

JUL 05 1995

Mr. Ismail Serageldin
Vice President, Environmentally Sustainable Development
The World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433

Dear Mr. Serageldin:

I write to express appreciation for the periodic meetings that you have hosted to facilitate communication between Bank staff and members of the Washington-based NGO community. Yesterday's discussion with Mr. Picciotto and Bank staff from the India and Indonesia country departments was one of the most useful and well-attended of those meetings that we have had to date.

I thought it would be useful to identify some of the elements that led to such a successful meeting (measured in terms of substantive dialogue and broad, senior-level attendance from the NGO community) in order to maintain this quality of interaction at future meetings. I would suggest that the following attributes were significant:

- the topic of discussion was identified by the NGO community as significant and timely;
- the date and subject of the meeting were determined and disseminated several weeks in advance, allowing NGOs to prepare for the meeting and take advantage of the presence in D.C. of visitors from other countries;
- relevant background material (i.e. the OED Precis on Narmada) was distributed to participants in advance of the meeting;
- relevant Bank staff were available to answer questions;

World Wildlife Fund

1250 Twenty-Fourth St., NW Washington, DC 20037-1175 USA
Tel: (202) 293-4800 Telex: 64505 PANDA FAX: (202) 293-9211

Incorporating The Conservation Foundation. Affiliated with World Wide Fund for Nature.



- participants adhered to the agenda agreed in advance; and
- you were present for the full meeting.

I believe that if the Bank and the NGO community can commit to invest in this level of preparation for our regular meetings with ESDVP, the quality and utility of the discussions as well as the level of participation will increase.

Again, I want to thank you for your efforts to reach out to the NGO community through these meetings, and I hope you will continue to host them on a regular basis.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Frances J. Seymour".

Frances J. Seymour
Senior Program Officer

THE WORLD BANK/IFC/M.I.G.A.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM


DATE: June 2, 1995

TO: OEDD1 Higher Levels and Researchers

FROM: Robert van der Lugt, OEDD1

EXTENSION: 81293

SUBJECT: **NGO Study**

A large, handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'R. van der Lugt', is written over the 'FROM' and 'EXTENSION' fields. The signature is highly stylized and cursive.

Attached please find for your information the listing of NGO related ratings from the PIF data of the 1993 and 1994 cohorts.

Attachment

cc: Messrs. Picciotto (DGO), Aguirre-Sacasa (OEDDR), Guerrero (DGO)

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: May 24, 1995

TO: Mr. Toshiko Hino, OPRFG

FROM: Robert van der Lugt, OEDD1

EXTENSION: 31740

SUBJECT: NGO PARTICIPATION IN BANK PROJECTS

1. Please find attached a table of projects with NGO related ratings in 1993 and 1994 evaluation years. As I told you before I have my doubt about the systematic coverage of this query.

2. There are three questions in the PIF related to the participation of NGOs in Bank projects:

First, a query whether NGOs had a positive or negative influence on the achievement of environmental objectives.

Second, a query whether effectiveness of NGO participation had a positive or negative influence on the achievement of social objectives (and we have added the target group of the social objectives when available).

Third, whether NGO participation (local or expatriate) was used as a modality, with a positive or negative impact (in this case not available means that there is no data in ICR) for institutional development.

3. You can retrieve further information on these projects from the OED Evaluation Textbase.

Attachment

cc: Messrs./Mmes. Guerrero (DGO), Battaile (OEDDR) Mahatanankook, Murphy, Sheerin (OEDD1), Johnson (OEDD2)

Projects With NGO-related Ratings, 1993 and 1994 Evaluation Years

OED ID	Title	Reg	Country	Sector Name	NGOs as Positive or Negative Influence on Environmental Objectives	Effectiveness of NGO participation as Positive or Negative Influence on Social Objectives		NGO participation as a modality for Institutional Development	
					(Pos/Neg)	(Target group *)	(Pos/Neg)	(local, pos/neg)	(expatriate, pos/neg)
C1280	Gujarat water supply and sewerage project	SAS	India	Water & Sanitation	Positive				
C1390	Secondary towns project	AFR	Kenya	Urban		b	Negative		Not Available
C1499	Second small industries project	SAS	Pakistan	Finance			Negative		
C1514	Kerala social forestry project	SAS	India	Agriculture				Not Available	Not Available
C1523	National agricultural extension project	SAS	India	Agriculture				Not Available	
C1528	First urban project	AFR	Malawi	Urban		a	Negative		
C1529	Fisheries development project	AFR	Zambia	Agriculture		e	Negative		
C1564	Accra district rehabilitation project	AFR	Ghana	Urban	Negative	a	Negative		
C1601	Road rehabilitation and maintenance project	AFR	Ghana	Transport					Positive
C1605	Forestry development project	EAP	China	Agriculture		a	Positive		
C1620	Second forestry project	AFR	Burundi	Agriculture					Positive
C1625	Second water supply project	AFR	Burundi	Water & Sanitation	Positive	d	Positive		
C1646	Second industrial investment credit project	SAS	Pakistan	Finance	Positive				
C1649	Third population and family health project	SAS	Bangladesh	Human Resource			Negative		
C1651	Shrimp culture project	SAS	Bangladesh	Agriculture		a	Positive	Positive	
C2030	Second agricultural sector adjustment program	AFR	Somalia	Agriculture			Positive		
C2212	First social investment fund project	LAC	Honduras	Human Resource			Positive	Not Available	
C2214	Second economic recovery credit	AFR	Zambia	Non-Sector Specific				Not Available	Not Available
C2401	Second social investment fund	LAC	Honduras	Human Resource		a,b	Positive	Positive	
L1644	Tungurahua rural development project	LAC	Ecuador	Agriculture	Positive	a,c	Positive	Positive	
L1990	Second urban and regional development project	LAC	Mexico	Urban		a	Negative		
L1991	Puerto Ila-Chone rural development project	LAC	Ecuador	Agriculture	Positive	a	Positive		
L1997	Northwest rural development project	MNA	Tunisia	Agriculture	Negative				
L2044	Esmeraldas rural development project	LAC	Ecuador	Agriculture	Positive	a	Positive	Positive	
L2236	Jakarta sewerage and sanitation project	EAP	Indonesia	Water & Sanitation	Positive	a,d	Positive		
L2360	Central Visayas regional project	EAP	Philippines	Agriculture		a,d	Positive		
L2373	Second vocational training project	LAC	Paraguay	Human Resource			Positive	Positive	
L2386	Southern conveyor projects for water resources dev	ECA	Cyprus	Agriculture				Not Available	Not Available
L2407	Second Mae Moh lignite project	EAP	Thailand	Energy	Positive				
L2587	Second urban development project	MNA	Jordan	Urban			Positive		
L2620	Lagos solid waste and storm drainage project	AFR	Nigeria	Water & Sanitation				Positive	Positive
L2665	Earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction project	LAC	Mexico	Urban		a,d	Positive		
L2803	Emergency Petroleum Recon.	LAC	Ecuador	Energy		d	Negative		
L2832	Pehuenche hydroelectric project	LAC	Chile	Power	Positive			Positive	
L2859	Agricultural extension project	LAC	Mexico	Agriculture				Not Available	
L2917	Second Felcra land development project	EAP	Malaysia	Agriculture			Positive		
L3247	Structural adjustment loan	ECA	Poland	Non-Sector Specific				Not Available	Not Available
L3306	Emergency recovery project	MNA	Jordan	Human Resource			Positive		

* a Targeting socio-economic status(i.e. poverty)

b Targeting gender

c Targeting ethnicity

d Targeting community type or locale

e Targeting other - profession:artisanal fisherman for the credit component

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: May 23, 1995

TO: Mr. Francisco Aguirre-Sacasa, Director, OED

THROUGH: Mr. Roger Slade, Chief, OEDD1

FROM: Christopher Gibbs and Josette Murphy, OEDD1

EXTENSION: 31735

SUBJECT: **NGO Strategy Paper**

We have reviewed quickly the NGO Strategy Paper and have the following comments based on OED's **evaluation experience**. While the paper has considerable merit, we have not commented on its substance because OED has already made substantial inputs to several recent documents on participation and NGOs, to which the paper is indebted.

1. There is a **dearth of competent evaluation** of NGO performance in promoting development effectiveness. This conclusion applies to NGOs' own, exclusive activities and to NGO activities that complement the work of others, notably the Bank. There are several reasons for this related to timing, scale, definition, and the need for objectivity.
2. **Timing.** Too few NGO-supported development activities have matured to the point where performance audits or impact assessments are feasible on the basis of experience. In the Bank, NGOs are making unprecedented inputs into policy dialogue, project preparation and implementation, and the redefinition of Bank processes. But the effect and impact of these inputs has yet to be evaluated.
3. **Scale.** Many NGO-supported development activities are modest in scale and the high cost of competent evaluation of individual activities may appear unjustified. Evaluators will have to be creative if they are to address them cost-effectively.
4. **Definition.** NGOs come in a multitude of forms, shapes and sizes, and the performance of some of these may already be evaluated but not acknowledged, e.g. farmer organizations for communal irrigation management in the Philippines are NGOs, but they may not be formally recognized as such in evaluations.
5. **Objectivity.** Judith Tendler's 1982 hypothesis that a close examination would reveal that many NGOs are top down, not participatory, not experimental, not innovative, and work well when they complement the public sector, is still likely to be true. The conclusion of others that the number of competent NGOs is still exceedingly small, is also likely to hold up. For these reasons alone, NGOs and NGO advocates have been less than diligent when it comes to performance evaluation.

6. **Evaluation Textbase Findings.** For agriculture, a search of OED's Evaluation Textbase (ETB) under "NGO" and "non-governmental organization" recognized only three audits: for Albania, Ecuador and Bangladesh, all dated 1994. Two interim evaluations of the Aga Khan Rural Support Program in Pakistan provide the only other significant contribution. For education and PHN, an ETB search for references to NGOs produced no findings. This is a very small pool of documented experience. There is, however, a risk that the ETB understates the actual record if special attention is not required for NGOs when summaries are drafted.

7. **Conclusion.** We would, therefore, propose that OED take the initiative to evaluate NGO contributions to development effectiveness in Bank-supported development activities. In preparing a study proposal we should a) look carefully at the various ways in which NGOs are involved in Bank **products and processes**, b) address the interpretation of **participation and stakeholders** fully, both conceptually and operationally, and c) employ a more **forward-looking** lens than is customary. The objective of sustained development effectiveness would continue to apply, as would OED's three standard criteria of relevance, efficacy and efficiency. Cooperation with OEDD3 would be required to ensure that the urban development environment was covered.

cc: Mr. Picciotto, DGO

JM

WORLD BANK OFFICE TRACKING SYSTEM
Director General, Ops Evaluation
Routing and Action Transmittal Sheet

=====

TO:	OEDDR, (T-9025)	DATE:	5/15/95
-----	-----------------	-------	---------

=====

*received OEDD /
22/5*

=====

| SUBJECT DOCUMENT: |

From: M. MALLOCH BROWN
To: J. ADAMS
Dated: 5/08/95

Reference No.: DGO950515003

Topic: NGO STRATEGY PAPER

=====

| ACTION INSTRUCTIONS: | DUE DATE: |

- _____ HANDLE
- XXX REVIEW AND RECOMMEND
- _____ FOR YOUR INFORMATION
- _____ DISCUSS WITH _____
- _____ AS WE DISCUSSED
- _____ PREPARE RESPONSE FOR _____ SIGNATURE
- _____ FOR YOUR FILES
- _____ RETURN TO _____
- _____ OTHER: _____

5/22/95

Remarks: FAS/JM - PLEASE REVIEW

=====

OFFICE MEMORANDUM RECEIVED

FAS/JA
Please review
9

DATE: May 8, 1995

95 MAY -9 AM 11:38

TO: Mr. James Adams, OPRDR

DGO

FROM: Mark Malloch Brown, EXTDR

Mark Malloch Brown

EXTENSION: 85914

SUBJECT: NGO Strategy Paper

Thank you for giving us the opportunity to review and comment on the draft NGO Strategy Paper. Attached is a note from Spiros Voyadzis which sums up our NGO Team's comments and suggestions. I fully endorse their comments and look forward to further discussions on the NGO strategy.

However, I must express a concern that this paper is in some ways the Participation Paper revisited in that it only addresses one set of NGO-Bank relations with any completeness.

My own view is that we need to start from a stronger conceptual foundation -- that NGOs are partners in development whom we have underutilized, but that equally, as the current lessons of development suggest, growth and issues of equity involve a much wider set of actors, including, among others, strong-willed governments promoting economic and institutional reform and private sector flows. The NGOs have made the Bank a better, more accountable place. Yet given the finite limit on their role, how do we first develop the right relationship with them which continues to let them be a prod to improved operational effectiveness without deflecting our strategic evolution as an organization? Second, how do we deal with civil society in all this -- a much broader set of players than NGOs with which the latter are in more than occasional conflict? And third, how do we make NGOs the champion of our mission, because if we, our partners, and our impact are "bigger" than the aggregate of NGO activity, then their long-term mission must come to include the promotion of the Bank to their own national constituencies?

Attachment

cc: Messrs. Serageldin (ESDVP); Picciotto (DGO); Choksi (HROVP); Wijnand, Clark, Williams (OPRPG); Voyadzis (EXTIM); Wyss (Paris)

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: May 5, 1995

TO: Mr. Mark Malloch Brown, EXTDR

FROM: Spiros Voyadzis, ~~EXTIM~~

EXTENSION: 32713

SUBJECT: NGO Strategy Paper

1. Together with Jane Kirby-Zaki, Kris Martin, and John Mitchell, we reviewed the draft NGO Strategy Paper. As NGOs are a key target group of EXT's communications efforts, this NGO strategy has a direct bearing on, in particular, the work of our newly created Issues Management Team. I hope that OPR is planning to circulate the paper in draft more widely in the Bank, including to the Regional and Central Vice Presidents, OED, EDI, FRM, and so on. I think that the strategy would benefit greatly from a thorough airing in other parts of the Bank that interact with NGOs.

2. Overall, we found the paper to be a thoughtful piece that is well grounded in the Bank's experience to date with NGOs, particularly at the operational level. We agreed with many of the paper's assessments and recommendations regarding, in particular, operational collaboration with NGOs. However, from our point of view, we believe the paper could go a bit further in acknowledging the role of NGOs in advocacy, which is a reality. As such, shouldn't there be an increased role for EXT's Issue Managers, not only in enhancing outreach to the NGO community, but also in coordinating the policy dialogue with NGOs on strategic Bank-related issues? We firmly believe that the Bank needs to develop a comprehensive communications strategy vis-à-vis NGOs in addition to an operations strategy; we could, if all interested parties were to agree, try to develop such a strategy. Please let us know what you think.

3. Following are our general comments and suggested changes for strengthening this draft of the NGO Strategy Paper.

4. **Part I:** We agree in general with the paper's assessment of the Bank's and NGOs' interest in each other, as described in Part I. We would suggest, however, including more background about the "NGO explosion," why it happened, and where it is likely to lead in the future. As it stands, the paper assumes that the reader fully understands the "NGO phenomenon." Along these lines, we appreciate that one of the Bank's interests in NGOs is helping improve the enabling environment for NGO activity in our member countries. However, we think it should be made more explicit in this and other sections of the paper that we are referring in this

instance to the enabling environment for local NGOs and not international NGOs. As it stands, this distinction is not at all clear.

5. The paper rightly notes that the dichotomy between operational and advocacy NGOs is increasingly blurred, which points up, among other things, the need for all parts of the Bank that interact with NGOs to be communicating consistent messages to both types. We therefore liked very much the idea of convening a Bank-wide advisory group to monitor and review progress in collaboration with NGOs, including our communications and outreach efforts. We would be pleased to have EXT represented in such a Bank-wide network.

6. While we agree that the Bank's overriding interest in NGOs has to be to improve the effectiveness of both our development efforts, we would like to emphasize that the Bank also has an interest in motivating certain influential NGOs to lend increased support for the Bank's work, including IDA. The notion of "third party endorsements" is mentioned later in the paper, but we would like to see included in this first section of the paper some recognition upfront of the influence which NGOs can have over donors, the media, and the general public as yet another element which attracts the Bank to cooperate with NGOs.

7. The paper's description of the NGOs' interest in the Bank seems to be fairly accurate. We would only add a note of realism that some NGOs (mainly international NGOs like Greenpeace and OXFAM America) use their attack campaigns on the Bank in part to further their fund-raising efforts with the public.

8. **Part II:** As Part II of the paper stresses, we agree that forging operational partnerships with NGOs, in close collaboration with governments, has to be at the root of an effective NGO strategy for the Bank. Steps that facilitate expanding operational collaboration with NGOs should be encouraged and supported by Bank management. We would caution, however, that going as far as helping governments "discover attributes of NGOs and contribute to overcoming a mistrust of them" sounds like we are trying to "sell" NGOs to governments. Some qualification would be helpful in this section to clarify that the Bank is not pushing governments to cooperate with every NGO in a country.

9. Further, we think that the Bank should be viewing the expansion of collaboration with NGOs within the wider context of our efforts to work more closely with the broader forces of civil society in our member countries, including academia, media, business, the informal sector, unions, and so on. We question why the notion of civil society has been omitted completely from the paper and would suggest that some treatment of this subject be added. We also note that the strategy makes no mention of the many years of learning and study that the Bank has devoted to participatory development. Given the direct relevance of the participation learning exercise to our work with NGOs, we would therefore suggest that the connection between that exercise and the NGO strategy be discussed in the paper.

10. **Part III:** As noted in Part III of the paper, the Bank should be seeking expanded opportunities to engage with NGOs (as well as with other elements of civil society)

on substantive policy issues of mutual concern. We agree with the set of priority policy issues listed on page seven of the paper, as well as with the guiding principle that successful collaboration -- whether in operations or policy dialogue -- depends on the careful selection of appropriate partners and the setting of clear objectives and procedures at the outset. Where appropriate and feasible, our government partners should also be included. Please note that, as part of their new responsibilities, I intend for EXTIM's Issues Managers to assist others, or to take the lead in, organizing meaningful exchanges between the Bank and NGOs and other audiences on strategic Bank-related issues. I understand that you have already asked our Paris office staff to be involved in promoting increased policy dialogue with European NGOs and other audiences as well. All these efforts will, of course, be greatly facilitated if we all work on the basis of an agreed communications strategy vis-à-vis NGOs.

11. **Part IV:** The six key issues and opportunities for partnership with NGOs discussed in Part IV of the NGO Strategy Paper are well conceived. Again, we agree that NGO selectivity will be one of the key determinants of effective collaboration and successful outcomes. Actively reaching out and listening to, in particular, leading "operationally experienced" NGOs on policy issues should result in a more constructive and balanced dialogue between the Bank and NGOs than in the past. We wonder, however, whether loosening our contractual and procurement procedures just for NGOs might again be going a bit too far. While we are usually all for flexibility, we should be cautious with such "affirmative action" statements, spell out in detail exactly what is being changed, and explain why these changes will not hurt the fundamental integrity of our competitive bidding processes.

12. **Part V:** The final section of the draft NGO Strategy Paper provides a comprehensive framework for building on existing best practices to mainstream further collaboration with NGOs. We agree in principle with the five areas of work identified, including our exploring the opening of an "NGO Small Projects Window." As the Bank looks for new instruments for tackling poverty at the grassroots, we should consider mechanisms that can directly support NGOs' efforts in developing countries. A modest, pilot initiative to direct increased resources to NGO-sponsored operations in sectors beyond those that will benefit from the new Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) is worth considering. In addition to enhancing the Bank's support for poverty reduction, such a facility would help build a network of support for the Bank within the NGO community which other multilateral and bilateral development agencies already enjoy. It is probably no mere coincidence that the NGOs that are publicly supporting IDA have also received funding for their work from the Bank (WWF, CRS, World Vision, etc.) Having said that, however, shouldn't we await the first results of the CGAP?

13. Regarding the strategy for promoting operational collaboration, we are sure that the NGO Unit is best placed to decide on a suitable plan of action. We would nevertheless like to suggest one additional area of work which the NGO Unit and OED might undertake jointly, namely the evaluation and appraisal of a few key NGO projects to determine what is really working well and what is not. Mr. Robert Picciotto and I have recently exchanged some views on this matter. Indeed, there has to date been little independent assessment of NGO effectiveness and impact to demonstrate that NGOs are the best channels for reaching and

assisting the poor, as we tend to say. We think that the Bank is well placed to contribute to the dearth of evaluative information in this area, and we would encourage the NGO Unit and OED to consider undertaking a program to study some NGO projects that are likely to bear useful best practice lessons. We would likewise like to see the Bank reciprocate and open up some of its own projects to NGO evaluation and analysis. The results of this work study would be valuable not only for the design and implementation of Bank-financed projects involving NGOs, but also for our advice to governments on working with NGOs.

14. We have noted, in particular, the paper's proposals regarding (a) outreach to NGOs, and (b) strengthened management of the Bank's response to criticisms and external concerns, both of which have direct bearing on EXT's work. Regarding outreach to NGOs, the proposal to regionalize the Bank-NGO Committee seems like a good one and is fully consistent with EXT's plans to increase the amount and quality of communications going to and coming from our member countries. We assume that the recommendation to hold two (as opposed to, say, four or six) regional or subregional Bank-NGO Committee meetings is based primarily on the availability, or lack, of resources. We would encourage moving the locus of Bank-NGO interaction to developing countries sooner rather than later, however. In addition, just as EXT is encouraging resident missions to interact more with the local press in their countries, resident missions should also begin to play a greater role in engaging with NGOs at the local level. Working closely with resident missions, we are trying to report out more stories of good Bank projects from the field, and we would be pleased to help develop stories about good NGO-associated, Bank-financed projects as well.

15. EXT is actively seeking to expand the Bank's communications to NGOs, particularly (although not exclusively) to NGOs in Part I countries and including NGOs beyond the usual cast of characters (reference our strategy to improve Bank relations with U.S. religious groups). Several communications steps that we are planning which we think will be helpful to the NGO Strategy include, among others: (a) arranging high-level briefings between NGO leaders and senior Bank staff, executive directors, and resident representatives; (b) developing more and better information materials about the Bank's work and Bank-related issues of interest to NGOs; (c) exploring (along with the NGO Unit) the development of an electronic newsletter for NGOs and including access to items of interest to NGOs on the Bank's new Internet home page; (d) organizing in-house seminars for Bank staff featuring NGO leaders; (e) exploring options for NGO events to be associated with our Annual Meetings; and (f) (in conjunction with PSP) establishing an informal working group of Bank and NGO staff on poverty reduction issues.

16. In essence, I see a much greater role for EXT in the substantive policy dialogue with NGOs than the NGO Strategy Paper proposes. Issues Managers (whether located in EXT or elsewhere) are meant to facilitate two-way substantive communications and to promote dialogue between the Bank and various external actors, including NGOs, on strategic issues such as poverty reduction, structural adjustment, environmentally sustainable development, gender, debt relief, and so on. This work will be accomplished by creating WDR-type or Issues Teams with all of the relevant parts of the Bank, including the NGO Unit, RVPU, CVPU, resident missions, etc. We would like to suggest that the draft NGO Strategy Paper

be changed to reflect EXT's particular role in this area and perhaps to clarify a division of labor between OPRPG and EXTIM staff with regard to the NGO audience.

17. As for the paper's proposals for strengthened management of the Bank's response to criticism and external concerns, you have already introduced in EXT a whole new arsenal of improved communications tools (boiler room, grassroots outreach, speakers' bureau, ad campaigns, etc.) and strategies for handling major attack campaigns on the Bank. Depending on the issue/region concerned, the relevant parts of the Bank are actively engaged in planning, executing, and following up on strategy. We have noted the paper's suggestion for creating "response groups" in the face of major campaigns, and we would like to acknowledge that this is an excellent idea, which is indeed already being implemented.

cc: Messrs./Mmes. Martin, Mitchell (EXTIM); Maguire, Kirby-Zaki (EXTDR);
Cullen (EXTME); Feather (EXTOP); Stephens (EXTCU);
Walsh (EXTWU); Van Praag (Paris)

THE BANK AND NGOs - STRATEGY PAPER

Increasing Development Effectiveness through Strengthening Partnerships and Understanding

RECEIVED

95 MAY -9 PM 4: 04

PART I - Background

DGO

NGOs have become of greater significance to the Bank in recent years as they have become increasingly interested in its work on the project and policy level and as their capacities have become more important to Bank work across many sectors. Understanding the "NGO phenomenon", why many NGOs have become interested in the Bank and some also critical of it, and which NGOs the Bank should be reaching out to is an important starting point for evolving a more appropriate strategy for strengthening partnerships in the interests of facilitating the Bank's mission.

The NGO Explosion

The NGO sector has mushroomed over the past two decades. International NGOs' programs doubled in real size from 1975 to 1985 and by 1993 represented 14 percent of all development assistance, or \$8.5 billion per annum. An increasing volume of official funding is channeled through NGOs, rising from 1.5 percent of international NGO income in 1970 to 30 percent in 1993. Including food aid, OECD donors now channel about 5 percent of their ODA to NGOs, rising to 11 percent in the case of USA. These developments are reflected in rapid growth in the sector in our borrowing countries, for example there are estimated to be 18,000 registered NGOs in the Philippines, and 3,000 in Brazil, while registered NGOs in India handle \$520 million per year, or 25 percent of all external aid. It is clear NGOs are now an increasingly important source of development assistance.

This growing role has been reflected in Bank operations. The numbers of Bank-Financed projects where there is some collaboration with NGOs has increased from an average of 6 percent of projects approved from FY73-FY88 to 50 percent in FY94 and the scope of collaboration (which is most extensive in Africa) has broadened from the social sectors and rural development to environmental programs, informal sector development, social funds, resettlement operations and a wide variety of other activities. NGOs are increasingly involved in the design, preparation and other stages of Bank-financed projects, as well as in implementation.

A typology of NGOs

One key issue is that the term "Nongovernmental Organizations" embraces a myriad of different types of not-for-profit agencies. While for this paper only those directly or tangentially involved in development are considered, this still leaves a wide range of actors. The Bank interacts principally with two main groups of NGOs:

- (i) Operational NGOs (ONGOs) whose primary purpose is their own programs designed to contribute to development, environmental management, welfare or emergency relief. These include international organizations (INGOs), typically headquartered in developed countries; national organizations (NNGOs) usually operating in individual developing countries; and community-based organizations (CBOs) which serve a specific population group in a narrow geographic area.
- (ii) Advocacy NGOs (ANGOs) whose primary purpose is advocating a specific point of view or concern and who seek to influence the policies and practices of the Bank, governments and other bodies. These are mostly, but not exclusively, based in developed countries. ANGOs

are quite effective at networking internationally and increasingly draw evidence from partners (both ANGOs and NNGOs) based in developing countries.

The dividing line should not be drawn too rigidly, however. While some NGOs concentrate on relief and service delivery and have virtually no analytical or policy function, and some are lobbying NGOs with no operational base, the majority of NGOs fall somewhere between these extremes. ONGOs (and in particular NNGOs and CBOs) usually have more field-level experience of relevance to the Bank, but often thoughtful, well-connected advocacy groups may offer invaluable grassroots insights. Similarly, local branches of INGOs may have a better record in participatory approaches and be more effective than NNGOs.

While earlier it was mostly advocacy organizations in industrialized countries which sought to challenge or influence the Bank's guiding policies and philosophy, recent years have seen a broadening of such pressure as an increasing number of the larger international operational NGOs (such as Oxfam, World Vision, and Save the Children) have devoted more resources to policy analysis and lobbying, and as advocacy groups and networks have emerged in developing country regions (including the Third World Network, the Asian NGO Coalition, the Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations, the Inter-Africa Group and others). The distinction between advocacy and operational NGOs is now unclear.

At the same time, the early dominance of environmental NGOs in the Bank-NGO dialogue has become less pronounced as new categories of ANGOs, such as human rights and women's organizations, are arriving on the Bank's stage.

The Bank's Interest in NGOs

The Bank's agenda has become more complex in recent years as it has given greater prominence to issues of poverty, participation, gender, the environment, governance, capacity building, and improving implementation quality. The Bank's portfolio is undergoing a significant shift as a consequence from traditional infrastructure and industry lending to financing the social sectors, conservation programs and policy reform. Much of the broadened agenda emphasizes areas in which certain NGOs have clear strengths. NGOs often work closely with vulnerable groups and study closely the dynamics of poverty; many give priority to developing decision-making structures which empower local people to make development decisions and control resources; they are often energetic in ensuring that women are fairly represented in decision-making or that parallel projects for women are introduced; they often have insights into the trade-offs and complementarities between environmental protection and the needs of indigenous populations; they often emphasize protecting vulnerable groups from capricious actions and malpractices of local officials and the elite; they often help central and local government increase their capacity for service delivery, public consultations or other activities, through training programs for civil servants, acting as contractors or advocacy; and they can help governments, the Bank and others to identify problems in the implementation of their programs. The importance of tapping into this know-how should provide the key rationale for our efforts to build up more effective partnerships with NGOs.

The combination of the broadened development agenda together with the growth and increased interest of NGOs in Bank matters has two implications for the Bank. First, it is critical that the Bank begins to interact more consistently with proficient, experienced, operational NGOs, to broaden their awareness of the Bank's development work. This group of NGOs are on the front line of development. They understand the complexity of development and have many capacities the Bank can usefully draw on. A good example of what can be effective is the series of workshops initiated in Tanzania, Argentina and

other countries. Second, the Bank needs to ensure that greater priority is given to Bank efforts to work with governments in improving the environment for NGOs. This should properly be seen as an important element in improving the enabling environment for the private sector. A number of themes in the Bank's private sector policy work are directly applicable to improving NGO impact (such as the importance of a level playing field, stable and clear regulatory rules, fair tax regimes etc). A relevant example is the studies and policy reflections on the NGO-state relationship which have been launched by the Bank, jointly with government and NGOs, in Indonesia and Bangladesh. The Bank's effectiveness in forwarding its new agenda will be important to many NGOs who have policy interests in these issues and will want to interact with the Bank.

As the Bank will interact with a wide variety of NGOs, ranging from purely service delivery to political lobbyists, its response should vary according to the nature of the NGO but must be consistent with an overall guiding strategy. In particular the Bank should enhance its collaboration with operational NGOs with proven effectiveness in poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. It should also improve its capacity to dialogue with and learn from NGO experience. While operational NGOs may be less practiced or high profile in presenting their views than advocacy specialists, their grassroots experience is potentially important to the Bank and can contain important messages for improving Bank operations and policies.

NGO Interest in the Bank

There are three major categories of NGO interest. Any Bank strategy must deal effectively with all of these. Firstly, as NGOs have grown in size and numbers, some increasingly seek official funding, and view the Bank as an important source of funds, particularly through contracts to implement project components.

Other operational NGOs are attempting more strategic use of their experience to achieve greater impact than is possible through their direct programs alone. They aim to encourage government and other official agencies to adopt approaches they have pioneered, to choose them as business partners in service delivery, and to listen to their advice on matters of policy. They sometimes find it easier to initiate a relationship first with the Bank or other aid agency and through that forge a more strategic link with the government in question.

Finally there are those who seek to change Bank policy or approach. International environmental and development lobbyists have increasingly shifted their attention towards the Bank because of its influence on development strategies. Phenomena such as global environmental stress and continuing hunger in Africa have been widely interpreted by many NGOs as evidence of failure of conventional development strategies and of the need for new approaches. Many of these NGOs caricature the Bank as having promoted economic growth and market liberalization as if these were the goals of development, rather than means of achieving social and environmental objectives. While there are a range of themes, this group typically highlights their conclusions the needs of the poor and the environment have been neglected and they conclude that fundamental changes are needed in Bank priorities. NGOs also often believe that the Bank influences the environment in which they work through structural adjustment. Though the specifics of reform are often poorly defined, some elements of their criticism have been picked up by both right and left wing critics of aid. While in the past multinational corporations and colonialism were viewed as the primary sources of developing countries' exploitation, now the Bank - caricatured by NGO critics as coopting developing countries through structural adjustment into an elite-serving, global market-place - is described as fostering divisive development in which government

excesses and the needs of the poor are both overlooked.

PART II - Operational Links with NGOs

The Annual NGO Progress Report and "Working with NGOs: A Practical Guide to World Bank-NGO Operational Collaboration" (both products of the NGO Unit in OPR) describe many examples of Bank-NGO partnership in practice. These will not be repeated at length here. The conclusion is that there has been a rapid expansion of operational collaboration, and that it is good business practice for Task Managers to work closely with experienced and professional NGOs which have intimate knowledge of poor communities, with an emphasis on National NGOs and CBOs.

Administrative budgets have been used to contract NGO staff as consultants or researchers; PPF (and SPPF) funds can be used during project preparation, for example for beneficiary/social assessments; project finance can be used where the borrower agrees an NGO role in service delivery or in the social fund etc; Special Grants Program resources can be used for discrete categories of operations in certain fields (such as population programs, safe motherhood, river blindness and TB programs); GEF resources (administered by UNDP) can be sought by NGOs themselves for environmental activities; TMs can solicit donor cofinancing (eg the Small and Medium Enterprise Pilot Initiative of PSD); the Fund for Innovative Approaches in Human and Social Development can be used to engage NGOs in designing projects in participatory ways; the Small Grants Program can finance NGO workshops, studies and dissemination of experience; and the newly agreed micro-finance facility would provide funding for micro-credit programs aimed at the very poor. All these mechanisms allow the Bank to tap into NGO capacity.

These partnerships with NGOs have enabled the most vulnerable to access program benefits, negative project consequences to be avoided or mitigated, and communities to be involved in the design and execution of projects. NGOs have helped introduce participatory approaches, strengthen transparency and accountability at the grassroots level and pilot innovations. Through working with NGOs and governments, the Bank has often been able to help governments discover attributes of NGOs and contribute to overcoming a mistrust of them. Mainstreaming partnerships with NGOs, in close collaboration with governments, must be one of the principal objectives of an effective NGO strategy. The Bank can achieve this by developing operational links at three levels.

(i) Country Priorities. Experienced NGOs recognize the importance of sound country strategies. Reflecting this they are increasingly involved in discussions of development strategy at the country level, especially concerning questions of poverty and the environment. Many NGOs see the influence the Bank has in these areas and are prepared to work together. The Bank has begun to respond. For example, NGO representatives have been included in a new high-level working group on poverty in Bangladesh, and through their involvement in Participatory Poverty Assessments, NGOs have been prominent in the discussions between government and donors about poverty strategies in Zambia and Ghana. NGOs have instigated dialogue with government on strategies for reducing hunger in Mali and Ethiopia in the context of follow up to the Bank's conference on "Overcoming Global Hunger". NGOs have also been involved in deliberating National Environmental Action Plans in a number of countries such as Guinea (where the government officially designated a national NGO—Guinea Ecologie—to be responsible for the NEAP preparation), the Gambia, Madagascar and Nicaragua. A recent ESD review of NEAPs ("National Environmental Strategies and Action Plans: Key Elements and Best Practice", Feb. 1995) concludes as one of its main findings that effective NEAPs must embrace the "active voices of key stakeholders" including NGOs and CBOs representing affected populations, to ensure the success of resulting environmental strategies. Expanding further this interaction has high priority, particularly in poverty and

environmental areas. This expansion will depend on the government in question, but the Bank has been able to enhance the level of government interest.

(ii) Economic and Sector Work. A recent analysis of ESW by OPR demonstrates the importance of the participation of governments and other stakeholders in fostering local "ownership" of ESW, and the importance of that to the success of resulting projects. Involvement of NGOs and other participatory approaches have a particularly important role in education and dissemination policies to ensure broad political support for development activities, for better identification of gainers and losers, and for improved design of compensation policies. Change has started. ESW Task Managers are increasingly using participatory research methods such as semi-structured interviews and community ranking exercises to improve analysis. This enables TMs to assess better the perceptions of local populations (particularly the poor) concerning the issues studied and their preferred strategies for tackling the priorities they identify. Many NGOs are either skilled in the required methodology or enjoy the close contact at grassroots level which makes them ideal partners in such research. Beneficiary assessments and Participatory Rural Appraisal techniques have greatly strengthened many poverty assessments (ref Andrew Norton paper); NGOs have contributed to Women in Development Assessments (eg in Morocco); and NGOs have often helped identify local people's usufruct needs in the development of forest sector strategies. In some occasions it has proved valuable to include an NGO specialist as a consultant on an ESW mission. For example in this way a CEM mission to Zimbabwe was able to gain insights into poor people's concerns regarding cost recovery in the health service, and a mission considering poverty and adjustment in Mongolia was better able to appreciate the diversity of poverty groups. Even when NGOs are not formally involved as consultants or researchers, the advice and experience of local NGOs who are knowledgeable about the sector in question is often invaluable, for example NGOs added important insights to both the Madagascar and Uganda poverty assessments, though not contractually involved. More systematic involvement of NGOs in analytic work will both build understanding and mutual objectives, and clarify why the Bank is facing some tough decisions.

(iii) Project Work. The involvement of NGOs can be sought at any point in the project cycle. Though there is much documentation of this phenomenon, there is little evaluative material documenting how satisfactory is the experience, either from the viewpoint of governments, TMs, beneficiaries or NGOs. The NGO Unit is now giving attention to this. That TMs who have involved NGOs in past projects are most likely to plan NGO involvement in new ones is an indication that the outcomes are generally regarded as positive.

Involvement of NGOs at the identification and design stage can help TMs ensure that the project is tailored to the needs of local people and that potential social or environmental problems are avoided. NGOs may be involved in assessing potential environmental or social impacts, in organizing public consultations, in advising on aspects of project design (such as service users' associations), and in helping communities articulate their concerns about an upcoming project. For example, working with both national level and community-based NGOs has enabled resettlement and environmental problems to be minimized and for mitigation to be sensitively planned together with affected communities in the case of the Gazi Barotha dam in Pakistan. This could afford a welcome contrast to the well-publicized and controversial dam projects elsewhere.

NGO involvement in projects is most common during the implementation phase. Those with sufficient capacity as well as local knowledge may be contracted to deliver certain project services (such as family planning services within population projects), to affect the required mobilization of communities (for example in immunization programs), or to manage project sub-components. The latter could include

implementing the resettlement or environmental mitigation plan or managing the program's outreach to a particular population group (such as female-headed households). NGOs can also be financial intermediaries as in the many Social Funds and Social Action Programs. For example, in the Burkina Faso Population and AIDS Control Project NGOs played a key role in reaching high risk populations.

Many NGOs also have significant capacity to provide training to project authorities, civil servants and target beneficiaries when they have first-hand experience of techniques deployed by the project. For example NGOs have provided training in working with Indigenous People for staff of natural resources projects in Amazonia, and training in micro-enterprise development for women in the WEMTOP program. In Ghana, the US-based NGO Technoserve provided training to Department of Cooperative civil servants aimed at improving their capacity to work with rural communities. Though there are few occasions where NGOs are formally involved in monitoring and evaluation (the mid-term review of the Fourth Livestock Development Project in Ethiopia and the impact evaluation of three Transmigration projects in Indonesia are exceptions), it is increasingly common for review or evaluation missions to consult with NGOs on the ground. NGOs may be involved as project partners in other ways such as co-financing, for example Rotary International funded the building of a polio vaccine plant within a Bank-financed polio eradication project in China.

It is clear that there is now a considerable volume of experience of working with NGOs, but it is equally clear that there is the capacity to do much more. Expansion of such partnerships should be seen as a high priority. However in this expansion great care must be exercised in the selection of appropriate NGO partners. Collaboration is not virtuous in itself, but because of certain attributes which carefully selected NGOs are able to offer which are important for poverty reduction programs and improving portfolio quality. These attributes are:

- Innovation: The FONCODES project in Peru has demonstrated how an effective Social Fund can be built upon a model demonstrated by a consortium of NNGOs, and Oxfam's program of "water harvesting" in Yatenga, Burkina Faso, has served as a model for Bank operations in soil and water conservation throughout the Sahel.
- Local Accountability: NGO involvement in government health programs has ensured that health workers are not abusing their positions; for example, in Uganda some bilaterals chose to channel aid through NGOs to reduce under-the-counter sale of drugs.
- Responsiveness: NGOs can help ensure that the social aspects of projects are properly implemented through helping to organize consultations with affected communities and monitoring.
- Participation: NGOs can act as interlocutor between project authorities and communities, as well as providing structures for participation. For example, Orangi in Karachi implemented a widespread sewerage project which was more effective, sustainable and considerably cheaper than an equivalent public utility project, because it engaged local people in managing the project and in cleaning their local neighborhood.
- Sustainability: Local structures which are not linked to government can provide a continuity where governments are weak and prone to rapid change.

Not all NGOs are able to offer these attributes, however, and collaboration with NGOs is not successful

in all projects, or relevant to all sectors. Task Managers have found that due to weak management or other factors NGOs have not been able to deliver what was hoped for (for example ADAUA in Mali), or irreconcilable differences in approaches have led to collaboration being discontinued (as with an agricultural credit program in Niger where CARE did not agree with the Task Manager's insistence on certain eligibility restrictions). Establishing clear objectives and procedures for collaboration at the outset is as important as sensitive NGO selection.

PART III - Policy Dialogue with NGOs

The aspect of NGO relations which has proved most difficult for the Bank of late has been interaction on matters of development policy. While NGOs have tended to dominate the dialogue, and specialist NGO lobbyists have made the fiercest attacks on the Bank, many operational NGOs (particularly INGOs) have joined in criticizing the Bank in recent years. Operational and developing country NGOs are generally aware that national-level decision-makers have clearest responsibility for determining the direction of development in that country and should therefore be the primary campaigning target, however the Bank presents a more attractive advocacy focus, either because--for INGOs--it is within their sphere of influence, or--for NNGOs--because it is a politically safer target.

NGOs who seek to influence changes in Bank policy mostly concentrate on three operational areas:

- **structural adjustment**, its social and environmental costs, and what is perceived as a "structural adjustment paradigm" that many NGOs believe dominates Bank work; the need for "structural adjustment in the North"; the need for debt relief, especially on multilateral debt.
- **environmentally sustainable development**, including tropical, temperate and boreal forestry policies, energy production and efficiency, conservation of natural habitats, national accounting systems, environmental assessments, environmental action plans, the Bank's contribution to "Agenda 21" (including efforts to phase out ozone-depleting substances), and the workings of the GEF.
- **social policy**, including popular participation, gender, equity, direct poverty reduction (PTIs, human resource operations, participatory poverty assessments, the poverty progress report, hunger reduction programs), micro-credit, resettlement, indigenous peoples, and human rights.

In addition, leading NGOs have called for significant institutional reforms of the Bank. This agenda is dominated by "good governance" themes:

- **transparency**: evolving the information policy and strengthening its implementation towards maximizing public disclosure; translation of basic project documents into languages spoken by project-affected people and of certain Operational Directives into major languages;
- **accountability**: monitoring the Bank's response to issues raised in the Wapenhans report; developing improved indicators of development impact; changing the culture of the Bank and its reward system to emphasize delivery by staff of stated Bank priorities;
- **participation**: ensuring that the politically weak have a voice in Bank-financed operations, particularly through holding public hearings, consultations with affected communities and through the independent inspection panel; the right of project-affected people to receive just

compensation; the importance of popular participation in development decisions as well as implementation; and greater Bank attention to human rights considerations.

The recently agreed disclosure policy, the program of action on participation, and independent inspection panel all illustrate that NGOs have provided input into the Bank's reform agenda, and that the Bank has the capacity to respond to external concerns. The former offers a wholesale leap in information available to the public and goes considerably further than do most development agencies, governmental bodies and indeed most NGOs. The latter sets a precedent for all international organizations; governmental and otherwise. The Bank's increasing work on governance issues is also noteworthy but has received less attention from Bank critics. The challenge now is to demonstrate that these new policies are being effectively and decisively implemented.

IDA 11 will be a key focus over the next 18 months. Clear differences of views are emerging amongst Bank critics on the desirability of replenishment. Other foci for advocacy will be the GEF replenishment, the Halifax G7 Summit which will initiate a review of the purposes and workings of the Bretton Woods Institutions, and the Beijing Conference on Women. These should be used as opportunities to engage on substantial policy issues.

PART IV - Key Issues and Opportunities

Existing policies already allow considerable opportunities for partnership with NGOs. The following is a description of some of the key issues.

(i) NGO Selection Process. In most countries there is a profusion of NGOs, not all of which have attributes of value to the Bank. As has been stated, collaboration is not always beneficial. The selection of NGOs for partnership is of critical importance and needs to be based on an intimate knowledge of the NGO community. The most important selection criteria are (a) **skill and capacity issues:** which NGOs have the necessary sectoral or geographic expertise, which can undertake the scale of operation envisaged, which have a proven track record, which have the necessary staff and management capacity; (b) **governance issues:** whether the NGO is well-managed and reliable, whether it has well-developed systems of accountability and transparency, whether it is politically neutral and free from nepotism; (c) **legitimacy and credibility issues:** which NGOs are acceptable to government and other partners, which have the necessary legal status, which NGOs have mechanisms to ensure representivity of the grassroots, accountability to local communities, and maximum delegation of decision-making to community level (such as in organizations with widespread membership of the poor). As the Bank's involvement with NGOs increases so will its ability to select carefully the most appropriate NGO partners. It is important in most cases that capacity in resident missions be developed for these processes.

(ii) Involvement of the Government. For development initiatives to be sustained and to be truly owned by the government and communities in question, it is important for governments to be fully involved in collaborative partnerships with NGOs. By fostering a "trialogue" between the Bank, government and NGOs, TMs have often been able to help bring about path-breaking collaboration between the public and NGO sectors. In Uganda, for example, a Bank study of the NGO sector revealed many aspects of the operating environment which hampered the contribution of NGOs and caused mistrust between them and the government. This study, and subsequent workshops for discussions of the findings, helped the government strengthen its relations with NGOs. In Philippines, also, the promotion of NGO-government partnership at the municipal level has been an important feature of a health program. In policy dialogue, too, governments should be involved. Increased interactions with NGOs may be necessary to achieve

maximum poverty reduction. Where governments can be persuaded of the desirability of these measures there is no dilemma and a Bank-Government-NGO "trialogue" can yield constructive results. Where governments are suspicious or hostile, however, the Bank faces very difficult choices. Sometimes the Bank will derive useful advice from bilateral interactions with NGOs; sometimes, where involvement of NGOs would be critical to a project's success and this involvement is blocked by government, it may be most appropriate not to proceed with the project.

(iii) Flexibility in contracts and procurement. Rigid interpretations of business practices and the project cycle are likely to hamper creative partnerships with NGOs. Again there is considerable flexibility within the system, but Task Managers differ both in their awareness and willingness to use this flexibility. For example TMs are able to use simpler procurement rules to ensure more effective community participation (ref). There are many ways in which procurement and disbursement can be made more appropriate to NGO involvement (see Alexandre Marc xxx). OPR has recently established a Task Force bringing TMs, CVPU's and experienced NGOs together to study and advise on how to improve business practices to facilitate Bank-NGO collaboration. Such improvements will be key to deepening cooperation.

(iv) Better listening. The Bank has acknowledged that some ANGO criticism has been valid through changes in Bank policy. In the future the Bank needs to be less defensive, more open to issues they raise, and proactive in seeking the guidance of NGOs with relevant experience. For example the Bank held productive consultations with NGOs in drafting its Forest Policy and again two years later when the implementation of this policy was reviewed. Similarly, an informal Bank-NGO working group on disclosure has greatly helped the Bank identify ways of strengthening the implementation of the new disclosure policy.

(v) Selectivity in dialogue. The Bank cannot interact with every NGO. It needs to give little attention to NGOs which have neither large or influential followings nor important first-hand experience, but it must be prepared to talk with NGOs which are widely perceived (by politicians, journalists or publics) as being a credible commentator on development, however unwelcome are their messages and style. The Bank can, though, greatly influence who it has dialogue with and about what by taking a proactive approach. Actively reaching out to a range of operationally experienced NGOs and asking their guidance on diverse issues would not only provide valuable learning, but would also make the policy dialogue with NGOs more constructive and less dominated by NGOs whose primary mission is to attack the Bank. Careful briefing of key NGOs (perhaps with privileged information) and patient listening to them will help increase their influence within the broader NGO community.

(vi) Divisiveness between Bank members. The new emphasis on participation, public consultation and seeking constructive dialogue with NGOs and critics is not always compatible with confidentiality requirements, achieving specified development objectives with the requisite government ownership, and the maintenance of a close relationship with borrowing governments. The better access ANGOs have to Bank information and top managers, the more they call for, while borrowers see the Bank as more concerned about the views and interests of ANGOs (particularly in Washington) than their own. Often they resent ANGOs who they see as accountable to no-one (other than to their Boards or funders), yet who seek to impose on them the same sophisticated, expensive standards of governance which are required in Part I countries but which not all NGOs adhere to themselves, and which may not be compatible with their individual historical and cultural characteristics. Some Part I governments increasingly consult NGOs and rely on NGO information in formulating their opinions on Bank matters, which is resented by borrowing governments, who think the Bank and some of its members is giving too much attention to discussing policies and projects with NGOs.

PART V - A Framework for Mainstreaming

Through building on existing good practice, and through being better placed to respond to the key issues and opportunities described above, the Bank will be able to develop more fruitful collaboration with NGOs and achieve a more constructive dialogue on controversial policy issues, with only modest resource implications. The strategies set out below all have precedents within the Bank's work. All are based on innovations which have made important advances to Bank-NGO collaboration and dialogue. The mainstreaming approach described here consists of making today's best innovations tomorrow's usual practice.

NGOs are now important partners in many Bank activities, but they are also amongst the Bank's most powerful Bank critics, influencing the institution directly and via donors and the media. Innovative operational approaches often entail a level of collaboration with NGOs which would previously have been rare. And many recent changes in policies or projects involved responses to NGO initiatives or advocacy. Progress depends not so much on managing the Bank's bad press, but on becoming open and flexible enough to listen to well placed criticism and advice, and on incurring greater trust within the wider development community by demonstrating clear results on the ground.

Objectives of Improved Relations:

- (i) To improve the effectiveness of Bank-financed operations, particularly with regard to poverty alleviation, environmental sustainability and popular participation, by forging partnerships with NGOs with proven effectiveness and strong local knowledge.
- (ii) To foster a more enabling environment for NGOs to contribute to such development priorities within borrowing countries.
- (iii) To engage more actively with NGOs in dialogue on the development agenda.

The emphasis of the proposed strategy will be to build on best practice; to gradually move the locus of Bank-NGO interaction to developing countries; to deepen sector-specific interactions; and to address current constraints inhibiting fuller partnership and more constructive relations with NGOs.

1. Promoting Operational Collaboration and Dialogue

NGO involvement in projects is being reviewed more routinely at the IEPS and later stages. Where direct collaboration with NGOs in implementation is to be sought, PIDs should clearly identify such opportunities, the terms of engagement should be made clear, and governments should be fully included. The NGO Unit in OPR will work with OED and CDs to monitor and evaluate the costs and benefits of NGO collaboration, and will disseminate lessons of best practice.

The NGO Unit will also enhance Bank-NGO interactions through providing cross support for innovative or high-risk NGO collaboration; helping organize international and regional policy discussions and sectoral meetings; and helping CDs foster a more enabling environment for NGOs through studying and discussing with governments ways in which NGOs might make a richer contribution to national development.

Each Region and CVPU Departments which interact considerably with NGOs would also be asked to

identify one or more NGO point people who in addition to their normal duties would comprise a Bank-wide network (coordinated by the NGO Unit) for responding to NGO-related issues, evolving the Bank's NGO strategy, and disseminating relevant experience. This network will also exchange experience on NGO issues with counterparts in other official aid agencies.

Strengthening operational staff capacity is a key element of enhancing operational collaboration. Country Departments, especially TMs and Resident Missions, are at the front-line in this. There are three priorities. First, increased operational collaboration should concentrate on national NGOs, community based organizations and experienced local branches of international NGOs (see selection criteria above). Second, implementation of the Bank's disclosure policy must concentrate on providing information to people in developing countries. And third, more effort is needed to engage experienced developing country NGOs in discussion of policy issues.

Strengthening of local capacity in the field is therefore called for. Specifically, CDs should consider appointing local staff in major resident missions with NGO relations as a major (but not exclusive) item in their job descriptions. India was the first resident mission to appoint such a staff member; the Indonesia, Ethiopia, Argentina and other missions have followed suit. These staff would build up relations with and knowledge of key NGOs and CBOs, disseminate lessons of experience regarding collaboration within the Bank, ensure effective distribution to NGOs of Bank information relevant to the country, and arrange country-level Bank-NGO interactions, especially taking advantage of visits of senior Bank staff. The capacity of Regions to work with NGOs may need expanding in other ways, but this should be for each region to determine. The Africa Region has had a fulltime specialist lodged within the TD; other regions might prefer other approaches.

Capacity for collaboration needs to be strengthened elsewhere, besides in operations--including NGO capacity to work with the Bank. The Training Department, EDI, Resident Missions, the NGO Unit and other CVPU's can all contribute to this. For Bank staff--especially TMs--the priorities are: (a) appropriate training, particularly through NGO modules within broader training programs, (b) "how-to" manuals and other resources providing guidance on best practice, and (c) guidance in management of policy dialogue. For NGOs, the priorities are (a) national level workshops describing how the Bank works and the opportunities for Bank-NGO collaboration (as have been pioneered in Tanzania and Argentina), (b) training in Bank procedures, especially procurement and disbursement, to be provided at the outset of projects involving NGOs, (c) "how-to" manuals for such purposes, (d) ensuring that Project Implementation Units are equipped to help NGOs understand the processes involved.

2. Strengthening the Policy Environment for Effective NGOs

In recent years, the Bank has placed emphasis on encouraging "good governance" as central to strong and equitable development and sound public management. NGOs make (or in some countries could potentially make) an important contribution to this. They can: (i) contribute to public sector management; (ii) help governments strengthen accountability of public agencies; (iii) disseminate information to the public about legal rights, new development programs and public laws, and ensure that the information is widely understood; (iv) help ensure the equitable application of the rules of law; (v) facilitate public debate on proposed development initiatives and policy formulation (and hence broaden the consensus on eventual outcomes); (vi) provide supplements to public services in the form of alternative services; and (vii) help the public (especially its weaker members) influence the quality, volume and targeting of government services and benefits.

The contribution NGOs play in these activities varies enormously from country to country. The policy environment for NGOs is a critical determinant. As part of creating a more conducive environment for sound development, therefore, the Bank should aim to foster a healthy NGO-State relationship (see "Governance and Development," World Bank '92). Such a relationship would be one where: (a) there are no arbitrary obstacles to the forming of NGOs; (b) fiscal, registration and other regulations concerning NGOs are enabling, predictable and conducive to local philanthropy; (c) there is ready NGO and public access to information about development plans, and wide dissemination of such information (for example, regarding Environmental Assessments and Action Plans); (d) NGOs are protected by the rule of law; (e) NGOs play a role in helping governments enhance public accountability of state agencies (NGOs themselves should also be expected to be transparent and accountable); and (f) governments and donors work in partnership with and perhaps fund NGOs whose effectiveness is demonstrated, particularly in reaching the poor.

The Bank should approach its relationship with NGOs as an important facet of the way it approaches the broader issues of facilitating the development of the private sector, at times encouraging governments to be more responsive to NGO concerns and programs. The Bank, through its ESW and policy dialogue, can help governments more fully appreciate actual and potential NGO contributions to development efforts. Insights from studies of State-NGO relations can be used to advise borrowing governments on policy measures which could increase resources for and remove obstacles to greater NGO contributions, perhaps in the context of the Country Assistance Strategy. Where the State is over-extended, strengthening the contribution of NGOs can be an important ingredient of enhancing the role of the private sector. For example OPRPG and the Country Department worked with the government of Honduras to hold a major consultation with NGOs, chaired by the President of Honduras. This led to a new level of understanding and to important new instances of collaboration between the government and NGOs.

3. Outreach to NGOs

(a) Making a special effort in developing countries

Without reducing its responsiveness to dialogue with Part I NGOs, the Bank should make strenuous efforts to reach out to NGOs in developing countries (national, grassroots and local branches of international NGOs, particularly those with experience of working with the Bank) to discuss issues of development policy. Such dialogue is likely to be both more informative and less hostile. It is proposed to organize Bank-NGO meetings on a regional or sub-regional basis, especially in the context of the Bank-NGO Committee (as with the recent meeting with African NGOs in Addis Ababa about future IDA priorities, and the meeting in Peru on Bank priorities for LAC). Meeting topics germane to the region would be jointly agreed by NGOs and the Bank. A target of two such meetings a year should be set, rotating between the geographic regions. These meetings (involving OPR, the Regions and perhaps sometimes organized jointly with Regional Development Banks) would be tailored to the specificities of the country in question and would be for information exchange and policy dialogue. Prominent academics and other leaders of development thinking would be invited to participate as well as NGOs.

The Bank-NGO Committee needs overhauling in other ways. In the late 80s it was a useful forum for dialogue with NGOs on operational and policy matters. Now, however, the Bank has a high degree of interaction with NGOs elsewhere. The composition of the committee is unique, comprising a high calibre team of both NGO and Bank participants, but the debate and output of the committee at present does not reflect this calibre, and tends to duplicate discussions held elsewhere. The Bank should, subject to the

agreement of the NGO members, work to modify the functions of the committee, so that - in addition to dialogue on specific policy issues such as the IDA 11 replenishment--it helps guide the Bank's evolving NGO strategy. Rather than being the forum for debate on policy issues, it would help the Bank steer its relationship with NGOs (particularly in developing countries) by constructing the most appropriate fora for such debate, and by helping the Bank monitor and evaluate its experience with collaboration, dialogue and (perhaps) funding.

(b) Proactive dialogue with specialist NGOs

On topics of particular interest to a sizeable body of knowledgeable NGOs, the relevant CVP Departments should ensure active dialogue with influential and knowledgeable NGOs (whether critical of the Bank or not), perhaps through establishing sectoral NGO committees, as has been proposed by the Energy Department. Whilst many of the strongest critics would be included, this strategy would ensure that the Bank is listening to a broader range of NGO opinion--not just to the most vocal.

The present practice of holding consultations on upcoming policies and major new lending initiatives of particular interest to NGOs and others outside the Bank should be expanded and strengthened. These should be at draft policy or early project preparation stage, should be carefully followed up to inspire confidence in the process, and should (in the case of policies) ensure a geographic spread of participation. The value of these has been demonstrated by the consultations on forest and water policies. The purpose of such consultations is to improve the way the Bank does its business. Hence these consultations should be technically, not politically, driven. Good practice encourages TMs of policy papers to draw on expertise on the subject outside as well as inside the Bank. This expertise includes academics, specialists of other agencies and, frequently, specialist NGOs. It is good practice, to underline this, to involve NGOs and other specialists in the same meeting. The Industry and Energy Department now has regular meetings with advisory groups of NGOs on energy policy issues.

(c) Improved communications

Many NGOs, politicians, journalists and members of the public only know of the Bank through what they hear from Bank critics. To convince a broad range of well-meaning NGOs--and through them their supporting publics--that the Bank is serious about reducing poverty, protecting the environment and other development priorities, the Bank needs to tell its own story. This requires a communication strategy tailored to such an audience, explaining, for example, the need for economic policy reform. Most valuable to the Bank and most credible to NGO and other publics are testimonies to the effectiveness of Bank programs and rebuttals to critics' allegations which come from senior development specialists outside the Bank who have no personal axe to grind (such as NGO leaders, academics, development journalists, leading politicians etc). The Bank should both encourage and disseminate such "third party endorsements". For example, in responding to critics of adjustment the Bank usually quotes its own evidence of the efficacy of those programs. It would be more credible to quote the papers of USAID, SIDA, Killick and others which pour doubt on the claim that the poor are systematically hurt by adjustment.

In developing a more proactive communication strategy (with an NGO audience in mind), there is a need for producing excellent materials on the Bank's work in areas of special public interest (poverty reduction, environmental protection, participation, micro-enterprise development etc), on Bank policies in "difficult" areas such as adjustment and resettlement, and on how the Bank works. It also calls for more regular in-house seminars with NGO leaders and more conferences for NGOs on controversial

topics and issues of mutual concern.

4. Strengthened Management of Bank's Response to Criticisms and External Concerns

There is a need for a more collegial approach to determining the Bank's response to controversial issues (including problem projects). Though the most relevant department on the issue in question should retain the lead, other departments must be more fully involved and on-board with the agreed strategy since public controversy has significant implications for the Bank as a whole. This practice is already beginning to emerge. For example AGR, ENV, GEF, EXT, and OPR were all involved in evolving the Bank's position on the Bangladesh Flood Action Program and the Laos forestry project.

Regarding "problem projects," the objective should be to identify possible NGO concerns ahead of time, so that potential problems can be rectified at source and so that negative publicity can be avoided. It is usually possible to predict in advance which projects are likely to be particularly sensitive. It is good practice to discuss these at the earliest possible stage with responsible, knowledgeable NGOs, (as has been the case with the Ghazi Barotha dam in Pakistan). It may also be desirable to include an NGO consultant on identification and preparation missions (for which support from FIAHS may be possible).

In response to NGO attacks, is appropriate to be more robust than the Bank has been in the past, but this must be even handed. Where unsubstantiated or willfully exaggerated claims are made the Bank needs to be emphatic in countering these claims. However management must be equally robust in ensuring that, when serious charges are levelled by NGOs, these are not brushed aside but are fully investigated and responded to.

In the face of a major campaign, a response group should be established, chaired by the EXT Director, and comprising the region in question, OPR, DEC and other relevant CVPU's, to determine the Bank's strategy and follow up on implementation.

5. Financing an NGO Small Projects Window

All major bilateral and many multilateral agencies have NGO funding mechanisms. In the case of IDB the "Microprojects" facility channels some \$30 million per year to NGOs in LAC. Many proposals have been made over the years for Bank funding of NGOs. For many, it has become the acid test of the Bank's seriousness regarding NGOs. However, the fact remains that funding shortages are not always the limiting factor in the growth of good quality NGO programs (except where NGOs have a better track record for service delivery than government departments). Moreover, because the Bank is a centralized organization, focussed on policy issues and large projects, identifying good NGOs to fund is not necessarily the Bank's comparative advantage, neither would it find it easy to administer and evaluate a micro-grants program, unless perhaps there were wholesaling intermediaries.

It is however recommended that the Bank needs a new instrument in its arsenal for tackling poverty at grassroots level. An effective poverty reduction strategy must include carefully targeted measures addressing the specific needs of particularly vulnerable groups as well as economy-wide actions. Many such targeted measures are so specific to the population group or locality in question that they can best be addressed through grassroots initiatives based on sound local knowledge and community involvement. Whilst some such initiatives are possible through government programs (especially through programs which are highly decentralized or participatory in design) and would therefore be financed through regular loans and credit, it is often likely that NGOs and Community Based Organizations will be the initiators.

It is therefore desirable that the Bank should have instruments for supporting such activities where they are well designed, likely to make a significant poverty-reduction contribution and require additional funds.

It is therefore proposed that the Bank develop a small projects "window" for an experimental period to provide grants to NGOs and other intermediaries to enhance their contributions to poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. This should build on the multi-donor Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (a micro-finance program), which was agreed in March by the Board. The CGAPP framework restricts funding in the first instance to micro-finance schemes since these have the clearest track record in helping improve the incomes of the poor. OPR believes that the scheme should be rapidly broadened to encompass a wider variety of purposes. This broadening needs to be borne in mind when considering the structure and staffing of the secretariat responsible for the Fund's administration.

Since the Bank is not well equipped to chose between large numbers of small funding requests, a "wholesaling" approach is suggested in which grants are made to intermediaries (typically respected and larger national NGOs, credit unions and cooperatives). Those intermediaries would either maintain their own programs for poverty reduction or would channel funds to small NGOs and CBOs for this purpose. The models for this wholesaling function would be PHN's funding for population NGOs and IDB's small projects program. The Fund would also provide grants for strengthening NGO capacity and dissemination of experience. This would include funding for training NGOs in management and other key skills, seminars to facilitate strategic planning and improved coordination between NGOs and government agencies, and technical assistance to NGOs to assist them "scale-up" their activities. Grants would also be made to intermediaries to provide training to the ultimate beneficiaries.

CONCLUSIONS

We are confident that the five action areas described above not only provide a firm foundation for building an improved relationship with the NGO sector, including with many of the Bank's critics, but also would help the Bank better fulfill its development objectives.

file NGO

The World Bank
Washington, D.C. 20433
U.S.A.

FAS
let's talk

RECEIVED

From the Vice President
for Environmentally Sustainable
Development

95 MAY -8 PM 4:36 *9*

May 5, 1995

DGO

Mr. Robert Piccolotto, G7-121



Dear Bob,

At the latest of my regular ESDVP/NGO meetings, several NGOs expressed a desire to discuss the Bank's operations evaluations with the department.

Please find attached their follow up note. I am happy to organize and host the meeting 22 June beginning at 9:30 a.m. I have signaled the NGOs about this tentative date. I believe we need to have a very knowledgeable OED person to discuss these issues. I would be most grateful if you could arrange to have someone come to this meeting.

Many thanks.

Ismail Serageldin

MAY 03 '95 14:36 FR BANK INFORMATION CTR. 2024668189 TO 4733112

P.01/01

Immediate Attention

ONE PAGE FAX
Wednesday, May 3, 1995

CINDY - 3 PM 3:15
VP'S OFFICE

TO: Joan Martin Brown, ESDVP
John Clark, OPRPG/NGO Unit

FROM: Cindy M. Buhl, Bank Information Center
Frances Seymour, World Wildlife Fund

SUBJECT: June 22nd Meeting

On behalf of the NGOs that meet regularly with Vice President Serageldin, we want to thank him and you for deciding to hold a meeting with NGOs on the morning of June 22nd.

Our understanding is that the meeting will consist of one hour with representatives of the Operations and Evaluations Department (OED), and another hour for a discussion with Mr. Serageldin on the social and environmental impacts of and lessons learned from the Narmada and Kedung Ombo projects (based on the PCRs of those two projects).

What about Regional Represent?

For the discussion with OED, we know that many NGOs are interested in knowing or understanding better the criteria OED applies to determine whether to rate a project, or a component of a project, as satisfactory or unsatisfactory. We would also be interested in hearing how well OED believes it incorporates the input of NGOs and affected peoples into its research and reports, and how that process might be improved, if necessary. NGOs are also interested in knowing how projects are selected for an OED audit, since all projects have PCRs but not all undergo a complete OED review with recommendations for the future. To the extent possible, if OED could use the Narmada and Kedung Ombo cases to illustrate current OED practices and approaches that would be helpful and could also better inform the NGO discussion with Mr. Serageldin.

Our understanding is that the meeting would begin at 9:30 AM and conclude no later than Noon. Please contact Cindy Buhl if that is not correct. Fortunately, several NGOs familiar with these two projects will be in Washington on June 22nd and their insights should be a welcome addition to the discussion.

We hope Mr. Serageldin and all of you know how much we appreciate these discussions with him and other Bank officers. We very much look forward to the upcoming June 22nd meeting.

file NGD

WORLD BANK OFFICE TRACKING SYSTEM
Director General, Ops Evaluation
Routing and Action Transmittal Sheet

=====

TO:	OEDDR, (T-9025)	DATE:	6/23/95
-----	-----------------	-------	---------

=====

=====

| SUBJECT DOCUMENT: |

From: ROYAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
To: REPORT
Dated: Reference No.: DG0950623001

Topic: NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AS CHANNEL IN DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE - THE NORWEGIAN SYSTEM

=====

=====

ACTION INSTRUCTIONS:	DUE DATE:
----------------------	-----------

HANDLE
XXX REVIEW AND RECOMMEND 6/30/95
FOR YOUR INFORMATION
DISCUSS WITH _____
AS WE DISCUSSED
PREPARE RESPONSE FOR _____ SIGNATURE
FOR YOUR FILES
RETURN TO _____
OTHER: _____

=====

Remarks: FAS - THIS INTERESTING REPORT SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY OED STAFF
CONCERNED WITH PARTICIPATION AND NGOs. I'D APPRECIATE A COMMENT
ON IT.

=====

THE WORLD BANK
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY

June 23 195

→ FAS

This interesting
report should be
reviewed by OED
staff concerned
w/ participation
of NGOs.

I'd appreciate
a comment on
it.

9



RECEIVED

95 MAY 25 AM 11:26

DGO

With the Compliments
of

the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Oslo

ROYAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
NORWAY.

Evaluation Report 3.95

Non-Governmental Organizations as Channel in Development Assistance

The Norwegian System

**Prepared by: The Centre for Development Studies,
University of Bergen.
by Terje Tvedt**

**The views expressed in this report are those of the author , and should not
be attributed to The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affaris.**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	i
THEORIES AND CONCEPTS.....	i
OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS.....	iii
METHODOLOGY AND DATA.....	vi
Historical data.....	vii
Comparative data.....	vii
All organisations.....	ix
Selected organisations and areas.....	ix
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	xi
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO OVERALL POLICY ISSUES.....	xi
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES IN THE STATE BUREAUCRACY.....	xiv
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE NORWEGIAN NGOS.....	xvii
CHAPTER I	
A DESCRIPTION OF THE NGO LANDSCAPE.....	1
THE NGO SECTOR IN NORWAY.....	1
NGO growth	1
The NGO landscape.....	4
Big and small NGOs.....	6
Project profile.....	7
Geographical profile.....	8
Personnel.....	8
The self-financing of the organisations.....	8
The goals of the organisations.....	9
NGOS IN SOME SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.....	10
Bangladesh.....	12
Zimbabwe.....	13
<i>Community-Based Organisations (CBOs)</i>	14
<i>Intermediary NGOs</i>	14
<i>Service NGOs</i>	14
<i>Trusts and Unions</i>	14
<i>International NGOs</i>	14
Ethiopia.....	16
<i>Religious NGOs</i>	18
<i>Relief and Development NGOs</i>	18
<i>Functional organisations</i>	18
<i>Advocacy Organizations</i>	19
Nicaragua.....	19

CHAPTER II

THE EFFICIENCY AND IMPACT OF NGO

ASSISTANCE.....	22
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE.....	22
What is comparative advantage?.....	22
What do we know?.....	22
What can we know?.....	24
Comparative disadvantage.....	24
Forget about "comparative advantages"!.....	25
The question of flexibility and creativity.....	26
Reports to the Storting on flexibility.....	27
Types of organisations and the question of flexibility.....	27
A case study: Norwegian Lutheran Mission - mission and aid.....	30
<i>Norwegian Lutheran Mission. Aim and organisation</i>	31
<i>NLM in Ethiopia</i>	31
Mission, local church and "charitable work".....	32
NLM, NORAD and Sidamo Hospital.....	34
Nationalization of the Hospital.....	35
NLM and development goals.....	35
NLM, value dilemmas and nationalization.....	36
FLEXIBILITY AND MICRO-DEVELOPMENT.....	38
FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICS.....	41
A case study: NORAD, NCA and Kenya.....	42
A case study: NCA and the emergency relief-desk (ERD) operation.....	42
<i>History and the role of NCA</i>	43
<i>The problem of "neutrality" and humanitarian aid</i>	44
CONCLUSION.....	45

CHAPTER III

THE ROLE OF NGOS IN CONNECTION WITH

PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY.....	47
THE "NEW PARADIGM".....	47
A new legitimation.....	47
Competition with the state.....	48
The new paradigm on the shoulders of history?.....	49
NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY.....	50
The inherently good civil society.....	50
NGOs, popular will and sectarian interests.....	51
A "STATE-FRIENDLY" THEORY.....	52
States and "strongmen".....	52
State policies and NGOs.....	53
DEMOCRACY, PLURALISM AND ACCOUNTABILITY.....	55
Resource transfer and accountability.....	56
Accountability and organisational behaviour.....	57

Accountability and target groups.....	58
Multiple accountability or institutionalised irresponsibility?.....	59
A CASE STUDY: GOVERNMENT AND NGOS IN A "TUG OF WAR" IN BANGLADESH.....	60
The July crisis.....	61
NGOs as "Western agents".....	63
Some consequences of the Crisis.....	63
A CASE STUDY: NGOS, SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN SOUTHERN SUDAN.....	65
The state - civil society dichotomy in Southern Sudan.....	66
Formal relations.....	67
Infrastructural power.....	67
Local monopoly in the social-services sector.....	68
A particularistic, target oriented development strategy.....	70
A giving, care-taker "state".....	71
The accountability problem.....	72
NGO-mythology versus Southern realities.....	72
CONCLUSION.....	73

CHAPTER IV

THE NORWEGIAN STATE'S POLICY ON NGOS.....	74
GENERAL NGO POLICIES.....	74
Report no. 36 (1984-85).....	74
<i>NGOs and democracy in developing countries</i>	75
<i>The role of the NGOs and the image of developing countries</i>	76
<i>The role of the NGOs and the image of aid</i>	77
Report No. 51 (1991-92).....	78
<i>The role of Norwegian NGOs</i>	78
<i>NGOs, states and the "new paradigm"</i>	78
Conclusion.....	79
NORADS SEARCH FOR AN NGO-STRATEGY.....	80
Norad support to Norwegian NGOs.....	80
<i>A short history</i>	80
<i>Coordination and the complementary role</i>	82
<i>A case study: Bangladesh</i>	83
<i>A case study: Nicaragua</i>	86
<i>Conflicting loyalties</i>	88
<i>Administrative rigour, but what about policies?</i>	89
<i>Administrative guidelines</i>	91
<i>Administrative guidelines and unintended consequences</i>	92
<i>Guidelines and the neutrality paragraph</i>	93
Norad and local organisations.....	94
<i>Achievements</i>	95

<i>Dependence</i>	96
<i>Position in the society</i>	96
<i>Coordination</i>	97
<i>Strategy and knowledge</i>	98
<i>A case study: Zimbabwe</i>	98
Analyses of "civil society".....	99
The question of integration.....	100
The question of strategy.....	101
The question of strategy again.....	101
Actual profile.....	102
Distribution of funds.....	103
Opinion of NORAD and the role of the government.....	103
<i>A case study: Bangladesh</i>	104
A history of "direct support".....	104
A new direction.....	105
Criteria.....	106
Local support and diplomacy.....	107
A constant issue - NGO/state relations.....	107
<i>Some central policy issues (for both NORAD and NGOs)</i>	107
Strategies and NGO/state relations.....	110
NORAD'S SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL NON- GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (INGOS)	112
A short history.....	112
An <i>ad hoc</i> policy.....	113
New guidelines.....	113
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SEARCH FOR AN NGO STRATEGY	114
Foreign policy and NGO support.....	115
Norwegian foreign policy and NGOs.....	116
<i>Policy line</i>	116
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NGOs.....	117
A case study: The MFA and the emergency situation in the Horn of Africa.....	118
Norway and the Eritrea question.....	119
The justification and the "humanitarian argument".....	119
A case study: The Sudan.....	121
Development aid and emergency assistance.....	124
The "Norwegian model" - potentials and constraints.....	126

CHAPTER V

NORWEGIAN NGOS IN SEARCH OF A STRATEGY	130
NGOs and information.....	131
TYPES OF NGOS AND MAIN AID STRATEGY	133
OPERATIONAL NGOS	135

A case study: Norwegian People's Aid in Zimbabwe.....	136
A case study: Redd Barna in Zimbabwe.....	137
DEVELOPMENT AID AND CHRISTIAN MISSION.....	140
NORWEGIAN TRADITION AND NON-EUROPEAN SOCIETIES.....	143
NGOS AND THEIR "MISSION" - "PARTNERSHIP" AND "DIALOGUE"	145
NGO motivations.....	146
State motivations.....	147
Conclusion.....	147
THE AIM OF "EQUITY" AND "PARTNERSHIP"	148
Zones of dialogue and the NGO channel.....	150
NGOs and "legitimate paternalism"	151
Gifts of power.....	151
NGOs - dialogue and human rights.....	152
A pluralist channel outside the state system.....	154
A moral channel outside the state system.....	154
Networking and implementation.....	155

POSTSCRIPT

NOTES

REFERENCES

APPENDIX

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study is the result of an initiative taken by the Evaluation Division, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1991. The Ministry wanted a thorough evaluation of "Private organisations as a channel in Norwegian development aid" (private organisasjoner som kanal for norsk bistand). The study was divided into two parts. The Centre for Development Studies (CDS), University of Bergen, was commissioned to carry out Phase I. This phase focused on the history and character of the Norwegian organisational landscape in development aid and the aim, character and changes in Norwegian government policies on this issue. This phase was also expected to draw up proposals and ideas for how Phase II of the study should be carried out.

Phase I produced a main report:

The private organisations as a channel for Norwegian aid. An analysis of the relationship between the Norwegian state and the third sector, Oslo: Foreign Ministry, 3.1992 (the report was written in Norwegian. A slightly revised English version will be published in 1995 by CDS).

Ten sub-reports were written, and were included in an edited compilation available at CDS, University of Bergen:

Tvedt, T., (red.), 1993, *En studie av frivillige organisasjoner i norsk bistand*, Bergen: CDS.

The sub-reports are:

Tvedt, T., E. Barkved, L. Manger og O. I. Steen, 1993, *De private organisasjonene som kanal for norsk bistand. En tilleggsstudie*.

Dalseng, T., *Statlige utbetalinger til private organisasjoner*.

Hødnebo, K., *Norske myndigheters retningslinjer for private organisasjoners bruk av norske statlige u-hjelpsmidler*.

Steen, O.I. *Utvalgte oversikter basert på innsamlet materiale for ti organisasjoner*.
Morvik, K. *Kunnskapsutvikling og læring i fire norske private organisasjoner*.

Steen, O.I. *Privat bistand og humanitært hjelpearbeid på 1980-tallet. En studie av*

offentlige støtteformer i utvalgte giverland.
Tvedt, T. *The "civil society", the state and the NGOs in the Southern Sudan*.

Wiig, A. *Et økonomisk perspektiv på private organisasjoner*.

Barkved, E., *Bibliografi over evalueringsstudier av norsk privat u-hjelp og priv.org. litteratur om enskille land*.

Barkved, E., *Handbok over norske private u-hjelpsorganisasjonar*.

The Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen, was also commissioned to undertake the Second Phase of the study. This was given a very wide Terms of Reference and started in August 1993 and was finalised in September 1994. The following reports have been produced as part of the study and will most likely be published in an edited version at CDS:

Jamil, I. and M. Mannam, *A study of government-NGO relations in Bangladesh in the period 1992 and 1993: Collaboration or confrontations?*

Johannessen, B. og G.M. Sørbo, *NGOs at the crossroads: Norsk Folkehjelp (Norwegian People's Aid) and Redd Barna (Norwegian Save the Children) in Zimbabwe*.

Karadawi, A. *The NGO scene in Ethiopia*.

Keen, D. *A Comparative Study of Some Donor Countries' Experiences with NGOs*

Moyo, S. *Development and change in Zimbabwe's NGO sector*.

Skar, H.O. (ed) Anette Haug and Coleen Littlejohn, *NGO's in the Nicaraguan changing reality. An evaluation*.

A number of people have contributed to the final product. Jon Askeland, Olaug Bergseth, Ove Stoknes have translated the questionnaire from English to Spanish and the responses from Spanish to English, Einar Barkved has made most of the figures and tables in the appendix and helped with the questionnaire-survey, Terje Dalseng has provided up-to-date data on the allocation profile of state-funds to the NGOs in 1993, Torhild Håland Eide, Thelma Kraft and Kristin Holst Paulsen have battled with the many versions of the manuscript. Ragnar Skre has assisted in checking references and rendered technical assistance. Kurt Gjerde did the programming for the questionnaire-data. Anne Marie Groth and Tore Øverhaug have identified and collected written source material at

NORAD/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kjell Hødnebo has proof-read and written notes on various topics in the report, Jannik Lindbæk has made figures and tables and proof-read parts of the manuscript, Terje Sande has given advice regarding the form of the questionnaire and run the data collected by it, and finally; Stener Ekern, Sharif Harir, Bjørn Johannessen, Aud Kolberg, Eyolf Jul-Larsen, Ove Stoknes and Stein Willumstad have all read and commented upon previous drafts. We thank them all. The shortcomings of the study are not their fault.

We would also like to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NORAD, the NGOs in Norway and the governments and NGOs in those countries where the work has taken place, for their cooperative attitude.

Terje W. Tvedt
30.01.95.

Bergen

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The present report is the final product of the biggest evaluation ever undertaken in the history of Norwegian aid: "Non-government organizations as channels for Norwegian development assistance". It was initiated by the Evaluation Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹ On the basis of the report from Phase I, OECD wrote that the study may represent a "watershed" in Norwegian NGO assistance (Smillie and Filewood in Smillie and Helmich 1993:225). Time will show, and the readers will decide that question.

The time for undertaking such a study is very apt. There has been a rapid growth of non-governmental organisations on a global scale during the last decade. A fundamental redefinition of the optimal relationship between states and societies has taken place both ideologically and also in fact as a part of this process. This phenomenon in world history has been hailed as an associational revolution that challenges global power relations. Hence the study addresses an issue of importance, not only for Norwegian aid policy, but for understanding central forces in global development processes.

Norwegian NGO policy plays a modest but, nonetheless, important role in this overall context. Before the development aid era, a few missionary organisations with only a handful of missionaries were working in other continents.

- In 1963, when the Norwegian government first channelled money through voluntary organisations, seven organisations and seven projects were supported.

- Between 1963 and 1981, 7.2% of total bilateral aid was, on average, channelled through these NGOs. At the beginning of the 1990s Norwegian organisations were running more than 1500 projects in about 100 countries. More than 25 per cent of bilateral aid was given to the NGOs, and the percentage is increasing.

- In the beginning of the 1990s the Norwegian government gave direct support to more than 300 local NGOs in eight developing countries totalling between NOK 80 mill. and NOK 90 mill.

annually.
- The NGO channel has also become a more important instrument in Norwegian foreign policy initiatives (the Oslo channel, the peace negotiations for Guatemala etc.). It has given birth to a new breed of Norwegian foreign policy actors largely paid by the state.
- The NGO decade has also played a role in Norwegian national history. It has been important in creating Norwegian attitudes to, and images of, the developing countries. It has changed the Norwegian organisational landscape in crucial ways.

The Norwegian NGO support started at the same time as other Western states began to channel money through NGOs. The present evaluation took place almost at the same time as Denmark, Sweden, Canada, Britain, Finland and the Netherlands were undertaking the same exercise.² While focusing on the Norwegian channel, this study also addressed some main problems of general importance and international relevance. The Terms of Reference asked for a very broad study. The work started in 1991 and about 25 researchers have taken part in the project. To write the report has been a daunting task. The aim has been to organize this complex reality into one coherent story and to analyse it in a fruitful perspective with a clear and consistent use of defined core terms. The report is organized around the questions of the Terms of Reference. The theoretical and conceptual work which was necessary to study the field in a fruitful and comprehensive way is left out from this report, due to the need for brevity.

THEORIES AND CONCEPTS

Below only some of these theoretical and conceptual points will be referred to. The NGO channel in development aid has been enmeshed in different but powerful ideological currents. Especially during the last decade or so a definite "NGO-speak" or NGO language has developed as a means for donors, NGO actors and researchers to communicate about the NGOs' role in development; ("comparative advantage", "flexibility", "empowering", "grass-rooting", "representing democracy and pluralism", a

functional "response to state and market failures" etc.). In order to be able to analyze what has actually happened and is going on, some fundamental categories in this NGO language had first to be clarified. How to define the organisations working in development aid? There is, and has been, widespread conceptual confusion about what is an NGO, reflected in the proliferation of acronyms. Different studies (and donors and NGOs) employ different concepts and conflicting definitions of the same concepts, without explaining why some are chosen and others implicitly rejected. Definitions have tended to reflect ideas of what is a "good" organisation. Hence the channel's actors, as far as conceptualizing, planning and description are concerned, will be reduced to those organisations that are acceptable to the observer's normative NGO project. Some of the definitions, on the other hand have been so broad as to make discussion and comparison difficult. We have maintained the term NGO, in spite of all its limitations, but implicitly based on the following definition: A development NGO is an organisation receiving donor funds for development, which is institutionally separated from the government and is nonprofit-making. This definition is used throughout and is especially fruitful in bringing more attention to how NGOs in development affect and interact with those parts of the organisational landscape in a society which are not directly linked to or a part of this channel. It also used the term "voluntary organisations" instead of the established term "private organisasjoner" for the NGOs in Norwegian aid, due to particular historical circumstances and traditions.

An important premise for the analysis is also a reflection on the crucial question: why do NGOs exist? Dominating functional explanations cannot explain the historical development and position of NGOs in development aid in different countries. These theories have contributed to a situation in which the concrete background to, and role of, development NGOs are difficult to discover. It has helped to create a justification of the NGOs in development which is untenable. NGOs in development, rather than being seen as a "natural outcome" of state and market failures, should primarily be regarded as a product of deliberate

state policies. In the OECD countries it originated as a result of American and UN initiatives and pressures in the early 1960s. In Norway the state, in order to broaden the basis and support of, and financial input for aid, was instrumental in creating the NGO channel. During the 1980s the NGOs were internationally propagated as part of the "new political agenda", but also furthered by both "left" and "right" as an answer to the problem of the state.

This analysis is important in two ways:

- it indicates that the dominant justification and legitimation of the NGOs in aid is untenable, and that the NGO system therefore should be analyzed through other perspectives.
- while focusing on the importance of the political initiatives behind the growth of the NGO community, it liberates the field from the weight of assumed social laws.

How should I then analyse the NGO situation in different countries? The functionalistic analysis is insufficient, although this theory has affected policy formulation internationally and in Norway. An alternative, the "national style approach", which focuses on the importance of national political and cultural traditions for existing organisational landscapes and relationships with the state and market, might be useful in a western welfare-state context, but not so fruitful in a development aid context.

The NGO scene in countries like Zimbabwe and Bangladesh and the development NGOs' role in Norway of course express national traditions and national historical developments. But due to the importance of the NGO channel and the way in which it functions, it is analyzed not only or in some cases not even primarily within a national, third sector perspective, but rather as an outcome of complicated processes in which international ideological trends, donor policies, NGO agendas etc. interact with national historical and cultural conditions in complex ways. The chapter argues that this perspective allows emphasis on how an NGO scene in a developing country *might* be more a reflection of donor interventions than a "natural" outcome of internal, national development processes. It thus underlines that the NGO channel is a new type of international social

system which is framed by a particular relationship between internal socio-economic and political mechanisms and external donor interests. A focus on the channel as an international donor-driven system also enables a more realistic analysis of the theory of a global "associational revolution" to be made.

This analysis is important in three ways:

- it pays attention to the role of donor money and donor roles in shaping organisational landscapes in other countries.
- it pays attention to the problem of how organisations should be developed that to a gradually greater extent are rooted in societies and not live on donor injections.
- it also pays attention to the fact that NGOs from donor countries do not necessarily represent the traditions of these countries.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS

The report is organized around two fundamental issues: the character and role of the NGOs, and the policy of the Norwegian state and government.

Chapter I describes some of the principal features of the development and characteristics of the Norwegian NGO landscape (for a more thorough analysis, see "De private organisasjonene som kanal for norsk bistand. En analyse av utviklingstrekk i forholdet mellom den norske staten og den tredje sektor" and the NGO scene in four countries; Bangladesh in Asia, Ethiopia on the Horn of Africa, Nicaragua in Latin America and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa.

Chapter II discusses the impact and efficiency of NGO assistance. It discusses the validity of certain assertions about NGOs' "comparative advantage", "efficiency" and "flexibility". On the basis of proposed definitions, classifications and analytical approaches explained briefly below, this part tries to describe and analyze how NGOs function. It is argued that the "NGO articles of faith" are untenable; first because of the heterogeneity of the organisations involved. Secondly; because it is impossible to measure such "advantages", partly due to methodological problems and partly because such a

characterization presupposes that states, markets and NGOs have more or less identical objectives. This chapter shows on the one hand that NGOs are not in general more flexible or more efficient than governments. On the contrary, they may be less efficient and less flexible in certain cases, not the least because they do not have the sanctions available to governments, and because they do not have the "universalistic" approach that governments generally have. The very fact that organisations might be strongly "value-driven" or are organised around "shared values", might make them inflexible in some contexts and very flexible in others. On the other hand the chapter shows that NGOs under certain conditions might be both flexible, cost-efficient and grass-root oriented, but that this depends on tasks, contexts and organisations. The NGOs are not "quick fixes", but they might act in accordance with the prescriptions of the "articles of faith" in development, in democracy work and in advocacy. Another section analyses NGOs and the accountability problem, showing that there exists a systemic characteristic that the channel has to live with and learn to manage as a permanent dilemma.

The chapter raises problems of urgency for the NGO system:

- Compared to the "NGO articles of faith", there is a great gap between images of the channel and what the organisations are able to achieve. Critics argue that the NGOs, rather than alleviating poverty and further equity, perform a system maintenance function, that they preserve differences between classes and nations at least in the short run, and reduce pressure for more radical reforms, partly by harnessing the energy of radical middle-class enthusiasts.

The study could not substantiate the claims of the NGO propagandists. Neither could it evidence the arguments of its critics. Instead it shows that NGOs may have different functions. They may cause changes that are the opposite of their stated aims; they may in other contexts simply be marginal and unimportant while they in other cases may both help to alleviate poverty, change power relations in favour of the dispossessed, etc. There is, however, a gap between public images

and expectations and actual achievements. This might over time develop into a crisis of donor expectations (both public and private). This may be dealt with in two ways: One can continue as before and hope that "nobody" will discover this inflated and partly false image, or one can consciously reduce it to reasonable proportions. As shown, NORAD, the Foreign Ministry and some organisations in official guidelines, in Reports to the Parliament, in magazines etc. continue to produce ideas about "comparative advantages", "flexibility", "efficiency", "always reaching the most needy". But these statements cannot be substantiated, and they express ideas which make studies and policies imprecise and self-contradictory in certain cases.

Chapter III discusses the role NGOs in furthering democracy and pluralism and assesses the conceived role of the NGOs in the "new policy paradigm", which is being propagated internationally as a new development theory, in important NGO circles. It describes this theory which indeed gives a very prominent role to NGOs, and compares it with competing state-centred development theories. It is argued that it is crucial to understand these theories, and to address them consciously in analyses of concrete state-society relationships in different countries. This is also necessary if a useful strategy for NGO activities is to be formulated, both on a general level and for each individual NGO. Lack of clarity and reflection on this issue, might lead, and has led to, a practice whereby NGOs have "sold out" to autocratic governments and have increased the fragmentation and disintegration of already weak societies.

This chapter indirectly shows how a combination of myths about NGO advantages and micro-perspective and narrow project focus of the NGO actors' have reduced the channel's potential role, and hindered paying attention to and reaching an understanding of the context in which the channel has operated.

Chapter IV presents an analysis of Norwegian policies and general theories on this issue. By analyzing the most important government documents from the 1980s and 90s, it shows that the policy framework has been unclear and that

Norway has had no overall strategy. Norway like other donors, has not developed a comprehensive analysis of the third sector or of the role played by NGOs in the overall economic, social and political development of a country. Although this kind of support may have, and in some cases clearly has had, substantial impacts, these questions have not been addressed.

It was considered important to document that there have been and still are unclear ideas about what is meant by crucial concepts like civil society, democracy, pluralism or institution building in an NGO context. As long as the overall policy framework has been unclear or undeveloped, the practitioners and the bureaucrats have had a difficult task. It is shown that Report to Parliament no. 36 (1984-85) formulated a very different policy than did Report to Parliament No. 51 (1991-92), although the latter underlined the continuity in policy framework. The description of the NGOs was less idealized in the latter Report, but key issues are still unclear and create self-contradictory policy guidelines.

It also deals with how NORAD has tried to operationalize and implement a policy of support to Norwegian NGOs. In a previous study the history of this support was described in more detail. The aim was to understand the context from which the present system has emerged and the constraints and possibilities this tradition has created. This chapter summarises the main lines in this history and the scope of the activities, but focuses on how the policy has been implemented during the last years and presents dilemmas regarding a) overall strategy; b) cooperation with the NGOs in Country Programmes; c) administrative guidelines and d) the neutrality paragraph.

It is argued that conflicting policy signals and unclear aims have made it difficult for NORAD (even if they had so wished) to create "complementarity" or "coordination" between the Norwegian NGOs and NORADs development policy in different countries. Capacity and competence problems at NORAD, Regional Departments, administrative structures combined with the history of the different organisations' work in different countries have further

compounded the issue. The recent emergence of other donors and the growing role of international network organisations also make it less likely that at least the biggest organisations will actively seek complementarity with NORAD aims. The coordination/complementarity issue has come to the fore in cases in which the overall strategy is that Norwegian NGOs shall implement government country strategies (Eritrea).

It is shown that NORAD's administrative and financial guidelines have become more stringent and clear, but that this may have some important consequences that were not intended. This "tougher" policy will affect the character and profile of the organisational landscape over time, as well as internal priorities in the individual NGO. It is too early to conclude that NORAD has found the correct balance between what is stated as two aims: administrative control and the encouragement of NGO autonomy and flexibility. The conflict between a number of organisations and NORAD regarding information support in September 1994 also shows that NORAD faces a growing credibility problem vis à vis important parts of the Norwegian NGO community.

The historical role of the "neutrality paragraph" in Norwegian NGO aid is discussed (see Phase I report for details), and the significance of NORAD's reformulation of them in the new guidelines is highlighted. It is shown that although this change of policy signals constitutes a radical and new direction for NGO support, it has not been discussed in the Storting or been given much attention by NORAD itself. It is also noted that NORAD for the first time explicitly states that the values that underlie NGO support are universal. This is, of course, problematic from a historical-philosophical point of view, but it also contradicts the actual value-orientation of important NGOs that are not primarily working for "universal ideas" but, for example, for their own interpretation of the Bible.

Another part of this chapter deals with NORAD's support for local NGOs. This support and the way it is handled represents a new practice in Norwegian foreign policy. In spite of that, it has not yet been debated in principle in the Storting. A brief summary of the Norwegian history of this

arrangement is provided (for a more detailed description, see Phase 1 report). The chapter focuses on how this policy has been implemented. It is shown that NORAD, Regional Departments, or the Foreign Ministry, in spite of strong efforts from NORAD, Oslo, have not developed something which can justifiably be called a strategy for how the "indigenous" NGOs ought best to be supported in different countries.

On the basis of the case studies from Bangladesh and Zimbabwe it is argued that NORAD has not been in a position to implement the planned policy regarding support to local NGOs. It also discusses to what extent experiences can inform choices about whether NORAD should continue with such support, whether its direction should be changed by becoming more closely integrated with government plans in the recipient countries, or whether it should be dropped altogether, and handed over to the Norwegian NGOs. The focus is put on structural issues of power and culture, and not on a "comparative assessment" of whether the NGOs or NORAD have been "best" in this cooperation.

It also takes up NORAD's strategy for support to international NGOs. It shows that this support was developed in a very *ad hoc* manner and that a number of offices were involved in supporting organisations based on scanty information and weak control, but that at the same time, in certain cases, it most likely helped to bring some issues more to the fore on the international agenda. It concludes that in the past few years, NORAD has managed to establish clearer guidelines and a firmer administrative system, but that also this area shows and reveals the differences between the administrative cultures of the Foreign Ministry and NORAD, differences that create difficulties of coordination.

Finally, it discusses how the Foreign Ministry has implemented its NGO policy, and identifies the changes in this policy during the past few years. The Ministry has become very active in policy dialogues with the biggest NGOs, and is also contracting NGOs to an even greater extent to undertake work and projects in areas in which the Ministry thinks, due to foreign policy considerations, that it is important that Norwegian

organisations are present.

The chapter argues that it is too early to draw definite conclusions as to the success of this policy. At the same time it describes a number of cases where there have been a gap between the Norwegian aim of becoming a "superpower" in conflict resolution and human rights issues, and the capacities of the NGOs and the ability of the national authorities to use them.

By focusing on the differences in working methods, aims and agendas of the Foreign Ministry and NORAD, the problem of coordination of efforts is raised. It is shown that this coordination in the past has been weak, and that this has affected the work of Norwegian NGOs, their partners in the developing countries and the Norwegian state.

It shows that emergencies have been conceptualized as temporary set-backs in a society's normal development. It discusses how the present division of labour between NORAD (their strategy and guidelines for NGO support explicitly state that emergencies are none of their business) and MFA (they deal only with emergencies, although important parts of their funds are used for development) can be seen as a historical legacy of the developmentalist thinking of the 1960s and 70s. As long as this idea and administrative set-up prevail, it is unlikely that the Norwegian NGO channel will be able to manage the growing number of "complex emergency" situations in a productive manner. Success seems more and more to be defined as good media coverage in Norway, rather than by actual achievements in the area concerned.

Chapter V discusses the organisations' search for a strategy, mainly focusing on the Norwegian NGOs but with some comments on NGOs in developing countries as well.

The chapter is divided into three parts. The first deals with how the growth of NGO activities has created a new context for NGO information work. It discusses the extent to which the NGOs have managed to do anything more than reproduce dominating images and attitudes of "the other" and Norwegian aid. The second part focuses first

on three main questions: a) different types of organisations and their strategy; b) strategic dilemmas mission that organisations are facing being dependent on NORAD money and NORAD regulations; and c) problems facing operational organisations. The description especially relates to fundamental problems such as; a) the question of sustainability and the fact that NGO projects often would collapse if the NGOs withdrew; b) the problems NGOs have run into in linking work at micro-level and macro-level; c) unsolved dilemmas between operating simultaneously as a "gap filler" for government and as agent of social mobilization, and finally whether recent global developments would suggest that Northern NGOs implementing their own big projects will be an historical phenomenon.

A final section of the chapter presents some data from European surveys of people's attitude to aid and NGOs. It discusses NGO activities in relation to fundamental policy questions which have emerged more strongly in the last few years: a) the dilemma between the giver role and equity; b) the NGOs between universalism and cultural relativism; c) the NGOs as "value-sharing" organisations in relation to the aim of "value pluralism", and the "humanitarian mandate" as opposed to "speaking out" organisations. In this discussion some useful concepts are introduced and explained: "community of interests", "zones of cross-cultural communication", "ethics without frontiers" and "NGO pluralism (accepting the incompatibility of moral values).

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Practically all the empirical data that forms the basis of this report has been collected in connection with this study. The fact that there was very little on which we could base our study, indicates that knowledge of the this field has been accidental and superficial, in spite of its significance and scope. This not only reflects a problem in aid administration, but also the paucity of research.

A state-of-the-art paper on Norwegian NGO research in 1990 (Onarheim and Selle 1990) registered only three studies of NGOs in aid (Skar

1987, Steen 1988 and 1989). No study had presented them as a part of a general Norwegian history. Nearly all evaluation reports about NGOs have focused on effects of projects in developing countries. They have seldom dealt with macro-level issues in the recipient countries and even less with the overall historical context and social development that influence the NGO channel in the donor countries, and which it in turn influences.

In order to understand the character of this field of Norwegian aid, it was considered necessary to study its historical development - especially the relationship between organisations and the government. The mutual influence of the history of Norwegian organisations and the aid policies of Norwegian NGOs must be acknowledged. For both purposes, a conceptual bridge must be built between what is "out there" and "back here". The field has not been studied as a part of the history of developing countries only, but as an important aspect of the history of Norway. A comparison between these organisations as aid channels abroad, and the traditions and routines of the same organisations or similar organisations in Norway, was felt to be useful. Public policies, organisations and sectors are always subject to different historical limitations, and how to navigate in the future and which direction to choose cannot be decided in a temporal or spated vacuum.

Historical data

The study has tried to present the dramatic development of this field, as well as changes and continuity in the relations between the Norwegian state and the organisations. These are developments and established structures which strongly affect the framework for future alternatives for action. In order to analyse this long-term development, it was necessary to go further back in time than to the decision on the new NGO strategy of NORAD (1991), the forming of DUH (1984), the establishment of NORADs NGO Division in 1979, etc. The empirical study starts with the establishment of Norwegian Development Aid in 1962 - but the analysis draws lines all the way back to the

activities of the missions in the 1800s. A historical description - comparing the situation of the field along time axis - will more easily bring out the specific features of the present situation.

It was considered important to acquire a large amount of concrete data on central areas in different periods. This has been vital in a field of this kind; development aid and the non-governmental organisations form an arena within which grand ideologies and simple theories have competed with and replaced each other. On the basis of interviews, press headlines, and public documents, it is obvious that many participants have definitive opinions of NGOs, their influence on "civil society", their independence, their professionalism and efficiency, etc. But these opinions are often poorly founded, or founded on personal experiences, which of course will always be narrow and limited. We have emphasised the documentation of changes in public policies, and on justifications presented by central actors. A concrete historical background may thus be outlined - a background which may be useful for reaching an understanding of current dilemmas and possible solutions. Not because history provides "lessons" as to what organisations and government may accomplish in years to come, nor primarily because history provides a structural framework for future choices for participants in the field of aid (although they certainly do), but first and foremost because knowledge of the past may free current decision-makers from the burden of the past: existing institutional, administrative and political arrangements are not "natural" or necessary results of general processes in the field of aid policies and aid administration.

Comparative data

The growth and strong position of non-governmental organisations in Norway seems to be conceived by people in the aid milieu as necessary or historically natural. But merely by referring to France, Great Britain and Japan, we may show that alternative solutions exist. In 1988 the NGOs received 0.3%, 0.4% and 0.7% respectively from the official aid budgets of these countries, while in Switzerland this figure represented more than 17% of ordinary aid

appropriations (OECD 1990:16). Generalisations build on the perception that "the state needs private aid organisations"; or that the growth of NGOs may be explained by general economic laws about the higher total costs of other ways of organising these activities, are not very useful when analysing a particular NGO scene. If we hope to understand the position and function of the field, general expressions of this kind are of little value. Developments must be placed in a concrete historical context, as an interplay between national tradition, history and different kinds of international influences. Likewise it is necessary to place and analyse the NGOs working in developing countries in an historical context. The NGO scene has generally been analysed in an ahistorical manner influenced by the jargon of the present.

NGOs have become increasingly popular internationally during the past decade, when it comes to attracting research activity. In other OECD countries too, research on development aid tends to be kept separate from other forms of social research. Studies of NGOs are largely limited to project assessments and evaluations of their role in development countries, at the micro level. Several evaluations have been carried out in recent years. The data are of varying quality, but where it is possible and fruitful, we have tried to make use of them as a basis for comparison between Norway and other donor countries.

Special emphasis has been given to a comparison between so-called "like-minded" countries, such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada, in a few selected areas. The objective of this comparison has been twofold: In Phase I the aim was to clarify the special features of the Norwegian organisational pattern; its history, its dilemmas and possibilities, by comparing them to other countries' systems. In Phase II the aim has been to map how different donors organise their NGO support and how aid communities conceive of the role of the NGOs and the relation between NGOs and the donor state.

Two types of data have been used: 1) Written sources on public financial and administrative systems within this sector. A number of sources have been used, such as government documents,

evaluation reports and scientific articles. Comparative studies encounter serious problems of measurement, concerning both the validity and comparability of the data, not least since the field has been defined differently in the different countries. Our comparisons must therefore be seen as means to extract rough outlines. 2) In addition, a number of interviews in the above-mentioned countries have been undertaken.

As described below, the study has also attempted to compare between NGOs working in different countries. Based on different criteria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe were chosen. They were selected because they are all very important countries for Norwegian NGO assistance both in terms of the number of Norwegian NGOs working there and annual expenditures. In addition, NORAD has played different roles there regarding both Norwegian NGOs and national NGOs, so that the countries bring forth the heterogeneity of the NGO channel. These countries were also selected because of the different recent history of state/society relations, with important impacts on the NGO scene. In Nicaragua the Sandinist government had a close contact with, and encouraged very pro-government NGOs to cooperate, with Northern NGOs. After the Sandinistas lost the elections, the former pro-government NGOs became anti-government NGOs, at the same time as the present government has reduced the role of the state and supports establishment of NGOs but as social delivery agents in a society with a rolled-back state. In Ethiopia the history of NGO-state relations is very different. The emergencies in the Horn of Africa in the 1970s and 1980s created an influx of Northern NGOs, while the Mengistu government restricted the growth of national NGOs. The new government in Addis Ababa has encouraged the establishment of NGOs, on both religious and ethnic grounds, while attempting to tighten control of foreign NGOs. In Zimbabwe the NGO-government relations have generally been enigmatic, and most foreign and national NGOs attached to the aid channel have been pro-government NGOs. Lately, and partly as a result of the restructuring programme, this is about to change. Bangladesh is a country in which NGOs are very visible in public life, and the past decade has witnessed a proliferation of national NGOs. In

Bangladesh the conflicts between the state and the NGOs have not so much been related to political issues, as to questions of legitimacy and foreign influence. The four countries selected thus provide different types of state NGO relations at the same time as they provide different types of Norwegian NGO channels. The study has carried out country analyses of these four countries, has collected a wide variety of relevant written archival sources on both NORAD's and the NGOs' efforts there, and has had meetings with both Norwegian and local NGOs working in the countries.

What should be the level of analysis? One level chosen was that of the Norwegian government, parliament and the national institutions that implemented official Norwegian policy on NGOs (including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Ministry of Development Cooperation and NORAD). Our study includes both development aid - meaning long term assistance and refugee aid as well as humanitarian aid. A close reading of all Reports to the Storting and parliamentary debates in this field has formed the basis for a reconstruction of the political developments and how policy changes have been justified. These were then compared to the way state institutions have carried out this policy. The policy and administrative guidelines for the various state units, the public coordination of policy and their relation to organisations have been studied (especially by a reconstruction of the history of NORAD guidelines and discussions at NORAD Board meetings.

All organisations

On the one hand, our objective was to present an all-embracing description of the field and its history in Norway. One method may be called an extensive, quantitative analysis. One study reconstructed in detail the state budget and its distribution of funds to the different NGOs over time; the number and types of projects supported by the state, the geographical location of the supported projects; their profile, etc. Especially for the years 1981, 1987, 1991 and 1993 in particular a great deal of data were collected and analysed.

In addition, the study collected central, written documentation material for 1988-1991 from all the 99 organisations registered at the NGO Division in NORAD. We received information from 83 of these organisations. Twelve organisations replied that there had been no aid activity in this period. Four organisations did not respond. For the 83 organisations, their objectives, total budget for developing countries, state support compared to own financing; project portfolio and the number of employees working with developing countries were registered and analysed. In the Phase I report we presented a rather complete picture of this Norwegian scene. We found that information registered in different DAC overviews was inaccurate.

Selected organisations and areas

Data have been collected at three levels:

Ten organisations were selected on the basis of different criteria; The Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian People's Aid, Save the Children, Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions, Norwegian Missionary Society, Strømme Memorial Foundation, the Latin American Solidarity Groups of Norway, Norwegian Council for Southern Africa, Norwegian Association for the Blind and Partially Sighted and The Norwegian Association for the Disabled. The Norwegian Employer's Confederation (NHO) was originally one of the selected organisations. They withdrew from the NORAD cooperative project at approximately the time of this evaluation, and we therefore decided that the inclusion of NHO in this study would be irrelevant. These organisations were chosen because they belonged to different categories of Norwegian organisations (see chapter V), and because they represented different working styles within the same categories.

These organisations' annual reports, strategy documents, evaluation reports, etc., from every year in the period 1981 to 1991 were collected and analysed (for a list of sources, see the final pages of this report). In addition a questionnaire was distributed to these 10 organisations.

In addition four organisations were selected in order to carry out comparative case studies (Norwegian Association for the Blind and Partially Sighted, Norwegian Missionary Society, the Latin American Solidarity Groups of Norway and Save the Children) to study : the learning ability of the organisations their administrative set-up and their financial arrangements.

In order to gather empirical data on the NGO channel in the four countries a questionnaire was distributed to about 150 Norwegian and national organisations in the four countries (see appendix). Almost all relevant organisations replied and thus provided new empirical data on a wide range of relational issues and other information about 221 programmes in these four countries. The answers have to be interpreted in different ways according to their nature, but in general the replies seem to be accurate and balanced, also because the respondents knew that the present study was in a position to check the correctness of the information given.

The main approach has been to carry out archive studies and close readings of different kinds of written material, and to collect different kinds of written data: parliamentary documents as well as documents from NORAD and the organisations carry more weight as sources to the history of this field than individual statements in individual interviews, in retrospect. This method was also chosen in order to achieve the greatest possible distance and independence from the different actors and special interests this field. A much used and less demanding method in evaluation studies - interviews - involves problems of memory, recollection, the wish to "gloss over" the past, or to "blacken" it, depending on the present position of the interviewee. Hundreds of interviews have, nevertheless, been carried out, in order to check/improve the interpretation of the written material, and to fill in the gaps in our analysis.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On what basis can recommendations be made? It is of course possible (depending on ideology and values) to support or reject NGO assistance in general. The NGO channel has all the following functions: agent of privatization on a global scale; cultural imperialist *per se*; and a force which gives the impression that a lot of positive things are going on in changing power relations, while nothing important is really achieved. In many cases they have also been a wasteful channel of delivery of social services, because they do not have the comparative advantages that the NGO myths give them.

These recommendations take as one starting point that NGOs in development have all the above functions. On this basis, Some may conclude: block the channel! Others will say: pour more money into the channel. But, as has also been shown, NGOs may have other functions as well, and not least, other potentials. Norwegian NGOs have helped to save thousands, perhaps millions of lives during the years, they have managed to mobilise the Norwegian people in showing empathy and solidarity with people on other continents whom they do not know and will never meet and they have established zones of communication and built communities of interests that differ from relations created by states and firms. Here the official aims and official policies are taken as a starting point. Are these policies and guidelines conducive, counterproductive or self-contradictory in achieving their stated aims, and are the stated aims and policies clear, consistent and in line with overall declared intentions?

The recommendations relate to three different levels. The most fundamental level deals with more general and abstract issues such as policy, strategies, definitional issues etc. The second level deals with issues of importance for how the state administers the NGO channel. The third level deals with the NGOs themselves.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO OVERALL POLICY ISSUES

1. Change of justification. The state and the NGOs should *change the justification of the NGO channel.* Whether the present proportion of funds channelled through NGOs (about 25 per cent) is appropriate, this study could not tell. It has, however, shown that the use of the channel, legitimized by arguments about general "comparative advantages", is untenable because the NGOs are too diverse, their relation to states and recipients so different, their competence and cost-effectiveness so varying and their power generally so modest. The "old" legitimation should be "cut down" to more realistic proportions (the study did show that some NGOs - in certain contexts - may exhibit some of their hailed qualities), and be supplemented by a new justification that bases itself upon what is their one common characteristic: i.e., that they do not formally belong to the state system.

- This alternative justification for the NGO channel should focus on the following points (this is discussed in chapter V): a) expanding the "community of interest", i.e. Norwegian NGOs should seek international networks and national NGOs with common interests so as to forward their specific values; b) establishing and broadening zones of cross-cultural communication where relations should aim at more equity and dialogue than is normally the case in other international arenas. The NGOs (both Norwegian and others) may play an important role in educating Norwegians and people in other countries in the value of pluralism and the plurality of morally acceptable value hierarchies; c) the NGOs should play a more important role in mobilising people for solidarity and concern, by organising the "good act" but without reproducing stereotyped images of "the other"; d) the NGOs may play a more important and useful role if they focus on exporting a particular type of expertise to where it is asked for, rather than to continue as Jacks-of-all-trades in the development aid business.

From one point of view this justification is more realistic, since it is based on their formal "nongovernmentality". On the other hand it is more "idealistic", in the sense that it pay more attention to the NGOs' value orientations. The NGOs and their leaders will have to address a

prevailing dilemma with more direction: Is their mission to expand as producers of social services or as contractors for state policies (which might gradually sharpen the already stiff competition for market shares, i.e. money from the state), or are they in the business primarily to promote some values and achieve development results that "only" they can deliver?

This also implies making some concrete decisions:

- *The new NORAD-guidelines for support to NGOs, issued in September 1994, should be withdrawn or reformulated on important points.*

Although in many regards it represents an improvement, it repeats some of the NGO myths and dogmas, while the description of their tasks do not include some of the most important challenges of the NGOs in the 1990s. They serve the function of making the channel less intelligible, and may distort the ability to formulate the role of NGOs in aid and the ability to put forward a strategy for their work.

- *The NGO actors should propose that the official description of their capacities, potentials and drawbacks are more balanced.* The funding institutions and the NGOs should have a policy for bringing the NGO image down to more real proportions (as an immediate measure NGOs should "forbid" their spokesmen to say absolutely absurd things like: "we reach always the most needy"!).

2. A clear policy framework for NGO assistance has not yet, after 30 years, been formulated. To do so should be a priority. The policy framework as formulated in the Report to the Storting No. 51 (1991-92) should be replaced by a strategy which is more specific on the importance and role of NGOs, which emphasises the need for country-specific analysis and which makes a more realistic assessment of their potential contribution to development and democracy.

Previous policies do not address present global development processes, such as the religious revival, the ideological and political challenges to the legitimacy of the state, the new trend (in Norway) to make aid explicitly a part of the donor state's foreign policy and economic policy etc. The strategy development at present under

way in NORAD should be continued and may be built upon, but must be broadened in order to encompass these fundamental changes affecting the international frameworks of the NGO channel.

- Country strategies should be formulated by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *These ought to include analyses of the relation between the state and the society and the potential role of different types of organisations.* Past and present country strategies have generally been very superficial and have not even attempted to include necessary analyses of this kind. This has led to *ad hoc* policies and a profile of Norwegian NGO assistance which is not in line with official aims.

- In this work it is most important that the Storting, MFA, NORAD and other actors within the channel consider what the Norwegian attitude should be to the "new paradigm" regarding the role of NGOs in development. Globally, there is a fight for the ideological hegemony of the fast-growing NGO channel. A clear attitude would enhance the potential influence of Norwegian actors in international debates on NGOs in aid. This standpoint should consciously and openly relate to the Scandinavian or Norwegian "model" of close cooperation between state and organisations. The point is not to formulate a blueprint of this model, but to draw up a strategy which is based on and related to national and international experience. Despite its unique history in this field, Norway has had no political-ideological voice of its own.

3. The strategy for linking emergency aid and development aid is not very sophisticated, and needs to be paid more attention, because of the growing number of what has been called "complex emergencies" and because of problems inherent in the developmentalism that has influenced Norwegian aid thinking. Report to the Storting No. 51 (1991-92) declared that *emergency aid should be more closely linked to development assistance, and that long-term development was most important.* Emergency aid has become the most dominant activity for the NGO channel, in spite of all policy declarations. If present funding trends continue this development will be strengthened. This also counteracts what

governments in many developing countries say is most important. This development is furthered by present administrative set-ups. But it fundamentally reflects conceptual problems in grasping the new developments and interventions from Norwegian foreign policy interests, which are not yet integrated in national policy for the NGOs in such situations. NORAD thinks it has a clear development strategy. The MFA thinks it has a clear emergency strategy. The problem, especially from NORAD's point of view, is the area between. It makes little sense to have a "clear" development strategy and a "clear" emergency strategy, since what is needed is a strategy that regards both elements as part of a development process. To develop a clear policy for this complex field will also improve the administrative system and save money, because it will make it possible to use funds more rationally and efficiently.

4. The experience of MFA in using NGOs as contractors in foreign policy initiatives should be assessed.

A very important and far-reaching reorientation of Norwegian NGO aid and Norwegian foreign policy has taken place during the last few years. This policy needs to be discussed and analysed by the Government, Parliament and the MFA, based on experiences to date.

5. In order to develop a clear strategy it is important to improve our understanding of what the NGO channel is and what it contains.

- One way of doing this is for MFA, NORAD and the organisations to refine present definitions of the NGO and try to agree on a term and definition of what an NGO/"voluntary organisation" is, which is broad and at the same time not value-exclusive. Implicit definitions or ideas about what an NGO is, lie at the heart of the NGO myths. To the extent that Norwegian actors have ambitions to play any role internationally, it is also important to have a clear idea about what one is talking about (especially since there is both widespread confusion and struggle for ideological hegemony).

- *The term "private organisations" should be replaced by the term "frivillig" or "voluntary" organisations in Norway.* This is due to national traditions, actual characteristics (they are not very private but most of them have some voluntary inputs), and it reflects better what the state and the organisations are concerned with and should be more concerned with (autonomy, identity, mission, roots in society, etc.).

- NORAD should also consciously develop different classification systems that fit their different demands, both in a Norwegian context and within the different countries. Developing such categorizations and discussing them within the aid system could be a very efficient instrument in clarifying strategies, because this would help both donors, NGOs and governments to decide what they expect from the channel. The NORAD/NGO representations in the different countries should be asked to develop such a classification system within a definite time limit, as a means of stimulating knowledge-gathering and reflection on the organisational landscape they have impacted, and which they wish to influence in the future.

6. Guidelines for how NGOs should relate to state policies are unclear and contradictory. The present "rules" are not coherently adapted to present day conflicts and tensions.

- The Storting should discuss the neutrality paragraph again on the basis of experiences during the 30 years of NGO assistance. NORAD should withdraw its new regulations which have changed the neutrality paragraph without prior discussions in the Storting. In a context in which NGOs increasingly become actors in political, cultural and ethnic conflicts, and the focus on religion and civilization as part of the "aid project" becomes more important, it is necessary to assess whether past and present guidelines are sufficient.

- *The question of the relation between mission activities and aid should be reopened.* Since the NGO channel was established, the question of relations between civilizations, religions and cultures has become gradually more important in peoples perception of NGOs. The question of cross-cultural communication is a challenge that

NGOs face to a larger extent in the 1990s, than when aid and development were regarded as a rather easy, unilinear process. Both the mission organisations (Bistandsnemnda has initiated what has been an important process: studies of mission and nationalisation processes) and the state should initiate studies about experiences and challenges inherent in this relationship. The role of Christian missions as part of the state's public NGO channel will become a core issue if religious contradictions become more important internationally. At the present time, the state has no well-reflected policy on the issue.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES IN THE STATE BUREAUCRACY:

I. There is a need for better national coordination of NGO support, especially between support for development and emergency/human rights. Experience shows that present policies are inefficient in terms of resource utilization, and that they create problems for the organisations and between the organisations and their partners.

An assessment of the administrative set-up must be seen in a longer time perspective. Twenty years from now, if support continues on the same level, about NOK 25 billion will have been channelled through NGOs, in addition to the more than NOK 15 billion that will have been given by the Norwegian people. Should a practice continue whereby NORAD will give about NOK 10 billion and the Foreign Ministry perhaps some more in the next two decades, to the same organisations, for related tasks, but without institutionalized coordination?

The existing system was set up at a time when emergency aid was marginal and developmentalism was the dominant ideology. Its institutionalization is based on a concept of development and emergencies that has its roots in the developmentalist ideology of the 1960s and 70s. It does not reflect or cater for global changes in the developmentalist project and the rising incidence of complex emergency situations.

- As long as the present administrative set-up

continues the declared aim of development aid as the most important field for the NGOs will not easily be reached. Within present structures it will also be more difficult to channel more emergency aid to local NGOs in different countries, as would become natural if the policy of "recipient responsibility" and "partnership" is further developed in the years to come.

- If NGOs are to work in development on a long-term basis, this would require that the funds that they are given, are given to a greater extent under the same conditions and better coordinated. At present, MFA in reality also makes big allocations for development aid, without having built up an apparatus which can handle it.

- The present administrative set-up also affects the rather peripheral role, of NGO issues in country strategies, in spite of their importance in terms of money and personnel. There are two options:

a) Administratively, this problem can be reduced by *dissolving the NGO Division* and giving the Regional Departments in NORAD, Oslo, the responsibility for NGO support. From one "NORAD-internal" perspective this may look convenient, but it presupposes that Norwegian NGOs can be coordinated with Norwegian state policy in different countries, and that all NGO support to countries where NORAD has no country programs should be marginalized or, over time, terminated. It would also enlarge the gulf between emergency/human rights support and long-term development aid. This solution would therefore have important drawbacks.

b) *A bigger NGO Division under NORAD could be established.* If so, it should possess more authority and leverage vis à vis the different NORAD Departments and should have the competence and capacity to play a leading and efficient role in Norway, and to strengthen their potential to influence the international debate on NGOs. This arrangement must pay heed to Norwegian experience and might also be based on a close analysis of the Swedish system, which resembles this proposition. It should also facilitate better coordination of development and emergency aid, and reduce the incentive and potentials for exploiting NGOs for more short term foreign policy interests. In practice this would also imply

that NORAD taking over responsibility for emergency aid.

- Proposal b) above may find justification in the fact that we are experiencing, not necessarily an associational revolution as some argue, but at least important social and political processes within which the NGO aid channel is playing an important role. In this context *NGO policies should be an important task in Norwegian foreign policy and aid policy. Norway may have a role to play internationally in this field, due to a combination of several factors; its non-colonial past, its smallness, its lack of strategic interests, and the availability of funds and experienced organisations.* It may also find justification in the discussion of the relation between complex emergencies and development. Moreover, if the main thrust of the channel is not to be the provision of more or less efficient instruments in a service delivery context, but to establish other forms of partnership and networks in development, then such a bigger division may become useful.

II. NORAD should consider gradually terminating its support for local NGOs, because of foreign policy considerations and problems related to power structures, sustainability and organisational cultures. The study has shown that NORAD has carried out this task in an unsatisfactory manner. However, NORAD Oslo and some of the Country Offices have given the task - at least occasionally - the attention it deserves. The argument here is that even if NORAD manages to improve its policy (within the existing structural limitations), there are structural relations pertaining to power and organisational culture between an embassy and a local organisation which would make proper "institution building" and equal "partnership" difficult to achieve. If the aim is to use the local organisations for specific political purposes, which is an idea that goes against Norwegian traditional relationships with these countries, then this should be the task of the Foreign Ministry rather than NORAD.

- *A certain portion of the funds should be channelled through Norwegian NGOs,* because these organisations are in a better position to support institution building, establish long-term relations, and create global networks outside

existing state and multilateral institutions. The Norwegian state is in a better position to implement such an NGO policy than most other donor nations, since Norway has few economic, strategic or political interests in most of the countries in which NORAD has an office. The point is not that experience shows that Norwegian NGOs are good, or better than NORAD, at institution building and long-term partnership. The argument is rather that due to structural mechanisms and relations, the Norwegian NGOs have potentials that NORAD, as a foreign state institution, can never realise.

- *A certain portion of the funds should be channelled through the national recipient governments to local NGOs,* working in agreement with the government. This does not imply that NORAD should only support government-friendly "gap-filling" organisations, but that it should put forth specific ideas and proposals in negotiations with governments about what kind of NGOs should be supported in this way. By channelling some of its resources in this manner, NORAD may help to strengthen the accountability of governments, reduce those unproductive tensions between organisations and governments that are linked to the question of foreign interference and improve the efficiency in resource utilisation. This policy must, of course, also vary from country to country, since it in some countries would have a negative effect on the society and might also seriously weaken strong and popular, but oppositional NGOs.

- *This policy must be country specific:* In some countries (like Tanzania and Zambia), there are very few Norwegian NGOs that can take over NORAD's present commitments. In Bangladesh the Norwegian NGOs are unable to take on much more than what they already have etc. The point is not that the policy should or could be changed overnight, but that the direction and strategy should be altered, while the implementation should be pragmatic and gradual.

- *If and when the Norwegian government wants to support some local NGOs because of specific political reasons* (human rights issues, advocacy etc.) this should not be the responsibility of the local NORAD NGO officer, but should be handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These are issues of possible important diplomatic consequences. Therefore such decisions should be

made on this basis, although in practice also in the future in some countries it must be handled by NORAD due to capacity and administrative factors.

III) NORAD should not reduce the relative position of Norwegian NGOs as receivers of funds. NORAD is one of the few donors that give support directly to local NGOs and to international NGOs. NORAD should continue to support international NGOs, if they are asked to provide the same reports, financial statements, project proposals etc. as Norwegian NGOs. NORAD should also continue to support local NGOs but in different ways than what has been done in the past (see above). Norwegian NGOs have, however, a special importance - and their importance should not only be seen in a "development perspective". They provide also important links with and face-to-face relations between the Norwegian society and non-European countries. *Their role as transmitters of funds to local NGOs however, should be strengthened, both in development aid and complex emergency situations. This development must match local capacities. On the other hand, the "absorption capacity" of the Norwegian channel has in general been reached - at least for some years to come. Some NGOs have already become to resemble mini-NORADs in important aspects.*

IV. The state should continue to mobilize a broader selection of Norwegian organisations into this channel, defined as a social and cultural network. This should be based on their need for international contacts, learning requirements and their special competences that could be transferred to other countries. To close the door to new organisations in general because there are no more professional development NGOs is unreasonable and is based on ideas about the role of NGOs that belongs to a time when NGOs should be operational NGOs. Some of these organisations may be very professional in a "community of interests" perspective, as exporters of special expertise or as organisations that can anchor this work and cross-cultural communication in more sections of Norwegian society. NORAD has already helped to create a unique involvement of NGOs in aid. In the future they should expand this activity to create an even broader involvement in

aid and "cross-cultural" communication.

- *The state should be aware of the fact that a very small minority of Norwegian NGOs take up to 70 per cent of total official funds. This monopoly trend has come further here than in other areas where NGOs work for ministries in Norway. The problem is not that some good organisations get money other organisations could have handled better, but that some big organisations are given more money than they themselves can handle.*

IV. NORAD should initiate relevant studies of state/society relations in cooperating countries. As a follow up of its support to the compilation of NGO directories in several countries NORAD should *initiate and support studies/research projects (how it should be organised should be based on the context) on the history of the NGO system in different countries, how it relates to the third sector in the society (if there is any), its conflicts and links with the apparatus of state etc.* Such studies may be an important element in these countries' self-understanding, and will of course assist NORAD and other donors in their local NGO policy (see below).

V. NORAD should maintain its policy of strengthening NGOs' autonomy and identity. For example: NORAD should maintain the prevailing 80 to 20 % ratio of government to NGO shares of total project costs. *This is important to reduce dependence and strengthen organisational autonomy. The aim should be to gradually increase the ratio of the NGOs but at the same time implement this policy with pragmatism and care.* How far it is possible to go in this direction also depends on the general political situation in Norway, the status of the NGO community, the general concern for third world matters, etc. This policy should not become an end in itself but should be regarded as a means to achieving autonomous NGOs with their own value orientations.

- NORAD should consider its present administrative system vis à vis Norwegian NGOs as *sufficiently developed*, and rather be aware of possible unintended consequences for the organisations' activity profile and on the character of the NGOs that they will tend to

create over time.

VI. National authorities should be more careful than they have been to use the NGO channel as a channel for excess funds or for funds that need to be spent quickly. There are quite a few cases in which the state (NORAD and especially the MFA) has "begged" the organisations to take on projects that they - at least sometimes - have been reluctant to take on. Such projects may of course be very relevant, but they may also be detrimental to relationships that the organisations have built up over the years. It may always look nice in a Norwegian political budgetary context, but it may smell terrible in a development aid context, on the ground, where people are running around trying to spend enough money on things that have not been planned. The state should instead tell the Norwegian tax-payer that in order to spend money for development wisely it is better to wait for the right moment and the right project than to rush and "throw" money on NGOs or projects.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE NORWEGIAN NGOS

i). More Norwegian NGOs should *formulate strategy documents* for the decade(s) to come. These should include careful assessments of their relation to Norwegian national institutions and to institutions in the recipient countries. They should include an identification of partners and should state how these partnerships can gradually become more equal and reciprocal. They should also include an assessment of their particular strengths, and develop a policy for knowledge and staff development accordingly. They should include analyses of how the organisation can be even better geared towards cooperation with groups with common interests or towards problem-solving for the poor and oppressed, rather than being too much affected, by and too much dependent on, media coverage at home. Some NGOs should also clarify to what extent their mission is to become a big professional development aid firm, and/or to what extent the organisations should be built upon shared values. - A starting point should be that lack of clear ideas and strategies will increase coordination problems in developing countries. Thousands of

international NGOs in search of projects or implementing "Jack of all trades" projects may be very inefficient development policy.

- Another starting point should be: What should be most important: focus on shared values or focus on the maximization of funds? Should the NGOs look for big projects they can start or fund, or should they look for important gaps in ongoing processes, which they may stimulate with smaller amounts of money but with more expertise? NGOs will also in the future be involved in very different types of projects. There will be cases in which large-scale implementation of social service delivery will still be most appropriate. The individual NGO should decide in what direction it wants to go in these issues.

ii) The Norwegian NGOs involved in emergency assistance should consider how to develop an organisation and a policy that can *cope with the complex emergency situations* which seem to become more and more common in many developing countries. They should be aware that the comparatively easy availability of funds from the Foreign Ministry may change the organisations' profile without being planned or intended. They should *pay heed to experiences that show that isolated emergency initiatives may have devastating effects in the long run.* Rather than separating development from emergency, as two different processes, they should develop personnel, knowledge and administration that are able to cope with these as different aspects of the same development situation. Because of the public funding situation in Norway, many large NGOs are heading in the opposite direction. This requires discussion on the role of neutrality, advocacy etc., which the different organisations should solve in a way that fits their agendas.

iii) *The organisations should continue to assess the relationship between engagements, activities and aims on the one side and the need for adequate knowledge and competence on the other side.* NGO staffs are growing in Norway and abroad, especially in some important humanitarian organisations, due to emergency work. There is an obvious lack of knowledge in the organisations, especially regarding macro-issues like history, economy etc., and how the

organisations may relate to ideological trends. Turnover of staff, rapid growth in some organisations and their set-ups, make it important for the organisations to manage this dilemma. *Organisations should consider establishing their own "development aid school", or a kind of permanent "seminar" or more systematically attach themselves to NORAD's programme for staff development (Bistandsskolen).* This is especially important if NGOs reorient their activity towards "community of interests", "partnership" and "dialogue". Then they will need to be educated not only in the history and role of developing countries, but in their own values, Norwegian history, the "Scandinavian" model, etc.

iv) NGOs have lately focused more on supporting organisational and institutional processes, which *aim at building up institutional strength and capacity in the non-governmental sector. This development should be strengthened and continued - because it reflects global processes of change.*

- In order to increase "equity" and "reciprocity" in this process, they should *search for people/organisations with whom they have a "community of interests".* This will imply the export of Norwegian models for organizing societies, which may be more productive than export of unclear donor paternalism, covered in rhetoric about "universal" ideas of popular participation, etc. This means trade unions mixing with trade unions, churches with churches, women groups with women's groups, Redd Barna with Redd Barna groups, etc. (over time).

- Finding such partners solves fewer problems than organisations tend to believe (or at least like to tell). When NCA finds a church partner, that does not mean that NCA finds either a good or an honest partner. *Proper analysis and understanding of the organisations should be a prerequisite* for funding, to avoid what has sometimes been the case: the joy of finding a partner - at a seminar, etc., has overshadowed the need for assessing its capacities and character.

- NGOs should on the one hand, *treat these partners as they themselves are treated by*

NORAD; i.e. as demanding reports, audit statements etc. There are too many examples where "good-hearted" NGO support has - understandably - created corruption and embezzlement, and thus weakened the standing of the NGO community in the country as a whole. On the other hand the Norwegian NGO should allow the cooperating organisations to treat them with the same necessary openness. In practice this will never happen. But it should be an aim. Very often, Norwegian NGOs in discussion with their partners defend reduction in support by alluding to lack of or reduction in funds from the Norwegian state or in their private donations. This is often not true, and over time will erode their credibility. Partnership requires - at least this kind of partnership relating to such issues - that policy disagreements and project disagreements are spelled out.

v) The Norwegian NGOs should *continue the ongoing debate on autonomy and identity.* In practice this can be done by building up links with international NGO networks and local and regional NGOs in order to *create zones of cross-cultural communication with more equity and reciprocity* than is the case in other international networks and institutions. They should build on what is a real comparative asset, but an asset which gives opportunities that have not been sufficiently grasped: Norwegian NGOs are considered as "do-gooders" internationally and organizers of altruism in Norway, and are supported by a state that has less dominant interests and more credibility than most other states, when it comes to aid as an altruistic, solidarity project.

vi). Organisations that are implementing organisations should consider how their activities can gradually be changed to some form of partnership, either with local organisations or with international networks. *Political global developments will make the above type of project more difficult to undertake* in the future in most countries.

vii). Norwegian NGOs should *critically assess their information activities* in Norway. It has long been a conventional wisdom that nation infowork has been an important factor behind Norwegian

attitudes to aid. This view cannot be substantiated. Polls indicate that the NGOs themselves have not managed to reach the population at large. There can be no doubt that much information is producing images of "the other" that distorts the build up of equity and partnership in the long run, since they are images created in order to mobilise financial support rather than understanding. On the other hand; a number of NGOs have produced leaflets and booklets that challenge dominant attitudes. The NGOs should ask themselves: If the present practice continues, *what will we have taught the Norwegian people 20 years from now?* A policy which is based on manipulation or instant media successes erodes the legitimacy of the channel in the long run, and even more important, the NGOs will have been an important psychological-cultural force that hinders equitable relations, and creates stereotypes rather than knowledge.

viii) *The NGOs should strengthen their systems of quality control.* Evaluations have often been nothing less than a costly ritual, and generally very narrowly focused, and often carried out by people who have had a stake in the project themselves. If the NGOs are to improve their development work, and if they are to improve their role in different networks, in cross-cultural communication and in information work in Norway, it is of vital importance to initiate broad and critical assessments of their work.

A DESCRIPTION OF THE NGO LANDSCAPE

The knowledge about the NGO channel and the organisations it comprises, as well as the organisations' knowledge about each others' working principles and experiences as channels for the authorities, has been superficial and scanty both in donor countries and in developing countries. In reports to the Parliament in Norway, the sector has generally been underrepresented due to lack of overall perspective, as well as coordination problems between state institutions. In other countries, the sector may be overrepresented either to attract donor funds or to dramatize foreign influence through NGOs. A number of organisations in Norway (and also local NGOs in developing countries) have, to a certain extent, guarded their "secrets" and positions in relation to the state and donors as a result of their becoming competitors in an aid market, while other NGOs, mostly in developing countries, have been forced to protect themselves against state suppression. This chapter will describe and analyse the NGO scene in Norway and four developing countries. It relates to points 3.1, 4.1, 5.2 and 5.3 in TOR.

THE NGO SECTOR IN NORWAY

Main findings: For the present purpose the development of Norwegian NGOs in aid can be separated into four distinct phases (for a more detailed and empirical description of the sector's history, see Tvedt 1992): a missionary phase (1860 to 1960s) where the focus was on diacony and the work had no or little financial public support and then three phases all related to NGO/government relations, an establishment phase (1963 to 1978), an expansion phase (1978-1992) and a consolidation phase (1992-).¹ Since 1992 the number of organisations has slightly decreased, and during the last years very few new organisations have entered the field.

Although the government has played a very central role in modern Norwegian welfare state history (the concept of "the Scandinavian model" catches these characteristics),² the voluntary sector has been rather strong.³ It has

been said that especially the Scandinavian social democratic model provided social welfare with "no ideological space for voluntary organization" (Lorentzen 1989:11). In the case of development aid, the growth in official aid has definitely not made the voluntary organisations redundant (See Tvedt 1992).⁴ On the contrary, the substantial growth in official ODA has led to an even stronger growth in government-support to NGOs and their ideological space has been enlarged (see for example Reports to the Parliament on development aid.)

What needs explanation is the emergence of this rather large sector within the field and the very significant growth in NGO activities from 1963 to 1993. Readers from developing countries should note that seen from a national, Norwegian point of view and in a wider time perspective, the activity from 1962 to 1992 was a pioneering period; it was a period when Norwegian organisations started their work for development in other countries and they also became crucial in informing Norwegians about the third world. A study of the activities of NGOs in Norway is consequently relevant, not only to the foreign and aid policy of the organisations themselves; it also involves describing a main channel through which the reality of "the others" is filtered. Thus, the strengths and weaknesses of the field and its degree of amateurism or professionalism should also be seen in such a historical perspective.

NGO growth⁵

Norwegian missions had since the middle of the last century been working in countries like Madagascar, South Africa and China. Their aim was of course to spread the Gospel, and as part of their strategy they established hospitals, schools etc., supported financially by their congregations in Norway. Before 1963, 20 organisations worked in developing countries using their own funds only. In 1963 the state for the first time channelled money through what the Storting called "private organisations". Seven Norwegian organisations got a total support of NOK 3 million for seven projects. The Reports to the Parliament in the 1960s and 1970s argued that the NGOs should be mobilized to take part in development aid. From the very beginning it

was underlined that the organisations should take care to maintain their independence.⁶ The establishment of the NGO Division (a direct English translation would be the "Office for private organisations") in 1978 made it clear that the state aimed at institutionalising the support of Norwegian NGOs. In that year NORAD supported 34 Norwegian organisations, and the total budget for NGOs was a little less than NOK 50 mill. This was 4 per cent of Norwegian bilateral aid. At the same time policy and guidelines for the NGO field were fundamentally revised (1977 and 1979): The establishment phase was over.

During the next decade the support "exploded". NORADs support to NGOs grew rapidly year by year from 1980. In 1981, NORAD supported 70 organisations with NOK 80 millions. In 1982 NORAD allocated an extra NOK 64 million. New guidelines were put forth where NORAD directly could support local NGOs in Norway's main cooperating countries and international organisations. "Frame agreements" with the largest Norwegian NGOs, (rotational for 3 years) were also initiated at this time. By 1991, 134 Norwegian organisations, many hundred "local" organisations and between 20 and 30 international NGOs working in about 100 countries were supported by the Norwegian government with about NOK 1,2 billion. While the NGOs share of the total aid budget averaged 7,2 percent for the whole period from 1963 to 1981, it was increased during the 1980s to 25per cent of the total bilateral aid in the early 1990s. About 43 "new" organisations started work in developing countries in this decade. The relationship between the state and the organisations was during this period not only broadened in scope, but it also became more routinised and bureaucratised. Different governments formulated a number of new guidelines, defining them as both operators for and partners with the state. During the same period many organisations took on commissioned work for both the Foreign Ministry and NORAD, especially in relief and emergency and in specific programs such as AIDS, the Sahel program etc. Not only had the size of the channel increased, but some organisations now also carried out projects that were 100 per cent financed by the state. A

logical outcome of this development was that the organisations, or at least some of them, at the end of this period had become what can be called nonprofits for hire.

In 1992 a consolidation phase was initiated. The Foreign Ministry launched a major review of past experiences and NORAD broadened their reappraisal of past NGO policies. Many organisations felt that time had come to reassess their profile and working methods. Although the support to the NGO-sector is still on the increase, the growth in budgets and official transfers have flattened out. Few new organisations are entering the field. The state is aiming at professionalizing the organisations, partly by stream-lining their administrative governance and partly by stressing the need for the organisations to maintain and strengthen their autonomy and identity. At the same time there has been a growing pressure for coordination between NORAD and the Norwegian NGOs, and an alignment in policies and geographical areas between the state and the NGOs. The organisations on their side discuss (to organise) a lobbying organisation for voluntary activities within the aid sector. Clearly, the NGOs and the NGO/state relationship are at a crossroads now⁷.

The growth of NGOs has not been based on experience as to their development role. The introduction of NGOs into the field and the growth of the sector were effectuated by conscious government decisions. In the early 1960s - when government-to-government aid was undisputed as the main and best form of aid - they were invited to the arena by the state: they should cooperate in government programs and preferably carry out their own projects, but more important; their main task was to help broaden the support for development aid in Norway in general. The state deliberately involved the organisations to achieve a broader aim: the "internationalization" of Norwegian society.⁸

During the late 1970s and early 1980s the state and NORAD deliberately gave a number of offers which the organisations "could not refuse", by reducing the demands for own contribution and by increasing the financial support to administration and management. The initiative was in the hands of the government and

the state, and only gradually the organisations acquired enough political leverage to exert considerable influence on parliamentarians and the aid administration on policy issues and in defining their "space" within the overall ODA. Public pipeline problems (the spending imperative) coupled with rapid growth in emergency budgets, the need for legitimation of and information about aid in Norway, the political demand for alternative channels to sensitive areas and groups (Frelimo, ANC, Palestine etc.) and the government decision to launch aid programs to countries affected by the SAHEL drought outside the traditional areas of Norwegian bilateral aid required alternative channels. The use of the NGO channel was a convenient administrative and political solution for the government - and a solution that would be welcomed by influential NGOs. In some cases the original junior partner played the tune, invading "niches" which NORAD had not planned, because of political and ideological alliances between organisations and politicians.

In 1984-85 the Conservative-Christian government formulated a basic need strategy which made NGOs a central actor in policy implementation (Report to the Parliament no. 36, 1984-84). The government argued that it was important to reach the poorest among the poor and the most vulnerable groups, if necessary by bypassing state structures in the recipient country. The organisations were propagated as an alternative by the state itself, especially with regard to their flexibility, and their ability to pursue a grass-root oriented policy etc.⁹

Because the Norwegian state has had few and not very important political and strategic interests in the developing world, and because the Norwegian business community has had relatively few economic interests in the same countries, development aid has since its start in the 1950s been a field reserved for the "good-hearted", altruistic and mission-oriented Norway.

In Norway popular support to aid has primarily been based on altruistic arguments. In the formative years of Norwegian aid, opinion polls showed that around 40 per cent supported aid because of the moral "duty to assist", while almost none mentioned aid motivated because it

was "positive for Norway" (in 1974 and 1977 none answered this).¹⁰ In Norway the NGOs have traditionally had very weak -mostly nonexistent - connections with the for-profit sector, unlike what has been the situation in many other countries. The fact that Norway has given more money than any other nation in the world, per inhabitant, and that Norway has given it more or less unconditionally has been an important element in Norwegian identity-management and identity-production in the epoch of the development aid.¹¹ The altruistic attitude has been dominating in the public opinion during the whole development aid epoch: In 1993, for example, 66 per cent had the opinion that developing countries receiving aid from Norway should be allowed to buy their products wherever they want, even if it would harm Norwegian firms.¹²

The NGOs have emerged in Norway as one of the most important and most visible organisers of altruism. Norwegian Church Aid, Redd Barna, Norwegian Red Cross etc. have become national symbols of "good-heartedness". The work of the organisations abroad are usually mentioned by the King and the Prime Minister in their addresses to the nation every New Year. Their leaders might speak on moral issues to the nation on television the same days, or they might be "stars" in entertainment programs in prime-time and talkshows, about the need to help. Every autumn they gather the nation in front of the TV-screen in a national campaigning day for unconditional aid to the poor people in the Third World. The NGOs represent a belief that it is not only possible, but also preferable to help other people without expecting reciprocity. Dominant theories of the economic man or the interest-maximizing actor ("If you scratch my back I will scratch yours") is therefore not very useful to understand how the channel has been perceived and understood. Reciprocity and reward have not been implied in the vision of this relation. One important reason for the channel's position in the public view is its image of the selfless, poverty-eradicating and efficient "Good Spirit That Goes" (this does not mean that the people working in the organisations necessarily are more altruistic than people in ordinary forprofits ventures or in public bureaucracies. Therefore the analysis separates between image of the

NGO-group, and the goal and attitudes of the individuals working there.).

The NGOs play a mobilizing role. According to the *EUROBAROMETER* more than half of the Norwegian population was, in 1991, prepared to give some of their time to support "something being done for the Third World", while 29,3 per cent was not willing to do so. The people of Ireland and East-Germany showed the same interest. In EEC at average the percentages were 40,4 for and 40,2 against.¹³ Other polls indicate that Norwegians were less willing to give more money than what they presently did (they seem to have been content with being at the top of the world ranking list. It might also express a growing awareness that gifts are not everything). 38,3 per cent say they are prepared to give more money, while 45,8 per cent are not willing to do this, as compared to an European average of 45.1 percent and 38,6 per cent. In Spain 66,2 per cent are in favour of giving more money, while in France only 24,3 per cent share this opinion.¹⁴

The Norwegian people are organisationally far more involved than what is the case elsewhere in Europe. 16,6 per cent answered that they are a member of an NGO (group or association) working to help the Third World, as compared to an average of 6,6 per cent elsewhere. The figures for the Netherlands are almost as high, 15,1 per cent, while in Portugal 1,2 per cent and in Denmark 8,7 are members of such groups.¹⁵ The strong prevalence of Norwegian NGOs is even clearer when it comes to fund-raising. In Norway 27,2 per cent answer that they have been asked to give some of their time or play a personal part in campaigns or activities to benefit the third world, while the EEC average is 15,3 per cent, and the figures for the Netherlands are 9,5 per cent, in Greece 7,5 per cent and in West Germany 21,5 per cent.¹⁶ The same opinion polls shows that no less than 81.1. per cent of the Norwegians had been asked to give money for some specific project in the Third World, as compared to an average of 54,5 per cent and 63,3 in Netherlands, 27,5 per cent in Greece and 58,9 per cent in Denmark.¹⁷ This indicates that the Norwegian NGOs are more visible in the public and are more active in asking people for contributing their time (and not only their money) than in any of the EEC- countries.¹⁸

The Norwegian NGOs were not more important in providing information about the Third World than NGOs in most other countries. About 10,7 per cent replied that they had "recently" got information from NGOs, as compared to an European average of 11,1 per cent. 13,1 per cent in Norway said they had read information leaflets received at home as compared to an average of 7,4 per cent and 4,4 per cent in West Germany and 3,3 per cent in France. These leaflets are generally issued by NGO, so there is discrepancy between the two answers. It is fair to conclude that the NGOs in Norway have a strong position, and are very important as informants within the "aid community" or "aid family" itself. But in spite of the fact that NORAD is channelling more than NOK 20 million a year through these organisations, the channel does not reach the population to any noticeable extent.

The growth of this sector in Norway cannot be explained by the failure of the state due to its hierarchical structure, bureaucracy etc. Rather it reflects the combined effect of state success in inviting and mobilising Norwegian voluntary organisations to broaden their work to include development aid (for example *Norwegian Confederation of Sports, Norwegian Housewives Association, Norwegian Union of Teachers*) and in changing what originally were solidarity organisations into service providers for official Norwegian aid on the one hand, and the existence of ideological and political diversity in society on the other. Many of the different NGOs represent not social strata in an economic sense or consumer interests, but groups with different and competing political and ideological values, i.e. what can explain their differences are more linked to ideological agendas than social diversity and consumer positions in Norway.

The NGO landscape

The official classification of Norwegian organisations involved in aid is based on ideological criteria, or better put, they have been grouped according to what we here can call "valued shared" when the organisation was established:

- 1) Humanitarian - altruistic attitudes
- 2) Political - idealistic aims, often connected to political parties and solidarity movements
- 3) Missionary purposes
- 4) Special interests groups and organisations that promotes social welfare
- 5) Occupational associations and Trade Unions

These latter categories fit the Norwegian NGO channel quite well. They also have served a political goal; to ensure the state that money is disbursed to different types of Norwegian NGOs with different constituencies.

A categorisation such as the above is based on conditions that were central in Norwegian debate on the voluntary organisations as aid channels, and which influenced NORAD's distribution policy between organisations and types of organisations. During the first phase it was politically essential for NORAD that it reduced the heavy dominance of the missionary organisations, thereby increasing support to aid among the people. In general, NORAD had a positive view of the work of the mission organisations, but it was important to counteract the link that some people saw between private aid and mission. In the 1960s, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions were defined as a Trade and Vocational organisation, so in order to create a balance among the business and industry organisations, NORAD was working to turn NAF (presently Confederation of Business and Industry, NHO) into an aid organisation as well. In the 1980s, the solidarity organisations argued that their organisations, as a special type, should be granted support to educational work and to run development projects.

The number of organisations within the different categories which have been active during the 1980s (we have information on the years 1981, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991), are 19 humanitarian, 24 mission, 22 special interest organisations, 17 trade/vocational organisations and 54 political/ideal organisations. The state had by the beginning of the 1990s thus achieved the balance in the organisational landscape which was the aim as expressed through policies and guidelines established during the 1960s, but as discussed below; this balance is about to disappear, due to

the very rapid growth in support to the few big humanitarian organisations.

The humanitarian and mission organisations demonstrate the most stable landscape. There is a great turnover among the other organisational types. The newcomers of the last few years are at the same time proof that there is still a potential for recruitment, if the state so wishes.

The 16 humanitarian organisations received 54.1 percent of the total appropriations from the state in 1991. This is not so remarkable: it is approximately the same amount they have been allocated throughout the 1980s. Through the appropriations earmarked for the NGOs, they "only" get 40 percent, while from the MFA they received 69 percent in 1991. In 1993 they got almost all of MFA's allocations, i.e. 81,8 per cent, while in for example 1989 this percentage was 49,6. MFA supported these organisations with more than the double of what NORAD did. What is even more noteworthy is that 4 of the humanitarian NGOs in 1993 received more than 75 per cent of all the funds allocated by MFA (Redd Barna, Norway, receives only 4,2 per cent reflecting this organisations scepticism to become too much involved in this type of aid).

It is interesting to note that the mission organisations were given 12.4 percent of the means in 1991, of which Mellomkirkelig Råd received nearly 28m, and The Norwegian Tibet Mission 22m. If these somewhat special appropriations are kept aside, the missionary organisations' share is less than 10 percent, which means that their importance as a whole is severely weakened compared to what was the case in the 1960s. Consequently, the state's policy in trying to extend the basis of Norwegian aid, has been reached. However, six of the 20 largest organisations are still missionary, and if we add Norwegian Church Aid, Caritas Norway and Mellomkirkelig Råd, some 40 percent of the total means goes to Christian aid organisations.

The political and ideal organisations have increased their share during the 1980s, from 3.3 percent to 8.1 percent: while the trade and vocational organisations have been stable at about 3 percent, and the special interest organisations

have increased from 0.9 to 4.1 percent. The two latter organisational types have scarcely received support from MFA, less than 1 percent, while the political/idealistic organisations got 8.3 percent: i.e. more than the mission organisations. It is however important to stress the shortcomings of this type of comparisons. The bulk of MFA support in 1991 went to only two organisations of this type, the Development Fund, Future In Our Hands (20m) and the Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan (13m). In 1993 MFAs support to this type had dropped to 5,9 percent.

However, as is already indicated, there are large internal differences within the various categories established here. We have categorised 16 humanitarian organisations. Five of these receive 3/4 of the money, while the other 14 share the rest. Within the Trade and Vocational organisations, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions got about 50 percent of the public support in 1991, and the Norwegian Teachers' Association got about one third. If we add the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry, these three organisations received some 30m, while the remaining 12 organisations share 5m. As we have mentioned, a few political/ideal organisations are receiving the bulk of the support given to the 54 organisations we have categorised under this label. Three organisations got 50 percent of the support given to 34 organisations.

Norwegian NGOs may also be grouped according to diverse criteria as "organisational capacity", "size", "experience", the role of aid (in financial terms/personnel etc.) as compared to the total activity of the organisation, "information activities", "policy aims" etc. These classifications have been helpful when used to highlight different aspects of the Norwegian NGO landscape. They also make it possible to analyze the field from many angles (see Tvedt 1993)

Big and small NGOs

- The ten largest NGOs received in 1993 65,4 per cent of of the total grants allocated by the Norwegian state. as compared to 47,5 per cent in 1981 and about 60 per cent in 1986 and 1991. The five largest received 56, 5 per cent of the

total in 1993 as compared to 47,5 per cent in 1981. They received about NOK 100 million in 1981 and about NOK 750 million in 1993.

A certain "monopolisation" has taken place in the aid market, but to a lesser extent than in most other donor countries. The Norwegian development appears to differ from the development in certain other DAC countries in important areas. In Sweden, the 11 largest organisations, having a frame agreement with SIDA, receive more than 90 percent of total public funds. In Denmark, the three largest organisations receive almost 40 percent of DANIDA's support to Danish organisations. A survey of 56 Dutch organisations (van Heemst, 1989) shows that the seven largest organisations received more than 90 percent of total public funds. A few spokesmen for the large, professional organisations have advocated that they be given more, or rather all, of the public funds. In other words: that Norwegian policies in this field should be more like those of other DAC countries. NORAD has rejected this proposition, and pointed out the advantages of a varied non-governmental aid field, both for aid itself and not least to maintain support to development aid in Norway. Still, it is obvious that representatives of many smaller organisations do not feel quite comfortable, as the initiative coincides with a stronger demand from NORAD to the organisations, regarding possible conflicting demands such as professionalism and popular basis, unique characteristics and political-administrative supplement in country strategies, etc. The relatively weakened budget position of the NGO Division within the state system will also influence the relationship between large and small organisations over time. MFA's policies and appropriation profile imply that the large take priority, since they provide the most useful instruments in emergency situations. The above trend is mainly due to the role of the MFA, which predominantly channels funds to the five big NGOs. NORAD and the NGO Division has in fact counteracted this development: In 1981 the ten largest organisations received 83 per cent of the grant, while in 1992 the corresponding figure was 56 per cent. International literature discusses "obigopolitical tendencies" within the field of private aid. These tendencies are also strong in

Norway, counteracted by the large undergrowth of strong Norwegian organisations with aid as a side activity. In countries where public support is rather more marginal (the US, Great Britain), the tendency towards "monopolising" is even stronger. Public support has, therefore, in Norway, worked as a market regulating mechanism to the benefit of organisational variety.

On the other hand: History has shown that "small" organisations may become large, and that relatively large organisations may become small, depending on the political development in the area or country where they work. Or, in other words: a "sleeping" expertise, from the point of view of the state, may be activated and prove very useful at other times, and vice versa. For example: The Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan turned from a "poor" voluntary solidarity organisation into one of the most significant receivers of public funds (MFA) during the latter half of the 1980s, because the MFA wanted to assist Afghan refugees and also to support reconstruction efforts within Afghanistan. This committee in this political context possessed what was conceived as necessary competence and local network. This also affected the character of the organisations, and it was transformed from being a solidarity organisation to becoming primarily a development NGO. Very few organisations, except the biggest humanitarian organisations, can rely on the state's courting or interest to last, especially this holds for the MFA support. Another matter which should be pointed out is the state's liberal attitude concerning acceptance of political solidarity organisations, even though they have actively and openly opposed Norwegian foreign policies. Therefore the NGOs in Norway belong to the whole political spectrum.

Project profile

In 1963, Norwegian organisations administered seven projects with public funding, whereas the number today is about 1050. (The exact number is difficult to calculate. As a measure of project activity, a project index is measured which, with certain reservations, indicates the number of projects for each organisation, as well as a total figure. The number of projects quadrupled during

the 1980s, from 273 in 1981 to 1058 in 1991. This growth, however, took primarily place within the larger organisations; their project-portfolio was doubled many times over, and in 1991 Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian Save the Children were administering approximately 30 percent more projects than the 77 "small" organisations taken together. 77 organisations run between 1 and 10 projects; 59 organisations run between 1 and 3 projects; while as many as 33 organisations run only one project. Around half (55) of the organisations are funded through one budget channel only; in most cases the Office for NGOs. Based on the answers of the 10 chosen organisations to our questionnaire for example, it becomes clear that Norwegian Save the Children tripled their number of projects between 1986 and 1991, from 116 to 225; during the same period the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions increased from 22 to 55, Norwegian Missionary Society from 29 to 40, Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted from 11 to 25, whereas Norwegian People's Aid nearly tripled its project portfolio during the same period.

The survey for 1991 shows that only NOK 228.000, or 0.1 per cent, is spent on "planning and public administration", whereas more than NOK 64m (15 percent) is spent on social infrastructure, social welfare, and culture, along with nearly NOK 95 million on health and population projects, for example. The sectorial priority is made evident through the spending of approximately NOK 8 million on industry, mining and craft, as opposed to nearly NOK 30 million on farming and fishery. It seems as though the 110 million categorised under "Multisector and Unspecified" are largely related to the tertiary and welfare sectors. The development of public utility services (9.9 per cent) shows that the organisations are attached to public administrative structures. To a large extent the projects will be associated with various forms of welfare arrangements. Consequently, the overview confirms what most people will perceive as a typical "NGO profile". Results from the questionnaire to all NGOs working in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe strengthen this impression.

Geographical profile

Norwegian NGO assistance has expanded immensely in geographical area since its feeble start in 1963, and is, in comparison with other aspects of Norwegian activities, a main form of Norway's relations with non-European countries. Several organisations, traditionally working in developing countries, are now entering the former Soviet Union (Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Red Cross and Norwegian People's Aid) as well as the US (Norwegian Church Aid-project to the benefit of refugees from El Salvador).

In 1991 more than 15 organisations have commitments in Nicaragua, India, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, and between 11 and 15 organisations are active in the remaining main cooperating countries. On the other hand, in 22 countries only one Norwegian organisation was active (we do not have figures for 1994/1995, but the situation more or less is the same). These are, of course, countries other than the main cooperating ones. Most organisations run projects in between 2 to 5 countries, while 12 organisations are involved in development aid in more than 20 countries. In 1991, Norwegian Church Aid worked in 61 and Norwegian Red Cross in 55 development countries. The 17 organisations working in only one country seem to be distributed fairly evenly between cooperative and non-cooperative countries.

Personell

In 1990, the total number of positions in Norway associated with NGOs aid was about 240. Consequently every full-time employed aid bureaucrat within the organisations administered on average about, NOK 6m. The relationship between turnover and personnel is such, that bureaucratic expansion should be able to occur without raising criticism on "parasiting on the money designated to the third world" etc.

About 2/3 of the organisations (80) from which we have acquired our information, maintain a paid, home-based staff. Added up, 24 organisations administered a total 1990 budget of NOK 45m without having employees of their own.

This implies that the state, buying services from the organisations, gets good value for its money regarding expenditure for wages and staff. However, variations are of course significant between the organisations. Another interesting point is that many large Norwegian organisations, being relatively modestly engaged in the field, have delegated this task to their ordinary administration. This applies to for instance the Norwegian Housewives' Association, Norwegian Confederation of Sports, The Norwegian Educational Association and the Norwegian Union of Journalists. There is also an expressed difference concerning the organisations' amount of paid or unpaid, voluntary manpower. Amongst the organisations, only the traditional solidarity organisations belonging to the group of "large" organisations and the small organisations are run on a voluntary basis.

Especially during the last decade the organisations' activities have escalated. The administration of Norwegian Church Aid is several times bigger than that of NORAD's NGO Division and the aid-related offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs put together, but then the organisation had 1990 expenditures of NOK 1bn, 168m. Norwegian Church Aid has boosted home administration from 21 in 1981 to 71 in 1990; 27 of these are declared to work directly with aid-activities, Norwegian Save the Children has increased its home administration from 35 in 1981 to 90 in 1991, of which respectively 6 and 21 have been working directly with operational aid activities, and Norwegian People's Aid has had an increase from 2 in 1981 to 16 in 1991. Norwegian Missionary Society alone reports having 62 employees in its main office, of which 1 position is formally tied to aid. Many more are however engaged in aid activities (numbers are based on our questionnaire).

The self-financing of the organisations

What is the financial basis of the organisations, and how much is the organisations' work and existence dependent on injections of gifts from the state?

To focus on the self-generated funds, or own capital, might disrobe a fundamental change in the organisations' relations to the state. In 1965, the organisations raised NOK 20-22m, while receiving NOK 3-4m in appropriations from the state. Come 1975, these two sources are equi-important; NOK 25m from each. In 1991, the figures are turned upside down compared to those of 1965 for many of the trendsetting organisations. The Parliament's discussion in 1962 hinted that the organisations could use their collected means to support the state to state projects. 30 years later it is the state that finances nearly all the NGO aid-projects; often exceeding 80percent. The state's willingness to buy the services of the organisations, and the organisations' willingness to take on tasks for the state, has led to a situation where the state is "running" several of the organisations.

In 1990, 22 organisations received more than 80 percent of their total aid expenditures from the state .23 organisations received less than 40 percent of their total aid expenses from the state. Some voluntary organisations have made themselves dependent on support from the state, and are hardly able to survive without those frequent financial injections. Other organisations have relatively orderly financial circumstances; 23 organisations generate and cover more than 60 percent of their own expenses.

The organisations are significantly heterogenous when it comes to financial strength, self generating financial potential and ways to make money. Norwegian Church Aid is not a members' organisation; instead it boasts 114 000 contributors, registering over NOK 77m of collected means and gifts in 1991, in addition to receiving contributions from other organisations (nearly NOK 20m), project funds from various UN-organisations, etc. In 1992, they arranged their 25th fast-action, after having collected NOK 16.5m in 1991. The Red Cross annually collects about NOK 70m from their gambling machines. The Norwegian Save the Children carried out a very successful fund-raising TV campaign in 1993; at the same time the ordinary contributions are steadily increasing. They have also made arrangements with the employees of 70 Norwegian companies, introducing reductions for

the benefit of Save the Children. Other, more typical members' organisations, such as The Norwegian Educational Association, have set aside 1 per cent of the members' subscriptions for an international aid fund, and the Norwegian Society of Social Educators every month receive NOK 3.- from each member's pay to a solidarity fund, as part of the subscription. Even if many organisations have financial problems, most of them display an impressive piece of work collecting money from the Norwegian people. Doubtlessly, these efforts - in line with the state's objectives - have contributed in creating a relatively trustworthy anchorage in the Norwegian populace.

The goals of the organisations

An analysis of the organisations' endeavours should not perceive them as statically committed once and for all. This also applies to the NGOs. The organisations' formulations of their aims must take into account the various expectations of different groups; the attitudes of members and contributors, the official aid related slogans and administrative routines and to the changing convictions of the recipients in different societies. Besides, a number of other considerations affect target formulations; the economic situation of the organisation and its share in the aid market; which member and leader groups influence the target formulations, etc. Thus the leaders or members of the organisations may not freely choose their own goals. The target formulations which are adopted are not to be interpreted as the "real" goal of the organisations. These are results of struggles and compromises between different interests. Our searchlight will be directed at such a "compromise": the interaction between state and organisation as target formulations are created. The distribution of power and resources in this relationship, and the utilisation of these, will determine which formulations will be adopted, and which goals are carried out in practice.

Objectives serve as guidelines for the work of the organisations, as legitimation of their activities (this is not least important for organisations which depend on their "image" and continuously beg for contributions) and as a tool for assessing the work

of the organisations (Etzioni 1978). Research on organisations have shown that only very few organisations have clear, unambiguous and stable goals and criteria for their activities. The goals are rather characterised as complex and dynamic, in order to avoid conflicts and as an "apology" when the partial goals have not been reached. Organisations survive and prosper with ongoing ambiguities about preferences, causal ties and history (Olsen 1988:5).

While the basis of the organisations, and their main objectives, vary greatly, the aid objectives are more uniform. They are quite identical - at least on paper - and drawn up closely to the state's and public declared political profile. Nearly all the organisations have goals for giving aid and working among exposed target groups: the poor, the blind, women, children etc. As a rule, the goals are related to the tertiary sector. To the extent administrative structures and local cooperation partners are deemed important, focus will be on local and often more informal structures. This is not the case for all the organisations, however. The objective of the Norwegian Association for the Disabled is to strengthen the situation for the disabled, but primarily by working through the state administration. A look at the organisations' strategies and documents still gives the impression of a striking uniformity concerning project objectives. They may thus not be used as a basis for differentiation. The health projects of very different organisations with very different "value orientations", as the Latin American Solidarity Groups and the Norwegian Lutheran Mission hardly differ as far as the objectives are concerned.

The project objectives of the organisations demonstrate that a narrow micro-perspective dominates. There is little concern for the projects' relation to national or international economic systems and fundament, national political and institutional framework conditions, etc. The organisations have this feature in common, with few variations. The objectives show little reflection over the special role the third sector may play in the development of a society. In recent years, some of the more "fashionable" organisations have expressed objectives such as the strengthening of "civil" society, but the

objectives are usually not integrated in a concrete and superior analysis of the different societies and the development situations in which the organisations are working. Nobody will expect that small and medium-sized non-governmental organisations develop comprehensive country strategies, but it is worth wondering why the organisations seldom present analyses of how their projects and sector efforts fit in with the macro-economic and macro-political situation.

The organisations' strategy documents reveal two typical features: A normative general motive for action and a very limited micro-perspective of the project activities. According to international NGO literature, this is a common feature. However, an increasing number of organisations have joined projects extending the traditional functions. The Norwegian Church Aid works through global network institutions, such as the Lutheran World Federation and through national church structures such as the Mekane Jesus Church in Ethiopia. The Norwegian Red Cross cooperates with the International Red Cross League, and has for a long time worked with the establishment and strengthening of national Red Cross organisations. The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions has extensive contacts with other trade unions. The Mission works in several places through national or regional church institutions.

NGOS IN SOME SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES¹⁹

Main findings: The NGO scene is extremely heterogenous in the different countries. Their history, background, role and potential in society vary so much that it is futile to give them identical characteristics. What distinguishes the NGOs attached to the international NGO channel in these countries from the NGOs involved in Norway, is that the latter are rooted in the society to quite another extent than what are the majority of the development NGOs in the developing countries. There are, however, very important exceptions to this general picture.

One important difference is economic self-sufficiency. The study has collected empirical data on the Norwegian NGOs (questionnaire b)

and about "local" NGOs (questionnaire a; see Appendix). The figures speak almost for themselves: In Norway 22 out of 70 organisations received more than 80 per cent of their budgets from the state; 39 organisations received more than 60 per cent while 23 organisations received less than 40 per cent of their budgets from the state (Tvedt 1992:87). At the same time they collected, a total of about NOK 800 million in 1992, as compared to an allocation of about NOK 1,3 billion from the state.

A survey of all local organisations receiving support from the Norwegian government and from all Norwegian NGOs in four selected countries; Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe, shows that out of the 87 organisations that responded to the inquiry, only 4 organisations provided more than 50 per cent of their funds from their own organisation, and the great majority of them were 100 per cent dependent on funds, not from their own government but from foreign donors..

This does not mean that there are no organisations with a firm root in the societies concerned, but often these are not the "traditional" development oriented NGOs. There are also some big semi-official organisations with a very long and complex historical role. For example the Orthodox Church in Ethiopia, a central institution in the country's history for the past 1600 hundred years (and most of the time in close alliance with the reigning Emperor) and the Catholic Church in Nicaragua have been important actors within what in such a time perspective becomes the recently established NGO system. Some organisations, like Eritrean Relief Agency, helped to mobilise the Eritreans to win the war against Ethiopia.

Another variable may be degree of voluntarism. In Norway the degree of voluntarism in the work of the organisations have been comparatively strong.

During the last decade research has shown that this is going down, but still voluntarism may be important. In 1994, Norwegian People's Aid mobilised more than 90.000 people to take part in a national campaigning day for people in

Mozambique, Angola and Bosnia. This means that about 2,5 percent of the Norwegian people took part. This is, however, atypical, and many organisations face growing problems in recruiting members etc.

A survey of 66 Norwegian NGOs working in developing countries showed that they have employed a total of 987 Norwegian and other expatriates and 4381 local employees during 1992. The same organisations had only 63 volunteers enlisted. (Staff working in Norway are not included here. The information is based on a questionnaire sent to all Norwegian organisations in 1992). In the above mentioned survey of local organisations 80 organisations answered. Out of these, 17 said that they did not have volunteers in 1992, 15 had 10 or less and 8 had 20 or less. The majority of those organisations that said they had many volunteers were Christian organisations (Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus, 50 000, Consejo de Iglesias Evangelicas Pro-Allianza Denominacional, 120 000, but also Zimbabwe Red Cross, 58 000). In general such figures will be inflated because voluntarism is regarded as a "market asset", and also because it is difficult to define voluntarism. A study of rural NGOs in Zimbabwe shows that 69 percent of the organisations had either no volunteers, or only one or two. Of the organisations that reported one or two volunteers, almost half of these were foreign and were recruited and supported by an international agency (which means that they were not volunteers in the original meaning of the term). Some of the few organisations which reported large numbers of volunteers counted all former beneficiaries as volunteers, giving them the role of "spreading the word". A few relied on, according to this survey, volunteers for a substantial proportion of their activities (Vivian and Maseko 1994:11-12).

Below some central data and analytical approaches to the NGO field are presented, in order to show the heterogeneity of the field and how insufficient a project perspective or a "national style" approach is in understanding the role of NGOs.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh has a large number of very different NGOs. The NGO movement began after the war of independence in 1971 and the famine of 1974. Some of the NGOs with clear international connections started before, as CARE International in Bangladesh (1955) and Bangladesh Northern Evangelical Lutheran Church (1959). Now at least 12,000 groups are registered. According to official government sources there are "only" 122 international and 650 national NGOs registered in the country under the Societies Act of 1860 and Voluntary Societies (registration and control) Ordinance, 1961. Around US\$ "100 million are channelled to NGOs from external sources (about 5 percent of total aid flows", UNDP, 1993:92). Others have convincingly argued that the percentage is around 15. The most influential and vocal organisations in the country are part of the NGO donor channel and supported by foreign funds (our knowledge of Muslim NGOs and their link to Islamic funding sources in the Middle East is scanty).

The proliferation of small rural organisations in Bangladesh is, of course, partly a result of market or state failures. In a country like Bangladesh there are a lot of "niches" that need to be filled and can be filled. But who has occupied them at a certain point in time is not decided by the market or the sectors' comparative advantages, but is primarily affected by decisions taken by donor governments and the government of Bangladesh, and the ability of NGO leaders to communicate with the donors. Pervasive corruption during the Ershad regime was one reason why international donors swarmed around local NGOs, seeking alternative avenues for funds. In 1981 68 foreign NGOs were registered with the NGO Affairs Bureau, while in 1993, 109 had registered. In 1981 45 foreign-aided national NGOs had registered, while in the 1993 the number had increased to 513 (Aminuzzaman 1993:6). This has led to a situation where most NGOs depend almost completely on external funding. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s the government wanted to control what its predecessor had unleashed, which led to the strife between the government's *NGO Bureau* and the NGO-community. On the other hand,

data from questionnaire A suggest that the NGOs in Bangladesh are more positive towards NGO government cooperation than are NGOs in Nicaragua and Zimbabwe.

The state and the NGOs are competing (but also collaborating), but the prize is not so much market niches or political gains as foreign funds. The state is the winner and receives still between 80 and 90 per cent of the foreign aid funds, but a gradual shift has taken place in the last years. What counts in defining this division of functions is the institutional choices of the donors - and not of the "consumers" - as some functional economic theories would have us to focus. The point here is that to understand the NGOs growth, it is insufficient and not very useful to focus on the performance of the market or the government's failure in providing service. To regard them simply as a functional necessity, as "society's response", gives no help in understanding and analysing why these same organisations are issues of political strife: they are regarded as weapons of imperialism, Christianity, anti-government policies, or pro-Indian policies etc.²⁰ Others see them as expressions of pluralism, rationalism, and people-centred development.

The NGOs that are linked to the NGO channel have been classified in many ways in Bangladesh. The Islamic movement tends to distinguish between Western (or Westernized local organisations), Christian and Secular organisations on the one hand and Islamic organisations on the other hand. Radical political movements have tended to focus on the organisation's attitude to the state and to political questions of perceived importance in Bangladesh. Asian Development Bank classified NGOs in Bangladesh according to three major criteria: country of origin, area of operation, and sources of funding (Asian Development Bank 1989).

In Bangladesh, as one of the few countries in which they are giving direct support, NORAD has developed a sort of classification system. The system used in Bangladesh stems from 1991. The classification is based on NORAD's own policy priorities. The example is given here to show how NORAD has attempted to grapple with organisational heterogeneity, and also to indicate

concretely the implications of different systems and how they are used.

- The first category consists of organizations described as organizing women and landless day labourers. They are providing "functional education and conscientizing", thus enabling the groups to collectively resist demand for dowry, negotiate for khas land, to qualify members for getting loans etc. NORAD-supported organizations in this category are among others: Banchte Shekha, Voluntary Health Services Society (VHSS), Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Saptagram Nari Swanirvar Parishad..

- The second category is made up of organisations which confined themselves to activities like:

* Providing vocational training and promoting right to work (IDEAS)

* providing legal aid and promoting justice "for the law" (sic!) (MLAA, ODR)

* providing health services (CHCP, ICDDR/B, CARE)

* providing training to other organizations (VHSS)

- The third group supported activities "among the minority groups". NGO allocations "being used for the promotion of human rights (travel grants, seminars on human rights, election monitoring etc)" are put under this category. ("The NORAD support to non governmental organisations in Bangladesh. Operational guidelines". Asia til Priv.org., Forslag til retningslinjer for bruk av lokal NGO bevilgning", 28.5.1991).

This classification focuses on activities more than on ideological background (different from what NORAD does for the Norwegian organisations in Norway). In NORAD's categorization of the organisational landscape there are no Islamic and Christian organisations. It does not include the international NGOs (NORAD, Dhaka, has over the years had very little contact with Norwegian NGOs). It mentions therefore Bangladesh Northern Evangelical Lutheran Church (BNELC), an organisation heavily supported by Norwegian initiatives and Norwegian funds and having become nationalized, but not the Norwegian Santal Mission, which works in close cooperation

with BNELC. Unit of analysis and basis for classification are unclear, and it mixes sectors in which the organisations work with targeted groups. (The NGO scene in Bangladesh will be described and analysed in three case studies below).

Zimbabwe²¹

The NGOs in Zimbabwe mushroomed in the late 1980s and beginning of 1990s, not as a result of government or market failures as such. In the 1980s it was the policy of Mugabe's party to mobilize the people by encouraging farmer unions, trade unions, women groups etc. By the end of the 1980s external pressure was put on the Zimbabwe government to restructure their policy, reduce state involvement, reduce social benefits etc. By encouraging NGOs in this new context it becomes possible to reach an important policy goal: to reduce the number of state employees and reduce public budgets. There is no evidence to suggest that the Zimbabwean consumer (at least not in the poor rural households to which the NGOs direct their attention) have been against what the state has provided or that they have preferred relations with NGOs. It is primarily the World Bank and other donors that have been dissatisfied, and their leverage has changed the environment and space for both indigenous and international NGOs. The gap they are to fill has gradually been widening, not so much because of the laws of economy, but due to external conditionalities. Similarly, the NGOs that existed prior to independence were also the outcome of policies, at that time by the racist government, which banned black organisations, except "apolitical" burial societies etc.

The NGOs in Zimbabwe have been categorized according to the geographical area they have been working in. They operate at three levels: a) across the country, such as YMCA, Christian Care; b) provincial level NGOs, such as Manicaland Development Association and ORAP; and c) local level, mainly community or grassroots organisations.²²

They are also often put into five other categories: Community-Based Organisations (CBOs),

Intermediary NGOs, Service NGOs, Trusts and Unions, and International NGOs (INGOs).²³

Community Based Organisations (CBOs)

It has been estimated that as much as 60 percent of the organisations in Zimbabwe are community-based organisations (see Moyo 1994). Only few of these are part of the NGO channel. Many are promoted by various Government ministries, as well as by church groups and national NGOs. Others have an unclear legal status, and may not be registered at the national level under the Welfare Act, nor as cooperative societies. CBOs may be grouped into larger NGO umbrella associations such as ORAP, OCCZIM, and Manicaland Development Association. CBOs are largely self-help groupings and associations that most often exist in a particular locality for a specific activity. Since independence, there has been a mushrooming of two particular kinds of CBO, farming groups and collective cooperatives. The latter were ideologically supported by the post-independence Government led by ZANU (PF) and they have also attracted much funding from international NGO donors.

Intermediary NGOs

Intermediary NGOs exist to facilitate activities of smaller groups or to mediate between such groups, governments and funding agencies. The largest intermediary organisations are Christian Care and Cadec, whose national and regional offices identify rural projects to be presented to foreign donors. Both are also implementing NGOs. Also Self Help Development Foundation, the Association of Women's Clubs, and Zimbabwe Women's Bureau, which mainly target women's groups in their programmes, are intermediaries that implement projects.

Other intermediary NGOs are the Organisation of Rural Associations in Progress (ORAP) and the Organisation of Collective Cooperatives in Zimbabwe (OCCZIM), both CBO umbrella organisations. ORAP works in the two Matabeleland provinces, Midlands and part of Masvingo. OCCZIM, operates at national level

and aims to unite all registered cooperatives under its umbrella. Its target groups are in the fields of manufacturing, agriculture, fishing, transport, security and printing, as well as in the retail and consumer sectors (NANGO, 1992). The National Council of Disabled Persons of Zimbabwe (NCDPZ) advocates and campaigns to protect the rights of disabled.

Service NGOs

These NGOs provide an expanding range of support services. They assist in project formulation and execution, or engage in consultancy and research activities on behalf of donor agencies, regional groupings, other NGOs, and Government institutions. The Zimbabwe Project is such a service NGO, set up to assist ex-combatants from the liberation war.

Trusts and Unions

A fast-growing category of NGOs are the trust funds, modelled on the Manicaland Development Association, which has demonstrated remarkable success in fund-raising (de Graaf et al, 1991). Some trust funds have been established by influential politicians, such as the Zimbabwe Development Trust, whose patron is Vice President Joshua Nkomo. Included in this category are the various interest group organisations, notably farmers' groups such as the Zimbabwe Farmers Union, which represents small scale farmers, and the various trades unions. A growing number of trusts have been formed to improve access to small credit and investment funds among small enterprises for income generating projects and disadvantaged business people.

International NGOs

Around 30 international and regional NGOs are registered. These engage in collaboration or coordination with local NGOs, but rarely involve the latter in project activities (Chinemana, 1991). In 1991 15 Norwegian NGOs worked there, Redd Barna being the biggest with a staff of 30 people and 17 projects.

This classification system reflects also national characteristics. To have a separate class for CBOs is important in Zimbabwe, since it is one of the characteristics of this national scene, created as a result of popular mobilisation, state policy and donor support. It is also natural to include Unions and Trust Funds as a category since trade unions and farmer unions are a natural parts of the NGO-channel, while they are consciously excluded in Nicaragua and in Bangladesh.

An analysis of the NGO landscape or the relations between NGOs and the state in Zimbabwe has to take account of the impact of the racial policies of the settler state. The government restricted most forms of non-governmental organisational work by law. Only social clubs were allowed among blacks. The white ran NGOs that existed, maintained the missionary "civilatory" tradition. Christian Care and CADEC were the main channels for NGO assistance. When Ian Smith's rule ended, there were hardly any NGOs concerned with the real problems of the black majority.

After independence the environment for NGO establishment changed fundamentally. A growing number of "black" NGOs emerged, with the declared aim of contributing to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. They developed close links with government agencies, particularly departments concerned with improving the welfare of the citizens. This development has been influenced by Mugabe's policy and government regulations for NGOs. But this policy in itself has been formulated and developed in a national/international context.

The volume of funding to NGOs in Zimbabwe has grown quickly since 1980. The foreign support to the NGOs has been estimated at US\$ 40.000.000,- annually, which represents 10 percent of all foreign assistance to Zimbabwe. This was estimated to be equivalent to between 15 - 25 percent of total ODA in 1990, and probably representing 20 percent of the official foreign currency aid inflow (Moyo, 1994:58).²⁴ There has been a wide range of sources of funds available to the NGOs. NOVIB, Netherlands was found to have contributed 27 percent of recorded NGO assistance. OXFAM, Save the

Children, (England and Norway), Norwegian People's Aid have all established country branches operating in Zimbabwe. Church based NGOs, as the World Council of Churches, continue to raise significant levels of funding. Secondly; there are foreign government agencies such as NORAD, SIDA, ODA, CIDA, USAID. NORAD has, for example, since 1986 channelled about 3 million dollars annually to a total number of 45 local NGOs. A third source of funding is the multilateral agencies; although in Zimbabwe they play a rather marginal role. The European Union is the biggest multilateral funder. Its annual allocation has risen from about ECU 1.5 million in 1989 to over ECU 2 million in 1994.

The importance of foreign funds can be seen in the number and types of NGOs that exist. As some donors reduced their contributions (Sweden cut back its foreign aid with 10 percent in 1992, while Britain froze its ODA), some NGOs had to change both aims and profiles; some transformed themselves into some sort of consultancy firm or started income generating businesses. Many also shifted focus from a local level to national and regional level. ESAP (introduced in 1991) affected the NGO community. NGOs faced increased competition due to the deregulation of agricultural markets and the liberalisation of imports, but on the other hand their prospects as "gap-fillers" increased.

The relative importance of external linkages is of course affected by alternative funding sources nationally. In Zimbabwe private sector funding amounts to less than 10percent of the overall NGOs funding (Moyo 1994). Fund raising is mostly associated with disasters and extreme Social Welfare problems. The government's development policy and strategy are not designed to target NGOs as a channel of financing development. The Finance Act of Zimbabwe tends to exclude NGOs from receiving fiscal allocations, unless the NGOs are deemed to be QUANGOs, whose financial operations are governed by the Auditor-General's standing rules (Moyo 1994). Government financial support is mainly available through the payment of salary grants in private mission hospitals and schools. Otherwise NGOs gain access at an *ad hoc* basis to the use of

government expertise in design and management of their projects, and to the use of Government offices, schools and facilities. The Government has also entered into direct joint venture with a handful of NGOs (Moyo, 1994:67) The most prominent indirect manner in which the Government supports the NGOs is through the legal provision that they are exempt from overall income taxes and parts of income duties. All other sources combined, they are insignificant, and will be insignificant for a long time to come compared to that of foreign donors. (The NGO scene in Zimbabwe will be described and analysed in two case studies below).

Ethiopia²⁵:

In Ethiopia there has been, historically speaking, weak traditions for organisations in opposition to the government or formally outside the state apparatus. Its history is closely linked to and affected by fundamental political changes and natural disasters. After World War II, Emperor Haile Selassie gradually allowed the formation of associations provided they were in accordance with the constitution of the Empire and the specific laws related to them. Ethiopia was an autocratic society where the Emperors had ruled with the support of the Orthodox Church, an institution which recently has emerged as an NGO, with a development branch. Welfare associations emerged in the 1950s to serve their home areas. Through such 'home area' organizations several schools, clinics and roads were built. Basically these organizations were ethnic-based welfare associations. From one point of view these may be seen as forerunners to the present proliferation of ethnically based NGOs, while the incoming of the church may indicate the role religious NGOs play in Ethiopia.

The history of the Ethiopian NGO-field can be divided into three periods; a) Under Haile Selassie, b) the regime of Mengistu 1974-1991 and c) the period after EPRDF took over in 1991. Two developments are especially important, the drought in 1984 and the Charter of the Meles government. The drought in 1984/85 created a humanitarian outcry in Britain and the U.S. Band Aid was started, Michael Jackson, Bob Dylan

and other "superstars" went in studio to sing charity songs for Africa (e.g. "Do they know it is Christmas" and "We are the world") and a great number of NGOs went to the Horn to help. The pattern of NGO development was directly influenced by the Ethiopian Government's refusal to let international agencies have safe passage to areas under control of liberation movements in the north. As a political and military weapon, the Ethiopian government wanted to command distribution of relief. International NGOs were not allowed to work outside government controlled areas. The UN was constrained by its mandate. The Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA) and the Joint Relief Programme challenged the policy of the Derg and Mengistu. Several NGOs worked together to meet the relief needs of the population in the north (Norwegian Church Aid was an active partner in both these organisations). Some NGOs decided to accept the government strategy, because it was better to reach some groups instead of being expelled. The Government attempted to control the NGO growth through its Relief and Rehabilitation Commission - RCC. RCC was established in 1974 in response to the Wollo relief. It was charged with the responsibility of coordinating relief efforts. In spite of the clear guidelines given by the Government, this body was unable to control or evaluate the NGOs, due to lack of capacity. Altogether an estimated 40 international NGOs took part in this relief operation according to official figures given by the government-establish Relief and Rehabilitation Council in 1985. Presumably the figure was close to 100. Although unclear criteria make exact figures difficult to give, more than 10 Norwegian NGOs worked in the area and many more collected money to alleviate the 1984-85 crisis. Some local NGOs emerged also, but these NGOs were very weak (also because at that time it was more unusual for donors to channel money to local NGOs), except for those attached to guerilla movements.

In the period 1973-91 there was a growth of NGOs associated with liberation movements and NGOs which wanted to assist refugees that fled Ethiopia. The combination of war and drought in 1984/85, caused both national and international NGOs to move in where the government was not

present (for example during the war and drought situation in 1984/85 they actually sought to support the "closed areas", i.e. rebel held areas). After 1991, the growth has entered a new phase. Now the government wants the NGOs as contracting partners and they also want to monitor and control their activities more than before. The government and NGOs are competing for funds on the one hand, and on the other hand the government wants the NGOs to operate. The donors, with the World Bank as the leading agency, demand the reduction of the role of the state. NGOs are encouraged, officially even to organize around ethnic allegiances.

The external influence on the NGO landscape should not be underestimated. The amount and earmarking of foreign funds are important. This is partly reflecting the number of catastrophes and their aid mobilization character; if the BBC had not "discovered" the Keren camp in 1984, the Ethiopian NGO landscape would have looked very different. Also important is the strength and size of the middle classes and the intelligentsia in the country, i.e. whether there are social groups capable and interested in formation of NGOs which satisfy donor notions and expectations; government policies and the recurrent trends followed by the international aid communities.

The total number of NGOs in Ethiopia is unclear. The FINNIDA report says "more than a hundred", "most of them international or foreign" (Salokiski and Varis 1994). In March 1993 there were more than 90 Ethiopian organisations (92 registered by RRC in 1994, 6 awaiting registration).²⁶ According to figures from *Relief and Rehabilitation Commission* (RRC), there were in August 1994 229 NGOs whereof 134 were indigenous and 95 international.²⁷ Until 1990 only seven Ethiopian NGOs were registered by RRC, while in 1992 alone, 21 were registered. In 1994 the government estimated that about 200 million US dollars were transmitted through NGOs.

The emergence of strong liberation movements in Ethiopia and Eritrea created NGOs of a special type. Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), operating in the western part of Tigray, managed in 1977 to mobilize people to fight the Ethiopian

Democratic Union out of Tigray. Its political and military line was to mobilize the rural people around its programme for rural transformation and national liberation. In this policy the role of their NGO, REST, cannot be overemphasised in providing material benefits for the population. REST was established in 1978. Initially REST was established to start health and education projects. Due to the escalation of the war since 1978 and the onset of droughts and famines, REST became responsible for the coordination of the largest relief programmes in the area. By the early 1980s, it had gained the confidence of European and American Aid agencies. By 1982 it was officially registered as a humanitarian NGO with the Sudanese government. This was a crucial event, which gave them access to the international donor-market.

Important in this internal/external relationship is the establishment of the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA). It was originally an *ad hoc* coordinating body for Christian NGOs (called Christian Relief Association) and was formed in 1973 in response to the Wollo famine. As the need for continued assistance did not abate, the CRA evolved into the CRDA in 1984. Since then the CRDA acted as an umbrella agency (with a membership of about 90 NGOs in 1993). CRDA is not operational in the field but channels funds through member NGOs. CRDA's strength has derived from its being a broad forum for church NGOs, as well as international secular NGOs, indigenous independent NGOs and recently admitted, the relief arms of political movements such as REST, ORA, Ethiopian Aid and ERO. CRDA is criticized for excluding NGOs representing sections of the Muslim population.

Central political-ideological issues in Ethiopia are often conceived in religious and ethnical terms. It is therefore natural to employ a national classification system which pays heed to this, since NGOs in Ethiopia reflect this national situation. The NGOs can be categorized into the following groups (building on Karadawi, 1994):

Religious NGOs.

The most important Christian organisations are The Ethiopia Orthodox Church (EOC), claiming to have more than 30 million followers (EOC Booklet, 1990), the Ethiopia Catholic Secretariat (ECS), and The Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY), claiming to have about 1 million followers and with a development department established in 1962. The Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA) is an umbrella organisation for more than 90 organisations (also secular members). Islamic agencies officially arrived in 1991, including Islamic Relief Agency (IARA), *al-Dawa al-Islamiya*, the International Islamic Relief Organization, *Muwafaq* Charitable agency. They assisted the Muslims in Ethiopia with building mosques, schools, clinics and improving their religious knowledge. However, as a result of the change of 1991, Islamic organizations are also organized locally. Examples are Islamic organizations such as *al Manar* welfare association, al-Omimam Relief and development Association, al-Barbara Relief and Rehabilitation organization. Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA) and *Muwafaq* are both created in Sudan by the fundamentalist political organization of the Muslim Brothers. There are 15 organisations that can be put in this category.

Relief and Development NGOs.

These are divided into two sub-groups:

-a) NGOs Associated with Liberation Fronts/Ethnic political organisations, The Relief Society of Tigray (REST), formerly the relief arm of the TPLF in the war against Mengistu and mainly operating in Tigray, The Ethiopian Peoples Relief, formerly the relief arm of the Democratic Movement, working in Gonder and Wollo or what is now Region 3 Amhara (registered with RRC Sept. 1991), The Oromo Self-Help Organization (OSHO) associated with the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO), which dominates the administrative structures in Region 4, Oromo Relief Association (ORA), formerly the relief arm of the Oromo Liberation Front, which is now banned while ORA is a legally registered NGO and works in Wollega, Borana, and

Hararghe, The Ogadeni Relief and Rehabilitation Society associated with the Ogadeni National Liberation Front. There are also, Afar Aid associated with the Afar Liberation Front and Ethiopian Aid associated with the Ethiopian Democratic Union.

Another generation of organizations was born in 1991, inspired by the experience of humanitarian/relief arms of the liberation fronts. Among these are The Afar Relief and Development Association, The Bani Shangoul Relief and Rehabilitation Association,; Eastern Hararghe Development agency; Gergaar Relief and Rehabilitation Association; Gonder Relief and Rehabilitation Association, Guardian (Ogaden); Harar Relief and Development Association, Relief and development Group for Oromiya and Wollo Development and Rehabilitation Association.

This class reflects and coincides with the new "ethnic" administrative policy. The strength of this group of organisations is in their close links to political struggle for transformation. The successes of REST and other such organisations has become part of the received wisdom of the politicized Ethiopian scene.

b) Independent NGOs:

These can be divided into three sub-categories:

(i) those concerned with community development.
(ii) Research Organizations.)Karadawi includes the Organization of Social Science Research for East Africa (OSSREA), a non-governmental grouping with membership from Academics in East and Central Africa, the Centre for Research and Training on Women in Development and the Institute of Development Research based in Addis Ababa University, and finally Armauer Hansen Institute.

Functional organisations.

These include organizations which serve particular purpose and/or provide services for specific groups. These category include Development Aid for Youth, Lem Ethiopia Environment and Development Society, Abebech Gobena Orphanage and School, Nazreth Children Centre and Integrated Community Development, Children

of Light Welfare Association, Kind hearts Children Village, Multi-disciplinary Health Resource Education and Assistance Team, The Crescent of Hope.

Advocacy Organizations

The Inter-Africa Group: A group formed by social scientist and activist NGO workers who have quickly moved to pivotal positions in Ethiopia shaping debate on economic reconstruction, conflict resolution and development of 'civil society' including the making of Ethiopian Constitution and the role of NGOs in the democratization process. There is exist different human rights organisations, representing different and competing political groups: The Ethiopian Council of Human Rights, the Ethiopian Congress for Democracy and finally the Human Rights Research Centre. (The NGO scene in Ethiopia will be analysed in two case studies below).

Nicaragua²⁸

In Nicaragua the NGO activity developed more slowly than in other Latin American countries. At the end of the Somoza period there were only seven or so Indigenous NGOs. The Revolution in 1979 changed the context radically. The existing NGOs received legal status, and new ones emerged. In this new climate the NGOs worked closely with the Sandinist government in designing and implementing projects. After the elections and change of government in 1990, there has been an explosive growth in the number of indigenous NGOs. At the same time the NGOs relations to the state have changed to one of competition and confrontation. The conflict stems from, among other things, disagreements between the state and the NGOs on development objectives, the state's loss of social legitimacy, the emergence of stronger and more autonomous social movements and the withdrawal of the state from the social sector. Assessing the growth of NGOs, one finds a clear lack of complementarity. The failure of the market and the state has on the one hand created a too broad gap to fill, at the same time as there is a dissonance between NGOs and the state on which problems to solve, and by whom (it ought

to be solved?). (Bebbington and Rivera, 1994:5-7). The amount channelled through NGOs increased from US\$ 35-40 mill. during 1980s to US\$ 100 mill in 1992 alone (estimates referred to in Ibid, 1994:7)

In Nicaragua the development of the NGO landscape cannot be explained by the national culture or the country's political culture alone, but by analysing the connection between dramatic political changes in Nicaragua, caused by individual politicians and political forces, and the intervening role of foreign NGOs and funds. The NGOs attached to the aid channel have influenced the entire organisational landscape in this country, as in many other developing countries.

The modern NGO story in Nicaragua starts with the establishment of Caritas-Nicaragua, a Nicaraguan Catholic Episcopal Conference which began to operate in the mid-fifties (this part is based on Skar et. al. 1994 and Bebbington and Rivera 1994). The earthquake of 1972, gave birth to the largest NGQ in Nicaragua today, CEPAD - the Consejo de Iglesias Evangelicas Pro-Alianza Denominacional. During the Somoza dictatorship organizations such as INPHRU (Instituto Nicaraguense de Promoción Humano), 1966, CEPA (Centro de Educación y Promoción Agraria), 1974 and the ERN (Escuelas Radiofonicas de Nicaragua), 1966, began literacy work and organizational activities. The Bishops' meetings of Madeleine in 1968 expressed its "option for the poor", and gave support to such activities. This development was influenced both by national traditions, natural catastrophes and political and ideological trends in the Catholic Church internationally, and the popularity of Paulo Freire. At the end of the 1970s, another group of NGOs began to appear, such as ADP (Asociación para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos) and CRISOL, the Christian Committee in Solidarity with the People of Nicaragua, CEPAD, FUNDE and the Red Cross.

During the insurrection years against the Somoza dictatorship (in the 1970s), many of the present NGOs emerged and were consolidated. Some examples are the Sandinista Defense Committees, the beginning of AMPRONAC, (Asociación de Mujeres Frente a la Problemática

Nacional), the Association of Farm Workers (ATC), which later continued as a farm workers' organization with a spin-off - the UNAG - the Nicaraguan Union of Small Farmers and Ranchers, the urban union movements, especially industrial, teachers, health and other public sector workers. At the end of the Somoza period, in 1978, there were 6 to 7 national NGOs which were supported by the international community and international NGOs.

During the Sandinist period the context for NGO work changed fundamentally, partly because of a change in the government's policy. Important NGOs that had been established in the 1960s and 1970s were further consolidated. Officials from some of the major NGOs were offered and accepted important positions in the Sandinista government.²⁹ Several major new NGOs were created. The Augusto C. Sandino Foundation (FACS) was established in 1980. It aimed at channelling support to Sandinista-affiliated mass organizations. The Manolo Morales Foundation, affiliated with the Christian Democratic Party, was founded in 1982, and began working in development projects with unions and campesinos. A few NGOs, such as the Centro Antonio Valdivieso (CAV) and the Eje Ecumenico, were created and began to specialize in development projects with Christian-based communities. In general the NGOs were very pro-government, as was the international NGO community.

Foreign NGOs were attracted to Nicaragua by the Sandinista revolution. Not less than 120 offices of international NGOs were opened in Nicaragua during the 1980s. Many established direct relationships with popular organizations or with the government. Coupled with the enormous growth in donor funds for NGOs and the governments policy for mobilising the masses, this shaped the NGO scene in the period. Significantly, many Nicaraguan NGOs opened offices for International Relations and began to negotiate projects directly with international NGOs. Relations with the Nicaraguan government were very good throughout the 1980s for the majority of the NGOs. NGO cooperation represented one of the major sources of dollar liquidity as Nicaragua was starting to feel the consequences of the economic and

financial boycott of the United States and most of the multilateral financial institutions. It was rare to see an NGO development project which did not have a strong component of local support by the government. In some cases, NGOs channelled funds from international NGOs to government projects. As a rule, the major national NGOs received the majority of their financing via international NGOs.

When Dona Violeta took power after the victory of UNO in Nicaragua in 1990, as many as 350 new NGOs were registered (Skar et al. 1994:15). The deep-seated cultural traditions did of course not change overnight, but during some few months in early 1990 opposition groups hastened to register civil "legal bodies" by the outgoing members of the Sandinista-dominated National Assembly, which could provide both alternative employment for those out of power, and para-political platforms. Only about 150 of the new NGOs have survived according to a Directory of Nicaraguan NGOs published by CAPRI in 1990 with the financial support of NORAD. New NGOs are now being established by those with connections to the present government, often led by people recently returned from exile in the U.S. The government has also established some NGOs of its own to channel services out of the state arena.

The shifts in orientation and the rapid growth in number can indicate the importance of external funds. When first published in 1991, the Directory of NGOs in Nicaragua reported a total of 174 local NGOs (based on available lists of existing NGOs and the lists of the newly approved NGOs from the National Assembly). Two years later, the Directory was re-edited. Approximately 100 of those previously identified had disappeared. 53 new had been established, the majority of whom had begun to work in 1991. 12 of the NGOs supported by NORAD as part of the local NGO-grant were established in 1990 (Questionnaire I. 39 organisations replied to the questionnaire. 2 did not give year of establishment). 29 were established after 1980. Only 6 of the 37 organisations supported by Norwegian NGOs were established before 1980. 12 organisations were established after 1990. The organisations supported by NORAD and the Norwegian NGOs

were in general not the same organisations. All together the organisations had 1628 employees. (2 organisations did not answer this question). The organisations established in 1990 or later had 137 employees and those established after 1980, 1000 employees.

The present external linkages are taking place under new policy contexts. The government now tries to reduce the ministries and the state apparatus to a minimum. The government has turned the past policy upside down, and pursued a neoliberal policy. From a decade of state led development in a war economy, Nicaragua now develops according to a policy of rapid retrenchment of the state. During a couple of years the NGO-state relations have changed from one of collaboration to one of confrontation and competition. (The NGO scene in Nicaragua will be described and analysed in one case study below).

THE EFFICIENCY AND IMPACT OF NGO ASSISTANCE

Main findings: The NGOs do not have the comparative advantages that they are generally assumed to have in the literature on the NGOs in development. On the contrary, in some cases they have a comparative disadvantage because they can survive despite organisational failures. The above assertion presupposes a uniformity within the NGO community, which in reality share very few common traits. It is furthermore ideologically coloured and it presupposes that social forces in development (or science) can agree on what is a developmental advantage. Finally, there are no empirical data that can substantiate the conclusion that they are "better" than governments in poverty alleviation, sustainable development etc. If the Norwegian NGO channel is to be maintained, the above findings will require a new justification for NGO activities. They may be very important in campaigning for and furthering political and social issues, and in establishing other and more equal relations with people in the developing countries (see chapter V).

This part discusses experiences with NGOs development assistance (see point 6.1. and 6.3. in TOR). First it will analyse and discuss the presumed comparative advantages of the NGOs. It will do so from different angles; conceptually, theoretically and methodologically and finally by presenting some case-studies. This question is a key-question for how one regards the whole NGO-channel.

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

What is comparative advantage?

This concept raises a number of both theoretical and empirical problems. For a decade, evaluations and reports have been attempting to demonstrate that NGOs have comparative advantages. It is possible to assess whether NGOs have succeeded in mobilising people, reaching project targets and improved the standard of living of the target groups, as it is possible to do the same for state-to-state aid and

government projects. But such studies cannot substantiate a claim about comparative advantages for a whole group of heterogeneous organisations vis-à-vis another equally multifaceted group of states.

The way the concept "comparative advantage" is currently used presupposes that the actors or institutions being compared have more or less identical aims, i.e. in this case NGOs, governments and for-profit bodies. An influential NGO-researcher puts it like this: "What does comparative advantage mean in organisational terms? We will take it to mean that an organisation has traits or features which make it more suitable for achieving a particular purpose than an organisation which has the same purpose but does not possess these traits or features" (Fowler, 1990). Therefore, to show that a grassroot-oriented NGO in Chile under the Pinochet government managed to reach the poor with true and meaningful participation to a better extent than the elitist government managed to do, says nothing about comparative advantages in general, but only something about differences between particular governments and NGOs in particular areas at a special time in this country's history. To show that a small Northern NGO is better at implementing projects among poor peoples in remote villages than NORAD, SIDA or a national government, does not imply that general comparative advantages have been demonstrated that the former assists the poor better than the latter in the long run.

What do we know?

The relatively few studies that have assessed the comparative advantages of development NGOs in reaching the poor and vulnerable as compared to governments have not managed to draw any clear conclusions. Tendler analyzed 75 NGO project evaluations in the files of the US Agency for International Development. She concluded that the "literature and knowledge is by and about PVO [NGO] organizations, not about the world and the problems in which the project is taking place, or about the general class of problems being dealt with and the experience in dealing with them", and that the projects evaluated by USAID found no basis for the

claim that NGOs obtain more or better participation or are able to target, reach and work with the poor effectively; articles of faith were frequently myths (Tendler, 1982). *The 1993 UNDP Human Development Report* noted eleven years later that there has been little systematic analysis of NGO impact, either by NGOs themselves or independent organisations (UNDP, 1993:94), but that "...NGO interventions probably miss the poorest 5-10%" (UNDP, 1993:96). The *DANIDA/CASA* evaluation of 1989 stressed the difficulties experienced by NGOs in reaching the very poorest groups, particularly where the emphasis was on self-help (DANIDA/CASA, 1989:91-92). The study by the *Overseas Development Institute* (ODI) of interventions funded by British NGOs showed that most of the projects that were examined failed to reach the very poorest, with disproportionate benefits accruing to those who had access to some land or business, as well as to those with some education and to men rather than women (Muir, 1992:109-112; de Coninck, 1992:108, White, 1991:98, Robinson, 1991:118; Riddell and Robinson, 1992:8). A world-wide review of research projects on animal-drawn agricultural equipment shows that NGOs have been no better or worse than other (private or public) organisations (Paul Starkey, 1987, quoted in Badges and Neame, 1994:10). Our study of the more than 100 evaluations of Norwegian NGOs up to 1991, confirms Tendler's conclusion.

Fowler asserts that the comparative performance study undertaken by Esman and Uphoff of 150 projects involving membership organisations and public service organisations in Africa, Asia and Latin America, selected via a 'random walk' through the literature (Esman and Uphoff, 1984:84), shows that NGOs are '...more likely to adopt a favourable orientation towards and effective support of the actors in micro-development than are governments.' (Uphoff, 1987:14). Another comparative performance study quoted by Fowler concluded that "the limited evaluation work available so far 'tended to show that NGOs have a comparative advantage in addressing basic human needs at the grass-roots level' (OECD, 1987:104)" (quoted in Fowler, 1990). However, These studies cannot be used as evidence for general

comparative advantages, as has been done, because different environments or contexts, the time factor, or units of analysis were unclear.

Even in very similar situations and in cases where a state and an NGO have similar aims, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions. NORAD's district development programme in Turkana from 1971 to 1990 (NORAD had to terminate their support to this project in 1990 after the Kenyan Government asked the Norwegian Embassy to leave following political disagreements between Oslo and Nairobi regarding internal relations in Kenya) can be compared to Norwegian Church Aid's programme in Southern Sudan, Torit District, from 1972 to 1985/86, a programme that had total expenditures (including assistance to Ugandan refugees where NCA was an implementing agency for UNHCR) of about NOK 500 million (NCA was forced to leave after the civil war reached their project area). Such a comparison could bring forth interesting similarities and differences between one state and one NGO in these particular contexts, but not a general conclusion that the one group is more efficient or effective than the other. On the basis of a number of evaluation studies and one book on the Turkana project, and my own analyses of the NCA project, one might suggest that the NORAD project was more "blue-eyed", more voluntaristic and less state-oriented and as grass-roots oriented as NCA's project in Southern Sudan (see Harden, 1992, and his chapter on Turkana, called "Good intentions", pp. 177-217). This example does not show that Norwegian NGOs and NORAD are similar. It only demonstrates that an NGO and a state, under certain conditions, can carry out more or less identical projects in more or less the same way.

NGOs and governments differ fundamentally, at least according to the rhetorics championed by many of the supporters of the "comparative advantage" argument. Many NGOs are based on strong ideological orientations, be they political or religious. They are value-rational rather than means-rational (as state bureaucracies are said to be), to use the sociologist Max Weber's terms. To compare them generally would therefore entail comparison of entities with different

rationales and aims. In some cases NGOs and governments and NGOs and for-profit bodies have opposing development goals and declared differences in target-group orientation. Additionally, NGOs as a group do not have the same aims, the same degree of "value-orientation" or the same abilities and advantages, as is also the case with states and governments. For-profit organizations on the other hand, have more similar aims: To make profits (at least in the long run). Therefore they can be more meaningfully assessed according to comparative advantages than, for example, a mission organisation and a secular state.

What can we know?

The sudden popularity of the term expresses a faddish application of concepts of neoclassical welfare economics to the NGO channel. The theory is also based on a functional argument: if each actor or institutional sector does what it is best at, then improvements in society will be optimal. This is an analytical language emptied of national and organisational histories, power and distributive aspects, and hence the actual role of different NGOs in different countries at different times will be less easy to detect and analyse.

How is it at all possible to substantiate the argument that NGOs are better than governments? Let us assume that all development NGOs are identical (have the same aims, the same attributes, etc) and all states are identical (have the same aims, the same attributes, etc.). The theory can be tested only when the performance of the different organisations that are being compared takes place or is implemented under identical or at least reasonably identical conditions. Methodologically this is problematic. NGOs and governments have extremely different types of instruments with which to influence actions and impacts. Governments, for example, can use instruments such as taxes, legislation, national media, newspapers, prisons, etc. NGOs will usually control fewer instruments, they perform and implement on the basis of more "particularistic" perspectives and approaches than governments. The government, for

example, can change the tax-system or the curriculum of primary schools with immediate and important (positive or negative) consequences for all the poor people in a country, while all the NGOs with all their combined efforts never reach more than a fraction of the people. On the other hand, governments can have a number of planning-experimentation units without enabling structures for doing new things, while NGOs might be able and willing to experiment. It might be meaningful to compare the comparative advantages of BRAC in Bangladesh with the impact of the Bangladesh government in the primary education sector (see below), but such an analysis cannot be generalized to an assessment of BRAC and the government on a general level. The conditions under which the two types of organisation are being compared can never be sufficiently similar, and a direct test of comparative advantages will not therefore, be possible. To draw conclusions from one, two or fifty such examples to the NGO channel as a whole is absurd.

To compare "NGOs" and "governments" faces some of the general problems inherent in comparisons. The way it has been employed within this field is especially problematic: the thesis has a universal ambition; it claims that NGOs are "better" than governments, disregarding NGO/government heterogeneity in time and space.

Comparative disadvantage

Everybody talks about comparative advantages, but very seldom does anybody in the aid community dare to mention the term "comparative disadvantage". Elsewhere it has been argued that the main task of the nonprofit sector (or NGOs, as we focus on here, distinguishing it from the third sector notion as such), is to provide the public sector with unique opportunities to rid itself of insoluble problems which may prove politically risky. In aid, for example, this may mean poverty alleviation and assistance in political conflict areas. The sector in this perspective serves as a "risk-reduction" channel, and is not the efficient, flexible and grassroot-oriented provider of services that NGO

propaganda suggests. The cynical version of this theory would be that NGOs are swarming the world, giving the impression that something is being done about poverty, injustice, environment etc, while most basic relations continue as before. The "leftist" version of the same theory (argued by traditional Marxist-oriented political groups in Bangladesh, for example) is that the NGOs are "opportunistic" organisations, diverting and fragmenting the struggle of poor classes. Seibel (1990) argues that these organisations survive because of their inefficiency and lack of responsiveness. The NGOs can exist and thrive because they represent a de-modernized area in a modern, means-rational organisational culture, i.e. they represent an alternative in maintaining the status quo, because they are less efficient.

Seibel has emphasised, on the basis of his research into mismanagement in the third sector in western states, a paradoxical phenomena: that organizations survive "despite organizational failure". Nonprofit organisations can survive, even in the long run, "despite a substantial lack of organizational learning and responsiveness" (Seibel, 1990:107). He argues that non-profit bodies "survive not *despite* but *because of* their notorious lack of efficiency and responsiveness" (Seibel, 1990:107). He argues that the particular function of the NGOs is "to cope with the political risks of organisational efficiency and responsiveness in a democratic society (Seibel, 1990:108). Organisations are not inevitably inefficient and irresponsible, but they exhibit a broader range of inefficiency than for-profits and public bureaucracies.

Seibel argues, if it is at all possible to talk about a distinct third sector, that the non-profits exist because there are functional necessities *other* than organisational responsiveness and efficiency. If this had not been the case, long-term organisational behaviour would, because of requirements of efficiency and responsiveness, otherwise become similar to that of for-profit organisations and public bureaucracies.

This means that only to the extent that organisations manage to maintain their comparative disadvantage can they hope to exist as something different from state or market

actors. Consequently the Norwegian NGOs will become mini-NORADs or types of consultancy firms in the long run if they do not strengthen their comparative disadvantages, i.e. their value-commitment for example, that may make them less efficient and less competitive in a comparative perspective. When I discuss a new legitimation and new challenges for the NGO channel elsewhere in this report, it should therefore be understood as a discussion of alternative ways by which the parliament, government and the NGOs can achieve what is their declared goal: to maintain a strong NGO channel in Norwegian aid policy.

Forget about "comparative advantages"!

When discussing the question of NGOs' advantages or disadvantages both these perspectives should be considered helpful. Studies of "comparative advantages" in other donor countries about are not very useful in this regard, since basic conceptual, theoretical and methodological problems have not been properly addressed. They have usually been asserted, rather than demonstrated.

The above discussion does not imply that NGOs or groups of NGOs cannot be efficient in challenging structural power relations (the proliferation of church- and left-oriented organisations in parts of Latin-America has helped to undermine the deeply rooted patriarchal power of the Catholic Church and the Military. The leaders of the Church and the Army may not consider this a comparative advantage, but a disadvantage. Furthermore, NGOs have been established to serve a wide range of interests, not only the "progressive" ones, as is usually implied in NGO literature and is a precondition of the "comparative advantage" argument. In his analysis of Brazilian NGOs, Wils refers to "NGOs established by a worried bourgeoisie which hopes to disarm what it considers a "social bomb" threatening to explode and destroy Brazil's capitalist system; and another group of NGOs which began to emerge recently and which is tied to right-wing Protestant sects and movements inside and outside Brazil" (Wils, 1991:9, quoted in Keen (1994)).

There are therefore no clear findings about the most fruitful relationships between a donor country's primary strategies and the administrative structure of individual donor countries, and the organisations' ability to direct activities towards a priority goal and to avail themselves of their presumed comparative advantages. Since the criteria for successful activities vary, and relationships between the organisations and the state are influenced by national traditions, it is also impossible to draw any firm or useful conclusions about which strategic, administrative or operational factors are important prerequisites for successful activities. To assess how NGO activities in general compare with government activities is also futile, since this depends on context in its widest meaning, the character of the particular NGO and the particular state apparatus. What is possible, however, is to discuss their strengths in relation to certain activities.

The question of flexibility and creativity

Main findings: General statements about NGO flexibility and efficiency cannot be substantiated, also due to the heterogeneity of the channel. It is argued that there are no one-to-one relationships between size, efficiency and flexibility, and that contrary to conventional wisdom, very value-oriented NGOs may be less flexible than other NGOs. On the other hand, in certain situations and activities, as in micro-developments and in political conflict situations, NGOs have proved to do things that states easier could have done less easily.

The NGO literature, including Reports to the Storting, ascribes many good attributes and deeds to the NGOs, but seems to disregard incompatibilities in organisational activities. Voluntarism, effectiveness, responsiveness and democratic structures might not always be compatible with each other or with flexibility and vice versa. However, they may be flexible instruments in furthering donorstate policies and government interests in developing countries. There is a great need for contextual analyses of NGO capabilities in aid.

As discussed above, it is not particularly fruitful to compare NGOs with governments, or the

"NGO-group" with the "government-group" on a general level. Governments are just as heterogeneous in their structures, aims and powers as NGOs. It is in fact impossible to establish conditions which make such comparisons methodologically worthwhile. The focus here is rather on what situations NGOs might be especially flexible and efficient. To what extent will the legal standing of NGOs as nongovernmental organisations affect their potential "flexibility" in situations in which governments have particular legal or political constraints on actions? And to what extent will NGOs' value orientations affect their flexibility in reaching development objectives?

Reports to the Storting on flexibility

First, an outline of Norwegian government policy regarding the general flexibility and creativity of NGOs is presented.

Report to the Storting no 36, (1984-85), as the only one in the history of Norwegian aid, devoted a separate chapter to a description of the NGOs: Chap. 9: "Special target group-oriented channels". It made one general remark (there is no official English translation of this report):

"Experience shows that the private organisations represent a valuable alternative for channelling Norwegian aid to certain specific goals. Through the organisations it has been possible to reach certain target groups that are important for Norwegian aid, and which it may be difficult to reach directly in government-to-government cooperation. Women, labour unions, aboriginal groups and disabled persons are examples of such important groups that for the first time might be reached through such channels. In many situations the working style of these organisations gives more options for flexibility than state-to-state aid. Many organisations have shown a larger ability to work unbureaucratically, fast and directly, and demonstrated an ability to try out new ways and to adapt their activity to local technology and resources." (Report to the Storting: 81 no. 36 (1984-85)).

The Report focuses on two types of "flexibility":

a) The state may use the organisations to reach certain groups. and b) some of these organisations have a larger ability to change and adapt than the government. The concepts of "adaptation", "rapidity", "experimentation", "unbureaucraticness" (and perhaps "smallness") are here conceived of as indicators of "flexibility". In some sense, flexibility stands rather for representing options seen from the state's point of view.

Report to the Storting no. 51 (1991-92) on North-South relations generally tuned down the role of the NGOs as compared to no. 36, 1984-85. It repeats some of the same notions, but in a slightly less generalized mood.

"They are often more flexible when it comes to a quick response to new needs that arise, and many of them reach further down to the "grassroots" in developing countries than state aid."

"The organisations also have advantages in their organisational structures, which enable greater flexibility in their work."

"The role of the organisations must be seen in connection with our total aid to the individual country or a specific region. It is preferable that the work done by these organisations is directed towards prioritized target groups and sectors, in such a way that their endeavours may be complementary to state-to-state cooperation." (St.meld. nr. 51, 1991-92, p.235.)¹

The coordination of NGO work within the overall direction of governments is stressed. Thus the second notion of flexibility (as far as their adaptation, speed, and ability to change is concerned) is repeated, although it is emphasised less. The first notion (flexibility as an alternative channel for the state's aid policy) is still viewed as important, but more complementary with official aid policy. The different aspects of the concept "flexibility" seem to contradict each other: It is unlikely that an organisation or project could maintain both its "freedom under responsibility", "adaptational approach", "experimentation" and simultaneously be a tool (or contractor) for government policy.

Seen from a donor-state's point of view NGOs may, as the reports say, be very flexible in executing donor policies that the recipient government is not interested in undertaking. But then the question is about their role as donor-state instruments, and not about the efficiency of different types of social institutions.

Types of organisations and the question of flexibility

In general it is impossible to say something definite about NGOs as a group, regarding "flexibility", not least because organisations develop over time. General statements completely ignore the challenges set forth by the Swiss social scientist, Robert Michels, who in 1915 published *Political Parties*. He argued that he "who says organisations says oligarchy", and that all organisations would become dominated by a self-perpetuating and self-serving leadership. In the sociological tradition this has become known as the "the iron law of oligarchy". A flexible organisation today might be a rigid organisation tomorrow, depending on leadership, individual actors, the funding situation, etc.

Flexibility may vary with size. In Norway the organisational landscape shows great variety. Some of the biggest are (according to aid budgets in 1992): Norwegian Church Aid: NOK 299 mill; Redd barna: NOK 277 mill. (1993); Norwegian Red Cross: NOK 193 mill. and Norwegian People's Aid. NOK 161 mill. On the other hand there is a large undergrowth of small organisations. The four biggest got 55% of the support in 1991, and the 22 biggest received 90% of the funding the same year. On the other hand: there were 100 registered organisations, both Norwegian and international, that had a budget of less than NOK one mill in 1991. (NGOs supported directly by the NORAD representations are not counted here.)

The government has stressed the need for Norwegian organisations to be involved in aid, not least because of their work on public opinion and comparative advantages. The realisation of such a goal requires a great variety of organisations, since different organisations have developed

different profiles. Will Norwegian Church Aid or the Norwegian Lutheran Mission (9th in 1991, more than NOK 21mill.) be as efficient as The National Organisations for Lesbian and Gay Liberation in promoting the rights of homosexuals in developing countries? Were organisations for senior citizens to venture into the aid sector, would Norwegian Save the Children or Norwegian Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund be the best channels? Obviously, the argument of variety and comparative advantages has its limitations. How many smaller specialised organisations with experience from Norway are to be "let loose" by the state on other societies, and thus create small images of the Norwegian organisational map? There can be no doubt that NORAD's policy and openness to new organisations and the willingness of the NGO Division to "train" these has contributed to the creation of a variety of aid organisations of which few, if any, countries have seen the like.

Is the channelling of all funds via, for instance the ten largest organisations opportune from a point of view of what is the most effective, or is size a measure of efficiency at all? The point of departure for this train of thought is a belief that such organisations are more professional, more cost-effective etc. However, it is not difficult to refer to cases where these large organisations are bureaucratic, slow and inefficient. To choose a criterion like this is alluringly simple, because size is a variable common to all organisations, and it is easy to measure. Size may be measured in terms of budget, number of members, number of employees, number of target groups or the number of budget channels giving their support. The problem, however, is that a variable like this cannot be used as a criterion of aid quality, efficiency or informational competence. Research on correlations between size and the quality of activity in organisations in general has concluded that size is not related to the form of action, that it is positively related to the form of activity, that size and form of activity are arc linear and that size is positively related to some aspects of activity, but negatively related to others (Bozeman, 1987:24); i.e. that size is not an indication of anything but the fact that it is big. To introduce this as a criterion of priority, as suggested, will therefore be unfruitful.

In Bangladesh the largest NGO is BRAC with 12, 000 on the payroll, about 1,1 million members and a yearly budget of about 30 million US dollars, while there are thousands of small rural associations. In Zimbabwe there are more than 800 registered organisations, but only 20 with a financial turnover of more than 1 mill Z. dollars. 50 NGOs employ more than 20 staff. ORAP claims to have more than 100,000 members. (de Graaf, Moyo and Dietz 1991; Moyo, 1992.) Only a few of these NGOs are linked to the aid channel, however. *The Orthodox Church* is registered as an Ethiopian NGO. It has over 30 million members, over 25 000 parish churches and 400 000 clergy. Coptic Christianity has been the state religion since around 350 AD. The Church has been and is a hierarchical organisations which can be compared to a pyramid with most number of people at the lower levels. In 1972 it established Ethiopian Orthodox Church Development and Inter-Church Aid Department to "perform the church's historical duties, social welfare activities and act as a catalyst to development", with its first priority: to "involve the Church in economic, social and cultural development of the society". At the other extreme there are very weak, one-man (or one-woman) organisations among the 150 or so other Ethiopian NGOs. The degree of flexibility and the need for flexibility might vary with size, organisational set-ups, the degree of bureaucratic professionalism, etc. The more successful (or the more "scaling-up" as the present jargon calls it) an NGO, the less flexible it may become.

On the other hand: large NGOs, like BRAC and Norwegian Church Aid, might be more flexible than smaller organisations when it comes to the ability to change and experiment. Both experiments and change may presuppose more financial resources and a stronger ability to cope with failures etc. Thus one could argue that the combination of financial strength with non-governmental status could be an appropriate environment for flexibility in this sense of the word.

Flexibility may vary with activity profile. Many of the big organisations are multisectoral. They have over the years shown great willingness (the

ability could, however, be more questioned) to shift from one sector to another and from one activity to another and also - from one slogan to the other. Redd Barna has renamed previous projects in Ethiopia from "Rural Development projects" to "Child Centred Rural Development projects." Organisations have taken on all the most popular slogans of the day - all the time. Whether this is flexibility or reflects a split "personality" (organisations are not only Jack of all trades, but act as if they were both Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde as well) is open to question and research.

Other organisations are working only within one narrow area with special target groups. This is the rule rather than the exception among all the Norwegian organisations that participate with only a small input in this field. Many of these are interest organisations for special groups or professions in Norway; the Norwegian Association of the Disabled; Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted; Norwegian Union of Teachers; Norwegian Nurses Association; the Support-committee for children in need of aid in Chile, etc. Internationally some examples are: World Wildlife Fund; the International Consumer's Organisation; World Council of Indigenous People; International Tropical Timber Organisation; International Confederation of Sea Fishworkers etc. These organisations naturally tend to be rigid in taking up responsibilities outside their domain or mission. On the other hand the same organisations might show impressive creativity and flexibility in obtaining their more easily defined aims. Rigidity of the aim may correlate positively with flexibility in implementation, and vice versa. However, it is impossible to conclude whether single-sector organisations in general are more successful than multi-sector organisations (TOR 6.1.4 and 6.3.5).

Flexibility may vary with organisational structures. One-man NGOs (as is the case with many of the "new" NGOs in the developing countries) or which are led by charismatic leaders (like BRAC and the Green Belt Movement in Kenya) will tend to be more responsive to external changes than organisations with members, democratically

elected Boards etc. In some cases flexibility and membership organisations/democratic organisations are opposites, while in other cases they might coincide. The apparent "rigidity" or unwillingness of Redd Barna as compared to Norwegian People's Aid to take up new assignments proposed by the Norwegian government and other donors outside their traditional work profile partly reflects the fact that the former is an organisation with a Board and a number of local groups, while Norwegian People's Aid is to a larger extent led by professionals. To draw a clear line between membership organisations and non-membership organisations is not reasonable, because the criteria may have marginal influence on aid conduct and aid profile. Take two of the most important Norwegian NGOs; Redd Barna (Save the Children, Norway), a membership organisation, and Norwegian Church Aid. Redd Barna is a strong membership organisation in Norway. It is a firmly and formally constituted organisation with a Board led by volunteers and a number of local cells around the country which mobilise children and others to arrange bazaars, parties etc. to collect money for aid. It has worked in most sectors (health, health-related research, primary and secondary education, social services, culture and arts, emergency, income generating etc. Redd Barna started development work in 1961, and runs development projects and relief operations in more than 30 countries. Its total expenditure on development activities abroad in the same years (including emergency aid) excluding administration at home) in the years 1981, 1986 and 1991 respectively, came to NOK 38 mill., 101 mill., and 209 mill., respectively (budget). Norwegian Church Aid was established in 1947. It is not a membership organisation, but is governed by a Board appointed by a Council that in its turn is established by various institutions, including one from each Bishopric in Norway, one from the Annual Church Meeting in Norway plus other institutions - clerical as well as secular. It started operations in developing countries in 1962. In 1991 it worked in 61 countries. Total expenditure (excluding costs in connection with the running of the international network: Emergency Relief Desk) in the same years were NOK 82 mill., NOK 298 mill., and NOK 369 mill. NCA works primarily

with local churches, while Redd Barna primarily implements its own projects.

In Ethiopia Redd Barna's revised budget for 1993 shows a total cash requirement of NOK 23,295,000. The budget comprised funds for 17 projects in a number of warradas. It has a staff of more than 300 people. It implements the projects themselves. NCA cooperates mainly with Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY). Since 1986-1991 NCA has supported EECMY with NOK 43,959 mill. in nominal terms. In Eritrea Redd Barna and NCA are both working very closely with the government. In Zimbabwe, Redd Barna has a good relation with the government, and tries to work through a Community Based Organisations, while NCA in other countries is an implementing organisation. From one perspective these organisations are "many" types of organisations, and fit many of the most used terms.

Flexibility may vary with value consciousness and traditions. Brown and Korton argue that what characterizes NGOs is the fact that they are organisations of shared values. Let us assume that this generally is the case. Some NGOs have shared values (for example the aim of helping the poor, the blind or disabled, and have no other "hidden" value agenda. Such organisations will tend to be flexible in trying to reach this aim. Other organisations are very value conscious and share values that to them are much more important than aid and the particular aid projects. Here we can find mission organisations and organisations primarily working in aid in order to spread some kind of "message", be it religious, political or ideological. These organisations may be extremely inflexible in questions of principle, but very flexible in ways of achieving their main aim. Their "voluntarism" or the energy encouraged by convictions might be their Achillesheel when it comes to flexibility in aim adjustments, working methods etc. This can be shown by a study of a mission organisation involved in aid in Ethiopia. Other types of organisations could have been selected, but few organisations have a documented history and are so aware of this dilemma as the mission organisations. In order to bring to the attention the complexities and dilemmas involved, it is

thought useful to present some case studies in detail.

A case study: Norwegian Lutheran Mission - mission and aid

Main findings: NLM is a "value-oriented" organisation, like other missionary organisations and many other (although not all) development NGOs. This "value-orientation" might be conducive to flexibility and efficiency, but might also hinder it in important areas. In this conflicting zone between "value-orientations" - because other actors, like the Norwegian state, the local partners, the local state etc. also promote values - organisational efficiency and flexibility manifest themselves. The dilemmas between aid and mission can, however, be tackled - as has been demonstrated in the past - in a pragmatic manner. Nationalization processes, for example, can be set in motion, and have been set in motion because of internal conditions in the organisation (change of opinion, lack of educated missionaries as staff etc.), relation to the national Church (changing ideas and capacities). NLM has hesitantly reformulated some of its aims also due to political and economic pressure from NORAD.

The focus here is on the Norwegian Lutheran Mission (NLM) and its work in South Ethiopia. Other organisations, both mission and secular, could have been chosen, although there are few secular organisations with similar traditions and strengths. NLM's history is also much better mapped and analysed than most secular development NGOs.²

This rather detailed case study intends to give a description of the intriguing complexity and important processes that hide beneath the rhetorical level and ahistoricism of conventional evaluation studies. It is, of course, unique but may illustrate problems of a more general nature in NGO aid.

Norwegian Lutheran Mission. Aim and organization.

NLM is a mission organisation which is also a development NGO. Its development projects have been financed via the Norwegian aid budget since 1963. Mission organisations constitute often an important part of the NGO-landscape both in the donor countries and in developing countries. It is therefore important to study them, also because the NGO literature deals mostly with secular organisations like OXFAM, CARE, Save the Children, Médecins sans Frontières, etc., and with some religious organisations like Norwegian Church Aid, Christian Aid, NOVIB in the Netherlands, but more rarely with mission organisations. This perspective reduces the heterogeneity of the field, and it makes it less natural to analyse the NGOs in a wider historical perspective, since its forerunners are lost in the graveyard known as past.

It may be useful first to refer to some central mission goals of NLM, as approved by the General Assembly in 1991, in order to bring forth the importance of NLM's main programme:

"Sending mission: mission is no more a human invention than the Gospel itself. It has its starting point and mandate in Jesus' own words to us. The great commission, as it is given to us at the end of all four Gospels and in the beginning of The Acts, is a call to all believers to proclaim the Gospel so that new people can become disciples of Jesus. The preaching of the word of God and the witness for Jesus are the main concern of the mission, because it is only the good news about him which can give salvation to sinners.

NLM therefore wishes to be an instrument for fulfilling the great commission in the world of today. We wish to be available to persons who are called by God and suitable for missionary service, to train them and send them with the word of God to those parts of the world where it is little known. We want to be a sending mission, because our most important resource in mission are people who have a living testimony about Christ."

"We wish to serve the whole person: in John 20:21, Jesus gives his commission in a wider sense than elsewhere. "As the Father has sent me, I am sending you". Jesus' ministry included both preaching and caring for the welfare of the people. He both taught and helped the sick and needy.

The disciples should serve in the same way. In the word of God there is no contradiction between serving with the Gospel and doing the deeds of Christ's hands among people in social distress. It is therefore an important goal for us as a mission to meet different types of human need with adequate help. Jesus asked us to do so."(NLM, 1991, "Statement on mission", Oslo.)

NLM in Ethiopia.

NLM was established in 1891 and worked only in China until 1948. It was invited to Ethiopia by a Swedish missionary organisation. Following a decision of the NLM General Assembly in 1946, a delegation visited Ethiopia. They were given an audience by the Emperor, Haile Selassie. He asked them to start their work in the provinces of Sidamo and Gemu Gofa, which have been their area of concentration until today. Since then Ethiopia has been the most important mission field for NLM. Its work in Ethiopia is by far the most extensive area of activity for NLM. In 1993 a total of 110 missionaries were attached to 24 mission stations and devoted their service to 1,356 organised parishes, 1,800 women's and youth groups, 16 primary schools, 624 reading schools, two schools for health assistance, one school for homecrafts, one theological seminar, one orphan home, several bible schools, one youth polytechnic and three hospitals. (Skole og misjon, 1/1988) The permanent secretariat in Ethiopia is manned by a staff of five: Mission Secretary; Consultant of Projects; Financial Secretary; Secretary and Accountant.

The total NORAD-granted budget of NLM in Ethiopia in 1993 was NOK 10.2 mill., of which 80% or NOK 8.2 mill. was paid by NORAD. This included investments and running costs for three health projects in cooperation with the Ministry of Health and nine health and emergency preparedness projects together with the Ethiopian Evangelical Church, Mekane

Jesus.³ The NLM project administration at the secretariat and main office in Ethiopia cost NOK 365,000 as part of these total NOK 10,2 mill project costs, under the 80/20% NORAD/NLM arrangement. NLM was also paid 5% on top of the total costs of NOK 10,2 mill for its home administration by NORAD. This amounted to NOK 513,200. (Bistandsnemda's comment on NLM in Ethiopia, 1993).⁴

Mission, local church and "charitable work"

How has NLM's relation to "local partners" and "nationalization" developed? NLM's policy regarding evangelisation and development work, and its relation to what in modern secular development language is called a "local organisation" or a "partner", has a long and well-documented history. This analysis focuses on what has been a main problem in the history of NLM (and other missions, but the problem takes on different aspects from organisation to organisation and depending on the country in which they work): the problem of nationalisation. While this is a term used in aid and belongs to the development aid era, it is closely related in missionary terms to the question of the relationship between the local church and mission organisations. An early study from the middle of the last century phrases the crux of the matter: Peter Beverhauss: *Die Selbständigkeit der jungen Kirchen als missionarisches Problem*. The question involves fundamental aspects of both mission strategy and development strategy and can bring to the fore constraints of flexibility in organisations with strongly shared values.

Scandinavian missions have played a leading role in spreading Lutheran Christianity to Ethiopia. In 1866 the first Swedish missionaries came to Massawa. A mission was established in Eritrea and started to work in Jimma. In 1904 Karl Cerderquist came to Addis Ababa as the first Swedish missionary. The Swedish Mission Bibletrue Friends officially commenced work in Ethiopia in 1921, although a missionary family had already worked in Adwa for some years before that time. The first missionaries of the Norwegian Lutheran Mission came to the country in 1948. In their assigned area they were

allowed to work among "unreached people" but, according to the regulations, not to evangelize and only to undertake development work. The Emperor's decree of 1944 on the establishment of missions ruled that mission activities in so-called closed areas, i.e. areas in which the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was dominant, had to be confined to medical and non-denominational educational work. The mission soon discovered that it was difficult and in certain cases impossible to obtain permission for evangelical work. The missions were therefore forced from the very beginning to concentrate on what were then called "charitable activities", like running schools and hospitals.⁵ The more modern "holistic" diaconal approach had not yet been internalized in strategic terms.

NLM was not primarily interested in development projects. Their concerns were church-related. Should a church be established or not, and if so, how should the church function and what should NLM's role be? NLM supported the establishment of independent Lutheran congregations instead of working through the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. According to strategy documents it was not the task of the mission to counteract the EOC, but to maintain friendly relations with the EOC priests as far as possible⁶ (Bakke, 1987:119). This was not easy, partly due to the proclamatory missionary policy of NLM. Just a few days after the close of the first NLM missionary conference, Abune Timoteos,⁷ the bishop of Yirga Alem, warned the faithful celebrating the *timqet* festival against NLM. In his judgement the NLM missionaries were "lions and poisonous snakes" who planned to harvest the fruit of EOC's efforts.⁸ Later he complained to the Emperor that the NLM perverted the people and that he therefore could not return to Sidamo as long as the mission remained in the province.⁹ Complaints were also made by the clergy at Gidole against the presence of NLM.¹⁰ This was in a context where it was considered a crime to leave the EOC, and nominal Orthodox believers who wanted to join an evangelical congregation were often accused and put in prison (Bakke, 1987: 119-120).

These external pressures affected and changed missionary policies in regard to what in today's aid-language would be called "competence

building" or "local participation". In the 1950s it was still rare to give leading positions in missions work to "local boys". The colonial impact on Western mission was clearly felt. In Sidamo NLM gradually had to give leadership positions to young Ethiopian converts. Because of EOC pressure the missionaries were forced to concentrate on leadership training, rather than on district evangelism (or as it would be called now: on "direct implementation of projects to target groups").¹¹ This pressure also convinced those NLM missionaries who did not favour cooperation with other Protestant groups, that evangelical believers in Ethiopia ought to build an organization through which they could approach the government.¹² This development was important for the establishment of the new Church.

NLM's cautiousness reflected religious disagreements and different organisational agendas. NLM emphasised the laity and had (as they still have) a very critical attitude to clericalism. NLM policy in the "home country" concerning cooperation with the Church of Norway was another factor. Since they did not favour such cooperation and the ecumenical idea in Norway, why should they do so with other Lutheran missions in Ethiopia? They were critical to the establishment of the World Council of Churches in 1948, since its basis of belief did not "clearly express that Scripture alone should be the organizational basis", especially expressed in "the work of the so-called dialogue programme" (NLM, 1991, Statement on Mission:18). NLM, then as today, dissociated itself from the World Council of Churches, regrets that the Norwegian state is a member and advise its cooperating churches to exclude themselves from membership in this organisation. They were and are also very critical to The Lutheran World Federation (where for example Norwegian Church Aid is a prominent member), because the organisation has not "portrayed a genuine Lutheran understanding of the Biblical message", especially in the vital question of the relationship of missions to non-Christian religion. Therefore, they also advise their cooperating churches not to belong to LWF (Ibid:19). When NLM talked about "partnership", - religious attitudes to ecumenism have been of paramount importance- it was

therefore partnership on their own conditions. After having worked for more than 60 years in China, NLM now for the first time accepted cooperation with another Lutheran mission on more than a purely theoretical issue (Bakke, 1987:161).

This hesitant attitude was noted by contemporary missionaries, but interpreted culturally and historically rather than based on scriptural interpretation: "I see this on the background and my knowledge of my own people who are, I believe, the hardest group to work with when it comes to all kinds of cooperation. The theological and psychological temperament of the Norwegians sometimes necessitates making haste slowly."¹³ (Bakke, 1987:162). Missionaries from other countries could write: "Traditionally, Norwegians and Swedes distrust each other and historically, because of the last World War, Norwegians and Germans find it difficult to forget the old bitterness"¹⁴ (Bakke, 1987:162). The NLM Home Board discussed the issue, but were not willing to support cooperation. After about ten years in the country, the General Secretary was sent to a missionary conference in Ethiopia and said: "I believe we may work better and more peacefully by not joining. We shall try to be faithful towards our own conviction and at the same time respect the opinions of others"¹⁶. (Bakke, 1987:164). The vote taken at the missionary conference still showed a small majority against such cooperation, but it was in 1960 overruled by the NLM home board.¹⁷

Due to their long traditions and their interpretation of the Bible, NLM could not be flexible in their attitude to building up the church, or a "local partner", in the "NGO-speak". They disagreed internally and it was regarded as unnatural to cooperate with people who did not agree with NLM in what were regarded as fundamental religious matters. Gradually they accommodated to new realities. They started to involve themselves strongly in building up the established church and took on more development work, both as a way of preaching the Gospel but also as a means of obtaining work permits in order to do evangelical work.

A classical discussion in the history of missions soon started: should the weak and new EECMY-

church, established in 1959, be burdened with development tasks?¹⁸ NLM held that it was important not to give it responsibility for institutions and programmes which were not really necessary. The foreign missions were under a Government obligation to run educational and medical institutions. However, this was not the case for a national Church, and EECMY could follow a policy of "selective integration". NLM, on the other hand, had to take on development projects, whether they wanted to or not, or whether they felt they had the capacity or competence or not - in order to stay and implement their "real mission".

And how could NLM continue after a church was established? This was an economic question. To continue its work, NLM was dependent on money from Norway. These could be obtained through appeals. In order to convince people, NLM argued that it was crucial to have people, missionaries, in "the field". NLM and its leaders therefore fought a battle with EECMY regarding the right of the mission organisation to remain in Ethiopia. The strategic question was: how to maintain a mission organisation in the field when transfer of responsibility to the national church had taken place? The mission ought to be a partner of EECMY, not integrated into it. As a partner the mission could work in and through EECMY, and at the same time appeal as before to its support groups (Sæverås, no date:155). It was also important to maintain its position in relation to other mission organisations, with other messages. The conflict with Norwegian Missionary Society (Det Norske Misjonsselskap=NMS) in 1968 can show this. NLM was negative to NMS' plans to be involved in Ethiopia, partly because, according to NMS, they interpreted this as an attempt to capture the very many mission friends that supported work in this country (Kjosavik, 1992:130-131). NLMs working areas were also restricted. They had to say no to work in some other areas in the West Synod, for example, because liturgy and church arrangements had been influenced by Swedish and American church traditions (Ibid.:131).

And finally: in which direction ought the new church to develop? NLM advocated that EECMY should not become a Church with priests, etc, but if they must have priests, women

priests should not be ordained, and EECMY should not join LWF. NCA on the other hand, also with money from NORAD, has an official policy that EECMY ought to take an active part in LWF, that women priests should be ordained, etc. Religious divisions in Norway are thus exported to EECMY paid by the Norwegian state. An Ethiopian minority Lutheran Church has been built up to a large extent with money from the Norwegian state - under guidelines that strongly underline that projects shall not be motivated or serve special economic, political or religious interests.

NLM, NORAD and Sidamo Hospital

In 1963 NLM signed the first agreement with Norsk Utviklingshjelp (NORAD). This concerned support for the Sidamo Regional Hospital in Yirgalem in South Ethiopia. NLM has had several other projects in South Ethiopia, but this analysis is not an attempt to reconstruct the whole history of its mission in Ethiopia. The following review will limit itself to a short account of those aspects of the hospital project in this context. This hospital is famous in Ethiopia, and considered to be one of the best, if not the best, in the whole country. Compared to similar hospitals elsewhere, the cost is very low. The expatriates are missionaries, with a salary far below other expatriates in Ethiopia. Everyone who visits the place seems to return impressed by what NLM and the Ethiopian staff manage to do with relatively modest budgets. It shines, as Albert Schweitzer's hospital in "the jungle". The following is not an assessment of the project as a development project in a narrow, conventional sense. It is an analysis of how the relationship between mission and development aid has been handled in the development aid era,¹⁹ and how different and competing agendas affect organisational flexibility in reaching "localisation" or "nationalization" goals in development aid.

The contract from 1963 stated that NLM committed itself to undertake the project on a general humanist basis without being motivated by economic, political or religious special interests.²⁰ The Norwegian state made it very clear that for the money given by the state, NLM

was not to engage in religious activities. From the very beginning the exact interpretation of this paragraph was a point of confusion. In the same contract it was stated: "The economic responsibility for management of the hospital will be specified in a contract between the Ethiopian state and Norsk Luthersk Misjonssamband, and is not the concern of Norsk Utviklingshjelp".²¹ The Norwegian state made it very clear that it was not prepared to support the running cost of the hospital. 30 years later tens of millions of kroner have been transferred to this project, and the Norwegian state is still financing expatriate salaries, the programme against TB etc., and the hospital is still run by the Mission but in cooperation with the Ethiopian Ministry of Health. As a mission history summarizes: It was not "difficult to raise funds for that kind of work" (Bakke, 1987:123). Information on such institutions convinced possible donors that the mission "was not only preaching". The various development activities were also regarded by the missions as useful for their position in relation to the Ethiopian government. Schools, hospitals and clinics were no doubt popular services.²² (Bakke, 1987:123). The hospital has therefore been important from many points of view; it has served tens of thousands of Ethiopians for a comparatively modest sum of money; it has been a central element in NLM mission strategy in Ethiopia and it has most likely played an important role behind the build-up of a large, rather efficient and development oriented Lutheran minority church in Ethiopia.

Nationalization of the Hospital.

What has happened in the meantime and why is the Hospital not yet nationalised, or why is not EECMY responsible for the project? There are of course a number of reasons for this situation. The hospital has generally functioned very well. The mission and many Ethiopians have feared that if NLM withdrew, the level of services would deteriorate. Due to war and general poverty the state has been unable to take it over and maintain present standards. The government has therefore been sceptical to a "hand-over". Many in EECMY have felt that the church's commitments are heavy enough, without the

burden of running the hospital. Recurrent administrative shake-ups at the regional level (the overthrow of the Emperor, the war situation, the overthrow of Mengistu, the ethnification of regional and local politics after 1991, etc.), have made it difficult to find state institutions that are able or willing to take it over.

Here we focus on another aspect: how the mission agenda itself has affected NLM's development policies and choices. The point is that other mission organisations have similar problems in many countries. Fundamentally, these reflect goal conflicts; the mission's mission agenda and the mission's externally defined development agenda, or as it is called in the internal language of the mission organisations: projects run with "alien money". The point here is not to discuss whether mission organisations are "bad" or "good" NGOs. Nor it is to discuss whether NORAD should support organisations that use development funds as a shield and a shelter to protect the execution of their "real" aim. The task is to show how organisational values breed inflexibility in relation to development aims.

NLM and development goals

One analytical point of departure might be a comparison of the language of the *Statement on Mission* (NLM, 1991) and *Strategy document on NLM's project work abroad* (NLM, 1988).²³ The latter states that the main aim is the spread of God's word. Diaconia is not "primarily" based on mission-tactical arguments, it is said, because for a Christian it is "impossible to live in a society where the suffering is great, without trying to help as long as resources are available" (Strategy document). The most striking thing about this document, if compared to the *Statement on Mission*, is its language. While the latter uses an expressive language, highlighting the convictions and seriousness of NLM commitments, the aid document is written in imprecise "NGO-speak". Their project criteria are:

- "Projects that support the poorest, the weakest and the most oppressed
- Local needs and conditions

- Priorities set by the local population
- Have to be adopted to public plans
- The resources of the organisation and its partners
- Projects with a education profile"

On partnership in development aid, the strategy document states that:

"The main cooperation partners of the mission are local churches and synods. Where such do not exist, the mission wishes to work for the establishment of church societies built on local congregations. In those cases where there is a church co-partner, the other types of cooperations are organized through the church organisation and not directly with NLM".²⁴

The strategy document thus refers to the "local partners", emptied of religious convictions, with no trace of its stand against the ecumenical movement and opposition to church networks like LWF and WCC. The impression is that NLM is a development aid organisation, certainly religious, but that this is not a big deal. The document does not reflect problems related to encounters with local cultures, dialogue, etc. The emphasis is simply: the need for preaching their version of Christianity as the best way to create development. This type of use of concepts (and other central words within the phraseology) creates a notion of uniformity (on the surface, i.e. in the documents circulating within the aid channel) where the realities "on the ground", are ambiguous and contradictory. As a mission organisation bred within the Norwegian lay movement the NLM has several objections to cooperation with churches of high-church order or with strong hierarchies. Their interest and agenda are rather to maintain and continue their mission within a lay structure, and to neither cooperate with strong formal church structures nor "nationalise", if their fundamental convictions about the message of Christ are not secured. Thus such cooperation with a "local partner", "organisational support" or "institution building" becomes difficult and leads to ambiguous strategies that conflict with the fundamental goal of the mission. When such concepts are so readily used by the organisation in its official development document (as demanded by NORAD) it should be interpreted,

on the background of their mission strategy, as a rhetorical device.

NLM, value dilemmas and nationalization

How have contradictions between missionary strategies and development policies, between NORADs emphasis on religious neutrality and nationalisation and NLMs aim of evangelization and continued missionary presence been solved concretely in relation to this project? These dilemmas were brought into the open as early as 1972, when EECMY, NLMs cooperating partner and "offspring", became famous within the world missionary movement with a religious line that countered the separation between development and evangelization that the NORAD link made obligatory. EECMY urged NLM and other missionary organisations and religious organisations to implement a holistic approach; i.e. not to separate the two and give priority to evangelization. For NLM, which is not registered with the Ethiopian authorities and which allowed to work there only as employees of this same EECMY, this has created permanent and deep conflicts of orientation.

What was the background to EECMYs appeal? EECMY soon took over some of the projects the mission had started and the projects initiated by other donors. All the health work of NLM, except the running of two hospitals, became the responsibility of the South Ethiopian Synod/EECMY in 1971. The administration of these institutions and programmes made it necessary for EECMY to establish development departments at both church and synod level.²⁵ The church discovered that money was not a big problem. Support was coming from abroad. Therefore it could not responsibly let the opportunities to get funds for development projects go by without making the fullest possible use of them. This sharpened the conflict between evangelization and development work: It was easy to obtain funds for development schemes but not so simple to get help for other church activities. This imbalance had been pointed out earlier also by Norwegian missionaries. It was said that medical and educational work had become a means to an end, "baits by which the unsuspecting and the

suspicious are caught".²⁶ An employee at the hospital in Yirgalem wrote a memorandum to the LWF in which he complained about the tendency to "count charity work as a footstep for the real mission work which is preaching to the gospel and baptized".²⁷ It was suggested to the LWF that "an inquiry be conducted inside the Lutheran missions in order to identify the relative share of their missionary programmes occupied by medicine and welfare, education and evangelism".²⁸ The huge input of development aid resulted in a new demand for technical personnel in all fields. Such people were not so easy to find, and it became necessary to offer them higher salaries in order to attract people. Living conditions and benefits above the norm were the natural results. An imbalance between evangelism and development became more and more visible. The problem was raised at the Seventh General Assembly of EECMY in 1971. It was agreed to approach the donor agencies through the LWF to reconsider their criteria for aid and include direct support of congregational work, leadership training and church buildings. This initial request was followed up by the now famous EECMY letter, *On the Interrelation between Proclamation of the Gospel and Human Development*. It accused the missions and the Western churches of distorting the churches' aim to serve the whole person. It emphasised that evangelism and development are not two separate activities but one. Development activities without the evangelistic aspect meant accepting that man can be treated in parts. On the other hand; evangelism is development work, because preaching leads to improved living conditions. True development takes place only when a person is renewed in "his inner man".

How did NLM operate in this context? How should they maintain balance, not only between the two principles, but between the two "partners", EECMY and NORAD, both requiring that NLM should work in line with their expectations? As has been shown, NLM missionaries had already, before the contract with NORAD was signed, questioned the tendency for evangelisation to become separated from development work. The initiative of the Home Board to cooperate with NORAD, based on overall assessments of strategy, funds and

expansion, threatened to widen this conflict. The EECMY letter was written on a background where funds for evangelism did not increase, whereas it seemed to be no problem to obtain grants for development schemes. Many argued that the best way to develop an area was to channel funds through the church. The development aid available made it possible for synod leaders to direct funds to their own area and their own people. A number of new jobs were created. The growth of the church was partly a result of growth in development budgets, job opportunities, the power to allocate resources locally, etc. Many interpreted the fact that EECMY and missionaries from NLM were allowed to operate under Mengistu partly as a result of being involved heavily in development activities. NLM and the NLM camp at Awash, for example, were left undisturbed, which could be seen as a sign of appreciation by the government for the development work undertaken by NLM.²⁹

EECMY leaders did question why the NLM in 1971 preferred to keep the contracts concerning the running of the government hospital in the south in the name of NLM. NLM argued that the contracts had been made between the government and the mission and could not easily be transferred to an Ethiopian church. NLM also argued that these institutions would be far too heavy a burden for EECMY. They required tremendous resources in highly qualified personnel and large financial contributions, which EECMY did not have. In the opinion of the NLM these institutions would serve the people and the church best if they remained projects under direct mission control and influence (when NCA and other NGOs started to channel more money to EECMY this argument was no longer valid). NLM also pointed to the special relationship of the NLM to NORAD. NORAD had invested highly in these institutions and was, NLM said, "in the process of accepting responsibility for an increased number of positions" (Bakke, 1987: 224-225, footnote 7). The hospital project's role as a shield and source of money for NLMs continuous missionary work there was not mentioned.

Put under continued pressure from NORAD in the late 1980s, - the Office for Private

Organisations incessantly hammered on the need for nationalization - without showing particular knowledge of and interest in the particular histories and role dilemmas of mission organisations and "local partners"- NLM was forced to set out a ten-year nationalization plan for this hospital (and for Arba Minch Hospital) in 1988. Since then a number of evaluations, reports, discussions, internal seminars and open conferences internationally and with NORAD have taken place at which this issue has been at the top of the agenda.

Some of these discussions with NORAD were based on an untenable premise that all NGO actors favour nationalization (other NGOs would also find it hard to make themselves redundant). These discussions presuppose that everybody favours nationalization. Hesitation was generally explained sociologically or psychologically (a general fear of change, a fear of losing the mission identity etc.) or historically (it takes time to adjust to new challenges, etc.). These arguments are all relevant, but an analysis of the problem that does not focus on how the organisation interprets missionary work or the diaconal project, elements that are crucial to the organisation's existence and self-understanding, and how these relate to existing NORAD guidelines and policies, will blur the issues.

NLM could not subscribe fully to the EECMY doctrine because of their link to NORAD, although they shared their opinions. They received money to undertake development work separated from evangelization, although for the last decade they have been employed as missionaries in a church that preaches a "holistic approach". Separate accounting in this system and context is not easy. NLM could not give the hospital to the church, because that would have threatened their own presence and undermined their own agenda. (NLM does not want EECMY to be a member of LWF, to ordain women priests etc. An EECMY that distances itself from parts of the NLM doctrine, implies that NLM has not finished its job. In addition there are still a number of "unreached" peoples in the country). Although both EECMY and NORAD wanted nationalization, NLM did not, but on grounds that could not easily be discussed (this does not mean that there were not a number of other

reasons for not "nationalizing" the hospital in this context, reasons partly neglected in both EECMY's and NORAD's arguments). NLM could not continue as before, because of opposition from EECMY, from other donors' influence on EECMY, but primarily because NORAD threatened to end support if nationalization did not take place or was not seriously considered and planned for. The NLM leadership was not interested in a halt in support, also because this support was regarded as a financial asset.³⁰ In addition, a survey undertaken by NLM in 1972 - 73 supported the "developmentalists" within NLM; it was said that the literacy schools had a markedly positive influence on church attendance and church offerings. Later, while other missions (like the American Sudan Mission) were expelled from Ethiopia and NLM could continue more or less as before, even maintaining their beautiful camp at Area Minch, aid as a political guarantee was underlined.³¹ Undoubtedly, development programmes are furthering the authority of both EECMY and the Mission, and enables pastors and evangelists to operate. The imbalance in funds between development work and evangelization work has increased, notably in the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990, as NCA and other European NGOs have increased their support to the Church. In this situation NLM becomes even more important as a bridge between those who put most emphasis on evangelization and the European Church related organisations that are described as almost secular organizations. (In the middle of the 1980s NCA was criticized by EECMY for being too secular in its orientation and work). Seen from EECMY's point of view, NLM was an organisation on "the right side", but they should at the same time, and from NORAD's point of view, act according to neutrality regulations, including the issue of religion.

FLEXIBILITY AND MICRO-DEVELOPMENT

Main findings: it has been argued that the main advantage of NGOs is their flexibility in micro-development situations which require extensive and intimate contacts with the intended beneficiaries. There are many examples that

show that many NGOs have potential in this area. This does not mean that NGOs cannot be very flexible in very important macro situations, as shown below. Nor does it imply that all NGOs are interested in this work or have the potential to undertake them. Their successes obviously depend to a very large extent on macro-relationships outside the control of the NGOs.

This part focuses on NGO flexibility and micro-projects, without assuming that this is an area in which NGO activities are more or less relevant than in other areas. Fowler has described micro-development as activities which require control based on micro-social relations, types of activities which stand or fall on the basis of community inputs and support, activities which require specific local adaptations and applications of general technology improvements, experiments or research which require significant inputs from the intended beneficiaries for them to be relevant, or in which natural conditions are desired and/or controlled conditions are not possible, activities which stimulate learning, adaptation and sharing of knowledge and comparative experience.

It is likely that a group of experienced development NGOs or local organisations with local knowledge will be able to do this kind of work better than most government bureaucracies can. There are a number of studies that show that organisations are good at such things, although they do not necessarily meet the expectations of the NGO propaganda.³² There are a number of cases in which NGOs, with a dedicated staff, willing to live "in the bush" or in remote rural areas, with local knowledge, etc., have been able to carry out good projects in this area. Famous models include BRAC in Bangladesh. Although their success-rate may be exaggerated, and the benefits of such schemes might be reduced if "all" NGOs start with similar projects, such projects may illustrate that NGOs may have a potential government bureaucracies do not have in their field.

BRAC's Non-Formal Primary Education (NFPE) programme runs about 20,000 schools. Girls are given priority since they are the most underprivileged among rural children. All the schools have high attendance rates. The reported

dropout rate is only 3% as compared to 80% in government schools. BRAC schools are different in curriculum structure and flexibility of the teaching system. Schools are usually located in rural areas. The classes meet for three hours a day. The time is decided upon by both parents and teachers so as to fit in with seasonal work, etc. The teachers are locally recruited, the students are not required to sit for formal exams as is usual in government-run schools. Children's progress is measured instead through continuous assessment by the teacher. According to BRAC, the NFPE programme is not an alternative or a substitute for public education. It is intended to be complementary and supplementary, aimed at dealing with dropouts and non-starters. When the primary school system can cope more effectively with them, BRAC will have finished its task. A number of countries and NGOs have shown interest in this programme, and are contemplating replicating it.

Another example can also be mentioned³³. The Kenyan NGO, *Participation for Productivity Services Foundation (PFP)* is one of the oldest in this field. It dates back to before the more generally known "take-off" of this type of scheme in Asia - to the Quaker settlements in western Kenya in the 1940s. It still carries a "Quaker spirit"; a simple, self-reliant and productive way of living. The PFP is currently operating all over East and Southern Africa. In Kenya the organisation conducts a number of small-scale projects in about 40 % of the districts of the country, especially north and west. NORAD started cooperating with PFP in 1989 the Bungoma Farmers Small Enterprise Development Project, a five year plan with annual budgets of two mill. Kenyan shillings, was agreed upon. This project obtained renewed support from NORAD via NCA after the diplomatic crisis in 1990. The aims and objectives generally match Norwegian development policy: to assist rural poor groups, such as women, youth and poor farmers with training and credits, to create employment and develop agriculture in remote areas. The activities are training of business management and administration of loan schemes. Loans are given to groups of 20 - 25 members. The original plan was to reach 30 such groups, but a total of

87 was brought under the programme. The groups were mutually responsible for loans. Leaders were elected every year and were always women. Credit was given on a 30-month basis at a rate of 18% a year to groups. Individual activities was small businesses, one cow dairies, selling maize, handicrafts, small work-shops etc. In Lurare Women Group, Malakasi, the group received a loan of 10,000 KSH in 1989 and made a profit of 23,900 after repayment. In 1990 the profit had increased to 33,900 KSH. Later that year the group received additional support loan of 60,000 KSH, transferred the total saving to their own revolving loan scheme and thus, in 1991, became more or less self-reliant.

On the question of why the project and the individual groups had gained such success the answers dealt with the following points: very good and proper training by the PFP staff who knew the area and the "trade"; good follow-up by PFP; sound accounting practices; flexibility in credits and activity; small and self-ruled groups with elected leaders; obvious and direct benefits to all participants.

Flexibility was possible because groups were small and the NGO, PFP, had a good knowledge of the area and its population. At the same time PFP had the financial security of a five year plan in cooperation with NORAD. Neither the Kenyan central government, the district authority nor the banks were able to provide such a low interest rate of loans and certainly not the training component.

A number of other projects carried out by Norwegian NGOs that might have been mentioned. All the big NGOs and many smaller ones have implemented projects that have reached their aims. The differences between the settings - for example Norwegian People's Aid among squatters in Chile, Redd Barna among illiterate peasants in mountainous rural Ethiopia, Norwegian Church Aid among farmers in northern Thailand etc., are so wide, that no general lessons can be drawn. In such micro-situations individual factors such as the personnel's competence and enthusiasm, become very important.

This issue can be analysed from another angle. A study of different perceptions of NGO-managed income-generating projects can reveal some structural factors influencing donors "direct-funding" policies. Bishwapriya Sanyal analysed such NGO projects within a wider institutional context than has usually been the case (Sanyal, 1991:1367-1379). Such projects have usually been studied within a functional perspective, identifying their monetary costs and benefits. Sanyal analysed the perceptions of their viability among key institutional actors in Bangladesh; the NGOs, the government and the donors. He discovered strongly conflicting perceptions among them. Yet, despite these contradictions, all three actors continued to implement more of the same projects. This phenomenon of simultaneous conflict and cooperation he called "antagonistic cooperation". By understanding institutional perceptions we can better understand institutional actions, and the difficulties that a donor faces in deciding on strategies.

GOB initially supported and encouraged the work of the NGOs in connection with rehabilitation work after the civil war and the famine in 1974-75. They regarded their work as supplementary, social work, and never regarded it as initiating development. Since the First Planning Commission was set up, the GOB has regarded development work as the responsibility and the prerogative of the government. Rural development will be the result of large-scale infrastructural and irrigation projects. The GOB has continued to define rural development in terms of aggregate indicators, "such as agricultural growth, total area under cultivation and irrigation" (Ibid:1368). This view of development contrasts with the view presented by the NGO approach, which regards development as a result of what starts at grassroots level; by generating employment and income for the poor. The GOB regards all NGO-income generation projects as not very effective in promoting development, also because these projects are seen as requiring intense supervision and control. They cannot therefore, it is argued, be replicated in large numbers. GOB officials thought that the NGOs' income-generation projects were illogical in economic terms and were considered as "yet another of the fads that

characterize Western aid" (s.st.:1370). They also thought that some donors had been carried away by the "image" and "talk" of the NGO leaders. As they said: "Many of the NGO leaders wear cotton kurtas and carry jute bags which make them look like they get along well with the poor" (quoted in Sanyal, 1991:1370).

NGO views of these projects differed. Some of those who were not involved were critical. They said among other things that the "so-called solidarity groups are created primarily to ensure loan repayment and to reduce the overhead cost of recovery" (Ibid:1371). Some argued that for the poor to participate in such projects will increase their vulnerability to market forces. Therefore, since the poor cannot take such risks, the projects reach the more well-to-do peasants and village people. Instead of the poor coming together in small groups to repay loans, these NGOs argued that they should join hands in country-wide organisations, to create a national political organisation of the landless for example. Political groups were critical of donors: they regarded their support for these kinds of projects as a way of imposing their ideological biases by encouraging profit-making through individual efforts, a solution they regarded as not viable in Bangladesh due to the huge number of landless people in rural Bangladesh.

The "most notable" concept in the NGO community, it is argued, was to see their relationship with the government in an "us" versus "them" perspective (Ibid:1371). The government was bureaucratic, lethargic, and corrupt, and served only the interests of the rural elite, while the NGOs had exactly the opposite qualities. The NGOs dealing with income-generating projects viewed donors as slow in supporting them and in disbursing the necessary funds, and felt that they put strings on their aid which reflected fads in Western aid thinking.

The donors faced a dilemma. On the one hand, most of them regarded such projects as too small to be able to eradicate rural poverty. On the other hand, such projects were also seen as necessary to achieve this aim, but if so, they required much more support, support which is not available. The donors regarded the NGOs as having good,

efficient and unbureaucratic leaders. Most of them are western educated. They knew the language and the workings of the donor agenda. They are good at structuring aid requests in a way to which the donors can effectively respond.

These projects, Sanyal argues, serve different and important functions for the actors, although they disagree about them. For the government they both create some grass-root development, and provide people with a non-political activity. It is better for the elite that the poor are organised by development-oriented NGOs than by political parties. For many NGOs the projects are regarded as good and worthwhile to support, although some have criticized them for being inefficient and status-quo oriented and individualistic. For donors they offer an opportunity to disburse money to "good", although in general inefficient, projects.

FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICS

Main findings: there is one area which has been given little attention in research on NGOs, in spite of its importance in the history of NGO aid, and that is their flexibility as instruments for governments, especially in crossborder operations and in societies in which the donor state, for various reasons, cannot work as it would like to. From one point of view this flexibility can be described as the "magic" of the NGO channel. The advantage is not related so much to traditional positive attributes like grass-root orientation, voluntarism etc., as to one thing: they are not a part of the state apparatus of donor communities.

The fact that NGOs are not a part of the state apparatus can be used by governments supporting political opposition groups and by internal political movements in need of external support. It is also an advantage that can be used for humanitarian purposes in areas where the UN system or the state system cannot work. In this case it is possible to talk about the NGOs as a group, because they share this quality. Their potentials as actors however, will of course vary according to their size, experience, political position, local contacts, etc.

A case study: NORAD, NCA and Kenya

The history of aid to Kenyan organisations after the diplomatic breach between Kenya and Norway in 1990 is interesting in relation to the question of NGOs as a flexible channel for governments in touchy political situations. When Kenya broke off diplomatic relations with Norway on 22 October 1990, NORAD was given one week to pack and leave. All state-to-state cooperation was terminated, but the Norwegian NGOs were allowed to stay on. The decision was then taken at a high level in NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to allow for the continuation of NORAD support to some Kenyan NGOs. These were NGOs that had just previously signed 3-5 year contracts with NORAD. The following paragraphs are based on the evaluation report by Hødnebo et al.: "Grace Period or a New Deal", Bergen, 1993, reviewing this support since 1990.

NORAD's aim was very simple: how to minimize the negative impact on Kenyan NGOs if all Norwegian financial support were suddenly to be cut off. To hand the support over to a Norwegian NGO which continued to work in Kenya was regarded as a flexible way of ensuring continued assistance to Kenyan NGOs. An important part of this assistance was support to democratization and popular groups that advocated certain interests in the "civil society". The Norwegian Foreign Office had no objections to such a continuation. The NORAD support of NOK 15 mill in 1990 was reduced to NOK 5,6 mill. Support was given to 12 Kenyan NGOs and follow-up and payment of 10% retention money to 32 other projects. As a result of negotiations with NORAD in November 1990, Norwegian Church Aid was willing to serve as a contractor for NORAD.

First NCA hesitated. The organisation was initially reluctant to play such a role for the Norwegian government. The NCA board accepted that their Nairobi office could function as a "mail box" between the Kenyan NGOs and NORAD, but on two conditions: this should not harm any of NCA's other activities in Kenya. This was important to NCA, since their regional office for East Africa was in Nairobi. Secondly: this role of a contractor for NORAD should not

in any way alter the aid profile of NCA. The organisation immediately approached the Kenyan government. They were assured that they could continue to work there. NCA soon took several initiatives: in a joint seminar with the 12 NGOs NCA presented itself and its profile as a Christian aid organisation. During 1991 it was evident that both the 12 NGOs and NCA found the situation satisfactory, as did probably the two governments. A flexible solution had been found in a diplomatically and politically touchy situation.

One reason why this shift was smooth, was that the development strategies and project aims of NORAD and NCA were similar, although not identical. Support for institution building, welfare and advocacy organisations, poor and marginalised groups etc. were goals shared by NORAD and NCA. It shows that the Norwegian aid system shares many of the same values, and therefore enables assessment of comparative advantages. A review of aid profiles and aid activities of NORAD and NCA in Kenya regarding their support to NGOs shows that NORAD and NCA supported projects within six of the same sectors, while NCA also worked with refugees and displaced people, and institution-building within organisations (see Hødnebo et al., 1993). It is interesting, and says much about the channel or the "NGO-thing", that NORAD and NCA did more or less the same thing in Kenya.

A case study: NCA and the emergency relief-desk (ERD) operation.³⁴

Main findings: this relief operation, from Sudan into Eritrea and later to Tigray, was one of the biggest cross-border operations in the history of aid. In 1991 the total budget was about one billion NOK, and the whole operation involved complex issues of neutrality and diplomacy. It is also an example of the potential political importance of humanitarian intervention - a Norwegian NGO supported by Norway and other donors had an important impact on the outcome of the Ethiopian/Eritrean war and on power relations in Ethiopia after the fall of Mengistu. It also was the biggest operation that NCA has ever involved in.

The background to ERD was simple: it had proved very difficult if not impossible to assist the victims of war and drought in the areas controlled by the Eritrean guerilla movements, Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). They could not be reached from Ethiopian ports or roads, because of Ethiopian government policy. One of the very few options available was illegal cross-border support from Sudan. ERD emerged therefore as a response to humanitarian needs in Eritrea and was from the very first involved in what was regarded by the Ethiopian government as illegal operations, and which also was problematic in relation to international conventions and laws. It is the flexibility of the NGO channel in this very complicated political and diplomatic situation that will be emphasised here.

The total value of food donations between 1981 to 1991 was USD 216,5 mill. Support for transport in the same period was USD 116 mill. ERD distributed on average about 60,000 tons of food every year in the period 1981 to 1991. Transport was carried out by ERA, REST and Oromo Relief Association (ORA). From scratch the transport fleet reached 400 vehicles for ERA, 250 for REST and less than 10 for ORA in 1991. Until 1985, ERD was responsible for about 2/3 of food deliveries to Eritrea and Tigray, and after that it stabilized at around 40-50 %. ERA was given aid for a value of about USD 200 million, REST for about USD 150 million and ORA for less than USD 10 million. (See Table A.10 and Figure A.2) This aid profile must have had important consequences for the outcome of the wars and rebellions, especially since it was in reality the political fronts that were in charge of its distribution. Food is power, not only when it is denied, but also when it is given.

History and the role of NCA

The initiative for cross-border assistance was taken by Scandinavian Protestant organisations, Swedish Church Relief (SCR) and Norwegian Church Aid,³⁵ after the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) had accepted channelling aid into Eritrea from Christian organisations in Europe. Between 1977 and 1982 they were the

only organisations involved in these operations, and they supplied almost all relief assistance that reached Eritrea and Tigray from international agencies. In 1977 an Eritrean Desk was established in SCC, channelling aid to the humanitarian wing of the Muslim-dominated ELF. In September 1977, the other organisation, EPLF, contacted NCA by letter, inviting it to work in Eritrea. In 1978 NCA was established in Khartoum to take on this task. In 1979 it was clear that the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) were unwilling to become involved in Eritrea (Duffield 1993:). NCA decided to go "alone". A few other Protestant agencies also became involved.³⁶ Negotiations to establish a coordinating group began in 1980. The agreement to form the Emergency Relief Desk (ERD) was signed in Khartoum on 21 February 1981. The agreement was made between SCC and NCA. This agreement, by establishing an ecumenical instrument, made it possible to approach other church-affiliated agencies. Only in 1984, when negotiations concerning the re-organisation of ERD began, did other member organisations begin to meet on a formal basis. It had been, and still was, NCA and the ERD Executive Secretary (an employee of the NCA) which effectively ran the operation. In the period 1981 to 1991 NCA, with support from the Norwegian state, made about 20% of all cash donations to ERD.

How did ERD regard itself or describe itself in this period? ERD described itself as non-political, having a strictly humanitarian mission. It cooperated with the indigenous "humanitarian organisations" ... "on an equal basis." In the beginning, assistance to ERA (EPLF's humanitarian arm) and ERCCS (ELF's humanitarian arm) was divided equally. In relation to ERA and REST (Tigrean People's Liberation Front - TPLF's humanitarian arm), however, equality was not achieved, although in some years support could be more or less equal (food donations in 1988 and 1990). In the 1980s some aid was also sent to Oromo areas, channelled through Oromo Relief Association (ORA, the humanitarian arm of Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). In 1982 NCA and ERD regarded ELF and ERCCS as being crushed after internal fights with EPLF, and after 10,000 of

them were put in a camp near Kassala, Eastern Sudan. The IAs were consistently described as humanitarian, implementing agencies and it was not before the end to the war that they were described as humanitarian arms of liberation movements in NCA documents.

The role of ERD was to be a logistics and monitoring organisation. It received requests from ERA and ERCCS and later REST and ORA, in ERD-speak called "implementing agencies" (IAs). For assistance, they were to verify need assessments through field visits, pass on requests to member agencies, arrange procurement in Sudan when necessary, clear shipments, receive distribution reports, and so on. In other words, ERD was an ecumenical institution organised to channel relief assistance in kind to the IAs. It was also responsible for securing its legitimate distribution and to pass on information about the operations to its members.

The problem of "neutrality" and humanitarian aid

The Norwegian government, partly pressed by a vocal pro-Eritrean public opinion, assisted on a humanitarian basis what was described as a humanitarian effort through the neutral ERD from 1981. In 1982, help from the British government, via Christian Aid, was only possible on this basis of conceived neutrality, as was the case with the Dutch and American governments. The ability of being able to present an accountable ecumenical body as a neutral 'screen' between Western donors and the complex political reality of internal war was a strength of ERD (Duffield's expression, Duffield 1993), and demonstrated its flexibility. This was especially the case with regard to donor support for Tigray, which did not develop until the mid 1980s. In this period, the increasing involvement of USAID and EC made a neutral screen even more essential. In autumn 1984 NCA went to New York with representatives from ERA and REST to secure this support.

ERD balanced on a tight rope. Its international credibility as an humanitarian agency rested on its non-political image. The image of ERD was that of a neutral humanitarian consortium.

Because ERD only worked on one side of the conflict and, moreover, collaborated with relief associations established by the Fronts, this required rhetorical skills or "voluntary" blue-eyedness, or a combination of both. The solution was to describe ERA and REST as neutral humanitarian organisations or as Implementing Agencies. ERA and REST were, however, clearly part of the Fronts. They depended on the support of their respective civilian administrations. They could have implemented little on their own. The IAs were very clear on this issue again and again, and they also asked NCA and others to come more out in the open and take sides in the conflict.³⁷ Redd Barna sent reports to the Foreign Ministry clearly stating the political role of ERA. By describing them as neutral, ERD, as a consortium of agencies with different agendas, was able to form and to be maintained. Some ERD members had long-standing relations with Ethiopian church agencies which were critical of what they regarded as illegal activities in support of rebel groups.

ERA and REST were portrayed as having similar aims. REST approached SCC/SCR in February 1981, shortly before the establishment of ERD. TPLF was not fighting for independence like the Eritreans, but for a more de-centralised Ethiopian state. Support for REST was therefore regarded by many as more sensitive. EPLF was seen as having a more or less legitimate territorial claim while TPLF represented a direct challenge to the integrity of the Ethiopian state.

This arrangement was fragile since ERD's "neutrality" was constrained by the nature of the operation. A combination of war, areas of drought and transport problems meant that it could only work on one side of the conflict even if it had preferred to work on both.

ERD, being confined to one side, heightened the tension between neutrality and involvement in forwarding the viewpoints of "their" side. By the mid 1980s, while ERD's collective neutrality was being confirmed, individual members had started to support their cause in public. The contradiction between neutrality and involvement continued to influence the discussion in ERD.

ERD and NCA did not comply with dominant ideas about state sovereignty. Cross-border relief work, according to these regulations for relations among states, was illegal. This was a main reason why governments could not be openly involved, and why many NGOs also rejected taking part; if they took part, their personnel were "segregated" (Duffield, 1993). ERD defined itself in terms of meeting humanitarian need "in parts of Ethiopia which are not accessible from areas controlled by the Government of Ethiopia". It strengthened its diplomatic position with regard to a "behind the scene" peace role which its members, on occasion, were able to play on behalf of the Fronts. In addition, ERD's attempts to maintain a political distance allowed it to mediate between the political differences which distinguished the Fronts and their respective relief associations. From the mid 1980s, however, with the support of USAID and EC for the operation, together with the greatly enhanced role of NGOs, the situation began to change. Western humanitarian politics has been increasingly influenced by a new interpretation of, and approach to, the principle of state sovereignty. There has been a clear change in how sovereignty (in the developing countries) is regarded in the West. Did ERD express this shift and herald the age of the new "humanitarian interventionism"? NCA said they gave priority to the humanitarian mandate, while organisations such as LWF and WCC were more reluctant, partly because of their official links with the Ethiopian churches (this was the argument later used in NCA-material), but also because they partly disagreed on the "disintegration of Ethiopia".

At the time ERD's criteria were described as, and partly believed to be de-politicised. It is a good example of one of the weaknesses of neutrality, humanitarianism and "good intentions", as a means of informing policy. It disregarded and did not understand the complex realities at the Horn of Africa, and therefore no comprehensive analysis of the emergency situation or of the important political role NCA and the Norwegian state played was produced. Defining ERA and REST as simply "IA", produced a neutral image of the international agency, which resulted in a superficial "naïve" view of the political dynamics of Eritrea and Tigray.

This cross-border operation can show that NGOs can act in situations where governments, due to legal and diplomatic constraints, cannot. Their lack of accountability also makes them more flexible when it comes to being involved in matters which are not always easily defensible in public. In addition, the knowledge gap in Norway between what organisations are involved in, and what the public (or the politician) understands, is so great that it creates great room for manoeuvring. NCA had no staff in the area to control distribution of food or for use of lorries. They were accused again and again of taking side in a war, but responded always with the humanitarian mandate, and they still do. The operation was summarized as being based on "real local participation" (NCA: Sak 123/93 i Styremøte 26.11.1993).

NCA argues in hindsight that "politicians in USA and Europe were of course aware of what was happening" (ibid). This led to a situation in which food from the US reflected political moods in Washington rather than needs in the field. NCA gambled with its position in Sudan in 1989 by taking over the entire responsibility for the operation. LWR was a middle-man for USAID, while DIA and CA played the same role vis-à-vis the EEC.

CONCLUSION

NGOs in development do not function in any specific way. They do not have important common characteristics, except three: they receive money from public donors, they are formally independent and they are non-distributing. Their roles in societies, however, vary tremendously. It is more important and useful to understand and analyse how different organisations play different social, political and cultural roles in different contexts, than to try to assess such general characteristics. NGOs have played very important roles in social and political transformation where they (always only some of the whole NGO group) have become parts or actors within wider socio-political movements. In some cases they have been instrumental in spreading the ideology of self-reliance, minority group interests, etc. In other cases they have been marginal, and by and large

they play a modest role as gap-fillers in different societies' social sectors.

NGOs do not have the general "comparative advantages" that NGO language and official documents assign them. This term, taken from neo-classical economic theory, is not useful in the aid context and blurs empirical understanding and assessments. NGOs may have important potential for supporting development and democracy in some cases, as has been shown, partly because of their "value-orientations", but may also be inflexible in other situations, partly because of particular "valueorientations".

The contradictions between organisations' "value orientation" and donors' policies have been little discussed in NGO literature, partly because most actors have adopted "NGO-speak" in describing their activities. This apparent unity (which exists only on the surface) is one reason why it has been possible to talk about the NGOs comparative advantages as if they were more or less type of organisation. In the literature, "value-orientation" and "flexibility", "grass-root orientation etc. have been described as always being compatible, while it might be the opposite case in the real world. On the other hand, the idealism of many NGO employees may make them flexible and willing to work "in the bush", i.e. to work among the poor etc. No doubt the NGOs have been very flexible in working in conflict situations, in the sense that they have done a lot of things which governments and the UN cannot even contemplate doing.

THE ROLE OF NGOS IN CONNECTION WITH PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY

Main findings: organisations in many countries have of course played important and crucial roles in furthering both democracy and pluralism (which are not the same thing). Labour organisations and trade unions, cultural clubs, women organisations and missionary organisations have played important roles in Norway's national and social history, and have helped to strengthen both democracy and pluralism. But there is no evidence to suggest that development NGOs as a group can be said to further democracy and pluralism irrespective of time and place. In certain countries in Latin America they have helped to undermine paternalism and authoritarian structures, while in certain countries in Africa they have both undermined the state and "civil society". There are elitist NGOs and grassroots NGOs, rightist NGOs and leftist NGOs, and there are a number of NGOs with very weak roots in the societies in which they work, and there are (fewer) NGOs attached to the aid channel that have such connections. There is no one-to-one relation between the number of NGOs and democracy or pluralism. In some cases a proliferation of international NGOs or development NGOs may undermine both pluralism and democracy, while in others the growth of such NGOs may create more openness, more debate and outlets for people's organisational energy.

To assess this question (see TOR 6.2), it is necessary to relate it to dominant theories and thinking about the actual and future role of NGOs in furthering democracy and pluralism. Aspects of the role of NGOs in different political and socio-economic processes are then discussed.

In summer 1994 *Foreign Affairs* ran an article which argued that a "veritable associational revolution" is underway at "the global level", comparable in importance with the rise of the nation state in the nineteenth century.¹ Here we are not concerned with whether this assessment is supported by empirical data, but with theories about what most regard as an important phenomenon in NGOs' role in society. The many theories of state-society relations give the organisations - or in this case the development NGOs - more or less space in society and more or less importance. Here two theories will be

discussed, one "civil society-centered" and one "state-centered", both forming parts of the political-ideological context in which NGO strategies have recently been formulated.

The way in which this relation between state and society and between state administrations and NGOs has been conceptualized has been affected by identifiable historical developments and ideological trends. The historical situation after World War II; the anti-colonialist movement; the globalization of nation-building projects; dominant state-centred development theories and the state-centredness of the UN charter and the UN system caused an unprecedented trumpeting of the cause of the state. Now, strengthened by the fall of the Soviet Empire, the reemergence of ethnic and religious movements, the crisis of the welfare state and the UN's policy of "humanitarian intervention", have together nourished a very influential ideology which represents an assault on the state and a trumpeting of the "civil society". Since the 1950s almost all social scientists from all disciplines were not only concerned about the state; they became "state activists" (Migdal 1988, p.11). Now social scientists from most disciplines interested in NGO work seem to be discontented with analysing only what has been named "civil society". They have become "civil society" activists. This ideological situation makes it even more important to discuss the content of the new theories, to confront these with other theories and to test them against empirical cases.

THE "NEW PARADIGM"

A new legitimization

Since NGOs first entered this field they have been regarded by many as places where people learn through practical experience about society and instruments by which the situation for the poor might be improved. NGOs were often equated with grassroots movements, often populist or leftist in orientation, although in reality they were often involved in important political games, both on the "Right" and on the "Left". The focus was on micro-level development and the need for local empowerment. This view centred around loose

concepts like strengthening of local capacities, grassroots participation and mobilisation. It included unclear ideas about on what social level and to what extent this "grassrooting" would be effective for societal development in general.² Emphasis was often on local economic self-sufficiency, a project which was based on the idea of mobilisation of certain kinds of popular organisations such as producers' societies, cooperatives, self-help groups etc., possibly supported by external donors or even implemented by Northern NGOs.³ The more politicized version included the aim of de-linking rural producers from the capitalist world market, by mobilization and organisation of the local people for self-sufficiency.

The "democratization wave" in the late 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s altered the way in which the NGO potentials have been described. It gave birth to the "New Development Paradigm", which has not only enlarged the role of the NGOs, but which also implies a view of the relationship between society and the state as being dichotomous. It suggests and implies a far-reaching re-definition of relationships between state, society and external actors on a macro-political level. While theories about NGOs in the 1980s were often based on ideas that the state was too weak/too bureaucratized to mean anything to the poor, or that the state was controlled by anti-popular forces, the "new paradigm" implicitly regards the relationship between state and "civil society" as a "zero-sum" game. By strengthening the "civil society" the state is weakened, and vice versa.⁴ NGOs replace of the state in key aspects of societal development, and hence we might see a redefinition of "the social contract" between governments and citizens (Farrington and Bebbington 1993, p. 188). In advocating the new "paradigm", traditional theories of development are rejected. The old strategies, it is said, regarded the state as the origin and cause of progress, while society, when thought of at all, was considered either as an obstacle to, or an object of, development.

This paradigm allocates NGOs a crucial role in the creation of a more just and democratic development. It is a paradigm of competition and struggle between society and the state. It

included a major assault on the concept of "the state" itself and a widespread call for its roll-back. Aid should be geared towards developing "civil society", defined as those uncoerced human groups and relational networks of consensual associations and empowerment that enable society to exist independently of the state.

This way of defining "civil society" and its relationship with the state is from one point of view new. When the German philosopher Hegel first distinguished between state and civil society in 1821, in his book *Philosophy of Right*, the civil society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) was a "stage" in the dialectical development from the family to the state "which contradicted the kind of ethical life found in the human micro-community in order to be itself contradicted and overcome (i.e. cancelled and preserved, aufgehoben) by the macro-community of the politically independent, sovereign nation" (Pelczynski 1984, p.1). It represented a stage in the development of a metaphysical idea, where the State was the final end-station of human development. The role of civil society was to prepare the ground for the state's final victory.

The term was reformulated by Marx (the bourgeois society), and he made it, and not the state, the basis for political life and the source of political change, not against the state, but to take over the state. Both of them as do present notions, however, excluded national characteristics from the notion of civil society, which is one reason why the term still is insensitive to ethnic and nationalistic forces. One of the most influential theories of civil society was formulated by the Italian marxist Antonio Gramsci whose revolutionary strategy relied on the concept of civil society. He argued that in Italy and in other Western European countries the working class under communist leadership had a better chance of gaining hegemony the civil society than on the national/political arena, and when they had achieved that, they could conquer the political power of the state.

Competition with the state

Within the "new paradigm" a pluralistic and expanded "civil society" should be created.

Responsibility and resources should be given to those elements of "Civil Society" that directly interact with, listen to, and respond to local communities, i.e. the NGOs. In line with this ideology an alternative term for NGOs has been put forth; "stakeholder" rather than partner. Partnership, it is said, implies shared decision-making with governments which, because of the differing natures, mandates and accountability of governments and "civil society", is regarded as either impossible or not preferable. Within the same paradigm NGOs are defined in terms of a "commitment to organizational autonomy", owing "allegiance to no vested interest" but, instead, claiming "a direct relationship with social groups and movements". (Bratton 1989, p.574). Whereas the state is driven by the organizational imperatives of administrative command and control, NGOs generally seek to encourage "autonomous and participatory action" (Bratton 1989, p.573). NGOs are nothing less than the special guardians of democracy, inherently representing democratic forces and "civil society" in a competitive relationship with the state, and in which one actor's gains are another's loss.⁵

The new paradigm on the shoulders of history?

This "paradigm" has been argued on a very general ideological level, and there have been few efforts at substantiating it with empirical examples from history and contemporary developments. It is given authority by claimed historical experiences in the West, where voluntary associations played a formative role and represented a counterweight to the "accumulation of excessive power by a political executive". In Africa, however, this development has not yet taken place, and "the sequence of institution building has departed from this checked and balanced model". The problem is that Independence saw the "intact transfer of an already large ("overdeveloped") state from colonial to nationalist hands" (Bratton 1989, p.573). If history had provided such clear-cut lessons and this summary of African state formation and the implicit assumptions about history of democracy in the West had not been highly questionable, then the "new paradigm"

could stand secure by, on the shoulders of History. But there is no clear causal link between the number and diversity of NGOs, and democratic institutions in a society. The expansion of social welfare services in the "West" generally required the active involvement of the state. An NGO-dominant paradigm might therefore be consistent with a high level of welfare provision or strengthened democracy, but this is no universal historical law. This view of civil society has a corollary: NGOs will be described as sources of diversity and innovation; they contribute to democracy, pluralism or people's empowerment by establishing centres of influence and institutions outside the state and provide instruments which deprived or disenfranchised groups may use.

In the literature it has also been generally concluded that NGOs have contributed to pluralism and democracy in developing countries. For example, it has been documented "clearly in Latin America" (Edwards and Hulme 1994, p.4, quoting Loveman 1991 and Lehmann 1990). There have also been published a number of articles on Asia and Africa which argue that the NGOs, indeed, have contributed to pluralism, democracy and a strengthened civil society. Since such descriptions seem to support a strong ideological programme, they have been embraced and propagated by many NGOs, NGO analysts or propagandists (see for example Clark 1991 and Korten 1990). The problem is that some of the most often cited works cannot be used, because of conceptual obscurity and methodological shortcomings. They may show and describe such changes in a particular context, but cannot be generalized. One of the most renowned analysts on the Latin American scene, concluded that due to the fragmentation of focus, lack of collective effort, cooption by the elite, a non-radical clientele, the middle-class nature of the NGO staff, their smallness and their portfolio of service-oriented development projects, the NGOs had no significant impact on social transformation (Smith 1990, pp.275-278).

The popularity of the present paradigm overshadows opposite theories: a less influential view holds that NGOs within "civil society" reflect elite interests (Arnove 1980, Cockson & Persell 1985, Stanfield 1984); i.e. that the

people-centred ideology is a sort of rhetorical camouflage. In this perspective charity is seen as a form of "regressive redistribution" (Ostrander 1984), where the rich exchange domination for prestigious charity activities, an exchange which enhances their social status and thus maintains and legitimates existing power structures. Far from representing democratic ideals and the interests of the poor, development NGOs may be fronts for seeking personal gain. (For example, fund-raising events may provide an arena for the elite to exchange political favours and pledges, get their photos in the newspapers shaking hands with the President or the poor). It is therefore also possible to interpret foreign and national NGO political communities as representing elite interests, exchanging riches for legitimacy in a chain of interlinked dependencies, with the role and impact of basically maintaining the *status quo*. Some argue that the multi-level NGO network contributes to the paralysis of social and political action. This has been a criticism of the successful service-providing NGOs in Bangladesh. Lowi 1969 and Olson 1982 argue that private associations have this effect in Western welfare states, i.e. that far from contributing to democracy, they contribute to paralysis of political action. In analyses of the "crises of the welfare state" it is said that states maintain legitimacy by delegating more and more functions to the non-profit voluntary sector. It is thus also possible to regard their growth and mushrooming as a sign of the state's legitimation crisis. Since in developing countries it is not the state, but often the donors, that delegate services and therefore also power to the NGOs, the legitimation of states' might in some cases be maintained, but in other cases undermined without a parallel strengthening of "civil society".

NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Main findings: to support and strengthen "civil society" has become a declared aim of most donors, including the Norwegian government (See Report to the Storting no. 51, 1991-92). But what does the concept entail? Most often the connotations are human rights realization, good governance, privatisation or deregulation, participation, empowerment public sector

reform. It has become a core term with ideological connotations, but without being defined clearly, and partly without any effort to define it clearly. In the NGO literature of recent years it has become synonymous with positive and always compatible values and ideas, which it clearly is not. In some cases it is also irrelevant to talk about civil society at all.

The inherently good civil society

UNDP has recently come up with a definition which breaks out of the more narrow NGO focus.

"Simply stated, civil society is, together with state and market, one of the three "spheres" that interface in the making of democratic societies. Civil society is the sphere in which social movements become organised. The organisations of civil society, which represent many diverse and sometimes contradictory social interests are shaped to fit their social base, constituency, thematic orientations (e.g. environment, gender, human rights) and types of activity. They include church related groups, trade unions, cooperatives, service organisations, community groups and youth organisations, as well as academic institutions and others" (UNDP 1993).

This definition draws attention to the idea that civil society consists of a wide range of organisations. This indicates what is obvious, that civil society is not uniform. On the contrary, it can be regarded as a social space within which interests and ideologies confront each other; religion against religion, ethnic group against ethnic group, capitalists against workers, etc. UNDP says that the organisations "sometimes" represent contradictory interests. This definitely do, and rather it is safe to assert that there are always contradictory interests in civil society, but that the degree of conflict will vary. Development NGOs are only a small, and often a very small section of the organisational landscape in a society. They can therefore never aspire to talk on behalf of it, or of "the people", or of "the popular organisations". They always talk on behalf of some particular group interests, no matter how broad and altruistically formulated their demands are. Civil society is

not only organisations caring for "environment, gender, human rights", as UNDP indicates. It also consists of racists, authoritarians, fundamentalists and male-chauvinist interests and groups. To strengthen civil society is therefore never in itself identical with strengthening "positive" or "progressive" values. Its overall role depends on particular circumstances, as history has demonstrated so many times that it should not be necessary to mention it here.

To strengthen civil society is not the same as strengthening the "popular will", as is often implied in "NGO-speak". The relative importance of "civil society" might increase in the implicit "zero-sum" game by weakening the "opposite", the state. The sphere within which the state is not functioning is thus enlarged, but this does not imply a strengthening of civil society. This has been demonstrated in many developing countries as a result of the restructuring policies of the 1980s. To strengthen "civil society" might mean that some groups, not seldom at the cost of others, are strengthened. If some groups become very strong compared to other groups (for example if development NGOs emerge as a much stronger force than traditional trade unions, leftist parties mobilising landless farmers, etc.) some people would argue that the potential for impacting government policies on crucial issues is reduced. This also implies that whether a particular strengthening of civil society is seen as "good" or "bad", depends on the observer's value orientations.

All this is obvious, had it not been for the fact that the NGO system has given the term a uniform, associative value that expresses progressive, positive, unified, democratic ideas and interests. There are many examples showing that strengthening NGOs has weakened "civil society", because stronger NGOs have led to weaker organisations elsewhere in society.⁶ Stronger NGOs may have emerged not as a result of a stronger "civil society", but of a weaker, rolled-back state, since a state might not only be a negation of "civil society", but also its guarantor.

NGOs, popular will and sectarian interests

NGOs might become and have become vehicles for ethnic chauvinism or localism as well as for nation building, for defending minority interests as well as for promoting majority needs. A multiplicity of development NGOs, does not in itself necessarily constitute a vehicle for achieving a democratic society or a sign of democratic improvement. It can be, but it does not have to be. More important than numbers of NGOs are their character, strength and mobilization capacities. No less important are aspects related to their legitimacy and roots in the society. External funding from an alien state might become a liability and a serious Achilles heel, precisely because they question the organisation's sustainability and support in a given society. It might increase the number of organisations, without strengthening the capacity of people to organize themselves.

Some NGOs have emerged in order to fight for special or sectarian interests and concerns. They may serve as instruments for carrying the voices of different sections of the people, aiming at providing services to these groups or aiming at influencing government policies. Indirectly, of course, they help to manifest diversity in society. Advocacy NGOs may work in close cooperation with the state or against the state,⁷ and which strategy is most conclusive in the long run for democratic development or improvements for the marginalized is not easy to determine.

In the NGO literature, NGOs are treated as though they are organisations without actors. The leaders of these new organisations, often with considerable resource bases and authority, can be seen as collectively constituting a new social group, in general belonging to the middle class, but representing an elite in the society as compared to the marginalised areas and poor. This is an elite of a new kind. They acquire status, take part in important networks with state leaders and powerful people in the international donor community, they are proficient in English and in the global jargon of the international NGO channel. The NGOs do not therefore only mobilise the poor. They also create new - and in some cases - very important social groups with long-term impacts on the political and cultural

orientation of the intelligentsia, and the character of the middle class. This is, of course, of special importance in societies where NGOs represent an attractive job opportunity for academics and entrepreneurs.

A "STATE-FRIENDLY" THEORY

As a contrast to the "new paradigm" a more "state-friendly" perspective can be presented. This suggests that the main problem in developing countries in general is weak states rather than weak civil societies. The states are not overdeveloped, they may look strong, but they are not empirically rooted in society. Implicitly they reject Hegel's developmentalism and Marx's and Gramsci's focus on civil society as an arena of struggle for political power in the state. The international situation and the pasts of these countries demand the establishment of strong states. Strong states are seen as a precondition for functioning societies. This perspective does not necessarily reject the proposition that governments cannot create sustainable progress on their own, or the importance of creating a conducive social, economic and political environment in which progress may take place. It will argue, however, that most states in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, are still in a "nation"-state building phase. The main issue in securing development and democracy in the long run is for strong states to emerge and to take control. Where states are at loggerheads with ethnic groups, kinship, particularistic oriented organisations, strongmen or localised sentiments, neither living standards or society might improve in the long run.

States, of course, differ as do NGOs and third sectors/"civil societies". This perspective does not focus on a state's class character or on whether it is human-rights oriented or totalitarian. These are problems of a second order, so to speak. The strength of a state can be seen as a continuum in which states vary in their ability to enforce the rules of the game. State social control can be described as the "ability to appropriate resources for particular purposes and to regulate people's daily behaviour ((Migdal 1988, p.261). Without a tremendous concentration of social control strong states

cannot develop, is Migdal's theory. The following is a short summary of the main points in his theory.

Migdal argues that the rapid extension of the world market from the late 1850s through World War I led to a fundamental penetration of the world economy in to all parts of society, which eroded existing foundations of social control. Migdal says that several factors worked against the creation of conditions for the emergence of strong states in the non-European world. In Latin America and in societies that escaped formal colonial rule altogether, the alliance of European merchants and indigenous strong-men limited the ability of state leaders to concentrate social control. Key players in the expanding-world economy channelled resources into societies quite selectively, allowing for the strengthening of caciques, effendis, caudillos, landlords, kulak-type rich peasants, moneylenders, and others. Through credit, access to land and water, protection, bullying, and numerous other means, "strongmen" were able to maintain the existing survival strategies. British policies in colonial territories in many societies favoured the emergence of new or renewed strongmen. Colonial policies often led to the reestablishment of fragmented social control. State rulers have discovered that the legacy of such fragmented social control has continued to constrain them severely. Once established, Migdal argues, "a fragmented distribution of social control has been difficult to transform. State leaders could not easily dismiss conflicting sets of rules in society. Their central problem has been in the political mobilization of the population" Migdal 1988:263).

States and "strongmen"

The effects of society on the state - that is, "the impact of fragmented social control and the consequent ruler's dilemma on political style and state preferences in distributing resources have been monumental" (Migdal 1988, p.264). Fragmentation of social control and the difficulties of political mobilization have led to a pathological style at "the apex of the state". It is this feature that has led to "the politics of survival" that characterizes many elite groups in

societies with weak states (Migdal 1988, p.264). State leaders in such states have destroyed the very arms of the state that could have achieved the goal of mobilization. Top state leaders have used a variety of techniques to deal with major power centres in society, including cooption and allocating huge amounts of state resources to such centres. They have tried to hinder the emergence of strong organizations with independent-minded leaders, leaders that may in some cases have more mobilizational capability than the state leaders themselves, and who thus prohibit control of the rules of the game.

At times state leaders have allowed power centres to grow, inside or outside the state organization, because they have felt they could not do without the services that these centres provide (for example, as Migdal mentions, security and wealth from industrial production). In our context state leaders have accepted and even welcomed NGOs, although the consequences for state control might have been obvious, because strong NGOs that provide services to the people which the state is unable to provide itself, and because given them space, also secure donor money for state activities. The dilemma of the state leaders remains, and results in vacillations and unpredictability in state policy toward powerful agencies and organizations inside and outside the state. State leaders have accommodated power centres, but they have also developed trade-offs with less powerful strongmen. In exchange for resources and minimal interference, strongmen have ensured a "modicum of social stability". The strongmen of the NGO world do not depend on state resources since they most often get funds from abroad. Unlike those traditional strongmen Migdal is describing, they are obliged to learn to accommodate state leaders, but due to their influence can capture lower levels of the state. They represent, therefore, a new type of strongmen, in one way both more powerful than and more independent of the local state than previous strongmen have been. Most NGOs do not have enough power to represent a serious form of fragmented social control. Other institutions are generally more important in this respect. But as a group they often possess such power. This might make the strengthening of

state power difficult, not the least in societies where a weak state is an Achilles heel.

The image of the strong state in developing countries, a fundamental premise for the "New Paradigm", comes in large part from the rapid expansion of the state organization in Latin America, Asia, and Africa during the past generation. In this period, state leaders in many countries have set out to build a "nation-state" by trying to offer viable strategies to the populace at large, and by winning people and ethnic groups over to the state's rules. When tested, state leaders have often been able to depose most individual strongmen with little difficulty. But not always (Somalia is a case in point). One should not equate a growing state apparatus and ability to get rid of a strongman with state predominance. Individual strongmen may come and go, but the overall distribution of social control may remain remarkably constant. The bureaux of the state may (in some circumstances), especially at lower levels, become little more than arenas for accommodations with other organisations.

State policies and NGOs

Strategies of strengthening state control vis-à-vis NGOs take on different forms, like monitoring, reporting systems, and in some cases outright repression which can end in dissolution of NGOs. In many countries the government has had no regulations for NGOs, or very little power to enforce regulations. If they have had them, donors and foreign NGOs have often not known about them or simply ignored them.⁸

Governments have very rarely resorted to the extreme measure of dissolving NGOs, considering the number of NGOs working in developing countries and the "popular", anti-statist rhetorics many of them pursue. In 1985 *Medicins Sans Frontiers* was expelled from Ethiopia. In Kenya the government demanded that "ethnic welfare organizations with sectionalist political ambitions should disband" (Bratton 1989, p.580). In 1987 the government of the Sudan expelled certain foreign NGOs, (none of them Norwegian). Another method is legal scrutiny (in order to do their work, NGOs

require a legal identity, which they obtain by registering under a legislative statute) which the Ethiopian, Eritrean and Tanzanian governments are working on in 1994.⁹ Another method is to appeal to coordination (the sector is seen as diverse and fragmented. Rational planning and efficient use of scarce resources therefore require a formal framework) and to exploit them as providers of external funds in a situation with impoverished public agencies but rich NGOs. Some governments have tried to coopt NGOs by establishing *quangos* (quasi-NGOs), but in general the NGOs, both national and international have been given a great deal of freedom of operation: (there are of course some very strong exceptions: the Ethiopian government would have crushed REST and ERA if they had been able to do so, as the government in Khartoum would have disbanded SRRA, but since they are operating in areas outside government control these examples are not very relevant in this context). Historically speaking, therefore, one may argue that the NGOs have not represented that threat to state interests that have been conceived of by the "new paradigm" and also implicitly by Migdal's theory. The system seems to function in such a way as to distribute some benefits to both states and societies, or at least, this is the way it is conceived of by the actors.

This may relate to the normal activity profile of the majority of NGOs. NGOs working for example with refugees, or engaged in cross-border relief operations touch upon the most sensitive issues of international relations within and among African states, so this should be treated as a separate case. In general the context of NGO programmes are non-controversial child immunization programme, clean water, agricultural extension services etc. Therefore, Bratton is wrong when he argues that the "very existence of NGOs is a test of a government's stance on a basic issue of national governance: how to balance central political control with autonomy for civic organisations" (Bratton 1989, p.576).

Bratton's argument deemphasises the importance of the donors and their influence. The space for NGOs both in Bangladesh (after the "tug of war" between NGOs and the government's NGO

Affairs Bureau in July 1992) and in Ethiopia (after the government-body RRC in 1992 and 1993 tried to develop new guidelines for NGO work in the country and stirred up opposition from the primarily foreign NGO community in the country), was decided by diplomatic intervention at the highest level from the American and British embassies. He also reduces the very important role of foreign NGOs in these countries, the number of which has very little to do with internal relations in different developing countries, but more to do with relationships in the donor countries.

Are some African states still in a nation-building stage at which NGOs would represent "strongmen" with centrifugal powers? Are some states in Asia really overburdened, and do the NGOs there therefore represent the open, pluralistic society which can sustain development and democracy in the long run?

Two generalizations can be suggested at this stage: a) Development NGOs are likely to have a stronger impact on the characteristics and policies of a state than do non-profit bodies in welfare societies. While in such societies the NGOs will generally be marginal when it comes to affecting state policies, NGOs in developing countries, with weak states and strong NGOs, can, under certain conditions have a fundamental impact. The importance of NGO aid should not therefore be underestimated and should not be analysed via a cultural lens on a background of stable Western welfare states or a Scandinavian model. b) The extent to which NGOs have such impact depends on the particular NGO-state relationship in the country concerned, and, very important in our context, the particular NGO and NGO-donor relationship. On the one hand it seems clear that the "New Paradigm" promises more than NGOs can deliver. On the other hand an assessment that concludes that NGOs are "unlikely to have significant impact on political reform because regimes have effective instruments to contain such a possibility and the legal standing, typical development approach and the relations maintained by the NGO community are not sufficiently consistent with this aim" (Fowler 1993, p.326), disregards empirical evidence that shows the opposite (see sections on Norwegian

Lutheran Church in Ethiopia, Norwegian Church Aid in Southern Sudan and ERA/REST on the Horn of Africa.

DEMOCRACY, PLURALISM AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Main findings: accountability has been regarded as a core question in democratic developments but it is not so important fostering pluralism. Unaccountable organisations may be very important in creating pluralism, while at the same time they weaken democracy, if democracy means majority rule, a multiparty system, popular power or the right of the population to change its leaders.

By channelling increasing amounts of money through NGOs, power and resources are delegated from the state to the organisations. By establishing "partnerships" with local organisations, Northern NGOs channel money through local NGOs, and thus also delegate power and resources. This power can be seen as being linked to two different factors: financial resources and knowledge. How these are distributed influences the type of accountability which is most important in general and in connection with the individual programme or project.

Government(s) cannot always be responsive to peoples' demands and needs, because this may inhibit the continued existence of democratic government and public administration. No responsible government for example, can accept all demands from the people, neither in Norway nor in Bangladesh or Ethiopia. On the other hand, a lack of responsiveness cannot go too far. They cannot reject all demands by referring to the "universal" interest of the country. That would endanger the legitimacy of the political system or political party in question. NGOs can accept all demands from a certain section of the people, or from their target groups, if their funds are sufficient. Organisations can also be seen as a solution to a real dilemma of the government or elected leaders: NGOs compensate for market failure in helping victims of restructuring

programmes, but unlike governments, they also provide a structural non-responsiveness and inefficiency. Organisations can function as a *cordon sanitaire*, as Seibel argues; they are both a disguise (of the real problem) and a buffer (between people and government), but they cannot solve the initial problem. They help to segregate a social problem from the government's responsibility and install what has been called a "a tyranny of structurelessness" (Seibel 1990, p.115). An illusion is created: a lot of activity is going on even if hardly anything of importance is being done for the population at large. In this way, NGOs may in a broader perspective be seen, not as representatives of "civil society" against the state, but as a means by which the *status quo* is maintained. Within the same perspective but in a broader context it is possible to regard the NGOs as being primarily producers of ideology and images of the world, and that it is as that kind of actor that we "all" need them.

An important feature of the claimed comparative advantage vis-à-vis the state is the "different way that NGOs can relate to the intended beneficiaries, and their freedom in organising themselves" (Fowler 1990). Government/citizen relations are said to be based on control and authority, while NGOs are able to form "un-ambivalent relationships" with their target groups and beneficiaries free from any control dimension. NGOs have the "potential to adopt an unequivocal, un-ambiguous position of support, mutual trust and equality of interest with their intended beneficiaries; dominance and control need not lurk in their shadow". For governments, the "hierarchical structure of bureaucracy may be suitable for the maintenance of a stable state in a stable environment, but it is much less suitable for development and change in situations of unpredictable futures". NGOs are said to be free "to design their organisations in ways which are optimal for the situations and development tasks they themselves select while demands on governments lead to hierarchical bureaucratic structures which rely on uniformity, standardization and rigidity" (Fowler 1990). Based on such stereotypes, how can comparative advantage be measured? The focus is very often on the same descriptive points and the whole argument thus tends to be tautological. Their

ascribed special traits are their comparative advantages.

Democracy and the question of how NGOs relate to the beneficiaries (TOR 5.3.4) is fundamentally an issue about accountability. To ask who is actually accountable to whom, beneath the rhetorical level of equality and partnership, is to address the balance of power within the system. The question is: to whom are the local NGOs or the Northern NGOs accountable? To their beneficiaries, to their members, to their boards, to the "public", or to their founders(s)? Here, as elsewhere, accountability tends to become an issue when power and resources are delegated. Accountability is especially complex for the NGO channel in aid, due to the number of actors (different donors and different cooperating partners), different states and governments and the distance between beneficiaries and organisation involved. International NGOs might obtain support from their own government, but since many organisations also work in many different sectors they can obtain funds from different government departments. Norwegian Church Aid, for example, gets money from 10 chapters in the Norwegian state budget. In addition they can receive money from other bilateral donors, e.g. from the UN system and from international network organisations. An NGO in developing countries might in addition to these government donors be given support (in cash or in personnel etc.) by the national and local government, and from a number of international NGOs which again receive funds from a number of bilateral and multilateral donors. Beneficiaries contribute legitimacy, voluntary labour and small amounts of cash. Members of organizations or the public give money to support NGOs. All of these actors may be involved in one and the same project. This kaleidoscope creates unusually complicated mechanisms of accountability.

The donor states control the lion's share of resources, and they also possess the means of acquiring knowledge of NGO activities by institutionalized reporting and accounting. NGOs that are intermediaries for funds to national NGOs will tend to institutionalize similar types of accountability and control mechanisms with their "partner". National NGOs

that are receiving money either from foreign donors, the national state or international NGOs may also channel money to *ad hoc* groups or smaller NGOs, or as in Zimbabwe for example, to CBOs. Due to the number of levels and funders, this creates a complicated system, encompassing state borders, economic and social sectors, and widely different legal systems or formal accountability mechanisms. The strong ideological emphasis on alternative accountability mechanisms; "people's participation", "putting the last first", and the conviction of many NGOs that the marginalized groups are there to define and the NGOs only to provide, have blurred the realities of resource transfers, accountability and therefore also the role of NGOs in furthering democracy and pluralism.

Resource transfers and accountability

A starting point here is that the form and content of cooperation with "local recipient groups, organizations and governments" are linked to type and size of resource transfers. Official donors, and in some cases national governments (in general the public or the recipients are not in a similar position) are in a position to enforce accountability. The donors have power to sanction organisational behaviour. It is natural that when a government gives money to an organisation it will demand a certain level of influence on what actions is taken and in which ways. The recipients of NGO assistance do not have the same leverage. There are also exceptions to this "rule". In some cases the donors have become so dependent on local partners, that the local partners in reality exert considerable power over donors. Recipients for whom donors compete to support, as REST and ERA in Tigray and Eritrea and BRAC in Bangladesh, have had sanctional possibilities. They have been in a position to reject donors that have required responsive or explanatory accountability, by threatening to go to other donors. But in most cases, when the target groups are, for instance, poor women's association, landless farmers, or illiterate youngsters, their only available sanction is to refuse to participate. They can sanction action, but the NGO can move to another country or to

another place. International development NGOs have more "exit options" regarding accountability downwards in the system than a Norwegian NGO working in Norway or a British NGO working in Britain. This general imbalance of power frames the structure of the accountability system within the NGO channel. In a situation in which there is only one main donor, and a private donor market which seems to dry out, competition pressure on organisational decision-making will increase. The greater the degree of similarity of goals and tasks between the organisations, the greater the level of competition that is likely to occur between them. Organisations will of course respond to the demands of groups in a given environment that control the most critical resources (Saxon-Harold 1990, p.128). moreover focus on fiscal accountability is easier to deal with than programme accountability or goal-measuring accountability, especially because development aid is an arena in which the public and the donors have insufficient knowledge of or lack of interest in assessing, social impact. The imbalance between the policy and media concern for aid-money that cannot be accounted for, efforts to strengthen financial reporting systems, and the lack of interest in the development impact of NGOs, can be seen as reflections of these relations.

The discussion about accountability in the NGO community often presupposes that everybody favours improved accountability. This is an untenable assumption. When donors at different levels delegate resources and power to NGOs certain activities can be protected from political interference (this has been called the *buffer theory*). Another theory is the *escape theory*: by giving tasks to NGOs known weaknesses of government departments can be escaped, and by reducing accountability one can achieve independence from financial controls and checks of Parliament, regulation and salary scales of the bureaucracy. (adapted from Smith and Hague 1971, quoted in Leat 1990, p.144). One point can be added: *the PR theory*; NGO successes can be used to further governments' reputations, while their failures might be written off as "private" failures, outside government responsibilities. Donors do not necessarily always want accountability systems without holes. The

"magic" of the channel seen from a donor's political point of view is exactly this: the channel is a great asset when they succeed, but can be dropped when they fail.

To what extent are organisations accountable to governments in the country in which they work? Many governments try to increase their control of the NGO channel by requiring different types of accountability from organisations receiving external support. The arguments are political but also economic; since in most countries such organisations have the right for example, to duty-free imports, and are thus subsidized by governments, these governments feel entitled to accountability. Many organisations are, however, opposed to this, which often described as undue state interference, and which is said to divert their responsibility for the target groups. In many countries there have been open political confrontations between the state administration and the NGO community related to this issue (Ethiopia in 1992 and 1993, where the government has worked on a code of conduct for the NGOs; the government requires that each NGO should be accountable to some Ethiopian authorities, and also in Bangladesh, especially in 1992). It seems that international and Norwegian NGOs are accepting accountability and government control from their home governments to quite another extent than they do from national governments. There has developed a culture in some of the NGOs expecting more "freedom", i.e. more room for NGO manoeuvring in developing countries than at home. In fact, the interviews undertaken during this study suggest that it is precisely this "freedom" from bureaucratic regulations that is one of the most important attractions for NGO actors in the field.

Accountability and organisational behaviour

In general institutions in society will tend to opt for separation of control over policy from control over resources. This is a marked feature of the NGO channel. The Storting provides the political guidelines, but has little possibility of controlling how the allocated money is used in Torit, Arba Minch, Rushinga or Sylhet. On the other hand, Northern NGOs prefer independence

and autonomy in management and policy-making in relation to the donor state. Southern NGOs prefer the same in relation to the Northern NGOs. The arguments in favour of such independence are often that he who knows best should also have the power to decide what is best. In cases in which donor states and organisations, or Southern or Northern NGOs, work in tandem, the accountability problem does not appear to be so important.

The form of accountability is linked to the method of resource transfer. A strategy pursued by both NGOs in developing countries and Northern NGOs is to diversify the control over the resources they receive, in such a way that the influence of any one donor is made marginal to the total. Because of similar situations national NGOs have, an ambiguous attitude to donor consortias. Many organisations regard it as better to have a consortium of donors than only one donor, because the latter relationship will often be experienced as a form of paternalism and lead to undue pressure for accountability "upwards". Consortia that become too effective, or which enable the different donors to agree, or to "gang up", as it might be expressed by NGOs, aggravate this problem and therefore NGOs tend to dislike these. Accountability is not therefore a relation that everybody supports at all times or in all situations, as current NGO myths imply.

In the literature it has been argued that "accountability" is related to the question of making NGOs more effective - i.e. the more accountable, the more efficient. Improved accountability may increase efficiency but also inefficiency. The theory that the two reinforce each other has been falsified. To show strong accountability towards external donors might counteract both efficiency and not the least, legitimacy. An NGO, especially in countries in which there are political and ideological conflicts, that is seen as being too concerned with pleasing (being accountable to) foreign donors, often faces a problem of local or national legitimacy. On the other hand, to demonstrate too strong accountability to poor women's groups or landless farmers might jeopardise financial support and work-permits. The questions of accountability and legitimacy are related, but should not be intermingled.

Organisations may have great legitimacy, and precisely for that reason be subject to few and weak accountability arrangements. This is a feature of development NGOs, especially those working in other countries. Legitimacy can be based on media legitimacy, elite legitimacy, church legitimacy etc., and need not be based either on accountability to or legitimacy with recipients.

Of course, there is also a problem with accountability within the NGOs. This problem might be less in non-democratic organisations or in organisations led by charismatic individuals. Member organisations do not experience fewer accountability problems than non-member organisations. In Northern NGOs, with growing activities and a growing professional aid staff, involved in areas far from where the members live and in activities they do not know very well members or the Home Board will, because of their poorer access to knowledge, be marginalized within accountability flows. In some organisations a growing gap has developed between formal responsibility for overall management and policy, and actual responsibility for policy implementation. Professionals in an NGO will "know best" and will gradually "know best" more and more. An experienced implementor, with no formal authority in the elected bodies, will therefore tend to become very central in deciding the organisation's profile and policies.

Accountability and target groups

It has been argued that the implicit contract between NGOs and recipients is a fundamental basis of accountability mechanisms. But how real is the premise that there exists such a contract? It is possible to develop a relationship that resembles a "contract" during the programme period, but recipients (as "contract-holders") have no effective sanctions, while the organisations have many possibilities. To withdraw participation or "voluntarism" is a weak threat or sanction. The non-existence of contracts can be demonstrated in many ways. When an NGO withdraws from a project (this happens all the time), this is often defended as justifiable by overall arguments about more

pressing needs and the necessity for making priorities etc. An NGO often has more freedom of manoeuvre in this manner than do governments, because there is no contractual relationship between NGOs and the people.

NGO rhetoric asserts that NGOs do not work for others but together with others. They represent a reaction to attitudes of paternalism inherent in other organisations. The partner defines the problem while the NGO only provides the means of solving it. Let us assume that this is what is happening in the field, and that a policy of "putting the last first" has succeeded. The project might have been improved, the target groups might have become more involved, but at the same time this might increase accountability problems. Why should poor women in Wolata, Ethiopia or in Rushinga, Zimbabwe, bother about writing quarterly reports about project aims and project results, as long as the project established schools, latrines etc., if that was what they wanted? The more a project is geared towards the target group, and adapts to always changing local circumstances, the more difficult will it be to be accountable upwards in the way the system expects. The legitimacy of the channel is partly based on ideas of recipient/constituency accountability. It rests upon the idea that the target groups have the same will, or one voice. This myth blurs the fact that in this context organisations are accountable to segmented and overlapping constituencies, and some levels have more sanctional power and knowledge than other levels.

The target groups in aid are "victims" of what can be called the imbalance of knowledge. Their knowledge and their reaction or ideas in relation to a project have very little chance of reaching the founders in the donor country. They might receive a visitor now and then, but most people would tend to think that they know what they have and not what they might have had. The criticism of projects will therefore tend to be muted, also because the projects often represent enormous resource transfers in local terms. This imbalance is not created by the aid relation, but the aid relation is an expression of it.

Multiple accountability or institutionalised irresponsibility?

An organisation might be formally and rhetorically accountable to a number of institutions and groups. Most models of accountability reduce this complexity and do not cater for the particularities of development aid, the great number of donors, or their different characteristics and requirements. What happens when conflicting demands or conflicts of accountability arise? What comes first - in the end? It is reasonable to assume that choices depend upon the expectations and the seriousness of potential sanctions. The different types of sanctions that different groups have at their disposal become important. It has been suggested that a general hierarchy of groups exists, to which organisations have to relate. Empirical data suggest rather a number of different hierarchies which change internally all the time, related to the different political and resource needs/environments of different types of organisations.

The problem therefore, is twofold. Rhetoric tends to promise more than it can deliver. This is the role of rhetoric everywhere, so the point here is to assess the implications for this field. By the end of the day the organisations and those funding them cannot escape the question: "which group comes first"? "NGOspeak" suggests the target group. The target groups and their opinions cannot be ignored always and in the long run, because lack of participation might affect the general legitimacy of the organisation in the country where donor funds come from, but they can be ignored and often ignored. When conflicts over accountability arise, what happens is that accountability becomes primarily a question of being accountable to those who can exert most power over the organisation. This is often the donor, but not always. In general, withdrawal of financial support is more important than withdrawal of popular support from the target group, which it is possible to "survive", unlike the withdrawal of financial support which is more difficult to overcome. This does not imply that it is impossible to show voluntary accountability to selected target groups, based on organisational ideologies and values. But in a situation in which the

organisations develop economic dependence on a donor, the former will tend to play second fiddler over time. The amount and type of resource transfers; i.e. the imbalance of economic weight and the lack of reciprocity between the different actors, especially that between the NGO and the target group, must affect the way that accountability is handled.

In development aid the growing attention to accountability issues could be interpreted from another angle: Because of the distance and inequality between the donor, the NGO and the recipient, it may function as a disguise. "Multiple accountability", which for many has become a favourite slogan - is practically speaking impossible. It might therefore maintain existing roles between recipients, public donors and the organisations and its members. Since nobody is accountable to anybody in particular, but a little accountable "to everybody", one ends up by being "controlled" by or being really accountable to nobody.

A CASE STUDY: GOVERNMENT AND NGOS IN A "TUG OF WAR" IN BANGLADESH

Main findings: the relationships between the government of Bangladesh and the NGOs have often been uneasy. A study of this development, concentrated on the "tug of war" in summer 1992 might be instructive in showing how this relation can be conceived of in a developing country. The arguments are of course peculiar to Bangladesh, but the case contains issues and problems which are general for the NGO channel as an international system.

The NGOs in Bangladesh have played an important role in certain sectors such as education and rural credit, and have obtained a rather visible role in public life. They are a force in this country to a larger extent than in many countries. It is therefore natural that their role is attracting public interest, also because the majority of them are receiving funds from non-Islamic countries. The government has defended the NGOs, and pointed out that the fundamentalists' allegations against them are basically unfounded.

A study of the Bangladeshi NGO scene (both Norwegian, international and national NGOs are here considered as part of this scene) may demonstrate aspects of the NGOs' role in furthering pluralism and democracy, and also the relationship between NGOs and the state.

The NGO community had developed into a comparatively strong social and political force in Bangladesh during the 1980s. In Bangladesh the growth in the number of NGOs receiving foreign funding has been tremendous. The number of national NGOs increased by 1040 % during the NGO decade, while international NGOs increased in number by 60 %. In 1981 there were 68 foreign NGOs registered while in 1991 there were 109. In the same period the number of national NGOs supported by foreign funds increased from 45 to 513 (see table A.7). The proportion of total foreign aid channelled through NGOs was about 1 % in 1972-73 (Abed et al, 1984 - quoted in Aminuzzaman, 1993). By the end of the fiscal year 1986-87 this had increased to 17.6 % (Alam 1988),¹⁰ and is still increasing (from US 5 million in 1972-73 to US\$ 339 million in 1986-86 (Aminuzzaman 1993, p.5). The number of projects undertaken by the registered NGOs rose from 162 in 1988-89 to 610 in 1991-92. Over 600 NGOs are said to be supported by foreign funds. The external influence is not only from Western countries. Many Islamic NGOs have a direct liaison with Jamat-e-Islami, an Islamic fundamentalist party. One NGO called Rabeta Al-Alam Al-Islami has its headquarters in Mecca and many of its top leaders in Bangladesh belong to the cadre of the Islamic fundamentalist party.

Their importance has made it natural that they have also become an issue of public debate. One starting point for this short analysis is an interview published in *Courier*, May 11-17, 1990 with Mohammad Asafuddowlah, the secretary of the Ministry of Social Welfare. He talked about the relation between government and NGOs. He said: "There must be some motive behind offering such aid and in my opinion they are not always honest". He says that people in Bangladesh will not give up their culture and religion and argues that "some beliefs are purchased with money", especially thinking on the mission organisations: "Sale of religion is

religion and argues that "some beliefs are purchased with money", especially thinking on the mission organisations: "Sale of religion is not social services". "Conversion to another religion should not be a precondition to having social services. This sort of mentality has to be abandoned". He also argues that when NGOs "start accumulating wealth through their own projects then they are not different from multinational companies". What is the guarantee that the money generated by the project will be distributed among the distressed? Who will supervise it? Such NGOs should instead be registered by "the Registrar of the Joint Stock Company"? And he continues: "Why should the laws be relaxed for the foreigners who work here? When the new ordinance will be introduced there will not be any confusion regarding this. The foreign organisations will have to work according to that law". This interview mirrored opinion in important government circles.

The same year the NGO Affairs Bureau was established. The NGOs started to show resentment, especially some of the big and leading NGOs. The Bureau was criticized for delaying project approvals and for exercising control over NGO activities. The Bureau, on the other hand, alleged that NGOs had mushroomed during the Ershad regime, when, according to the new government, large-scale corruption and favouritism were the order of the day. This had made it possible for NGOs to work without any control from the authorities at the same time as they channelled enormous foreign funds. Some of the NGOs were blamed for being for-profit businesses and for being engaged in various forms of subversive activities.¹¹

The July crisis

In July 1992 the conflict came into the open. The relationship between NGOs and NGO Bureau had continuously deteriorated. ADAB submitted a memo to the Prime Minister's office with complaints against the NGO Bureau. It urged the Prime Minister's office to facilitate NGO activities. It also urged the simplification of the procedures for project approval, permission for release of funds, renewal of registration, etc. The

PM office had also received complaints against the NGO Affairs Bureau in writing from the US ambassador.

Such complaints prompted the Prime Minister to call for a report from the NGO Affairs Bureau. The report "NGOs Activities in Bangladesh" alleged that the NGOs had received around Taka 1800 crore in the last two years, of which 60% was used for staff salaries and administrative costs. The report recommended an evaluation of how the rest of foreign assistance was used. It also mentioned that NGOs show unconditional loyalty and subjugation to the donor agencies. NGOs make political statements from time to time, participate in local elections, publish news magazines with political propaganda, carry out religious activities and proselytization by taking advantage of the illiterate and poor people. Besides, they are involved in embezzlement, irregularities, corruption and anti-state activities. In the absence of representative government during the previous regime, no action was taken against the activities of NGOs. As a result they raised huge sums of donations from the rich western countries by exhibiting a poverty-stricken image of Bangladesh. The money thus collected is used for luxury cars and lifestyles, fat salaries, wealth accumulation and at the instigation of foreign "lords" they are even engaged in politics (BK: 29.7.92, DC: 14.8.92).

The report contained allegations against 46 NGOs of receiving Taka 138 crore from foreign countries from 1988 to 1991 without the approval of the government, and of spending it as they wished. Among them were BRAC, PROSHIKA, MCC, CARITAS and many others. The immediate action of the Government in response to the report was to cancel foreign donations registration of ADAB. They were not allowed to spend foreign assistance without prior government approval, or to engage in political activities. The government also cancelled the registration and operating licence of another NGO - Society for Economic and Basis Advancement (SEBA). Further, a list of 52 NGOs alleged to be engaged in missionary works, especially in proselytization was published by the government. The Bureau also opened court cases against seven NGOs, and in connection with one of them the Metropolitan

Magistrate of Dhaka issued arrest warrants against three foreign nationals.

ADAB, an umbrella organisation with 600 NGOs as members was described as being "beyond Government's control", "NGOs defeating the Bureau?" (DC 28.8.92). It referred to ADAB's intimate relationship to big Western donor agencies, which also played a crucial role in pressuring the Government to withdraw its cancellation order of ADAB. Diplomats and aid officials from Western countries met the prime minister several times and complained that the Bureau was unnecessarily interfering in the activities of NGOs and obstructing their work. The charges against the NGO employees were withdrawn under the directions of Prime Minister's office. Immediately after, the director-general of the NGO Affairs Bureau was placed under order of transfer while he was on a foreign tour.

The Bureau also formulated some recommendations with the declared aim of making the NGOs more accountable to the government. These included: a) supervision of NGO activities by elected representatives of an area; b) the formation of a committee or a commission at the highest level to which the NGOs would be accountable; c) ensuring application of laws for regulating NGO activities; d) formulating laws to ensure punishment of defaulting NGOs; e) working out a salary structure for the employees of NGOs; and f) making sure that appointments of NGO personnel are made on the basis of competition. However, not yet clear whether the government would go in for a new regulatory system for the NGOs (DC: 14.8.92). These measures were made less strict, and the proposal to administer NGO activities at district level by the district administration was turned down. The suggestion of fixing the salaries of NGO executives at a maximum of Taka 20,000 and to limit the number of foreign experts to 10 in each NGO were, according to a left-wing newspaper, "undermined" (AK: 27.7.92).

Most of the articles written on NGOs in 1992 in different newspapers, irrespective of their political colours, were negative to NGOs. The

government was shown as an innocent victim of corrupt NGOs. The NGOs were generally accused of misappropriation of funds, administrative irregularities and anti-state activities.

One of the NORAD-supported NGOs, Saptagram, was accused in The "Daily Sangram", of the Jamat Islami Party, in September 1992, of

"carrying out persistent and systematic propaganda against the cultural and religious values of the people of Bangladesh ... They are also bringing huge amount of money from foreign sources and pocketing most of the finance ... Saptagram ... in the name of development is carrying on systematic propaganda among the poor women that purdah is standing in the way of their development. Through this propaganda they are bringing the women out of the house and encouraging them to become loose charactered ... They are destroying and breaking down the discipline of family life. The lady who is the Project Director smokes cigarettes publicly..." (DS 2.9.1992).

The NGO responded critically to both the press articles and to the Bureau's version of their work. Their view on the government was different. A common criticism levelled against government organizations was that they were not sensitive to local problems. An NGO source said that the bureaucrats loved "issuing edicts without a sense of urgency or a positive direction" and "that approval of projects and registration are not given within the stipulated time, which is detrimental to programmes. The donor communities are backing out of their commitments and transferring their attention to other countries" (NN: 19.11.92). Some NGO actors described the government as authoritative, inefficient and reluctant partners, and that the NGOs emerged in the vacuum "created as a result of an awful loss of sense of direction in the government" (DC: 20.8.1993). The government is considered as inefficient and sloppy, while for example, Grameen Bank has come to be accepted as a model both at home and abroad" (DC: 20.8.1993) and BRAC's non-formal primary education project has lately attracted international attention (DC: 20.8.1993).

The media discussed the power relationship between the government and NGOs. In one article it was argued:

"They [NGOs] have monstrous power. They are rich, have a huge network throughout the countryside and they are not accountable to anybody. If this continues, they will be the main source of state power (K: 31.8.92) ."

The leader of BRAC replied:

"NGOs are not an alternative government. NGOs work to complement the role of government. We are not thinking to become as an alternative government. We are co-operating with government in its effort to alleviate poverty among the rural landless class. When everyone will be employed and become educated, the role of NGOs will come to cease" (DB: 3.9.92).

These two statements reflect two different views of the NGO/state relationship.

NGOs as "Western agents"

Two arguments are used against NGOs in this context. First, NGOs are considered as agents of imperialism, and secondly, they are involved in proselytization of the poor to Christianity.

The NGOs are proselytizing the poor to Christianity in the name of welfare service, the fundamentalist Dainik Millat argued (DM: 12.8.92). Others argue that what the NGOs are doing is only to implement official government policy; developing systems and institutional structures for creating a sustainable health-care system at the community level through people's participation, and the delivery of those family planning and contraceptive services which have been approved by the government, measures which will improve the situation for women and then erode the power of the Islamists (TDS: 11.2.93). Islamic forces also have propagandized that, like the East India company, the NGOs with foreign blessings are conspiring to occupy Bangladesh. Even at that time BRAC was singled out for attack (in 1994 some of their schools were burnt down by Islamic

fundamentalists): "BRAC is now operating in 24 Zillas. BRAC by purchasing land and constructing building in 24 Zillas is establishing forts like the East India Company" (DM: 27.7.92).

In aid politics Scandinavians were described and considered as benevolent imperialists. The Scandinavians have subtle conflicts with the "American imperialist". American imperialism has an institutional character and is thereby able to support industries like the garment industry. Because of the fact that the Scandinavian imperialism emerged much later than the American imperialism, it is bound to be of a non-institutional character. Therefore, a pro-establishment newspaper wrote, instead of investing in garment industries, they are much more interested in supporting NGOs (DS: 31.8.1987). The Scandinavians help poor women to produce traditional quilts and pay Taka 10 as a wage. This quilt is being sold at dollar 10 which may be considered as a vicious cycle of profit-making (DS: 31.8.1987).

Some consequences of the Crisis

In reaction to the Bureau report, the NGOs submitted written protests and issued rejoinders claiming that their goal was the well-being of the poor and that their activities were in accordance with the law of the land. They denied the allegation that they had received foreign donations without the knowledge of the government. They denied the accusation that they were engaged in communal politics and proselytization. BRAC denied that their executive director received a fat salary, and that their commercial ventures were established to make profits. Proshika denied that they owned a printing press and a video library.

The July 1992 crisis led to an uneasy situation and the concerned actors searched for an outlet to mitigate and normalize the tense situation.

This event helped the government to evaluate its own position and attitudes towards NGOs. It begun to examine the efficacy of existing laws that govern the NGOs. The government felt a need to formulate a comprehensive law. A

cabinet sub-committee was established to work on the formulation of a consolidated law that would empower the government to look into the affairs of NGOs. The government made an attempt to normalize its strained relationship with NGOs on the issue of allegations against their involvement in the country's politics. In the presence of US Ambassador, the Finance Minister M Saifur Rahman spoke, "We are welcoming the good NGOs for development, progress and prosperity" (TDS:14.8.92). The good NGOs are those who strictly follow an accountable, transparent and development oriented system for national progress and prosperity. Thus, "we want real NGOs and we do not want NGO business" (TDS:14.8.92). The government set up a meeting which was attended by "high officials of the Bureau, representatives of the Prime Minister's office, and the Chairman, Vice Chairman and other officials of the Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB)" (TDS: 9.9.92). At the same time, the Bureau approved 35 projects submitted by NGOs (TDS: 9.9.92). After the meeting, a leader of NGO community said, the government's attitude "toward the problems faced by the voluntary organization was positive" (TDS: 9.9.92).

The July 1992 events created opportunities for both the government and NGOs to make efforts to recognize and understand each others roles. However, a trend is clear. The political "left" gradually lessened their criticism, and the Communist Party has come up with support for NGOs. The conflict has become a conflict focussing on the question of culture and religion (Islam against the West and Christianity, and the NGOs as spearheads of westernization) and the question of accountability (to whom are the NGOs accountable and how should the NGOs and government relate to each other)

The trend of attacking NGOs, particularly by Islamic forces, has not decreased but rather increased. BRAC as the largest organization has become a target of these Islamic forces. It is described as a Christian organization involved in proselytizing the poor with Christian faith. "BRAC is introducing atheism in its Non-Formal Primary Education (NFPE) program. The NFPE programme of BRAC through 100 schools is

teaching against Allah and spoiling innocent children" (DI: 22.11.93). The immediate reaction of BRAC was to issue statements in various local dailies (Holiday: 3.12.92) against such allegations.

Such a story against BRAC is: "A BRAC girl student died. A foreign NGO official advised her father to wrap his daughter's dead body with black cloth and to put the body into the grave following the rituals of Christians. For this purpose, he is willing to pay the poor father Taka 10, 000" (SMJ: 16.6.1993). Similar fabricated stories were also published in the Monthly Jago Mujahid (October, 1993, January 1994) and Dainik Inquilab (24.11.93). Some newspapers further substantiated their claim by describing the credit operations of NGOs like BRAC, Grameen Bank etc. as being as exploitative as those of *British Zaminders* who oppressed the poor peasants (JM: January, 1994). This type of criticism is made when BRAC is trying to obtain permission to transform its credit operation into a BRAC Bank (BK: 21.10.93). Reports were also published of how a BRAC area office came into public attack: "BRAC office is attacked by the people in protest of misbehaviour of Regional Manager in "Dusta Mata Unnayan Programme" (Development programmes for destitute mothers). The incident started when two women were beaten severely by the Regional Manager (RM) when some women members breached the rules. To save the RM, the Gaibandha Upazilla Executive Officer had to intervene (DS: 14.4.92).

In recent months, BRAC's NFPE programme has become under severe attack from Islamic fundamentalists in the rural areas. As a result of this attitude, scores of schools run under the NFPE programme have been burned down and hundreds of mulberry trees planted along the roadsides have been uprooted (BK: 16.1.94).

That the government/NGO issue has continued was demonstrated by a public statement by the American Ambassador: "Our experience is that NGOs work best, and serve the society, when they are controlled the least". They should neither be " beholden to" or "antagonistic" to the government (Daily Star, 28.4.1993. The same newspaper, some days before, had carried as its front-page lead: "New policy to control NGOs"

(Daily Star, 17.4.1993). ADAB sent an "Urgent Memorandum from the NGOs of Bangladesh in the context of the proposed Act (draft) and the new circular" (they were referring to a cabinet sub-committee headed by the Commerce Minister who had drafted the report entitled "Bangladesh Voluntary Social Welfare Organisations (Registration and Control Act)" the same month, which started: "Deregulation of overly bureaucratic control is accepted as principal means of democratization of society and to bring more efficiency and productivity and to lessen opportunity for corruption". They warned that the NGOs work would be "crippled" (p.3), and they wanted firmly to be "recognized as part of the private sector in development, in this case the nonprofit sector", showing to the deregulations for businesses.

A CASE STUDY: NGOS, SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

Main findings: The characters of, and relationships between, state and society vary considerably between countries, reflecting historical developments, economic situation, the degree of social integration/compartmentalization, etc. A productive relationship between NGOs and the host government's administrative system must therefore adapt to different roles and potentials of the third sector and the NGOs. In the case of Southern Sudan a kind of conceptual dogmatism played an important role; the dominant perspective underestimated the weakness of the state institutions and overestimated the degree of social integration and value consensus in the social system.

This study is taken from Southern Sudan, because it provides a setting in which the concepts of state, pluralism, democracy, civil society and accountability can be studied fruitfully.

The 1980s in Africa have been called the "NGO decade"; then the NGOs "entered the limelight..." (Bratton 1989, p.569). In Southern Sudan the NGOs came to play a very important role as early as the 1970s.¹² The enormous task of socio-

economic reconstruction of the whole region after the first war (1955-1972), the emergency assistance to more than half a million Sudanese returnees and later to about 200,000 Ugandan refugees fleeing to Southern Sudan between 1979 and 1983, and a new weak state administration without enough money, people or experience to carry out these tasks alone, made the region natural location for extensive NGO involvement.¹³ In Juba alone there were 38 foreign aid organisations in 1985.

There is no doubt that many of the NGOs were rather efficient development agents. The Norwegian Church Aid/Sudan Programme, which will be especially focused on in this chapter, definitely helped to raise the living standards in their programme area on the East Bank of the Nile in Equatoria Province. The area covered 86,000 km² and had an estimated population of around 500,000. Approximately 90 % were small framers. About 20 different ethnic groups lived in the area, the most important being Toposa, Boya and Didinga in the eastern part of the programme area, Latuka, Lapit and Lokoro in the centre and Madi, Acholi, Lokoya, Luluba and Bari in the west. After 1983 it, covered the Kapoeta, Chukudum, Ikotos, Torit and Magwe Area Councils in addition to the east bank of the Nile in Juba Area Council. Norwegian Church Aid built a number of new roads in the area and organized repair and maintenance on others. They helped establish 15 dispensaries and 40 primary health care stations. They constructed 30 primary schools and six secondary schools and 16 schools which they helped to initiate on a self help basis. They drilled hundreds of wells and installed Indian Pump II. Through their active support, Torit District Cooperative Union was able to organise 139 co-operatives at village level. Broadly speaking; NCA was an efficient aid organisation, primarily concerned with doing a good humanitarian job while trying to stay out of local and regional politics. However, in this chapter the NGOs will, not be evaluated in terms of their ability to reach the target groups and deliver the goods. Their impact will be analysed in relation to the dissolution of state administrative functions and institutions in the South, and to the whole underlying question of

social integration and particularism versus universalism.

The state civil-society dichotomy in Southern Sudan

In recent years a dominant perspective in much research on NGO government relationships has focused on the differences and contrasts between the political role and characteristics of states versus those of voluntary organisations. This theory allocates NGOs a crucial role in the democratisation of African countries: they are to strengthen and pluralize what is commonly called civil society. The NGOs are conceived of as representing instruments for organising local initiatives and for promoting local participation and diversity as opposed to the state, whose approach is seen as dirigiste and top-down, and which expresses the interests of a bureaucratised, alienated elite in search of control. The emergence of NGOs on the African scene has been analyzed as an organisational expression of particular interests or objectives within the body politic, which are not adequately represented within the political system.

The sudden dominance of the term "civil society" in the vocabulary of social sciences and in the jargon of the development aid community in the 1980s (it is extremely rare to find the term in development aid documents of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Even in dictionaries of social sciences and political thought the term often was not mentioned at that time), can be seen as an expression of the strength of this ideological trend. This dichotomy has obvious ideological connotations. But more important, the power of this concept and its inherent perspective has given birth to a mythology which has tended to disregard the differences in relationships between the state and the society under industrial and post-industrial capitalism and in societies where 90 % of the population are subsistence farmers. The term has also, when dogmatically applied in prescriptions about NGOs' contributions to development, failed to distinguish between African societies with a long and internally rooted tradition of state and societies in which the state is a very recent phenomenon, introduced from above and

maintained by external sources. Moreover, the actual and potential roles of the third sector in African countries vary according to its homogeneity, organisational history, exchange relationships with the state sector, etc. Analytical perspectives which study NGO government relations in Africa within frameworks based on general assumptions about a bureaucratised and parasitic state on the one hand and the existence of a civil society with supra-ethnic or supra-tribal organisations fighting to curb the role of the state supported by NGOs as agents of micro-developments on the other may, of course, be fruitful. On the other hand, I will show that in the case of the Southern Sudan this is not very illuminating. The impact of the NGOs must be analysed concretely. Their role depends on the specific character of the state system and of the "civil society" in which they operate.

The relationship between governments and non-governmental organisations involves a fundamental question of the legitimacy of various types of institutions that exercise power and authority. I will argue that in the Southern Sudan, the NGOs unintentionally contributed to the erosion of the authority of the very weak state. The NGOs did not organise civil society against the state, or consciously promote and strengthen the civil society, as current rhetoric supposes. Basically, they themselves became local substitutes for state administration. The NGOs assumed in a very efficient manner the welfare functions of an ordinary state (see Tvedt 1994 for an analysis of the history of the state administration in Southern Sudan). As the state was "withering away", (though not in the way Karl Marx described) - in the first instance it was ephemeral and in the second place its role as service provider was abdicated - whole districts or sections of ordinary government ministries' responsibilities were handed over to the NGOs to run. The NGOs set up their own administrative and authority systems, undermining the state institutions without establishing viable alternative structures, partly because there simply was no familiar "civil society" to root them in. Project proliferation therefore imposed potential long-term burdens on state administration and state finances. The NGOs represented different types of organisational behaviour, different types of bureaucratic

systems and development philosophies. Their practices therefore came to express institutional and ideological opposition to region-wide, rule-oriented and universalistic state administration and bureaucracy.

These points will be substantiated mainly by a closer description of the programme of the biggest NGO in the region, that of Norwegian Church Aid. In important respects NCA was more concerned about developing good relations with the state and its administrative structures than many other NGOs. It continuously emphasised the need for mutual discussions and formal agreements with the state authorities. NCA warned against the danger of establishing institutions that the government could not take over and stressed the necessity for local participation as a way rooting the projects locally.¹⁴ Other agencies were apparently less concerned about the long-term sustainability about their projects. Its particular role makes NCA especially interesting, and the extensive documentation of its project activities combined with its open door attitude to external researchers make its history accessible.

Formal relations

Both in Juba and locally, there were now and then open tensions between the state administration which was trying to execute administrative control of all the different NGOs and the NGOs' defense of their autonomy. In the first years after the Addis Ababa Agreement regular monthly meetings with the NGOs were coordinated by the Regional Ministry of Finance and Planning (NCR/SP 1975, p.31). But these meetings gradually developed into empty rituals; the government representatives were formally in charge, but their words carried less and less authority. They had little administrative power to backup their proposals and objections. Some of the government representatives also irritated the action-oriented agencies; they demonstrated a combination of "officialdom" and lack of knowledge of what was going on in rural communities. There were NGOs which did not bother to register with the host government. Some of them did not want to discuss their projects with the regional or local authorities,

although they might inform them of their plans. Many organisations had formal agreements approved by the central or regional government (some donor countries like Norway made this a requirement for financial support), while others looked upon this as unnecessary "red tape". What is more interesting than these formal questions, however, and what will have far-reaching consequences in a longer historical perspective, is the imprint of the existence of different forms of authorities and different types of organisations and bureaucracies on local society.

Infrastructural power

In certain areas, the NGOs had very strong infrastructural power compared with the state. NCA's total activities on the East bank for the years up to 1986, including refugee aid, came to about 75 million US dollars. This was almost 20 million more than the regional government invested in the whole region (Yongo-Bure 1987, p.43). In a land-locked economy, Juba being about 5000 kilometres from the nearest port, and in a society where there were no regular newspapers, one local radio-station which was on the air for a few hours a day, no inter-regional mail or functioning telegraph system, the NGOs and their employees in important areas monopolised the distribution of both information and goods due to their well-developed logistic systems, communication networks and superior means of transport. The British NGO, ACROSS, had more than 100 vehicles. When petrol became very scarce in the mid-1980s, this power relationship tipped even further to the side of the NGOs, since the few government cars often had to be supplied with fuel begged or bought from the NGOs or the UN.

Hilieu, just outside Torit, was the administrative centre of NCA. It had excellent secretarial services, radio communication with Khartoum, Nairobi and most of the East Bank, a functioning mail service and flight services. (For comparison: the regional government in Juba sometimes did not have a functioning photo copier machine.) Hilieu had three office blocks and the whole program had approximately USD 600,000 for stationery and office equipment

(Norwegian Church Aid/Sudan Programme 1986b, Annex 11, p. 5). Hilieu had a car park with about 200 vehicles and with no fuel shortages. Most of the cars on the roads on the East Bank in the mid-1980s were NCA cars. NCA built up six administrative centres, with administrators, logistic officers, researchers and secretarial staff and stationery and radio communication. Until the evacuation in January 1985 NCA had about 50-60 expatriate personnel. The expatriate colony in Hilieu, including family members, came to about 200 people.

In one of NGA's "district centres" the Arapi Rural Development Centre (RDC), in Loa district, there were between five and ten expatriate experts who lived and worked there for years until 1985. The centre had two administrative buildings, much better than any house owned by the government or any other person in the area, well supplied with stationery and clerks. The RDC had radio links to both Juba and Hilieu, plenty of cars, fuel, a workshop, etc. The local government in Loa, which was responsible for the same area as Arapi RDC, was housed in an old building badly in need of repair. In addition to the Head Chief there were only a cashier and a typist/secretary, with one typewriter. The Head Chief had a bicycle, and when he had business with the government in Juba he often came cycling to NCA's Development Centre to ask if he could borrow NCA's radio. The infrastructural weakness of the Sudanese state would have been the same whether or not the NCA had been there, but the existence of this efficient and successful programme demonstrated its weakness to the people and thus eroded its legitimacy. NCA had become not only a state within a state, but "the state". The NCA not only delivered services, they could also respond to local requests, they could bring sick people to hospital, etc. The government ordinary administrative authority was more or less confined to the radius of the old chief's bicycle (the police, the military or the coercive power of the state were of course another matter. This is not included in the analysis).

This situation led to what can be described as a process of local brain drain. The NGOs had relatively minor staffing problems as compared

to the state. They did not necessarily pay higher wages, but salaries were regularly paid and there were certain fringe benefits, such as access to cars, motor-bikes etc. In addition, to work for an agency generally brought higher work satisfaction because the organization functioned properly. The number of local Sudanese staff varied, but for years it was more than 2,000 people, which made NCA the biggest employer on the East Bank. It had a management staff of about 90 persons on 1. October 1985 (Norwegian Church Aid/Sudan Programme 1985, pp.36-37), of whom 70 were Sudanese (Ibid.). The NCR/SPs report for 1974 reported in line with the Regional Government that their "greatest problem in the period has been lack of staff in all projects (Norwegian Church Relief/Sudan Programme 1974, p.11). The agricultural staff of the NCA project in 1974 already came 174. In 1983 the number of permanent Sudanese staff had increased to 317 (NCA/SP 1984, p. 28), with 69 working at both Arapi Rural Development Centre (RDC) and Palotaka RDC, while the whole Ministry of Agriculture employed 80 (Norwegian Church Aid/Sudan Programme 1986, p.13). None of the later reports mentioned lack of staff as a serious problem, contrary to the situation within the government, where staff shortage was a permanent problem.

Local monopoly in the social-services sector

The NGOs' strong position reflected the fact that they could supply something which was very much needed and something which nobody else, and especially not the state, could deliver; social services. The state administration had very little money for development or social services projects. According to Madison, the Regional Government expenditure on Regional Ministry of Agricultural and Natural Resources up to 1981/82 totalled around 7 million Sudanese pounds (Madison, 1984, p. 148). The Regional Ministry of Communication, Transport and Roads had spent about 2.5 million pounds on projects (Madison, 1984). It did not even manage to pay some of the recurrent expenditures for teacher salaries causing government schools to temporarily close down, while agency-supported schools functioned.

One might say that the big NGOs and the Khartoum government had one thing in common: because of their purse they held the Southern government machinery hostage. Most government financed projects in the South were not implemented. Many of them were big and well-known projects, but as the government admitted in 1977; "though the list of projects is impressive, in fact the majority of them were not implemented" (Peace and Progress, 1977, p.38).

The local government on the East Bank naturally did not pay much heed to collecting unpopular social service taxes, since these services were provided anyway. By easing this burden of government, the NGO at the same time further alienated the state from society and vice versa, and reduced its potential role as a meeting point for the compartmentalized components of society. By establishing what can be described as competing tax systems (in order to mobilise what commonly was called the "sense of responsibility" among the local people and the level of "popular participation", the agencies demanded that the local people should pay for pump-repair, stationery etc. to the agency or some local committee established by the agency), the "extraction/accountability cycle" was affected. Most normal functions of a government became the domain of the NCA, as in other areas it had become the domain of other NGOs.

Both in comparison with the government administration and the institutional and organizational features of the local societies in which they worked, the NGOs represented and, in many areas, introduced different organizational modes and cultural values. The NGOs were goal-oriented (and value-sharing) organizations, in principle organized on a temporary basis. In the context of the surrounding society they were more *ad hoc* "problem-solvers" than "rule-oriented" bureaucracies. Furthermore they operated within geographically limited areas with limited objectives, and therefore, did not have to develop more general, universalistic types of organisation adapted to different types of activity and different types of culture.

A local government bureaucracy was anathema to the NGO sector, as it had been to the British, although for different reasons. The NGOs' relationship to the state administration was often based on individual and personal contacts. These contacts were important when it came to speeding up the removal of official stumbling blocks which hindered efficient project implementation. The NGO government relationship was therefore also personalised, and not rule-based, in many ways identical to the clientele system which had been developed within the state administration itself. Their relations to the recipient society contrasted with cultural attitudes within the beneficiary groups, and they also played by different rules from those assumed by western bureaucratic culture. From their expatriate compounds the aid workers made development excursions into the surrounding society. A relationship was established which had no traits of that reciprocity which has been said to be typical of local socio-cultural relations.

As a rule the NGOs did not try to establish anti-state structures or organisations. There was no deliberate policy of strengthening such organisations to counterbalance the state. The "civil" organisations which were established, like Women Groups, Cooperative Societies etc., were in line with government policies and priorities and were not strongholds for anti-government policies. Their fundamental basis however, was money supplied from foreign sources. The kind of development institutions which were established through popular participation therefore had difficulties in growing roots in the local soil or in breaking down ethnically divided polities. Little consideration was given to the problem of organisational sustainability in this context, independent of aid injections. The NGOs created bases for alternative entities, but entities that did not possess the universalistic outlook of a regional or provincial administration and which ultimately depended on external money to survive.

The way in which services were provided was perhaps as important. For some of the NGOs money was not the decisive constraint on their scope of activities. What affected project size

and project components was usually not the purse, but arguments about what was morally right and most conducive to local development. Generally the NGOs acted within a culture of absolute affluence, in which goods and services were not priced. When the NCA now and then tried to counter this unsustainable economic culture, as when they were informing the UNHCR that if they needed NCA lorries for transport, they would have to pay for them, this was met by strong objections from the aid community. This was characterised as greediness by central actors in the aid community, although the sum did not cover the cost involved. It was difficult to question the principle that aid was free and in some mysterious way outside the realm of economic realities and the emergence of governmental systems.

The NGOs could also decide what kind of exchange relations should be subject to negotiations among the people, the state and the NGO. When a specialized agency worked in an area (education or health for example), they delivered their specialities. An organisation geared towards aid for education or the disabled, could not or would not respond to proposals which, seen from a local or government perspective, were more important to society as a whole. On the East Bank, it was really in the NCA development centres and ultimately in Hilieu that decisions were taken as to where to drill bore-holes, where to assist self-help schools, which agricultural produce should be supported in what areas, which Primary Societies should receive most support. Through their control of the Co-operative Union they also fixed the prices of crucial agricultural components as seeds and ox-ploughs. The local people influenced the decisions as did the government, but at the end of the day NCA decided.

A particularistic, target-oriented development strategy

The dominant development strategy of the NGOs, that of realizing the peoples' basic needs, had consequences both for how the agencies conceptualized NGO-government relationships and for the social, economic and political

integration process. The NGOs had a particularistic strategy for development and a particularistic approach to the administrative system they tried to establish.

Most of the NGOs had a target-oriented strategy that aimed to reach the poor people living in their villages. The NGOs had different approaches, and implemented different aspects of the basic needs strategy. Some only worked in the health sector and with small riches within it, such as combatting blindness and helping the disabled. Other concentrated on educational services, while some NGOs, like NCA, implemented comprehensive integrated rural development projects. What was common to almost all these projects was that in order to meet goals and to report success stories in order to maintain support from the home country or the UN family, the NGOs sought to circumvent inefficient state institutions and to work directly with the beneficiaries. The better they did it, the more the authority and legitimacy of the local government structures were eroded. There was a contradiction between establishing programmes for costly social services and the state's potential for becoming a vehicle of economic transformation. The NGOs established social services which, although they differed in the level of ambition, had running and maintenance costs which could not be financed by local surpluses or local revenue, not even in the foreseeable future.

The realization of people's basic needs was considered as a right by both the NGOs, by the local people and by the government's declarations and rhetoric. But the recurrent costs of these were bound to become, in the long run, a serious drain on the already strained budgets of the local councils. The legitimacy of the state institutions was undermined and, therefore, the chances of building institutions which could penetrate competing local institutions. The possibilities for local administrations and state institutions to take upon themselves a more active role regarding new investments etc, were simply not there, no matter what might be the personal attitudes or wishes of the local administrators or government representatives. The NGOs were instrumental in relieving the government from would-be pressures by

carrying out service-sector tasks. On the other hand, by letting others fulfil this role, the state, as a potential supra-ethnic and universalistic entity, could not point to its record as service provider to strengthen its position.

There was, therefore, a further contradiction between projects that aimed at realizing certain target groups' basic needs at local level, and projects that aimed to strengthen the regional or national economy, or between a successful local project and a beneficial regional project. Since the aid input was so heavy and the local development councils and committees were so weak, this uneven relationship also created uneven development between people and areas defined as target areas and areas outside the spheres of development aid organisations. The ambitious programmes and projects and the lack of reflection on the administrative and financial situation in the Southern Region created a situation in which there was little correlation between development activities and implementation capacities in the would-be implementing institutions.

The NGOs were apportioned different parts of the region, in many ways similar to the way in which the British government decades before had divided the region between different missionary societies. The NGOs tried to establish local institutions and local accountability by a policy of "popular participation". They established formal administrative structures and informal authority networks independent of the state institutions and partly in competition with them. Bypassing local state institutions took different forms, unintentional in some cases and deliberate in others. The general impact of their activities, aimed at reaching the target groups with basic need projects, further marginalized the state in many areas and made local and provincial councils more or less redundant.

A giving, care taker "state"

A type of development administration was created with very unusual traits. The aid handed out consisted mainly of grants, and the improvement of the lot of the people did not

reflect an improvement in state finances. In at least important parts of Southern Sudan there were no "tremendous setbacks" in the meeting of basic needs of the rural people in the early 1980s, as the World Bank reported to be the general rule in Africa. On the contrary, there was an increase in living standards and without doubt there was an increase in collective services at least in Equatoria. This development was mainly caused by foreign donors and NGOs as implementing agencies. The aid helped the local people. But the aid mechanism and the asymmetric relationship between the weak infrastructural power of the state and the strong infrastructural power of the NGOs caused the state institutions to play an even more marginal role in large parts of the region. A system had been established whereby the people expected initiatives and development projects to come from individual foreign organizations rather than from a bankrupt, inefficient government. Social and economic conditions had improved but due to the particular conditions of the region it is questionable whether this represented a strengthening of the "civil society". It weakened the possibility of building state institutions and as a potentially universalistic, rule-oriented bureaucracy. A practice was established, however, whereby predominantly subsistence farmers started to talk to their government about their rights regarding education, clean water, health facilities etc. A revolution had taken place in expectations, more profoundly than at any time in the region's history, without a parallel improvement in the state's ability to fulfil them or to guarantee these rights.

The success of the NCA programme and the consequential growth of their budgets and activities, created a "state", an administrative machinery, which represented a "revolution from outside" on the East Bank as far as development administration was concerned. In the perspective of a local state building process, however, this machinery represented a perpetuation of some of those processes which had helped to block a locally rooted state-building process in the past. Its actual and immediate role however, was very different; it built and did not destroy, it gave, but it did not take. Both in historical and contemporary perspectives this "state administration" was a novelty. It was a state as a

service institution, without functions either of suppression or extraction. The relative autonomy of this state in relation to the economic and social basis of society was complete, since its activities depended on money from abroad and on the moral-political judgements of the aid workers. These "state officials" were social workers rather than rulers and parasites. New institutional structures and new normative models of state behaviour had been created, but based on structures and models which can hardly be implemented by any future Southern state. What had taken place was what can be termed a privatisation and an externalisation of the state, at the same time as the Government continued its rhetoric about the state building socialism.

The accountability problem

The NGOs also had conflicting and multiple loyalties and created an organizational system marked by a lack of accountability. Important ordinary state functions had been taken over by a Norwegian private organization which legally was answerable first and foremost to Oslo, the capital of Norway, although morally to the local people. The lack of clear lines of administrative authority in the region in general was further blurred. From one point of view the NGO sector deepened the general problem of accountability. It was an in-built problem of the whole structure since the personnel and the organisation were rewarded for implementing project targets within an alternative and fundamentally external reward system. What took place was "downwards" accountability to the people and upward accountability to the NGO's HQs, while local state institutions were often regarded as inefficient, time-wasting institutions that should preferably be circumvented.

NCA had established formal institutions and informal networks which were not only a counterweight to the state, but an alternative. In the same way as the British "indirect rule" policy created traditions and practices which influenced the framework for the administrative build up of the Southern Region after 1972, the NCA programme and its operation will have a legacy for future state building. NCA and the other

NGOs were not important enough to bar the development of universalistic bureaucratic rule over the whole region, but by establishing their own localised bureaucracy with stronger infrastructural powers than the regular state in important sectors of the society, they represented one of many centrifugal forces. While the programme area was locally called "Little Norway", the Sudanese administrative staff were called "Black Norwegians".

NGO mythology versus Southern realities

One example: in 1974 NCR/SP stated typically, and in line with government aims, that their reconstruction programme should be incorporated in "the existing government structures at the end of the three-year programme" (Norwegian Church Relief/Sudan Programme 1974a, p.4), i.e. in 1977. In 1977 the programme was further from being handed over to the government than when it started. The Southern politicians and the NGOs both underrated the region's very special "state history" and its financial difficulties. For example, the agency meetings (which were few, partly because of competition and mutual suspicion) reported mostly on the development within the different organisations' areas, and never considered more macro-oriented issues such as regional integration or regional universalism. The NGOs made important contributions to the improvement of local living standards and they mobilised people locally for development and social change. But the impact of NGOs, in so far as they are involved on such a relatively massive scale as they were in the Southern Sudan, cannot be properly understood within the micro perspective and grassroots perspective which have been part and parcel of current NGO mythology. They also had important and overlooked impacts on the state administrative system, impacts which were not intended but which must have influenced, although on a limited scale, both the dissolution of the Southern state and the breakdown of the administrative system.

CONCLUSIONS

process of change and recent developments.

Norwegian NGOs have, as we have shown, played very different roles in different contexts. In Zimbabwe the Norwegian NGOs, like most other NGOs, have worked in close understanding with the government. When the restructuring program was initiated and changed, diminishing the role of the state and the government, the NGOs moved in to fill the gap. In Bangladesh most of the Norwegian NGOs have been much more independent, registering with the government, but working with their traditional target groups. Their role is very marginal, except in certain areas and among some minority populations, and their work has not significantly been changed by external or internal Bangladeshi political factors. What has been more important is the decline in their relative share of funds from NORAD as compared with local Bangladeshi NGOs. The growth of Muslim fundamentalism and the growing concern of the Bangladeshi government about Christian missionary organisations have, of course, strongly influenced the long-term plans of the Santal Mission in particular. In Ethiopia many of the Norwegian NGOs have a rather long history (Redd Barna (1969), Norwegian Lutheran Mission (1948), Norwegian Church Aid (1974)), and they have established their profile, thus becoming less influenced by changes in the political environment than organisations with fewer roots in the society concerned. The most important issues are not the restructuring programme, but the policy on religion and ethnicity. Some Norwegian NGOs very much favour recent developments, and one of them, NCA, was active in supporting the transition process, while others are more critical. The ethnification of the administrative policies has caused problems for all the organisations in terms of personnel, co-operating institutions etc. In Nicaragua most of the Norwegian NGOs came to the country as explicit supporters of the Sandinist revolution. The change of government came as a shock to most of them, but they have accommodated themselves to the new realities and continue their projects more or less as before, but with less close ties to the government structures. By and large the role of the Norwegian NGOs has been marginal (Ethiopia/Eritrea is an exception to this - see case studies) in this

THE NORWEGIAN STATE'S POLICY ON NGOS

Main findings: the Norwegian strategy for NGOs in development aid is a mixture of different traditions and theories of development. It is still unclear, partly self-contradictory and is fundamentally based on an untenable foundation; that the NGOs as a group have comparative advantages in the development process. It is particularly unclear on the potential roles of the NGOs, their relations to the state and "civil society", the question of how to handle development aid and emergency aid as parts of the same development process and on whether they should be neutral humanitarian development organisations or be contracted for specific policy purposes. They have, however, great potential as flexible instruments in implementing state policies. Considering the large amounts of funds the NGOs have been given, the state and government have given very little attention to the problem of formulating a comprehensive strategy.

This chapter will deal with three major issues (see TOR 5.1. and 6.4);

- general Norwegian NGO-policy as formulated in Reports to the Storting,
- the policy, guidelines and follow up of NORAD
- the policy, guidelines and follow up of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I

GENERAL NGO POLICIES

What is Norwegian general policy on NGOs and how does it relate to basic questions such as their role in society, their importance for democracy and pluralism, their place within the social fabric etc? Is it clear, consistent, and realistic (see TOR 5.1.2)? It has been outlined in major Reports to the Storting, particularly in 1984 (report No. 36) and 1992 (Report No. 51). What roles were attributed to NGOs in these reports? And to what extent did the basic philosophy underpinning this policy, and the particular role of

development assistance change between 1984 and 1992?

Report No. 36 (1984-85)

I will start with the 1984 Report, since present policies and practices are still very much influenced by the strategy formulated there. The 1984 Report was of course formulated within the framework of a very different ideological context. At that time, the old state-centred theories had come under attack, but not so much because they were state-centred as because the new states did not meet current expectations, and had to be reformed by popular, marginal strata in society.

Report to the Storting No. 36 (1984-85) put great emphasis on the role of organisations in creating democracy and economic development: through the organisation of small groups society would be democratised, and their mobilisation was described as a prerequisite for a sound and self-sustaining process of development.

As a result, popular participation via support for NGOs was perceived as something more than just a method for the implementation of a project, although it represented that as well: It emphasized that the government would give priority to popular participation in development work and choose forms of aid and implementing agencies that were in accordance "with this aim" (p.34). In addition, this was described as a main strategy for the furtherance of democratic development. It was in the course of promoting the political and economic organisation of groups that internal structural changes might take place. The strategy was formulated as a general law of development: "If groups organise in working for their rights, this will be an element of democratisation in the internal affairs of a country" (p. 23).

This description of the role of organisations in furthering democracy was not a duplication of the development of parliamentary, representative democracy in Norway. On the contrary, this process of democratisation had few traits common with the history of democracy in Norway, which in general terms can be said to

have been a struggle for participation in the governing of the state. The development of democracy has been closely related to the process of nation building and to the entry of different social classes on the national political arena. As a result, democracy has been associated with forms of central government, and its development with the struggle of the citizens for the democratic right of influencing the state's decisions through debate in Parliament.

NGOs and democracy in developing countries

The Report's approach to democracy in developing countries was of a quite different character. It was not concerned with state formation or national assemblies. This does not imply that it was unaffected by European experiences. The experience it referred to, however, was confined to the period after the emergence of the industrial state, a period in which relationships of between state and civil society have been at the centre of attention in the West.

The strategy's perception of democracy was in many ways similar to a pluralist participatory model. This doctrine is closely related to the expansion of the industrial state in the early 20th century. The demand for participation might be viewed as a reaction to the increased power and presence of the state. The aim was to defend various interest groups in society from excessive use of state power. The underlying ideology was based on a belief that these groups were inherently representative, as opposed to the nature of the state. The model as described in this Report - and which should be applicable to organisation building and the promotion of democracy in rural Africa where the state is often non-existent or very weak - was a model that was developed in Europe as a response to industrialisation and a strong state.

The Report did not discuss whether there is a material, political or cultural basis for its strategy of democratisation in the developing countries. If the strategy is to work properly, it requires a national political arena within which the state's authority can manifest itself, and a local basis for this kind of popular participation

and organisation. Obviously, political institutions are not mere reflections of socio-economic conditions. However, experience indicates that in order to play a role in society in the long run these must have some connection with the articulation of economic, political and social interests in society itself. The question is whether the organisations that were mentioned as collaborating partners in this model of participation - "agrarian- and fishery cooperatives, community councils, trade and enterprise organisations, womens' organisations, religious, social and human-rights movements, etc." (p. 89) - will have the necessary local basis in rural communities where most Norwegian NGOs work.

The way the target-oriented, poverty-alleviation strategy was formulated assumed that exposed groups, the poor and the women involved with traditional farming, would establish not only social groups, but formal groups of organised interests. Indirectly, it assumed that the groups aimed at were actors in an internal conflict that more or less constituted not only the social system and the societal order, but also the groups' social and political consciousness. The strategy related to a different reality than many of the targeted groups lived under. Such groups do not primarily show affection to a social category, and they do not act as one either. The strategy does not reflect on the difference between organising people whose primary solidarity is oriented towards religious, ethnical, geographical or kinship ties, and people who have developed a consciousness of mutual social or economic interests based on similar socio-economic roles in society at large.

While the Report is very critical of the state and the existing elite, it is uncritical of popular organisations. It does not distinguish between various phases of organisational development, such as the mobilisation, bureaucratisation and demobilisation stages. Since aid is a kind of gift economy with, at least in local terms, enormous amounts of money involved, it manipulates local elite formations with projects and means, and new elites emerge through the newly created organisations on the basis of their control of the resources disbursed. What characterises the new elite that emerges through the aid projects? What

historical role will it play? The local administrators whom the colonial powers educated became the new leaders in the newly independent states. What role will the emerging elite play in the work for national unity, consolidation and development? While the Report makes critical remarks about the elite that grew up during colonial rule and immediately thereafter, it has no reflective attitude to the new elite established through aid and the support of local organisations. Social groups are created through aid work, often in contexts in which the initiative comes from 'above' and abroad. Groups do not necessarily already exist beforehand - indeed the Report states that they should be organised. Experience so far indicates that many small local groups often dissolve after the aid workers depart, or the funds are stopped.

The role of the NGOs and the image of developing countries

This model implicitly assumes that there is a state to make demands of. This assumption is baseless. Many states still fight to justify their supremacy, indeed their sovereignty over other institutions - especially ethnic groups and religious societies. The principle of state sovereignty over competing domestic institutions, which emerged in European state theory and political practice in the 18th century, is not accepted in all developing countries. Thus there is no consensus on what constitutes the national arena in which political conflicts over the power of the state can take place. Influential groups in society may not only question a particular government's right to govern. They question the legitimacy of any government to rule, since state formation itself is regarded as illegal or as an artificial construction.

The model of participation in the Report does not limit itself to furtherance of the ideal of a balance between the state and the society through the modification of the poverty of the state. "Local participation", "popular participation" and "active mobilisation" are presented as a means of establishing of counter-power for the "furtherance of political and social demands"(p. 89), to "disclose decisions that compromise the interests of the poor"(p. 89), and

to strengthen their "ability to further their interests"(p. 23). Hence, the objective is counter-power against the elite, the state and the interests of the bureaucracy. This popular participation is not seen in terms of possible stages in a process of national integration and consolidation. In the Report, "people" are interpreted opposing the state, and the organisations opposing state authority. The popular organisations are also collectors of deviating attitudes and actions in relation to the state, but still, as we shall see, agencies for participation in relation to aid. The importance of creating a national consensus concerning the basic rules of the game and the borders of the 'arena', recedes into the background in comparison with the conflict and counter-power perspective.

Few developing countries have established the strong, well-developed bureaucracy and state apparatus that Norway has, i.e. they lack the ability to counter the partial and limited interests of interest organisations. Nonetheless, the Norwegian government furthered a policy that at home it warned against and feared the consequences of. Populist ideas were very popular in parts of the Norwegian population, particularly during the seventies. However, it is surprising that the conservative coalition government during the eighties promoted an extreme populist strategy in the developing countries. It emphasised popular participation rather than bureaucratic professionalism. There is no trace of Weberian admiration of the national and state bureaucracies as institutions that can and should educate the self-interested people in "moral behaviour", or as potential negotiators and mediators between conflicting interests.

The Report did not discuss whether the poor in rural Africa or Asia might have demands, ideas or policy opinions that were in conflict with a sustainable, sound and just development of their society. Although the Norwegian population has experienced a rather long process of political socialisation, a high level of education and broad access to information, claims of "lack of national responsibility" and "group politics" are the Norwegian state's main arguments against interest organisations in Norway. In developing countries, where the discourse about common

interests, either on a state or a class-based level, is often undeveloped, the Norwegian state did not acknowledge that this problem exists.

To support the development of representative parliamentary democracy was not a priority objective in the Report. On the contrary, it encouraged ignoring national assemblies and governments in order to enter into direct cooperation with organised interests. Thus, organisations in society might be strengthened at the expense of representative democracy at state level. As a general model this vision of democracy is incompatible with parliamentarism, which per se is indirect and representative. The perspective of the strategy was of course not against parliamentarism, rather the contrary, but the difficult and important relation between direct and indirect democracy was represented in such a way as to make direct democracy the most important method of democratising society.

It was "primary democracy", and not the "committee democracy" or representative democracy that was presented as the Norwegian state's ideal for the developing countries. Little is said about aid for the development of national institutions, and not a word about helping the economic and administrative problems of national assemblies. The general attitude indicates that the ideal lies closer to Rousseau: The legitimate authority is the peoples' when assembled for deliberation. Where he talked about city state, the Report's focus was rural rather than urban, or aimed at the village rather than the city.

But, based on recent historical experience, under what conditions does a society have "sufficient" participation to maintain a level of democracy without introducing sources of cleavage which may undermine both the cohesion of society and the little democracy that exists? The belief that a very high level of participation is always good for democracy has proved to be invalid. The problem is much more complicated than the Report made it out to be, and the role of the NGOs is therefore also more complex. If the claim that lack of fundamental "primary consensus" is one of Africa's most important problems is still true, how could NGOs operate?

The role of the NGOs and the image of aid

Furthermore, the slogan "popular participation" has an important limitation in relation to aid itself. "Participation" means taking part in. In the Report this is implicitly defined as taking part in the donors' activities. The mobilisation of the population is necessary for the recipients to feel responsibility for the projects. The method is not intended to create counter-power, nor is it indicated that the power of the donors should be shared with, or taken over by, the local people or the recipient state. The picture painted is a scenario of the aid administrators and the local population "hand in hand" as a counter-power to the national bureaucracy and state administration. In consequence the Report allots the aid bureaucracy, as opposed to the national bureaucracy, solid attention as a party to the case rather than an impartial expert. The strategy is not against the state as such, since the donor state is benevolent but the recipient state less so, and therefore can and should be circumvented.

This model creates a problem of accountability that is left without consideration. It is generally acknowledged that an important problem in many developing countries' democratic evolution is to establish a political-administrative system and a political culture that make the bureaucracy and administration accountable to the people. The direct cooperation between the aid organisations and the local NGOs can easily create a structure that is characterised by lack of accountability. This collaboration between aid experts and bureaucrats that report to another country and local interest groups will make it difficult to establish the accountability of various actors in policy articulation and formation. The Report adopted a policy where informal responsibility might deviate radically from factual responsibility. The model did not consider that experts may stand on the outside of the formal government of the state, at the same time as they actually govern.

It is claimed that an organisational society breeds "Organisation Man". The Report seems to reflect Organisation Man's recipe for democratisation and development, irrespective of whether the recipients live in an

organisational society or in a "traditional" rural village where formal organisations are not part of that tradition. The problem is not regarded as very relevant, because the aid channel will overcome these limitations, as time goes by.

Report No. 51 (1991-92)

To what extent were these perspectives carried forward into the 1990s? Report to the Storting No. 51 (1991-92) paid much more attention to support of the state and state institutions. Only three and a half page in a document of 279 pages dealt specifically with NGO support, although the channel was responsible for more than 25 % of Norwegian bilateral aid. In many ways the Report represented a shift of orientation and emphasis in a more "state-friendly" direction. On the other hand the Report argued that a challenge for the 1990s would be to handle the ongoing redistribution of tasks between the public and private sectors. The government declared that, in this situation, the "NGOs may enter an even more important role" (p. 235). At the same time it was of great importance for this new role to be "integrated into the authorities' administration". The organisations in the cooperating countries are described as "channels for support to increased pluralism, strengthened democracy and the defence of human rights". It was emphasized that "local and regional organisations will be central in this respect".

The role of Norwegian NGOs

The Report further stated that the government wished "to underline the important and positive role" played by Norwegian NGOs in Norwegian aid, and that it would uphold "an orderly and close relationship" with them. Cooperation with the NGOs "must build on their popular and voluntary character, at the same time as their integrity and peculiarity must be respected". The "complementary" role that NGOs could play in relation to state-to-state aid and multilateral aid was emphasised. It also stressed that the standards of competence expected of Norwegian aid in general should apply to the NGOs as well.

The work of the NGOs "must be related to our

total aid to a singular country or a single region". It was underlined as "desirable" that the NGOs' work aimed at "priority groups and sectors" in overall Norwegian aid strategy. The Government also welcomed the organisations as a "more active part of Norwegian aid cooperation, and suggested that the NGOs should be a part of the dialogue in the planning and follow-up of Norwegian aid". The NGOs role as what were called "listening posts" (this has nothing to do with espionage, the term notwithstanding. The word describes the NGOs' potential role as organisations that can inform the public about living conditions in the "South") was described as "particularly valuable" in imparting knowledge, and in the promotion of positive attitudes among the Norwegian public concerning Norwegian development aid. There is reason to give the organisations a considerable part of the credit for the fact that a large majority of Norwegians have a positive attitude to aid (p.236). Their "considerable experience" is also underlined, and the Government invites them to put more emphasis on the transfer of experience and knowledge, and cooperate with each other.

NGOs also represent another channel for state money, because of their "well-developed network in important disaster- and conflict-ridden areas". The government underlines that it regards it as positive that several organisations were "developing strategies that entail a more integrated view of the two kinds of aid", because this would "contribute to ensuring that acute emergency efforts are followed up by long-term development programmes, intended to prevent new catastrophes" (p.239). The Norwegian NGOs are clearly not seen as adversaries in a zero-sum game, but as useful instruments in the donor state's policy, underlining the need for "complementarity" in aid efforts (p.235-236).

NGOs, states and the "new paradigm"

The Report implicitly distances itself from the "new policy paradigm" although it has taken some crucial terms from it. It explicitly rejects the general "assault on the state" by focusing on the need for state building in developing countries, while at the same time employing a political language that borrows some

fundamental concepts furthered by the "new paradigm". The report underlines that it is important to assess the character of the organisations. It argues that a "rise in the tendency of people to organise within society is a prerequisite for the evolution and consolidation of a democratic system. The indigenous NGOs in developing countries are particularly important in this respect". But efforts should be geared towards "strengthening a broad popular organisational activity" and support for NGOs is to be given on "the condition that the organisations have a broad and solid basis in the population". The trade-union movement is described as particularly important in "defending human rights and in the development of democracy". The development of NGOs will happen "through a process that emerges from 'below', i.e. through the population itself". However, it is most "important that the authorities in developing countries stimulate this process. Not only must the freedom of opinion and expression, and the freedom to organise, be secured, but the public administration must develop a system that properly incorporates the opinions of the organisations in civil society" (p. 216).

On the other hand, the Norwegian government underlines the importance of the state in recipient countries. Relations with recipient governments "are essential in any kind of development effort", and it "has been an important principle for Norwegian aid that it should be recipient-oriented. This means that such aid should be included in the recipient country's plans and priorities" (this is historically not correct, but it underlines the change of direction). The Report criticises the fact that "donors have in many cases started to operate alongside the national administration", because it is important that the countries themselves "take responsibility for their own development, both when it comes to planning and implementation. Integrating development efforts in the countries' own plans is the only way to ensure that the recipient countries' authorities obtain control over their own development, and that they take responsibility for the choices that they make" (see p.220-221).

Conclusion

The strategy of Report No. 36 (1984-85) was very "pro-NGO", allocating them an important role in social, economic and political developments, not as representatives of "civil society" against the state, but rather as representatives of the people, perhaps in opposition and perhaps not in opposition to the state. The important point was who and what these organisations represented, not that they formed part of a "privatization" policy, a strengthening of the "third sector" or of a communitarian movement. It had few links to the new "paradigm" of the 1990s.

Report to the Storting No. 51 (1991-92) was influenced by the "new" paradigm in some core terms. It distanced itself from the dichotomous perspective inherent in the new "paradigm" and underlined the importance of strengthening the state and the state's responsibility for strengthening the organisations in society. The Report has few linkages to the "zero-sum" perspective inherent in the paradigm. The NGOs are described not as saviours or as a leading force in an associational revolution but as important actors within a national strategy formulated by the recipient government. At the same time a number of positive and general characteristics are attributed to NGOs, as if they, as a group, have important comparative advantages to other sectors or institutions in society. At the same time the Report is clear, in comparison with the Report from 1984, about what is meant by good, supportable organisations.

The effect of Norwegian NGOs and the activities of the Norwegian state in influencing future organisational societies and cultures, should not be underestimated. Norway is the main funder of hundreds of organisations in several developing countries, and some of these organisations play very important political, economic and religious roles in these societies. The NGO sector is probably one of the areas in which the effect of aid is the more lasting, for better or worse. The manner in which the organisational landscape developed has played an important role in Norway's history. With the assistance of aid there has been an explosion in the establishment of organisations in many

recipient countries. There is a growing gap between the actual role of the NGO channel in aid, and the attention it is paid in official policy documents. Relationships between these organisations and the state, the concept of group interests versus national interests, their role in establishing particular welfare systems, their importance for creating civic moral norms, etc. will have consequences well into the future. The Norwegian strategy for this sector has been a mixture of different traditions - as it has been for most other donor countries.¹

This analysis may demonstrate the difficulties of a small donor state in formulating a comprehensive and operational strategy for the field, enmeshed in ideology as it has been and in a period during which the NGOs are said to be spearheading an associational revolution.

NORAD'S SEARCH FOR AN NGO STRATEGY

NORAD support for Norwegian NGOs

Main findings: NORAD has played a very important role in mobilising Norwegian organisations to take part in development assistance. For some years, NORAD has been developing a comprehensive policy for administering Norwegian NGOs. NORAD has not had a strategy which has enabled the development of a "Norwegian profile", regarding political relations between NORAD, the Norwegian NGOs and the governments of the cooperating countries. NORAD has not managed to implement the stated policy of closer cooperation with Norwegian NGOs in the cooperating countries, partly because of capacity problems, necessary administrative hierarchical structures in NORAD, the history of Norwegian NGO involvement and the impact of other donors. A growing problem for NORAD is that there is no formulated long-term policy for distribution of efforts between Norwegian NGOs and Southern NGOs or between NORAD and Norwegian NGOs in support of Southern NGOs. The present practice is partly a result of ad hoc policies, and partly a result of NORAD's strong desire to establish its own local NGO channel at the end of the 1970s, a channel which has since

been gradually enlarged. NORAD has some important formulations in the new guidelines (regarding the neutrality paragraph and the universalism of Norwegian NGO policies) which should be withdrawn or reformulated.

This section will deal with how NORAD has conceived of and managed its cooperation with Norwegian NGOs - especially in questions of coordination versus organisational independence. Special focus will be put on the role of the neutrality paragraph which is seen as an effort to reconcile a "rule-oriented" state bureaucracy with the more "value-oriented" NGOs.²

*A short history.*³

The Storting debated support for Norwegian NGOs for the first time in 1962. At that time nobody talked about a separate channel or a need to create a separate public institution to administer it. Norsk Utviklingshjelp, NORAD's forerunner, was at that time given a modest task: to "establish contact with and joint consultations between institutions, organisations and private persons in the field" (quoted in Tvedt 1992:24). Coordination was regarded as neither necessary nor useful, since only a handful of organisations were potential actors.⁴ The first political-administrative guidelines for NGO support were finalized by Norsk Utviklingshjelp on August 17, 1962.⁵ The political breakthrough came with Report to the Storting, no. 36 (1984-85), presented by the Christian-Conservative coalition government and the newly established Ministry of Development Cooperation. In this report support for NGOs was given a separate chapter, and their role and potential in development aid were described in very positive terms. The last Report to the Storting, no. 51 (1991-92), presented by a Labour government, generally supported by existing policies for the NGO channel and their role in development, but paid it less attention. Its most important point in this context, was that, contrary to other reports to the Storting, it underlined the need for coordination with NORAD policies, and the potential of NGOs as a channel for the Foreign Ministry in emergency situations and in the promotion of human rights.

Support for Norwegian NGOs started in 1963,⁶ and until the establishment of the NGO Division in NORAD in 1978 and the explosion in support in the 1980s, they played a marginal role. Allocations from the NGO Division in 1981 to NGOs made up about three % of total Norwegian aid, while in the early 1990s it was about seven %. In 1981 the percentage of NGO-support was 5.6 % of total bilateral aid while in 1991 it had risen to 11.1 %. NORAD has therefore gradually given more support to NGOs. The bulk of their funds, however, comes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that is why a focus on NORAD alone is insufficient if the real role of the NGOs is to be analysed (see section on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). If these funds are taken into account, NGOs today channel about 25 % of Norwegian bilateral assistance. While development aid was something of a "state monopoly" in the 1960s, parts of it have become "privatized" in the 1990s. The overall aid budget has been reduced during the last few years, but support for NGOs has continued to increase. The rapid and continued growth of the NGO channel has therefore caused dramatic changes in the profile of Norwegian aid in general.

NORAD has generally shown a positive and benevolent attitude to Norwegian NGOs, and they are now managing relations with a very heterogeneous Norwegian NGO scene. What started as a very modest initiative has also changed relations between Norway and many developing countries. Norwegian organisations are working in about 100 countries with financial support from the state. In some countries this support is without relevance from a foreign policy perspective. In 1991, Norwegian NGOs worked in 22 countries where only one Norwegian NGO was present, and they often had modest projects. In other areas they have played, and are playing, important roles. For instance, the most important long-term consequence of NORAD support for Ethiopia has most likely been that Norwegian NGOs have been a crucial force in the build-up of a strong Lutheran minority Church in Ethiopia, thus establishing a new religious force in Coptic Ethiopia⁷, but this is a goal which was not planned by NORAD at all. The increase in activities, project loads and areas of operation has, obviously, put strain on NORAD's ability to monitor and control how

state funds are used.

In 1991, NORAD supported 12 Norwegian NGOs in Bangladesh, 18 in Nicaragua, 12 in Ethiopia and 16 in Zimbabwe.⁸ Not all were implementing organisations, but the number can indicate activity level. Support came to about NOK 200 million in that year alone. In addition came the organizations' own funds. In Nicaragua, for example, with an estimated GDP per capita of USD 1,497 in 1990 (UNDP 1993:136) and a 1989 population of 3.7 million (World Resources 1988-89:246), NOK 400 million in NGO support between 1979 and 1986 might or might not have been important for the development of the country (see case study on Nicaragua), but it was certainly a visible manifestation of Norwegian presence. In Eritrea the presence of the Norwegian NGOs and Norwegian state support through NGOs have had a rather high profile.⁹ Likewise, in parts of Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Zimbabwe, NGOs supported by the Norwegian state have been important local, regional or national actors. NORAD has gradually had to face a situation in which NGOs are not only marginal implementors of projects, but also play important political roles.

In Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe Norwegian NGOs support or cooperate with more than 50 local NGOs, also financed by NORAD (see questionnaire I, 1994). This means that in these four countries about 100 organisations are working with money from the Norwegian state¹⁰. The Norwegian Government has never had an accurate overview of either the number or the range of organisations. The official figures on money disbursed are therefore unreliable, because reports from NORAD representations and from Norwegian NGOs have not been very accurate.

A main point in this report is that while support has increased very substantially, the Government and the state did not have a clear strategy for the role of NGOs in development. Basically the attitude has remained, when it has come to planning and coordination, as when the NGOs were a marginal supplement to state-to-state aid. However, in the meantime they have become a main channel of aid and an important foreign

policy institution, sometimes conceived of in the developing countries as acting on behalf of the Norwegian state.

Coordination and the complementary role

Governments and Storting regarded the NGO channel until 1991-92 as being of varying importance, but basically as something "apart" from Norwegian aid in general. The NGOs were to be free to work wherever they wished and within whatever sector they preferred, as long as they fulfilled the more administratively focused requirements. They were seen as a "global channel", in the sense that the NGOs (and UN-funds) were a kind of counterweight to NORAD's more concentrated state-to-state aid to selected recipient countries.

Report no. 51 (1991-92) had a more ambitious but also more ambiguous policy: on the one hand what was clearly seen as a fragmentation of Norwegian aid was to be reduced (The following examples could have been used: Norway was supporting projects in the same country via NORAD, various UN systems and NGOs without any efforts at coordination. Similarly NORAD and MFA were supporting the same international organisations, without knowing that five different state offices had funded the same organisation, while some organisations fattened themselves and exploited this lack of coordination (see section on international NGOs).¹¹ Complementarity and even coordination between NGOs and NORAD were therefore suggested.¹² On the other hand, the Storting has set out a policy that underlines the autonomy of Norwegian NGOs, and that all NGOs are to be treated in the same way by NORAD. NORAD has been caught between these two policy signals and a gradually stronger NGO community.

In line with what was regarded as the dominant policy signals and NORAD's new strategy The NGO Division attempted, first to push for stronger concentration and coordination. While NORAD in September 1994 describes its policy as a "responsive program",¹³ in 1990 and 1991 the language was somewhat different. The Report to the Storting No. 51 (1991-92)

underlined the need for concentrating on main cooperating countries. In the Phase I report it was shown that the concentration goal had already been achieved, when the government and NORAD first asked for it. In 1991, 66.5 % of NORAD's NGO support went to the concentration areas for Norwegian assistance, while the percentage in 1981 was 37.4 %. PFK and the NGO Division had discovered the same, and NORAD declared openly that "geographical concentration" was not an issue, because by and large it had already been achieved. Reactions to NORAD's initiatives had demonstrated that this discovery was also convenient.

Efforts at concentration have been counteracted by at least two opposing forces. The Phase I report discussed how this focus on geographic concentration, in long-term development work, might contradict the Foreign Ministry's emphasis on NGOs as channels for aid in emergency situations and regarding human-rights issues. Recent developments in the Middle East and in Yugoslavia have proved this. In 1993, for example, support for NGOs in Yugoslavia came to NOK 172,853,000 (12.4 % of the total NGO allocation). It had become the most important country in regard to NGO assistance, while it was not an area in which Norwegian NGOs worked at all in 1991. NORAD also faced vested interests. When they tried to reduce their engagement in Mali through Norwegian NGOs, the proposal had to be withdrawn as a result of effective political lobbying from the organisations established there.

NORAD also initially worked for closer complementarity and integration of sector priorities. An analysis of the programme aims and project profile and goals of all the Norwegian NGOs,¹⁴ shows the proximity in aims and project profile between the NGOs and NORAD. If the DAC-sector categories are used the same general picture emerges. The same conclusion is confirmed by data registered in the survey on the organisations working in the four countries selected. NORAD and the Norwegian NGOs have given assistance to more or less the same sectors, although the NGOs have naturally shown less interest in industry, banking etc. But this "sameness" does not imply that there is neither coordination nor complementarity,

although it may be possible to report that "complementarity" has been established (see case study on NORAD support in Zimbabwe). There have been few concerted efforts at creating an overall Norwegian profile and coherent assistance in a given country (except in the Middle East and Gaza, after the Peace Agreement). When NORAD now has since concluded that "complementarity" is sufficient or that "fragmentation" is a lesser problem than originally believed, this does not imply that any changes have taken place. The main difference is that basically, the reality that in 1990-91 was described as "fragmented", is now described as "complementary".

The role of the NGO Division is basically restricted to assessments of what are called "quality criteria", i.e. to secure what are defined as the efficiency and sustainability of NGO work. The NGO Division has time and again felt the need to distance itself from ideas about coordination and closer cooperation, in order to reduce "fear" and distrust among NGOs. Even hints of greater coordination have met strong opposition from vocal NGOs. By effective lobbying, questions have been brought to the Minister for Development Cooperation in the Storting. The coordination signals given in Report to the Storting No. 51 (1991-92), have been reduced in practice to a) dialogue about experiences, b) cooperating in main cooperating countries in which common interests are identified, c) NORAD has contracted some organisations to perform specific projects.

The criterion of geographical concentration is not always followed; NHO got support for a project for managers training in China in 1994 while the Norwegian Lutheran Mission did not, the latter with the argument that NORAD was sceptical towards going into new areas.¹⁵ Policy has in general been implemented via discussions on general issues such as overall aid profile, reporting systems, etc. This communication has been facilitated through two newly instituted meetings; "policy meetings" and "country meetings". Their stated purpose is to involve the NGOs more actively in the discussions and debates on Norwegian development policy in general and aid to individual countries in particular; i.e. to generate "awareness" about

strategic thinking.

To what extent does the present policy represent an optimal balance between the organisations' need for autonomy and identity, and the state's need for efficient use of the aid budget? To what extent does it express national traditions and established institutional structures and relations? These questions cannot easily be answered.

It is possible, however, to identify a number of factors which have hindered the implementation of the policy spelled out in Report no. 51 (1991-92). It seems that NORAD has not had the power or the capacity to achieve coordination, partly because of its own organisational set-up and partly because of historical legacies and resistance from NGOs.

The history of NGO activities tends to hamper coordination and complementarity. The present NGO profile was basically laid down when NGO activities were influenced by the strategy proposed in Report to the Storting No. 36 (1984-85), which paid little or no attention to coordination, either with Norwegian state policy or with the policy of the recipient governments.

A case study: Bangladesh

Some short stories that focus on some important factors behind some of the Norwegian NGOs' involvement and profile of work in Bangladesh may indicate the heterogeneity of the Norwegian NGO channel, and the difficulties involved in trying to make a "profile" out of it in the short run. This landscape is not different from organisational landscapes in other countries. First a short general description.

Bangladesh is among the countries that has received the largest parts of the grants in the "Privorg." budgets over the years.

Total support via Norwegian and local organisations has increased from NOK 9.9 million in 1981 to NOK 33.372 million in 1993. The relative share allocated to Bangladesh has decreased. This is mostly due to a more even spread of these grants to other countries. Of NOK 33 mill NOK in 1992, 11 mill went to six

Norwegian NGOs, and 22 mill was allocated to local NGOs. The number of Norwegian NGOs receiving grants from the Norwegian government has varied over the years.

NORAD has not made any plans for the incorporation of the Norwegian NGOs into a single Norwegian strategy for Bangladesh. Information on NGO activity is not therefore easy to compile. It does not seem that NORAD has a total and adequate overview of all the Norwegian-sponsored activities which would enable it to assess and create such overall strategies.¹⁶

The *Norwegian Bangladesh Association* was established when Bangladesh became independent. It started as a solidarity organisation. In 1992 they cared for 650 "fadder-children" in six schools in Bangladesh. Those who supported it paid NOK 1,000 annually directly to the child and NOK 200 to cover administration. The support is given to children without parents. They say: "It is both more committing and inspiring to give support to one individual child instead of collectively to one or another association". All work on the Board of the organisation is voluntary. Even travel to Bangladesh is financed privately by members of the Board. They applied for support for annual inspection missions to Bangladesh, but this was rejected by NORAD. (*Fadderkontakten*, 2, 12, 1990).

Food for the Hungry International Norway gave for a period support to mother and children at the children's hospital in Shishu, Dakha. The NGO was established in 1984 and after some years the project was terminated. They started their work there for the same accidental reasons as they ended it - so in 1992 they were not in Bangladesh any longer.

Norwegian Housewives Association started its work because "Finnmark krets", a local group in the very north of Norway, in 1982 heard about CARE's work for poor women in the countryside north of Dhaka. The group decided to support this work and contributed NOK 18,000. Since then they have been told about the project from representatives from CARE, Norway" (*Norges husmorforbund, Engasjement i utviklingsland*,

1990: 21).¹⁷ Another group has had contact for some years with "Shallows Thanapara" and sold their fine handicrafts in member groups" (*Norges husmorforbund, Engasjement i utviklingsland*, 1990: 21).¹⁸ An aim has been to inform the Norwegian population about the country. In their annual report for 1989 they say that they sold goods from developing countries for NOK 135 174 at meetings of the organisation (*Årsmelding 1989, Utvalget for internasjonale oppgaver*). This NGO obtained NOK 200,000 for information activities in 1990, in addition to NOK 68 000 earmarked for a studytour for three participants for three weeks in Asia.

Norwegian Red Cross had at the end of the last decade, a project called "Disaster Preparedness Assessment for the League, the Cyclone Preparedness & Development Programme". The aim was to help to build up the catastrophe preparedness of the Bangladesh Red Crescent". In 1990 the budget was NOK 4.8 million. Their aim in many countries has been to build up regional and national Red Cross or Red Crescent societies. The aim of this particular project was to build 500 shelters together with International Red Cross that could act as a combination of shelters/platforms for use in floods and as "samfunnshus". The long-term aim was to make it possible for these shelters to be used for more joint purposes, in such a way that activities in the local community could be developed. ("Forslag til handlingsprogram 1990 for Norges Røde Kors"). In 1992 the project was suddenly stopped, due to problems of local corruption.

With money from the TV-campaign in 1989, CARE and Norwegian Housewives Association have introduced what they call promising activities in the Rasjahi district. Women "recruited among the poorest of the poor of the rural population attend a three-year course with leader-training and health, hygiene and agricultural training. Many are also helped to form savings and credit groups. Altogether 100 000 women have taken part in the program in 1990-91. 6,000 of them attended the leader-training which enables them to organise rural women and continue the work on their own. Experience shows that they succeed (CARE Norge, 1990-1991. *Årsmelding*:5).¹⁹

The immediate background to why Pastor Strømme's Minnestiftelse started up its work in Bangladesh was the personal contacts that a missionary son, at that time General Secretary of the organisation, had with the leaders of the Bangladesh Northern Evangelical Lutheran Church (BNELC) and with Norwegian Santal Mission. The aim was to start local development projects in cooperation with local churches. His contacts led to the establishment of BNELC Development Foundation in 1986. When Norsk Barnefond went bankrupt, Strømmestiftelsen took over a project they had in cooperation with the church and started in north Bangladesh, in the Rangpur/Dinajpur area, "because church affiliations and contacts were in this area" (ibid.)²⁰

In 1990 they established a regional office in Dhaka. Sixteen of more than 70 projects are in Bangladesh. Pastor Strømme's Minnestiftelse has 13 partner organisations in Bangladesh (questionnaire IV). Six are called humanitarian organisations while seven are Christian churches/organisations. This NGO will continue to work in Bangladesh, they say, because there are many "efficient NGOs and Christian cooperating partners there" (ibid.). The aim is formulated in secular language: "to educate and make tribal peoples more visible, to strengthen the consciousness of poor people, to teach the poor to read and write, and empowerment" (ibid.)²¹

The Strømme Memorial Foundation is not an implementing organisation in Bangladesh, but supports other local organisations, churches etc. They work on income generation, literacy, credit schemes, education and consciousness. The main focus is development of human beings through education, literacy and consciousness. A good example here is a programme run in cooperation with the Norwegian sponsored Worldview International Foundation to campaign against blindness through improved nutrition and raised public consciousness.

Another project to be mentioned is the development programme for river nomads in the Kurigram/Rangpur area. This programme aims to raise living standards and the prevention of human catastrophes during the floods of

Brahmaputra and Jamuna. It combines the "consciousness raising", health, nutrition, women, income generation, education for poor families and flood prevention. The main focus is on educating committees of volunteers and assisting them for future coordination of these activities.

NABP started in 1976 without previous knowledge of or contacts in the country. They came to the country because they knew there were many eye diseases there. It was, as it reads in the documents from NABP, on "all lips" after the war. Until 1992 this was an important country for the organisation. Since then, its budgets have been reduced, partly because of internal disagreements about the training of the project, and partly because the big learning center at the outskirts of Dhaka gradually is becoming a government project. The largest project is called "National complex for special education" and is in cooperation with the government of Bangladesh. The projects concentrate on supporting individuals such as blind orphans living in childrens' homes, and supports building schools for the blind. Essential to both types of activities is the strengthening of competence of teachers and other adults working with blind children.

Norwegian Church Aid started its work as early as 1969 when the then general secretary Elias Berge contacted the local church council after the hurricane catastrophe that year. The local church council and its ability to work with emergency aid was very weak, and it agreed that NCA should send several medical teams of doctors and nurses. A country office was established in 1970. After the end of the war, NCA became heavily involved in the rehabilitation of refugees. NCA has ever since been present in Bangladesh, and has rendered assistance in all the major floods and catastrophes in addition to working on long-term development schemes. The main cooperative partners have been the National Christian Council of Bangladesh and local projects in charge of the Lutheran World Federation. LWF is working through local church structures: NCCB and the Christian Commission for Development in Bangladesh and its own local establishment: Rangpur Dinajpur Rural Service.

These projects are located in poor areas that are liable to flood. Activities are: education of women, family planning, income generation, agriculture, literacy, health, communication, and small-scale industries. More than 400,000 people have been reached during the past five years in these projects via LWF and NCCB.

As has been shown these organisations have different histories, profiles and partners. NORAD has not come up with a clear idea about what "coordination" or "complementarity" mean in such situations.

Between 1.1.1992 and 1.9.1993 one meeting with all Norwegian organisations working in the country was held. Relations with NORAD, Dhaka, have generally been good for most of the organisations, while other organisations have had very little to do with the representation. The point is that the relationship has been of a "non-strategic" nature.

A case study: Nicaragua

The special history of Norwegian development assistance to Nicaragua has affected the relationship between Norwegian NGOs and NORAD. Unlike the situation in most other countries, where NGO support only gradually increased relative to government support, Norwegian aid to Nicaragua since its start in 1979, after the Sandinist revolution and until 1984 was only channelled via Norwegian NGOs. Only in 1984 did state-to-state cooperation start. In the period 1979 to 1986 total support amounted to NOK 215 mill., of which more than 90% was channelled via Norwegian private organisations. (Country strategy: Norwegian development cooperation with Nicaragua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993: 36)

A new Norwegian policy for Nicaragua was outlined in Report to the Storting no.34 (1986-87), presented by the Labour government. Nicaragua was given the status of special "cooperative country" in its relation to Norway, and became a "programme country" with a NORAD representation in 1988. The Norwegian government established the representation in Managua at a time when the Sandinist regime

was struggling to survive the American economic blockade and in the civil war with the American-supported Contras. Norwegian NGOs heavily campaigned for this reorientation, especially the Norwegian Labour Union and Norwegian Peoples' Aid, both organisations with close ties to the Labour party. (The new minister of Development Cooperation, Vesla Vetlesen, was a former head of the development department in Norwegian Peoples' Aid.) The presence of the Norwegian NGOs in Nicaragua clearly influenced state-to-state aid to Nicaragua.

The important role of the NGOs continued: The country report states that total official support to NGOs in the period 1987 to 1992 came to NOK 174 mill., of which 4.3 mill. was allocated to local organisations over the two last years, i.e. 1991-1992. (Op.cit. p.41). These amounts however, are not correct, as the total grants via NGOs are much larger (see statistical appendix). This is due to the many allocations dispersed over various other budget items: The "Regional schemes" are projects in charge of regional NGO, like CATIE and INCAE. "Special grants" cover two purposes: environment and women, where most of the money is allocated to Nicaraguan NGOs. Grants to "Natural disasters" and "Refugees" are channelled via Norwegian NGOs. In addition many of the Norwegian peace corps workers work with and assist local private organisations. And even the "Multi-bi" grants, via UNFPA, FAO and UNICEF, in certain cases are channelled to Nicaraguan or regional NGOs. Thus the NGO share of the total NORAD budget for Nicaragua is significantly greater than officially stated. In 1987-1992 at least NOK 250 mill. was channelled through Norwegian and local NGOs. If we add NOK 150 mill. (of the total 215) for 1979 to 1986 a total of about NOK 400 mill. NOK has been channelled via NGOs, mostly Norwegian, to Nicaragua since 1979. These make up 1/3 of the total NOK 1200 mill. granted over the whole period. In 1987-1990 Norway gave 13% of the total official bilateral aid to Nicaragua. In this context, support via the Norwegian NGOs was not insignificant.

Another feature that affected the relations between the Norwegian NGOs and NORAD is the different activity profile. Whereas Norwegian government assistance has mostly

been confined to direct financial aid or sending fishery equipment and fertilizers, the NGOs, with Norwegian personnel, have been engaged in schemes for refugees and natural disasters and many social programmes. The Norwegian NGOs have basically used their own personnel in these projects, as opposed to working through local partners. Seen from the point of view of Nicaraguans, in the overwhelming majority of cases the visible Norwegian presence in Nicaragua has been represented by Norwegian NGOs. The importance of Norwegian NGOs in financial terms and as "representatives" of Norway has overshadowed that of the NORAD office.

Another aspect of the Norwegian development policy for Nicaragua is the clear shift from support for the state and its institutions under the Sandinistas, to support for private institutions, organisations, parastatels and firms under the new government. Norwegian NGOs have been working with the state since 1979, but have also shifted partners since 1990. At the same time NORAD started to support local NGOs, and allocated 4.3 mill. NOK in the two following years. This privatization policy has been a deliberate attempt by the new Nicaraguan government to come to terms with international banking institutions. Norwegian support to local NGOs is declared to be support for the process of democratization. Another scheme which pulls in the same direction is the Norwegian-supported institution CORNAP. This is a government institution responsible for the privatisation of the Nicaraguan government's business enterprises. The Norwegian support is channelled via UNDP. The general direction of the Norwegian support to Nicaragua since 1990 is mostly in the same direction: privatisation of social services and economic life in combination with a scaling-down of state activities. In this overall sense there is coordination.

The NORAD representation was established in Managua 10 years after the first Norwegian NGOs. The NGOs were instrumental in the political process when Norway changed its policy on Nicaragua, and were considered as playing a vital role in Norwegian development cooperation with the country. Thus, as a result of this process, the Norwegian parliament decided

to earmark at least NOK 20 mill. annually to projects implemented by Norwegian NGOs in Nicaragua, starting in 1987. This strong presence of Norwegian NGOs in Nicaragua at the time of establishment of the NORAD representation was one important factor that had to be incorporated in the Norwegian policy from the very start. The political backing for the presence of these NGOs at home in Norway was a guarantee of their continued strong role.

The first NORAD 3-year country programme for Nicaragua (1988-1990) assigns two totally different roles to the Norwegian NGOs compared to NORAD's engagement. (Country programme for Nicaragua: 1988-1990. Ministry of Development Cooperation, 1988.) The NGOs were heavily involved in several large projects of a longterm character in fisheries, agriculture, health services, education and rural development. NORAD therefore did not engage in such projects, but rather supported the more general economic development of the country. This included gifts of goods and capital inputs for agriculture (fertilizers) and fisheries (boats, equipment etc.) in addition to technical aid and Peace Corps support. A clearcut division of work was undertaken, regarding both sectors and areas, i.e. the state accommodated the NGOs in the sense that they would do what the Norwegian NGOs not already had started with. No need for cooperation was therefore felt.

This first policy paper from 1988 explicitly states that these two roles are complementary, and as long as these organisations showed competence and capacity: "... there would be no need for any active linkage between the country programme and the private organisations' schemes." (Op.cit.p.28) As a future task for the NORAD representation however, it was suggested that there might be need for better knowledge of local organisations, if they were to apply for support. (NORAD started direct funding of Nicaraguan NGOs in 1990, according to the country strategy from 1993, but some organisations were given support both in 1987, 1988 and 1989.)

The country plan vaguely stated the areas of Norwegian NGO operation. Their number is not given until the next plan for 1989-1991. Then it

was stated that there were 20 in 1989 (Country programme: Nicaragua, 1989-1991. Ministry of Development Cooperation, 1988: 18) This second plan wished to invite the NGOs to cooperate more active by within their special fields in order to strengthen the bilateral activities of NORAD. (Op.cit. p.19) But no further action to that effect was taken.

An initiative was taken to map the landscape of the local NGOs for future cooperation. The NGO Division in Oslo, was brought into the process in this connection. Nicaraguan NGOs were to be treated on equal terms with other NGOs. The office then initiated a study to undertake this mapping.

The report pointed to several questions which were implicit in NGO state relations in Nicaragua as contrasted with the Norwegian policy. The first point was the apparent contradiction in the fact that the Norwegian policy aimed at strengthening the development of democratization, i.e. civil society, pluralism etc. This was also the official ideology behind the support for Norwegian NGOs at that time. 70 % of Norwegian NGO support to Nicaragua was, however, channelled to what were aptly called Nicaraguan state institutions (Op.cit.:3)

The second question raised was the issue of "neutrality": In a country as highly politicised as Nicaragua - what should be NORAD's policy in its support for NGOs? Support the opposition? Support government/Sandinist-related organisations under an NGO cover? Was "neutrality" even a possible option? How to render such support without being accused of "interfering in internal political matters? The report pointed to some experiences and reflections of the Dutch NGO NOVIB.

Third issue raised by the report was related to second question. The report argued that NORAD's administrative, technical and political competence and capacity were not satisfactory in the face of such a task. The new policy of direct support for Nicaraguan organisations would require even stronger competence. It was not regarded as relevant and satisfactory to hire a secretary in a 1/2 position. Both NORAD/Oslo and Managua would need to seriously upgrade

their capacity and competence. The subsequent administrative and bureaucratic handling of this report in the Ministry mostly ignored the critical issues raised.

In all the later three-year country plans for Nicaragua (1990 to 1994) NORAD has stated that there is a need for strong co-ordination of total development aid to Nicaragua. This was supposed to take place in a forthcoming larger "country plan". In 1994 this plan has yet to appear. Individual competence at NORAD, Managua may have been more than sufficient, but shortages and rapid turn-over of staff, and staff having little knowledge of or connection with Norwegian aid strategies (in a period when Norwegian NGOs have had to reorient fundamental policies as a result of the change of government, and Nicaraguan NGOs are mushrooming and all the time knocking on NORAD's door asking for money) has led to a situation wherein NORAD, Oslo and NORAD, Managua, have both been channelling funds without really having time and capacity to sit down and analyse: according to what overall policy?

Conflicting loyalties

For the biggest NGOs NORAD has gradually become a less important partner. The new guidelines (in force from September 1994) state that short-term humanitarian assistance and pure charity works are outside NORAD's area of responsibility. When the biggest cooperating NGOs have become increasingly involved in emergency aid, and have other and perhaps "richer" donors than NORAD, they will, at least in situations where funds are more easily available elsewhere, show less inclination to fall in with NORAD policies.

NGOs and NORAD have been worried about the autonomy of the NGOs. The policy dialogue is putting new demands on the NGOs. Will the policy meetings and country meetings end up being fora for state control rather than an institutionalisation of the processes of collective learning? Some of the smaller NGOs are becoming increasingly critical of new directions in NORAD's policy. This emerged in September

1994 in relation to the debate on "information support". The new set of regulations requires that NORAD to attempt to protect the NGOs' integrity and distinctive identity. Both parties have experienced that there is a fine balance between integration/coordination/complementarity and autonomy. NORAD's declared intention of strengthening NGO autonomy, might restrain complementarity or coordination, while the intention of complementarity and coordination may erode autonomy. The historical irony, perhaps, is that the emphasis on autonomy and some sort of coordination emerged at the same time.

Administrative rigour, but what about policies?

Both aims notwithstanding, the policy issues are pursued with administrative rigour rather than political means. This reflects partly the way in which the NGO Division is organised: the officers are in charge of different organisations. They may be responsible for more than ten organisations (even close to twenty) working all over the world. Individual officers do not have the capacity or competence to discuss country-related policy questions. Furthermore, they may not necessarily know very much about the specifics of NORAD's country strategy in the different countries, not to mention the recipient government's policy. The historical relationship and actual links and conflicts between states and societies and types of organisations in the countries concerned are issues far beyond what the officers know or could know. For their part, the Country Offices do not have responsibility for planning complementarity with Norwegian NGOs. NORAD and the Norwegian NGOs have belonged to "separate worlds", while historically they have been living "in the same house" in Norway. To give the Country Offices more responsibility for overall planning and discussions with the recipient government and Norwegian NGOs on this issue, will come up against both the Norwegian political scene and administrative requirements in Norway (signing contracts, reporting on expenditures etc.). This implies that those within the NORAD system with competence have no administrative power, while those with administrative power have little competence (on this issue). Therefore - most

likely - the situation will more or less continue as it has been in the past, supposing that the administrative system remains unchanged.

The question is, therefore, whether the state has a clear and consistent policy when it comes to cooperation with Norwegian NGOs and their role in Norwegian assistance overall. PFK and the NGO Division have developed a method that might stimulate closer coordination in the long run, without having to decide on overall aims and strategies. They have stated that additional allocations will generally be used for priority areas. They have also established a system whereby NGOs, by finding tasks of common interest with NORAD, can be supported more generously than is normally the case.²² For instance: Redd Barna and NORAD can come together and discuss how rehabilitation of rural districts can be carried out in Mozambique, since both have this as a priority area. If this system of "invitations" becomes a success, there will be fewer funds for other areas, and thus a coordination of activities will take place over time.

The main problem seems, however, to have been a conceptual one, related to basic ideas about the NGOs and the state and relations between them. This can be demonstrated by an interesting example: Norway's policy vis-à-vis Eritrea.

MFA has decided that Norway shall have a coherent and comprehensive aid policy there. On the other hand it has been decided that Norwegian NGOs are to be the channel for such aid. The point here is not what is normal: that very modest efforts have been made to draw up something resembling a country analysis regarding society/state relations, that can increase the chances of efficient assistance to a country which Norway helped to independence (see Case Study on Emergency Relief Desk). To what extent is there a social base for a thriving NGO community in Eritrea (basically a peasant society with a very small and weak middle class), which as the Eritrean government officials say, are needed in the state apparatus since "for the first time since God created Eritrea the Eritreans are governing themselves". The affluent people are not educated people, but people who have enriched themselves through

trade, and there is therefore a situation in which the NGOs have either been religious organisations (as in the past) or might be cover organisations for ethnic mobilisation tomorrow. This might change if Eritreans in exile came back in large numbers. To what extent is it conducive to the development of Eritrea that foreign NGOs just come to Asmara and put themselves up as a government, with little time or competence for strategic planning?

What is interesting is that MFA has decided that the main actors should be Norwegian NGOs, while it lacks a policy for answering the following questions: how to coordinate them, who should be (if any) the lead agency, do they have the required competence, do they have a history in the country that is conducive to cooperation (NCA and Redd Barna were at loggerheads some years back) and perhaps most importantly: with whom should they cooperate? There can be no doubt that both NCA and Redd Barna have a good reputation in Eritrea. But to what extent does that constitute a policy?

The Eritrean government prefers state-to-state aid. They are sceptical of NGOs, not simply because the former EPLF leaders have "undemocratic ideas", etc., as for example NOVIB, a Dutch NGO, has criticized them for, but perhaps as much because of the delicate balancing act they have to perform in order to preserve the religious, ethnical and cultural unity of the country. The nine existing local NGOs are either government instruments or religious NGOs (Islamic, Lutheran, Coptic etc.).²³ If anything, the proposal is therefore not recipient oriented. And should NCA, the biggest Norwegian NGO in the country and with a good reputation after the ERD operation, be allowed to cooperate only with their most natural partners the Lutheran NGOs? What if all other donor countries followed the same policy? How long would Eritrea then remain a peaceful, independent country? Would MFA and NORAD demand that NCA also channelled funds and established partnership with an Islamic NGO? Would NCA be right or wrong in accepting that? And do the organisations possess relevant competence? Redd Barna presently has an experienced leader, who also knows Eritrea well. But what personnel would be required if they

were to pursue a child-centred strategy, which all programme documents now underline that they will do more than in the past, and should a child-centred NGO be responsible for Norwegian policy in a country? The problem is that the decisions to formulate a comprehensive and coherent Norwegian aid policy and to use Norwegian NGOs as the main channel have neglected a crucial point: the NGO's role in society and their relation to the state. MFA may regard the Norwegian NGOs as a risk-aversion channel in a country where the future is uncertain, but are the NGOs willing to play this role? The background for and motives behind this decision are complex and impossible to reconstruct. This example, however, can demonstrate the ambiguous character of the state's policy: on the one hand the NGOs are genuinely supported so that they can strengthen their autonomy and identity; on the other, the state is drawing up plans for aid (at least to a certain extent in dialogue with the NGOs), where they have decided that the NGOs should implement it.

The policy of "closer cooperation", "coordination" or "complementarity", or whatever term is chosen, was started at the end of the NGO decade, after the cards had already been distributed. NORAD's NGO landscape was no tabula rasa. It also started when the Foreign Ministry became much more active in dialogues, discussions and use of NGOs. NORAD's cooperating organisations therefore also had to relate to other state-policies. It was also in these years that some of the biggest NGOs became more internationally oriented; Norwegian Church Aid has cooperates close by with the Lutheran World Federation. Norwegian Peoples' Aid is involved in European networks and the Norwegian Council for Refugees is strongly involved on the international scene. In addition to the increased attention on identity and profile within the NGOs themselves, these will form strong limits on how far this "coordination" can go. NORAD's initiatives have been welcomed by most people as positive and timely. But once again, the problem is: a) what shall they be "coordinated" with or "complementary" to, as long as neither the state nor most of the NGOs (there are important exceptions) have a clear strategy for what should be the Norwegian

profile in the country; b) on past experience it is doubtful whether the NGO Division has sufficient competence, capacity and political authority to be the necessary counterweight to centrifugal forces; c) the unsolved dilemmas in the government's overall policy create confusion regarding its implementation.

An example of how NORAD and the NGO Division are caught between two aid traditions can show this. In 1993 they presented proposals for new guidelines for what NGO work they could support. Mentioning local institutions with which NGOs could cooperate, they did not list either central government institutions (although an official aim at the same time was to coordinate NGO activities with government plans) nor informal groups at grass-roots level (although an official aim was that such organisations represent democratic potentials). These guidelines, that aimed at closer cooperation between the NGOs and the state also repeat the unsubstantiated myths or dogmas about NGOs' role in development.²⁴ By underlining the "comparative advantages" and the imagined peculiarities of NGOs as a whole, the problem of complementarity might perhaps be solved, but at a rhetorical level only.

Administrative guidelines

Main findings: increased emphasis on professionalism and goal attainment on the one hand will help the NGOs to improve their efficiency. On the other hand, if this leads the NGOs' activities into forms that require clear, measurable aims, with development indicators easily formulated in budgets and reports, this might go against fundamental policy aims formulated by some NGOs and also by NORAD. It could lead to a situation in which potentially useful initiatives might be rejected off-hand, because the character of the process will evaluate 'open-ended' goals as an irrational policy.

NORAD has formulated guidelines for support for and cooperation with Norwegian NGOs. These outline the goals and principles of cooperation, what kind of requirements the organisations must fulfil and how cooperation should be organised. NORAD also formulate

decision documents, with relatively clear criteria for allocation of funds. The NGOs must comply with a number of different criteria related to organisation and competence, e.g. popular roots, economic strength, etc. They are also required to initiate evaluations of their work. NORAD generally can support up to 80 % of budgeted costs, and the organisations shall provide at least 20 %, while there are also detailed criteria for administrative support. Tvedt 1992 describes and analyses these guidelines in detail. Here the focus will be put on more general policy questions.

In the new guidelines for 1994 the "old" demands about administrative requirements etc. were taken out of the guidelines. Instead they are to be attached to applications and contracts. However, they are of no less importance for that reason.

The state considers that the work carried out by the NGOs with public funds falls within its area of responsibility, and consequently, that it has the right and the obligation to ensure that funds are used according to the guidelines. As shown above, NORAD has not been efficient in assessing NGO work in aid policy. The knowledge problem, the administrative set up, psychology, etc. have all contributed to a situation in which control functions focus mainly on financial aspects, and less on the effects of the funds used. In NORAD the interesting question is not whether the administrative guidelines are "good" or "bad" (from being rather liberal in the early period of NGO support, NORAD has now developed a system which is very strict and with few loopholes) compared to many other institutions, but how they interact with and affect the overall NGO strategy.

In the latest guidelines for NGO support, which were set out in 1994, there is a contradiction between the aim of "participation" and the time horizon of support (3-5 years). The reporting and accounting requirements are extensive, but necessary if strict financial control is to be achieved. NORAD has not made it clear whether these demands are to be considered as an entry ticket for joining the NGO channel, or as a development objective for organisations joining

it. If NORAD is to support institution-building as a main aim in developing countries, this does not necessarily match with demands made necessary e.g. by requirements made by the State Board of Auditors in Norway. Some of its messages are conflicting, and the whole proposal has by some organisations been characterized as an employment scheme for Norwegian auditors. These new guidelines might reduce the number of partners and the number of projects. The question can be asked: is it a rather costly facade for appearing to control what is quite uncontrollable, while the important questions remain unasked: how should the money be used?

In general, voluntary organisations in Norway are not subject to the same strict rules and regulations regarding budgets, economy, personnel policies and reporting systems as are public institutions. The organisations are neither bound by the same institutional control mechanisms as actors in the market have to comply with, such as laws for the stock-market, accounting controls, public registration and reporting etc. In this sense the organisations fall between the state and the market. It is exactly this structural position that makes it difficult to control them, and makes it problematic to control them too much.

Administrative guidelines and unintended consequences

The greater emphasis on administrative professionalism has simplified cooperation between the parties. This has led to more time and room for discussions on strategic issues. At the same time, it is clear that the increased requirements in this field have caused a shift in NGOs attention away from development issues to administrative questions. Several NGO actors have expressed worries about greater bureaucracy in their organisations. A general feature of the set of regulations, and the organisational practice it encourages, is that they have helped create and reproduce a micro-perspective in planning.

Obviously, the greater requirements for NGOs to report to the state enhances state control of the use of its money. It also increases the work load

of the NGOs, something that in the long run might strengthen the emphasis on projects and reduce their focus on broader societal development processes. A layer of professional employees in the NGOs that are continuously held responsible by the state, but only rarely so by their own infantry, is likely to have its loyalties changed.

The increased emphasis on administrative professionalism has reinforced the already considerable distance between the smaller and the larger NGOs. The "large" organisations have been more able to use the weaknesses of the former, more liberal system, but are also better prepared to meet these new demands. Smaller NGOs, which NORAD has deliberately encouraged to take part in aid activities because they represent a contribution to the creation of a varied organisational landscape, may come out as the 'loser' in this process.

Through the set of regulations, NORAD has developed a flexible system of cooperation that incorporates consideration of the varied competence, professionalism etc., of the NGOs. The system is not formed in order to develop the various NGOs' special advantages, as it naturally treats the NGOs as one administrative category. The system functions both as an encouragement and as a set of sanctions. Assuming that the NGOs' ambition is to 'climb the ladder', to increase their portfolio, there is a risk that the set of regulations will streamline the NGOs in their bid to "please" the donor. If implemented in a radical manner, the new regulations might bring about fundamental changes in the relationship between NGOs and NORAD. NORAD signaled that it would proceed with caution, but the proposals for new guidelines presented in 1994 are ambitious. Report to the Storting no. 51 (1991-92) does not discuss the new set of regulations. Thus, present there is no official political stance on NORADs' NGO policy.

How does the set of regulations function when it comes to leading NGO activities towards preferred aims, including more conscious planning, control and follow-up within the NGOs themselves, local build-up of organisations and takeover of aid enterprises? While the NGOs as a whole claim to report in a

very detailed manner to NORAD, they say that NORAD does not follow up. Indeed, Save the Children's administration affirms that it sends more detailed reports to NORAD than it does to its own Board, but the authorities "send nothing back". NGOs claim that the continuous reorganisation of NORAD has hindered the establishment of routines for the exchange of information. At the same time they underline that they would like NORAD to assume a more coordinating role than previously.

Guidelines and the neutrality paragraph.

Main findings: in its latest guidelines NORAD has written on the one hand that Norwegian aid is built on universal ideas and on the other cut out a sentence from the old neutrality paragraph that aimed at acting as a barrier against aid motivated by particular political, economic and religious interests. The paragraph, in its old form, created confusions and unclear strategies. How the new formulation will function of course, is too early to say. The point here is that this change has not been discussed, although it represents an important departure from earlier policies.

An important issue in NORAD's policy towards the Norwegian NGOs is the so-called neutrality paragraph (the same criteria should also be followed, according to the regulations vis-à-vis indigenous NGOs). Its position and authority in Norwegian aid arises from the discussions between the state and the missionary organisations in the 1960s. The government and the state explicitly did not want to support mission organisations using state money for missionary purposes. They also wishes to broaden the support for Norwegian aid. The way it was formulated reflects the thinking at the time; the ideas which Norway promoted were universal and therefore neutral. Of course, NGO aid, like other Norwegian aid, was export of Western ideas with a little dash of Norwegian social democratic and Protestant virtues.

Ideologically, the neutrality paragraph rests on one fundamental assertion: that the ideas pursued by Norway and Norwegian NGOs are universal. In the new guidelines this is made

explicit for the first time: "Democracy and respect for human rights are universal values and among the basic tenets governing Norwegian involvement in development assistance". In most countries leading politicians and theorists now argue that the fight for human rights, for women's rights, etc. is a fight based on ideas developed within Western societies. Aid is therefore also export of the "American dream" or of Western concepts and notions. By formally insisting that NGO aid is neutral Norway reduces the NGO actors' as well as NORAD actors' ability to understand and grasp the kind of conflicts that NGO aid is likely to meet, and indeed already has met.

Both at the start of the first Norwegian official development aid in 1952 and at the NORAD was set up in 1962 it was explicitly stated by the Norwegian parliament that international aid based on public money should be given according to the "principles of neutrality" as adopted in the principles of the United Nations. These principles were discussed by the Storting in relation to the first guidelines for public support for private organisations. The Storting included a paragraph on political and religious neutrality in its general guidelines for development aid:

The Norwegian efforts must be undertaken on a general humanist basis without being motivated by economic, political or religious special interests. (Innst. St. nr. 75 1961-62)

These principles and this specific paragraph were subsequently carried into the special guidelines regulating the government's financial support for Norwegian organisations. Following political discussions and negotiations with the organisations this paragraph was formulated as follows:

The organisation shall commit itself to work with the projects on a general humanist basis without being motivated by economic, political or religious special interests.

This formulation was accepted by the NGOs. It was vague enough to cover up any disagreements that existed between the missionary organisations and NORAD on this point. Support for missionary organisations was

initially confined to investments in physical structures, like hospitals, schools and other activities around their mission stations, and from 1966 to the salaries of personnel working at these stations. This support was given by NORAD on the condition that these personnel were not acting as missionaries, but as technical personnel (doctors, nurses, teachers etc).

In the new guidelines, approved in 1971, this paragraph on neutrality was somewhat sharpened:

Support can only be given to schemes that benefit the local population without any discrimination of race, faith or opinions. Schemes which have as a primary aim to further particular economic, political or religious special interests fall outside this kind of support.

When the general guidelines underwent major changes in 1977, 1983 and 1992, this paragraph remained unchanged. All these general guidelines, including the paragraph of neutrality, were included as appendixes in the contracts for each project, as signed by both NORAD and the relevant organisation. In the new revision of these guidelines in 1994, this paragraph on neutrality has been changed.

Now it simply reads that the Norwegian government:

"...supports activities that benefit the local population, irrespective of race, belief, sex or political convictions".

Few projects fulfil these requirements. NORAD and Norwegian NGOs in Bangladesh are the main supporter of a number of Christian Lutheran organisations, because they are Christian and Lutheran. There are also a few examples of Norwegian missions only giving support to Christians. In Orthodox Ethiopia, money from the Norwegian state channelled through Norwegian NGOs has overshadowed all other donor funds in the South Synod and the South Western Synod of the Lutheran Church there. Fifteen of 83 local organisations supported by NORAD locally in the four selected countries are organisations with Christian long-term goals and with aims related to

strengthening Christianity in their project goals (information gathered from Questionnaire I).

On the other hand, the principle of neutrality will, because of changes in developing countries and in aid strategies, frequently be broken. The very existence of this principle might on the one hand be interpreted as a "thought-stopper", because it makes it more difficult to discover the role of the organisations as political agents; that Norwegian organisations, claiming to be neutral, are talking with several political tongues. On the other hand the neutrality principle may be seen as a significant signal, and to abandon or modernise it would entail difficulties larger than those now created, since it functions as a "tread carefully" sign. Given the likelihood of ethnic and national discord in several countries during the coming decade, the state and the organisations will have to choose between extending aid as an integral part of Norwegian foreign policy, and maintaining the political neutrality which has traditionally been an important aspect of humanitarian and voluntary organisations; thus if possible achieving a balance between consciously acting as agents of foreign policies, or endeavouring to play the part of "development diplomats" of ultimate neutrality.

To remove the old paragraph may signal important changes in Norwegian NGO work, although that may not have been intended. To take out that sentence of the neutrality paragraph which prohibit projects to be motivated by particular political, economic or religious interests, is a dramatic change (discrimination according to gender is incorporated). The sentence that has now been taken out is the 1971 reformulation of the original neutrality paragraph from 1952 and 1962/63. This paragraph was then discussed and unanimously agreed by the Norwegian parliament.

NORAD and local organisations

Main findings: the character and nature of NORADs support to local organisation have varied greatly over time and from country to country. A general impression is that the receiving organisations regard NORAD as a

good and flexible donor. The control mechanisms regarding assessment, evaluation, auditing etc. however, have been comparatively weak. The policy has often not been in line with stated goals, but has rather reflected established funding patterns. Most of the NGOs supported by NORAD are totally dependent upon foreign funds, and have weak roots in local society. The main point is that NORAD, as part of the international state system, has interacted with local NGOs within power structures of dominance and dependence that have affected policies and relations adversely. The whole system should therefore be revised, if the overall aim is to strengthen the institutional and organisational set-up of the cooperating countries.

This section will analyse NORAD's policy for direct support to national NGOs. In Tvedt 1992 it was shown that this policy has not been discussed in principle in Parliament. This study shows that practice came first and efforts at putting it into a broader planning and policy context were made later. It discusses how attempts, especially by NORAD, Oslo, to develop a policy, have so far been unable to solve the dilemmas in this policy. The difficulties are not primarily related to knowledge and capacity, but rather to historical legacies, and institutional and system characteristics.²⁵

The Phase I study presented a fairly detailed account of how a donor's "discovery" of Southern NGOs was turned into official aid policy. This was done by giving an empirical analysis of the history of Norwegian support. This study will focus on how that policy has been implemented in the developing countries. Exact figures are difficult to establish, but based on a compilation of official budgets and different "windows" it is safe to conclude that during the past decade something like NOK 1 billion has been given to such organisations. According to recorded transfers about 11 % of total grants or NOK 154 million were channelled to local/regional organisations in 1993. In 1979 the resident representatives were for the first time given the power to support local NGOs in the amount of NOK 50,000 without prior consent from Oslo. In the same year the Country Office in Kenya was

permitted to use NOK 150,000 in the same way. Gradually the amount was increased, and now they can allocate NOK 750,000 in this way. In 1981 the total budget for direct support was NOK 1,5 million while in 1993 it came to more than NOK 89 million.

This support is interesting from a number of viewpoints: it signifies a new foreign policy line for Norway, in the sense that in the 1980s the Norwegian government, for the first time in history has channelled money directly to such organisations in these countries (unlike many other European governments, see Chapter II). It draws attention to how the Norwegian state has thought about and handled the relations between a Western rich donor government, indigenous NGOs, and governments and states in the third world.

The data on how this policy has developed are scanty. Two case studies are presented: NORAD's support to Zimbabwean and Bangladeshi NGOs.²⁶ No such empirical-historical studies are available about other donors' experiences. The literature suggests that other donor nations have no clearer ideas about what they are doing in this area.²⁷ These cases focus on NORAD's country strategy for indigenous NGOs, and NORAD's and the local NGOs' relation to the recipient state. The actual history will vary from one country to another, but the general processes seem to be more or less the same for NORAD offices in other countries. The following is therefore to a great extent a summary of these case studies.

Achievements

From one point of view NORAD has contributed to what has been called an "associational revolution". In Bangladesh, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe it supports more than one hundred organisations from its country offices/embassies. While in 1987 NORAD was the main funder of four organisations, they were the main funder of 15 organisations in these three countries in 1992, some of them very important organisations in national contexts (see Questionnaire).²⁸ The organisations that NORAD has supported directly (ranging from BRAC in Bangladesh with

its estimated one million members to small human rights institutions in Nicaragua) have by and large played an active role in development in the countries concerned. They have mobilised millions of people, brought education and self-respect to poor people in remote areas. In some countries like in Bangladesh they have stirred up public debate about fundamental development questions. In other countries such as Nicaragua - the NGOs are important instruments in the struggle between government and opposition. Many of the organisations regard NORAD as a benevolent, flexible donor. Seen from this perspective, the NGO support has perhaps functioned better than might have been expected.

Support for NGOs has already had far-reaching impacts on many societies. It might not necessarily strengthen the "civil society", although that of course also happens. NORAD has supported opposition groups and what are most aptly called government bureaux. NORAD's policy has strengthened some organisations, while disempowering others in terms of organisational talent, resources, attention and internal power relations. A disproportionate support for development NGOs as in Zimbabwe and Bangladesh may create and has created imbalances across the organisational landscape with, most likely, far-reaching historical consequences. NGOs have been given the role of representing such organisations in policy discussions at national and regional levels, organisations that may have no basis, except funds from abroad and dedicated employees with a feeling of "mission". This kind of support has consequences that no one can foresee today. It might strengthen a democratic development, or create enduring lack of accountability. The point here is that NORAD is not doing what it says it is doing, and that the policy is based on conflicting political strategies and may create a number of unconsidered and unintended consequences.

Dependence

But to what extent is it useful to describe NORAD as an actor furthering an "associational revolution", a global movement which, with great historical consequences, redefines the relations

between state and society? Based on empirical data brought forth in this study, this analysis seems to be too hasty. It deemphasises this "revolution's" dependence on foreign state funds. The description assumes, so to speak, that the states are financing their own global roll-back, since it is the states, including the Norwegian state, that keep the majority of the most important organisations alive. The phenomenon should therefore be analysed within a perspective of organisational proliferation and growth, but also of dependence. While many states have long been dependent on foreign aid, now also societies themselves, or at least important actors in them, are becoming dependent on the benevolence of donors. A great majority, (all except 1) of the organisations supported by NORAD depended on foreign donors for more than 50 % of their funds, and it is safe to assume that the great majority of them were close to 100 % dependent on Northern "charity".

The space available to NGOs is decided by foreign interests and not only by the political will of the recipient governments.²⁹ In some cases this may also reflect that some of these organisations provide an arena for a new type of strongmen, with a personal or partial agenda rather than a "people's" agenda. The way organisations are supported, the "closeness" of the system, the lack of organisations with a history and traditions in some of these countries, also create this kind of social impact.

Position in society

NORAD is far from accomplishing the aim that was declared in Report to the Storting no. 51 (1991-92), that supported organisations should be rooted in society, etc. Norwegian government policy is that organisations should contribute to democracy and development, but it is underlined that these organisations must be rooted in society. In general they have very few members and very few volunteers, and by and large they are organisations that have been established by intellectuals, either for political humanitarian or economic reasons, and they are more or less totally dependent on donors. Most of the organisations have been established very recently

and few of the NORAD-supported NGOs are membership organisations. The organisational landscape varies according to the countries' history, but there is a tendency for NORAD's focus on "development-oriented" NGOs to imply that a special type of organisation has got support, a type that consists of development agencies rather than organisations as we know them in a Norwegian context. These are organisations that manage to attract the donor's interest and concerns via aid rhetoric, reporting capabilities, discussions on Logical Framework Analysis, etc. These organisations always represent only a certain section of the recipient society and, strengthened by the profile of NORAD's "windows", they tend to represent the educated, English-speaking middle class. It is therefore unlikely that NORAD has managed to strengthen the organisations of the poor or the interests of the marginalized through their direct support: they do not knock on an embassy-door in Dhaka or Managua.

In Bangladesh NORAD has been a very active actor in the donor community and in the NGO community. In Zimbabwe NORAD has played a more peripheral role in the donor community and among the NGOs, and the strategic thinking has been more ad-hoc, the turn-over of staff has been more frequent, etc (this has, indeed, also been the case in Nicaragua). But whatever approach the NORAD employee has shown, he has still been regarded as a representative of the Norwegian government, with huge amounts of money in his/her pocket. The NGO responsible has been a representative of a state and, after the merger with the Foreign Ministry, even of a foreign embassy. This has produced and reproduces barriers to equity in relationships and two-way communication. A "diplomat", in the eyes of many people in the recipient society, with access to funds that are so huge that they can change the organisational landscape in the country in important ways, never has and never will become a "partner" with a local organisation in development. He might become their patron and benefactor, but not a long-term partner in institution-building, etc.

Coordination

In most countries in which NORAD has an office, coordination with and attention to the NGO issue is not very visible. The policy has gone through three stages. The first phase was what can be called a "responsive programme". The Country Offices responded to applications from a number of NGOs, and at one time in Zambia alone they supported 130 projects. The support had no clear profile, the Country Office was not able to visit more than a fraction of the projects and the economic and political control of how the money was spent was almost non-existent. Then NORAD, Oslo, initiated a second phase, where emphasis was put on "complementarity"; the support was to be in line with Norwegian overall goals for assistance to the country concerned. NORAD asked for country plans, and the Resident Representatives were denied the right to allocate money without prior acceptance from Oslo if such plans were not made. The aim was to stimulate a development away from *ad hoc* project support to programme development. Now NORAD has entered third phase. The focus on country plans helped to reduce the "post-box" function, but at the same time it insulated plans for NGO support from the general country strategic planning. The aim is now to try to integrate the country plans into the overall country strategy.

It seems that structural features of the administrative set-up have made this policy difficult to achieve. NGO support has generally (with some exceptions) been regarded as a "thing apart". The administrative system, with a separate position for NGO matters, has on the one hand increased local NGOs' opportunity to acquire funds according to their own plans and priorities. It could perhaps have developed into a "centre" for strategy formulation on "civil society"/state relations, but generally speaking the offices have instead become a mixture of "post-boxes" for ad hoc management of too many applications for one person to handle, and a more strategically oriented planning unit. The system has made it difficult for the country offices to coordinate overall country activities. The history of the support shows that it has been difficult to coordinate NGO support with sector programmes, not because of

individual, personnel factors, but because of the administrative separation itself. The present NORAD policy of closer integration in the Country Plan and the Country Programmes has met obstacles, also because of profiles of past NGO support schemes, which were implemented in line with other policy guidelines (see the policies in Report no. 36 (1984-85) and Report no 51 (1991-92)). The support might be in line with sector priorities, but it need not be so: support for women-oriented projects amounts to six % in Zimbabwe and 20 % in Bangladesh, and support to human rights and environment to one % in Bangladesh, while environment is given 17 % in Zimbabwe. Both in Bangladesh and Zimbabwe most support goes to urban-based middle-class organisations, and not to the poor and the marginal groups' organisations, as both overall policy and country strategies suggest should happen.

Strategy and knowledge

NORAD has not developed a consistent strategy for direct funding. This is expressed in definitional confusion about what an NGO is, and in changing classifications of the NGO community in the countries concerned. On the whole NORAD has not distinguished clearly between the NGOs of the NGO channels and organisations in society at large. The history of the support points to a basic problem: are NGOs supported because they represent a "civil society" or forces "against the state", or are they used because they are efficient service-providers in sectors already supported by NORAD, and therefore "gap-fillers" in universally oriented government programmes?

As a state institution in another country NORAD has usually supported organisations and projects that already have had the support of the government. This is natural, since NORAD organises state-to-state aid. Support for stronger "civil society" in reality will (rhetoric is quite another matter) not be possible to carry out, unless the receiver state to some extent agrees. This state-to-state link, therefore, puts limits on NORAD's role as a supporter of "civil society". The profile of the support (along with other donor

states) may therefore help to form an organisational landscape that is opportunistic, the NGOs are closely linked to the state, but have a rhetoric that may come close to anti-statism.

There has been strategic confusion and aim view of the size of fund. NORAD has not done much to improve the environment in which NGOs work, or to facilitate interaction between NGOs, the state and other social actors. On the other hand, NORAD has done more than many other donors in this regard. They have initiated some important seminars, compiled NGO directories for some countries etc. After the first "ad-hoc" period for the past few years, NORAD has had the main planning aim of bringing NGO support in line with the country programme. But as the case studies show, this has proved to be more difficult than NORAD, Oslo, originally believed and hoped.

A case study: Zimbabwe

NORAD opened its Harare office in 1986, and began direct funding of local NGOs in the following year, guided by a study entitled "Zimbabwean NGOs in Development". Under a policy framework for assistance to NGOs, it was decided to support the following activities: i) development, rather than welfare-oriented NGOs ii) NGOs located in undeveloped rural areas iii) NGOs working in the water sector iv) NGOs offering skills and management training v) NGOs engaged in marketing products and purchasing inputs vi) NGOs offering credit schemes for cooperatives and other small enterprises (Chinemana 1991).

Responsibility for coordinating NORAD's support for local NGOs was given to a Zimbabwean project officer in September 1987, with an initial budget of NOK 3 million for 1988 (Z\$ 789,474 at the time). The support for local organisations was not justified by referring to civil society, pluralism or democracy, but to the fact that some of these organisations could do a good job in the sectors where NORAD was already giving support (NORAD, Zimbabwe Landprogram 1988-90:26). Local NGOs were chosen, not because they were regarded as representatives of "civil society", as "gap-fillers",

as a part of a "third sector" etc., but primarily because NORAD had decided, in line with a general pro-NGO attitude, to channel money to local NGOs. On this basis it was proposed that NORAD should channel NOK 8 millions to local NGOs in 1990.

Norwegian NGOs had already been working in the country for some years, but as the representation reported to Oslo: support for these NGOs had its own objectives to a large extent and the system had a life of its own separate from country program activities (Zimbabwe - Landprogram 1988-90, s.11). The activities of the Norwegian NGOs were mainly in other areas than NORAD supported, but nevertheless, their activities were described as a "fine supplement to the country programme" and helped to strengthen the profile of Norwegian aid to Zimbabwe. NORAD's Harare office would, in line with what were regarded as clear political signals from Norway, not suggest closer cooperation between the country programme and the Norwegian NGOs (Zimbabwe - Landprogram 1988-90: 26).

In 1988, when the country programme for 1989-91 was formulated, NGO activities outside the country programme were described in exactly the same terms. Criteria for NGO support were underlined: local NGOs working in remote areas and in sectors where NORAD already was active. NORAD, Harare sought through "active dialogue" to stimulate the organisations to work "in the periphery", i.e. the border areas and most of Matabeleland, and the southern parts of Masvingo and Manicaland" (ibid.:20). In the first year only 80% of allocated budget was used (Zimbabwe - Programgjennomgang. Landprogram 1989-91, DUH, Harare, 20.1.1988:20). This might be an indication of the relationship between donor and "civil society". It was a donor led intervention because good or acceptable organisations were not queuing up. All NGO projects were to be scrutinized by provincial or district authorities. The policy was clear: NGO activities were to be coordinated with public development plans in the same area. Already at that time some "hip" organisations were heavily overfunded, while others had to "shop around" for a donor (Zimbabwe Country Study, 1989:227).

As has been indicated before, NORAD has employed a Zimbabwean as responsible for NGOs. This was rather unusual at the time, and demonstrates how little NORAD was at that time interested in using NGOs as political instruments for Norwegian political purposes. It also reflected that NORAD knew that this task required knowledge about the society; knowledge they were unlikely to have. But it also reflected the lack of priority this channel was given. (see for example Zimbabwe Tertialrapport - I. Tertial 1993, PRIV to AFR, 21.6.1993). NGO support was regarded as a matter of necessity: it was not a policy that "grew out of" Zimbabwean experience.

Analyses of "civil society"

In 1989, NORAD presented an analysis which attempted to legitimize concrete by its support for the NGO channel in Zimbabwe. The country program stated: "Zimbabwe, like most African countries, has to a small extent developed a civil society, i.e. many and strong institutions/organisations which function independent by the state. A strong civil society forms a defence for democracy and against arbitrary harassments, and is a balancing force against a dominating state with repressive features. Support for local NGOs and Norwegian NGOs which cooperate with local NGOs in building up and strengthening independent popular institutions can, by that help, develop a pluralistic democracy which is badly needed in Africa" (Draft to Country Program, Zimbabwe 1989-92, appendix 1:1 (in Norwegian). The final document could not be found in NORAD's archives).

This description becomes interesting when contrasted with a very different description from the following year: "Zimbabwe is a country with a rich organisational life. In addition to the many interest and welfare organisations, which have primarily operated in the urban areas, there has (sic!) since 1980 emerged a number of local organisations" (Landprogram for Zimbabwe for perioden 1990-1993, 21.3.1990: 35). Almost 40% of the funds in 1989 went to Women's groups and activities whilst 38% went to the cooperative movement (Notat, Annual Report on

1989 activities, NORAD, Harare to NGO Division, NORAD, Oslo, 10.1.1990). No assessment is available of how they were actually conducting their businesses. In December 1990 Harare reports that their main concern was to try to "avoid the haphazard dribs and drabs manner whereby applications were appraised and approved as they came in" (Note, Annual report on NGO activities, NORAD, Harare to NGO Division, NORAD, Oslo, 10.12.1990).

The question of integration.

The programme for 1990-93 repeated that it was not necessary to undertake any coordination of NGO activities with the country programme. On the contrary, this fact was described as "a resource for the broadening of knowledge of development work in Zimbabwe" (Landprogram for Zimbabwe for perioden 1990-1993, 21.3.1990: 36). The channel was already significant in scope. NOK 12.6 million were allocated to Norwegian NGOs and NOK 3 million to local organisations in 1989. In 1990, 25 local organisations received money from Norway. Humanitarian welfare organisations were explicitly defined as generally being non-recipients. The aim continued to be the support of organisations in peripheral areas, and this was the main criterion.

In 1992 all this changed. In the meantime NORAD had started to discuss programme support instead of project support. According to archival material, the Office for Private Organisations commented for the first time in 1990 on the text of the country programme. From now on, support was to be incorporated in the country plan in Zimbabwe, as in other countries where direct support was given. In May 1990 Oslo instructed all representations to develop a comprehensive strategy for the NGO sector within the country plan. In 1992 the NGOs were to be one of the main elements in a coordinated Norwegian plan (Zimbabwe, Prinsipper for norsk bistand. Planperiode 1992-95: 12). The scope of NGO support was to be widened to "bring it more in accordance with the priorities in the country programme and in NORADs general strategy" (Zimbabwe,

Prinsipper for norsk bistand. Planperiode 1992-95: 12). Secondly, it was argued that support for "private organisations and interest organisations is an important support for the development of a pluralistic society, and a way to use local resources to further development in favour of the poor and marginalized target groups which are not reached through public programmes" (Zimbabwe, Prinsipper for norsk bistand. Planperiode 1992-95:13). If it was "possible to identify sustainable private organisations NORAD would also increase the allocations for such organisations in order to help a continuing positive democratic development" (Zimbabwe, Prinsipper for norsk bistand. Planperiode 1992-95:8).

In 1992 NOK 5.7 million were given to local NGOs and NOK 32.1 mill. to Norwegian NGOs from NORAD alone. In January 1992, NORAD PRIV, in Oslo had informed Harare that NGOs were to be the main channel in the fight against AIDS. Human-rights issues and democratization would also be priority areas for NGOs (PRIV til SAFR 20.2.1992). Such "Special Grants/Allocations" create coordination problems on the ground. Who should be responsible; the NGO or the sector at representation level?. Since NGOs were the declared channel, how to guarantee a clear plan? As a result of increased donor funding for NGOs and the ESAP program, which NORAD supported, the state's activities were reduced, especially in the health and education sector. The NGOs accordingly moved in to fill the gap, supported by the donor community, among them NORAD. The organisations would therefore continue to be dependent on aid, as NORAD remarked (Landprogram Zimbabwe, 1993-96:20). The national development plan was quoted: it is expected that in both sectors (health and education), a revitalization of "private sector" investment will take place with the involvement of both local and foreign-based non-governmental organisations" (quoted in Landprogram Zimbabwe, 1993-96:20). The increased space of the NGOs, therefore, was partly a result of the World Bank's and other donors' (including NORAD) cutbacks in aid to the state for the public sector, especially health and education.

The question of strategy

After five years of support, NORAD Harare, in April 1992, formulated a strategy for support to local NGOs, which was accepted and supported by NORAD Oslo. The Plan of Action (strategy) represents something of a water-shed. It was the first effort to analyse the sector, but there is no real analysis of the relationship between the sectors or of the role of different types of organisations vis a vis different specific policy objectives. It argued that many pre-independence NGOs found "the transition to a development orientation problematic", while new "development-oriented" NGOs had been established after 1980. The development is noted, but there are no efforts to analyse the crucial impact that this shift, and the sectors' linkages with the donor agenda, would have on society.

NORAD now distinguished among four categories of organisation, a categorization clearly influenced by the new "paradigm": First, those who acted as pressure groups on the government; secondly, those who had close links with the grass-roots and were based "on mass participation in articulating needs"; thirdly, those which cater for needs not "fully covered by the Government" and having wide-reaching networks (women groups, cooperative movement etc); and fourthly, the regional and international NGOs. But at the same time the relationship between government and NGOs is described as "generally mutually supportive". The Government policy is described as one of "non-interference, but that it required all NGO projects to be considered by the Provincial and/or District Development Committee before implementation, and to be incorporated within local development plans" (p.2). The efforts of the government after independence were positively assessed, but it was also stated that the "Government has not yet succeeded in changing this situation through its policy initiatives and programmes, and NGOs still have a major role to play in servicing these vulnerable groups" (p.2). The structural position of these services is therefore described as "complementary to the role of the state" (p.4) while their ability to influence policy on the macro level was "currently limited" (p.3).

The conclusion of the program document is that "one should actively aim at increased assistance via channels outside of the country programme, particularly via private sector cooperation and support through NGOs. Utilization of different channels of assistance should be coordinated" (p.8). Priority sectors where the NGOs were believed to have a "special role to play" were chosen. Concentration should be sought, *inter alia* through long term cooperation with a restricted number of NGOs". In spite of the plan, about 80 NGOs were supported in 1993, and thus a development contrary to the aims of the strategy from the year before had taken place.

According to the same planning document, NGOs which could facilitate development in different sectors should be supported. Regarding human rights and democratization, NGO support was seen as an efficient channel in assisting particularly vulnerable groups such as children, the handicapped, minority groups, etc. NGOs promoting the rights and interests of such vulnerable groups would be supported. This, it was claimed, would contribute to creating a more pluralistic society in Zimbabwe. However, the geographical criteria should be maintained. Emphasis should be given to dialogue and to monitoring and follow-up, but NORAD would not be involved in the planning and implementation of NGO projects.

For 1993 the goal was that 70-75% of annual allocations should be "tied to more long-term cooperation with a limited number of organisations". The document implies permanent underlying contradictions regarding the way in which different aims and strategies could be harmonized. NORAD would use NGOs to reach marginalized people. NORAD would use most of the funds at its disposal for long-term programmes. NORAD would use NGOs as a main channel for support for democracy (Landprogramdokument for Zimbabwe 1993-96:13).

The question of strategy - again

In 1994, the need for developing an NGO country strategy continued to be emphasised. NORAD, Oslo asked for what was called "visible

integration" in the country plan, as a tool for "reaching sector-specific objectives". After years of stressing the need for strategic planning, the Office for Private Organisations, NORAD, wrote as late as February 1993 to NORAD, Zimbabwe, that their plans missed out how the representation's cooperation with NGOs could support the aims for the different sectors, (See "Vedr. representasjonenes virksomhetsplaner - 1993, PRIV to AFR, 25.2.1993); while for Zambia they wrote that "integration thinking" was implemented. Our point here is that none of the reports discussed the democratic, or for that matter, economic or social potential of the NGO sector or of individual NGOs in the country concerned.

In 1994 it was found out that more than NOK 10 millions were earmarked for the productive sector, but that it was "difficult to get a clear picture of the profile/content of the NGO portfolio in this sector" and that given the relative importance of this sector and the high percentage allocation to it through NGOs, there was a need for a "closer assessment of the NGOs' concrete role and contribution in this area" - especially so because the NGOs in this field "have not had any comparative advantage/special competence in this field" (Report pertaining to Alf Arne Ramslien's tasks at the Norwegian Embassy, Harare, 31.1.-11.2.1994, regarding the Embassy's collaboration with NGOs to, the Norwegian Embassy, Harare, 24.2.1994). This relationship had other difficulties: "There continues to be a tendency to disregard or be relaxed about the terms of contracts of a number of the collaborating NGOs. Late reporting, altered budget lines and other changes without prior agreement continue. We now are being much firmer on these issues" (Memorandum, Collaboration with local NGOs - funds for 1993, RR Harare to PRIV, Oslo 12.11.1992).

These documents provide evidence that NORAD, Harare, has had no clear strategy for support to Zimbabwean NGOs. Support was given with good intentions to many good organisations (and many organisations praise NORAD as a donor), but spread out rather thinly and in a haphazard way, or based on undefined, shifting emphasises. Despite the official Norwegian policy of concentration and integration within a country

plan, this has not as yet happened. The practice established during the early years has been more or less continued in the 1990s. One might ask: Was it a policy rhetoric only? Or was it unsuitable when it came to practical life? Or was the historical burden so heavy that it will take years to reorient policy focus and actual programme profile?

Actual profile

In 1994, NORAD provides an unspecified proportion of the funding requirements of between 7.5% and 10% of the 850 or so NGOs working in Zimbabwe (the following is based on Moyo 1994). Only 2% of the NGOs supported by NORAD are CBOs, while the bulk of NGOs supported are service NGOs (40%) and Trusts or Unions (38%). Only 7% of the NGOs supported were intermediary NGOs based on membership associations within different communities. The majority of the NGOs supported had their constituencies in professional associations, trustees and paying members of the NGOs. NORAD also supported regional and international NGOs which operate from Harare or work on Zimbabwean projects (10%).

In practice, NORAD supports other areas and groups that are not indicated by the policy documents. NORAD concentrated its support for about 300 registered NGOs. About 70 of these have received support, (in terms of value NOK 4 million i.e. about 23%).³⁰ The CBOs have been given very little support, unlike other donors. NORAD has apparently believed that it was supporting these marginalised groups, but in reality they have cooperated with more urban-based professional groups. The sectoral emphasis of NORAD's Country Programme prioritizes what in Norway (and in Zimbabwe) are important issues: support for women, environmental and AIDS-related activities. But what kind of people are working with these issues? They are service NGOs, Trusts and Professional Associations etc., because these themes require expertise, awareness, and material resources that CBOs do not have. NORAD's support is now heavily focused on urban areas since the AIDS, cultural, small enterprise and many women's NGO

activities and other aspects funded are more problematic in towns and major cities than in rural marginalized areas. Professional associations are the key beneficiaries of NORAD support over and above local CBOs and intermediary NGOs. This policy is not a result of a local NGO strategy, but is a profile created by a number of new NGO windows, given by Harare to Oslo (Aids, Environment and Women are all allocations more or less earmarked for NGOs, and administered separately at the Harare office). NORAD does not offer much support to NGOs in those sectors in which most NGOs operate, namely agriculture, rural development and social services. At the same time, NORAD has been at the forefront of donors in supporting new and therefore riskier sectors, notably Culture and AIDS.

NORAD has not been very active in supporting institution building and efforts at building stronger or better "rooted" organisations. NORAD has mainly provided project and training support to NGOs. The bulk of the NGOs' institutional costs are met by other donors and the NGOs themselves. NORAD support for NGOs seems to have been less concerned with institution-building than with project results. Only recently has NORAD begun to consider greater financial support to the core institution-building costs of a handful of NGOs. While institution-building is emphasized, project support has continued.

As shown above, support for NGOs has grown more out of the sectoral emphasis combining bilateral assistance with NGO activities. There has been no focus on NGOs as representing "society" or "civil society".

Distribution of funds

The broad funding category, "support for local NGOs", regularly receives about NOK 5 million per annum. This amounts to about 50% of the total grant. Of the remaining average of NOK 5 million allocated to environment, culture, AIDS and women's activities, NGOs receive more than 80% of the funds actually expended. It is shared each year by about 50 NGOs, resulting in an average grant per NGO of approximately NOK 150,000 per annum. Women's activities get 7%,

while productive income-generating activities or small enterprises receive close to 60% of the grants. Environmental activities received approximately 23% in 1992, declining to 10% in 1993. AIDS and culture have received approximately 20% and 12% of the overall funds allocated each year. The AIDS and environment grants will play a larger role in 1994 than in previous years.

As shown above (see table A.11) 7% of the grants made to an NGO can be less than NOK 10,000, which amounts to broadly the same number of Zimbabwean dollars. Ten thousand Zimbabwe dollars is the equivalent in 1994 of the salary of low-ranking Government officials (clerks, etc), or 10% of the price of a small car in Zimbabwe (the following is based on Moyo 1994). 31% of the total grants provided to NGOs were between NOK 10,000 and NOK 50,000. Grants above NOK 200,000 were made to 14 NGOs, which provided approximately 25% of the average total institutional budgets of medium-sized NGOs. For new and small NGOs (excluding CBOs), such an amount would come to over 40% of the institution's total budget. For really large local NGOs, NOK 300,000 in 1994 Zimbabwe dollars is the equivalent of 10% of their total budget. Therefore, over 38% of the NGO grants are provided at levels below NOK 50,000, with the bulk of grants in this category being NOK 30,000 and less. To concretise this level of funding, NOK 30,000 is the equivalent of the annual salary of an NGO officer with a first degree and less than three years work experience, or half the salary of a junior lecturer in the university system. (Moyo 1994)

The value of NORAD funding to NGOs in Zimbabwe thus has a quite varied structure, with over 80% of the funding being targeted at projects, and the rest at direct institutional and human resources capacity building.

Opinions of NORAD and the role of the government

NORAD's policy for support to NGOs is generally well known by NGOs. Many regard it positively (see Questionnaire I). It is regarded as

risk-taking, supportive and progressive in many cases. NORAD has engaged in policy dialogues with some organisations. With other NGOs there is little or no contact. NORAD staff have monitored NGOs mostly through interviews during the application process, via audit statements and narrative reports provided by NGOs, and through a "few fleeting visits" (Moyo 1994) to some projects and NGO offices. The monitoring of the about 50 NGOs and what they are doing cannot be very efficient.

NGOs in Zimbabwe depend heavily on donors (see Questionnaire I). Few NGOs thus have consistent long-term programme and institutional funding relationships with single donors. Some NGOs have sought means of generating independent sources of income by offering for-profit activities. Most of them are for being financially independent. This donor-dependence - created by donors such as NORAD, has not been addressed as a crucial society-state question.

More recently the Government has begun to support NGOs in a variety of indirect ways. For instance, the Government recently decided that bilateral funds from NORAD should be allocated to an indigenous small enterprise support institution, the IBDC. Similarly, the Government has promoted the fund-raising efforts of numerous NGOs from bilateral, multilateral and INGO sources. Government has increasingly involved NGOs in training, in the delivery of drought relief, and in the management of health services. This has increased access to funds for some NGOs.

A case study : Bangladesh

Norway started aid to Bangladesh after the war in 1971. In 1973 it became a main cooperating country. NGOs in Bangladesh could apply for direct support in 1982. Since the mid-1980s it has been an important country in relation to direct support for local NGOs. In 1985, NOK 8 million went to local NGOs and the same amount to Norwegian NGOs. In 1993 NOK 22.4 million was channelled to local NGOs while half, about NOK 11.43 million went to Norwegian NGOs. The relative importance of this support has increased.

A history of "direct support".

In 1992 approximately 15% of all Norwegian aid was earmarked for the NGO sector. About NOK 25 million was given to 34 organisations. (See table A.12). The question is: According to what strategic considerations have more than NOK 100 million been allocated to NGOs in Bangladesh in the period 1986 to 1994? What has been the strategy behind supporting NGOs instead of the state? Why are those NGOs that get Norwegian aid supported, and to what extent has this policy been integrated into the overall country strategy? NORAD Dhaka has for a long time given considerable emphasis to NGO work. There has always been an expatriate in charge (unlike Zimbabwe and Nicaragua, for example). In the past years much effort has been put into making a picture of the NORAD - NGO scene, the character of the organisations, etc. The problem to be analysed is therefore not related to the individual competence there, but to historical and structural constraints.

When NORAD started support in the early 1980s nobody talked about "NGOs as a means of strengthening civil society". At the time, NORAD's main aim, also in using NGOs, was described as contributing to the fulfilment of basic human needs. A widespread lack of trust in the government, corruption and inefficiency and the government's "lack of accountability", made the NGO channel a promising alternative. This was combined with the fact that, at the time that this channel was opened up, there was a "tremendous pipeline of disbursements of NORAD grants" (Johannessen, B., 1990, pp. 283-290).

By establishing the direct support system in 1986, pressure on NORAD Dhaka from Norway was eased. Support in these first but formative years was therefore not according to a clear strategy about NGOs' role in society, the relation between "civil society" and the state, or the type of relation with government which should be preferred etc. Those organisations that appeared to be good received support. The recommendations of the Bangladesh Country Study were not followed: "Their (the local NGOs, my comment) capacity is highly limited, and actions through NGOs should primarily be

pilot operations. There is a real danger that successful and popular NGOs can be swamped by so much foreign aid that their efficacy and impact will be severely reduced" (CMI 1986:191). The establishment of this new transfer channel was a development which was resisted, of course, by the government of Bangladesh. Since the Government was heavily dependent upon foreign aid, this implied less money through the state channels, and in negotiations regarding country programmes between Bangladesh and Norway this was a recurrent theme. It also argued that due to high overhead costs, the NGOs implemented projects more expensively than the GOB would have done. But NGO support was given in order to "bypass a corrupt government bureaucracy" and "to use NGOs as a vehicle for delivering services to the poor and to promote development". (NORAD support for non-governmental organizations in Bangladesh, Operational guidelines 1990).

A new direction.

This legacy of ad-hoc arrangements (some of the choices turned out to be in line with NORAD aims, others did not) was there, when NORAD reformulated aims at the beginning of the 1990s in line with a general shift in NORAD Oslo's policy. NGO support "should be in an integrated and coordinated manner to achieve the overall targets" in the country program. At the NORAD Regional meeting in Colombo, the Director of the NGO Division in NORAD Oslo emphasized that "an understanding of the NGOs' role in Norwegian-supported sector strategies and specific programmes should be reached with the relevant government authorities" (Report. Regional Meeting, Colombo, 30-31 October 1991). The focus was on the need for closer NGO/government collaboration. NGOs should "not be directed, but through improved communication it is important to reach a mutual understanding of common priorities for NORAD and the NGOs" (ibid). The arguments were still not related to "civil society" considerations but to aid effectiveness or country goal achievements. The policy document concluded - with no research findings to substantiate this and without explaining assessment criterias - that the

NGO aid had been "very successful" (*Support for the NGO sector in Bangladesh. NORAD strategy paper. Draft paper, Dhaka, May 1992: :1-2*).

This new strategy had to build on relations and commitments that had already been established, and the shift had to be undertaken while conflicting policy aims made the policy unclear. What had been established was based on conflicting policy lines. At the same time the policy was based on the idea that NGOs play a key role in the democratization process.

The following quotations from Country Programmes for Bangladesh may suggest problems of continuity, when the strategy is not crystal clear: "The number of new allocations in comparison to ongoing projects was considerably reduced in 1988 (LP BGD 1989-92:23). In the same document and on the same page: "Areas and organisations where cooperation preferably can be enlarged have increasingly crystalized ". In the next country plan it was argued that: "On the other hand it is NORAD's aim to expand support for individual, successful projects within prioritized areas, such as primary education, employment/credit and implementation of national primary health care programmes (LP BGD 1990-93:28). The next country programme did not have identical priorities: "Prioritized areas for support for private organisations are health, education, institutional development and rural development" Country Programme (LP BGD 1992-95:13), while employment and credit are left out. While support in the early years had not been aimed at integrated coordination, NORAD formulated it thus in 1994: "Another important task is to make sure that the different support areas in an integrated coordination can achieve their aims. This is especially the case for support for private organisations" (LP BGD 1994-96, part 1:7). The main aim for 1993 and the years ahead was formulated in 1992 as a) to "integrate the support given to private organisations with the total cooperation with Bangladesh" and b) to strengthen sustainability and institution building in private organisations and their projects" (Landprogram 1993: Støtte til private organisasjoner i Bangladesh).

In 1992 NORAD stated that they shared the Government's requirement regarding insight into and responsibility for the work of the private organisations, at the same time as NORAD supported the NGO community along with other donors during the July Crisis. NORAD still argued in favour of the importance of the NGOs in development and democracy, but not within a dichotomous perspective. NORAD was prepared to attach some of the activities which at that time were financed over the NGO budget, closer to the activities of the government. They suggested that one or more organisations could be financed via the country programme. This would give the organisations more legitimacy and the aid would be more efficient. Care Bangladesh, ICDDR, and BRAC's planned Non-Formal Primary Education program, would be natural in this context. In such situations NORAD can play an important role, it was argued, since it shares the confidence of both camps. This change represents different understanding of NGO/state relations than the ideology of the 1980s and the "New Paradigm".

NORAD Dhaka has also showed a realistic, but somewhat split attitude towards the NGO community. While NORAD on the one hand supported the local NGOs because they as a social force were seen as representative of "popular groups and forces" etc, NORAD argued that some of the biggest NGOs, supported by NORAD, were not democratic organisations. They were "set up and run by a strong, even charismatic leader; they are not membership organisations as such, but tools for service delivery and group organisation" (NORAD, Dhaka, 1992. *Support for the NGO sector in Bangladesh. NORAD strategy paper:2*). Leadership "is autocratic rather than democratic" and the group formations are "top-down in manner" (ibid:6). NORAD wrote that "there is often a greater degree of accountability in the public sector" and continued: "At present, the most important accountability for private organisations is towards those who fund them, not towards their membership masses or target populations" (ibid:6). The existence of such groups "may in many cases be nothing more than artificial groupings of people with little in common other than being offered services by an outside agency, on condition that they form a group" (ibid:6). But on the other hand, a) "many

NGOs have been more successful in channelling and distributing services than government agencies, and in reaching the rural poor", and b) "most of the organisations have a reputation for having an honest and dedicated staff, working in many sectors of society" (Ibid:2).

Criteria

How to choose what organisation to support? NORAD received many applications from new organisations every week. In 1992 and 1993 they supported between 30 and 40 NGOs. One problem which was pointed out was that NORAD's representation in Dhaka "does not have the administrative capacity to oversee or have sufficient insights into such a large number of organisations" (Ibid:3). The NGO portfolio was too big to handle.

In 1992, one main criteria was that NORAD "only funds organisations screened and registered with the government NGO Bureau, whose project proposals have received government approval" (Ibid.). This was of course different from the policy under the Ershad regime. However, NORAD also supported a few organisations and projects that did not have such acceptance from the government, but this was support that for political reasons could not easily be integrated into the country frame. NORAD underlined that it was "essential" for NORAD to continue to fund human rights issues" (Ibid.), even if these, compared to the total support "represents only a tiny proportion of Norwegian NGO funding" (about one percent in 1992). The main argument for this modest support was not based on policy grounds (the country strategy emphasized human rights issues), but on technical-administrative considerations. The "absorptive capacity" of the activist groups was "limited" (Ibid.).

NORAD Dhaka argued in favour of increased support for the NGO sector. The arguments resembled those used in 1986: it makes it possible to transfer "unspent funds under the country frame to the NGO sector" (Ibid:5). The problem of undemocratic organisations, was one which NORAD underlined in relation to the legitimation of NGO support. NORAD would

assume the role of strengthening the popular character of these organisations. They would demand that target groups become more involved in project and policy formulations and in "decision-making related to the development activities targeted towards them" (Ibid:7).

The strategy was given the full support of Oslo, and was described as a good document, especially since it attempted to integrate NGO support into NORAD's country plan. The various offices in NORAD and the department were mainly concerned with one issue: was "their" subject represented? The emphasis was naturally on the NGOs role within the different sector plans, without any notion of NGOs as something "apart", as forces worth strengthening, because they might represent popular, non-governmental and non-statist interests. It is therefore interesting that priority sectors for NGO work, human rights (0.06 %) and environment receive altogether 1 % of the NGO allocation (See table A.13).

Compared to many other strategy documents on NGO support this Dhaka document was broad, reflective and probably useful as a planning instrument. In comparison with the importance of the sector, the complexity of NGO/state relations, the special NGO/state relationship in Bangladesh, and the structural shortcomings of a NORAD office vis-à-vis the tasks outlined, the field did not get the overall policy attention it deserved. It was generally seen as "something apart".

Local support and diplomacy

In some countries NORAD supports opposition groups and minority Lutheran churches, even where this support runs contrary to the recipient government's policies. These organisations may be very efficient in development aid, and they may have stronger or weaker roots in the society. The point here is that this policy, with potentially important diplomatic consequences and repercussions, has been handled by the person in charge of NGO support, often working quite isolated from the rest of the office, not seldom a non-Norwegian and often with little diplomatic experience.

Foreign state support for national organisations is, of course, a touchy issue in any country (ref. the case study on Bangladesh). It would have been a big issue in Norway if it turned out that the government of Islamic country X had supported an organisation in Norway, through their embassy in Oslo, which was trying to organize students in Tromsø or Oslo so that they could "empower" themselves. Such support may be regarded as "right" and as important. That is not the case here. The problem is that neither the Norwegian Storting, the public, the Foreign Ministry nor NORAD have discussed how to handle these diplomatic aspects of NGO support. It is interesting, and reveals a great deal about the present historical era, that Norway and NORAD have engaged so actively in this support, without really discussing the relation between the "North" and the "South" that this reflects and the policy implications it may have.

A constant issue - NGO/state relations.

Some central policy issues (for both NORAD and NGOs).

Main findings: there is a constant need to define the nature of the political and social relationship between state and society (at least if the aim is to support NGOs in such societies). The relationship between government and third-sector organizations is far more complex than most rhetoric in current political debate would suggest. It is also far more difficult and important than NORAD apparently has believed it to be. As has been shown elsewhere, NORAD has never yet attempted an analysis of any particular country regarding this relationship, how it is likely to develop or how it should develop, what kind of organisations are most likely to forward the desired development, etc. The policy has mainly been ad hoc.

Within the "New Paradigm" NGOs are given a key role in furthering democratic development. In Norwegian politics their importance is described in more modest terms. The last Report to the Storting underlined their general importance in furthering democracy in developing countries (disregarding time and place), but also said it was important to

coordinate NGO support with governments (irrespective of time and space). Preconditions for democracy will vary, as will opinions of what it means, more than in a European donor context or a Norwegian context. The terms "democracy" and "pluralism" overlap in Report to the Storting No. 51 (1991 - 92) (as they generally do in aid literature). The conceived relation between NGOs promoting pluralism and diversity, teaching people to act on their own, to demand greater participation at all levels of decision-making as a counterweight to state-bureaucracy on the one hand and the building up of formal democratic institutions on the other hand, consequently becomes confused. There has been a clear and widespread tendency to mix ends (democratization) with means (pluralism, i.e. western style institutions or number of NGOs). The policy seems to have been unaware of internal dilemmas and contradictions, since there can be incompatibility between the promotion of democracy or pluralistic diversity and social and economic improvements of the poor. Furthermore, the form that this incompatibility takes will vary in time and space. There has not been much reflection on these issues. As long as this is the case, whether NGO support has promoted "democracy" and "civil society" or not, has been solely a question of chance.

NORAD has occasionally questioned the accountability of individual NGOs. However, NORAD has never discussed how to manage the permanent problems of accountability in the NGO channel as a whole (see Chapter V). Is it possible to develop democracy by bypassing legal and, in theory at least, accountable institutions by supporting organisations that have a structural accountability problem? The global liberalisation/privatisation drive in weak states might weaken democracy, although it increases pluralism. International and national NGOs often try to bypass what are regarded as cumbersome official procedures, thus circumventing legitimate state institutions. This has moved important decision-making processes out of more accountable institutions to NGOs, which are not seldom primarily accountable to external donors. In some places the NGO channel has created a situation in which everybody decides what is best for the country concerned, except those living there. NGOs may

shape national policies without having any mandate to do so, or any recognised place in the body politic. In some cases such NGOs may not be registered by the host government, or their registration is only a formality. This must be a problem for democratic development, also in cases where NGOs play an important, vibrant and positive role in public debates about development, equity, women's questions etc, as they have in some countries. The mushrooming of NGOs can lead to a weakening of popular organisations and political parties, as was the worry of some party strategists in Bangladesh. They regarded the government's policy of encouraging NGO as a tactical move to weaken the organized political opposition.

The particularistic approach of NGOs, the fact that they concentrate on and have to concentrate on particular areas or groups, while state institutions have a responsibility to ensure a reasonably fair distribution of services, might indirectly erode government accountability and legitimacy. This accountability problem has not been faced, therefore organisations that are accountable to no-one except to NORAD have been built up. In some cases organisations which have been accountable to political groups or a church leadership have been supported. In other cases support have been given to organisations, which almost from scratch, have gradually managed to increase their standing and legitimacy in society.

How can civil society be strengthened in cases where this is regarded as important, and what should be the role of development NGOs?³¹ The democratic and development potential of the NGO channel reflect relations between the society and the state. Societies are embedded in a concrete historical and economic-political context. Organisations in Norway (see table A.25) have organised millions of Norwegians as members. Two of the organisations involved in aid have about 1.3 million members and close to 800,000 members. These organisations are rooted in society to quite a different extent than the NGOs in Zimbabwe, for example, where very few have members at all. (An exception is the Red Cross which has more than 50,000 members). While many NGOs in Bangladesh have existed since the early 1970s, the majority

of Nicaraguan NGOs are only a few years old. The role of the state reflects its relationship with society, and the strength and efficiency of a third sector reflects the responsiveness of the surrounding political society and state. Rather than being at loggerheads, the two spheres are locked in a dialectical relationship in which they feed upon each other or often reinforce each other. Almost all the NGOs supported by NORAD and Norwegian NGOs reported that their relation to their government was "very good" or "good". In Nicaragua, on the other hand, four organisations said their relationship was "bad" and two that it was "very bad". For a donor, the recipient government and the relevant NGOs, it is necessary to assess this relationship and its development in a concrete way. And more directly relevant: to what extent are the NGOs in the country in focus at this particular time opting for confrontation or cooperation, and how would different NGOs be most likely to develop?

What has to be underlined is an obvious but nonetheless neglected point: any such strategy has to consider the varying role of NGOs from one country to another and from time to time in the same country. Discussion of their comparative advantages and role as crucial actors in a new "global" development strategy has encouraged generalizing studies. Much research and consultancy work discusses NGOs in "Latin America", in "Africa" in "Asia" etc., as if these geographical distinctions have relevance for the study of NGO/state relationships. This continental framework is not particularly fruitful, although convenient in a consultancy context (at least for consultancy businesses). The differences between countries on the same continent are too great, no matter how often they are carried out, or how many articles and conferences discuss the problem in this perspective. Some have emphasised the need for a "national style approach" to study cross-national variations (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990). This represents a step in the right direction, but it is insufficient in our case: the role and the relationship between NGOs and the state in many developing countries may undergo fundamental changes in short periods of time (the legal traditions and environment are usually more stable in western welfare states) and

because of the crucial role of external factors like donor policies.

It appears that NORAD has not developed an analysis of the character of state authority involved. To what extent, then, can NGO support be meaningful, since NGOs always operate in a macro legal or regulatory environment? Effective NGO activities might politically challenge the state and the elite, but can also erode the position and standing of the state or the government without presenting an alternative. The legitimacy of state structures and governments can be questioned unintentionally, as a result of successive NGO interventions (see the discussion of Norwegian Church Aid in the Southern Sudan in the period 1972-1985). The normal functions of the state can be "privatized", in this case not by sections of the national elite or foreign firms, but by altruistically oriented NGOs with headquarters in other countries. NGOs which are "going to the bush" (as many Norwegian NGOs have done), by providing services to poor rural populations or neglected rural areas, might ease the fiscal and management burden of the state, thus also playing an auxiliary role or the role of gap-fillers. If NGOs can mobilize (mostly external) resources and deliver goods to communities that otherwise would have been neglected, the state might be strengthened (which is often discussed in the literature) but also weakened (see Tvedt 1992). There can be no doubt that there are many empirical examples which can show that NGOs protect democracy and pluralism but also privilege and lack of accountability, create either innovation or paralysis, and are both instruments of, and competitors to, states. NORAD's policy has been superficial and *ad-hoc*.

A number of questions which should be asked all the time, not only about the "third sector", and the NGOs, but also about the state and the actors' future relations, have not been asked. Are the states too strong or too weak, is the relevant country still in a nation-building stage where the establishment of a national political arena and a national state administration is crucial? Is the state developing into a kind of federation or is it about to disintegrate, where the only viable political systems are regarded as being localised, or ethnically based?

Strategies and NGO/state relations

In chapter VI and in the related case studies the "civil society state dichotomy" was discussed. The aim was to identify some of the theoretical-ideological contexts which have influenced strategic thinking in the field, and to describe empirically some of the elements which will have to be considered in a well-reflected NGO strategy.

Here some other typologies and models will be presented, in order to highlight issues that have not so far been consciously integrated into strategy formulations, and in order to suggest ideas for future studies and policy formulations. Most of them have been developed to study relationships between the "third sector" and the state and hence also "third-sector" organisations and the state.

Gidron et al. have suggested one model which has been used in studies of welfare states. This is a typology of government nonprofit relations which may be of some use if the aim is to integrate NGO support with the plans of the recipient government. Central to this model is a distinction between two sets of activities that are involved in producing social services available to the population; first the financing and authorization of services; and secondly, the actual delivery of them.

a) *Government-dominant model.* Here the government plays the dominant role in both financing and delivery. The tax system is used to raise funds for the services, and government employees deliver these services.

b) *Third-sector-dominant model.* This is the opposite extreme. *Voluntary organizations* play the dominant role in both the financing and delivery of services. It prevails where opposition to government involvement in social welfare provision is strong for either ideological or sectarian reasons, or where the need for such services has not yet been widely accepted.

c) *Dual model.* In between these two extremes are two hybrid models, referred to as the "dual or parallel-track models". Here non-profits supplement the services provided by the state,

delivering the same kinds of services but to clients not reached by the state. Alternatively, third-sector organisations can complement the of government services by meeting needs not met by the government.

d) *Collaborative model.* Here the two sectors work together rather than separately. The non-profits can function as agents of government programmes, termed the "collaborative-vendor" model. Alternatively, they can retain a considerable amount of autonomy and direction, termed a "collaborative-partnership" model.

This model is critical to the dichotomization between society and state or between the third and the first sector. Research has shown that the collaborative model is most common in welfare states, at least according to much recent research (Kramer, 1981 and Salamon, 1981). For most developing countries in which NORAD is involved, a version of the "dual model" seems most appropriate, because the state has neither the financial nor the administrative capacities to produce the services needed. The donor comes in to fill at least of the gap. The model introduces some useful concepts, but for understanding "third sector" relations with states in developing countries it is too formalistic. It says nothing about how the NGOs and the rest of the organisational field relate ideologically to the state and government. Nor does it deal with the power dimension, be it the power of the state or of the international NGO channel. It is also important that it does not catch a relation in which external donor linkages might be more important than national traditions or "styles" in forming this relationship. Moreover, the model will tend to place too much emphasis on structural model characteristics and underrate the very radical shifts in sector relations that may take place and have taken place in many developing countries within short periods of time. Neither does it capture the importance of the NGO channel in creating and forming the third sector itself, and indirectly (and sometimes directly) its relation to the state and government.

Another model has been proposed by Kuhnle and Selle for the study of organisations in welfare states (Kuhnle and Selle 1992). The first dimension relates to how close organisations are

to the state with respect to the scope, frequency and ease of communication and contact. Organisations might either be near, and hence integrated with the state, or distant, and separated from it. Political traditions and culture determine how great the ideological distance between state and voluntary organisations can be while close contact is maintained. (Ibid:26) In a "state-friendly society", the distance can be great, with great likelihood of adaptation and integration over time (Morken and Selle 1992). Great ideological distance does not preclude nearness in terms of communication and contact. The extent of communication may also simply be dependent upon the size of the country and the population (Ibid.: 27), consequently; "physical nearness does not imply ideological nearness" (Ibid.) and vice versa. This model highlights important relations and includes power relations at the same time as the NGO/state dichotomy is evaded. However, it does not catch the particular characteristics of the NGO channel and the role of NGOs in developing countries (this is also natural, since the model has been developed within a western welfare context). Some NGOs may be "distant" from the national government but close to a donor government and vice versa, and what is "distance" will vary extremely (the difference between the landscape in Ethiopia and in Bangladesh provides very different physical barriers, so that what appears to be very distant in Ethiopia is simply a reflection of canyons and ravines making communication almost impossible in large areas, while "nearness" in Bangladesh might express that all live on a plain where 80 % of the country is less than 10 metres above sea level).

Some argue that there is a relation between open, pluralist systems and the extent to which NGOs may enhance diversity (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990: 151). In corporatist systems they will tend to develop "welfare cartels" or "supply oligopolies" of social services. In other countries they provide institutional infrastructures for segmented and potentially antagonistic publics.³² This model pays attention to the different roles (they may enhance diversity but also develop into "supply oligopolies") that NGOs may play in contexts where the state's character varies. Research on most of the countries in which

Norway is working has not come very far in this field. This shows that what NORAD has done should not be criticized, as much as it should be understood as a reflection of the general state of knowledge.

What is important is that the differences between, and the multiplicity of, institutional arrangements in countries like Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Mozambique make it necessary to distinguish between different patterns of cooperation and conflict which operate jointly or separately in different countries at different times. In some countries there might be a contradiction between nation building and the proliferation of NGOs, while in other countries this may strengthen both the state and society. In a state where the citizens feel attached to existing state borders the consequences will be different than in multiethnic societies where the legitimacy of the state is fundamentally questioned, or where politics basically reflect ethnic or particularistic interests. To support diversity or a proliferation of organisations in a society where the issue is not who are the legitimate rulers of the state but whether the state itself has a right to exist, is a very different intervention with other implications than supporting diversity in a society with a bureaucratic and monolithic state structure which has undisputed or a relatively strong legitimacy. NORAD works in both types of countries but has a policy which describes the need and role for NGOs and states as basically identical.

NORAD's policy in the past must also be seen on a background of the general knowledge of and attention to these issues, and the poverty of Norwegian (and other donors') overall strategies for the field. Strategies have been superficial and too general, and have not addressed the crucial long term issue of state society relations, with a general disregard of the power aspect inherent in this kind of assistance.

NORAD'S SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (INGOS).

Main findings: Support for international NGOs has been effective in putting some of the issues that Norway has considered as important, on the international agenda. On the other hand, NORAD has put an end to a practice whereby international NGOs, much more easily than similar Norwegian organisations and institutions, have been able to receive relatively large sums of money, based on personal networks and lobbying.

A short history

In 1963, when the first guidelines for support for NGOs were set on, only Norwegian organisations were eligible to apply. During the 1960s, however, some international organisations were granted support, but only when they established offices in Norway (the *Salvation Army* and *Caritas*). Other international organisations received indirect support from the Norwegian government via Norwegian NGOs as part of their international network (Lutheran World Federation and World Council of Churches). In the beginning of the 1970s NORAD was approached by an increasing number of international organisations, especially in the main cooperating countries. Several of these organisations applied to NORAD for projects that NORAD found well adapted to the local situation, but it had to turn down these applications according to the guidelines.

Simultaneously, there was a growing interest in such cooperation both within NORAD and internationally. The Committee for Foreign Affairs in the Norwegian parliament, in its comments (Innst. S. nr. 192 (1975-76)) to the government's Report to the Storting No 94 (1974-75), "On Norwegian economic cooperation with the developing countries" announced its interest for the support of "... private international organisations that are engaged in relevant projects" in Norway's main cooperating countries. Subsequently the departmental committee proposed new guidelines and principles for this type of NGO

support by NORAD. On this background the NORAD board discussed the new guidelines for NGOs in a meeting on 11 July 1977. The preparatory paper for the meeting held that such support would be very difficult to monitor and control if it was not confined to the main cooperative countries (SD-80/77:8). In the new guidelines issued in 1977, Norwegian, international and local organisations in NORAD's main cooperating countries were eligible for support.

This resulted in an "explosion" of applications to NORAD. As early as 1979 they decided to restrict the "window" to international organisations. In line with the 1979 guidelines, NORAD encouraged indigenous organisations in its main cooperating countries to apply for financial support. The 1979 guidelines stated that:

International private organisations that do not have any separate division or organisational establishment in Norway may only obtain support for schemes in Norway's main cooperating countries in partnership with Norwegian or national organisations.

The term "national organisation" here meant "indigenous or local organisations" in the main cooperating country. A careful opening was given for such international organisations, but it was not until 1981 that the first NOK 300,000 NOK were granted to different INGOs via NORAD's budgets.

While NORAD proceeded carefully, and after long discussions decided to allocate NOK 300,000, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry had followed a very different practice. In 1972 Report to the Storting No. 29 (1971-72) stated that "humanitarian aid" to international organisations could be given in certain cases. It was also decided by Parliament to give the Ministry permission to support "national and people's organisations" in these countries. This came to mean organisations like FRELIMO in Mozambique and the ANC. During the 1970s and 1980s such financial support was given to an increasing extent by different offices and over special budget items in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Report No. 14 to the Storting: "On Norway's cooperation with the developing

countries in 1981" states in the same year as a very modest step was taken in NORAD, that NOK 16.5 mill had been granted by the Ministry to liberation movements in southern Africa. An additional NOK 33 mill was granted SWAPO, ANC and PAC the same year. NOK 187 mill was granted that year to a wide range of organisations under the budgets for humanitarian aid and international emergencies in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including the UN system, the International Red Cross, and "numerous Norwegian and international organisations." (Op.cit.p.69)

An ad hoc policy

Right from the beginning there have been two rather different attitudes to and use of these organisations in NORAD and the Foreign Ministry. This was further developed during the 1980s and 90s.

The guidelines for NORAD support for INGOs were not changed before the 1992 guidelines were issued. NORAD continued to increase its support for INGOs. The special grants and new budget items earmarked for special purposes made INGOs a suitable partner since they were regarded as having special competence within some of these areas. These grants were often given in combination with international discussions and projects, often sponsored by organisations within the United Nations. The UN conference on women in Nairobi in 1985 was followed by a separate budget item and a unit within the ministry was established. In 1987 a special grant for human rights issues was established, later called the "Human rights and democracy grant", and special grants for environmental issues were increased at the time of the Brundtland Report on the environment and development. Other such special grants allocated over specific budgetary chapters were for education, information, the Sudan-Sahel-Ethiopia programme and the regional grants for Africa and Central America. In addition, certain INGOs were given support outside these budget items.

The number of INGOs supported grew fast. Several received money through different

"windows", both within NORAD, the Ministry of Development Cooperation (DUH) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In 1989, PANOS and the International Union for the Conservation of Native and Natural Resources (IUCN), for example received support from respectively four and five different offices. No single office had an adequate survey of how many or which organisations were receiving support in the whole of MFA. In an effort to get to grips with this situation the administration of DUH made a list of such INGOs in 1989. (Note by Multilateral Unit 24 January 1989. See appendix no. XXX)

It was discovered that several of these INGOs were supported by many offices, without any coordination or internal information. A total of five offices in NORAD and four offices in DUH, in addition to support via the top directors at both institutions, had allocated grants to 72 schemes by 52 INGOs. There were no overall policy or guidelines to regulate this kind of cooperation. Experiences in NORAD and DUH were discussed. It was noted: "A fragmentation of the budgetary and administrative responsibility has at certain times created significant problems. This reflects a lack of overview and coordination within NORAD (and between NORAD and MFA), unclear communication lines, NORAD's restricted possibility of being able to speak with one voice (multiple communication) towards the same cooperation partner; INGOs use of several "straws"/ multiple financial possibilities within the same institution (Note on NORADs cooperation with international private organisations. Priv/PFK. 16.3 1993).

New guidelines

The lack of routines and policy led to an ad-hoc policy (Ibid). An initiative was taken to discuss and review current practice in this field. A meeting in February 1989 tried to reach an agreement regarding budgetary responsibility for these organisations. The meeting pointed out several difficulties, however: lack of definition of this type of NGO; how to differentiate between international and local NGOs; difficulties of placing the responsibility for many

of the "windows", especially the "global programmes". The meeting was not able to agree upon a unified policy on the issue, but simply asked the administration to make annual surveys of these INGOs.

This was clearly not a satisfactory solution. Two years later many uncoordinated actions and decisions renewed NORAD's interests in making an overall policy and obtaining a satisfactory overview of the situation. A new process was started by the PFK unit to streamline practices in NORAD and possibly within the ministries as well. This process took two years, and developed in stages; mapping of INGOs; clarification as to overall policy on INGOs; division of labour between MFA and NORAD; streamlining of practice according to overall development policy within NORAD; administrative decisions and implementation, including information to regional and country offices etc.

The PFK unit was given overall responsibility for coordination within NORAD from 1992. A new coordination "model" was agreed upon between NORAD and MFA. MFA was to provide budgetary support (core support) and programme support when that is deemed to be an integral part of core support. NORAD might also give programme support, but only in cases where these programmes were part of other NORAD-supported activities. NORAD was given the responsibility for "project support". NORAD's Country Offices could render support when such activity was part of local initiatives.

Internal communication lines were also agreed upon. However, MFA's multilateral unit had clear reservations, and stated that they needed room for flexible practices in order to respond to special needs.

During 1992, the PFK unit through the NGO Division started its "cleaning-up action". In a note dated February 1992, clear proposals on definitions of INGOs, budgetary responsibilities, administrative routines, communication lines and streamlining according to overall Norwegian development policy were outlined. This initiative won general acclaim. Proposals were subsequently put forward and implemented for all the relevant budget items and special global

schemes, etc. The board of directors of NORAD finally approved these proposals in April 1993, and agreed that in the future the PFK unit should work out annual overviews and propose frames and grants every year. In this way a concerted practice and policy could be attained.³³

However, PFK/NGO Division discovered that concerted action with MFA was not without problems. An internal note from January 1994 by the NGO Division questioned the will and ability within MF to be subordinated to coordination with NORAD in this matter: the unilateral decision by MF in 1993 to earmark part of the environmental grant for "political issues and ad-hoc schemes" created uncertainties (Note, Privorg 10.1 1994 p.16)

Two different attitudes and cultures regarding support for NGOs have developed (this is also the case with support for Norwegian NGOs and indigenous NGOs). NORAD has developed a cautious practice whereby coordination and planned activities in a long-term perspective are important. The MFA lives on the other hand in a less predictable environment, where quick political decisions have to be taken to reach what is considered as politically necessary.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SEARCH FOR AN NGO STRATEGY.³⁴

Main findings: the most important development in the Norwegian NGO system during the past few years is related to changes in the NGO policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). While NORAD has had rather close relations with Norwegian NGOs since the mid-70s, the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has changed from one of relative lack of interest to one of very active consultation and cooperation. The history of this kind of support is short in Norway. Assessment of experiences will tend to be coloured by *ad hoc* impressions. There can be no doubt that MFA has been very active in its NGO policy, but whether the system or the administrative set-up is optimal for reaching the aims put forth by the Storting irrespective of the politicians in charge of the emergency and human rights funds, is not clear.

This chapter will put this new policy in a comparative context. It will also discuss how this policy has related to the growth of what have been called complex emergencies, and some dilemmas it has created within the Norwegian NGO channel.

Foreign policy and NGO support

The first issue relates to the problem of NGOs as political actors contracted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The image of the NGOs as humanitarian, neutral and apolitical actors has some basis in reality in Norway. By and large, however, NGOs have played clear political roles, more often than not in tandem with official government policies in their home country. The NGO channel in aid emerged primarily because western donor governments in the 1960 thought it useful for various system purposes (see chapter II and III), but also - and this will be focused on here - as allies in difficult and touchy foreign policy issues.

From this angle, the MFA's policy has implied bringing Norwegian NGO policy in line with what has been a main feature of the channel internationally. In most donor countries development NGOs have played, and partly emerged, as instruments of or, at least, as allies of the governments' foreign policy. Even before the aid era they played an important role in supporting European state policies in overseas colonial regions (the historical literature basically agrees on this role of British, Portuguese and French mission organisations).³⁵ The Red Cross societies are also forerunners of the more recent NGO channel, and have been closely linked with national government support, funds and foreign policy interests, since their emergence was associated with caring for each nation's wounded during wartime.³⁶ In many countries, developing countries included, Red Cross or Red Crescent societies have the status of semi-official government agencies,³⁷ and have been regarded and used as policy instruments.

The U.S. government in particular, beginning

around World War I, came to see the value of NGOs "when it could not act officially to promote its interests abroad". They were "surrogates for U.S. government interests in neutrality periods during the two world wars and in the Soviet Union in the early 1920s" (Smith 1990:43). Their role was in "complementing foreign policy efforts of their home governments during wartime (particularly the United States in the first half of this century" (Smith 1990:27). There were, of course, exceptions to this general trend in the U.S., as there were in Europe where, for example, Oxfam Famine Relief Committee in Great Britain expressed open dissent with the policies of the London government. Foreign policy makers in most countries have long regarded NGOs or voluntary organisations as potential instruments in conducting a foreign policy the state cannot so easily do. Most public donors regard NGOs as having special advantages in political conflict situations.³⁸ The reason is that they can bypass problems which the established rules for state-to-state conduct have created (see case study on the Emergency Relief Desk). NGOs are also regarded as especially efficient in emergency situations; they act swiftly and they can mobilise popular support for different initiatives.³⁹ Generally speaking, voluntary organisations, with some few but very important exceptions, have for several decades usually accommodated such government strategies or policies.

The initiative behind aid and also the plan to involve voluntary organisations in government aid support came from the U.S. governments in the post World War II period. Truman proposed the "Point Four" programme, but as early as 1946 his administration wanted "to tie together the government and private programmes in the field of foreign aid". In the same year he appointed an Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid attached to the Department of State and composed of representatives of the organisations and the government (Smith 1990:45-46). This started a period of cooperation between U.S. NGOs and the State Department which has continued until today.⁴⁰ The general argument from the government and Congress has been that support for private organisations would heighten their visibility and thereby, it was hoped, increase support for all foreign assistance

programmes, governmental and private.⁴¹ In addition the help would more efficiently reach the most needy (bypass corrupt governments, UN organisations, where the Soviets had a role in administration of resources and could therefore mean setbacks in the Cold War), and act as useful channels for getting rid of surplus agricultural produce (see Food Aid and Foreign Aid). The majority of American NGOs accepted their role, and were important supporters of American policy in the Korean war and the Vietnam war.⁴²

The U.S. government regarded aid as a political question and as a weapon in the Cold War, and in its efforts to dismantle the colonial system of the old European powers. They initiated the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD, founded 1960) and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1961. They urged other Western states to become more involved in aid. To increase public support for more aid and more specifically, to the Development Decade declared by the UN General Assembly in 1961, voluntary organisations were regarded as important. Several governments started to support NGOs, and in 1963 a resolution was put forth in the UN by Britain and four other North Atlantic nations that underlined that NGOs should be mobilized in aid. After having established "Norsk Utviklingshjelp" in 1962 (NORAD's predecessor), the Norwegian government channelled money to Norwegian NGOs in the same year.

But while governments in former and existing colonial countries were motivated by the wish to (1) create a humanitarian image for themselves in ex-colonial territories, (2) get a "foot in the door" economically in the developing world through private surrogates where no colonial heritage existed, and (3) stimulate a greater domestic interest in international questions (based on Smith 1990:109), Norwegian policy was formulated in a different context. The policy of course was regarded as part and parcel of a Western strategy to stop communism and to promote democracy and social justice, i.e. to export "neutral" values, as it was said, as a disguise of general Western and Norwegian social democratic ideas. The channel was

established at the height of the Cold War, just after the U-2 plane had been shot down over the Soviet Union, and the Cuban missile crisis. For the government and the NGOs to think in this way, therefore, was so natural that it need not even be underlined (later developments have shown that this American and Western strategy was a successful step in the effort to stop communism). But the Norwegian government had neither a national image to remake nor national business interests to further. In this context the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not very interested in what the NGOs were actually doing (as long as they were seen as strengthening public support for aid, and did not do anything abroad that actually damaged Norwegian and allied interests). By controlling funds for political and humanitarian interventions (First and Second Political Division) channelled through NGOs they had, however, more leverage than the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had. In Sweden it had been decided that all such support should be handled by SIDA, or the SEO bureau.

This short historical summary shows that NGOs and foreign policy interests have been commingled since the birth of the channel. Governments have used NGOs, and NGOs have used governments. Some differences between the Norwegian context and some other donor countries have been indicated. In the following sections the importance and relevance of these differences will be discussed.

Norwegian foreign policy and NGOs

Policy line

The current policy is laid out in Report to the Storting No. 51 (1991-92). Its strategy is not very clear when it comes to how MFA initiatives for NGO support, based on Norwegian opinions and attitudes, should be mixed with what is underlined as the most important principle in Norwegian assistance; that it shall be "recipient oriented" and "be part of" the country's own plans and priorities. Report no. 51 also underlines that the crisis of the 1980s has weakened the administrative apparatus in many developing countries, and their ability to

administer these developments. The donors have "in many instances started to operate on the side of the national administrative apparatus" (p.32.) Norway will gradually implement the principle of "recipient responsibility for planning and implementation of development projects and initiatives. It argues in support of using the expertise and competence of the Norwegian NGOs in emergency situations, in disaster work and as channels for support for human rights issues and democratization. The Report does not discuss the possibilities of using local NGOs for such work, or whether it is possible to find a balance between government and NGOs in recipient countries for such work.

The government also argued that it is very important to place more emphasis on preventive measures, both in relation to natural disasters and refugee situations. The government also called for "an optimal effective organisation of international emergency assistance" and "to coordinate development cooperation for more long-term rehabilitation activities" (p:33). At the same time one should attempt to relate emergency assistance and long term development aid to each other.

The official policy does not reflect on the role of the NGOs as foreign policy actors in conflict situations, to what extent the NGO actors should be involved in complicated foreign policy issues, paid in fact by the state but accountable to none (which has been the case in some places) and whether important foreign policy issues (perhaps not important in Norwegian public opinion but in countries in which Norwegian actors intervene) should be "privatized" in a way which makes constitutional control less easy. This chapter will not go into these problems, but rather focus on some specific contexts of Norwegian aid and case studies showing how cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NGOs has functioned.

Until the end of the 1980s, the Norwegian government and MFA followed until the end of the 1980s, an *ad hoc* policy regarding the use of Norwegian NGOs for foreign policy purposes. Norwegian NGOs channelled money to groups fighting apartheid, but this did not make a policy. It was regarded as difficult but natural, in

such and similar obviously "just" cases. Since 1977 Norway has been giving assistance to refugee camps outside South Africa; the assistance was not regarded as political, although indirectly it was a support for the ANC. Norway played a very low key, both in talking about this support and in claiming honour for it afterwards. Nobody talked about contracting NGOs before the 1990s.

However, Norwegian NGO have been involved in political activities; some worked in close cooperation with political organisations, in some cases political organisations disguised as humanitarian or neutral NGOs, both in Southern Africa, Nicaragua, Eritrea and Palestine. In quite a few situations they have influenced Norwegian foreign policy in the third world. Exerting influence of this type is easier in Norway than in countries where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has to defend important domestic business interests, strategic interests etc. in these countries. But the aim was generally limited to solidarity in support of certain groups. It was first in the early 1990s that NGOs started to plan, with MFA's support, to intervene directly in and influence political processes. In this perspective, the policy of NCA in Ethiopia and Eritrea before, during and after the fall of Mengistu is a new departure in Norwegian foreign policy and NGO policy. The General Secretary of NCA functioned as a kind of Norwegian diplomat in the Horn of Africa, and was partly financed by the Foreign Ministry.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NGOs

The close and very direct connection between a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NGOs is not a common trait in donor countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, i.e. the department of state directly under the Foreign Minister, has developed a clear strategy for NGOs, which is pursued with great energy.⁴³ It is very different from the set-up in Sweden, for example, where SIDA deals with both long-term development and emergency allocations, and where political intervention as a rule is not allowed to interfere with decisions about where the money should go. On the surface the Norwegian model resembles more established superpower patterns,

where the state uses "its" NGOs as policy instruments, though often in a less direct manner than is possible in Norway.⁴⁴ The Norwegian model is different because the structural conditions are not the same.

It is too early to analyze the effect and impact of this policy. What seems clear, however, is that the end of the Cold War has made more room for smaller states on the international arena; Norway's position is stronger and NGO potentials in such areas are increased. This has already created, and will most likely create, a wider scope for Norwegian foreign policy and NGOs in the years to come.

The question remains: how efficient is the NGO channel as an instrument for Norwegian foreign policy? To what extent has the MFA been able to influence and govern organisations' activities, and to what extent have organisations been willing and able to follow what have been put forward as policy aims? Furthermore; to what extent will this policy in the long run undermine a main premise of this policy - that the organisations are regarded as humanitarian, neutral do-gooders? Here we briefly present two cases that can be used to illuminate some of the problems and dilemmas inherent in this policy.

A case study: The MFA and the emergency situation in the Horn of Africa

As shown in a separate case study, Norwegian Church Aid played a very important role as the lead agency in the Emergency Relief Desk, operating "cross-border" from Sudan into rebel-held areas during a crucial period in the wars between Eritrea and Ethiopia and in the internal rebellion against the Mengistu regime in Addis Ababa. During the 1980s NCA received part of its funding money from the Ministry for Development Cooperation (Emergency Division) and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Second Political Division) for this operation (see Figure A 13). The government's support was substantial and important parts of it went to areas outside the control of the Ethiopian Government. In the period 1984 to 1989, emergency support for Ethiopia totalled more than NOK 391 mill; of which NOK 124 was given by the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and NOK 267 by DUH. In addition to this, NORAD gave about NOK 255 mill. in development aid. In this period more than half of the aid to Ethiopia went to areas outside the control of the Addis Ababa government, of which in 1989 NOK 21,626,275 came from MFA and NOK 15,600,000 from the Emergency Division, DUH. Between 1.9.1989 and 10.5.1990, the Norwegian state gave NOK 131.8 million for emergency activities in Eritrea and Ethiopia. Most of the money, NOK 107.3 million, went to cross-border operations and NOK 24.5 million to areas controlled by the government. Almost all this money was channelled through Norwegian NGOs, primarily NCA.

This section will discuss the role of MFA, and to what extent it "controlled" developments or became the "captive" of the organisations, rather than the organisations becoming instruments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This will be compared with the policy on the war in the Sudan. Here the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) had taken up arms against what it called the illegitimate regime in Khartoum in 1983.⁴⁵ Since 1986 the Norwegian government (the funds came from the Emergency Division and the Political Divisions) supported both NPA, working in SPLA-controlled areas, and NCA, working on both sides, with annual amounts of cash that made Sudan the second most important NGO arena of operations.

A thorough presentation of this story would have shown that the main actors in shaping this policy were the organisations themselves, based on the relations that they had built up over time with local and regional actors. To the extent that anybody had a clear vision of the complexity of the situation they were involved in and what the outcome of these huge emergency operations could be, the NGOs and not the MFA were calling the tune. The MFA did not have a clear-cut strategy regarding the two big issues: the question of Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia and the unity of the Sudan. Neither did they have a clear idea of the complicated context in which the NGOs operated, while their "humanitarian policy" was so broad that the NGOs could manoeuvre within it. The main reason why Norway became politically involved in these

conflict areas (and not in other areas to the same extent) was not basic policy considerations or an assessment of the importance of these issues, but mainly because of the fact that Norwegian NGOs were working there. During the 1980s, Ethiopia and the Sudan were the two countries that received most funds via the NGO channel, in some years close to 25 % of the entire budget (Dalseng 1992:41, in Tvedt 1993).

Norway and the Eritrea question

Due to historical accidents, Norway and Norwegian foreign policy have twice played a very important role in the history of the Horn of Africa in general and Eritrean/Ethiopian relations in particular. In 1952, when the UN decided the future of Eritrea, Norway was a member of the Eritrean Commission and opted for unification with Ethiopia.⁴⁶ 30 years later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed a very different policy, but without prior and systematic discussions about the Norwegian attitude to Eritrean independence or a strategic discussion of a new policy line. The Norwegian government's humanitarian support for ERD, led by NCA, through an implementing agent, ERA at the receiving end, boosted the standing and political and economic power of the guerilla army EPLF, and of the TPLF in Tigray, Ethiopia.⁴⁷ The support was undoubtedly an important factor in the Eritrean victory in their struggle for independence, as it was for TPLF's victory in Ethiopia (interview with REST, Addis Ababa in February 1994 and with ERRA, Asmara, February 1994). The requirements for a policy line were neglected, because nobody seems to have had time or knowledge enough to assess the importance or the implications of this support for crucial regional developments.

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs took active part in an operation that was regarded by the Ethiopian government as a violation of the country's territorial integrity and national sovereignty.⁴⁸ There can be no doubt that Norway did violate what is generally regarded as a ruling principle in state-to-state relationships: territorial integrity and sovereignty. The operation could nonetheless continue because the Mengistu regime was very unpopular, both in

Western opinion and by important Western governments at the time; Reagan in the U.S. and Thatcher in Britain. The cross-border operation was also facilitated by the fact that the Ethiopian government had neither the strength nor the capacity to control the inflow of food and aid, although they in 1988 threatened to bomb everybody who crossed the border from Sudan. This particular situation made it possible to continue with this policy, without addressing the principles, aims and impact of the support.

The Norwegian government knew that the UN had to operate in agreement or after agreement with the government, and was thus constrained in its relief efforts. Norway also supported drought victims via the Joint Relief Partnership, which opened a supply route within Ethiopia from the south to Wollo and the north. The Norwegian government attempted to maintain its support for Ethiopia, also as a balancing act. Norway was well aware that the government in Addis Ababa knew about Norway's policy, but they did not want to make it "an issue". The Norwegian government was initially very careful in mentioning support for the "liberated areas", for fear that relations with the Ethiopian government might deteriorate, and among other consequences, make the work of other NGOs in the country more difficult. They did not report this support to the UN system before 1990. The aim was restated again and again; humanitarian support to both parties in the war.⁴⁹ The Emergency Division justified its support on purely humanitarian grounds; the suffering was worst in Eritrea/Tigray etc, and therefore it was natural that they should get most.

The justification and the "humanitarian argument".

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Emergency Division alternated during the whole of this period alternated between calling ERA and REST "humanitarian organisations" and the "humanitarian arms of political organisations". The implications of these important distinctions were apparently tuned down. The unclear grasp (or conscious representation) of the highly political aspects of the emergency operation comes through in various organisations'

applications: MFA received applications presenting quite different pictures of the ERA and REST. Redd Barna wrote a report, also despatched to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1985. It described ERA in this way: "ERA's concern is primarily humanitarian. Although ERA in principle is autonomous; its cooperation with the EPLF is extremely close. Projects are undertaken only with EPLF's implicit or explicit approval, EPLF personnel frequently work side by side with ERA people in ERA projects, and ERA borrows equipment from EPLF on an *ad hoc* basis. All ERA vehicles, for example, are serviced in EPLF's network of workshops and garages". (see Terje Todesen, Mission report. Travels in the Sudan and Eritrea 17 December 1984 - 2 January 1985 to evaluate present and possible future Redd Barna support for Eritrea.) Redd Barna got support for porridge production at a "Revolutionary school" inside Eritrea. SAIH, for its part, described REST as "a sovereign organisation in the areas controlled by TPLF" (SAIH, Søknad om støtte til innkjøp av læremidler for grunnskoler i Tigray, 26.9.1985). It obtained support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 1985. The Norwegian Red Cross described ERA as "an autonomous private organisation which cooperates closely with EPLF" (Søknad fra Norges Røde Kors om støtte til den Intrnasjonale Røde Kors komiteens hjelpeaksjon i Eritrea, UD, N&F-enheten, 4.9.1985.) By avoiding discussions of the local organisations' status and role in the wars, a political decision on the Ethiopian/Eritrean question could also be avoided, or at least postponed.⁵⁰ The strong pro-Eritrean opinion in Norway made it necessary to act, but it did not make it necessary to consider the overall impacts of these acts. In discussions with the organisations, political issues were seldom mentioned. The state's role became more and more to assess the amount of money which should be channelled rather than the political implications of support.

However, ERD's and Norway's support affected power relations on the Horn of Africa. In November 1987 ICRC appealed for support for the "roads to survival", which was regarded as a threat to ERA/REST, because it would make the cross-border operation less important. Their "monopoly" would be threatened. At the same

time the Americans issued statements critical of EPLF. The EEC also issued a condemnation of the EPLF attack in November 1987. The Norwegian government maintained a low humanitarian profile, while influencing developments on the grand scale. On May 15 1988 the Ethiopian government had declared a state of emergency; it established a ten kilometre no-man's zone along the Sudanese border, threatening to bomb anyone caught entering it, a sign which clearly indicated the political importance of the route. In June 1988 the British House of Commons voiced a concern that had never bothered Norway very much: there was very little control over the food aid which was given to ERA and REST. In summer 1988 NPA applied for support for a transport component in cross-border relief operations. They asked for NOK 15,600,000 for ERA and REST. The support should be given as a general allocation, and not be earmarked for any particular part of their programme. ERA prepared an analysis which stated that they needed 300 trucks in 1990 (NOFO to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26.1.1990). NPA wrote that the scepticism of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in allocating money for this component (which could be used for military purposes) created a sense of distrust in ERA and REST. In August the programme was supported although these reservations were made, and NPA, as an important member of a transport consortium, also contributed to the creation of a considerable transport fleet which, of course, was not only used for transport of food. After all, the Eritreans were fighting a war that had lasted for almost 30 years, and which had caused tens of thousands of deaths, against an army that was the second biggest and perhaps the most brutal in Africa. ERA and REST were, of course, more interested in winning the war than complying with some Norwegians' insistence that food and trucks should only be used for humanitarian purposes. In November 1988 the Washington Post announced that the American government would launch a major cross-border support effort for Eritrea and Tigray, and in 1990 ERD had a budget of over NOK 1 billion. That turned the balance, the whole situation changed and MFA assessed their support as a success, without having to reflect on the consequences of this new policy line.

This short summary of the dramatic change in policy that had taken place since 1952, and the role of the ERD operation both in creating new power relations in the Horn of Africa and drawing a political map that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had never thought in terms of, may indicate the importance of emergency operations and how the use of an NGO channel may affect policies and create room for manoeuvring. This case demonstrates some of the problems a smaller state like Norway may have in the follow-up of this kind of policy, whether the constraints are competence or traditions. Norway was on the "winning side"; ERA and EPLF came to power in Eritrea, and REST and TPLF came to power in Addis Ababa. The map had been changed with Norwegian support, but not as a result of deliberate, long-term policies and without being followed up with either business investment or aid. The example can demonstrate the weight of the humanitarian agenda in Norway, and that this kind of emergency initiative, motivated by humanitarian concerns, is difficult to convert into political or economic gains. In 1992 Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported Eritrea with NOK 58,589,119. Support for democracy was primarily money to the Bergen firm, W. Giertsen for printing machines and support for the referendum. They also supported NCA in their effort to build up an independent newspaper in Asmara with NOK 1 million and support for the Institute for Human Rights (election observers). In 1991 it was decided to allocate NOK 3.7 mill. for democracy initiatives in Ethiopia. NOK 3.4 million was given to the Norwegian Trade Council to purchase "goods and services" for the new national assembly in Ethiopia. The countries get far less aid than before, and in 1994, MFA and NORAD are still discussing fundamental aspects of how Norwegian development assistance should be organized in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The arguments set forth in the UN Commission of 1952 may have been right or wrong. That is not the case here. What is interesting is that MFA and the Emergency Division implemented a policy that would have direct opposite consequences without apparently contemplating the implications of that policy. The issue had become a domestic policy issue, and the

humanitarian mandate was regarded accordingly, and dealt with by ERD with its "neutral" implementing agencies. The radical shift in actual policy in a geopolitical area that has been regarded for centuries as strategically very important, was not discovered. The NGOs had not so much been contracted by the MFA, as the NGOs had contracted the MFA. NCA was an efficient lead agency of ERD. The organisation was also very efficient in mobilising the Norwegian government to support ERD, which gave ERD credibility. MFA for its part, had a channel through which it could do something to alleviate the consequences of drought and the war - but on the other side it had suddenly got a political instrument in its hands that it did not have any clear idea of how to use it.

A case study: The Sudan

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs faced related but different problems in Southern Sudan and the handling of the "humanitarian mandate" in that civil war. The international situation was also somewhat different. In Southern Sudan it was clear that the UN General Secretary, de Cuellar, had personally forbidden UNHCR and WFP to cooperate with SPLA in 1986. To support SRRA, the humanitarian arm of the SPLA, was therefore politically much more risky, also because Eritrea had a different international status (there were disagreements as to whether they had the right to secede or not). The history of Norwegian NGO involvement also took on a different character, it was more high-profile and politicized.

At about the time that the UN was forbidding cooperation with SPLA/SRRA, Egil Hagen, on assignment for Norwegian Peoples' Aid, left Nairobi with two lorries with 50 tonnes of grain for Southern Sudan and SPLA-controlled areas. He brought along a journalist from the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation. The grain came from the EEC, but since WFP was not able to do anything with it, NPA and Hagen had taken on the job. NPA planned to apply for transport support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which at this time was not involved.

On the one hand, the Norwegian government was

positive to the idea of providing humanitarian relief, also for people in SPLA-controlled areas. On the other hand it recognized the difficult diplomacy involved. In line with other countries, Norway wanted to be careful. One factor which impacted discussions was NCA's role in South Sudan and the huge project there (see the case study on NCA in Southern Sudan). A main problem, seen from the MFA's point of view, was that Hagen's initiative and the media coverage would most likely increase pressure on them to act. It was important to avoid a situation in which the Ministry would be forced to argue openly about what were conceived as touchy issues from a diplomatic point of view. By swiftly accepting the application, combined with a wish that NPA should be very low-key regarding publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs's support, the problem could be solved. NCA was very critical of Hagen's activities and of the support NPA got from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, partly because it was seen as jeopardizing the working prospects of all NGOs in the area, but also because Hagen was regarded as too liberal in monitoring of aid distributions in the field. NPA's application had stated that Hagen would be personally responsible for transport and distribution. It turned out that Hagen had left the grain in Nurus and proceeded to Mogot together with the NRK journalist, who later made the whole story public in *Verdens Gang*. When Hagen was back in Nairobi, the EEC withdrew their agreement with Hagen, due to the publicity. 1535 tonnes of grain would not be given free of charge to Hagen. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had already given an oral commitment to support him. What to do now? The conditions had changed with the EEC's withdrawal of support.

The situation in the Southern Sudan went from bad to worse. Now NCA had also decided to start work on both sides, being aware that this might make them an organisation "non-grata" in Sudan. They wanted support from the Norwegian government in this. NCA followed a different policy from their ERD operation and from that of NPA. It was important that the government in Khartoum should at least tacitly agree, and they put more emphasis on donor control of food distribution than they did in Eritrea/Tigray. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also funded NCA

activities, and therefore ended up supporting different Norwegian NGOs with different agendas and different attitudes to the government, the rebel movement and the relationship between development aid and emergency aid.

NPA had fewer constraints on its activities than the NCA and Red Cross (Red Cross worked in the Red Sea hills, Eastern Sudan and had also initiated a project with International Red Cross for bringing a boat down the Nile to transport food to the Upper Nile province). NPA had "nothing to lose"; they were working only in SPLA-controlled areas and could therefore simply go into SPLA areas with maximum publicity, because the organisation had no other commitments in the country (unlike NCA and Norwegian Red Cross). NPA and Hagen also openly informed SPLA that NPA's cooperation depended on support from the Norwegian government. When this "diplomacy" became known to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they initially refused to give any further support, while agreeing to pay some of the expenses that had already been incurred.

The standing of the NPA operations in the donor community gradually improved. In 1987, NPA planned to develop as a liaison organisation for other NGOs in the area. The Zurich group, a church-based organisation, financed parts of the feasibility study undertaken by NPA in SPLA areas. They consisted of more or less the same partners as supported ERD. They wanted to use NPA, and NCA was thus, in spite of their public disagreements, a door-opener for NPA. In September 1987 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed that the government should support NPA's emergency work in Southern Sudan with NOK 3.9 mill. They knew that this was a sensitive matter, partly because some organisations had recently been expelled (ACROSS; Lutheran World Federation and World Vision). The Foreign Minister finally decided that the issue should not be taken by the government, and the Minister decided to give NPA NOK 2 million.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs knew of course that the Sudan government regarded support for SRRRA as support for the guerilla army. If

something were to happen, the Norwegian government had no means of supporting personnel in these organisations. The principal question involved was discussed, but the established relationship with NPA and the fact that the media already knew about its involvement restricted its freedom of action.

In the meantime NPA emerged more and more as a "broker" for aid to SPLA-controlled areas. At the same time NPA had become "dependent" on SRRA, because their cooperation was a precondition for continued work there. In the agreement between SRRA and NPA, NPA was for example given the right to "appoint a representative in Nairobi", but "with the prior approval of SRRA" (Agreement between Norwegian People's Aid and Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association). The aid also affected the development of the war itself. The food distribution centres became important military centres. SPLA moved southwards, also because of the food aid from NPA.

In 1988 signals from Washington became clearer. The attitude towards Khartoum hardened. They discovered NPA and their activities, and argued that "the NGO commitments remain modest, and can themselves be significantly expanded, reinforced or complemented through U.S. support". By unorthodox means, the NPA had become a channel used by many donors to reach victims of war and drought in rebel-controlled areas. By pursuing (sometimes hesitantly and other times actively) what was regarded, described and conceived of as purely humanitarian assistance, the MFA had established a channel of great political importance. And again, by chance, the U.S. Government came to their rescue, in the sense that the rules of the game had changed in such a way as to make it possible to avoid awkward decisions on the relationship between humanitarian aid and political interference.

Of course, from these cases it is impossible to draw any general conclusions about the usefulness of NGOs as an instrument of Norwegian foreign policy. From certain points of view, the emergency assistance was a success. From others it was not. What the examples basically show is that emergency aid in such

conflict situations requires in-depth knowledge of local political situations, history and lines of conflict; knowledge that none of the Norwegian actors possessed to a sufficient extent. If this knowledge is not available, the chances of becoming tools in the hands of the warring factions will be great. It may also highlight problems between humanitarian aid and politics which are more complex than conventional rhetoric implies. Finally, it can indicate the need for more empirical studies of such situations in Norway, since it is a new experience in a Norwegian historical context, and a type of activity that diplomats and aid agents have not been trained to analyze.

However, this case can serve to show that the organisations' choice of policies tend, in important respects, to reflect their "interests" in the actual area.⁵¹ These organisations cannot be compared to a foreign service, in which people are stationed at one place for several years - often walking among like-minded "cynical" diplomats - as a step in a career within the system. NGO actors tend to become more involved, politically and emotionally, and to be coloured by their position. Some organisations have their organisational identity based on such "places", and for them a very important concern will be how to secure this identity in the longer run. To rely on such organisations for policy advice or policy implementation in difficult but potentially very influential policy situations implies both constraints and opportunities. The NGO actors may be knowledgeable and well-intentioned, but the organisational context affects policies to an extent that should not be disregarded in a study of their role. The Foreign Office has its own limitations. The most important in this regard is that it had insufficient competence and capacity to follow events properly, and relied to a large extent on information from the leaders of NPA's and NCA's operations there. Their main informants were often their instruments, but instruments with their own interests, sufficiently important to influence fundamental policy lines.

During the past few years MFA has contracted NGOs for projects of a more high-profile, political character in many countries. To be a small and credible nation creates opportunities,

but also limitations - especially when it comes to competence, capacity and power. The NGOs are in many senses already overstretched, and in some cases have been hesitant to take on more work. When they were asked in July 1994 by MFA and NORAD to channel an extra NOK 15 million to Guatemala during the 1994 budget year, with the aim of supporting the peace process there, they at first reacted rather negatively. The argument was that it would be difficult to find suitable projects at such a short notice, and that it might endanger their relationships with their partners there. After some discussion they accepted, but the incident may show the limited absorption capacity of the channel. And to what extent can MFA follow up all their initiatives? In former Yugoslavia, for example, four of the five big humanitarian organisations received in support about NOK 170 million in 1992, while 24 other organisations were given about NOK 3.3 million (see table A.16) in 1993.

It is safe to conclude that the gap between willingness to act and competence to initiate and follow up projects has not been bridged.

Development aid and emergency assistance

Main findings: in Norway despite global development patterns, relief and development are increasingly handled as separate activities. People in the Foreign Ministry argue that the "old idea" of bringing the two together is almost futile. NORAD, for its part, has explicitly written into its strategy and its new guidelines for NGO support that emergencies are none of its businesses. By separating development and complex emergencies in this way, relief has basically been regarded and administratively treated as a series of temporary and isolated initiatives.

This happens at the same time as short-term relief operations or human rights initiatives have come to play an increasingly important role in Norway's relations with the developing countries. It is about to become the NGO channel's principal means of relating to the developing countries.

This contradicts what most observers agree on:

"If conceptualized, planned and implemented in isolation (relief) will replace development and breed long-term dependencies, undermine indigenous coping strategies and increase vulnerabilities (UNDP 1994, January 12. "Position paper in the Working Group on Operational Aspects of Relief to Development Continuum" New York, UNDP:1)

The managing of emergency assistance and humanitarian assistance in Norway has its roots in a decision made in the mid-60s, which separated administratively the responsibility for development aid and emergency assistance (see Tvedt 1992 for a description of its background). The system was established at a time at which developmentalism, resting on ideas of the universality of linear forms of progress, dominated. Progress was regarded as normal and the long-term direction of social change would progressively lead to general improvements for all. This modernist paradigm, in development aid often caricatured and simplified, has dominated both international and Norwegian aid. The administrative system was established just after the UN had declared its first development decade in 1961, and "everybody" thought that emergencies and disasters would be exceptional and temporary setbacks.

The global situation in the 1980s, and perhaps even more in the 1990s, has negated this optimism. In many parts of the world the situation is dominated by systemic crisis, recurring emergencies, political fragmentation, and upsurges in local and internally generated wars. Such a development was not a part of the perspective of the official use of NGOs, or of the NGOs themselves. The number of international economic migrants has reached an estimated sixty million. The number of wars is increasing (to define what is a war and what is not a war is difficult; see a discussion on definitions in Tvedt 1993), but estimates range from 60 to 90. In 1993 there were 26 UN-designated complex emergencies affecting 59 million people. There are now around 20 million refugees, with a similar number of internally displaced people. At

the same time the gap between the richest and the poorest countries has widened, while a number of developing countries have become developed countries and leading forces in the world economy.

The question is whether this process has been and is conceptualized in a fruitful way and whether present administrative set-ups are able to achieve what the Storting has declared as an aim: optimal efficient use of funds and coordination of development and relief efforts? How efficient and well-functioning is a system in which the MFA has given the Norwegian Refugee Council funds for short-term refugee support, but has to reject applications (due to its own regulations) for assistance which may improve the situation for the refugees in the long run? This NGO then has approached NORAD for such funds, but NORAD, in line with its regulations, has priorities which make such support difficult to grant. Other organisations, such as NPA, claim that the support from the Emergency Unit/MFA constitutes a considerable part of their development aid budget. The implementation of this support, however, is not followed up/controlled by the state as NORAD-supported projects are, because that is beyond the capacity and competence of MFA/the Emergency Unit. Apparently this is an administrative problem, but it reflects fundamental conceptual issues.

There is a large literature on the problem of combining emergency aid with long-term development aid. The prevailing view has underlined the need for bridging the gap and for making emergency aid serve long-term development efforts. All reports to the Storting on aid have emphasised this need; e.g. Report No. 51 (1991-92). By administratively separating not only human rights support, but also emergency aid from NORAD's development oriented policy, the Norwegian system has widened the gap between the two. By moving the Emergency Division to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this separation is widened yet further. The coordination of NORAD and Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Emergency Division has not improved; rather the contrary. This is a policy which counters the declared policies of most governments in developing countries. For

example, the Ethiopian government, in spite of, or perhaps in light of, the recurrent emergency situations in the country, has appealed to the donor community and to the NGOs that emphasis should be placed on long-term development. Most Norwegian NGOs also have the declared aim of being development rather than emergency organisations.

There has been a growing understanding of the complex causes that create disasters, even natural disasters (the implementation of the SSE-program is evidence of this). What in the literature have been called complex emergencies are of course not always man-made, but how societies and people cope with them is a political process. The international (and Norwegian) aid system has not in general distinguished clear-cut natural disasters from complex emergencies. Moreover, emergency work has tended to follow the same approach, whether it takes place in societies with strong or weak states, in Bangladesh or in India, in Zimbabwe or Ethiopia (the Norwegian organisations worked more or less in the same way in Zimbabwe in 1990, as they did on the Horn of Africa, although the social fabric, the state's position, etc. were very different). The logic of general relief activity has been influenced by the logic of the natural disaster model, a model that naturally pays little attention to historical and political factors.

The issue of humanitarian aid is further complicated by a process in which humanitarian assistance has more and more often been intermingled with military power. In Somalia the NGOs had to bribe the war lords, and thus feed their war machinery, in order to enable food deliveries to be made (see Brons, Elisa, Tegegn and Salih, 1993). After the UN/American intervention food was distributed under the protection of troops. The limitations of "neutral" humanitarian aid are obvious. On the other hand, Norway does not possess the power to protect individual NGOs or individual NGO actors in such conflict situations. Therefore, Norwegian NGO actors will have a greater need to be regarded as "neutral do-gooders" than many other actors. Conceptualizations and strategies for emergency aid have not addressed this dilemma, which is accentuated by recent developments.

Narrow perceptions of national interest, or calculations based on media success or exposure, and domestic political advantage have gradually become more important, for both governments and NGOs. Developmentalism and the conceptualisation of emergency initiatives as short-term gains are two sides of the same coin, and offer ideological justification for a policy aiming at maximum media coverage. These coinciding tendencies will make it more difficult to overcome the short-termism of past emergency work.

The "Norwegian model" - potentials and constraints.

Main findings: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been pursuing a very active NGO policy. Most observers will argue that support for NGOs fighting apartheid during the 1980s was a success. Most will also point to the importance of the NGOs for the "Oslo channel" to be established and maintained in the early 1990s. Others will mention NCA's role in Guatemala and the negotiations held in Norway, supported by MFA, between the warring factions in 1994, and yet others will point to the role of NPA and NCA and their efforts, with support from the MFA, to support peace processes in the Sudan.

The channel has given the MFA a number of instruments which can be operated on the side of its own bureaucracy. The NGOs have initiated and implemented MFA-supported projects that have not required the same political backing as if the government itself had done them. They have carried out politically risky projects, and thus simultaneously functioned as a channel for "risk aversion" and a channel for "opportunity realisation". The system has also been able to tap some of the considerable knowledge of political situations and conflicts that some NGO actors have acquired. And, not least, MFA has consciously tried to use NGOs as a channel for crisis prevention and peace promotion. Inherent in this policy are a number of important dilemmas that should be analysed, and which have not been discussed so far, although they will have far-reaching consequences for Norwegian foreign policy.

The MFA's policy has also had other important components. The big Norwegian NGOs have been marketed vis-à-vis UN organisations, a policy based on the argument that these NGOs are among the 20 biggest in the world, that they are experienced and that it is reasonable that Norwegian NGOs to a larger extent than has been the case, should implement UN projects that are partly financed by Norwegian money. The Norwegian NGOs have also been asked to profile Norway more than before, in line with what is internationally described as a general trend where by donors try to make themselves more visible. The MFA initiative in former Yugoslavia put pressure on some of the big humanitarian organisations to cooperate and to make resource utilisation more efficient, but also to enable the establishment of what in a more high-profile way than earlier was called "Norwegian Aid". This is being propagated as a model for further Norwegian efforts. The MFA has also asked the Norwegian NGOs to use more Norwegian goods than they have used to do (Norwegian NGOs have traditionally not thought along these lines at all), they should mark their tents with Norwegian flags etc. In large parts of the Horn of Africa today there are rubber halls produced in Bergen, marked with Norwegian flags and spread to a large extent by Norwegian NGOs (also as contractors for the firm producing it), making Norwegian support more visible than before.

The MFA has achieved some of its declared aims by the use of the channel. But what dilemmas are inherent in this model, and to what extent is the political and administrative set-up adapted to meeting emerging international developments?

1. The contracting of Norwegian NGOs has implied the use of foreign policy actors outside the bureaucracy. This has given MFA flexibility, but raised the issue of accountability. NGOs have long involved themselves in conflict resolution. Norwegian missionaries played very important roles in such situations on Madagascar, decades before the development. To take a more recent and comparable example: Norwegians were active in the negotiations for peace in the Sudan in 1972 (the Addis Ababa talks). But they were not talking on behalf of the state or paid by the state, but on behalf of the

NGO and paid by the same organisation. The actors were accountable to their own organisation, and the Norwegian government did not have to be involved. Twenty years later NGO actors were involved in similar activities in the same area, but now partly commissioned by MFA. They involve themselves in political talks at high levels, they try to facilitate negotiations by buying clothes and air tickets for peace negotiators, etc. The question of control and accountability has therefore acquired a different character, and the role of the NGOs (at least for the NGOs themselves) is not clear. To whom was Egil Hagen in Norwegian Peoples' Aid responsible and accountable when he supplied the SRRA/SPLA with food during war and drought? And who is responsible for policies and actions that violate Norwegian official policy but that take place with Norwegian state support? To whom were the NCA actors who were very active in the Horn during the war and after the Meles had taken power, accountable?

2. The history of the NGO channel in Norway is mingled with the national policy of separating administrative responsibility for development aid and emergency aid. When Norsk Utviklingshjelp was established in 1962, it was explicitly stated that it should not work on emergencies but only on development. This emphasis was in line with political priorities, the profile of the first UN Development Decade launched in 1961, the dominant developmentalist thinking and the belief that emergencies would play an increasingly marginal role. This perception of the channel as primarily involved in development aid has continued, although its real profile has radically changed (see Tvedt 1992 for a discussion of how the relationship has been conceived of in Reports to the Storting). And as shown in this report, emergency aid and humanitarian assistance are becoming more and more important every year. By moving the Emergency Division to MFA's Political Division this gap is widened. The question is, to what extent is an administrative system that originally was established to take care of development aid in the most efficient manner, appropriate in a situation in which emergency and humanitarian assistance are the actual priority areas (although Reports to the Storting and the NGOs argue the opposite)?

The relationship between development and emergencies or between NORAD and the MFA is also a question of language. The dominant and traditional NGO language has centred on concepts such as "participation", "help for self-help", "institution building", "long-term development", "partnership" etc. This is the language and the perspective of aid as it is described in most "like-minded" donor bureaucracies and in the NGO channel as it has developed as an international social system. The language, and thus the perspective of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has a different emphasis. What is focused on is expediency, the need to be on the spot when a crisis hits, to deliver, to "show the Norwegian flag", to bring Norwegian goods, etc. These contradicting signals from the state create "identity dilemmas" in the organisations, as well as coordination problems between NORAD and the Ministry. If the aim is a comprehensive policy and a comprehensive profile internationally, this is a problem, especially so when these differences are not understood or addressed in the ministries.⁵²

A question which has fundamentally affected the Norwegian NGO channel historically is the demand for "neutrality". Three factors are of importance: a) aid has traditionally been regarded as a "non-political" affair in Norway. A precondition for receiving support has been that the state (NORAD) was guaranteed that the activities of the NGOs were politically, religiously and ideologically neutral; b) NORAD, and later the Ministry of Development Cooperation (from 1984), developed an aid culture during the 1970s and 1980s which was anathema to ideas of using aid as a political weapon linked to Norwegian interests; c) the organisations have portrayed themselves nationally and internationally as humanitarian, non-political organisations. This does not mean that aid was not political, nor that decisions in NORAD were not taken that were openly political, nor that organisations have not supported special groups, special religions and special policies. The important thing in this connection is that the ideal has been to disregard such "realist" considerations, and that the rules of the NGO discourse has forced all actors to at least rhetorically embrace neutrality. This has

caused a certain blindness to political analysis, and to reflection on and understanding of the political role any organisation takes on, especially in conflict situations. Both practice and rhetoric have helped to create an image both nationally and internationally of Norwegian NGOs as "do-gooders", acting more or less on their own behalf, and not representing the interests or even necessarily the view of the Norwegian government. The organisations therefore have a dual profile; on the one hand they are neutral development organisations (in line with NORAD regulations), on the other hand they are contracted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to carry out roles as political actors in political conflict situations.

3. The line between active NGO contracting for foreign policy gains and imperialism, at least as perceived by the receiving countries, is thin. This is, of course, not an imperialism based on narrow economic and political self-interest, but rather based on economic affluence and hegemony of culture and language. From a Norwegian point of view, the difference between what is regarded as Norwegian altruism and what is seen as colonial exploitation looks more fundamental than it does for many at the receiving end. This criticism of aid as a form of new colonialism has not been a reaction restricted to Muslim fundamentalists alone (see case study on Bangladesh). It has also come from many leftist groups and quite often from representatives of organisations working together with Norwegian NGOs and receiving funds from Norway. In many areas in which Norwegian NGOs have made their presence felt, it has been quite common for people to talk about Norwegian imperialism, although it may be seen as altruistically motivated. These perceptions may be rejected as groundless in Norway. Nonetheless, they form part of the context in which NGO aid is operating. As long as the perception of Norway as a small, more or less "neutral" country far to the North remains, this is a minor problem (if it is an aim to maintain the trust and credibility which Norway has enjoyed) than it would be if, and when, Norwegian state interests were more closely associated with major power interests.

There is no clear evidence to support the idea

that Norwegian foreign policy interests are best served in the long run by Norwegian NGOs working as "independent" do-gooders all over the world. On the other hand, there is neither enough experience to support arguments about the usefulness of using the NGOs as high-profile contractors for the state's foreign policy initiatives. Norwegian NGOs have been working to establish long-term equal partnerships. In quite a few cases, in order to increase their local standing, they have downplayed their support from the state. There are many examples that show that the information material they spread in developing countries (and also in Norway) tends to deemphasise their dependence on the state. This has been rational identity management - a signal underlining that they are independent of other interests. To the extent that they operate more and more as direct contractors of the Norwegian government, also in, and perhaps especially in, political conflict situations, the image of the past may cause a credibility problem. This dilemma between dependence and independence is insoluble and the most efficient policy will therefore be one that manages this dilemma most productively. It is an historical irony, though, that some of the organisations that cause the biggest problems for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD at certain stages (solidarity organisations for the Palestinians and the ANC, etc., which were also critical towards the Norwegian government's policy in these areas) turned out to be valuable assets at a later stage when mutual trust and networks became important. This might indicate the role that long-term development work might play in supporting foreign policy initiatives at later stages.

4. As the MFA makes the big Norwegian NGOs bigger and thus more successful, by propagating the Norwegian model and the achievements of the "big five" organisations vis-à-vis multilateral institutions and other donors, its control over what these NGOs do will be undermined in the long run. The organisations will become accountable to different donors and different governments, and will not necessarily feel most allegiance to the "smaller state". Between 7-9% of NPA's budget for 1993 is financed by NORAD and about 30-40% by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while USAID channels more than double the amount that

comes from NORAD, and various UN organisations and a European network finance the rest. This change in funding profile has taking place in the past few years. Similar changes are taking place in the Norwegian Council for Refugees and to a lesser extent in Norwegian Church Aid (which was the first Norwegian NGO to take on UN contracts). This is a new departure, and it may signal a development where by what have been Norwegian voluntary organisations are gradually becoming international NGOs, operating in a global aid market and with less accountability to the Norwegian state.

5. The present division of labour between NORAD and MFA regarding NGO support also has another side to it. The MFA has paid little attention to the foreign policy implications of NORAD's support for local NGOs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself and its First and Second Political Division deal primarily with Norwegian NGOs. Only 3.5% went to international, regional or local organisations in 1993. The political aspect of NORAD's direct support has been accentuated by the integration of NORAD Offices into Norwegian Embassies. This has not been paid much attention so far, partly due to MFA's traditional "lack of interest" in ordinary development questions and its focus on emergency/human rights issues.

6. How has the gap between the MFA's stated ambitions of becoming a "superpower" in furthering democracy and human rights internationally, and the capacity and competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff, affected the NGO channel? Divisions with a handful of people have to spend, if the money allocated is to be used within the budget year, about NOK 3 million a day on average. The formal requirements on NGO reporting have become stricter since 1992, but irrespective of what formal arrangements are made, the actual control, both politically, administratively and financially has not been and cannot be very good. Basically, it rests on trust. There are of course a number of less successful projects, but since they are understandably not publicized and journalists do not know about them, the importance and relevance of these gaps and dilemmas seldom surface.

NORWEGIAN NGOS IN SEARCH OF A STRATEGY¹

Main findings: the organisations have propagated a kind of universal altruism, "we are always reaching the poorest", and "we help where the need is most severe". Evidence suggests that although many of them work with poor people, they miss the very poorest. The inflated image of NGO aid has become a threat to the NGO channel itself.

The history of Norwegian NGOs shows that many of them have not developed a well-reflected strategy based on their particular competence. Their strategies are generally unclear concerning emerging issues such as "equal partnership", "advocacy", "speaking out" contra "neutrality", and regarding aid in relation to emergency assistance, and not the least, in their relation to the Norwegian State and the state in the countries where they work. Strategy formulation in the past has largely reflected ideological-political trends and has had a tendency to copy the donor's policy focus or the most successful project model at the particular point in time (there are exceptions!).

Operational northern NGOs have been facing increasing criticism from the developing countries and also from within the NGO channel itself. There is no reason to believe that this is a fad. The political and ideological development in developing countries and between the "North" and the "South", and the emergence of Southern NGOs which want access to the same resources as the Northern NGOs, will make obsolete the "old" (1980s) model of Norwegian expatriates staying in an area for years to develop the local people on expatriate salaries, obsolete. The organisations already face problems in recruiting sufficiently qualified personnel (accepted as qualified in the "South") without losing their NGO identity (the mission organisations will presumably be better to tackle this challenge because of their greatest asset - the missionaries' willingness to live on low salaries). In this situation the question of partners becomes crucial. The rush for good partners has already started internationally. Some organisations will have advantages, since they are part of a more or

less global "community of common interests", i.e. church-related organisations, trade unions, organisations for the disabled, etc. This means that organisations that have taken up "new" issues, like Redd Barna, face bigger challenges than those concerned with older issues in North-South relations, such as church-building.

While the policy problems vary between types of NGOs, they all face the question of "equity", "partnership" and "neutrality", versus "speaking out". The gap between being based in the rich North, with all that implies in economic, but in this connection, more importantly, conceptual power, and the aim of "equity" and "advocacy", has to a large extent been left unaddressed.

This part relates to TOR 6.1, 6.3 and 7.2 and the basic question is how NGOs' working methods, nature and efficiency can be developed, and objectives and strategies be formulated with regard to priority areas, on the basis of existing and changing framework conditions in Norway and its partner countries.

The chapter starts with a short analysis of the NGOs' enlarged role as informants about the developing world in Norway. A short description of some main strategic aims of the different categories of Norwegian NGOs follows (the classification used is according to aspects considered important in a Norwegian context). The strategic questions for two types of organisation, the humanitarian and the mission organisations, will be discussed in more detail. An emphasis on these organisations is considered useful, since these organisations make up a large proportion of the Norwegian development NGOs, and because they face the most difficult and fundamental dilemmas. Furthermore, some experiences of two humanitarian NGOs, Redd Barna and Norwegian Peoples' Aid in Zimbabwe, will be presented, in order to discuss more concretely some of the issues of relevance to this type of operational NGOs, here based on changed framework conditions in Zimbabwe. Finally, there is a section on how NGOs as a group have tackled and may tackle the questions of "equal partnership", "advocacy" and cultural brokers.

In the old Norwegian saga of Torstein Vikingson

there is a story about a drinking horn that gave joy, happiness and good health when one sipped from it, but sorrow, unhappiness and bad health when it was emptied. Perhaps the NGO channel can be equated with this horn: propagandists have exaggerated its potential role and "comparative advantage". To expect too much of it may destroy it. NGO expansionism, like proposing that NGOs should take over the project work of UN bodies while the UN should restrict itself to giving advice, as was proposed by a leading NGO spokesman (see Phase I Report:2), is to disregard what many have seen as a growing problem; coordination of a multitude of NGO approaches, overstretched NGOs and NGOs losing the "NGO mission".

A starting point might thus be a discussion of the relation between "universalism" and "realism", related to but different from the problems of universalism and particularism (see Phase I-report: 96-99). On the one hand the organisations have propagated a kind of universal altruism, "we are always reaching the poorest", and "we help where the need is most severe", etc. On the other hand the channel is a marginal actor and the organisations are often very small and uninfluential. Many outside the NGO community reject the realism of this universalism in the present-day world. NGOs are creating inflated images of and spreading propaganda about the "universalism" of their help as part of their market strategy. This strategy relies on an uncertain factor: the public's lack of knowledge. NGO aid has never been universal. NGOs always select who should be given support and who will not get support (and in extreme cases: who should live while others must die). Proclamations like those of the General Secretary of Norwegian Red Cross; that people could be guaranteed that the Red Cross always reach the most needy, are examples of the extent to which profiling threatens the virtues of NGOs: their transparency and truthfulness.² It might satisfy the organisation's financial manager in the short run, but undermine the standing of the whole channel in the long run. NGOs cannot maintain their expressed ideal of universal solidarity without accepting the gap between rhetoric and capacity and the limits of their responsibility and influence.

The universal ethic propagated by some NGOs has failed to perceive the above distinctions. In principle it requires unlimited aid, over all and at all times. The NGOs cannot base their "partnership" and "advocacy" on the idea that the same rights and the same happiness can be realised for all; now or in the future. The organisations are struggling with how to address the gap between "demand" and the limited effect and impact the channel can have and certainly has had in the past. Some have argued that political or popular expectations that are not matched by actual achievements over time will boomerang; repeated disappointments may develop an attitude which will write off ethical and practical responsibility for far-away peoples.

On the one hand, most NGOs and especially Norwegian NGOs play a marginal role in changing societies or in furthering development. On the other hand, the NGO channel has great "moral capital" and potential which other types of aid organisations do not have. Norwegian NGOs have tried to demonstrate and practice ethical ideals in cooperation with "the other", by becoming "spokesmen" of "the South", of other cultures, and of oppressed minorities, etc. NGO talk embodies unfulfilled promises and dogmatic approaches, but it also signifies value orientations which they are almost alone in pursuing and propagating.

NGOs and information

Main findings: the NGOs play an important role in the representation of Africa, Asia and Latin America. They help to maintain media interest in the problem of global poverty (for example: the annual NRK TV campaign has a very high viewing rate, more than 30%, and the NGOs publish a number of magazines, journals, etc., (see Phase I Report), although they apparently do not reach very many outside their membership ranks (Eurobarometer 1991). Most of their information is project-focused or focuses on the aid relation, reproducing stereotypes. Market competition for funds and the growing importance of emergency aid for some of the most influential organisations have reinforced this tendency, although there are exceptions. In spite of the many NGOs working in aid, the

consensus on Norwegian foreign policy and on Norwegian opinion about third-world matters remains strong.

One reason given by the Storting and governments for supporting NGOs has been the argument that they are efficient in broadening support for development aid. Here only one aspect will be dealt with: possible impacts on this work caused by the shift that has taken place in the most important NGOs the last few years: away from development aid to emergency work.

For the past few years NORAD has (with some minor ups and downs) supported about 140 organisations (including organisations working with information). In 1991 47 out of the 98 organisations that worked in aid had annual support of less than NOK 1 million, while 20 had support of more than NOK 10 million (see Tvedt 1992: Table 11:70). The relative importance of the different categories of organisations has remained basically the same for the past 15 years. The humanitarian organisations in 1993 received 81.8 per cent of all the funds channelled by the 1st and 2nd Political Division and the Emergency Division, much more than the NGO Division's entire budget, while they received only 49.6 per cent and 69.3 per cent in 1991. The Foreign Ministry allocates the lion's share of NOK 1 billion to the five big NGOs. This policy on emergency aid in developing countries is changing the organisational set-up of the third sector and in the long run will in also affect the relationship between the third sector and the state in Norway.

This increased use of NGOs for foreign policy purposes will also gradually change the arena for debate and information on foreign policy issues. A group of NGO actors is emerging, who have easy access to the media and who often have more knowledge and information of recent events than both bureaucrats, journalists and politicians. The "community of media informants" around the world is growing and becoming more diverse, and may have long-term importance for how Norwegians understand the world (who makes up this community is important in Norway, since the objects of representation are so "far away"). In 1992 987 expatriates were working for Norwegian NGOs

abroad (almost all were Norwegian), and 287 of them were working for the five big humanitarian organisations. In addition the NGOs continually send people from the home office to the field. Together they beat the media, the Foreign Ministry and NORAD combined, in numbers, access to direct information, etc. Interviews on NRK and articles in the press in relation to Rwanda, for example, have often been a description of the world from the "helper's" point of view. The NGOs active there have not been very active in trying to explain the background to the war, in discussing/rejecting explanations of ethnic warfare/tribalism etc. Their main topic has naturally been the Norwegian intervention, and how to portray the work of their organisation in the best way. They act within a context in which they are regarded and regard themselves as representing an organisation with emerging "foreign policy" interests, i.e. what they say is coloured by individual and organisational coping strategies. What NCA actors and Red Cross actors have said about Rwanda and the emergency situation in Zaire and northern Tanzania, and what NCA-leaders and leaders of Norwegian People's Aid have said about the situation in Southern Sudan, Operation Lifeline, the guerilla war etc., can no longer be regarded as "neutral" information (if it ever was), but as being influenced by organisational and often competing organisational agendas.

Another question is whether this enlarged community of informants has brought increased pluralism, openness and debate about the global development process, events in different countries, or Norwegian foreign policy in such areas, etc? There is little evidence to suggest that such a development is taking place. An opposite interpretation seems more fruitful: a mechanism has been set in motion (not necessarily intended by anyone) whereby the MFA contracts Norwegian NGOs and gives them a possibility for expansion, and in return gets external support for official policy. The increasing number of people in non-governmental organisations working on contract for the Foreign Ministry has not so far, to any noticeable extent, enlivened or pluralised discussions of Norwegian foreign policy, UN policies and regional developments. All of them must be aware of failures and mistakes in this policy, failures and mistakes that

people could have learned from, but the nongovernmental organisations say little about their own dilemmas or government failures. Over time this may create an even more inflated image of our importance in the world, suggesting Norwegian foreign policy is right while other governments make mistakes (for some unknown reason the picture of NORAD and state-state aid is very different).

A third consequence is that a growing number of Norwegians are "living on" disasters and misery management. This creates and recreates all the time a social basis for a special type of image production, both of "the others" and of "us". In the same way as missionary activities depended on support from Norway, relying on an image of "dark, wild and uncivilized" Africa, this modern version of Western humanism rests on an image of permanent emergencies and of people's inability to help themselves. This might have important impacts on Norwegian images, ways of thinking about the world and "us", may be as important which in the long run as what is achieved in developing countries. The NGOs may increase support for aid in the Norwegian population, but at the same time their role has helped to create cultural constructions of the world that makes its realities and complexities less intelligible.

TYPES OF NGOS AND MAIN AID STRATEGY

Main findings: as shown in the Phase I Report and this report, NGOs as a group have no collective advantages, expertise or competence. Their priority areas, activities, roles and functions vary, also concerning cooperation with recipient organisations or institutions regarding institutional development, organisational structure, local financing and local assumption of responsibility of projects. It is possible to identify particular types of competence and challenges for various types of NGOs, but not advantages related to sectors, humanitarian efforts, sociocultural conditions including assistance targeted at women, planning, implementation, administration and evaluation.

The classification of Norwegian organisations involved in aid has been based on ideological criteria when the organisation was established:

- 1) Humanitarian - altruistic attitudes
- 2) Political - idealistic aims
- 3) Missionary purposes
- 4) Interest organisations and organisations that promote social welfare
- 5) Occupational associations and Trade Unions

These categories highlight what are important questions in Norway, and they also affect the aid profile in important ways. These categories have also served a political goal; to assure the state that money is disbursed to different types of Norwegian NGOs with different constituencies. They are grouped according to their shared values and their project relation to the beneficiaries. In chapter I the relative position of the different organisational types was discussed. Here we focus on their strategy.

The function of the *Occupational Associations and Trade Unions* in the aid context can be described as one of assistance and guidance.³ The organisations reportedly take active part in the planning and preparing of their projects. *The Norwegian Bar Association*, for example, works in cooperation with its partner organisations or institutions in the country in which it works. *The Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions* tries to assess local needs and discusses project plans with its cooperating partners when entering into a project. *The Norwegian Union of Teachers* is offered participation in projects by *The World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession*, and cooperates in shaping the projects. These organisations also raise funds from their Norwegian members (*Norsk Undervisningsforbund* allocates 1 per cent of its membership fee to international work and in *Norsk Vernepleierforbund* all the members are "taxed" at a rate of NOK 3 monthly for solidarity work) and give advice on economic control and general administrative routines to their cooperating partners. For these types of organisations it is generally a cooperating NGO that is responsible for the implementation of projects, an NGO often belonging to what in this report is termed the same "community of interests".

These NGOs claim to have special knowledge of administration and institution building within their own area of interest. It seems reasonable to argue that their competence and advantages correspond to the fields in which they are engaged. According to the NGOs themselves, they are good at achieving their aims. These organisations work in areas which NORAD or the national government will hesitate to or be unable to support. In general they do not have staff working specially on development aid, or have only very few staff on this task. In 1991 24 organisations, with a total budget of NOK 45 million, managed their development activities without specially assigned staff (Tvedt 1992:84).

The Political/Ideal Organisations do not usually take operational responsibility. Umbrella organisations or cooperating bodies usually implement the projects. The Norwegian NGOs take part in the planning and design of projects. The organisations usually have bilateral agreements with local organisations, in some instances with local authorities. These organisations usually emerged from a political commitment towards the Third World. They do not have special competence, but often have comparatively good knowledge of the countries in which they work. This has been particularly important since one of their main aims has been to inform the Norwegian public about Third World countries. Organisations such as *The Norwegian Council for Southern Africa* have been a principal source of information about Southern Africa in Norway since 1967. It claims to have special competence and experience within the field of education, and works mainly within this sector. *The Latin American Solidarity Groups* has a slightly different profile. They work through volunteers, and have an anti-expert ideology, depending on the brigadier's effort.

Some of these organisations, because of their origin and history as solidarity organisations and the changed political situation in the country/region where they started to work (Nicaragua, Afghanistan, South Africa) go through a kind of identity crisis. To what extent should they transform themselves into professional development NGOs more or less contracted by the state and basing themselves on

the hope that the state will continue to support their work, or remain more modest, poorer but "clean" organisations with only one aim; to raise Norwegian knowledge of other peoples, cultures and political struggles through cooperation with similar types of organisations in other countries. This is a difficult dilemma because many regard the activity enabled by state-support activities as what keep the organisations alive.

Interest Organisations such as *Norwegian Association for the Blind and Partially Sighted (NABE)* and *Norwegian Association of the Disabled (NAD)* contribute first and foremost as specialists within their field, through cooperating partners. Their partners may be local organisations for disabled people or government authorities in the recipient country. The two organisations both 'assist' and 'guide', and they also engage in projects, taking operational responsibility. Both organisations emphasise the participation of local organisations as an important principle. *The Norwegian Housewives Association*, for example, runs aid solely through other organisations of similar types, both local, national and international.

NABE and NAD both have competence in the field in which they operate. Both have run projects for their members in Norway for years. Their main field is rehabilitation and institution building. NAD and NABE claim to have played a central role in the development of various parts of Norwegian health and social policy, and they have the competence and organisational resources to handle rehabilitation work, conditional preparations and production of remedy articles. The two organisations have been involved in development aid since 1978 (NAD) and 1981 (NABE). They have both sought to concentrate their efforts within a few areas, thus strengthening their knowledge of a set of countries. Their projects' contributions are related to planning and administration. Other organisations, such as *The Norwegian Housewives Association*, do not refer to a particular knowledge. Their competence seems to be broad and somewhat undefined. At the same time, their role is fairly limited, and they operate more as donors to other Norwegian NGOs than as agents in the field.

These types of organisations seem to face fewer problems regarding the strategy to follow in development aid (because their projects are comparatively small, and they seem to have moved away from an aid policy in which they themselves are operative). One important problem is the role of development assistance in the organisations' overall work profile. The international work of NABE, for example, has not been very closely related to the rest of the organisation. The international division seems to be "excluded" from the rest of the organisation.

The large *Humanitarian* NGOs still often run their own projects, although Norwegian Church Aid for instance has lowered the priority of operative field work in their strategy plan called 'Towards 2000'. According to this note, their operative capacity will be transferred to emergency aid purposes. *Strømme Memorial Foundation* wishes primarily to channel funds through Norwegian missions, national churches or individual Christians in developing countries. It prefers to avoid running its own operations. Thus, it seems that *Strømme Memorial Foundation* works according to the 'assistance' principle, and limits itself to approving projects that it will support, but is involved in planning and implementation support. However, in recent years it has involved itself in some operational activities (SSE Mali). *The Norwegian Medical Society for the Middle East* and *CARITAS* perform more of a 'guidance' role, where they participate in the outlining of projects. They also recruit personnel. However, the local organisations remain responsible for implementation. *Norwegian Church Aid* and *Redd Barna, Norway* also take part in projects where they leave the responsibility for the implementation with the local NGOs, while *CARE, Norway* is both operational and works through or together with national off-shoots of *CARE International*.

Humanitarian organisations do not have clearly defined fields of expertise apart from the fact that they are involved in aid activities, and have been so for many years. Hence, their competence will be closely related to the kind of personnel they employ. For example, *Redd Barna's* aim is to help children. Working on this task since 1945, it has developed a high degree of expertise

within the field. Nonetheless, the organisation has defined its aid involvement quite broadly. To improve the adolescence of children, they have stated that there is a need to change society in general. Thus, they have engaged in several other activities than those directly related to children, for instance income-generating projects (food production, grain mills), characterised as 'child-centred' aid. In the past few years they have emphasised the need to focus more on children and to develop further their special competence, moving away from broad integrated rural development programme. This category of organisation faces some common challenges and shares some of the same experiences, which will be focused on below.

OPERATIONAL NGOS

Main findings: the operational NGOs face a number of fundamental and related problems. The most important is that their working style belongs to a period during which the developing countries did not have sufficient qualified manpower and when it was still politically acceptable to have whole districts run by expatriates. This is not generally the case anymore. Since Norway does not have any state interests or important economic interests in these countries, this type of aid could be assessed without regard to such interests.

Northern NGOs have traditionally been implementing NGOs in the non-European world. This dates back to the start of missionary activities. It continued on a much larger scale and with much more weight in the development aid epoch. The 1970s and the 1980s in international aid were decades of "integrated rural development programmes", and organisations like NCA, NPA and *Redd Barna* managed and led such big programmes. In no other period in the relation between the "north" and the "south" have so many Westerners or Europeans worked as administrators, development diplomats or "expatriates" in Africa and many other developing countries, and a majority of the Norwegians were working with NGOs. In 1994 NORAD and the Peace Corps have only 130 and 116 such personnel respectively, while the NGOs in 1992 had close

to 1000.

It is impossible to assess the overall impact of this aid profile. Some projects have been good and some projects have had negative effects, at least in the long run. Below I discuss two case studies in order to depict some of the main issues involved in the implementation of such projects. The main point, however, is that this northern NGO profile is gradually becoming less and less politically acceptable to governments, organisations and peoples in developing countries. The issue is therefore now less how effective operational organisations are, as how the organisations can adapt to this new political situation in the future. One strategy for organisational survival is obviously to become heavily involved in emergency aid, since that is still an area which is more or less monopolized by operational organisations from the north.

The problems discussed below are not restricted to Redd Barna and Norwegian People's Aid or to Norwegian NGOs. The issues are of a more general nature.

In Zimbabwe both organisations worked in close understanding with the government and its general policies. Both organisations regarded this as natural, due to a generally positive attitude to the newly liberated country under Mugabe's control. When started the projects were not legitimized as a means of strengthening civil society, but within the language of the day, to improve the peoples' standard of living. They were started at a time when Norway had no strategy for its NGO support and when the NGO channel in aid was still new and inexperienced. Norwegian Church Aid's multisectoral project in the Southern Sudan was considered as a model project - in line with dominant international development thinking which focused on "integrated rural development" programmes.

A case study: Norwegian People's Aid in Zimbabwe⁴

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) has worked in Zimbabwe since 1983. The main area has been cooperative support, in line with the priorities of the Mugabe government. In 1993, NPA provided

financial support for 21 different projects. The projects involved production and/or vocational training, agriculture, fisheries, contracting activities, spinning, weaving, carpentry, education, water, pottery and loans and credits. NPA wound up its support for three development projects in 1993, while four new projects were included in the organisation's 1994 programme.

NPA is an implementing agency but also cooperates with local partners, mostly cooperatives. In a recent evaluation report by two Zimbabwean consultants (Norwegian People's Aid, 1993, *NPA-supported small-scale production in Zimbabwe*) several problems were identified:

- The eleven projects that were evaluated were characterised by weak management, inadequate accounting and auditing routines, weak planning routines and a general inability to function according to modern business principles.
- When cooperatives are unable to provide sufficient income for their members, this leads to a lack of group cohesion and apathy and dissatisfaction among members.
- The level of expertise was lower than was regarded as desirable and necessary in all areas covered by the study (agriculture, textiles, fisheries, mining and pottery).
- There was a generally low level of expertise in the maintenance of machinery.
- In general, cooperative members had received comprehensive training, but members' general educational standards were low, and improving educational standards will be both costly and time-consuming.
- With one exception (fisheries), all project units were reported to function at or below "subsistence level". The overall impression was one of excessive quantities of machinery, unsuitable technology and little maintenance expertise.
- Few projects were based on feasibility studies and, with the exception of fisheries, the projects had difficulty in marketing their products.
- There did not appear to be any correlation between the degree of financial support from NPA and the degree of self-sufficiency or sustainability of the projects.
- In cases where NPA directly managed projects itself, relations between NPA and the projects

were generally good. The study also uncovered many cases of weak or unsatisfactory communication and the target groups sometimes questioned NPA priorities and referred to types of assistance that they themselves did not regard as significant.

- In many projects, NPA gives priority to institutional development but is criticised for budgets being too low in relation to the standards that are necessary in order to achieve project targets.

This list of shortcomings could have been made for many similar projects. They reflect the difficulties that are always involved in this kind of development aid, although to a varying extent.

The assessment by Johannesen and Sørbo showed that both in Oslo and Harare the NPA management had shown little interest in describing or discussing the various factors that had affected the framework conditions for their activities. Both NPA's own planning documents and its applications to NORAD were, they noted, "conspicuously unconcerned about the internal and external framework conditions for their activities and the changes that are taking place". In Zimbabwe the focus was almost "exclusively on individual projects". This was the case, although the important macro-political situation in Zimbabwe had important and immediate impacts on the cooperative scene: long-term drought and economic structural adjustment programmes (ESAP), which led to "increased market competition, the marginalisation of large and increasing population groups" and cuts in subsidies, increasing numbers of unemployed, growing financial problems and reduced purchasing power, etc.

The project focus was narrow, which can safely be described as a general characteristic of NGO work, due to capacity and competence questions, the lack of a forum for general discussions and the requirements of quarterly reporting procedures. Since development is a very complex issue, and more complex than what the aid idealists thought when the project was established, it is not reasonable to expect small or even big NGOs to "solve" this problem. NPA has regarded "multi-sector plans" as favourable because they have meant that knowledge and

experience from one area may improve the work of the organisation in another field. Since sectors may be closely connected, and efforts in one area may therefore be conditional upon efforts in another, related sector. However, for most "multi-sector organisations" and certainly for an organisation such as NPA there has been a conflict between organisational resources and competence and implementation requirements.

It seems as though NPA has been caught in a "trap" between three factors: a weak partner, a changing political and economic environment, and a weak ability to monitor and supervise local partners. This case raises several questions, both in relation to NGO "partnership" and implementation of policy, especially under changing operational conditions: how is partnership built? Is financial support for a local organisation "partnership"? To what degree should organisational structures be assessed before cooperation starts? How important is the autonomy and independence of the partner when it comes to making agreements about projects? How important is organisational development in relation to the exchange of values and ideology in such a process? If these cooperatives were not autonomous bodies, but rather related to shifting government policies, how could a "partnership" be built in this case?

A case study: Redd Barna in Zimbabwe

Redd Barna-Zimbabwe (RBZ) started its programme of activities in 1983, initially by supporting two collective farming projects in Mashonaland. Activities were quickly extended to cover three settlement projects, a tree-planting programme for schools, a supplementary feeding programme, the building of community centres and activities directed towards educating mothers. Since 1987, RBZ has particularly focused on integrated community development projects in the so-called "communal" areas. The organisation has also provided assistance for Mozambican refugees living in camps inside Zimbabwe. During the 1991-92 drought, RBZ assisted government and local communities with a Child Supplementary Feeding Programme (CSFP). Until 1989, the Harare office also covered Redd Barna's programme of activities in

Mozambique.

In 1992, Redd Barna commissioned a review of its activities in Zimbabwe, the first programme evaluation to be undertaken since the establishment of RBZ in 1983. In 1993, a separate review of the CSFP, with special reference to the response of RBZ, was made.

While the CSFP review was largely very favourable, the 1992 review, which was undertaken with a high degree of staff participation in Zimbabwe, was generally quite critical of RBZ performance in the country. The latter is most interesting in our context, because it highlights problems of NGO conceptualization of how development should be encouraged through NGO work.

Three refugee camps and three community developments were studied. There were no clear goals and objectives laid down by which to evaluate performance. RBZ had adopted "an integrated approach" towards solving the problems of the local community in the community development projects. Community development was seen as raising the standard of living of the local population by giving them a better physical infrastructure. The strategy was based on mobilisation of people through formal structures. This choice was based on the aim of sustainability. RBZ did not want to build up alternative service delivery structures which might cease to function when they leave. Structures defined as falling within the sphere of responsibility of a ministry, were by definition regarded as sustainable. RBZ had emphasized delivering infrastructure components to government structures. This led to more or less mechanical ways of defining the time span of projects and setting targets for phasing out. The focus had been shifted away from people and the way in which they related to each other and to their environment. The questions of gender relations, ethnicity, and distribution of wealth became thus less relevant, since the measurement of success was mainly restricted to physical targets. It also led to an uncritical assessment of how the formal government structures which RBZ had been supporting were actually functioning.

It is also of general interest that the review team made a number of interesting comments on the organisational structure of RBZ. It was strongly biased towards administrative functions rather than programmes; there was a conflict between a decentralised programme structure and a centralised decision-making authority within the organisation; the personnel function had excluded staff development, performance appraisal, staff welfare and other organisational development functions of human resource management; inter-departmental communication was rigid and financial management unsatisfactory; and there was insufficient long-range planning in RBZ.⁵

NPA and Redd Barna, Zimbabwe (RBZ) confronted the issues of impact and sustainability in rather different ways: RBZ built up a large organisation. They are heavily operational and are working hard to become what is seen as a more professional development agency (better planning tools, routines, organisation, etc.). RBZ has tried to increase its impact by expanding projects or programmes that are judged to be successful, e.g. by involving itself in a growing number of community projects. It has also been a RBZ strategy to work fairly closely with governmental institutions, mainly in the various districts where RBZ has projects.

NPA, on the other hand, has only a very small staff of its own based in Zimbabwe and has chosen to work mainly by supporting local groups, including cooperative endeavours. The problem with this is that these groups are very weak and that the cooperative movement lacks the enthusiasm and the public backing it enjoyed when NPA initiated its projects in 1983. NPA has also expanded, mainly by increasing the number of projects supported. Both RBZ and NPA have lost some of their specific profile, Redd Barna as a child-centred organisation and NPA as growing out of the Norwegian labour and trade union movement. Most NGO projects carried out by Norwegian NGOs are not sustainable, in the senses that the projects are not self-financing, and that the co-operating partners are not able to stand on their own feet without injections of donor money. Some projects are undertaken by strong organisations (trade

unions, churches, some women groups, etc.). Some projects are handed over to governments and become in that way sustainable.

Secondly, the issue of government-NGO relationships. The relationship between the Government of Zimbabwe and RBZ has, on the whole, been very positive. They have operated as a conduit for government. That decision might have furthered their aims, but how is it related to aims such as social mobilization and fundamental changes in social structures? They, like most other organisations in many other countries, face a balancing act between "filling gaps" which the government cannot handle on its own and providing advocacy for democratic and social change. Answers will vary, but the dilemma has become more and more pressing.

Thirdly, the question of institution building. The current strategy of RBZ may not be viable in the long run (RB, Ethiopia, faces the same challenges, but on a larger scale). If development interventions are to include the building and strengthening of national or local institutions as well as competence building, a Northern operational agency has its drawbacks. Redd Barna and some other NGOs do not have natural partners. Should the aim be to establish national Save the Children associations, or should Redd Barna become an international NGO with HQ in Oslo only? The Board of Redd Barna has voted against the latter solution. But how is the organisation going to tackle the changing political-cultural context?

Fourthly, the question of aid and emergency aid. Both Redd Barna and NPA are finding themselves under increasing pressure to augment their emergency and relief work. Some disasters are the product of lack of rainfall, wars etc. But in Africa, many of the problems are a result of long-term historical processes of integration into the global economy and serious political conflicts, also between the states and donor institutions.

The result is that the development/relief dichotomy becomes increasingly blurred, as NGOs aiming at being development agencies discover that their main activity is emergency aid. Sustainable participatory development and

emergency assistance place very different institutional demands on NGOs. Organisations develop a split identity - like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (see Tvedt 1992). Research shows that there is a need to apply development criteria to disaster responses, specifically by analyzing a community's capacity and vulnerability. In many cases, this is hardly done at all, frequently leading to a dangerous and unnecessary dependence on continued injections of aid in areas which have received emergency and relief assistance (Johannessen and Sørbo, 1994). The organisations are also torn between loyalty to (or the funds of) the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and to NORAD, making the dilemma harder to solve.

The Mission Organisations are operative, although to a variable extent. *The Salvation Army* and *Quaker Service* work through their respective international networks. The two organisations are not usually responsible for the implementation of projects. Implementation is normally taken care of by local counterparts. An important part of the missionary NGOs' work is to build up local parishes and churches that can assume responsibility for diaconal and evangelical work. Missionary organisations take part in planning projects, and they contribute technical advice.

The missionary organisations have long experience of working with development projects. Several of them were established before or around the turn of the century, giving them considerable experience and knowledge of the countries in which they are working. Many, like *the Norwegian Missionary Society*, *Norwegian Santal Mission*, *Mission Covenant Church of Norway* and *Pentecostal Foreign Mission* still work in the countries where they once started their first projects. Missionary work has traditionally gone hand in hand with education and health work. The missionaries often hold some kind of special skill. As well as being missionaries, they have often been teachers or health workers. *The Missionary College* educates personnel in a way that also give them knowledge of the areas in which they are to work. On the basis of the long traditions of these organisations, it seems reasonable to argue that their fields of effort correspond well with their knowledge and

competence. But as discussed below, many of these organisations face the dilemma of being organisations formed to spread the Gospel while being heavily funded by NORAD, which has regulations that draw a strict line between development and missionary work.

DEVELOPMENT AID AND CHRISTIAN MISSION

Main findings: the strategic dilemmas facing the mission organisations are a most interesting question, partly because of the missions' role in Western and Norwegian history and their central historical position in the relation between "us" and "the others", but also because their dilemmas may reveal in a more constructive way some of the dilemmas that all real "value-sharing" organisations face in cooperating with NORAD and the state. Additionally, how the mission organisations and the state solve these dilemmas will also be influenced by what is regarded as a "religious revival" worldwide and the threat of Islam, and by how they and NORAD will formulate and apply the neutrality paragraph.

"Development aid and Christian mission are two sides of the same issue", a former Norwegian Minister of Development Aid, Reidun Brusletten, said to the Norwegian news programme "Dagsrevyen" on 7.6 1983 (quoted in Myklebust 1989:1). This view is not shared by all actors within the NGO channel and not even by all mission organisations. The relationship between secular aid and Christian mission has been, and still is, a question of great importance, although most NGO literature ignores it almost completely and most mission organisations in the NGO channel argue that development aid is an integral part of the mission: it is the diaconal responsibility of the church and there is therefore no dilemma to discuss.

Two issues will be raised here: the relationship between development aid and Christian mission and how it has been conceived of within the mission itself, and secondly, the importance of aid in influencing missionary activities and creating conflicts between evangelization and development assistance within the missionary organisations.

Since 1963 the Norwegian state has supported the missionary organisations with funds earmarked for development assistance.⁶ During the course of these years an estimated NORAD support of NOK 1 billion has enabled a rapid growth to take place in the number of missionaries in the decades of the aid era. The mission organisations, supported by tax-payers money, are now on more mission fields, bringing more people into contact with the Bible than ever before. The grand age of Western missions was not in the last century or during colonial times, but during the era of development aid in the period after World War II.

The notion of mission work as low key and the image of the lonely bush missionary living in a remote and old hut while teaching the pupils under a tree, which the Mission has produced and maintained, is no longer appropriate or typical. Mission organisations, like other NGOs, have their own compounds and fleets of cars, although salaries are lower than is the case for NGO employees in general. Both the Santal Mission compound in Sylhet, Bangladesh, and the Norwegian Lutheran Mission compound in Awash or Arba Minch in Ethiopia are just as attractive and well-furnished as other expatriate compounds around the world. The organisations therefore resemble other organisations, and in administrative matters, accounting, reporting, etc. they are as professional as any other organisation.

The missionary organisations that have agreements with NORAD, through Bistandsnemda, obtain support for traditional diaconal activities. In a longer time perspective there can be no doubt that the missionary organisations have become influenced by secular development priorities. In many areas of work there are very few differences between a missionary organisation and other organisations. In some project areas they are facing problems caused by NORAD commitments from the past: buildings, schools and even hospitals, established with NORAD support, have become a burden because managing them competes for staff, attention and time. The financial and political-administrative dependence on the state and NORAD has clearly influenced how the fundamental questions in a missionary strategy,

such as nationalisation strategies and the balance between mission and diaconical work, have been addressed.⁷ In a longer time perspective it might be possible to regard this close relation to a secular state, the seeking and acceptance of financial support and political-administrative control by NORAD, as very important in causing a watershed at least in Norwegian missionary history. In some cases evangelization has become subdued to secular development concerns, because to be member of the NGO channel has stolen time, attention and resources, and they have built up an aid administration which resembles that of our organisations. The establishment of Bistandsnemda as an umbrella organisation has improved the missionary organisations' ability to conform with state demands while maintaining the identity of the mission. It acts as a buffer or a two-way transmission belt between the missions and the state.

There has always been a discussion within the missionary organisations about the relationship between religious, cultural and social change. There is a great difference between regarding "sin" as a main reason for underdevelopment, and the propaganda and embracing of Christianity as a sufficient cause to achieve real development, and to give emphasis to historical, economic and social conditions. In the former perspective history of the world is regarded as a religious drama, where development in societies is a by-product of the correct religious conviction. There has been disagreement on the relation between saving the souls of individuals and the building up of local congregations and churches, just as there have been different opinions about the role of the missionary as an agent of social and cultural change.

The missionary organisations (we discuss them in plural, although it should be noted that they are different, also in relation to the points discussed here) are critical of what they regard as superficial slogans in the NGO language. Their long history has shown that many problems are not solved by, for example, "nationalisation". The Santal Mission, for example, was forced to nationalize the church in India after independence, but as they noted: "Many of those who the Mission educated got other jobs in the

public administration. Others proved to be untrustworthy. It took therefore a long time to establish that leadership which was necessary to continue the work" (p:53).

Due to their long-term commitments they also have to make long-term considerations: to leave a project is more difficult for such organisations, because a principal concern has long been to build up viable "local partners", i.e. local churches. For mission organisations it is of great concern that the cooperating partner may break his neck by taking over the northern NGO's project load. For NGOs with more limited aims, what happens after they hand over the project is of less concern. The Santal Mission has been clear on this point: the leaders of the new churches know of course that each time they reduce the services previously provided through NORAD-funds, they are criticized and get "many enemies" (p.54). Based on such experiences, the mission organisations will tend to see a greater contradiction between the organisations' long-term goals, and NORAD's requirements of nationalization after a definite period of time.

As value-sharing organisations, mission organisations experience the conflict between their own agendas and state agendas as a bigger problem than organisations that focus less on value promotion. The NORAD link gives access to more funds, but steals time and attention from what is most important. Should Christian missionaries, rather than being dogged down in project work and report-writing to NORAD, work as teachers and doctors in ordinary public or international projects, so that they can at least devote their time off to missionary activities? The Santal Mission has pointed out the temptation of becoming an "entrepreneur for public development work" (Santalmisjonen, 1986: 76-77). A strategy document, from which the above quotations are taken (1984-85), was at the same time very influenced by NGO language, thus illustrating the way their two agendas are handled: words like "community development", "awareness building", "justice and systemic change", "self-reliance", "participation", especially in relation to the "poorest of the poor", "women and men as partners in development" were central conflicts.

The Christian organisations have in important aspects become more similar to the state in structure and behavioural focus in aid activities, but by skilfully employing the official aid language, at the same time they have maintained other agendas and important value-orientations.

Norwegian Church Aid has not been a missionary organisation. It has been regarded in many countries and by the Norwegian public as almost a secular organisation. It should be noted that the NCA, which is the organisation that has received most funds from the state, and which, since the NGO channel was established, has always had the closest relationship to the state, has in the past few years consciously tried to move away from project implementation to ecumenical practice. Its heavy involvement in emergency aid counters this shift, although NCA has also tried to use local church organisations as implementing partners in this field. It has underlined its Christian identity much more strongly than before, as well as its aim of supporting the growth of Christianity worldwide. The difference between NCA and missionary organisations is becoming less visible. It cooperates closely with Norwegian mission organisations at home and in the field, and it works harder than before to try to strengthen and develop local and national churches.

This is partly due to internal mechanisms, but it also seems to have been influenced strongly by developments within the global Christian movement. LWF in 1988 published its mission document "Together in God's Mission", which underlined that all mission work should take place in cooperation with local churches. NCA now regards itself as a Christian missionary organisation, but as its diaconal arm, so to speak. All missions, also missions to the "unreached peoples" should take place in close cooperation with these local churches. NCA has loyally followed up this policy. Its strategy is now to work through local churches on an ecumenical basis. It has usually supported Lutheran Churches (as in Ethiopia and Bangladesh), but also Catholic and Orthodox organisations, although on a smaller scale, and partly after being asked to do so, when these churches have learned of NCA's ecumenical profile (This has been the case in Ethiopia. NCA's modest support for the Orthodox

Church happened after an initiative taken by this church, and NCA had to accept the request, in order to balance in some way their heavy commitments to the Lutheran minority church). NCA has employed missionaries and in many areas also has very close relations with Norwegian mission organisations, in line with the declared policy of the Norwegian Church. Over the years NCA has offered the missionary organisations cheap or free cars and other equipment, cars and equipment originally bought with money received from NORAD. NCA also work among Muslims and people with other beliefs, irrespective of their religion and without a missionary profile.

What has taken place in NCA the last five to six years is significant in the sense that the biggest Norwegian humanitarian NGO (even listed as a humanitarian organisation as distinguishable from Christian organisations by NORAD as recently as 1988 (see Phase I report: 78) has changed important aspects of its profile. In the late 1980s EECMY in Ethiopia criticized NCA for what was called "a secular" attitude. In Ethiopia they subsequently changed profile and they are now much more geared towards church-to-church cooperation. At the Church Meeting in the Norwegian Church in autumn 1993 it was decided for the first time that mission work overseas was a responsibility of the official organs of the Church. This will also have consequences for the work of Norwegian Church Aid, especially since it was underlined by the Church Meeting in 1993 that diaconal work and inter-church contacts and networks do not replace evangelization.⁸

It is safe to assert that NCA has found its partner, and that its strategic problems in this regard are fewer than some other operational organisations face. On the other hand they may face problems between having the image in Norway of being a rather "secular" organisation, and becoming an organisation with a gradually more visible Lutheran profile in developing countries. Moreover, the local churches are weak institutions totally dependent on external and foreign funds. Often because of diaconal projects financed by aid or the mission, the churches are financially and administratively overstretched. As the Norwegian Church emphasized in its discussion in 1993, many of them do not "even have resources to maintain basic church work"

(ibid.). Inherited problems caused by aid will be alleviated by the Norwegian Church, Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian mission organisations. Norwegian Church Aid is becoming an aid organisation for churches, which is what the English translation means. A literal translation of the Norwegian name would be "The Church's aid for disasters", with more secular connotations, in line with its image in Norway.

NORWEGIAN TRADITION AND NON-EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

Main findings: little thought has been given to the history of the Norwegian organisations and their close relation to the Norwegian state, and what this history has meant for the work of the organisations in other societies, when it comes to how they understand government and organisations; how the relationship between the third sector and the state has been perceived and interpreted, and how recipients relate to representatives of the "Scandinavian model". This model for society-state relations is the very opposite of the ideas inherent in the "new development paradigm".

In recent years more attention has been paid to the organisations' contribution to the establishment of what is called "civil" society (see e.g. Report to the Storting No. 51 (1991-92)). This is a new concept within the aid sector, and was not used in Report to the Storting No. 36 (1984-85). The previous report on the North-South issue (Report to the Storting No. 94 (1974-75)) was based on another tradition, in which this concept was not part of the political "tool-box". The concept becomes relevant in a conflict situation, where the opposition or contrast is provided by the state or the public sphere. Strengthening civil society in current aid rhetoric means to simultaneously attempt to limit the power of the state in society. In international literature, the concept is often used of a policy intended to "roll back the state". "The third sector" is also introduced, and these two concepts seem to be used interchangeably. The concept of the third sector represents another normative model of society, and depending on how the voluntary organisations are perceived, as

well as the role of the non-governmental and non-profit sector, very different and perhaps contradicting policies will be formulated. The practitioner might say that this is a twisting of words. But the choice of words signals which development theory one adheres to, and this in turn will determine the aid strategy chosen.

In Norway, "civil" society is not a commonly employed concept. This is partly due to the implied conflict with the state or the public sector, which has not been a topical aspect in the development and efforts of the Norwegian organisations. The organisations have worked with the state rather than against it. The goal of the organisations has primarily been to increase the responsibility of the state; not to replace it or supplement it on a permanent basis. Even the organisations opposing the state, such as the labour organisations of Thrane and Tranmel in the 1850s and before and after World War I, did not wish to limit the influence of the state, but rather to increase it, preferably by taking it over. Thus, the idea that there is a civil society that needs to be defended - against the state - has not been prominent in Norway. The role of the state has been that of "the benevolent state": The state has had practically no fear of the organisations; they have not been seen as hostile; on the contrary, the state has welcomed them as partners working towards the same goal. The organisations have generally come to expect public support, and the state has naturally assumed this role (as shown, cooperation is especially close within the aid sector). This friendly attitude to the organisations has been dominant ever since the establishment of The Royal Norwegian Society for Rural Development in 1809, which, typically, was a pro-government information organisation promoting the agricultural sector. The Norwegian form of social and political integration has shaped the character of the third sector. The voluntary sector may thus be characterised as a typically state-oriented sector. Historically, the Norwegian aid sector has been an obvious example of this common phenomenon.

In view of this contradiction between the Norwegian experiences and the diagnosis of the problem of developing countries, the question may be asked once again: will Norway limit the

influence of the state and strengthen the private, voluntary sector in the developing countries - as the concepts used imply? Or is the intention rather to contribute to a stronger state administration; to establish a state governed by laws and which is able to guarantee "universal rights", (i.e. to reinforce the state if it is a good state) but which also should be willing to encourage the development of alternative institutions which may help strengthen pluralism, democracy, participation, etc?

Secondly, Norwegian ideological concepts of welfare and rights and the role of the voluntary organisations in developing society, are universal rather than particular concepts. What is the significance of this contradiction in our discussion? The uniquely Norwegian and Scandinavian model for the growth of the welfare state has been nurtured by the idea of equality before the law, and that only one institution can guarantee these rights; namely the state. In line with this, private organisations in Norway have largely been conceived of, both by the state and by themselves, as being complementary to the policies of the state, and not as opponents.

The universalism of Norwegian ideas of the welfare state is opposed to the declared particularism, or target group-oriented policies, of the voluntary aid sector. This conflict between universalism and particularism is strengthened and of a different kind in societies where the administrative, economic and political potential of the state differs from that of the Norwegian state in relation to its "civil society".

This "particularism" is often pointed out as one of the historical and institutional weaknesses of the voluntary sector. Indeed, one of the prominent features of the voluntary aid organisations is their particular, group-oriented approach and strategy. The role of the organisations prevents them from guaranteeing the rights of the target group. Such a guarantee is not possible in Norway, and far less in the recipient countries, unless they permanently make an area or a group "their" area or "their" group. The demand for guaranteed rights, and recognition of such rights, will still be the responsibility of the state. We may therefore speak of a "philanthropic particularism" (Salamon

1986), a kind of particularism which in the history of Norway has been counterbalanced by the state, and which has been paid a great deal of attention by social reformers.

An overarching problem is thus the relationship between the organisational culture and the organisations' orientation towards the state in Norway, and the more particular "anti-state" strategy adopted in the developing countries. Or, in "aid language", the state wants the organisations to be "channels" for their aid; to be "complementary" to the aid activities of the state. The organisations have willingly accepted this public channel function, in line with what has characterised the relationship between the public and the voluntary organisations in Norway. In the developing countries, the same organisations may work via a strategy which is partly anti-governmental and partly particular. This gap has not been an issue in the strategy discussions of the state and the organisations.

Our point is not that the agents in this field should have been reschooled into becoming experts on Norwegian history, nor is it that the dilemma could have been solved if the organisations had simply exported their Norwegian experience or Norwegian traditions to other societies. But the fact that this dilemma has not been discussed must be seen as an indication of the intellectual climate of this field and the degree to which there has been reflection of one's own activities. Nothing in the historical development of the field justifies the lack of attempts to identify one's own "hidden" attitudes and the unique historical-institutional background. It would probably have increased the chances of developing a clearer policy which could have drawn on experience and competence. Thus, the field could have made an international contribution to the debate on "NGO's contribution to development". Norwegian traditions and experiences are of course basically irrelevant to the development of other historical processes and situations, for example in Sri Lanka or Bangladesh. But they may be made relevant, if the organisations (in time) develop an understanding of general as well as specific features of the Norwegian experience. This may also (in time) provide better understanding of the general and specific features of the societies they are trying to

change.

It is now possible to assume that the effect of Norwegian private organisations and the activities of the Norwegian state in influencing the future organisation of societies and cultures should not be under-estimated. It is probably in these areas that the effect is the more lasting, for better or worse. There is no doubt that the growth of Norwegian organisational society and the manner in which it has developed has played an important part in our country. Assisted by aid, there has been an explosion in the establishment of organisations in many recipient countries. The relationship between these organisations and the state, the concept of group interest versus national interests, their role in establishing particular welfare systems, etc. will be of consequence far into the future.

This suggests dilemmas and contradictions between the history, traditions and roles of the Norwegian organisations, and the dominating strategies for their work in other countries, dilemmas which have been ignored and thus not made exploited as a vital element in the development of aid policies.

NGOS AND THEIR "MISSION": "PARTNERSHIP" AND "DIALOGUE"

Main findings: the Norwegian NGO channel has primarily been altruistically legitimating, both by the public, governments and NGOs themselves. The channel cannot be explained as the result of the state's strategic interests in developing countries or as a reflection of a contract theoretical relationship between egoists. It is best understood as an expression of a wish to help the poor and suppressed, primarily because people feel sorrow for "the other" and as a reflection of a belief that Christian or social democratic, Norwegian values encourage development. There is no evidence which can substantiate the argument that reciprocity has been a predominant, calculated expectation. NGOs have tended to dilute their mission and some of them have come to resemble "mini-NORADs", while others have maintained their own agendas although sharing official aid

rhetoric. The NGOs have generally addressed neither their particular relations to the Norwegian state and public, nor the opportunities these create for policy formulation, or how "partnership" and "dialogue" may be achieved in a changing framework where the old aid relationship is becoming obsolete.

In spite of the diversity of the NGOs, it is possible to identify some challenges common to the whole channel, at least if the rhetoric about "partnership", "equity" and "dialogue" is seriously meant.

The NGO literature often refers to the NGO mission and the dangers that can dilute it (an example can be seen in the book edited by Paul and Israel (1991) for the World Bank). A common worry seems to be: how the pressure to assume increasing project loads can cause NGOs to dilute their commitment and stray from their basic mission. Easily available funds may be a "source of distraction"; it may create "opportunistic" NGOs (Samuel and Israel 1991:12). Growth may turn value-oriented organisations into routine service delivery institutions. But more important than developing an understanding of the NGO profile, and the effect that the availability of funds might have on NGO orientation, is the question of what is their mission in the first place.

The article on the World Bank and NGOs (Samuel and Israel 1991) does not discuss what the particular NGO mission has been or should be. Its description implicitly regards NGOs as a group, as value-oriented, which de-emphasises the wide and not seldom conflicting "missions" of the NGOs. Many NGOs do not have any particular mission at all except for one; they are in it for business! Other NGOs have primarily the mission of spreading the gospel of Christ, where aid is a means to this end. It also downplays potential political and ideological contradictions between donors and NGOs and between NGOs and other actors. The World Bank and other donors will tend to regard NGOs as instruments for achieving their own goals. At the same time as governments and multilateral institutions with various motives are channelling more and more funds through NGOs, a political-

ideological atmosphere has been created that tends to dilute interest in fundamental dilemmas and challenges facing the NGO system.

The challenges of the NGO channel cannot be discussed in isolation from the political-ideological trends that frame its development. What has been described as the present "crisis of development theory" affects all working with development aid. Aid is further questioned because the disappearance of the Soviet block makes aid less important as a political weapon than it was during the Cold War. Groups traditionally supportive of aid question the lack of realism in development aid and, privately, NGO actors may also express doubts about its usefulness. Others are more positive, and talk about a global associational revolution, partly spread by the NGO channel. Governments, media and important groups in developing countries are often critical of the NGO channel - regarded as a channel of "alien" western influence. Some Norwegian NGOs seem to tackle this situation by becoming more eager than ever to reach the headlines, and the professionalization "at home". This is partly due to more immediate concerns: harder competition in the aid market and administrative pressure from the state. Employees working with aid strategies and complex planning in developing countries often feel marginalized and are seen as bereft of direction compared to the PR people working to enhance the NGOs' profile in the market in Norway. Although Norwegian organisations in general are value-oriented and unbureaucratic organisations, there is seldom time and apparently little will to discuss fundamental issues, what is their mission in aid? Why cannot NORAD or another NGO do what they are doing? Organisations are at the same time increasingly using words like "advocacy" or "development partnership" that indicate fundamental strategy shifts. Based on an analysis of the particular context of the Norwegian aid channel, we will discuss the problem of "partnership" and "advocacy", and the potential of the Norwegian NGOs in this respect.

NGO motivations

People working in the NGOs are not saints,

whatever the media image says. Their motives are not always those of altruistic "dreamers"; they can be "realistic" career seekers. Here we focus on different types of relationships between Norwegian NGOs and their "counterparts" or "partners", relationships which affect organisational motivations.

Some NGOs are supported by special sections of the population and are involved in aid to strengthen the "community" where they themselves are members. Missionary organisations have the overall, strategic goal of expanding "the community of believers". The Norwegian Trade Union supports the build-up of trade unions in other countries to strengthen the cause of workers internationally. Norwegian Church Aid works primarily through local churches, although their ecumenical strategy encourages work among Orthodox believers and Catholics. The search for like-minded partners in what is phrased "development partnership" has an important consequence; it will gradually strengthen this "community motivation", away from donor altruism to reciprocity. But these NGOs also contribute to what is regarded as the need satisfaction of others, without insisting on the satisfaction of the wants of their own members, and are in this sense influenced by altruistic behaviour as it is usually defined.

Some Norwegian NGOs do not have natural partners with whom they can form a "community of interest". In relation to "the other" they have no other agenda than to help. This holds for most of the humanitarian organisations and some of the smaller solidarity organisations. The Afghan committee, for example, was partly established as a weapon against the influence of Soviet Union in the west, i.e. solidarity was a means to an end. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, this NGO has become primarily a committee of empathy for the Afghan Muslims. Some of the solidarity organisations originally imported "the other" to Norway as part of a national political debate. Afghanistan "proved" the theory that Soviet Union was the "most dangerous superpower". In 1975, one of the most important and hottest political debates in the biggest student society in Norway, at the University of Oslo, was between different leftist groups about which movement in Angola that

deserved support. The debate was important, but very few of the thousands of students had any notion about Angola at all, so the different acronyms of Angolan movements became symbols of political identity-making in Norway. Now, when the issues are less politicized, they are trying to reorient their activities towards a combination of traditional aid and information.

Compared with many other donor nations, Norwegian aid has been less influenced by national or economic self-interest, and in this sense, therefore, is more altruistic.⁹ This is probably due to the fact that Norway as a state has had relatively weak and marginal economic and political interests in the developing world. In general, aid has been given with few economic strings and political conditions, except for an altruistic one: the policy should favour the poor. Norway has also, historically, striven to avoid having its aid become entangled in the internal politics of recipient countries; thus contrasting aid policies of the U.S., France and Britain. The big powers have, for a long time, devoted large sums of money (also channelled through NGOs, especially in the US) to support organisations and groups which might further the donor state's economic or political interests. The point here is not whether this Norwegian policy has been productive in promoting development, or to what extent there have been gaps between rhetoric and reality or between official justifications and actual policy. The point is that the political and economic context of the channel has been different from that of many other donor nations. This does not mean that a Norwegian NGO is more independent of political constraints than for example OXFAM in Britain, but that the structural environment of the channel as a whole has created other opportunities and constraints. Nor does it imply that Norwegian aid has not also been motivated by cultural, political and economic self-interest. What is underlined is that the channel's fundamental legitimation has been altruistic. The guidelines for the state's NGO support have stated: projects which are aimed at "advancing particular economic, political or religious interests are not eligible for assistance".¹⁰

State motivations

The Norwegian government has supported mission organisations and solidarity organisations as well as other types of organisations, in the absence of clear or specific foreign policy objectives. Its aid through NGOs has defied traditional realist definitions of foreign policy. The state has funded the projects of organisations like the Norwegian Association for the Disabled and Mary's Friends without looking for relative gains internationally (political support nationally has been more important). The total funding to the channel has not been linked to such political interests, though it might have expressed an intention to export Norwegian, social-democratic values or particular types of Christian morals, but mainly because this has been regarded as a "universal good". This Norwegian "naiveté" has increasingly come under attack in Norway; politicians are arguing that aid should also serve Norwegian business and help to strengthen Norway's image globally. Lately, the Norwegian state has contracted NGOs not to further Norwegian interests in a narrow sense, but to further, as it has been expressed, "Norway's international standing". When NGOs have become a means to an end - to make Norway a "superpower" in democracy and human rights, government funds through NGOs can more appropriately be regarded as exchange rather than a gift. The distinction between this policy and the major powers which support "their" NGOs in a developing country to further strategic, political or economic interests is not sharp. This shift in policy and emphasis might improve Norwegian relations with the Third World, but it raises unsolved problems for the government and the NGOs in forming the NGO channel, and especially when it comes to "partnership" and "advocacy".

Conclusion

It might be useful in this context to distinguish between three types of motivation, although some will argue that acts are always motivated by rational value maximization. For example, when people give aid and apparently do not expect to get anything back in material or status

gains, they nonetheless maximize values; what they "earn" is the excitement of giving. However, the Norwegian "altruist" experiences what might be called non-material want satisfaction (at least if the gift both increases the well-being of the recipient and generates gratitude) and the feeling of having done something good, especially if there exists an environment which honours altruistic giving, or gives approval from "bystanders", for example, the international aid community. This theory of human behaviour is not very helpful in explaining what actually are different aid policies in different countries and changing aid policies in the same countries and in the same organisations and among organisations. Motives and intentions are mixed. As has been shown elsewhere, many organisations gradually become much more concerned with their own growth and their own standing and prestige in society as in helping the poor. Many organisations, for example, use more money on "market research", i.e. on how the Norwegian people assess their performance, than on research or studies of development problems in areas in which they are working. On the other hand it is difficult to draw conclusions about intentions based on aid profiles and answers in opinion polls. Nonetheless, I suggest that there exist "altruistic intentions", the intention to strengthen the "community of believers", i.e. a kind of collective rationality and the intention "to maximize one's own gains". The popular support for the channel has been related to the first and second type, while actors within the channel have moved between all three of these categories.

THE AIM OF "EQUITY" AND "PARTNERSHIP"

Main findings: the contradictions between altruism and other donor motivations, and the gap between popular perceptions and organisational realities, combined with the particular history of the Norwegian state and economy in developing countries, may create unique frames for formulating NGO strategies and for establishing alternative relationships with peoples in other continents and other countries.

The new proposed guidelines (1994) for NORAD's support to NGOs states, for the first time in this connection, that "democracy and respect for human rights *are* (my italics) universal values upon which Norwegian aid is based".¹¹ The organisations are too diverse to legitimize this universalism, partly because they - even in a homogeneous Norwegian context - will disagree on emphasis and on what rights should be prioritized, etc. To argue that the ideas they are carrying, or the mission they might have, are universal or belong to the "common pool of mankind", downplays both the fact that some organisations export their own notion of what is universal, and the unequal power relations inherent in the channel. Reports to the Storting have, with different emphases, argued that contact with other cultures and societies is important for the development of Norway and Norwegian culture, since its strength is related to the people's ability to show ethical empathy for humanity as a whole. The NGOs have been seen as a force which can organise and express this empathy and universal ethic, as an "act" and as an "example". NGOs can, as a result of particular power structures, enter into relationships in which one has to *argue* in support of reducing unhappiness and inequality, without linking the enforcement of the human rights agenda to states' donor power.

The ethical basis of NGO aid does not have to rely on a sense of duty (as has been so important in Norwegian motives), but, as has been argued in a slightly different language in some international NGO circles, on a special kind of reciprocity; the idea of "reciprocal affection". According to opinion polls, Norwegians are not much in favour of economic gains attached to aid. However, like people in other countries, they are tired of hearing about what "we are doing for them", and want to hear more about these countries, from their point of view. The channel, in a world of "trade wars", ethnic rivalry, national chauvinism and religious controversy, can institutionalize conditions for such dialogues in long-standing relations outside statist networks in institutions of comparatively free communication.

NGO aid, like that of other donor channels, continuously produces unequal donor/recipient

relations. The change of vocabulary to "equal partnership" does not change this. The NGO channel has been given a new moral justification, and this creates other frameworks in which its dilemmas can be solved and managed. For the NGO actors to continue as before, defending them by referring to structural constraints that are conceived as uncontrollable, means that NGO activities have no moral value. The popular support for the channel, based on a notion of its morality and value orientation, would thus rest on a false image. For the NGO actors, the character of the NGO image has a duality; it underlines that they have a possibility of choosing but also that they "have to" choose this "idealistic" path. The NGO leaders face a very idealistic challenge: how to institutionalize mutual communication and action where the partners realise themselves while changing the world.

To prioritize "partnership", not only rhetorically but in reality, will require attempts to bring down conceptual and cultural barriers between peoples. By overemphasising "efficiency" and "goal achievement" in project work, the overriding concern for the organisation becomes what it achieves rather than what it represents; how human relations are built and identity negotiated, both "ours" and "theirs". Traditional project approaches tend to erect such barriers, instead of making them easier to overcome.

This role is also related to the dilemma of humanitarian aid versus "speaking out". This is not a new issue. The International Red Cross is still dogged by its decision to say nothing about conditions in German concentration camps during World War II. *Medicins sans Frontières*, led by Bernard Kouchner, later French Humanitarian Minister, was established after Kouchner and some other doctors denounced the genocide they had seen in Biafra while working for the tight-lipped International Red Cross.

The conflict in Bosnia, as earlier in Eritrea, has presented humanitarian NGOs with a moral dilemma: speaking out means taking sides. NGOs working in Bosnia have in reality ended up calling for war against Serbia. The situation in Bosnia forced many NGOs to say what they thought. Some Norwegian NGOs did, others did

not. The humanitarian organisations have in general stood for bringing aid to anybody at any time, regardless of political or religious affiliations.

Some professional aid agencies are very critical to organisations like *Medicins sans Frontières*. This is also a question of publicity. MSF split after Kouchner chartered a hospital ship to rescue some 2,500 Vietnamese boat people drifting in the China Sea. Some thought he was pulling MSF into one publicity stunt too many. Kouchner and some of his colleagues formed *Medicin du Monde* instead. After the discovery of the Serbian camps in Bosnia, they ran a poster campaign comparing Serbian president Milosevic to Adolf Hitler. In Norway the NGOs seem to be less activist, and more geared towards humanitarian aid alone. Some organisations spoke up regarding Mosambique and some have done this regarding Bosnia, but in general they acted as if this does not constitute a problem. Redd Barna, Sweden, was for example thrown out of Ethiopia after it had criticized conditions under Mengistu, while Redd Barna, Norway, kept a lower profile in order to enable their projects to continue.

Seen from the outside, the Norwegian NGOs appear as a humanitarian monolith, with a few exceptions. In Norway there was a debate between the "responsible" Red Cross and the "activist" Egil Hagen (Norwegian People's Aid) regarding Southern Sudan and the attitude towards the government in Khartoum. There were also contradictions in approach between NCA and NPA. This general lack of disagreement might reflect a political tradition in Norway, or it may reflect the fact that the organisations, have tacitly agreed not to criticize each others policies in public, because to do so open a Pandora's box. It is astonishing, given that close to hundred organisations work in about 100 countries, many in the same country, that they apparently never disagree on fundamental policy issues or aid strategies, or how the contradiction between "speaking out" and neutral humanitarian aid should be solved.

Zones of dialogue and the NGO channel.

The aim of all Norwegian NGOs is that their work in developing countries should increase awareness and knowledge and create more "positive" attitudes towards this part of the world in their organisations and in Norway. There is no clear evidence supporting a causal connection between development aid and "positive attitudes". On the contrary the only study which has been done in Norway on this issue draws a different conclusion.¹² The study does not prove that this work is without positive impacts. It only shows how difficult it is to measure the impact of such activities, and it also suggests that the NGOs have a long way to go before this goal is achieved.

Organisations as project implementors have tended to produce information about their project activities, that creates a world picture in which the donor not only is the most knowledgeable (which of course she often is), but where the donor/receiver relationship itself acts as a barrier towards establishing communication. "The other" in such situations will tend to become a means to an end, due to the social and structural mechanisms involved.

If the NGO channel is to achieve this aim, which is also the primary justification for the state support given to the channel, the question remains: how are we to increase knowledge of the world in the Norwegian population as a part of development aid, and how can we establish methods for genuine "partnership" and "cross-cultural communication", and institutionalise an international network with fewer of the power relations affecting North/South relationships in general?

In Norway, as for other donors, it has been very common to act as if there is somebody "out there" who represents "the other"; the local people, the farmers, the South etc. Meetings have been held at which one or two Africans or Asians have been introduced to speak, not on their own behalf, as a government or particular pressure group, but on behalf of "women in the South", or "the South" etc. To invite people from other countries to speak about their lands from their perspectives is in line with both declared policies

and the wishes of Norwegian opinion. The problem, however, is that the idea that such collectivities can be represented by individuals, makes communication, discussion and the reenactment of others' thought and perspectives and understanding less important or almost irrelevant. "The South", more than 100 countries, and billions of people, has seldom been represented by one person! By inventing "the others" as opposed to "us", the complexity of the world becomes manageable, but in a way which may act as a barrier towards reaching the NGOs' goal: equity in communication. The channel, contrary to widespread rhetoric, is not involved in a dialogue between "North" and "South". It has never been and will never be. The prevailing idea that NGO people communicate with "the poor", "the oppressed", "the South" or "women", can be seen as a way to handle the need for conceptual control and action. But since dialogue is always a dialogue between or among special perspectives, interests and value orientations, only by liberating themselves from such ideas of representation the NGOs can develop the dialogue that they describe as the aim of NGO communication.

This tendency is linked to another feature of dominant NGO perspectives and NGO language: humanity is often described as "one". As a result consensus on fundamental values is not only possible but preferable. By continuous enlightenment (or cultural imperialism, others will say) and hard work (more projects and more donor money) they, the "others", would be persuaded to agree with "us", either regarding the gender question, equality question, pluralism or the only true religion, Christianity, or the only true version of Christianity. In this regard the practical sides of NGO thinking have been in line with, and are certainly influenced by, a fundamental trait of Western thinking. This view has created a conceptual barrier against comprehending and acting on the growth of fundamentalism or the upsurge of ethnic chauvinism. NGO information has up to now almost never discussed or taken up such themes. It is easier to see in the 1990s, with their upsurge of irrationalism, religious fanaticism and ethnic barbarism, than it was in the "stable" cold war situation, the conditions for communicative consensus which are a fundamental premise for

aid projects, in many cases are simply not there. It has also reduced the need for NGOs to take sides in struggles between moralities and values, since the present differences are regarded as a result of levels of historical development etc. NGO information has almost entirely described the recipients as an invented "other", differing from "us" in one way; their level of development. They have described victims of child abuse, of women's oppression, etc., but based on the notion that their argument has been self-evident or universal, and not one idea among others, which has to be fought for.

NGOs and "legitimate paternalism"

Fundamentally, slogans such as "partnership" and "equality in dialogue" require acceptance of pluralism, i.e. that "the other" which one wants to help is not seen or conceptualized as identical to "us". On the contrary, they require that "the other" is seen as different from us and as one who lives within his own context with his own projects. How can NGOs with strong missions, with a belief that their ideas represent the only path to "Heaven" or to "development" use these slogans? There is of course NGO aid which imposes itself upon the receiver. Sometimes, without having been asked, NGO actors come in their hundreds, and implement projects that target some pre-conceived target group. NGOs impose both paternalism and forms of relative equity. NGOs discuss how to strike a balance, or what paternalism is legal and what paternalism is illegal. Is it legal when those who are supported cannot speak for themselves, e.g. the dying Rwandan refugees in Goma camp? Where is the thin line between care and oppression? There is no clear-cut answer as to how one should care and bother about "the other" without invading him, or how to "advise" without "governing". Authentic help is an aid which should help the other's projects; its aim is that the other should succeed in what he wants to do. The dilemma is therefore; do the NGOs want a value to be realised, not because it is "theirs", or because it is a value, but because it is a value for those who ask for help? And if they do not, how can present NGO rhetoric be justified?

Gifts as power

Gifts have everything to do with haves and have nots, and therefore with power; while the aid-relationship officially aims at equality and partnership. Lately a great number of articles about "partnership in development" have been published, but fundamental mechanisms that erode partnership are not discussed. This contradiction can be addressed by asking how the question of generosity can become linked not only to the issue of altruism, but also to the question of freedom, not only for those who receive but also for those who give. The act of giving in this perspective thus becomes an act of reciprocity in another way than is usually discussed. Aid without the helper's attitude and appearance and without hidden important political-ideological agendas can be realised, if anywhere, within this sector. The actors cannot form this channel by their intentions alone. The channel develops as a process, produced and reproduced by repetitive and continuous interactions between the actors, through a power struggle between donor NGOs and supported NGOs or between official donors and NGOs, or, as has been the rule in Norway, it can be formed through consensus-seeking negotiations about how the channel should develop. In the past, this continuous "creation" of the channel has mainly revolved around the Northern NGOs project cycle. It has seldom developed around some form of reciprocity, partly because of the project load and partly because of the notion of the "good act". The inequality in power and historical relations has been even more important. Aid via this channel may establish and create relations where human beings in reciprocity can recognise and confirm each others' projects. It can house activities whereby through practice one can recognise oneself in the reality of the other. This act does not have to be, due to the institutional set-up of the channel, routine service delivery, repetitive and reifying, but can help the actors to realise and change not only the world but the way people think about the world, themselves and others.

NGOs - dialogue and human rights

"Partnership" does not imply that the channel creates arenas or relations in which people are "nicer" to each other than they are generally, or more "tolerant" and "relativistic". Their ability to "let the grassroots speak" has been put forth as a particular feature, or as an important comparative advantage, of the NGOs. A study of NGO achievements will not confirm this assertion, except in some cases. The point here is not to focus on the "grassroots", because they cannot speak, as nobody can speak on their behalf. The notion of the grassroots often speaking has often acted as a camouflage for the NGO project leaders to do what *they* regarded as most important, no matter what the local state administration, the donor or the HQ of the organisation said. As a general concept the "grassroots" are manipulative within this system of great distance between donor and project implementation, because they have no institutionalized expression or voice, and they may therefore also continuously enhance and enlarge differences between the giver and the receiver. Due to its very diversity in value-orientations, aims and profile the NGO channel has a potential for realizing its aims of dialogue if it accepts this pluralism, which the notion of the "collective grassroots" makes impossible.

The NGOs cannot meaningfully use the concepts of "equal partnership", "dialogue" or "advocacy" on behalf of "the other", without at the same time rejecting the idea that the true answers are known to somebody, be it Adam in Paradise or Muhammad in the desert. One has to accept that existing different moralities are incompatible or that there is no overriding criterion available by which people are enabled to decide the right life for men. That there is no path towards the discovery of these truths. And very important in an aid context; the true answers, when found, are not necessarily compatible with one another and form a single whole. Mission organisations have not accepted and will not accept this. They, and other types of organisations that have "discovered" the true path, use such terms hectorically only. The solidarity organisations of the past had also "found" the solution to development problems, and the Norwegian parliament unanimously seconded a government

development strategy in 1985 for all developing countries, a strategy which was said to have been proven by historical experience. Dialogue is not to say: "I will do to "the other" what I would like him to do to me", since "the other" might disagree with "me" about what is good. It is therefore unclear what the various NGOs mean by these terms.

The multiplicity of NGOs is an indication that there will always be a conflict between true ends and true answers to the central development problems. The world of the poor herder in Turkana is different from the world of the NGO bureaucrat. The world of the Muslim or Christian fundamentalist is not the world of the liberal atheist, and the world of those who think and speak in Swahili is not the world of the Norwegian-speaking expert. Each world is composed by everything that its members do and think and feel, expressed and embodied in the kind of words, the forms of language that they use, the images, the metaphors, the forms of worship, the institutions that they generate, which embody and convey their image of reality and of their place in it. This also implies that the members of the same organisations; for example a man compared to a woman, persons married compared to unmarried, field workers compared to the home staff, will have different concepts of the world. Conflicts between true ends are not culture-bound, but universal. The concept of a common good, valid for all mankind, rests on a cardinal mistake. The existence of fundamentalist NGOs, of the Norwegian Lutheran Mission, women's-lib NGOs, leftist NGOs and rightist NGOs, all altruistically motivated, is an indication of this plurality of ends. The human world can be interpreted as a battle of perpetually new and ceaselessly conflicting wills, individual or collective, and in our time is partly empirically reflected by the heterogeneity of NGOs.

This notion of "zones of dialogue" does not imply the institutionalising of cultural relativism. As a rule the Norwegian NGOs are not relativists. But these NGOs actors can, by the force of imaginative insight and contact, understand the values, the ideals, and the forms of life of other cultures or societies. They may find these values unacceptable, but still a starting

point for communication. What is important is that the NGO channel can, if the actors open their minds, grasp how another person may be a full human being, with whom one could communicate, and live in the light of values widely different from one's own. These values can nevertheless be seen as values, ends of life, ends which NGOs fight for and by which men's lives could be fulfilled. The channel itself may be an argument against equating one tradition with the human condition as a whole.

Social or political collisions will take place in such meeting places, and this is unavoidable if value-oriented NGOs take part. The conflict of positive values alone makes this unavoidable. At the same time the language of international NGOs is an important sign and reflection that one style of language, although born of Western history, is being adapted by the whole world. NGOs, and especially the proliferation of like-minded NGOs in almost all countries of the world during the past few decades, indicate how fast this channel helps transform the world. Culture-transcending knowledge has been created and has been published. Although traditions differ, people do not live in cocoons, and the NGOs create one of several meeting places where people can argue for universal values and reject cultural relativism. At the same time it may erase barriers against one culture allowing itself to claim that it knows everything or has the final authority. These zones may at least promote and preserve a kind of uneasy equilibrium, constantly threatened and in constant need of repair. Through these meeting points the organisations can be vehicles to understanding that the idea of a single, perfect society of all mankind, is internally self-contradictory. The paradise of the Muslims is not that of Jews or Christians. The good life of a Nuer is not that of a social worker from Oslo. The society which is preferred by a Zulu is not the good society envisaged by a fishery expert from Tromsø. And the beliefs of an African rainmaker are not the beliefs of an umbrella-carrying researcher at the University of Bergen. Each will have her ideal constellation of virtues. The notion that a single perfect society is possible is nonsense.

The NGOs can act as mediators (in this mid-way

position) between cultural relativism and aggressive uniformism. The channel as a social system and the organisations working there are founded on the expectation of and knowledge of the fact that there is knowledge beyond culture. They are planning development projects and reporting systems that are not determined by the internal characteristics of different cultures. The whole discourse on NGOs and their profiles and activities within the social system itself from Sylhet in Bangladesh to Awash in Ethiopia and Oslo in Norway, involving poor farmers, illiterate women and doctors is a clear sign that a "universal" language has developed. In fact, seen from the remote villages in many parts of the world, the NGO decade and the proliferation of NGOs have been most efficient vehicles for producing knowledge that is valid for all. This clears the ground for an open and potentially just struggle among ideas and convictions about what constitutes "good society" and "good life". On the other hand, according to their aims, NGOs are value-oriented organisations which justify their work by moral, altruistic arguments. They might be relatively big and powerful compared to weak peasant associations in Nicaragua or women's groups in Zimbabwe, but they are still a junior partners when compared to the authority and standing of REST in Eritrea and the Orthodox Church in Ethiopia. But compared to the state system and the multilateral system, NGOs, (at least Norwegian NGOs) are relatively powerless. Compared to other channels, the fundamental structural relations are therefore more conducive to dialogue than conditionality, to openness rather than to posing as having found the true path or the true answer, to curiosity about the world rather than to using aid as a means of confirming past outlooks and value preferences.

If they are based on pluralism and a knowledge of the infinite ways lives can take, and without strong sanctional powers, if they do not suppress too many varieties of positive action or frustrate too many equally valid human goals, the Norwegian NGOs may reach their aim: that of educating the Norwegian people about the world.

A pluralist channel outside the state system

The principle of state sovereignty, even if it does not resemble what the propagandists of the "New paradigm" argue, (increasingly being revealed "as a myth"), is coming under pressure because of the globalization of economic and information systems and because of the problems of the environment and poverty. Many matters require indivisible and global solutions, and cannot be handled according to the size and shape of sovereign states created by historical accidents and processes. In such a situation institutions and organisations that cross national state boundaries, and capable of mediating long-term ecological, security, and economic needs and values, seem to have greater space for action.

At the same time the world is marked by religious and ethnic strifes and conflicts between states and within states. Since the channel was established in the early 1960s our understanding of history and development has changed: Most important, forces have emerged which were not predicted and which most modernization theories thought belonged to the dust-bin of history; the resurgence of religious and especially ethnic chauvinism and aggressive nationalism. Aid was institutionalised at a time at which human history was generally regarded as a single progressive, universal civilisation. The disregard of the strength of totalitarian or authoritarian nationalist or religious movements, and their triumph, was inherent in precisely those ideologies which at the same time helped to frame the whole idea and strategy of development aid. In this situation the NGO channel may have a role in affecting how solutions are arrived at when interests conflict. It might influence how information is brought to bear on entrenched values and beliefs, not necessarily to "uproot" them, but to transform behaviour which may be acceptable to the individual but harmful to society. NGOs might contribute to ensuring tolerance for pluralism while sustaining individuals' identities and their sense of intrinsic value, although they in some cases have been organisations for both ethnic chauvinism and religious intolerance. Some of these problems seem to be difficult to solve by technocratic improvements in government and

political systems, but perhaps require alternative systems of international cooperation, although these would not necessarily be better or more democratic. The UNDP's 1993 Human Development Report noted that, "because future conflicts may well be between peoples rather than between states, national and international institutions will need to accommodate much more diversity and difference, and to open many more avenues for constructive participation" (UNDP, 1993).

By reorienting its activity profile, the channel has established opportunities for more influence and openness. This has partly been done on a moral basis. The possibility of exploiting the tremendous power that state-to-state relationships in aid give the donor state, is not available in the same way to the generally much, much weaker NGOs. People in these organisations have established cultural and economic networks across borders and outside the state system. The point here is not that these networks have proven to be "better" than public or official networks. It is rather that they are different and involve other people. If it is effectively pursued, it may establish unique face-to-face relationships between people with different ideas about the ends of development. "Equal partnership" or responsibility presupposes opportunities for physical coexistence.

A moral channel outside the state system?

By addressing the role dilemma in this way, the NGOs might also fill another lacuna. In the post-industrialized West, notions and descriptions of the world are flowing around, apparently free and without obligations, with representations more or less "liberated" from their social reality. On such a background the NGO channel can institutionalize cross-cultural relations in the form of direct contact, organized around a project for furthering common good. In a fragmented world, they may maintain visions about the possibility of the "moral act". The value of such a moral act may increase by the very absence of meaning and value elsewhere in society. The NGOs can thus represent what modernity seems to have buried; the idea of

global development, concern for the poor and unity among people.

This multitude of organisations does not represent an associational revolution, as has been suggested. Their aims are too different, also in relation to state power. Some organisations are founded to fight the state or the government in power. Some organisations, influenced by liberalist ideology (only a few American NGOs), have the goal of aiming at rolling back the state. Others want to minimize the role of the "overburdened" or "over-bureaucratized" state, based more on populist attitudes. Other NGOs were established to fight for power in the state (REST in Tigray, for example, and a number of the Sandinista-formed NGOs in Nicaragua) or to support the fight for another state power (as ORA in Oromo, Ethiopia), while some NGOs try to influence the policy of the state and government in power by advocacy and public campaigns. Yet others are most concerned with project implementation or social service delivery. The redefinition of the relationship between the state and society is therefore not a common objective. What unites them, if anything, is the heterogeneity of their approaches.

This heterogeneity represents alternative networks with different interests attached to them outside the state system. Within these networks equality, dialogue and self-control might be easier to institutionalize, than within state to state relations. People working in such organisations *might* develop loyalty not only towards their own organisations, or their own country but to an international network of similar NGOs and specific groups of ordinary people outside their state boundaries. At present, such networks are often influenced by social, political and cultural forms which are not replicable or sustainable over time. But they already represent a force which in some cases counteracts regionalization and ethnification of the world economy and world politics. Some of the international networks and partnerships recruit, train and promote a network of "ordinary people" with loyalty to the world community and sensitive to social and political issues. Rules, procedures, norms and evaluations, as well as organisations, can supplement a regime of

dominance and dependence with one of pluralism and equality.

This system cannot be regarded as completely separate and distinct from the constraints that define the overall strategic setting in which the organisations interact. But new institutions can affect the forms of cooperation that emerge over time. In this sense institutions matter. They might become vehicles for overcoming different types of state and market constraints. These institutions will also reflect the distribution of power between international and local NGOs, but these power differences will generally be easier to overcome than similar relations between state institutions. It can show that not all situations in world politics or international political economy need take the form of the Prisoner's Dilemma, and that states are not always trying to maximize their absolute gains. The states' preferences might be generally based on assessment of their own welfare, and not that of others. The NGO channel working in this way supported by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry is an example of the fact that foreign policy can be alternatively motivated.

Networking and implementation .

The focus on networking represents a partial shift in emphasis. The aim is not project development, but networking of a particular kind, in order to develop new types of international relations and relationships. Most NGOs and donors would say that there is a need for institutional innovation in international relations. In this endeavour a concern for rules, norms and procedures is important, implying that there is a prospect of long-term change in behaviour and perspectives. Within the NGO community there will be a struggle between those forces which aim at UN standards and state standards in salaries and benefits and those which do not wish to see a great number of new international bureaucrats or highly paid consultants, or a further mushrooming of "development-oriented" NGOs. One might foresee a renewed struggle for the ideological hegemony of the channel, and growing contradictions within the NGO community, where the "value oriented" NGOs will criticize

other NGOs for exploiting the channel's popularity for narrower economic or organizational reasons.

Some of the Norwegian NGOs continue as though the context had not changed. The "old" Northern NGO, implementing big projects, will soon belong to the past. The receiving communities will not accept this in the long run. Temporarily, some countries are forced to accept anything, but as soon as they develop, experience shows that they will not. Think of Norway for a moment. The Norwegian people would not accept that organisations from Islamic countries, for example, would come to develop Lofoten fishermen. We would not even accept that American or German organisations did that. Moreover, the competition from private firms will increase. NGOs in the "South" will demand a greater role, etc. The NGO project honeymoon will soon be over. This channel, as organizers of altruism, and as show cases demonstrating that the "little good deed" is possible, by mobilising popular engagement etc., is therefore forced, by the historical development itself, to address anew the fundamental question of its legitimacy and profile.

This development will also affect the balance between Norwegian or Northern NGOs and Southern NGOs, and between different types of NGOs within the NGO channel. Since the perspective focuses as much on communication and cross-cultural contact between people outside state apparatuses as on efficiency promoting economic, social or democratic development in developing countries. it will offer space and legitimacy to the continued existence of a heterogeneous Norwegian NGO channel. It will also affect the relationship between NGOs and governments, between Norwegian NGOs and other international NGOs and between a Norwegian NGO and a "southern partner".

I have tried to identify some of the main issues that such a reorientation of strategy will have to address.

POSTSCRIPT

When children in small villages north of the Polar Circle sell cakes they (or their parents) have made, when the winter wind is blowing cold through almost empty streets, in order to help street children in Khartoum or Jakarta; when women on the West-Coast of Norway come together to sell handicrafts from a developing country in order to send the profits back; or when an unemployed plumber risks his life, crosses war-zones and mountain-passes in Afghanistan, with tens and thousands of dollars sewn into his clothes to assist development projects that a Norwegian organisation has carried out together with the Afghan muslims, it becomes clear that discussing the NGO-channel is, from one perspective, to discuss a phenomenon that almost is above politics and ideology. It embodies acts that point (not to a different future, necessarily), but to the possibility of the good act in a world of ethnic chauvinism, religious intolerance and growing inequality between rich and poor.

However, NGOs have become imprisoned in an NGO language and in the images they and others have created of "NGOs in development". It is therefore important to liberate the channel from its own perceptions of itself, and for NGO actors to establish more distance to the dominant language, working methods, conventions etc. The NGO channel will have to accommodate itself to changing global and national frameworks. The choices that governments, Parliament, the NGOs and the people make, may or may not mean great changes, but the choices should be as well-informed as possible. We hope that this study will make a contribution to this effect.

NOTES

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Phase I was finalized in August 1992. The main report was published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November 1993. An edited version of all the reports produced during phase I was issued by the Centre for Development Studies in August 1994. Phase II started in August 1993. This report is a summary of Phases I and II. This chapter consists of two parts; a) a short summary of some of the main findings, and b) a presentation of the most important recommendations, based on the findings of both phases.

2. In 1986, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) carried out a study of 2,095 projects that has been jointly sponsored by CIDA and Canadian NGOs. The projects assessed were completed between April 1979 and March 1982. In 1989 the Danish aid organisation, DANIDA, together with the Centre for Alternative Social Analysis (CASA), evaluated the performance of Danish NGOs, which included a field study in eight countries. The Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) sponsored a study of the Swedish scene (English translation: "State Grants for Non-governmental Organisations"). The four NGOs receiving most government funds in Holland, CEBEMO, HIVOS, ICCO, NOVIB, sponsored a study by a "Steering Group on the Impact of the Co-financing Programme" (This programme was started in 1965). They focused on Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chile, India, Indonesia and Zimbabwe. Studies have also been undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute in the UK. The projects assessed by ODI were funded by, and in some cases run by, British NGOs. They have been the subject of separate evaluations by White (1991), Robinson (1991), Muir (1992) and de Coninck (1992). The conclusions of these studies were brought together in a report by Riddell and Robinson (1992), Riddell et al., *Strengthening the Partnership - Evaluation of the Finnish NGO Support Programme*, Report 1994:1, Overseas Development Institute & Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki.

CHAPTER I

¹ See Tvedt 1992 for a more detailed analysis of this history.

²The concept of a Scandinavian model has been elaborated by many when it comes to analyses of the welfare state, see for example Kuhnle 1989 and Kramer 1992.

³See for instance Kuhnle, S. and P. Selle (eds.), 1992, *Governments and Voluntary Organizations*, Aldershot: Avebury.

⁴This section is based on detailed reconstruction of all government disbursements to NGOs in 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1993, collection of central policy documents, annual budgets and reports for "all" (80) organisations for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, compilation of central policy documents, annual budgets and reports for 10 selected organisations for the ten-year period 1981-91, and three questionnaire-surveys. In addition, extensive archival studies in NORAD and interviews with almost all leading actors on the Norwegian NGO-scene.

⁵The data are mainly from the sub-report on public disbursements to Norwegian NGOs for the period 1963 to 1993, plus an examination of the budgets, strategy documents, annual reports of 83 organisations for the years 1988-1991 and of the selected ten organisations for the years 1981-1991, as well as information from three extensive questionnaires.

⁶NORAD's General-Secretary, Andresen, wrote in a memo on 17.8.1962 that the state should only have a supportive role and that the organisation at least should provide half of the project funds itself. If not "will the natural distinguishing line between private and official projects be rubbed out, and that might also create problems as to who has the responsibility" (quoted in Tvedt 1992:40).

⁷This development is similar to what takes place in other donor countries. The DANIDA/CASA report notes that "SIDA is emphasizing the importance of the NGOs maintaining and developing their own identities and ideologies and wants the NGOs to consider their individual ideology and approach as an advantage..." in *Danish NGO's Report I Synthesis*, Evaluation Report, DANIDA 1989: 154.

⁸Allocations from NORAD to Norwegian voluntary organisations for information on developing countries and the Norwegian aid have been generous since its start in 1966. In 1980, NOK 7.2 mill. were allocated to 12 organisations under frame agreements (6 of them were political parties) and to 41 other smaller campaigns. This was 66% of the NORAD budget for information. In addition 17 journalists received travel grants to developing countries that year from NORAD. In 1990, 22 organisations had frame agreements and 44 ad hoc campaigns were also given money. The support to NGOs amounted to 24 mill. NOK or 71 percent of the total NORAD information budget.

⁹The Minister in charge of development aid, Reidun Brusletten (June 1983 to May 1986) with a background from voluntary missionary organisations, was instrumental in bringing the NGOs to the fore in NORAD development policy. Jan Egeland, Personal Secretary to the Foreign Minister and later State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry (1991-) with a background as International Secretary in Norwegian Red Cross, has later played an important role in enlarging the role of NGOs in Norwegian foreign policy.

¹⁰Bjørnøy, H., 1988, *Undersøkelser om norsk utviklingshjelp utført av Statistisk Sentralbyrå i 1972, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1986*, NSD Rapporten, Nr. 75: 13.

¹¹In Norway, unlike the case in many other big donor states, it is fruitful to use the term "aid epoch". The reason is that the aid relationship has dominated the relationship between Norwegians and people from Asia, Africa and Latin America in some decades after the Second World War. This part of the world has been regarded to a large extent through the lenses of the "giver"- "receiver" relation (see Tvedt 1990).

¹²Vaage, O.F., 1993, *Holdninger til norsk utviklingshjelp 1993*, Oslo: Statistisk Sentralbyrå. P.24.

¹³EUROBAROMETER 36 - Fall 1991:198. The question was: "Still thinking about the Third World, would you be prepared to give some of your time to support something being done for the Third World?"

¹⁴EUROBAROMETER 36 - Fall 1991:199. The question was: "Still thinking about the Third World would you be prepared to give more money than you do now to support something being done for the Third World?"

¹⁵EUROBAROMETER 36 - Fall 1991:197. The question was: "Still thinking about the Third World are you a member of a group or association which does things to help the Third World?"

¹⁶EUROBAROMETER 36 - Fall 1991:196. The question was: "Still thinking about the Third World have you been asked to give some of your time and play a personal part in campaigns or activities to benefit the Third World?"

¹⁷EUROBAROMETER 36 - Fall 1991:195. The question was: "Still thinking about the Third World have you been asked to give money for specific projects in the Third World such as building of schools, wells, medical aid, etc.?"

¹⁸Part of the explanation may, however, be reflection of the yearly "NRK-TV Innsamlingen". This campaign takes place every year. The whole day on state-owned television is devoted to development problems in the Third World. One NGO is responsible for the programs, and for organizing a campaign for collecting money all over the country. The aim is always to reach every home with a "bøssebærer". It may also be a result of "Operasjon Dagsverk". Since 1963 pupils in Secondary schools all over the country have used one day every autumn to collect money for a specific project in the Third World. They collect money. Or they work for other people, and give the salary to the campaign.

¹⁹The present analysis bases itself upon empirical studies of NGO-Government relations in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe, a compilation of central legal documents and directories, guidelines for the NGO-sector, personal interviews with leading officials both in governments and in the NGO-community during five field visits to three of the countries. It also draws on data collected by an extensive questionnaire-survey to 119 organisations receiving support from the Norwegian government and Norwegian NGOs in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe. In addition information from secondary sources will be discussed. The empirical knowledge of the development of state-NGO relations in these countries is still scanty.

²⁰The Bangladesh government during the tug of war with the NGO community in July 1992 made a list of 52 NGOs, which were described as being engaged in missionary works, especially in proselytization.

²¹This section relies heavily on Moyo 1994.

²²In size, organisations vary greatly from the large membership NGOs like ORAP with over 100,000 members, to small community based organisations (CBOs) with 10-100 individual members or households (De Graaf, Moyo & Dietz, 1991).

²³Moyo 1994 discusses also other ways to classify NGOs in Zimbabwe; by size, budget, geographical location, sector of operation, particular activities undertaken etc. In this paper it is focused on organisational types, for comparative purposes.

²⁴These proportions have changed due to large inflows of official foreign assistance since Zimbabwe adopted ESAP in 1990, such that the proportion of foreign aid accounted for by NGOs will have decreased considerably - (but not the total amount received by the NGOs.)

²⁵The section on Ethiopia is based on Karadawi 1994.

²⁶Written list given to the author, March 1994, by RRC in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

²⁷The only list available with names of the registered organisations dates from March 1994, hence this is the basis for the categorisation below.

²⁸This section relies heavily on Skar (ed.), 1994.

²⁹For example, direction level persons from INPHRU, many of them militants of the Popular Social Democratic Party, assumed positions as vice-ministers or ministers in such ministries as Ministry of Labour, Social Welfare (INSBBI) and the International Reconstruction Fund (FIR) which later became the Ministry of Foreign Cooperation (Skar, (ed.) 1994). Leading members of CEPA went on to occupy important positions in the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.

CHAPTER II

¹This Report to the Storting can be found in a short version in English of 36 pages. The above paragraphs therefore are translated.

²The following is based on doctoral dissertations written on the history of the mission: Sæverås, O, 1987, *On Church-Mission Relations in Ethiopia 1944 - 1969 - with special reference to the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY) and the Lutheran Missions* and Bakke, J. *Christian Ministry - Patterns and Functions within the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus*, Oslo: Solum. Interviews have been conducted with personnel working for the mission both in South Ethiopia (in February 1994) and with their Secretariat in Addis Ababa in May 1992 and February 1994. The information is corroborated with documentation at the Priv.org.office at NORAD on the work of the organisation and finally based on information collected in relation to a questionnaire as a preparation for a meeting with all the Norwegian organisations working in Ethiopia, January 7, 1994 as part of the present study.

³Projects are here defined according to budgeting in the cooperation with NORAD, and not as they appear "on the ground" in Ethiopia. Thus NLM operates with many more operational units within their system.

⁴NLM had apparently not any problem in fulfilling its own share ("egenandelen") in relation to NORAD. In 1992 more than NOK 2.3 million were given by 38.816 individuals. These money were retrieved under 6 different categories: (*Giverkontakten*,1,1993):

Spring / Autumn's gift	8.281.000	Far-adoption	2.823.000
Regular offerings	1.862.000	Social projects	4.011.000
Evangelical projects	2.971.000	Other collects	3.183.000

⁵Schaefer, Field report No. 1, Nov. 10, 1957, quoted in Bakke (1987).

⁶NLM: Missionary Conf. Ethiopia, Mins, Jan. 1950, quoted in Bakke (1987).

⁷Consecrated on July 25, 1948. Mara 1972:80, quoted in Bakke (1987).

⁸NLM: Yirga Alem logbook Jan 19, 1950, quoted in Bakke (1987).

⁹NLM: Yirga Alem logbook May 1950, quoted in Bakke (1987).

¹⁰NLM: Gidole logbook October 1951, quoted in Bakke (1987).

¹¹NLM: Missionary Conf. Ethiopia, Mins, Jan. 1956, quoted in Bakke (1987).

¹²Lundgren 196074; Ut i All Verden 1974:1, quoted in Bakke (1987)

¹³LWF: Aske to Schaefer, April 16, 1958, quoted in Bakke (1987).

¹⁴GA: Schaefer, Field report Number 1, Nov. 10, 1957, quoted in Bakke (1987).

¹⁵Bauerochse (GHM) referred to them when he stated that the Norwegians were always quick to say: "If we can't do as we like then we better leave the whole work".

SEM/AA: Bauerochse to Arén, July 8, 1957, quoted in Bakke (1987).

¹⁶NLM: Missionary Conf. Ethiopia Mins, Dec. 1959, quoted in Bakke (1987).

¹⁷NLM: Home office to Ethiopia Field Council, March 3, 1960, quoted in Bakke (1987).

¹⁸EECMY was used as the name in the first documents about the new church. This name was not allowed, since there should be only one Ethiopian church in the country, The Orthodox church. After the revolution and the overthrow of the Emperor the position of this church was weakened and it lost its position as state church. Therefore EECMY again became the name of the church, and this time also officially. In this section the term EECMY is used throughout for because the text then will be easier to follow.

¹⁹There are a number of studies of missions under colonial rule, but as far as I know, almost none about missions and the development aid era.

²⁰As part of the NORAD standard contracts (in Norwegian): "Organisasjonen skal forplikte seg til at dets innsats ved sentralsykehuset i Irgalem må gjøres på en generell menneskelig basis uten å være motivert av økonomiske, politiske eller religiøse særinteresser". (Contract between NLM and Norsk Utviklingshjelp, 14.12.1963, NORAD Archive).

²¹In Norwegian: "Det økonomiske ansvar for drift av sykehuset vil bli nærmere fastlagt i kontrakt mellom Den etiopiske stat og Norsk Luthersk Misjonssamband og er Norsk Utviklingshjelp uvedkommende" (ibid).

²²Sæverås (no date:153).

²³The Norwegian title: "Strategidokument for NLMs prosjektarbeid ute", approved by the NLM board 23.9.1988.

²⁴The Norwegian original: "Misjonens hovedsamarbeidspartnere er lokale kirker og synoder. Der slike ikke eksisterer, ønsker misjonen å arbeide for opprettelse av kirkesamfunns bygd på lokale menigheter. I de tilfelle det finnes en kirkelig samarbeidspartner, er andre samarbeidsforhold organisert gjennom kirkeorganisasjonen og ikke direkte med NLM". (Ibid)

²⁵In 1992 the Development Department has the following sections; appropriate technology, building, child care council, education and training, medical, micro hydro power, relief, urban and rural development, and water development (See EECMY, *Annual report of development department 1992*, Addis Ababa:EECMY).

²⁶GA: Schaefer, Field Report Number 1, Nov. 10, 1957, quoted in Bakke (1987).

²⁷LWF: Tausjø to Florin, July 1962, quoted in Bakke (1987).

²⁸LWF: Magerøy to Sovik, May 18, 1962, quoted in Bakke (1987).

²⁹The leader of NLM in Ethiopia was also Norwegian consul there during the years of the White and the Red Terror.

³⁰The support of staff at the hospital was established by NORAD from 1966 and covered 50% of a stipulated cost per post. This support was almost not used by any organisation until 1972, when it was regulated to 6.000 NOK a year. From then on this kind of financial support became the most used type by the mission organisations until NORAD revised its regulations in 1988. This support to staff underwent a major revision again in 1974, when the rate was upgraded to 35.000 NOK a year. This included an unspecified coverage of other living expenses on c. 7.000 called "indirect expenses", such as travelling, transport, lodging etc. The average level used for "technical personnel" by the missions was NOK 36.300 at the time, thus an almost 100% coverage of this type of missionary personnel was gained by these organisations. This rate was gradually upgraded every other year, and reached c. 100.000 for singles and 150.000 for families in 1991. In 1977 the new type of operational support was introduced: A coverage of 80% of total operational support to projects, but on the condition that all expenses were specified. This type of support was immediately used by all NGOs that were development agencies. Most missions, however, NLM included, chose on the other hand, to continue with the old system of staff support (until 1988). The reason for this must be that their salaries were lower than the average and that they obtained a 100% coverage of some of their staff salaries and expenses - which constituted 85% of their total aid budget.

³¹Mengistu said in a speech just after he took power in 1977 that missionaries were agents of CIA in disguise. In the beginning of March, Radio Evangeliet Røst, was nationalized, and changed the name to Radio Revolusjonære Etiopias Røst. The Red Terror was launched to fight the White Terror. American and Finnish missionaries in Djimma in South-West Ethiopia were for example asked to leave the country in 24 hours in Easter 1977.

³²See case study I.B.

³³Based on the evaluation report by Hødnebo, K. et al.: "Grace Period or a New Deal". Bergen, 1993, and prepared for Norwegian Church Aid and NORAD. Focus was what happened to the development projects and programmes undertaken by Kenyan NGOs and supported by NORAD, after the diplomatic breach with Kenya in 1990.

³⁴This is based on Duffield and Predenrgast (1993), archival studies in NCA archives in Oslo and Asmara, archival studies in the archive of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Oslo and interviews with many of the leaders of ERD and of NCA in the period studied. (Khartoum 1983, Nairobi 1987, Addis Ababa 1992 and 1994, Nairobi 1992 and 1994 and in NCA Headquarters, Oslo).

³⁵There were many reasons for this. Swedish missionaries had been active in Eritrea since the 1850s. Escalating fighting in the mid 1970s weakened these historical links. Relief work could be one way of trying to maintain this contact. Generally, the opinion in the Scandinavian countries was very pro-Eritrea. NCA/Sudan Programme's influential director, Øystein Stabrun, had also visited the war- and famine affected Eritrea, and was positive to NCA-support.

³⁶These included, Brot Fur Die Welt (BFW), Christian Aid (CA), Dutch Interchurch Aid (DIA) and the Interchurch Coordination Committee for Development Projects (ICCO). Lutheran World Relief (LWR) made its first bilateral grant to REST in 1980.

³⁷In 1979, for example, the General Secretary of the EPLF visited Norway where he strongly pressed NCA to display political solidarity. NCA replied that in order to boost humanitarian assistance, Western agencies had to show impartiality and a low profile. ERA and REST were appreciative of the material support provided by ERD. But again and again they criticized ERD's lack of advocacy.

CHAPTER III

¹Salamon, 1994.

²See Tvedt 1990, for an analysis of how the Norwegian basic need strategy conceptualised the "world", "the other" and development, and the policy formulations this led to.

³There were a number of NGO-projects in the 1980s where the Northern NGO was seen as a vehicle (through integrated rural development projects etc.) for popular participation and economic self-sufficiency in many rural areas.

⁴This strategy is supported by leading policy-makers in most donor-states and strongly backed by influential international (and many big national) NGOs as well as by important parts of a growing community of researchers and consultants on development NGOs. Although intellectual roots and inspirations, aims and emphasises may vary, there seems to have emerged among many actors a broad consensus that former development strategies seriously underplayed historical experiences about the real and potential role of what now generally is termed "civil society" and the organisations therein.

⁵This theory does not explain actual patterns in how NGOs are funded. A survey undertaken during the study "Private organisasjoner som kanal for norsk bistand, fase I) showed that of 70 organisations, 6 received more than 90 % of their development budget from the state, 16 between 80 and 90 %, 17 between 60 and 80 % and 23 less than 40 %. This development is a general trend in all donor countries. In the developing countries the majority of the development NGOs are almost 100 % dependent on funding from external sources, mostly states. If this is a zero-sum game, the state is playing their cards with less than insight and without self-interest. This dependency on the state has reportedly reduced the involvement of US NGOs in advocacy (Smith 1990; Salamon and Anheier 1992; Smith and Lipsky 1993). In Britain fears have been raised that this financial situation over time will foster compromise in the willingness to speak out.

⁶See Tvedt (1994), in Harir, S. and T.Tvedt (eds). 1994.

⁷Regarding Zimbabwe one group has been identified as following a strategy called "entryism" (Moyo 1990). It involves the cooptation of government officials on NGO boards, the inclusion of ministers as patrons of NGOs, the use of government experts in the development of technical reports and strategies underlying advocacy works (Moyo 1994: 55). Some of those employing a no-confrontational strategy have managed to sway government policy. This is most in accordance with Zimbabwean political culture, and "obviates the partisan basis of policy dialogue and lobby" (Moyo 1994:55). Another but more rare strategy on the Zimbabwean scene is described as "confrontational lobbying" (Moyo 1994:56). These criticize openly weaknesses in government policies and a few work together with opposition parties "to strengthen the latter's campaign for political support" (Moyo 1994:56).

⁸In many countries NGOs have worked which have not been registered by the government. Such NGOs might have worked with money financed by Western donor states or in cooperation with UN-organisations (see forthcoming evaluation).

⁹They draw funds from international sources under i) Foreign Donations (Voluntary activities) Ordinance, 1978 and rules made there under and ii) The Foreign Contributions (Regulations) Ordinance of 1982. However, in the event of receipt of foreign fund, they are supposed to follow strictly the following specific rules and regulations:

- a) The NGOs should limit its activities only to those projects which are approved by the government;
- b) Without prior permission of the government, an NGO cannot receive or spend foreign donation;
- c) A foreigner cannot be appointed in an NGO without prior permission of the government;
- d) The NGOs have to submit a report on their activities on a regular basis to the government; and
- e) The NGOs have to submit audit reports to concerned authorities.

¹⁰These figures are used by NORAD, while UNDP operates with less than 10 % (see UNDP 1993).

¹¹The following is primarily based on information published in newspapers in 1992 and 1993 which widely covered the issue of government-NGO relationship. They represent a cross-section of daily and weekly newspapers (numbering 18), both vernacular and English. The newspapers can be categorized into a) pro-establishment, b) Islamic and c) left, by positioning them into the political trends they represent. The pro-establishment papers are Dainik Bangla (DB), Dainik Sangbad (DS), Shaptahik Bichitra (SB), The Daily Star (TDS), The Bangladesh Observer (TBO), Dhaka Courier (DC). The papers which are supporting the Islamic viewpoints are Dainik Millat (DM), Dainik Inquilab (DI), Jago Mujahid (JM). Apart from them there are left leaning papers which are Bhorer Kagoj (BK), Ajker Kagaj (AK), Kagaz (K) and Shaptahik Khoborer Kagaj (SKK). The information is based on a report written for this project. See Jamil and Manam 1994). In addition it is based on my interviews with leader of the NGO Affairs Bureau, November 1993, leader of ADAB, November 1993 and discussions with central actors on the Bangladeshi NGO-scene. It is also based on paper-clipping at the NORAD Office, Dhaka.

¹²At the Relief & Resettlement Conference on Southern Region in 1972, 38 representatives of different foreign NGOs participated (Democratic Republic of the Sudan, 1972, *Proceedings of Relief & Resettlement Conference on Southern Region*, pp.51-52).

¹³Some of the western NGOs operating in Southern Sudan during the period of study were Action Committee for Relief of Southern Sudan (ACROSS), African Interior Mission, African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF), Catholic Relief Service, Euro-Accord, German Volunteer Service (GTZ), German Leprosy Relief Association, International Volunteer Service, International Summer School of Linguistics, Lutheran World Federation, Missionary Aviation Fellowship, Norwegian Council for the Prevention of Blindness, Norwegian Association for Disabled, Norwegian Church Aid/Sudan Programme, Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), Save the Children Fund, Seventh-Day Adventist, Sudan Interior Mission, Swedish Free Mission, Voluntary Service Group, Swiss Interchurch Aid, , Voluntary Service Overseas and World Vision. This list of NGOs is compiled from Madison, 1984, 174-191, and personal notes of implementing agencies for UNHCR, Juba (The author worked in 1985/1986 as a Programme Officer for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Juba, being responsible for social services for all the Ugandan refugees in the South and for the rural settlement program for about 40 000 refugees on the East Bank).

¹⁴In 1986/87, when their long-lasting integrated rural development programme had been brought to a halt due to the civil war, the NCA also reassessed their past policies and decided that in future development assistance programs in the Southern Sudan more emphasis should be given to institution building including support to local state institutions.

CHAPTER IV

¹ See Smillie and Helmich 1993.

² As discussed elsewhere in this report, this difference between state and organisation is less in this field than what the general theory about these social phenomena suggests. In some cases the state-administrators have been more value-oriented than NGO-actors, most concerned with maintaining their own organisation. Additionally, a common trait of the whole channel, in the sense that it also has included the employees of the NGO-Division including, has been its value-orientation. The discussion is therefore more about how NORAD, as a state institution, has followed-up "rule-orientation" in this context.

³ For an analysis of all Reports to the Storting regarding the overall declared intentions with Norwegian NGO-support and the development of NORAD-guidelines and attitudes to NGO-support, see especially Hødnebo (1992) and Tvedt (1992).

⁴ At that time these organisations were primarily mission organisations. It was underlined that close cooperation was of interest, but that these mission organisations should "of course work on a basis which should be as free as possible" (quoted *ibid.*).

⁵ Since then new official guidelines have been issued in 1971, 1974, 1983, 1991 and 1994. See Hødnebo 1992 for a description of these guidelines, except the one from 1994.

⁶ For a statistical overview of support to Norwegian NGOs since 1963 with a special emphasis on the years 1981, 1986 and 1991, see especially Dalseng (1992) and Tvedt (1992).

⁷ See case study on Norwegian Lutheran Mission in Norway. NLM had help to build up and influence this new church both spiritually and financially. In the last decade Norwegian Church Aid has played, at least economically, an even more important role.

⁸ This information is based on NORAD, 1993, *Handbok for private organisasjoner*.

⁹ One small example: The Norwegian consul is also Resident Representative of Norwegian Church Aid.

¹⁰ This figure will vary. It is also difficult to identify the cooperating partners in some cases. The number of different organisations is less, since some of the Norwegian NGOs work in two and three (NCA) of the countries.

¹¹ The NORAD Representation, Dhaka, a representation which seems to give NGOs highest priority and which regularly produces detailed overviews and reports on the local Bangladesh-scene, has had no clear policy for Norwegian NGOs in the country. It has not been their responsibility. Documentation about country program discussions for Bangladesh shows that Norwegian NGOs are barely mentioned at all. In the Country Program discussions for 1991 to 1994, NORAD, Dhaka, notes that "the Representation has no regular contact with the Norwegian organisations" (Landprogram Bangladesh 1991-1994, del 2:37). This is an accurate description of the relation, and NORAD has - in general - not been willing or able to seek complementarity or coordination with Norwegian NGOs. NGOs have found themselves in a situation where they operated in the same country without knowing of each other. Meetings organized by the Centre for Development Studies in relation to the present evaluation turned out to be (for two main cooperating countries) the first time organisations working in the same country had met each other to discuss strategic problems.

¹² The Phase I report showed that generally the relation between Norwegian NGOs and NORAD has been very close, in line with general third sector/state relations in Norway. It also described a development in which some of the organisations with some justifications could be called "mini-NORADs", in the sense that they not only seemed to share their policies, but also their working methods. The debate among the NGOs has lately focused on this issue - increasingly described as a danger - resurfacing again in September 1994 over discussions about how NORAD handled the "information support".

¹³ Interview with Gunnar Bøe, 22.9.1994.

¹⁴ See NORAD, 1993, *Handbok for private organisasjoner*, compiled at the Centre for Development Studies, as a continuation of Phase I of the present study

¹⁵ Priv.org. to Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon 17.12.1993, 443.1.NHO/ NORAD

¹⁶The following is based on a Questionnaire sent to all Norwegian NGOs working in Bangladesh, organized by the author, autumn 1993 and documents dopiled during Phase I.

¹⁷In norwegian, they "fikk i 1982 høre om Cares arbeid for de fattige kvinnene på landsbygda nord for Dacca. Kretsen bestemte seg for å støtte dette arbeidet og bevilget ca. kr. 18000. De har siden fått både se og høre om prosjektet ved representanter fra Care Norge" (Norges husmorforbund, Engasjement i utviklingsland, 1990: 21)

¹⁸"Sør-Trøndelag krets har i flere år hatt god kontakt med "Shallows Thanapara" og solgt deres fine håndarbeider rundt om i lagene" (Norges husmorforbund, Engasjement i utviklingsland, 1990: 21).

¹⁹"In Norwegian: introdusert lovende aktiviteter i Rajshahi-distriktet. Kvinner rekruttert blant de aller fattigste lag av bygdebefolkningen gjennomgår et treårig program med lederopplæring og undervisning i helse, hygiene og jordbruk. Mange får også hjelp til å danne spare- og lånegrupper. Tilsammen har 100 000 kvinner deltatt i programmet i 1990-91, 6 000 av dem deltok i lederutvikling som gjør dem istand til å organisere nabokvinnene og føre arbeidet videre på egenhånd. Erfaring viser at de lykkes".

²⁰In norwegian: fordi kirketilknytning og kontakter var i dette området" (S.-st:2).

²¹In norwegian: "å dyktiggjøre og synliggjøre stammefolk, å øke de fattiges bevissthet, alfabetisere de fattige og "empoverment" (ibid).

²² Interview with Gunnar Bøe, 5.10.1994.

²³ In February 1994 the following organisations were listed by government sources in Asmara: ERRA, Red Cross Society, Eritrea (ERCS) (the delicate political situation in Eritrea can be shown by the fact that there was a debate on this organisation's name: The Red Cross name was an Ethiopian heritage, and it was "Christian" while the muslims (estimated at 50 % of the population) wanted it to be renamed Red Crescent), Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat, Evangelical Church of Eritrea, Eritrea Orthodox Church, Faith Mission, Muslim Relief Council, Khale Hiwot Church, Regional Centre for Human Rights and Development (a kind of research institute established with Norwegian support), National Union of Eritrean Women. As shown, they are either more or less government institutions or religious organisations, where the religious issue mobilize stronger feelings than what secularized politicians in the secularized Oslo will tend to understand. The international NGOs allowed to operate were Save the Children, UK, Redd Barna, Norge, Rädda Barnen, Sweden, SOS Children Village (if all donors would work through "their" NGOs children would be given high priority in Eritrea!), OXFAM-UK, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Association for the Blind and Partially Sighted, ACCORD and Christian Outreach (Source: ERRA Newsletters and interview with .). Of these organisations NCA was by far the biggest. NCA initiated and financed what was called "NGO-forum in Eritrea". Its first meeting was on 8.6.1993. They have planned to form some sort of consortium and formulate a "code of praxis" for NGOs in Eritrea. Should this be a planning instrument? In that case, they use an instrument the government has feared can instigate disunity along ethnic and religious lines.

²⁴ Interestingly enough, NCA pointed to this in their comment on the guidelines. An NGO criticized the state for reproducing positive myths about the NGOs! (NCA to NORAD , Kontoret for Private Organisasjoner, 9.12.1993).

²⁵ See Bebbington and Riddell 1994 on discussion of official donors' direct funding. They focus on knowledge- and capacity problems. In the report's perspective these issues are of minor importance, and can only rather easily be solved (more knowledgable people and improved capacity to the donor-representations). This will not, however, solve the institutional problems, it will only make some of the dilemmas more easy to detect.

²⁶ The material is primarily based on archival material on the two countries in NORAD, Oslo and archival material at NORAD, Dhaka. In addition a number of reports written on NORAD, Zimbabwe are used.

²⁷ According to Bebbington and Riddell "the themes of performance and accountability are at the centre of why bilateral donors are interested in direct funding of southern NGOs. On the one hand, southern NGOs are supported as means of strengthening civil society and fostering good government; it is supposed that they can make these contributions because they are more accountable than is government, and in turn, because they can make governments more accountable through representing popular interests effectively. On the other hand they are supported because they are deemed to perform better than government in delivering certain forms of aid to beneficiaries. In both cases it is often implied - though perhaps not said explicitly - that southern NGOs are assumed to be more accountable, better performers, and more effective in strengthening civil society than are northern NGOs" (Bebbington and Riddell 1994:2).

²⁸ Norwegian NGOs were the main funding-source for 12 organisations in 1987 and for 18 in 1992 in the same countries, including Ethiopia (in Ethiopia they were the main source for two synods of the Mecane Yesus Church). The support through ERD to REST and ERA is not included in this overview, due to ERD's role as a consortium.

²⁹ Ref. how Western embassies in Bangladesh and Ethiopia in 1992 and 1993 put pressure on the governments so as to reduce their control of the sector.

³⁰ Support to NGOs is given mainly from five budget lines, namely: Support to Local NGOs, Environmental Activities, Cultural Cooperation Support, AIDS Grant and Women's Activities. The Government of Zimbabwe has requested for allocation of some bilateral funds towards the Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Development, focusing on indigenous enterprise institutions. Whether these should be called NGOs are a question of definition.

³¹ Bebbington and Riddell argue that "strengthening of civil society implies increasing the socio-economic development impact of intermediary organisations and strengthening those relationships that increase accountability between NGOs, their social bases and the state" (Bebbington and Riddell 1994:5). This is a justification of large Northern NGOs implementing their own projects in developing countries. It might be appropriate in some cases, but less productive in other cases, and in general it is doubtful.

³² Seibel (1989) describes the NGOs "mellow-weakness" as a politically attractive but ineffectual safety-valve, to which the state offloads insoluble problems (e.g. the alleviation of poverty) that would otherwise threaten its legitimacy. In a more practical way the same debate has gone on in Norway for decades in connection for example with the question of who (the state or the organisations) should take responsibility for the psychologically disabled, the blind etc.

³³ As a result of the process in NORAD in 1991-93, a definition of these types of organisations were agreed upon. The following definition is found in the decision paper on the issue to the board of directors of NORAD on 14.4 1993:

"A non-governmental, independent institution/organisation which work with development relevant tasks and issues, and is active in relation to several countries in a regional and/or global connection. Neither Norwegian private organisations nor multilateral organisations under the UN-system are covered by this definition."

(Source: Note from Priv to PFK: NORAD's cooperation with international, Private organisations (IPO) - 1993. 31.3 1993.)

³⁴ This chapter is based on primary sources collected by archival studies in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Development Cooperation, documents collected from relevant organisations and interviews with political leaders in Eritrea, Ethiopia, SPLA, Norwegian Foreign Ministry and with core persons in the ERD-operation.

³⁵The extent to which the home-governments subsidized and supported the mission organisations varied, both among countries and in relation to specific organisations. The most famous example may be the Catholic missionaries sent from the Iberian Peninsula to Central America, which returned legitimacy to the *conquistadors* for government support. Also in other areas the mission organisation paved the way for colonialism (expanding western cultural notions and values), and legitimized colonialism, regarded as benevolent paternalism. In Africa, where most Norwegian NGOs work, they were not seldom given government subsidies for their charitable work, while allotted parts of the country where they were allowed to evangelize (so as not to compete with mission organisations with other beliefs (Southern Sudan under British rule can be a case in point). There were, of course, exceptions to this rule. The Norwegian mission organisations, of whom many today are also development NGOs, were not among the strongest critics of western colonialism, although they were not subsidized from a colonialist government.

³⁶The American Red Cross originally founded in 1887 as a private organisation, provided important help to Americans wounded in Cuba during the Spanish-American War at the turn of this century, was granted an official charter by the U.S. Congress in 1905, giving it status as a semi-official government agency. In 1981 54 % of its overseas resources came from the U.S. government. The Canadian Red Cross got 63 % from its government in 1980 (Smith 1990:30).

³⁷Red Cross, Norway faced difficulties in cooperating with Red Cross, Ethiopia, during the drought and war in Tigray and Eritrea, because it became clear that they were more a government agency than a neutral charitable organisation, and consequently did not accept assistance to rebel-held areas.

³⁸Other examples than the Emergency Relief Desk operation can be the achievements of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Somalia in 1992, which was generally praised, and the "advocacy" of NGOs during famine in southern Sudan. They helped to document the Sudanese government's promotion of famine, while donor governments and the UN were more inclined to keep quiet.

³⁹The Foreign Ministry has also initiated other instruments which might be flexible and able to react swiftly on emergency situations or on Foreign Ministry initiatives. Institutions in the grey-zone between state-administration, forprofits and nonprofits have also been established. NOREPS - *Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System* - is a cooperation between the 5 largest Norwegian NGOs, the Foreign Ministry and the Norwegian Trade Council. It offers supply of goods and services in five major areas and a team of relief workers to in operation within 72 hours. The NOREPS' services are for hire on direct order from the suppliers. The UN System is the largest customer. *Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights* (NORDEM) is a resource bank, from where the UN, governments and international and regional organisations are invited to apply for assistance. Participation by Norwegian experts may be funded by the Norwegian government or relevant international institutions. NORDEM as a permanent offer is financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but administered by what in this context is defined as an NGO, the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights.

⁴⁰One of the first examples of such a policy, was the Eisenhower-administration's forced withdrawal of CARE from Egypt, as a means to put pressure on Nasser by using the food-weapon.

⁴¹Telephone interview with the late Bernard Confers, Lutheran World Relief, quoted in Smith 1990:47).

⁴²CARE, Catholic Relief Service, World Vision, American Red Cross, Lutheran World Relief among others were all active in Vietnam, with considerable support from the U.S. government. A delegation of representatives from different organisations visited Saigon in 1965, when President Johnson was about to step up the war efforts. They declared that "the role of the voluntary agencies, whose programs vary considerably from one to another, is supplemental to that of the government... There should be no slackening of support for both types of activity, governmental and private, especially since they are working in increasingly close and effective collaboration" (Marr,D., 1974).

⁴³The more precise character of the policies presently implemented can be grasped by summarizing some main points in a book by Jan Egeland, State Secretary in MFA since 1991, which was published in 1988: *Impotent superpower - potent small state*. The book did not suggest an entirely new Norwegian policy. It

formulated, however, a more comprehensive and activist policy than what in the past had been more laid-back and *ad hoc*. Important in this context is that the NGOs were given an explicit crucial role to play. The main idea was that Norway, as a smaller nation, may possess a potential for promoting international human rights and democracy which is underestimated by Norwegians as well as by others. This ability was due to these reasons; a) Norway has fewer and less complicated foreign policy objectives; b) less organisational tensions within the national decision making system and consensus-oriented foreign policies; c) such a policy is less likely to clash with other external political, strategic or economic interests; and d) Norway is perceived as credible and worthy of support. This combined with affluence would give Norway a chance to play out this potential importance on a global scale.

Four conditions for playing this role are put forth: a) policy consensus, b) few conflicting foreign policy interests, and c) increasing funds for foreign assistance. The fourth criteria is the problem of institutional memory, which in Norway is of a technical nature, as opposed to the situation in the US's where there are limits inextricably tied to her status as a superpower or innate in the fabric of her political culture.

One clear suggestion was that aid programs for local human rights organizations "may be channelled through non-governmental organizations, to avoid being looked upon as official assistance to the opposition in the recipient countries" (Egeland 1988:187)

⁴⁴Due to the dominating tradition in Norwegian history this close cooperation between NGOs and governments is not considered very problematic. While in Canada it became a great issue when it turned out that organisations received more than 50 % of their costs from the government, the biggest humanitarian organisations in Norway may receive 110 % for a number of projects directly from the MFA without causing much discussion. This may create a situation where Norwegian NGOs gradually are regarded as spokesmen for the Norwegian government rather than as organisations working because they feel empathy, wanting to expand the "community of interests".

⁴⁵For articles about the impact of the war, see Tvedt 1993b, and for a background study of the war, see Sharif and Tvedt 1994.

⁴⁶Norway was a member of The Eritrean Commission, appointed by the United Nations, in the early 1950s (other members were Burma, Guatemala, Pakistan and South Africa). This Commission put forth proposals for the future relation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Pakistan and Guatemala wanted that Eritrea should become a sovereign state after maximum ten years. In the meantime it should be administered by the United Nations. Norway's representative in the UN-Commission was very clear: Eritrea should be under the Emperor's crown; he opted for "reunion". The delegation of Norway argued in support of the "necessity for the political association of Eritrea with Ethiopia" and about the mutual benefit to "both countries, by their complete and immediate union" (United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations Commission for Eritrea. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, 10.6.1950, A/AC.34/3.201, Foreign Office Archive, 26.6.26. Eritrea-kommisjonen, Vol. II, 1.6.1950-31.7.1950.). Subsidiary could the western part of Eritrea remain under British administration. Ethiopia wanted an intimate union between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Italy wanted maximum sovereignty for Eritrea, and were in this demand supported by the majority of Latin-American states. The Norwegian proposal received under the General debate only support from Liberia (and Ethiopia). Burma and South Africa proposed a federate solution, where the countries were united under the crown in Addis Ababa. This was supported by the General Assembly. Finally a resolution proposed by Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Greece, Liberia, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Turkey, and the U.S. got majority, 38 against 14.

Norway had backed away from the Commission-member's proposal, and supported this motion which implied that Eritrea should be a self-governing area in union with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopia crown. The Foreign Ministry opted for a compromise, a federational solution behind which the British delegation played a leading role.

⁴⁷"The soldiers learnt to like the BP5", interview with .. ERRA, February 1994. BP5 are biscuits made in Norway and provided by the ERD-operation.

⁴⁸Addis Ababa also knew that the Norwegian government was involved through NCA (Ethiopians working at the NCA-office in Addis Ababa reported to the government all the time, without NCA and the Norwegian government knowing it. This example can indicate that MFA should have no illusions about the "secrecy" of

such operations.

⁴⁹The cross-border support was broadly in line with other big donor nations. The U.S. government gave from 1984 to 1986 450 million dollars to famine victims in Ethiopia during the past two years, and about 50 million in assistance to Eritrea and Tigray, cross border from Sudan, mostly handled by ERD.

⁵⁰They were, however, put under increasing political pressure. The 2nd Scandinavian Conference on Eritrea in Oslo 15-16.3.1986 stated, for example, that Norway had a special responsibility because of its role in the first UN-conference on the Eritrean question. Norway was asked to become a central country in this new diplomatic efforts.

⁵¹NCA-people in Addis Ababa complained about NCA cross-border operations. NCA had two heads in Ethiopia. This created internal conflicts in NCA, between the "Addis-group" and the ERD-group. NCA-Addis was critical to the employment of foreign policy advisers, and complained that NCA had given up both their church-profile and their control-profile in relation to REST and ERA: "They received a half page report after having given them US 30 million" (kilde:)

⁵²People in the Foreign Ministry criticized this point when it was made in the Phase I report, and expressed disagreement with the analysis. The studies undertaken during Phase II has further confirmed the problem, and what was a hypothesis in the Phase I report has been verified now.

Her er en del tidligere fotnoter som ikke har noen henvisning i dokumentet:

1. See Ekern, S., 1989, NORAD and private organisations in Nicaragua. NORAD, Managua had a meeting when they received this report. They voted unanimously that the report should be put aside in future discussions on NGO-policies in Nicaragua. The author had not shown sufficient balance in his analysis of the Nicaraguan NGOs, NORAD, Managua, declared, because Ekern indicated that most of the Nicaraguan NGOs supported by Norway under the Sandanistas were government organisations more than NGOs.

2. Support to NGOs is given mainly from five budget lines, namely: Support to Local NGOs, Environmental Activities, Cultural Cooperation Support, AIDS Grant and Women's Activities. The Government of Zimbabwe has requested for allocation of some bilateral funds towards the Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Development, focusing on indigenous enterprise institutions. Whether these should be called NGOs are a question of definition.

3. Bangladesh has had a number of large and influential NGOs. Some are mentioned here:

BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) was established 20 years ago. They have seven programs with the aim of breaking the cycle of poverty through mobilisation of the people. The main program is RDP/RCP (Rural Development Project/Rural Credit Project).

About 600,000 members are said to be reached in about 5,200 villages. 70 % of the members are women. One of their most important sector-programs is silk-production. In 1991 they produced three tonnes, or about 10 % of the country's production. During this decade BRAC plans to produce 100 tonnes annually, and employ more than 250,000 at the end of 1990s. Primary education is a part of RDP. 180,000 children in 6,000 schools were started in connection with the rehabilitation program after the cyclone in 1991. NORAD has described BRAC as "one of the largest and most successful NGOs in the world" (Johannesen, B., 1990). This has for years been supported by NORAD. In 1992 they got about 26% of the total NGO-allocation, i.e. a little more than NOK 7 million.

Promika Kendra was established in 1976. It organized groups of landless and poor through development programs, education programs and credit-programs. It has ca. 450,000 members of whom 50 % are women.

GSS or Gono Shahajjo Sangstha has 240,000 members in more than 2,000 villages, especially in north and

F. fiernet pi disketten.

CHAPTER V

¹See Tvedt 1992:66-92, for a detailed analysis of the organisational landscape, its development and characteristics.

²Mollekleiv in NRK, 8.10.1993.

³*Assistance* is "...primarily to follow up communication and applications for loans, technical advice, expert knowledge or other assistance identified by members in local organisations or in society", defined in *Guidance in planning and Evaluation. Private Organisations' projects. Part 1, General Section*, Office for Private Organisations, NORAD, 1988, p. 13. *Guidance* is defined: "NGOs work practice guidance through local organisations. This might include their choice of aims and strategies, and the development of methods and routines. The northern NGOs take the 'backseat' and do not involve themselves in the daily administration" (Ibid)

⁴The description of these programmes is heavily indebted to Johannesen and Sørbo, 1994.

⁵Johannesen and Sørbo (1994) show how RBZ has managed to tackle some of these problems, and improved their programme across the board. It is, however, too early to say whether the problems identified have been identified.

⁶State support to Norwegian mission is not a new phenomenon. Both Thomas von Westen (1682-1727) and Hans Egede (1686-1768), who initiated mission among inuits and the sami people, were supported by the state through the establishment of Misjonskollegiet in 1714. From the state's point of view this was primarily seen as a means to secure political authority in the periphery of the kingdom.

⁷The Norwegian Missionary Council in 1991 supported a project called "Nasjonalisering og misjonens utviklingsprosjekter", which was finalized in August 1994 with the report: DIS, 1994: A report on the nationalisation project of mission health projects in Asia and Africa, submitted to the Norwegian Missionary Council, Office for International Development Cooperation. The debate was initiated again in March 1989, by Bistandsnemda, to discuss "Sustainable cooperation". The word nationalisation was avoided, perhaps because they did not want to dramatize the impact of a process that has put strong pressure on former mission priorities, and a process that to a large extent has been discussed within the secular NGO-speak.

⁸Menighet og misjon - en betenkning fra samarbeidspartene i Kontaktforum for Menighet og Misjon, in *Norsk Tidsskrift for Misjon*, 1994, 3:137-144, p.141.

⁹In 1963, when support to private organisations was started, the government's intention and plan was that Norwegian would become more important than NGOs. Norwegian firms were, however, at that time not interested, unlike Norwegian NGOs. In the last few years NORAD has made more efforts at supporting Norwegian firms. The total value of project-applications were NOK 7.962 billion in 1994 as compared to NOK 3.338 in 1993, while NORAD by July 1994 had channelled NOK 142.6 million to 43 projects as investment-and export support.

¹⁰NORAD, 1991, Support to non-governmental organisations' activities in developing countries.

¹¹NORAD, 1994, Retningslinjer for støtte til private organisasjoners virksomhet i utviklingsland.

¹²In 1990 Norwegian Red Cross evaluated their experiences in this field. The report concluded that the expected positive changes in attitudes among members to aid, in understanding of the situation of the developing countries and knowledge of developing countries, had not been reached via work with the project (Svenkerud and Svenkerud 1990:69). Possible explanations are not discussed. But one theory may be that the relationship was closely interconnected to donor-position. When for example Nord-Trøndelag district gave 50,000,- NOK in support of a hen-farm in Mahalapye, Botswana and reports sent home continuously discussed only the problems of selling the hens, it is likely that cross-cultural understanding or dialogue will not improve. The whole

experience was filtered through the project lens, where Red Cross knew both what should be done, how it should be done and was disappointed with their cooperating partners. (Peer Otto Svenkerud in cooperation with Peer Jacob Svenkerud, 1990, *Evaluering av distriktsprosjektene 1982-90*, Heradsbygd 10.9.90).

REFERENCES

This list does not include primary sources (or for example NORAD Country Strategies and NGOs' planning documents) included in the text.

- Abed, F.H. et al., 1984, NGO Effects and Planning: Development as an Experimental Process. Paper presented at a seminar on Focus of 50 million: Poverty in Bangladesh, organized by ADAB, Dhaka, quoted in Aminuzzaman, 1993.
- Alam, M., 1988, Special Employment Programmes in Bangladesh: An Evaluation of Major Schemes, in: M. Muqtada (ed.) *The Illusive Target: An Evaluation of Target Group Approach to Employment Generation in Rural Asia*, ILO.
- Aminuzzaman, S., 1993, *Role of NGOs in Socio-Economic Development of Bangladesh*, Dhaka, Bangladesh: Dept. of Public Administration, Univ. of Dhaka.
- Anheier, H.K. and W. Seibel (eds.), 1990, *The third sector: Comparative studies of nonprofit organizations*, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Anheier, H.K., 1990, Voluntary organizations and the Third World: The case of Africa, in Anheier and Seibel
- Arnove, R.F., 1980, *Philanthropy and cultural imperialism. The foundations at home and abroad*, Boston: G.K. Hall and Co.
- Asian Development Bank, 1989, *Cooperation with NGOs in agriculture and rural development in Bangladesh*, National Support Services, Asian Development Bank
- Bakke, J., 1987, *Christian Ministry -Patterns and Functions within the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus*, Oslo: Solum.
- Bebbington, A. and D. Rivera, 1994, *Strengthening the Partnership. Evaluation of the Finnish Support Programme*, Country Case Study, Nicaragua, Felsonson, Helsinki: FINNIDA.
- Bebbington, A., and R. Riddell, 1994, *New agendas and old problems: Issues, options and challenges in direct funding of southern NGOs*, London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Bjørnøy, H., 1988, Undersøkelser om norsk utviklingshjelp utført av Statistisk Sentralbyrå i 1972, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1986, *NSD Rapporter nr. 75*, Bergen: Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste.
- Bozeman, B., 1987, *All organizations are public. Bridging public and private organizational theories*, London/San Francisco: Jossey-Bass publishers.
- Bratton, Michael, 1989, The politics of government-NGO relations in Africa, in *World Development*, 17, 4, pp. 569-587.
- Brons, M., W. Elisa, M. Tegegn and M.A.M. Salih, 1992, War and the Somali refugees in Eastern Hararghe, Ethiopia, in Tvedt (ed.), 1993.
- Chinemana, F., 1991, *Review of NORAD support to NGOs in Zimbabwe*, prepared for NORAD-Zimbabwe, January 1991.
- Clark, J. 1991, *Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations*, London: Earthscan.
- CMI, 1986, *Bangladesh - Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review*, Bergen: The Chr. Michelsen Institute.
- Cockson, P.W and C.H. Persell, 1985, *Preparing for power*, New York: Basic Books.
- Dalseng, T., 1992, Statlige utbetalinger til private organisasjoner, in: Tvedt (ed.), 1993.
- DANIDA/CASA (Centre for Alternative Social Analysis), 1989, *Evaluation Report: Danish NGOs, Report 1, Synthesis*, Copenhagen, November.
- de Coninck, J., 1992, "Evaluating the Impact of NGOs in Rural Poverty Alleviation - Uganda Country Study", *Overseas Development Institute*, Working Paper no. 51, London.

- de Graaf, M., S. Moyo, and T. Dietz, 1991, *Non-Governmental Organisations in Zimbabwe*, NGO Landenstudie Zimbabwe/Impactsstudie Medefinancieringsprogramma, June.
- Democratic Republic of the Sudan, 1972, *Proceedings of Relief & Resettlement Conference on Southern Region*, 21.-23. February 1972.
- DiMaggio, P.J. and H.K. Anheier, 1990, The sociology of nonprofit organizations and sectors, *Annua.Rev.Sociol.*, 1990, 16, pp. 137-159.
- Duffield, M. and J. Prendergast, 1993, *Neutrality and Humanitarian Assistance: The Emergence Relief Desk and the Cross-Border Operation into Eritrea and Tigray*, Washington DC: Center of Concern and Birmingham: University of Birmingham.
- Edwards, M. and D. Hulme, 1994, *NGOs and development: Performance and accountability in the 'New World Order'. A background paper*, paper circulated to participants to the International Workshop on 'NGOs and development: Performance and accountability in the New World Order', University of Manchester, 27-29, June 1994.
- Egeland, J., 1988, *Impotent superpower - potent small state*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Esman, M. and N. Uphoff, 1984, *Local Organizations*.
- Ethiopian Orthodox Church, 1990, booklet.
- Etzioni, A., 1978, *Moderne organisasjoner*, Oslo: Tanum-Norli.
- Eurobarometer 36, 1991, survey carried out by Norges Markedsdata and INRA (Europe), Oslo: Norwegian Social Science Data Service and Brussel: The Commission of the European Communities.
- Farrington, J. A. Bebbington with K. Wellard and D.J.Lewis, 1993, *Reluctant Partners: Non-governmental organizations, the state and sustainable development*, London: Routledge.
- Fowler, A., 1990, *Doing it better? Where and how NGOs have a Comparative Advantage in Facilitating Development*, University of Reading: AERDD Bulletin 28, February.
- Fowler, Alan, 1993, Non-governmental organizations as agents of democratization: an African perspective, in *Journal of International Development*, 5, 3, pp. 325-339.
- Harden, B., 1992, *Africa - dispatches from a fragile continent*, London: Fontana Books.
- Harir, S. and T. Tvedt (eds.), 1994, *Short-cut to Decay. The Case of the Sudan*, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Hødnebo, K., 1992, Norske myndigheters retningslinjer for private organisasjoners bruk av norske statlige u-hjelpsmidler, in Centre for Development Studies, 1993, *En studie av frivillige organisasjoner i norsk bistand*, Bergen: CDS.
- Hødnebo, K. et al., 1993, Grace period for a new deal, report submitted to Norwegian Church Aid.
- Johannessen, B. and G.M. Sørbo, 1994, *NGOs at the Crossroads: Norsk Folkehjelp (Norwegian People's Aid) and Redd Barna (Norwegian Save the Children) in Zimbabwe*, Oslo/Bergen.
- Johannessen, B., 1990, Foreign aid to Bangladesh: the Norwegian experience, i *Koht Norbye* (ed), pp. 283-293.
- Karadawi, A., 1994, *The NGO Scene in Ethiopia*, (restricted).
- Keen, D., 1994, A Comparative Study of Some Donor Countries' Experiences with NGOs.
- Kjosavik, T.D., 1992, Etiopia, in Jørgensen, T. (ed.), 1992, *I tro og tjeneste. Det Norske Misjonsselskap 1842-1992*, Stavanger: Misjonshøgskolen.
- Korten, D.C., 1990, *Getting to the 21st Century - Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda*, Connecticut: Kumarian Press.
- Kramer, R.M., 1992, The roles of voluntary social service organizations in four European states: policies and trends in England, The Netherlands, Italy and Norway, in: Kuhnle and Selle (eds.), 1992.
- Kramer, R.M., 1981, *Voluntary agencies in the welfare state*, Berkley, Los Angeles and London:

University of California Press.

- Kuhnle, S., 1989, "Den skandinaviske velferdsmodellen - skandinavisk? velferd? modell?", in Kuhnle S. and L. Stokke (eds.), *Visjoner om velferdssamfunnet*, Bergen: Alma Mater.
- Kuhnle, S., 1992, Das Skandinavische Wohlfahrtstaatliche Modell im Zeitalter der europäischen Einigung, in *Zeitschrift für Sozialreform*, 10, pp. 606-619.
- Kuhnle, S. and P. Selle, 1992, Governmental understanding of voluntary organizations: Policy implications of conceptual change in the post-world war II-period, Bergen: LOS-Senter Notat 92/1.
- Leat, D., 1990, Voluntary Organizations and Accountability. Theory and Practice, in: Anheier and Seibel (eds.), 1990, pp. 141-154.
- Lorentzen, H., 1989, *The Welfare State and the Third Sector in Norway*, Shifts in the Welfare Mix - Social Innovation in Welfare Policies.
- Madison, B.B., 1984, *The Addis Ababa Agreement on the problem of Southern Sudan: A study to evaluate the distribution of benefits and social groups in the Southern Sudan and to determine the impact of this distribution on the region's political stability*, Ph.D., University of Denver.
- Marr, D., 1974, "The politics of charity" in *Indochina Chronicle* (October-November 1974:3), cited in Smith, 1990, p.65.
- Menighet og misjon - en betenkning fra samarbeidspartene i Kontaktforum for Menighet og Misjon, in *Norsk Tidsskrift for Misjon*, 1994, 3:137-144, p.141.
- Migdal, J.S., 1988, *Strong states and weak societies. State-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Moyo, S., 1990, *Non-governmental organisations in Zimbabwe: Context, role and relationships*, working paper.
- Moyo, S., 1994, *Development and Change in Zimbabwe's NGO Sector*, Harare, (restricted).
- Muir, A., 1992, Evaluating the Impact of NGOs in Rural Poverty Alleviation - Zimbabwe Country Study (with additional material by Roger Riddell), *Overseas Development Institute*, Working Paper no. 52, London: ODI.
- Myklebust, T., 1989, *Åndelig utviklingshjelp? Kritisk søkelys på kristen misjon*, Oslo: Human-etisk forbund.
- NANGO, 1992, *The Zimbabwean National Association of Nongovernmental organisations, Directory of NGOs in Zimbabwe 1992*, Harare: NANGO.
- NORAD, 1993, *Handbok for private organisasjonar*, compiled at the Centre for Development studies as a continuation of Phase I of the present study.
- NORAD, *Zimbabwe Tertialrapport - 1. Tertial 1993*, PRIV to AFR, Oslo: NORAD.
- NORAD, *Draft to Country Program, Zimbabwe 1989-92*, Oslo: NORAD.
- NORAD, *Landprogram Zimbabwe 1990-93*, Oslo: NORAD.
- NORAD, *Landprogram Zimbabwe 1988-90*, Oslo: NORAD.
- NORAD, *Landprogram Bangladesh 1990-93*, Oslo: NORAD.
- NORAD, *Strategy paper Bangladesh 1992*, Oslo: NORAD.
- NORAD, *Landprogram Bangladesh, 1991-94, del 2:37*, Oslo: NORAD.
- Norwegian Church Aid/Sudan Programme, 1984, *Agricultural Extension. Processing and Marketing Study. East Bank Equatoria. Final Report*, Herst (England), Hunting Technical Services Ltd., p.28
- Norwegian Church Aid/Sudan Programme, 1985, *Annual Report*, Torrit/ISP. p. 36-37
- Norwegian Church Aid/Sudan Programme, 1986, *Economic Development. Potential Study, East Bank, Eastern Equatoria, Sudan*. Herst (England), Hunting Technical Services Ltd., p.13
- Norwegian Church Aid/Sudan Programme, 1986b, *Proposal for Norwegian Church Aid Sudan Programme 1987-90*, Torit, Annex 11:5.

- Norwegian Church Relief/Sudan Programme, 1974, Progress Report, Torrit, p. 11
- Norwegian Lutheran Mission, 1991, *Statement on mission. A Declaration on the Mission Strategy of Norwegian Lutheran Mission in the nineties*. Oslo: The Norwegian Lutheran Mission.
- Norwegian Lutheran Mission, 1993, Giverkontakten, No. 1, Oslo: NLM.
- OECD, 1987: *Voluntary Aid for Development: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations*. Development Co-operation Directorate, Document DCD/87, II. Paris: OECD.
- Olsen, J.P., 1988, *Political Science and Organization Theory. Parallell agendas but mutual disregard*, Bergen: LOS-Senter Notat 88/22.
- Paul, S., and A. Israel, 1991, *Nongovernmental Organizations and the World Bank*, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- Pelczynski, Z.A. (ed.), 1984, *The State & Civil Society, Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*, Oxford: Cambridge University Press.
- Recommendation to the Storting no. 192, (1975-76), Oslo.
- Recommendation to the Storting no. 75, (1961-62), Oslo.
- Report to the Storting nr. 29, 1971-72, Oslo.
- Report to the Storting no. 34. 1986-87, *Om hovedspørsmål i norsk utviklingshjelp*, Tilleggsmelding til prinsippmeldingen St.meld. nr. 36, 1985-85.
- Report to the Storting no. 36. 1984-85, *Om enkelte hovedspørsmål i norsk utviklingshjelp*.
- Report to the Storting no. 51. 1991-92, *Om utviklingstrekk i Nord-Sør forholdet og Norges samarbeid med utviklingslandene*.
- Report to the Storting no. 94, 1974-75, Oslo.
- Riddell, R. and M. Robinson, 1992, "The Impact of NGO Poverty Alleviation Projects: Results of the Case Study Evaluations", Working Paper no. 68, London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Robinson, M., 1991, "An Uncertain Partnership: the Overseas Development Administration and the Voluntary Sector in the 1980s", in A. Bose and P. Burnell, *Britain's overseas aid since 1979: Between idealism and self-interest*, Manchester University Press.
- Salamon, L.K., 1994, The rise of the nonprofit sector, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1994, pp. 109-122.
- Salamon, L.M., 1981, Rethinking Public Management: Third-Party Government and the Changing Forms of Government Action, *Public Policy* 29, pp. 255-275.
- Salamon, L.M., 1986, Governmental and the Voluntary Sector in the Era of Retrenchment: The American Experiment, i *Jul. Publ. Pol.* 6.
- Salamon, L.M. and H.K. Anheier, 1992, In search of the non-profit sector II: The problem of classification, in *Voluntas*, 3:3, pp. 267-309.
- Salokoski, M., T. Varis and S. Gebre, 1994, *Strengthening the Partnership, Evaluation of the Finnish NGO Support Programme, Country Case Study Ethiopia*, Helsinki and Addis Ababa.
- Santalmisjonen, 1986, *Misjon, utviklingshjelp og diakoni*, Oslo: Santalmisjonen.
- Sanyal, Bishwapriya, 1991, Antagonistic cooperation: A case study of nongovernmental organisations, government and donors' relationships in income-generating projects in Bangladesh, *World Development*, 19, 10, 1367-1379.
- Saxon-Harrold, S.K.E., 1990, Competition. Resources and Strategy in the British Nonprofit Sector, pp. 123-140, in: Anheier and Seibel (eds.), 1990.
- Seibel, W., 1989, The function of Mellow Weakness. Non-Profit Organizations as Problem Nonsolvers in Germany, in James, E. (ed.), 1989, *The Non-Profit Sector in International Perspective. Studies in Comparative Culture and Policy*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Seibel, W., 1990, Organizational Behaviour and Organizational Function. Toward a Micro-macro Theory of the Third Sector, pp. 107-123, in Anheier and Seibel (eds.), 1990.
- Skar, Harald O., 1987, Norwegian Aid and the 3rd System. Norwegian Organizations in the Development Process: Future Directions, *NUPI-notat 376*, Oslo: NUPI.
- Skar, H.O. (ed.), A. Haug and C. Littlejohn, 1994, NGOs in the Nicaraguan changing reality. An Evaluation, Bergen (restricted).
- Smillie, I., and H. Helmich (eds.), 1993, Non-Governmental Organisations and Governments: Stakeholders for Development, Paris: OECD.
- Smith, B., 1990, *More than altruism. The politics of private foreign aid*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Smith, Steven and Michael Lipsky, 1993, *Nonprofits for hire. The welfare state in the age of contracting*, Harvard: Harvard University Press
- Starkey, P., 1987, Animal-drawn Wheeled Tool Carriers: Perfected Yet Rejected, Berlin: GTZ.
- Steen, Odd Inge, 1988, Mål og mildere i norske private organisasjoners utviklingshjelp. En undersøkelse av 11 organisasjoners prosjektvirksomhet i den 3. verden, *NUPI-rapport 119*, Oslo: NUPI.
- Steen, Odd Inge, 1989, Norwegian nongovernmental Involvement in Zimbabwe, *NUPI-rapport 138*, Oslo: NUPI.
- Svenkerud, P.O. and Svenkerud, P.J., 1990, Evaluering av distriktsprosjekter 1982-90, Heradsbygd 10.9.90.
- Sæverås, O., (no date), *On Church-Mission relations in Ethiopia 1944-1969 - with special reference to the Ethiopian Evangelical Church mekanu Yesus (EECM) and the Lutheran Mission*. Oslo: Lunde.
- Tendler, J., 1982, Turning Private Voluntary Organisations Into Development Agencies: Questions for Evaluation, *Programme Evaluation Discussion Paper no. 12.*, Washington D.C.: USAID.
- Tvedt, T., (ed.), 1993, *En studie av frivillige organisasjoner i norsk bistand*, Bergen: CDS.
- Tvedt, T., (ed.), 1993b, *Conflicts in the Horn of Africa, human and ecological consequences of warfare*, Uppsala: EPOS.
- Tvedt, T., 1990, *Bilder av "de andre". Om utviklingslandene i bistandsepoken*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Tvedt, T., 1992, *De private organisasjonene som kanal for norsk bistand. En analyse av utviklingstrekk i forholdet mellom den norske staten og den tredje sektor. Evalueringsrapport 3.92*, (to be translated into English during 1994), written with assistance from E. Barkved, T. Dalseng, K. Hødnebo, K. Morvik and O.I. Steen, Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Tvedt, T., 1994, The Collapse of the State in the Southern Sudan after the Addis Ababa Agreement. Internal Causes and the Role of the NGOs, in *Harir and Tvedt*, 1994.
- Tvedt, T., 1994, NGOs' Role at the End of History: Norwegian Policy and the New Paradigm, *Forum for Development Studies*, 1-2, pp. 139-167.
- UNDP, 1993, *Human Development Report*, Oxford University Press, 1993.
- UNDP, 1993a, *UNDP and organizations of civil society*, New York.
- Uphoff, N., 1987, Relations between Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations and the Promotion of Autonomous Development: *Paper presented at the Experts' Consultation on Promotion of Autonomas Development, 27-30 October*, Noordwijk.
- van Heemst, J.P., 1989, Size-related aspects of donor NGOs: Some findings for the Netherlands, *Working Paper Series No. 55*, The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.
- Vivian, J. and G. Maseko, 1994, NGOs, Participation and Rural Development, Testing the assumptions iwth evidence from Zimbabwe, *UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute*

for Social Development), *Discussion Paper 49*.

Vaage, O.F., 1993, *Holdninger til norsk utviklingshjelp 1993*, Oslo: Statistisk Sentralbyrå, p.24.

White, S. C., 1991, "Evaluating the Impact of NGOs in Rural Poverty Alleviation - Bangladesh Country Study", *Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper no. 50*, London.

Wils, F., 1991, *NGOs and Development in Brazil: An Overview and Analysis*, Co-financing Programme, Netherlands.

World Resources 1988-89, 1988, report by World Resources Institute and The International Institute for Environment and Development, New York: Basic Books.

Zimbabwe Country Study, 1989, Harare: Hifab International and Zinconsult.

Statistical Appendix

by

E. Barkved and T. Tvedt

Comments

Below are presented some quantitative data and statistics regarding the NGO-channel. Although figures do not speak for themselves, it was regarded as useful to compile an appendix of some of the data this study has collected. Exact knowledge about the channel, its internal financial flows; profile and funding history of NGO-landscapes; developments in staff and voluntarism etc. is scanty. By bringing the information below in one appendix, we hope to increase this knowledge and make it more accessible. They cover points 3, 4, 5 and 6 in TOR.

Tables 1.1 to 1.20 and figures 1.1 to 1.4 present disbursements made under NORAD's NGO-grant for the period 1963 to 1993, from special and regional grants and grants given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). These data are reconstructed from government files and registered by the team-member Terje Dalseng. Figures up to 1991 are partly presented in Tvedt 1993, Dalseng 1992 in Tvedt (ed) 1993) while figures for 1993 have been provided as background material for this study. These data are meant to provide an accurate description of the role of the state in financing and shaping the organisational NGO-landscape in aid, and they also indicate the role of different state institutions over the years.

Data presented in table 2.1 to 2.14 and figure 2.1 are based on a) readings of documents collected by the team for all the Norwegian NGOs involved in aid in 1991/1992. They have been presented in Norwegian in Tvedt et al. 1993; b) a questionnaire sent to ten selected organisations (see Executive Summary and the point on methodology) with data presented in Steen 1992, in Tvedt (ed) 1993 and c) a questionnaire sent to all Norwegian NGOs working in aid as part of Barkved's compilation of the catalogue over Norwegian NGOs working in the third world, published by NORAD in 1993 and included in Tvedt (ed) 1993. These data provide additional information of the NGOs work, their geographical areas, the relation between own-generated funds and public support etc.

the organisations (both Norwegian and local) working in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe (see appendix on the form of the questionnaire) which receives support from either the Norwegian government or Norwegian NGOs. As discussed in the Executive Summary the data collected are considered relatively reliable, and provide unique and new information about NGO-work. Data from this questionnaire can be found in tables 3.21 to 3.32 and in figures 3.6 to 3.8.



Additionally, especially interesting and relevant figures and tables that have been taken from different sources are presented, with sources explicitly mentioned in the sub-text of each table/figure. This information is based on official data that have been checked/are easy to check, and should therefore be considered reliable.

The appendix also presents data from a survey of

Table 1.1. *Financial support to NGOs from the Norwegian state^a*

	1981	1986	1989	1990	1991	1993
NGO division (NORAD)	79,546	367,280	441,924	589,210	536,424	538,806
Humanitarian support (MFA ^b)	125,317	333,188	426,155	378,231	504,342	651,547
Other grants			92,734	139,188	149,220	208,696
Total	204,863	700,468	960,734	1,106,629	1,189,986	1,399,049

Note: a. NGO are in this appendix synonymous with NGOs involved in aid and receiving support from the Norwegian state. The Norwegian state also supports Norwegian NGOs only working in Norway. b. MFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Figur 1.1. *NGO grants as percentage of official Norwegian bilateral aid*Figur 1.2. *NGO grants as percentage of total Norwegian official aid*Table 1.2. *Distribution of state support according to type of NGOs (1,000 NOK)*

Organisation	1981	1986	1991	1993
Humanitarian organisations	100,386	367,877	643,827	770,525
Mission organisations	32,310	97,051	147,232	124,430
Special interest organisations	1,927	32,227	48,195	47,887
Political and ideal organisations	6,721	19,426	96,495	78,072
Trade and vocational organisations	7,600	20,450	35,750	30,586

Note: "Other grants" (cf. table 1.1), which amounted to NOK 208,696,000 in total, has not been divided into type of NGOs and are therefore not included in the 1993 figure.

Table 1.3. *Allocations of support to NGOs from NORAD according to type of organisations, 1981, 1989, 1991, 1993 (1,000 NOK and percentage)*


<i>Type of organisations</i>	<i>1981</i>		<i>1989</i>		<i>1991</i>		<i>1993</i>	
Humanitarian	27 822	35.0	201 951	45.7	215 240	40.1	237 469	44.1
Mission	28 329	35.6	52 709	11.9	97 700	18.2	92 766	17.2
Special interest	1 927	2.4	23 824	5.4	38 392	7.2	43 439	8.1
Trade and vocational	7 580	9.5	31 711	7.2	33 357	6.2	28 686	5.3
Political and ideal	3 832	4.8	28 237	6.4	43 154	8.0	39 384	7.3
<i>Norwegian NGOs</i>	<i>69 490</i>	<i>87.4</i>	<i>338 432</i>	<i>76.6</i>	<i>427 843</i>	<i>79.8</i>	<i>441 744</i>	<i>82.0</i>
International	151	0.2	2 900	0.7	0	0.0	0	0.0
Local and regional ^a	8 952	11.3	77 689	17.6	85 709	16.0	89 430	16.6
Study	36	0.0	0	0.0	211	0	0.0	0.0
Unspecified	917	1.2	22 903	5.2	22 661	4.2	7 632	1.4
<i>Total</i>	<i>79 546</i>		<i>441 924</i>		<i>536 424</i>		<i>538 806</i>	

Note: a. Local and regional NGOs are NGOs that receive support directly from NORAD offices in the main cooperating countries. The figures do not include Norwegian NGOs support to cooperating NGOs. This will be registered as support to Norwegian NGOs. Furthermore, these figures do not include support to local and regional NGOs via the multilateral system.

Table 1.4. *Allocations of support to NGOs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs according to type of organisations, 1981, 1989, 1991, 1993 (1,000 NOK and percentage)*

<i>Type of organisations</i>	<i>1981</i>		<i>1989</i>		<i>1991</i>		<i>1993</i>	
Humanitarian	72 546	57.9	211 504	49.6	349 496	69.3	533 056	81.8
Mission	3 981	3.2	17 795	4.2	37 473	7.4	31 664	4.9
Special interest	0	0.0	3 495	0.8	3 685	0.7	4 448	0.7
Trade and vocational	20	0.0	105	0.0	1 698	0.3	1 900	0.3
Political and ideal	2 889	2.3	20 119	4.7	41 961	8.3	38 688	5.9
<i>Norwegian NGOs</i>	<i>79 436</i>	<i>63.4</i>	<i>253 018</i>	<i>59.4</i>	<i>434 313</i>	<i>86.1</i>	<i>609 756</i>	<i>93.6</i>
International	6 106	4.9	2 930	0.7	12 553	2.5	2 785	0.4
Local and regional	33 606	26.8	81 463	19.1	46 994	9.3	20 177	3.1
Study	0	0.0	0	0.0	18	0.0	0	0.0
Unspecified	6 169	4.9	88 744	20.8	10 464	2.1	18 829	2.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>125 317</i>		<i>426 155</i>		<i>504 342</i>		<i>651 547</i>	

Figure 1.3. Number of Norwegian NGOs that received support from the Norwegian state in 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1993



Note: The definition of NGOs in figure 1.3 are confined to NGOs involved in aid. Table 1.5 includes Norwegian NGOs receiving support from the state for information purposes as well. Table 1.6 to 1.9 also excludes the latter category of NGOs.

Table 1.5. Number of Norwegian NGOs with governmental support

Year	Number of organisations
1963	7
1975	20
1981	30
1986	60
1991	134
1993	100

Figure 1.4 Number of Norwegian NGO projects receiving grants from the Norwegian government




Table 1.6. Number of NGOs receiving public grants and the total number of projects in 1981, 1986 and 1991

Year	NGOs	Projects
1981	54	98
1986	77	509
1991	98	1058

Table 1.7. Norwegian NGOs and number of projects, 1986 and 1991

<i>Projects pr. organisation</i>	1981		1986		1991	
	<i>Number of organisations</i>	<i>Number of projects</i>	<i>Number of organisations</i>	<i>Number of projects</i>	<i>Number of organisations</i>	<i>Number of projects</i>
1 - 10	45	131	65	196	77	204
11 - 20	6	71	6	82	7	103
21 - 50	3	71	5	150	9	250
51 - 100	0		1	81	3	232
More than 100	0		0		2	269
<i>Organisations with:</i>						
1 project	14		23		33	
2 projects	11		16		16	
3 projects	9		7		10	
1 - 3 projects	34		46		59	

Table 1.8. Number of projects^a implemented by the four largest Norwegian NGOs

	1981	1986	1991
Norwegian Church Aid	19	76	152
Norwegian Save the Children	9	12	117
Norwegian People's Aid	7	35	99
Norwegian Red Cross	13	30	80
Sum, the four largest organisations	48	153	448

Note: a. Project is defined as number of transactions from the state to the respective NGO

Table 1.9. Number of Norwegian NGOs with support from the Norwegian state according to size of grant

<i>Size of grant</i>	1981	1986	1991
Less than 100,000	11	14	20
100,000 - 500,000	18	14	19
500,000 - 1,000,000	6	13	8
1,000,000 - 10,000,000	16	24	31
More than 10,000,000	3	12	20
Sum	54	77	98

Table 1.10. Ten largest Norwegian NGOs according to grants from the Norwegian state, 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1993 (1,000 NOK)

1981		1986	
Norwegian Church Aid	40,259	Norwegian Church Aid	174,870
Norwegian Red Cross	29,629	Norwegian Save the Children	64,756
Norwegian People's Aid	10,369	Norwegian Red Cross	58,205
Norwegian Save the Children	9,671	Norwegian People's Aid	27,607
Norwegian Missionary Society	7,346	Norwegian Missionary Alliance	24,794
<i>Five largest as percent of total</i>	<i>47.5</i>	<i>Five largest as percent of total</i>	<i>50.0</i>
Norwegian Fed. of Trade Unions	6,520	Norwegian Refugee Council	24,456
Norwegian Missionary Alliance	5,169	Strømme Memorial Foundation	13,475
Norwegian Lutheran Mission	4,684	Norwegian Lutheran Mission	12,535
CARE Norway	4,007	Pentecostal Foreign Mission	12,429
Norwegian Santal Mission	3,480	Norwegian Fed. of Trade Unions	12,388
<i>10 largest as percent of total</i>	<i>59.1</i>	<i>10 largest as percent of total</i>	<i>60.7</i>
1991		1993	
Norwegian Church Aid	204,282	Norwegian Red Cross	193,050
Norwegian Red Cross	141,543	Norwegian Church Aid	190,951
Norwegian Save the Children	113,067	Norwegian People's Aid	185,430
Norwegian People's Aid	79,637	Norwegian Refugee Council	125,171
Norwegian Refugee Council	41,814	Norwegian Save the Children	95,206
<i>Five largest as percent of total</i>	<i>48.8</i>	<i>Five largest as percent of total</i>	<i>56.5</i>
CARE Norway	39,406	CARE Norway	38,776
CN Council on Foreign Relations	27,892	CN Council on Foreign Relations	24,539
Norwegian Himal-Asian Mission	22,037	Norwegian Himal-Asian Mission	22,980
Norwegian Lutheran Mission	21,329	Norwegian Fed. of Trade Unions	19,743
SAIH	20,673	AIS	18,474
<i>Ten largest as percent of total</i>	<i>59.8</i>	<i>Ten largest as percent of total</i>	<i>65.4%</i>

Abbreviations: CN = Church of Norway, SAIH = Norwegian Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund, AIS = Arbeiderbevegelsens internasjonale solidaritetskomité (The Norwegian labour movement's international solidarity committee).

Table 1.11. Organisations and projects supported by the government in 1963 (1000 NOK)

Organisation	Amount	Project
Den Norske Koreaforening	550	Tuberculosis clinic for children, Mokpo, Korea
Norwegian Santal Mission	465	Lepra colonies, India
Norwegian Missionary Society	660	Mill- and agricultural college, Tombontsoa, Madagascar
Norwegian Church Aid	250	Agricultural project, Abakaliki, Nigeria
Norwegian Lutheran Mission	675	Central hospital, Irgalem, Ethiopia
Pentecostal Congo-mission	400	Technical college, Burhuza, Congo
<i>From another chapter</i>		
Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions / Kvinneutvalget	70	Mobile advisory buss, Singapore

Table 1.12. Norwegian NGOs according to state support 1991, 1,000 NOK

Norwegian Church Aid	204,282	Lions Clubs International Multiple District 104 - Norway	751
Norwegian Red Cross	141,543	Norwegian Ex-volunter Association	746
Norwegian Save the Children	113,067	Norsk Kristelig Forening for Unge Kvinner	737
Norwegian Refugee Council	79,637	National Association for Norwegian Student Nurses	716
CARE Norway	41,814	Norwegian Bar Association	656
Church of Norway Council on Foreign Relations	27,892	New Future Foundation	552
Norwegian Himal-Asian Mission	22,037	Norske Kvinners Nasjonalråd	500
Norwegian Lutheran Mission	21,239	Rogalandsforskning	500
Norwegian Students' and Academics' International	20,673	Educational Association of the Conservative Party	480
The Development Fund - Future in Our Hands	20,249	Free Evangelical Assemblies of Norway	468
Ad hoc-actions, Tv-actions, Operation a days work, etc	20,000	Norwegian Institute for Water Research	447
Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions	19,328	Det Norske Totalavholdsselskap	434
Strømme Memorial Foundation	16,380	Norwegian Nurses Association	421
Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted	14,485	Norwegian Institute for International Affairs	385
Pentecostal Foreign Mission	13,913	Arbeiderbevegelsens Ungdomst/king	372
Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan	13,265	Norges Landbrukskole	300
Caritas Norway	12,691	U-Assist Norway	299
Norwegian Missionary Alliance	12,337	Norsk ILO komite	275
Norwegian Santal Mission	12,250	The New World-Organization of Adult Education	275
UN Association of Norway	11,818	Operation a days work 1991	273
Chr. Michelsens Institute	11,777	Mission Covenant Church of Norway	270
Norwegian Royal Society for Rural Development	10,856	Socialist Association for Adult Education and Culture	260
Arbeiderbevegelsens Internasjonale Støttekomité	9,410	Norwegian Youth League	259
FORUT, Campaign for Development and Solidarity	7,582	Kristelig folkepartis studieforbund	230
The Namibia Association of Norway	6,760	Den internasjonale sommerskolen, University of Oslo	210
Norwegian Union of Teachers	6,668	Norwegian Institute for Nature Research	208
Norwegian Missionary Society	6,465	Folkehøgskolerådet	200
Adopsjonsforum	6,026	Senterpartiets studieforbund	195
Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry	4,928	Kvinnefronten i Norge	175
Det norske skogselskap	4,908	Norwegian Forum for Development Journalism	170
The Norwegian Association of the Disabled	4,860	Norwegian Union of Vocational Teachers	160
NORAGRIC	4,102	Den norske tannlegeforening	145
Norwegian Council for Southern Africa	3,963	Venstres Opplysningsfond	135
Norwegian Association for Mentally Retarded	3,814	Norwegian Missionary Council	128
Salvation Army - Norway	3,627	Norsk Sosionomforbund	126
International Press Service	3,275	Senter for Afrikansk Kultur, Oslo	125
Adventist Development and Relief Agency	3,155	Senter for Industriell og Teknisk Forskning - SINTEF	117
The Norwegian Heart- and Lung Association	3,108	Norwegian Housewives Association	114
Kvinnenes Internasjonale Garantifond	3,000	Solidaritetskomiteen for Kurderne	110
The Norwegian National Health Association	2,889	Nordisk Samaråd	101
Norwegian Confederation of Sports	2,816	Opplandsprosjektet	88
Blue Cross in Norway	2,632	Student Christian Movement in Norway	68
FAFO International	2,264	Norges Diabetisforbund	62
Den Internasjonale Tuberkulose- og Lungesykdomsunion	2,000	Norwegian Educational Association	55
FORUT - University of Tromsø	1,944	Inner Wheel Norway	50
Nordic Africa Institute	1,900	World Wide Fund for Nature	50
Latin American Groups of Norway	1,851	Worldwatch Institute Norden	50
United Methodist Church in Norway	1,700	Solidaritetskomiteen for Filipinene - Kalayaan	50
Norwegian Christian Mission	1,685	Norsk Institutt for By- og Regionforskning	50
Norsk Institutt for Fredsforskning	1,675	Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers	44
Lions Club Harstad	1,669	Norwegian Union of Handicap Organizations	42
Norwegian Aid Committee	1,538	Norges Naturvernforbund	40
Felleskampanjen for Jordas Miljø og Utvikling	1,500	Kristent Fredslag	30
Norwegian Medical Society for the Middle East	1,491	Women's Christian Temperance Union Norway	30
Quaker Service Norway	1,403	Information/Student organisation	30
ORT Norway	1,345	Solidaritetskomiteen for Bangladesh	29
The Baptist Union of Norway	1,264	Asociación Noruego-Cubana	26
Palestine Committee of Norway	1,209	Mary's Friends	20
Norsk Journalistlag	1,083	Norsk Bibliotekforening	15
Food for the Hungry - Norway	1,062	Norwegian Bangladesh Association	14
SOS-Kinderdorf International (Norwegian friends)	1,050	Telemarkforskning	11
Norwegian Committee for UNICEF	1,050	Den norske Helsingforskomite	10
Center for Partnership in Development	1,025	Det norske forbund av 48	9
Palestinagruppene i Norge	974	Den norske Tibetkomite	7
The Workers' Educational Association of Norway	902	Norsk - Tanzanisk forening	5
Norwegian Youth Council	818	Sammervenda for studiarbeid	4
The Norw School Agency for International Dev & Coop	770		
Norwegian Institute for Human Rights	755	Eritrean Medical Aid Group	-42

Figur 1.6. Support to NGOs from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Emergency Division




Table A.13. Support from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, humanitarian aid 1993 (1,000 NOK)

Organisation	Amount	Percent
Norwegian People's Aid	145,105	22.3
Norwegian Red Cross	144,371	22.2
Norwegian Refugee Council	105,979	16.3
Norwegian Church Aid	93,885	14.4
Norwegian Save the Children	27,112	4.2
Sum, five largest organisations	516,452	79.3
All other organisations	135,095	20.7
Sum, all organisations	651,547	

Table 1.14. Support from NORAD divided by DAC-sector

DAC-sector	1991		1993	
	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
0 Not referable to sector	11,329,000	2.7	8,002,000	1.5
1 Planning and public administration	228,000	0.1	506,000	0.1
2 Development of public services	42,206,000	9.9	33,437,000	6.2
3 Agriculture, fishery	29,657,000	6.9	39,768,000	7.4
4 Manufacturing, mining, handicrafts	8,675,000	2.0	24,416,000	4.5
5 Banking, financing, tourism	218,000	0.1	799,000	0.1
6 Education, science and research	66,205,000	15.5	56,698,000	10.5
7 Health, population projects	94,921,000	22.2	73,140,000	13.6
8 Social infrastructure, social welfare, culture	64,076,000	15.0	52,162,000	9.7
9 Multisector and unspecified	110,328,000	25.8	249,878,000	46.4
Total	427,843,000	100.0	538,806,000	100.0

Table 1.15. *The ten countries which received most support together with global efforts from the Norwegian state through NGOs (1,000 NOK), 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1993*

1981		1986	
Regional, Africa	53,410	Regional, Africa	104,856
Global efforts	41,533	Global efforts	95,225
Sudan	24,783	Ethiopia	67,493
Ethiopia	10,471	Sudan	46,100
Bangladesh	9,984	Afghanistan	35,426
Algeria	5,509	Mali	29,454
Tanzania	5,465	Nicaragua	26,851
India	5,427	Kenya	23,944
Regional, America	4,520	Tanzania	19,227
Madagascar	4,457	Bangladesh	18,626
Angola	3,609	Philippines	17,685
<i>As percent of total</i>	<i>82.6</i>	<i>As percent of total</i>	<i>69.2</i>
1991		1993	
Ethiopia	154,151	Yugoslavia	172,853
Regional, Africa	149,234	Global efforts	100,767
Regional, Asia	73,176	Black South-Africa	86,009
Global efforts	68,280	Mozambique	72,266
Sudan	54,923	Ethiopia	64,183
Afghanistan	51,297	Somalia	53,655
Bangladesh	45,494	Eritrea	46,015
Mali	44,930	Afghanistan	42,632
Nicaragua	44,091	Mali	42,094
Mozambique	38,323	Sudan	42,041
Nepal	34,855	Bangladesh	40,534
<i>As percent of total</i>	<i>63.8</i>	<i>As percent of total</i>	<i>54.5</i>

Note: All development projects are by the state coded according to which *country* the aid is given. Projects that include two or more countries are coded with a *regional* code. Projects included in several regions or where the country can not be specified, are coded as global. The support cross-border to Eritrea during the war on the Horn of Africa was coded under *regional* because of political considerations.

Table 1.16. *The ten countries which received most support together with global efforts from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through NGOs, 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1993 (1,000 NOK)*

1981		1986	
Regional, Africa	53,410	Regional, Africa	102,186
Global efforts	31,843	Ethiopia	53,470
Ethiopia	8,963	Afghanistan	35,426
Algeria	5,509	Mali	25,275
India	4,580	Sudan	14,246
Regional, America	4,520	Global efforts	13,353
Angola	3,000	El Salvador	10,611
Regional, Asia	2,954	Mozambique	9,926
Sudan	2,500	Uganda	8,778
Lebanon	2,450	Nicaragua	7,095
Somalia	1,750	Regional, America	6,682
<i>As percent of total</i>	<i>96.9</i>	<i>As percent of total</i>	<i>86.2</i>
1991		1993	
Regional, Africa	135,470	Yugoslavia	172,853
Ethiopia	83,492	Black South-Africa	78,724
Regional, Asia	59,273	Somalia	46,687
Afghanistan	47,549	Afghanistan	35,417
Sudan	36,025	Mozambique	34,247
Mozambique	23,800	Sudan	31,930
Global efforts	12,427	Ethiopia	25,621
Iraq	10,200	Angola	23,373
Bangladesh	10,000	Palestine	23,166
Regional, America	8,838	Global efforts	22,004
Sri Lanka	6,726	Eritrea	18,694
<i>As percent of total</i>	<i>86.0</i>	<i>As percent of total</i>	<i>78.7</i>

Table 1.17. *Foreign Ministry financial support to areas of concentration (1,000 NOK)*

	1981	1986	1991	1993
Total support, areas of concentration	76,049	211,452	300,005	265,443
Total Foreign Ministry support	125,317	333,188	504,342	651,547
Areas of concentration, percentage	60.7	63.5	59.5	40.7

Note: Areas of concentration have by NORAD been defined as programme countries and co-operative countries in Southeast Asia, Africa and Central America. There are 11 programme countries and among them we find the main co-operating countries.

Table 1.18. *The ten countries which received most support together with global efforts from NORAD through NGOs, 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1993 (1,000 NOK)*

1981		1986	
Sudan	22,283	Global efforts	81,872
Bangladesh	9,984	Sudan	31,854
Global efforts	9,690	Kenya	23,464
Tanzania	5,465	Nicaragua	19,756
Madagascar	4,457	Tanzania	19,202
Philippines	3,566	Bangladesh	18,613
Kenya	3,239	Philippines	17,608
Botswana	1,912	Ethiopia	14,023
Bolivia	1,859	Nepal	13,236
Zaire	1,791	India	11,210
Indonesia	1,548	Zimbabwe	10,611
<i>As percent of total</i>	<i>82.3</i>	<i>As percent of total</i>	<i>71.2</i>
1991		1993	
Nicaragua	41,004	Global efforts	38,733
Ethiopia	36,679	Bangladesh	36,095
Bangladesh	34,754	Nicaragua	34,968
Nepal	34,359	Nepal	34,346
Global efforts	28,622	Ethiopia	25,582
Zimbabwe	23,357	Uganda	25,210
Sri Lanka	20,558	Mozambique	25,136
Kenya	17,565	Sri Lanka	21,663
Bolivia	16,314	India	18,782
India	15,926	Zimbabwe	17,832
Sudan	15,852	Bolivia	17,293
<i>As percent of total</i>	<i>53.1</i>	<i>As percent of total</i>	<i>54.9</i>

Table 1.19. *NORADs financial support to areas of concentration (1,000 NOK)*

	1981	1986	1991	1993
Total support, areas of concentration	29,761	149,248	356,576	360,176
Total NORAD support	79,546	367,280	536,424	538,806
Areas of concentration, percentage	37.4	40.6	66.5	66.8

Note: See table 1.17

Table 1.20. *Finacial support to aid in former Yugoslavia from the Norwegian state to NGOs, 1993*

Organisation	Amount (1,000 NOK)	Percent
Norwegian Church Aid	12,000	6.9
Norwegian People's Aid	48,888	28.3
Norwegian Red Cross	40,590	23.5
Norwegian Refugee Council	68,109	39.4
All other organisations ^a	3,266	1.9
Sum	172,853	

Note: ^a In addition to these four NGOs, 24 other NGOs received support to work in former Yugoslavia.

Table 2.1. Norwegian NGOs background in developing countries.

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Country of first engagement</i>
Humanitarian organisations		
Blue Cross in Norway	1974	Madagascar
CARE Norway	1980	Bangladesh
Caritas Norway	1967	Uganda
Food for the Hungry - Norway	1985	Bangladesh
Mary's Frieds	1979	Sri Lanka
Norwegian Church Aid	1962	Nigeria
Norwegian Medical Society for the Middle East	1983	Palestine
Norwegian People's Aid	1975	Vietnam
Norwegian Refugee Council	1946 ^a	
Norwegian Save the Children	1961	Tanzania
ORT Norway	1990	Ghana
Strømme Memorial Foundation	1976	Hong Kong
The Norwegian National Health Association	1984	Nicaragua
U-Assist Norway		Thailand
Missionary organisations		
Adventist Development and Relief Agency	1880's ^b	
Free Evangelical Assemblies of Norway	1910	Swaziland, India (missionary work)
Mission Covenant Church of Norway	1900	
National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of Norway	1988	India
New Future Foundation	1964	
Norwegian Christian Mission	1948	
Norwegian Himal-Asian Mission	1938	Tibet
Norwegian Lutheran Mission	1891	China
Norwegian Missionary Alliance	1910 ^c	China
Norwegian Missionary Society	1869	Madagascar
Norwegian Santal Mission	1867	India
Pentecostal Foreign Mission	1910	India
Quaker Service Norway	1963	Algeria
Salvation Army - Norway	1895	Sri Lanka, India
The Baptist Union of Norway	1920	Zaire (Bas-Uéle)
Lutheran Free Church of Norway	1916	China (missionary work)
Methodist Church of Norway	1907	(1945)
Interest organisations		
Ansforum	1974 ^d	several countries
Norske Skogselskap	1988	Uganda
Norwegian Association for Mentally Retarded	1982	Bangladesh
Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted	1978	Sudan
Norwegian Breastfeeding Mothers' Support Group	1980	Argentina, Brazil
Norwegian Confederation of Sports	1984	Tanzania
Norwegian Housewives Association	1974	Kenya
Royal Norwegian Society for Rural Development	1981	Western Africa (regional)
The Norwegian Association of the Disabled	1982	Sudan
The Norwegian Heart- and Lung Association	1984	Nepal
Trade and vocational organisations		
National Organisation for Norwegian Student Nurses	1986	Palestine
Norsk Bibliotekforening	1992	Tanzania
Norsk Journalistlag	1990	Peru
Norsk Vernepleierforbund	1989	

Norwegian Association of Social Workers	1983	
Norwegian Bar Association	1987	Nepal
Norwegian Educational Association	1911 ^e	
Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions	1980	Jamaica
Norwegian Nurses Association	1988	Palestine
Norwegian Union of Vocational Teachers	1988	Palestine
Norwegian Union of Teachers	1979	Botswana
The National Farmer's Union	1988	
Political and ideal organisations		
Eritrean Medical Aid Group	1979	Eritrea
Foreningen Norge-Angola	1987	Angola
FORUT, Campaign for Development and Solidarity	1981 ^f	
InterFolk	1986	Nigeria
Latin-American Solidarity Groups of Norway	1980	Nicaragua
Lions Clubs International Multiple District 104 - Norway	1950	
Norwegian Bangladesh Association	1972	Bangladesh
Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan	1980	Pakistan and Afghanistan
Norwegian Council for Southern Africa	1984 ^g	Zimbabwe
Norwegian Guide and Scout Association	1980	Ethiopia
Norwegian Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund	1962	Bolivia and Lesotho
Opplandsprosjektet	1990	Uganda
Støtteforeningen for Chiles Nødstilte Barn	1984	Chile
Swallows Development Organisation	1960	Peru
The Development Fund - Future in Our Hands	1978	
The Workers' Educational Association of Norway	1981 ^h	Nicaragua
U-landshjelp fra Folk til Folk	1979	
Women's Christian Temperance Union of Norway	1985	Philippines

Notes: a. Year of establishment, b. Started mission work. From 1918 development aid. c. Started missionary work. From 1914 deacony. d. With NORAD-support since 1984 in Philippines. e. On central budget from 1982. f. Took over engagements started in 1967. g. Information work since 1967. h. Information work since 1976.

Table 2.2. Norwegian NGOs in developing countries according to period when work started

Period	Number of NGOs
- 1962	20
1963 - 1978	11
1979 -	43
Sum	74

Table 2.3. Norwegian NGOs budget for development work 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1992.

Organisation	1992	1991	1990	1989
Humanitarian organisations				
Blue Cross in Norway	2.698	-	3.741	-
CARE Norway	40.000	42.798	21.188	47.251
Caritas Norway	16.115	-	14.173	16.935
Food for the Hungry - Norway	1.957	1.597	999	57
Mary's Friends	-	-	1.128	1.434
Norwegian Aid Committee	-	5.500	-	-
Norwegian Church Aid	299.556	331.266	254.827	252.741
Norwegian Medical Society for the Middle East	1.696	1.822	1.529	1.168
Norwegian People's Aid	-	161.248	171.294	206.694
Norwegian Red Cross	193.038	201.902	157.976	121.987
Norwegian Refugee Council	105.692	104.644	52.707	-
Norwegian Save the Children	277.000	227.530	251.416	177.308
ORT Norway	3.937	3.767	-	-
Strømme Memorial Foundation	46.271	42.407	33.578	37.391
The Norwegian National Health Association	2.350	4.020	4.912	3.247
U-Assist Norway	310	310	310	-
Missionary organisations				
Adventist Development and Relief Agency	-	-	11.179	-
Free Evangelical Assemblies of Norway	1.500	1.500	4.500	-
Mission Covenant Church of Norway	5.350	-	5.507	5.431
National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of Norway	-	-	102	74
New Future Foundation	-	1.495	-	-
New Life Mission	-	-	3.000	-
Norwegian Christian Mission	-	-	2.147	-
Norwegian Himal-Asian Mission	27.993	14.887	43.483	-
Norwegian Lutheran Mission	25.498	20.100	25.500	-
Norwegian Missionary Alliance	32.841	26.195	32.558	35.794
Norwegian Missionary Council	2.800	2.583	2.393	2.150
Norwegian Missionary Society	10.000	11.000	-	-
Norwegian Santal Mission	35.000	-	28.173	-
Pentecostal Foreign Mission	50.000	-	53.000	-
Quaker Service Norway	3.722	-	1.763	-
Salvation Army - Norway	6.534	-	11.459	5.773
The Baptist Union of Norway	1.690	-	-	-
The Lutheran Free Church of Norway	5.200	4.960	2.659	-
United Methodist Church of Norway	-	-	3.791	4.505
Special interest organisations				
Adopsjonsforum	1.000	-	5.193	-
Det norske Skogselskap	-	7.000	7.500	8.000
Norwegian Association for Mentally Retarded	6.804	4.975	6.172	6.003
Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted	-	19.781	26.749	-
Norwegian Breastfeeding Mothers' Support Group	53	53	924	-
Norwegian Confederation of Sports	2.050	3.266	3.712	3.253
Norwegian Housewives Association	1.880	-	5.149	-
Royal Norwegian Society for Rural Development	16.856	16.051	22.300	-
The Norwegian Association of the Disabled	12.000	13.510	6.702	6.095
The Norwegian Heart- and Lung Association	4.640	-	-	-

Trade and vocational organisations				
National Organisation for Norwegian Student Nurses	-	747	-	742
Norsk Bibliotekforening	-	0	60	-
Norsk Journalistlag	1.130	789	-	-
Norsk Vernepleierforbund	29	25	-	0
Norwegian Association of Social Workers	-	-	312	-
Norwegian Bar Association	1.880	-	-	-
Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions	30.000	19.070	34.166	27.970
Norwegian Nurses Association	2.900	-	-	-
Norwegian Union of Vocational Teachers	377	189	491	-
Norwegian Union of Teachers	9.000	8.838	7.671	6.629
Political and ideal organisations				
Arbeidernes Internasjonale Solidaritetskomite	14.500	13.131	12.200	13.118
Eritrean Medical Aid Group	-	132	1.660	182
Foreningen Norge-Angola	-	-	205	-
FORUT, Campaign for Development and Solidarity	16.543	13.371	11.624	9.960
Inter Folk	-	1.900	-	-
Latin-American Solidarity Groups of Norway	-	1.200	-	-
Lions Clubs International Multiple District 104 - Norway	-	-	524	919
Norwegian Bangladesh Association	800	890	-	-
Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan	15.000	-	16.147	-
Norwegian Council for Southern Africa	7.500	9.500	7.000	-
Norwegian Guide and Scout Association	2.128	-	-	-
Norwegian Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund	-	22.019	21.781	17.923
Opplandsprosjektet	81	104	268	-
Støtteforeningen for Chiles Nødstilte Barn	-	164	264	588
Swallows Development Organisation	264	365	247	277
The Development Fund - Future in Our Hands	22.181	22.374	17.936	18.536
The Namibia Association of Norway	14.996	26.492	34.212	-
The Workers' Educational Association of Norway	-	730	735	-
U-landshjelp fra Folk til Folk	-	-	-	4.504
Women's Christian Temperance Union of Norway	-	283	1.495	-

Table 2.4. Rank of Norwegian NGO's according to development budget (1,000 NOK, 1992)

Rank	Organisation	Budget	Rank	Organisation	Budget
1	Norwegian Church Aid	299 556 ^d	39	United Methodist Church in Norway	3 721 ^b
2	Norwegian Save the Children	277 000	40	New Life Mission	3 000
3	Norwegian Red Cross	193 038	41	Norwegian Nurses Association	2 900
4	Norwegian People's Aid	161 248	42	Norwegian Council of Churches	2 800
5	Norwegian Refugee Council	105 692	43	Blue Cross of Norway	2 698
6	Pentecostal Foreign Mission	50 000	44	The Norwegian National Health Association	2 350 ^b
7	Stremme Memorial Foundation	46 271	45	Norwegian Christian Mission	2 147
8	SOS-Kinderdorf International	43 100	46	Norwegian Guide and Scout Association	2 128
9	CARE Norway	40 000	47	Norwegian Confederation of Sports	2 050
10	Norwegian Santal Mission	35 000	48	Food for the Hungry - Norway	1 957
11	Norwegian Missionary Alliance	32 841	49	Intern Folk	1 900
12	Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions	30 000	50	Norwegian Bar Association	1 880
13	Norwegian Himal-Asian Mission	27 993	51	Norwegian Housewives Association	1 880
14	Norwegian Lutheran Mission	25 498	52	Norwegian Medical Society for the Middle East	1 696
15	The Development Fund - Future in Our Hands	22 181	53	The Baptist Union of Norway	1 690
16	Norw. Students' and Academics' Intl. Assistance Fund	22 019 ^c	54	Free Evangelical Assemblies of Norway	1 500
17	Norw. Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted	19 781	55	New Future Foundation	1 495 ^c
18	Royal Norwegian Society for Rural Development	16 856	56	Latin American Solidarity Groups of Norway	1 200
19	FORUT, Campaign for Development and Solidarity	16 543	57	Norsk Journalistlag	1 130
20	Caritas Norway	16 115	58	Mary's Friends	1 128
21	Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan	15 000	59	Adopsjonsforum	1 000
22	The Namibia Association of Norway	14 996	60	Norwegian Bangladesh Association	800
23	Arbeiderbevegelsens Internasjonale Solidaritetskomité	14 500	61	National Organisation for Norwegian Student Nurses	747 ^c
24	The Norwegian Association of the Disabled	12 000	62	The Worker's Educational Association of Norway	730
25	Adventist Development and Relief Agency	11 179	63	Lions Clubs International Multiple District 104	524
26	Norwegian Missionary Society	10 000	64	Norwegian Union of Vocational Teachers	377
27	Norwegian Union of Teachers	9 000	65	Norwegian Association of Social Workers	312
28	Norwegian Council for Southern Africa	7 500	66	U-Assist Norway	310
29	Det norske Skogselskap	7 000	67	Women's Christian Temperance Union of Norway	283
30	Norwegian Association of the Mentally Retarded	6 804	68	Swallows Development Organisation	264
31	Salvation Army - Norway	6 534	69	Stotteforeningen for Chiles Nedstilte Barn	164
32	Norwegian Aid Committee	5 500	70	Eritrean Medical Aid Group	132 ^c
33	Mission Covenant Church of Norway	5 350	71	National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of Norway	102
34	The Lutheran Free Church of Norway	5 200	72	Future in Our Hands, Kristiansand	100
35	The Norwegian Heart and Lung Association	4 640	73	Opplandsprosjektet	81
36	U-landshjelp fra Folk til Folk i Norge	4 504 ^a	74	Norwegian Breastfeeding Mothers' Support Group	53
37	ORT Norway	3 937	75	Norsk Vernepleierforbund	29
38	Quaker Service Norway	3 722			

Notes: a. 1989. b. 1990. c. 1991. d. 1993

Table 2.5. *Financial sources of selected Norwegian NGOs, 1992 (1,000 NOK)*

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>
Blue Cross in Norway	2,698	299	2,081	191	127
CARE Norway	40,000	6,211	40,000	750	2,000
Caritas Norway	16,115	2,606	13,850	-	-
FORUT, Campaign for Development and Solidarity	16,543	2,570	8,353	5,000	300
Latin American Solidarity Groups Norway (1991)	1,200	240	960	-	-
Mission Covenant Church of Norway	5,350	4,755	595	0	0
Norwegian Association for Mentally Retarded	6,804	2,432	4,372	-	-
Norwegian Bangladesh Association	800	800	0	0	0
Norwegian Bar Association	1,880	156	1,724	0	0
Norwegian Church Aid	299,556	100,285	182,175	42,250	2,500
Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan	15,000	800	14,900	500	1,000
Norwegian Confederation of Sports	2,050	410	1,743	-	-
Norwegian Council for Southern Africa	7,500	100	4,330	-	3,070
Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions	30,000	6,000	24,000	-	-
Norwegian Guide and Scout Association	2,128	503	1,625	-	-
Norwegian Himal-Asian Mission	27,993	1,705	25,524	0	0
Norwegian Housewives Association	1,880	956	852	-	52
Norwegian Lutheran Mission	25,498	10,798	14,700	-	-
Norwegian Missionary Alliance	32,841	19,755	14,804	-	3,372
Norwegian Missionary Society	10,000	139,283	10,100	0	6,800
Norwegian Nurses Association	2,900	430	2,090	280	100
Norwegian Red Cross	193,038	59,129	133,909	-	-
Norwegian Refugee Council	105,692	20,570	65,786	11,613	2,613
Norwegian Santal Mission	35,000	45,000	20,000	-	-
Norwegian Save the Children (1993)	277,000	114,000	173,000	-	-
Norwegian SAIH ^f (1991)	22,019	1,093	19,486	-	3,680
Norwegian Union of Teachers	9,000	1,783	6,804	-	-
Royal Norwegian Society for Rural Development	16,856	3,289	13,567	-	-
Salvation Army - Norway	6,534	4,047	2,487	-	-
Strømme Memorial Foundation	46,271	50,010	16,306	-	6,830
The Namibia Association of Norway	14,996	482	8,652	3,804	1,839
The Norwegian National Health Association	2,350	470	1,880	-	-
The Norwegian Heart- and Lung Association	4,640	928	3,712	-	-
The Baptist Union of Norway	1,690	1,510	180	-	-
The Development Fund - Future in Our Hands	22,181	3,760	17,421	0	0

Notes: These figures are presented although we have had no chance to control their accuracy. They are based on both a questionnaire and written official documents of the organisations. a. Total development budget, b. Own funds, c. Governmental grants, d. International financial support, e. Support from other sources. f. Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund.

Table 2.6. *Financial support from the Norwegian state as percentage of total financial development aid for the Norwegian NGOs, 1990*

Percentage	No. of organisations
More than 90 %	6
80 - 90 %	16
60 - 80 %	17
40 - 60 %	8
Less than 40 %	23

N = 70.

Table 2.8. *Employees in the organisations working with development aid, 1990/91*

No. of employees	No. of organisations
No employees	24
0-4 ^a	31
5-9	13
More than 10	5

Note: a. Including part-time employed. N=73.

Table 2.7. *Sectors of work according to number of Norwegian NGOs involved in the sector*

Sector of work	No. of organisations	Sector of work	No. of organisations
Education	55	Adoption	3
Health	42	Welfare work for victims of alcohol	3
Organisational development	28	Fishery	3
Distict/rural development	17	Helping handicapped	3
Children's welfare	16	Development of competence	3
Agriculture	13	Support to administration/government	2
Productive enterprise/manufacturing	13	Peace work	2
Social welfare	13	House building	2
Rehabilitation	12	Human rights	2
Environment/resources management	12	Culture activities	2
Emergency assistance	10	Town and city planning	1
Employment schemes	10	Democracy development	1
Water	9	Family planning	1
Support to women's work	9	Welfare services for old people	1
Evangelical work	7	Sports	1
Infrastructure	6	Cultural monument preservation	1
Radio and mass media	4	Political liberation	1
Trade union organising	4	Living conditions	1
		Legal aid	1

Note: The organisations used different expressions to characterize their development engagement. In the table above we have tried to systemize and categorize the work done by the Norwegian NGO's. N = 82.

Table 2.9. *The development of Norwegian NGO's home admissions, 1981 - 1991*

<i>Orgatista iot</i>	1981	1986	1991
Norwegian Missionary Society	0,5	1	1
Norwegian Council for Southern Africa	0	0,5	1
Norwegian Church Aid		17	27
Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions	1,5	3	6
Latin American Solidarity Groups of Norway	0	0	0,5
Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted	0,5	5	6
The Norwegian Association of the Disabled	1	2	4
Norwegian People's Aid	2	8	16
Strømme Memorial Foundation	2	4	7,6
Norwegian Save the Children	6	10	21
In total	13,5	50,5	90,1

Note: a. No data.

Table 2.10. *NGO-employees in Norway (according to organization type and the largest organization, 1992)*

<i>Orgatista iot</i>	<i>Employees at headquarter^a</i>	<i>Employees in development aid</i>
Trade and vocational organisations	340	11
Humanitarian organisations	292.3	114.3
Special interests organisations	478.75	22.5
Mission organisations	208.33	43.33
Political and ideal organisations	38	28
<i>Tet largest orgatista iots:</i>		
Norwegian Church Aid	70	25
Norwegian Save the Children	90	21
Norwegian Red Cross	80	14
Norwegian People's Aid	46	16
Norwegian Refugee Council	40	9
Pentecostal Foreign Mission	ND	2.5
Strømme Memorial Foundation	23	4
SOS Kinderdorf International	6	6
CARE Norway	10	10
Norwegian Santal Mission	35	6

Note: a. "Employees at headquarter" lists all employees in the organisation, whether they work in aid or not. As discussed in the text, a particular feature of Norwegian NGO-landscape is that many of the NGOs active in aid, have most of their activities in Norway.

Table 2.11. *Personel in Norway (1992)*

	<i>in total</i>	<i>Employees at HO</i>	<i>dev'ment</i>	<i>Volunteers dev'ment</i>
Humanitarian organisations				
Blue Cross in Norway	800	12	0	-
CARE Norway	10	10	10	-
Caritas Norway	5.3	5.3	5.3	-
Norwegian Aid Committee	1	-	1	-
Norwegian Church Aid	75	70	25	-
Norwegian People's Aid	150	46	16	-
Norwegian Red Cross	100	80	14	-
Norwegian Refugee Council	40	40	9	-
Norwegian Save the Children	90	-	21	-
ORT Norway	2	-	2	-
SOS-Kinderdorf International	6	6	6	18
Strømme Memorial Foundation	23	23	4	-
The Norwegian National Health Association	-	-	1	-
Missionary organisations				
Adventist Development Relief Agency	-	-	2	-
Free Evangelical Assemblies of Norway	1.5	1.5	0.5	3
Mission Covenant Church of Norway	40	6	1.5	-
National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of Norway	1	-	-	3
New Future Foundation	-	-	4	-
New Life Mission ^a	-	-	8	-
Norwegian Christian Mission	-	-	2	-
Norwegian Himal-Asian Mission	3.5	3.5	1	-
Norwegian Lutheran Mission	1,400	-	1.5	-
Norwegian Missionary Alliance	10	10	-	-
Norwegian Missionary Council	5	5	5	0
Norwegian Missionary Society	244	62	1	-
Norwegian Santal Mission	100	35	6	<10,000
Operation Mobilisation	2	2	1	-
Pentecostal Foreign Mission	-	-	2.5	-
Quaker Service Norway	0.33	0.33	0.33	6
Salvation Army - Norway	970	77	2	-
The Baptist Union of Norway	3	3	2	-
The Lutheran Free Church of Norway	3	3	1	-
United Methodist Church in Norway	-	-	2	-
Special interests organisations				
Adopsjonsforum	12	12	0.25	35
Det norske Skogselskap	19	-	2	-
Norwegian Association for Mentally Retarded	12	12	3	-
Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted	347	347	6	-
Norwegian Breastfeeding Mothers' Support Group	1	1	0	10
Norwegian Confederation of Sports	500	-	1	-
Norwegian Housewives Association	14	3	0.25	34
Royal Norwegian Society for Rural Development	70	63	5	-
The Norwegian Association of the Disabled	81	39	4	-
The Norwegian Heart and Lung Association	1.75	1.75	1	-
Trade and vocational organisations				
Norsk Bibliotekforening	4	4	0	-

Norsk Vernepleierforbund	7	-	0	-
Norwegian Bar Association	20	-	0	3
Norwegian Educational Association	30	30	1	-
Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions	200	170	6	-
Norwegian Nurses Association	113	56	1	5
Norwegian Union of Teachers	-	80	3	11
Norwegian Union of Vocational Teachers	20	-	0	-
Political and ideal organisations				
Arbeidernes Internasjonale Solidaritetskomité	2	2	1	-
FORUT. Campaign for Development	9	9	9	-
Inter Folk	1	1	1	30
Latin American Solidarity Groups of Norway	1.5	1.5	1.5	-
Lions Clubs International Multiple District 104 - Norway	3	-	0	11-20
Norwegian Bangladesh Association	0.5	0.5	0.5	20
Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan	3	3	1.5	-
Norwegian Council for Southern Africa	4	4	1	-
Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund	5	5	5	100
Swallows Development Organisation	0	0	0	7
The Development Fund - Future in Our Hands	6	6	6	0
The Namibia Association of Norway	4	4	-	-
The Workers' Educational Association of Norway	200-300	-	1.5	-
U-landshjelp fra Folk til Folk	25	-	0	4
Women's Christian Temperance Union of Norway	2	2	0	3

Note: a. 1991

Table 2.12. Personnel in Norwegian NGOs in developing countries, 1992

	External employees	External volunteers	Locally employees
Trade and vocational organisations			
National Organisation for Norwegian Student Nurses	1	-	5
Norsk Journalistlag	0.5	-	2
Norwegian Bar Association	0	0	20
Norwegian Nurses Association	3	0	10
Norwegian Union of Vocational Teachers	0	-	1
Humanitarian organisations			
Blue Cross in Norway	4	-	17
CARE Norway	7	1	-
Food for the Hungry - Norway	4	-	17
Norwegian Aid Committee	8	-	15
Norwegian Church Aid	30	-	-
Norwegian Medical Society for the Middle East	3	-	9
Norwegian People's Aid	85	-	55
Norwegian Red Cross	29	-	200
Norwegian Refugee Council	86.5	-	178
Norwegian Save the Children	30	-	1,100
ORT Norway	1	-	-
Strømme Memorial Foundation	6	-	4
The Norwegian National Health Association	1	-	-
U-Assist Norway	0	-	16

Special interest organisation			
Det norske Skogselskap	6	-	-
Norwegian Association for Mentally Retarded	2	-	-
Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted	6	-	-
Norwegian Confederation of Sports	1	-	6
Royal Norwegian Society for Rural Development	3	-	-
The Norwegian Heart- and Lung Association	1	-	-
Mission organisations			
Free Evangelical Assemblies of Norway	8	-	27
Mission Covenant Church of Norway	19	-	470
National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of Norway	1	-	-
New Future Foundation	-	-	40
Norwegian Christian Mission	11	-	-
Norwegian Himal-Asian Mission	20	-	-
Norwegian Lutheran Mission	139	-	596
Norwegian Missionary Alliance	40	-	800
Norwegian Missionary Society	230	-	500
Norwegian Santal Mission	125	-	-
Operation Mobilisation	-	8	-
Quaker Service Norway	1	-	-
Salvation Army - Norway	14	-	-
The Baptist Union of Norway	5	-	-
The Lutheran Free Church of Norway	8	-	6
Political and ideal organisations			
FORUT, Campaign for Development and Solidarity	4	-	60
Latin American Solidarity Groups of Norway	1	24	2
Lions Clubs International Multiple District 104 - Norway	1	-	0
Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan	7	-	50
Norwegian Council for Southern Africa	3	-	1
Norwegian Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund	6	-	7
Swallows Development Organisation	0	0	20
The Namibia Association of Norway	13	-	17
U-landshjelp fra Folk til Folk	-	30	-
<i>Sum, Norwegian NGOs</i>	<i>987</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>4,381</i>

Table 2.13. Number of individual members, individual regular donors and member organisations in Norwegian NGOs, 1992

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Individual members</i>	<i>Individual donors (reg.)</i>	<i>Member organisations</i>
Adopsjonsforum	2,762	300	
Arbeiderbevegelsens Internasjonale Solidaritetskomité			38
Blue Cross in Norway	14,000		
CARE Norway	201	13,700	
Caritas Norway		1,350	
Det norske Skogselskap	1,282		20
Eritrean Medical Aid Group	80		
Food for the Hungry - Norway	200		
FORUT, Campaign for Development and Solidarity		1,500	- 3
Free Evangelical Assemblies of Norway	8,000		

InterFolk	10		27
Latin American Solidarity Groups of Norway	800		
Lions Clubs International - Norway	14,500		502
Mary's friends	795		
Mission Covenant Church of Norway	8,847		
National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá'is of Norway	700	700	
New Future Foundation	4,800	16,000	
Norsk Bibliotekforening	3,613		
Norw. Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted	5,661		
Norwegian Bangladesh Association	680	650	20
Norwegian Bar Association	3,560		
Norwegian Breastfeeding Mothers' Support Group	350	490	
Norwegian Church Aid		17,000	
Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan	400		10
Norwegian Confederation of Sports	1,651,423		
Norwegian Council for Southern Africa	800		43
Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions	790,000		29
Norwegian Housewives Association	27,740		
Norwegian Lutheran Mission			4,000
Norwegian Missionary Society		4,700	5,166
Norwegian People's Aid	10,000	500	
Norwegian Red Cross	135,000		
Norwegian Refugee Council		1,300	15
Norwegian Santal Mission	25,000	5,000	
Norwegian Save the Children	8,300	100,000	
Norw. Students' and Academics' Intl. Assistance Fund		50,000	6
Norwegian Union of Teachers	65,000	65,000	
PIDEE Støtteforeningen for Chiles Nødstilte Barn	100		
Quaker Service Norway		250	
Royal Norwegian Society for Rural Development	1,373		32
Salvation Army - Norway	30,000	50,185	
Seventh Day Adventist Church of Norway	5,488		
SOS-Kinderdorf International		163,000	
Strømme Memorial Foundation	85,000	25,000	
Swallows Development Organisation	220	220	
The Baptist Union of Norway	6,000		
The Development Fund - Future in Our Hands	1,000	1,000	
The Lutheran Free Church of Norway	21,000	500	77
The Namibia Association of Norway	275		
The Norwegian Association of the Disabled Norges	25,000		
The Norwegian Heart- and Lung Association	50,000		
The Norwegian National Health Association	105,000		
United Methodist Church in Norway		150	
Women's Christian Temperance Union Norway	5,000		
Sum	3,119,960	518,495	9,988

Table 2.14. *TV fund-raising campaigns, 1974 - 1992*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Amount</i>
1974	Norwegian Refugee Council	22 500
1975	Norske Kvinners Sanitetsforening	10 000
1976	Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted	13 500
1977	Norwegian Church Aid	54 500
1978	Norwegian Save the Children	42 700
1979	Norwegian Refugee Council	74 100
1980	Landsforeningen mot kreft	79 700
1981	Norwegian Red Cross	84 900
1982	Norwegian Missionary Council	86 700
1983	Norwegian People's Aid	69 400
1984	Amnesty International, Norsk avd.	81 000
1985	Norwegian Youth Council	79 000
1986	Norwegian Church Aid	110 000
1987	The Norwegian National Health Association	115 000
1988	Norwegian Refugee Council	96 900
1989	Tv-campaign '89 "Women in the Third World"	88 200
1990	Norwegian Save the Children	139 000
1991	"Et nytt liv" ^{ab}	102 000
1992	Rådet til fremme av Psykiatrisk Forskning	

Notes: a. 46 women's organisations. b. Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted, The Norwegian Association of the Disabled and Norwegian Association for Mentally Retarded

Source: Norwegian Broadcasting Union


Table 2.15. *State offices and NGO offices: A comparison.*

	<i>Est.^a</i>	<i>Total budget^b</i>	<i>Adm.^c</i>
Emergency Unit, MFA	1984	131,787	3
1st Political Office, MFA		130,522	4
2nd Political Office, MFA		442,839	4
NGO Division, NORAD	1979	536,424	8
Norwegian Church Aid	1962	278,465	75 (27)
Norwegian Save the Children	1946/61	358,164	90 (21)
Norwegian Peoples Aid	1939/75	161,248	150 (16)

Notes: a Where two years appear, the last indicates when the NGO started its developing activities. b 1991. All in NOK 1000. c Shows the number of employees in Norway. Figures in brackets indicate the number working with developing aid.


Source: Tvedt et al. 1993 and personal communication.

Figur 2.1. How many countries are Norwegian NGOs engaged in?




Note: It should be noted that this figure maps the countries NGOs are working in, irrespective of state-support.

Figur 2.2 Support from Norwegian government to Norwegian Missionary Council, Office for International Development Cooperation, distributed on the member organisations, 1992




Source: Norsk Misjonsråds Bistandsnemnd, Årsrapport 1993

Figur 2.3 Support from Norwegian government to Norwegian Missionary Council, Office for International Development Cooperation, divided on budgetary posts



Source: Norsk Misjonsråds Bistandsnemnd, Årsrapport 1993

Figur 2.4. Support from Norwegian government to Norwegian Missionary Council, Office for International Development Cooperation, divided on sectors of work, 1992



Source: Norsk Misjonsråds Bistandsnemnd, Årsrapport 1993

Table 3.1. *Financial support from the Norwegian state to NGOs in developing countries 1989, 1991 and 1993 (1,000 NOK)*

<i>Year</i>	<i>NORAD</i>		<i>UD</i>		<i>Total</i>	
1989	77 689	17.6 %	81 463	19.1 %	159 152	18.3 %
1991	85 709	16.0 %	46 994	9.3 %	132 703	12.8 %
1993	89 430	16.6 %	20 177	3.1 %	109 607	9.2 %

Note: Here is only included direct support from NORAD to national NGOs. Norwegian NGOs support to such NGOs are not included.

Table 3.2. *Direct support from the NORAD-representation to NGOs in developing countries*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Amount (1,000 NOK)</i>
1981	1 156
1986	22 708
1990	63 089
1991	81 225

Table 3.3. *Total NGO support from the Norwegian government to Bangladesh, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe, 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1993 (1,000 NOK)*

<i>Country</i>	<i>1981</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1993</i>
Bangladesh	9,984	18,626	45,494	40,534
Ethiopia/Eritrea	10,471	67,493	154,151	110,198
Nicaragua	632	26,851	44,091	40,031
Zimbabwe	771	11,441	25,055	20,756
Sum	23,839	126,397	270,782	213,512
Percent of total NGO support	11.6	18.0	22.8	15.3

Table 3.4. *Norwegian NGOs supporting projects in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe*

BANGLADESH	ETHIOPIA/ERITREA
Adopsjonsforum	Eritrean Medical Aid Group
Arbeiderbevegelsens internasjonale solidaritetskomité	Lions - Norway
CARE - Norway	Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted
Food for the Hungry - Norway	Norwegian Church Aid
Norwegian Association for Mentally Retarded	Norwegian Lutheran Mission
Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted	Norwegian Missionary Society
Norwegian Bangladesh Association	Norwegian People's Aid
Norwegian Church Aid	Norwegian Red Cross
Norwegian Housewives Association	Norwegian Save the Children
Norwegian Red Cross	The Development Fund - Future in Our Hands
Norwegian Santal Mission	The Lutheran Free Church of Norway
Operation Mobilisation	The Salvation Army - Norway
Strømme Memorial Foundation	
NICARAGUA	ZIMBABWE
Adventist Development and Relief Agency	Caritas Norway
Arbeiderbevegelsens internasjonale solidaritetskomité	Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted
CARE - Norway	Norwegian Church Aid
National Organisation for Norwegian Student Nurses	Norwegian Confederation of Sports
Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted	Norwegian Council for Southern Africa
Norwegian Association for Mentally Retarded	Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions
Norwegian Association of Social Workers	Norwegian Peoples' Aid
Norwegian Church Aid	Norwegian Red Cross
Norwegian Labour Youth	Norwegian Save the Children
Norwegian People's Aid	Students' & Academics' International Assistance Fund
Norwegian Save the Children	Quaker Service Norway
Students' & Academics' International Assistance Fund	The Lutheran Free Church of Norway
Norwegian Union of Teachers	The Salvation Army - Norway
Pentecostal Foreign Mission	United Methodist Church in Norway
Royal Norwegian Society for Rural Development	The Workers' Educational Association of Norway
The Development Fund - Future in Our Hands	U-landshjelp fra Folk til Folk
The National Farmer's Union	
The Norwegian National Health Association	

Note: These includes organisations only supporting other NGOs' work; i.e. the Norwegian Housewives Association, and NGOs having very modest budgets, as the Salvation Army in Ethiopia.

Table 3.5. *Number of NGOs registered with NGO Affairs Bureau, Bangladesh (1981 - 92)*

Category	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1990	1991	1992	1993
Foreign NGOs	68	73	75	79	80	83	88	89	89	90	106	109
Foreign-Aided National NGO	45	62	77	96	112	126	157	191	241	293	421	513
Total	113	135	152	175	192	209	245	280	330	383	527	622

Source: NGO Affairs Bureau, Dhaka, October, 1992, taken from Aminuzzaman 1993:6.

Table 3.6. *NORAD support to NGOs in Bangladesh and as percentage of total budget of NGO division*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Amount (1,000 NOK)</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1981	9,984	12.5
1986	18,613	5.0
1991	34,754	6.4
1992	33,372	6.2

Source: NORAD, NGO division

Table 3.7. *Norwegian NGOs in Bangladesh supported by NORAD 1992 (1,000 NOK)*

Care Norway	3,000
Norwegian Association for the Blind and Partially Sighted	906
Norwegian Association for the Mentally Retarded	1,292
Norwegian Church Aid	2,920
Norwegian Santal Mission	3,241

Source: NORAD, NGO division

Table 3.8. *National NGOs supported by NORAD and their sector activities*

<i>Sector</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Education, science	29.35
Rural development	27.49
Women's projects	20.65
Health, population projects	17.81
Industry, mining, handicraft	2.46
Environment	0.94
Other	0.48
Agriculture, fishery	0.41
Social infrastructure, social welfare, culture	0.35
Humanitarian aid (exclusive emergency food aid)	0.06
	100.00

Source: NORAD Dhaka

Table 3.9. NORAD allocations to national in Bangladesh, 1992 (NOK)

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Contractors</i>	<i>Additional</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Contractors</i>	<i>Additional</i>
1 BRAC	7,072,000		19 SUS	111,180	
2 GSS	3,709,319		20 GGUF	69,822	
3 BS	2,494,649		21 KS	53,814	
4 UCEP	2,353,649		22 SHANTI CLINIC	47,797	
5 CHCP	1,960,440		23 RDM	34,800	
6 MLAA	1,796,668	87,058	24 CONCERN	24,990	
7 CARE TICA	1,040,000	1,041,250	25 DO	23,478	
8 IDEAS	672,860		26 ORD	21,386	
9 VHSS	510,000		27 IDR	18,461	
10 SNSP	453,333		28 COMMISSION FOR	17,510	
11 COBSDP	257,946		29 UST	16,282	
12 BNELC	204,774		30 PUS	14,913	85,000
13 USHA	202,290		31 DBGSKS	10,319	
14 ICDDR, B	197,700	2,040,000	32 MJS	10,011	41,072
15 YMCA	150,040		33 HKI	8,335	42,500
16 BRAC DLO	130,000		34 CRP		
17 BUS	116,892				
18 BIA	111,414				
			Total, NOK	23,917,695	3,336,880

Source: NORAD, Dhaka

Table 3.10. NORAD support to different national NGOs in Bangladesh in 1992

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1 BRAC	25.95
2 GSS	13.61
3 BS	9.15
4 UCEP	8.64
5 CHCP	7.19
6 MLAA	6.91
7 CARE TICA	7.64
8 IDEAS	2.47
9 VHSS	1.87
10 SNSP	1.66

Source: NORAD, Dhaka

Table 3.11 *Number of Ethiopian organisations with agreement with Relief and Rehabilitation Committee*

<i>Period/year for signing</i>	<i>Number of NGOs with agreement</i>
1975-80	1
1980-85	5
1986-90	1
1991	6
1992	21
1993	7
1994	[51 (+6)]
Total	41 [92 (+6)]

Note: The figures in square brackets shows the gap between the number of NGOs which have signed an agreement with RRC per 1993, and the number of NGOs registered in the official list for 1994. It is not very likely that all these are established only in the last year.

Source: Based on analysis of written records received from RRC

Table 3.12. *Categories of Ethiopian NGOs and their distribution*

<i>Category</i>		<i>Registered, RRC</i>
Religious		15
	Associated with Liberation Fronts	5
	Independent	
	Community Development	6
	Research Organisations	2
	Functional Organisations	42
Advocacy		3
Sum		83


Source: RRC. list over registered NGOs as of March 1994

Table 3.13. *Emergency Relief Desk (ERD) Programme, value of in-kind donations 1984-1991 (US dollars)*

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Eritrea								
Food	8,500,000	19,566,942	15,802,092	4,197,099	15,519,505	11,286,134	34,137,070	14,286,588
Non-food	375,000	163,156	366,131	1,093,509	897,013	1,601,609	2,381,669	508,175
Transport		3,308,636	5,062,183	5,108,319	7,657,412	2,887,387	25,574,353	2,637,492
Tigray								
Food	2,500,000	7,887,864	3,372,741	1,406,868	8,994,678	8,102,352	35,846,642	7,352,195
Non-food	350,000	340,787	15,346	692,011	652,689	1,039,232	692,518	960,069
Transport		563,230	530,653	4,351,119	10,236,186	3,103,885	28,086,273	14,670,563
Oromo								
Food			343,087	248,565	93,602	415,633	665,132	524,961
Non-food	48000	273544	334,030	613,046	724	477,405	866,398	689,958
Transport		139988	256,404	502,648	193,617	181,230	810,073	191,334


Source: Norwegian Church Aid / ERD Programme. Summary

Figur 3.1. *ERD Programme. Summary value of donations. US dollars*




Source: Norwegian Church Aid/ERD Programme. Summary

Figur 3.2. ERD Programme. Cash donation 1981 - 1991 (total, US dollar)




Source: Norwegian Church Aid / ERD Programme. Summary.

Figur 3.3. ERD Programme. Cash donation per donor 1981 - 1991 (percentage).




Source: Norwegian Church Aid / ERD Programme. Summary.

Figur 3.4. ERD Programme. Total donations 1981-1991 (US dollars).



Source: Norwegian Church Aid / ERD Programme. Summary.

Figur 3.5 ERD Programme. Food donations 1981 - 1991. Metric tons



Source: Norwegian Church Aid / ERD Programme. Summary.

Table 3.14. *Nicaraguan NGOs according to category*

<i>Category</i>	<i>Number of NGOs</i>
Research and Investigation	51
Cultural	12
Human Rights	10
Development	54
Popular Education	27
Ethnic Groups	6
Producer Organisations	19
Youth/Childhood/Family	23
Environment	29
Women	32
Health	28
Sum	291

Note: The table is based on data compiled from the NGO Directory of Nicaragua 1991-92. This directory registered 152 NGOs. It is noted that the total number of NGOs here exceeds the national total. National NGOs can be included under more than one category.

Source: Bebbington and Rivera 1994: 64.

Tabel 3.15. *Norwegian bilateral aid to Nicaragua 1978-1993. Expenditure in mill. NOK*

<i>Sectors/channels</i>	<i>1987</i>	<i>1988</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993*</i>
Sectors/channels (State-to-state)	55	79	63	142	87	89	70
Of which is goods and capital inputs	55	79	27	52	64	67	
Regional schemes			12	4	2		
Special grants	1	2	5	6	5	6	6
Peace corps	1	6	6	7	8	5	10
NGOs	1	12	25	36	41	39	40
Trade/ business					1	8	
Natural disasters		9	15	1	2	1	
Refugees		5	3	3			
Democracy/human rights (Contras disarmament)					12		
Multi-bi aid	17	16	20	15	13	10	
Others (technical aid/evaluations etc)	2	1	5	5	4	4	4
Payment of foreign dept					30	30	30

Note: * 1993: Budget

Source: Country strategy: Norwegian development cooperation with Nicaragua. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1993: 37.

Table 3.16. *Estimated distribution of NGO types in Zimbabwe*

<i>Type of NGO</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Proportion</i>
1. CBOs	550	64%
2. Intermediary NGOs	150	18%
3. Service NGOs	80	9%
4. Trusts & Unions	40	5%
5. International and Regional NGOs	30	4%
Total	ca 850	100%

Source: Moyo 1994. Computed from various records, including NANGO Directory and various NGO evaluations.

Table 3.17. *Direct NORAD support to NGOs in Zimbabwe by type of NGO, 1992-93*

<i>NGO type</i>	<i>Absolute terms</i>		<i>Value terms</i>	
	<i>Number of NGOs</i>	<i>% distribution</i>	<i>Amount (NOK)</i>	<i>%</i>
1. CBOs	2	2.50	297,000	4
2. Intermediaries	7	8.75	1,142,000	15
3. Service NGOs	32	40.00	3,067,000	40
4. Trusts/Unions	30	37.50	2,909,000	38
5. International/Regional	10	12.50	194,000	3
Totals	ca 81		7,609,000	100

Source: NORAD Records 1994. Taken from Moyo 1994.

Table 3.18. *Sectoral distribution of NORAD NGO support to Zimbabwe (1990-1993)*

<i>Sector</i>	<i>Number of NGOs</i>	<i>% distribution</i>
1 Women	10	12.50
2 Environment	12	15.00
3 AIDS	13	16.25
4 Training	8	10.00
5 Culture	13	16.25
6 Small Enterprises	13	16.25
7 Other: Human Rights, Blind, NGO Coordination, Children, Trades Unions, Mental Health	12	13.85
Total	80	

Source: Moyo 1994

Table 3.19. NORAD allocations to NGO "funding" sectors in Zimbabwe (NOK 1,000)

Funding category	1992		1993		1994	1988-93
	Allocation	Expendit.	Allocation	Expendit.	Allocation	Expendit.
1. NGOs Support	5,000	4,854	5,000	3,222	4,500	18,105
2. Environment	2,400	2,354	900	719	4,250	10,574
3. Culture	1,079	1,082	1,100	952	1,200	4,251
4. AIDS	1,100	1,059	1,900	1,470	2,400	5,604
5. Women	750	710	450	352	800	4,429
Totals	10,329	10,059	9,350	6,715	13,150	42,963

Note: Exchange rates: 1992: NOK 1 = Z\$ 0.92. 1993: NOK 1 = Z\$ 1. 1994: NOK 1 = Z\$ 1.2

Source: Moyo 1994.

Table 3.20. Actual sectoral disbursement by NORAD to NGOs in Zimbabwe, 1993 (NOK 1,000)

Sector	Types of NGO					Totals	
	CBOs	Intermediary	Service	Trust/Unions	International	NOK '000	Percent
1 Women	297	0	185	0*	10	482	6
2 Environment	0	345	802	0	194	1,341	17
3 AIDS	0	797	223	0	0	1,020	13
4 Culture	0	0	0	999	0	999	13
5 Training	0	0	825	0	0	825	11
6 Small enterprises	0	0	0	1,885	0	1,885	25
7 Other	0	0	1,032	24	0	1,057	14
Totals	297	1,142	3,067	2,909	194	7,609	100

Note: * See also small enterprises

Source: NORAD Records, in Moyo 1994

Table 3.21. Year of establishment for NGOs in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe which receive Norwegian financial support

Year of establishment	Bangladesh	Ethiopia	Nicaragua	Zimbabwe
- 1979	14	6	7	5
1980-1984	5	1	11	5
1985-1989	6	0	7	9
1990 -	1	1	12	1
N =	26	8	37	20


Source: Questionnaire A

Table 3.22. When did the NGOs in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe first receive Norwegian financial support

Year	Bangladesh		Ethiopia		Nicaragua		Zimbabwe	
	Norw. state	Norw NGO	Norw. state	Norw NGO	Norw. state	Norw NGO	Norw. state	Norw NGO
-1979	2	4	2	3	0	1	1	0
1980-1984	6	2	0	0	1	4	0	3
1985-1989	11	4	1	0	11	10	7	8
1990 -	4	2	2	2	20	17	7	2
N =	23	12	5	5	32	32	15	13

Source: Questionnaire A


Figur 3.6. Main funding institutions for NGOs in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe receiving financial support from Norway (percentage).



Note: N = 26 (Bangladesh), 9 (Ethiopia), 39 (Nicaragua), and 22 (Zimbabwe).


Source: Questionnaire A

Figur 3.7. Number of NGOs in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe receiving financial support from Norway working in long-term development assistance and relief assistance.



Note: N = 26 (Bangladesh), 9 (Ethiopia), 39 (Nicaragua), and 22 (Zimbabwe).
Source: Questionnaire A

Figur 3.8. Most important sectors among the local, regional and national NGOs in the questionnaire



Source: Questionnaire A

Table 3.23 *Programmes supported by the Norwegian government in relation to groups/institutions initiating the programme*

<i>Group or institution</i>	<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>Ethiopia</i>	<i>Nicaragua</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
Local people	29.8	5.9	27.8	20.7
National staff of the organisation	3.5	23.5	25.8	50.0
Headquarter of the organisation	15.8	5.9	29.0	0.0
Expatriate staff of the organisation	5.3	32.4	0.0	0.0
NORAD office in the country	14.0	0.0	6.5	16.7
Local/national government	3.5	14.7	3.2	0.0
NORAD Oslo	0.0	2.9	0.0	0.0
Other donors	5.3	0.0	9.7	0.0
Others	22.8	14.7	9.7	15.7

Note: The programmes have had the Norwegian government as first or second sponsor. The total number of such programmes are 140, while 288 programmes had "other donors" as main supporter.

Table 3.24. *Programmes supported by other sponsors in relation to group/institutions initiating the programme.*

<i>Group or institution</i>	<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>Ethiopia</i>	<i>Nicaragua</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
Local people	12.8	16.7	25.7	30.4
National staff of the organisation	23.4	30.6	34.5	22.8
Headquarter of the organisation	23.4	5.6	10.6	10.8
Expatriate staff of the organisation	19.2	13.9	3.5	5.4
NORAD office in the country	0.0	0.0	1.8	2.2
Local/national government	8.5	22.2	6.2	13.0
NORAD Oslo	0.0	0.0	0.9	2.2
Multinational organisations	0.0	0.0	0.9	1.1
Other donors	0.0	8.3	2.7	2.2
Others	12.8	2.8	13.3	9.8

N=288

Table 3.25. *Programmes supported by Norwegian NGOs in relation to group/institutions initiating the programme.*

<i>Group or institution</i>	<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>Ethiopia</i>	<i>Nicaragua</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
Local people	14.8	5.9	25.7	30.4
National staff of the organisation	25.9	23.5	28.8	21.7
Headquarter of the organisation	18.5	5.9	14.3	13.0
Expatriate staff of the organisation	22.2	32.4	4.3	8.7
NORAD office in the country	0.0	0.0	4.3	0.0
Local/national government	3.7	14.7	7.1	0.0
NORAD Oslo	0.0	2.9	1.4	4.4
Multinational organisations	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other donors	0.0	0.0	4.3	4.4
Others	14.8	14.8	10.0	17.4

Note: The programmes have had the Norwegian NGOs as first or second sponsor. The total number of such programmes were 154 while 274 had other donors as main supporters.

Table 3.26 *Programmes supported by Norwegian NGOs in relation to group/institutions initiating the programme.*

<i>Group or institution</i>	<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>Ethiopia</i>	<i>Nicaragua</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
Local people	24.7	16.7	21.6	29.9
National staff of the organisation	7.8	30.6	36.5	28.7
Headquarter of the organisation	19.5	5.6	14.9	8.1
Expatriate staff of the organisation	7.8	13.9	1.4	3.5
NORAD office in the country	10.4	0.0	1.4	5.8
Local/national government	6.5	22.2	4.1	13.8
NORAD Oslo	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2
Multinational organisations	0.0	0.0	1.4	1.2
Other donors	3.9	8.3	4.1	1.2
Others	19.5	2.8	14.9	6.9

Note: The programmes have had the Norwegian NGOs as first or second sponsor. The total number of such programmes were 154 while 274 had other donors as main supporters.

Table 3.27. *Programmes with governmental collaboration and links in Bangladesh, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe (percentage)*

	<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>Nicaragua</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
All projects	43.4	41.3	78.6
Projects with Norwegian government as first or second sponsor	28.6	31.6	45.5
All other projects	60.0	44.3	86.7
Projects with Norwegian NGOs as first or second sponsor	50.0	52.9	81.8

Table 3.28. *Programmes with collaboration and links with domestic NGOs in Bangladesh, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe (percentage)*

	<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>Nicaragua</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
All projects	39.6	52.5	58.9
Projects with Norwegian government as first or second sponsor	17.9	57.9	36.4
All other projects	64.0	50.8	64.4
Projects with Norwegian NGOs as first or second sponsor	64.3	61.8	81.8

Table 3.29. *Programmes with collaboration and links to international NGOs in Bangladesh, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe (percentage)*

	<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>Nicaragua</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
All projects	35.9	53.8	60.7
Projects with Norwegian government as first or second sponsor	28.6	63.2	36.4
All other projects	44.0	50.8	66.7
Projects with Norwegian NGOs as first or second sponsor	28.6	64.7	81.8

Table 3.30. Programmes where own evaluation has been undertaken in Bangladesh, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe (percentage)

	Bangladesh	Nicaragua	Zimbabwe
All projects	79.3	91.3	69.6
Projects with Norwegian government as first or second sponsor	89.3	94.7	72.7
All other projects	68.0	90.2	68.9
Projects with Norwegian NGOs as first or second sponsor	64.3	97.1	72.7

Table 3.31. Programmes where external evaluation has been undertaken in Bangladesh, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe (percentage)


	Bangladesh	Nicaragua	Zimbabwe
All projects	56.6	35.0	60.7
Projects with Norwegian government as first or second sponsor	60.7	47.4	36.4
All other projects	52.0	31.2	66.7
Projects with Norwegian NGOs as first or second sponsor	50.0	47.1	63.6

Table 3.32. Female participation in programmes in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe (percentage)

	Employed	Volunteers	In total
Bangladesh	18.5	92.6	29.1
Ethiopia	40.0	4.3	6.9
Nicaragua	39.6	48.2	44.0
Zimbabwe	47.6	54.9	52.5


Figur 4.1. Attitude to helping the third world in some European countries. Question: "Would you be prepared to give some of your time to support something being done for the Third World?"

Source: Eurobarometer 36 for the Commission of the European Communities and the Norwegian Social Science Data Service. By INRA (Europe) and Norges Markedsdata 1991




Figur 4.2. Attitude to helping the third world in some European countries. Question: "Would you be prepared to give more money than you do now to support something being done for the Third World?"

Source: Eurobarometer 36 for the Commission of the European Communities and the Norwegian Social Science Data Service. By INRA (Europe) and Norges Markedsdata 1991




Figur 4.3. Attitude to helping the third world in some European countries. Question: "Are you a member of a group or association which does things to help the Third World?"

Source: Eurobarometer 36 for the Commission of the European Communities and the Norwegian Social Science Data Service. By INRA (Europe) and Norges Markedsdata 1991




Figur 4.4. Attitudes to helping third world countries in some European countries. Question: "Have you been asked to give your time and play a personal part in campaigns or activities to benefit the Third World?"

Source: Eurobarometer 36 for The Commission of the European Communities and Norwegian Social Science Data Services by INRA (Europe) and Norges Markedsdata 1991.




Figur 4.5. Attitude to helping the third world in some European countries. Question: "Have you been asked to give money for specific projects in the Third World such as building schools, wells, medical aid, etc..?"

Source: Eurobarometer 36 for the Commission of the European Communities and the Norwegian Social Science Data Service. By INRA (Europe) and Norges Markedsdata 1991




Figur 4.6. Attitude to helping the third world in some European countries. Question: "Some people are for helping third world countries and others are against. Are you personally...?"

Source: Eurobarometer 36 for the Commission of the European Communities and the Norwegian Social Science Data Service. By INRA (Europe) and Norges Markedsdata 1991




Figur 4.7. Attitude to helping the third world in some European countries. Question: "From this card, which one do you think provides the most useful help to the Third World countries?"

Source: Eurobarometer 36 for the Commission of the European Communities and the Norwegian Social Science Data Service. By INRA (Europe) and Norges Markedsdata 1991



Figur 4.8. Norwegian opinions about institutions and aid efficiency, 1990.


Source: Vaage, Holdninger til norsk utviklingshjelp 1993: 16



Figur 4.9. Norwegian attitudes to aid and business: Should developing countries buy Norwegian goods for the development aid they receive from Norway or should they not?

Source: Vaage, Holdninger til norsk utviklingshjelp, 1993:24

□ Yes
▨ No
■ Do not know



MANDATE FOR THE EVALUATION OF NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS AS CHANNELS FOR NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Phase I and Phase II

1. Background for evaluation

During the course of the last 10 to 15 years an increasing portion of Norway's development assistance budget has been channelled through Norwegian and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The number of organizations involved in development assistance has increased enormously. The government authorities believe that these organizations are effective in organizing development assistance and humanitarian relief efforts and that they are a useful supplement to other bilateral and multilateral efforts. Among the advantages NGOs may be presumed to enjoy are the following:

- a) Local contacts and organizational partners, providing increased local participation in decision-making processes, planning and implementation and encouraging the transfer of development assistance projects to organizations and institutions in the recipient country.
- b) Special qualifications for strengthening local organizations and thereby contributing to increased pluralism and promoting a basis for democratic development.
- c) Special qualifications for reaching poor and vulnerable groups of people.
- d) Flexibility, creativity and cost effectiveness, including the ability to make greater use of voluntary services.
- e) Implementation of projects in politically controversial areas.

2. Scope of evaluation

The evaluation shall encompass development assistance, international humanitarian relief efforts and aid to refugees through NGOs pursuant to Chapters 0155, 0190 and 0191, items 72 to 76 of the Fiscal Budget. With regard to development assistance to NGOs through the Sudan-Sahel-Ethiopia Programme (Chapter 0150.79), the evaluation is expected to be based on the individual evaluation currently in progress.

3. Objectives of evaluation

- 3.1. The evaluation shall comprise a survey of the scope and nature of development assistance activities conducted by NGOs, including humanitarian relief efforts for refugees and victims of conflicts and disasters. This will include an assessment of the working methods and special nature of NGOs and of their efficiency as channels for Norwegian development assistance. In addition, the guidelines, coordination and follow-up provided by Norwegian authorities for this type of development assistance shall be evaluated.

In view of the extremely broad range of NGO activity, the evaluation will be carried out in two phases. Phase I will consist of identifying fields of responsibility, discussing issues and preparing a plan for Phase II, which will include field work.

The following specific objectives have been defined for Phase I:

- 3.1.1. Preparing a summary of the objectives and activities of the organizations.
- 3.1.2. Surveying and analysing the Norwegian authorities' guidelines for and follow-up of NGO activities.
- 3.1.3. Assessing cooperation between Norwegian authorities and NGOs.

3.1.4. Identifying and investigating problems, discussing questions of method and proposing a plan and mandate for Phase II of the evaluation.

3.2. The following specific objectives have been defined for Phase II:

3.2.1. Analysing to what extent NGOs possess the presumed comparative advantages referred to in point 1 (a-e).

3.2.2. Assessing the effect and efficiency of the development assistance activities of NGOs.

3.2.3. Analysing the Norwegian authorities' guidelines for and follow-up of NGO activities.

3.2.4. Presenting recommendations, based on the above analyses, concerning future objectives, strategies, guidelines and procedures for Norwegian development assistance through NGOs.

4. Plan of evaluation

4.1. Phase I will consist of examining pertinent literature, archive materials and project documentation, and interviewing key members of their respective professional spheres in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate for Development Cooperation (NORAD), NGOs, local NORAD offices in current recipient countries and possibly outside experts. Areas of concentration shall include the following:

- Assessing the experiences of Norwegian and foreign NGOs with regard to the implementation of development assistance programmes and humanitarian relief efforts in developing countries.
- Examining documents and gathering other information indicating the primary general objectives and guidelines of NGOs and public authorities.
- Examining projects documents used by NGOs and public authorities in order to extract basic data concerning their activities.

The total number of projects administered by NGOs is extensive, as is the scope to these projects. It will therefore be necessary to select a limited number of organizations and projects for closer document analysis. A consultant shall be requested to present a proposal to this effect.

Efforts shall primarily be focused on collecting and processing available data and material in Norway, but short trips to Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia may be undertaken in order to examine archives and consult with local NORAD offices as well as individual representatives of local NGOs.

Furthermore, a general questionnaire will be circulated to personnel in all Norwegian NGOs involved in development assistance programmes in developing countries, and interviews may be conducted among a more limited selection of Norwegian organizations.

4.2. Phase II shall include studies within the following fields:

- Experience with NGOs in the development assistance sector in other countries, especially Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Canada.
- Political and socioeconomic processes of change in recent decades and the significance of NGOs in efforts to promote pluralism and democratic development in the four countries receiving the largest amount of support from Norwegian NGOs.
- The efficiency and impact of the various types of development assistance activities of NGOs.
- Experience with the Norwegian system of cooperation in relation to NGOs and recommendations for future objectives, strategies, guidelines and procedures.

During Phase II material from Phase I will also be examined more closely. This applies to subparagraphs 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 of the mandate description of Phase I.

A special consultant shall be appointed to be in charge of Phase II. Studies of the various countries shall be largely based on local experts with a thorough knowledge of the social structure of and organizations in their respective countries. While the studies shall consist primarily of examination of literature, project documents and archive materials in Norway and the other countries involved, visits to the projects areas shall also be included.

Projects and programmes shall be selected on the basis of recommendations from the consultant in accordance with approved criteria.

The consultant shall report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Evaluation Division, at regular intervals.

- 4.3. The consultant shall summarize the findings and conclusions of the evaluations for Phase I and Phase II into a final report.

5. Questions to be evaluated in connection with Phase I

Evaluation should be related to, but not necessarily limited to, the following topics:

- 5.1. The guidelines and follow-up of NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
 - 5.1.1. To what extent the Norwegian authorities' guidelines and practice relating to NGOs are clear, consistent, realistic and in accordance with general political objectives for the application of development assistance funds within various priority areas and budget chapters.
 - 5.1.2. To what extent the Norwegian authorities' guidelines and requirements for planning, budgeting, reporting, accounting and auditing are satisfactory and expedient.
 - 5.1.3. How NGOs perceive and relate to Norwegian authorities' guidelines and procedures for support, and objectives and strategies developed for various projects, countries or sectors.
 - 5.1.4. To what extent the guidelines of the Norwegian authorities may have unfortunate, unintentional consequences with regard to the choice and organization of the activities supported, or with regard to the special nature and advantages of various NGOs.
 - 5.1.5. To what extent guidelines function with regard to directing organizational activities towards priority objectives, including more purposeful planning, management and follow-up within the NGOs themselves, in local organizational structure and in local assumption of responsibility for development assistance projects.
- 5.2. NGO efforts.
 - 5.2.1. Priority areas, activities, roles and functions in relation to NGOs' presumed advantages, expertise and competence.
 - 5.2.2. NGOs' cooperation with recipient organizations in areas including planning, implementation, recruiting, reporting, evaluation, accounting and auditing.
 - 5.2.3. Cooperation with local authorities and other development assistance organizations in connection with coordination, exchange of information and, when relevant, implementation.
 - 5.2.4. Degree to which NGO efforts are adapted to the recipient's resources, competence and qualifications, as well as initiatives directed toward local assumption of responsibility for projects. Investigation of the degree to which responsibility for projects is transferred to recipient organizations.

5.3. Qualifications of NGOs as supplements to other forms of development assistance. On the basis of the presumed advantages of these organizations as well as the objectives and guidelines of the Norwegian authorities:

- 5.3.1. Give an account of the background and distinctive nature of NGOs and describe the growth of development assistance activities. This account should cover volume, number of projects, geographical distribution, location, type of development assistance, financing and cost profile, Norwegian and local staff, etc., possibly classified according to the various types of organization.
- 5.3.2. Give an account of the general objectives and strategies of NGOs, as well as of major specific objectives or strategies with regard to priority areas, regions, countries, sectors or projects.
- 5.3.3. Give an account of and discuss NGOs' organization, and execution of planning, follow-up, accounting, auditing and evaluation.
- 5.3.4. Give an account of and discuss the major objectives and strategies of NGOs with regard to cooperation with local recipient groups, organizations and authorities, including matters connected with institutional development, organizational structure, local financing and local assumption of responsibility for projects.
- 5.3.5. Identify particular qualifications or special areas of competence for various types of development assistance, including advantages related to land, sectors, humanitarian relief efforts, sociocultural conditions including assistance targeted at women, planning, implementation, administration, evaluation, etc.
- 5.3.6. Discuss the activities and functions of NGOs in connection with structural adjustment and modifications in the responsibilities and tasks of the governments of developing countries.

5.4. Assessment of results

Some of the effects of the development assistance efforts of NGOs will be registered during document analysis. The main analysis of such effects, however, will be undertaken during field studies in Phase II. The following problems in connection with the organizations' own assessments shall be analyzed:

- 5.4.1. What is the basis for assessment/definition of the concept of development used by NGOs (development for whom, assessed by whom)?
- 5.4.2. How do NGOs define the achievement of objectives?
- 5.4.3. What do NGOs regard as criteria for determining whether objectives have been achieved, including transfer of responsibility, sustainability, duplication effect, strengthening of local organizations and cost effectiveness?

6. Questions of evaluation in connection with Phase II

When Phase II is begun the consultant shall prepare an inception report assessing the extent to which the mandate for Phase I has been satisfactory fulfilled and whether additional studies are necessary.

Phase II shall focus on the effect of NGOs' development assistance activities. The work shall be carried out in the form of studies. Evaluation shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following subjects:

6.1. The experience of other donor countries with development assistance from NGOs.

A study shall be carried out to compare evaluations made by other donor countries, especially Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Canada. Special attention should be devoted to the following problems:

- 6.1.1. What is the general conclusion as regards the comparative advantages presumably enjoyed by NGOs

in other countries?

- 6.1.2. What is the relationship between the primary strategies and administrative structure of individual donor countries and the organizations' ability to direct activities toward a priority goal and to avail themselves of their presumed comparative advantages?
- 6.1.3. Which strategic, administrative or operational factors appear to be important prerequisites for successful activities?
- 6.1.4. Which sectoral efforts are regarded as especially successful or suitable for NGOs? Are single-sector organizations more successful than multi-sector organizations?
- 6.1.5. Which problems are connected to the organizations' ability to finance their own activities, safeguard their autonomy and maintain an individual identity in relation to contributors?
- 6.1.6. Identifying additional major problems which are relevant to the other studies.

6.2. The role of NGOs in connection with pluralism and democracy.

A study will be carried out on the political and socioeconomic processes of change in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh and Nicaragua, emphasizing the role of NGOs in the past and present as well as attempting to foresee their future role. The evaluation team shall include the following areas in their report:

- 6.2.1. A brief assessment of the political and socioeconomic changes that have taken place during decades and the most important external and internal factors influencing these changes.
- 6.2.2. What role has been played by selected local Norwegian NGOs in connection with the process of change? Which interests are represented by the most influential local organizations and their leaders, and by what means has it been possible to encourage the participation of the general population?
- 6.2.3. What proportion of local NGO funding needs is provided by the organizations themselves, as compared to external support, and to what extent has the latter resulted in dependence on or influence by donors?
- 6.2.4. What consequences have changes in national framework conditions had for the division of tasks between the public and private sectors and the development of local organizational structures?
- 6.2.5. What is the potential impact of the above consequences with regard to changes in future Norwegian cooperation with NGOs? Discuss topics such as budget quotas, objectives, strategies, guidelines, categories of support, choice of channels and administrative routines.

6.3. Efficiency and impact of NGOs' development assistance.

Studies shall cover activities run by both local organizations and Norwegian cooperation organizations.

- 6.3.1. What general conclusion may be drawn with regard to the presumed comparative advantages of NGOs?
- 6.3.2. Are individual organizations properly informed as to the poverty situation in project target areas, and is this information reflected in the choice of measures and activities implemented in these areas?
- 6.3.3. What is the connection between Norway's general strategies and administrative programmes, on the one hand, and the ability of NGOs to direct their activities towards priority objectives and make use of their presumed comparative advantages, on the other? Problems in connection with the organizations' ability to finance their own activities, safeguard their autonomy and maintain an individual identity in relation to donors shall be identified.
- 6.3.4. Do the measures implemented contribute to sustainable development in accordance with the criteria

set out in DAC/OECD (see Selected Issues in Aid Evaluation, OECD/DAC, 1989)?

- 6.3.5. Within which sectors are the efforts of NGOs considered particularly successful or appropriate, and for what reasons? Are single-sector organizations more successful than multi-sector organizations?
- 6.3.6. How do activities implemented compare to government measures of those of NGOs? Both administrative and technical approaches shall be compared. The possibility, expedience and prerequisites for further cooperation shall be assessed.

6.4. Guidelines and procedures for support to NGOs.

The following shall be assessed on the basis of the evaluations of Phase I and Phase II:

- 6.4.1. To what extent are current fundamental development assistance principles, guidelines, strategies and objectives in connection with support to NGOs relevant with regard to changes in framework conditions in partner countries and in Norway;
- 6.4.2. To what extent is the current administrative system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and NORAD, in Norway and abroad (including procedures, supervision of the project, accounting, and auditing), satisfactory;
- 6.4.3. How well does the dialogue between the MFA and NORAD, on the one hand, and NGOs, on the other, function, as well as any role played by NORAD and the MFA in connection with determining technical development assistance criteria or political criteria and supporting the capacity and training opportunities available in NGOs;
- 6.4.4. How does the technical and administrative coordination of emergency relief, support for human rights and long-term development assistance function;
- 6.4.5. What measures are taken to safeguard interaction with other forms or channels of development assistance, such as interaction with government authorities in partner countries, and the possibility and expedience of developing this interaction.

7. Recommendations

The evaluation team shall, on the basis of information derived from Phase I and Phase II, make recommendations concerning the following:

- 7.1. Subsequent Norwegian cooperation between public development assistance authorities and NGOs in areas such as objectives and strategies, interaction with other types of development assistance, administrative rules and routines, and coordination.
- 7.2. Further development of NGOs' working methods, special nature and efficiency (objectives and strategies with regard to priority areas, training and cooperation relationships) on the basis of existing or changed framework conditions in Norway and partner countries.

8. Implementation of the project

Phase I shall be implemented within a time-frame of seven months.

Phase II shall be implemented during the course of 11 months in 1993-1994. A final report shall be presented in August-September 1994.

Copied to JM
file
NGO

WORLD BANK OFFICE TRACKING SYSTEM
Director General, Ops Evaluation
Routing and Action Transmittal Sheet

=====

TO:	OEDDR, (T-9025)	DATE:	5/15/95
-----	-----------------	-------	---------

=====

=====

SUBJECT DOCUMENT:

From: M. MALLOCH BROWN
To: J. ADAMS
Dated: 5/08/95

Reference No.: DGO950515003

Topic: NGO STRATEGY PAPER

=====

=====

ACTION INSTRUCTIONS:	DUE DATE:
----------------------	-----------

HANDLE

REVIEW AND RECOMMEND 5/22/95

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

DISCUSS WITH _____

AS WE DISCUSSED

PREPARE RESPONSE FOR _____ SIGNATURE

FOR YOUR FILES

RETURN TO _____

OTHER: _____

=====

Remarks: FAS/JM - PLEASE REVIEW

=====

*Increasing Development Effectiveness through
Strengthening Partnerships and Understanding*

RECEIVED

95 MAY -9 PM 4:04

DGO

PART I - Background

NGOs have become of greater significance to the Bank in recent years as they have become increasingly interested in its work on the project and policy level and as their capacities have become more important to Bank work across many sectors. Understanding the "NGO phenomenon", why many NGOs have become interested in the Bank and some also critical of it, and which NGOs the Bank should be reaching out to is an important starting point for evolving a more appropriate strategy for strengthening partnerships in the interests of facilitating the Bank's mission.

The NGO Explosion

The NGO sector has mushroomed over the past two decades. International NGOs' programs doubled in real size from 1975 to 1985 and by 1993 represented 14 percent of all development assistance, or \$8.5 billion per annum. An increasing volume of official funding is channeled through NGOs, rising from 1.5 percent of international NGO income in 1970 to 30 percent in 1993. Including food aid, OECD donors now channel about 5 percent of their ODA to NGOs, rising to 11 percent in the case of USA. These developments are reflected in rapid growth in the sector in our borrowing countries, for example there are estimated to be 18,000 registered NGOs in the Philippines, and 3,000 in Brazil, while registered NGOs in India handle \$520 million per year, or 25 percent of all external aid. It is clear NGOs are now an increasingly important source of development assistance.

This growing role has been reflected in Bank operations. The numbers of Bank-Financed projects where there is some collaboration with NGOs has increased from an average of 6 percent of projects approved from FY73-FY88 to 50 percent in FY94 and the scope of collaboration (which is most extensive in Africa) has broadened from the social sectors and rural development to environmental programs, informal sector development, social funds, resettlement operations and a wide variety of other activities. NGOs are increasingly involved in the design, preparation and other stages of Bank-financed projects, as well as in implementation.

A typology of NGOs

One key issue is that the term "Nongovernmental Organizations" embraces a myriad of different types of not-for-profit agencies. While for this paper only those directly or tangentially involved in development are considered, this still leaves a wide range of actors. The Bank interacts principally with two main groups of NGOs:

- (i) Operational NGOs (ONGOs) whose primary purpose is their own programs designed to contribute to development, environmental management, welfare or emergency relief. These include international organizations (INGOs), typically headquartered in developed countries; national organizations (NNGOs) usually operating in individual developing countries; and community-based organizations (CBOs) which serve a specific population group in a narrow geographic area.
- (ii) Advocacy NGOs (ANGOs) whose primary purpose is advocating a specific point of view or concern and who seek to influence the policies and practices of the Bank, governments and other bodies. These are mostly, but not exclusively, based in developed countries. ANGOs

are quite effective at networking internationally and increasingly draw evidence from partners(both ANGOs and NNGOs) based in developing countries.

The dividing line should not be drawn too rigidly, however. While some NGOs concentrate on relief and service delivery and have virtually no analytical or policy function, and some are lobbying NGOs with no operational base, the majority of NGOs fall somewhere between these extremes. ONGOs (and in particular NNGOs and CBOs) usually have more field-level experience of relevance to the Bank, but often thoughtful, well-connected advocacy groups may offer invaluable grassroots insights. Similarly, local branches of INGOs may have a better record in participatory approaches and be more effective than NNGOs.

While earlier it was mostly advocacy organizations in industrialized countries which sought to challenge or influence the Bank's guiding policies and philosophy, recent years have seen a broadening of such pressure as an increasing number of the larger international operational NGOs (such as Oxfam, World Vision, and Save the Children) have devoted more resources to policy analysis and lobbying, and as advocacy groups and networks have emerged in developing country regions (including the Third World Network, the Asian NGO Coalition, the Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations, the Inter-Africa Group and others). The distinction between advocacy and operational NGOs is now unclear.

At the same time, the early dominance of environmental NGOs in the Bank-NGO dialogue has become less pronounced as new categories of ANGOs, such as human rights and women's organizations, are arriving on the Bank's stage.

The Bank's Interest in NGOs

The Bank's agenda has become more complex in recent years as it has given greater prominence to issues of poverty, participation, gender, the environment, governance, capacity building, and improving implementation quality. The Bank's portfolio is undergoing a significant shift as a consequence from traditional infrastructure and industry lending to financing the social sectors, conservation programs and policy reform. Much of the broadened agenda emphasizes areas in which certain NGOs have clear strengths. NGOs often work closely with vulnerable groups and study closely the dynamics of poverty; many give priority to developing decision-making structures which empower local people to make development decisions and control resources; they are often energetic in ensuring that women are fairly represented in decision-making or that parallel projects for women are introduced; they often have insights into the trade-offs and complementarities between environmental protection and the needs of indigenous populations; they often emphasize protecting vulnerable groups from capricious actions and malpractices of local officials and the elite; they often help central and local government increase their capacity for service delivery, public consultations or other activities, through training programs for civil servants, acting as contractors or advocacy; and they can help governments, the Bank and others to identify problems in the implementation of their programs. The importance of tapping into this know-how should provide the key rationale for our efforts to build up more effective partnerships with NGOs.

The combination of the broadened development agenda together with the growth and increased interest of NGOs in Bank matters has two implications for the Bank. First, it is critical that the Bank begins to interact more consistently with proficient, experienced, operational NGOs, to broaden their awareness of the Bank's development work. This group of NGOs are on the front line of development. They understand the complexity of development and have many capacities the Bank can usefully draw on. A good example of what can be effective is the series of workshops initiated in Tanzania, Argentina and

other countries. Second, the Bank needs to ensure that greater priority is given to Bank efforts to work with governments in improving the environment for NGOs. This should properly be seen as an important element in improving the enabling environment for the private sector. A number of themes in the Bank's private sector policy work are directly applicable to improving NGO impact (such as the importance of a level playing field, stable and clear regulatory rules, fair tax regimes etc). A relevant example is the studies and policy reflections on the NGO-state relationship which have been launched by the Bank, jointly with government and NGOs, in Indonesia and Bangladesh. The Bank's effectiveness in forwarding its new agenda will be important to many NGOs who have policy interests in these issues and will want to interact with the Bank.

As the Bank will interact with a wide variety of NGOs, ranging from purely service delivery to political lobbyists, its response should vary according to the nature of the NGO but must be consistent with an overall guiding strategy. In particular the Bank should enhance its collaboration with operational NGOs with proven effectiveness in poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. It should also improve its capacity to dialogue with and learn from NGO experience. While operational NGOs may be less practiced or high profile in presenting their views than advocacy specialists, their grassroots experience is potentially important to the Bank and can contain important messages for improving Bank operations and policies.

NGO Interest in the Bank

There are three major categories of NGO interest. Any Bank strategy must deal effectively with all of these. Firstly, as NGOs have grown in size and numbers, some increasingly seek official funding, and view the Bank as an important source of funds, particularly through contracts to implement project components.

Other operational NGOs are attempting more strategic use of their experience to achieve greater impact than is possible through their direct programs alone. They aim to encourage government and other official agencies to adopt approaches they have pioneered, to choose them as business partners in service delivery, and to listen to their advice on matters of policy. They sometimes find it easier to initiate a relationship first with the Bank or other aid agency and through that forge a more strategic link with the government in question.

Finally there are those who seek to change Bank policy or approach. International environmental and development lobbyists have increasingly shifted their attention towards the Bank because of its influence on development strategies. Phenomena such as global environmental stress and continuing hunger in Africa have been widely interpreted by many NGOs as evidence of failure of conventional development strategies and of the need for new approaches. Many of these NGOs caricature the Bank as having promoted economic growth and market liberalization as if these were the goals of development, rather than means of achieving social and environmental objectives. While there are a range of themes, this group typically highlights their conclusions the needs of the poor and the environment have been neglected and they conclude that fundamental changes are needed in Bank priorities. NGOs also often believe that the Bank influences the environment in which they work through structural adjustment. Though the specifics of reform are often poorly defined, some elements of their criticism have been picked up by both right and left wing critics of aid. While in the past multinational corporations and colonialism were viewed as the primary sources of developing countries' exploitation, now the Bank - caricatured by NGO critics as coopting developing countries through structural adjustment into an elite-serving, global market-place - is described as fostering divisive development in which government

excesses and the needs of the poor are both overlooked.

PART II - Operational Links with NGOs

The Annual NGO Progress Report and "Working with NGOs: A Practical Guide to World Bank-NGO Operational Collaboration" (both products of the NGO Unit in OPR) describe many examples of Bank-NGO partnership in practice. These will not be repeated at length here. The conclusion is that there has been a rapid expansion of operational collaboration, and that it is good business practice for Task Managers to work closely with experienced and professional NGOs which have intimate knowledge of poor communities, with an emphasis on National NGOs and CBOs.

Administrative budgets have been used to contract NGO staff as consultants or researchers; PPF (and SPPF) funds can be used during project preparation, for example for beneficiary/social assessments; project finance can be used where the borrower agrees an NGO role in service delivery or in the social fund etc; Special Grants Program resources can be used for discrete categories of operations in certain fields (such as population programs, safe motherhood, river blindness and TB programs); GEF resources (administered by UNDP) can be sought by NGOs themselves for environmental activities; TMs can solicit donor cofinancing (eg the Small and Medium Enterprise Pilot Initiative of PSD); the Fund for Innovative Approaches in Human and Social Development can be used to engage NGOs in designing projects in participatory ways; the Small Grants Program can finance NGO workshops, studies and dissemination of experience; and the newly agreed micro-finance facility would provide funding for micro-credit programs aimed at the very poor. All these mechanisms allow the Bank to tap into NGO capacity.

These partnerships with NGOs have enabled the most vulnerable to access program benefits, negative project consequences to be avoided or mitigated, and communities to be involved in the design and execution of projects. NGOs have helped introduce participatory approaches, strengthen transparency and accountability at the grassroots level and pilot innovations. Through working with NGOs and governments, the Bank has often been able to help governments discover attributes of NGOs and contribute to overcoming a mistrust of them. Mainstreaming partnerships with NGOs, in close collaboration with governments, must be one of the principal objectives of an effective NGO strategy. The Bank can achieve this by developing operational links at three levels.

(i) Country Priorities. Experienced NGOs recognize the importance of sound country strategies. Reflecting this they are increasingly involved in discussions of development strategy at the country level, especially concerning questions of poverty and the environment. Many NGOs see the influence the Bank has in these areas and are prepared to work together. The Bank has begun to respond. For example, NGO representatives have been included in a new high-level working group on poverty in Bangladesh, and through their involvement in Participatory Poverty Assessments, NGOs have been prominent in the discussions between government and donors about poverty strategies in Zambia and Ghana. NGOs have instigated dialogue with government on strategies for reducing hunger in Mali and Ethiopia in the context of follow up to the Bank's conference on "Overcoming Global Hunger". NGOs have also been involved in deliberating National Environmental Action Plans in a number of countries such as Guinea (where the government officially designated a national NGO—Guinea Ecologie—to be responsible for the NEAP preparation), the Gambia, Madagascar and Nicaragua. A recent ESD review of NEAPs ("National Environmental Strategies and Action Plans: Key Elements and Best Practice", Feb. 1995) concludes as one of its main findings that effective NEAPs must embrace the "active voices of key stakeholders" including NGOs and CBOs representing affected populations, to ensure the success of resulting environmental strategies. Expanding further this interaction has high priority, particularly in poverty and

environmental areas. This expansion will depend on the government in question, but the Bank has been able to enhance the level of government interest.

(ii) Economic and Sector Work. A recent analysis of ESW by OPR demonstrates the importance of the participation of governments and other stakeholders in fostering local "ownership" of ESW, and the importance of that to the success of resulting projects. Involvement of NGOs and other participatory approaches have a particularly important role in education and dissemination policies to ensure broad political support for development activities, for better identification of gainers and losers, and for improved design of compensation policies. Change has started. ESW Task Managers are increasingly using participatory research methods such as semi-structured interviews and community ranking exercises to improve analysis. This enables TMs to assess better the perceptions of local populations (particularly the poor) concerning the issues studied and their preferred strategies for tackling the priorities they identify. Many NGOs are either skilled in the required methodology or enjoy the close contact at grassroots level which makes them ideal partners in such research. Beneficiary assessments and Participatory Rural Appraisal techniques have greatly strengthened many poverty assessments (ref Andrew Norton paper); NGOs have contributed to Women in Development Assessments (eg in Morocco); and NGOs have often helped identify local people's usufruct needs in the development of forest sector strategies. In some occasions it has proved valuable to include an NGO specialist as a consultant on an ESW mission. For example in this way a CEM mission to Zimbabwe was able to gain insights into poor people's concerns regarding cost recovery in the health service, and a mission considering poverty and adjustment in Mongolia was better able to appreciate the diversity of poverty groups. Even when NGOs are not formally involved as consultants or researchers, the advice and experience of local NGOs who are knowledgeable about the sector in question is often invaluable, for example NGOs added important insights to both the Madagascar and Uganda poverty assessments, though not contractually involved. More systematic involvement of NGOs in analytic work will both build understanding and mutual objectives, and clarify why the Bank is facing some tough decisions.

(iii) Project Work. The involvement of NGOs can be sought at any point in the project cycle. Though there is much documentation of this phenomenon, there is little evaluative material documenting how satisfactory is the experience, either from the viewpoint of governments, TMs, beneficiaries or NGOs. The NGO Unit is now giving attention to this. That TMs who have involved NGOs in past projects are most likely to plan NGO involvement in new ones is an indication that the outcomes are generally regarded as positive.

Involvement of NGOs at the identification and design stage can help TMs ensure that the project is tailored to the needs of local people and that potential social or environmental problems are avoided. NGOs may be involved in assessing potential environmental or social impacts, in organizing public consultations, in advising on aspects of project design (such as service users' associations), and in helping communities articulate their concerns about an upcoming project. For example, working with both national level and community-based NGOs has enabled resettlement and environmental problems to be minimized and for mitigation to be sensitively planned together with affected communities in the case of the Gazi Barotha dam in Pakistan. This could afford a welcome contrast to the well-publicized and controversial dam projects elsewhere.

NGO involvement in projects is most common during the implementation phase. Those with sufficient capacity as well as local knowledge may be contracted to deliver certain project services (such as family planning services within population projects), to affect the required mobilization of communities (for example in immunization programs), or to manage project sub-components. The latter could include

implementing the resettlement or environmental mitigation plan or managing the program's outreach to a particular population group (such as female-headed households). NGOs can also be financial intermediaries as in the many Social Funds and Social Action Programs. For example, in the Burkina Faso Population and AIDS Control Project NGOs played a key role in reaching high risk populations.

Many NGOs also have significant capacity to provide training to project authorities, civil servants and target beneficiaries when they have first-hand experience of techniques deployed by the project. For example NGOs have provided training in working with Indigenous People for staff of natural resources projects in Amazonia, and training in micro-enterprise development for women in the WEMTOP program. In Ghana, the US-based NGO Technoserve provided training to Department of Cooperative civil servants aimed at improving their capacity to work with rural communities. Though there are few occasions where NGOs are formally involved in monitoring and evaluation (the mid-term review of the Fourth Livestock Development Project in Ethiopia and the impact evaluation of three Transmigration projects in Indonesia are exceptions), it is increasingly common for review or evaluation missions to consult with NGOs on the ground. NGOs may be involved as project partners in other ways such as co-financing, for example Rotary International funded the building of a polio vaccine plant within a Bank-financed polio eradication project in China.

It is clear that there is now a considerable volume of experience of working with NGOs, but it is equally clear that there is the capacity to do much more. Expansion of such partnerships should be seen as a high priority. However in this expansion great care must be exercised in the selection of appropriate NGO partners. Collaboration is not virtuous in itself, but because of certain attributes which carefully selected NGOs are able to offer which are important for poverty reduction programs and improving portfolio quality. These attributes are:

- Innovation: The FONCODES project in Peru has demonstrated how an effective Social Fund can be built upon a model demonstrated by a consortium of NNGOs, and Oxfam's program of "water harvesting" in Yatenga, Burkina Faso, has served as a model for Bank operations in soil and water conservation throughout the Sahel.
- Local Accountability: NGO involvement in government health programs has ensured that health workers are not abusing their positions; for example, in Uganda some bilaterals chose to channel aid through NGOs to reduce under-the-counter sale of drugs.
- Responsiveness: NGOs can help ensure that the social aspects of projects are properly implemented through helping to organize consultations with affected communities and monitoring.
- Participation: NGOs can act as interlocutor between project authorities and communities, as well as providing structures for participation. For example, Orangi in Karachi implemented a widespread sewerage project which was more effective, sustainable and considerably cheaper than an equivalent public utility project, because it engaged local people in managing the project and in cleaning their local neighborhood.
- Sustainability: Local structures which are not linked to government can provide a continuity where governments are weak and prone to rapid change.

Not all NGOs are able to offer these attributes, however, and collaboration with NGOs is not successful

in all projects, or relevant to all sectors. Task Managers have found that due to weak management or other factors NGOs have not been able to deliver what was hoped for (for example ADAUA in Mali), or irreconcilable differences in approaches have led to collaboration being discontinued (as with an agricultural credit program in Niger where CARE did not agree with the Task Manager's insistence on certain eligibility restrictions). Establishing clear objectives and procedures for collaboration at the outset is as important as sensitive NGO selection.

PART III - Policy Dialogue with NGOs

The aspect of NGO relations which has proved most difficult for the Bank of late has been interaction on matters of development policy. While NGOs have tended to dominate the dialogue, and specialist NGO lobbyists have made the fiercest attacks on the Bank, many operational NGOs (particularly INGOs) have joined in criticizing the Bank in recent years. Operational and developing country NGOs are generally aware that national-level decision-makers have clearest responsibility for determining the direction of development in that country and should therefore be the primary campaigning target, however the Bank presents a more attractive advocacy focus, either because--for INGOs--it is within their sphere of influence, or--for NNGOs--because it is a politically safer target.

NGOs who seek to influence changes in Bank policy mostly concentrate on three operational areas:

- **structural adjustment**, its social and environmental costs, and what is perceived as a "structural adjustment paradigm" that many NGOs believe dominates Bank work; the need for "structural adjustment in the North"; the need for debt relief, especially on multilateral debt.
- **environmentally sustainable development**, including tropical, temperate and boreal forestry policies, energy production and efficiency, conservation of natural habitats, national accounting systems, environmental assessments, environmental action plans, the Bank's contribution to "Agenda 21" (including efforts to phase out ozone-depleting substances), and the workings of the GEF.
- **social policy**, including popular participation, gender, equity, direct poverty reduction (PTIs, human resource operations, participatory poverty assessments, the poverty progress report, hunger reduction programs), micro-credit, resettlement, indigenous peoples, and human rights.

In addition, leading NGOs have called for significant institutional reforms of the Bank. This agenda is dominated by "good governance" themes:

- **transparency:** evolving the information policy and strengthening its implementation towards maximizing public disclosure; translation of basic project documents into languages spoken by project-affected people and of certain Operational Directives into major languages;
- **accountability:** monitoring the Bank's response to issues raised in the Wapenhans report; developing improved indicators of development impact; changing the culture of the Bank and its reward system to emphasize delivery by staff of stated Bank priorities;
- **participation:** ensuring that the politically weak have a voice in Bank-financed operations, particularly through holding public hearings, consultations with affected communities and through the independent inspection panel; the right of project-affected people to receive just

compensation; the importance of popular participation in development decisions as well as implementation; and greater Bank attention to human rights considerations.

The recently agreed disclosure policy, the program of action on participation, and independent inspection panel all illustrate that NGOs have provided input into the Bank's reform agenda, and that the Bank has the capacity to respond to external concerns. The former offers a wholesale leap in information available to the public and goes considerably further than do most development agencies, governmental bodies and indeed most NGOs. The latter sets a precedent for all international organizations; governmental and otherwise. The Bank's increasing work on governance issues is also noteworthy but has received less attention from Bank critics. The challenge now is to demonstrate that these new policies are being effectively and decisively implemented.

IDA 11 will be a key focus over the next 18 months. Clear differences of views are emerging amongst Bank critics on the desirability of replenishment. Other foci for advocacy will be the GEF replenishment, the Halifax G7 Summit which will initiate a review of the purposes and workings of the Bretton Woods Institutions, and the Beijing Conference on Women. These should be used as opportunities to engage on substantial policy issues.

PART IV - Key Issues and Opportunities

Existing policies already allow considerable opportunities for partnership with NGOs. The following is a description of some of the key issues.

(i) NGO Selection Process. In most countries there is a profusion of NGOs, not all of which have attributes of value to the Bank. As has been stated, collaboration is not always beneficial. The selection of NGOs for partnership is of critical importance and needs to be based on an intimate knowledge of the NGO community. The most important selection criteria are (a) **skill and capacity issues:** which NGOs have the necessary sectoral or geographic expertise, which can undertake the scale of operation envisaged, which have a proven track record, which have the necessary staff and management capacity; (b) **governance issues:** whether the NGO is well-managed and reliable, whether it has well-developed systems of accountability and transparency, whether it is politically neutral and free from nepotism; (c) **legitimacy and credibility issues:** which NGOs are acceptable to government and other partners, which have the necessary legal status, which NGOs have mechanisms to ensure representivity of the grassroots, accountability to local communities, and maximum delegation of decision-making to community level (such as in organizations with widespread membership of the poor). As the Bank's involvement with NGOs increases so will its ability to select carefully the most appropriate NGO partners. It is important in most cases that capacity in resident missions be developed for these processes.

(ii) Involvement of the Government. For development initiatives to be sustained and to be truly owned by the government and communities in question, it is important for governments to be fully involved in collaborative partnerships with NGOs. By fostering a "dialogue" between the Bank, government and NGOs, TMs have often been able to help bring about path-breaking collaboration between the public and NGO sectors. In Uganda, for example, a Bank study of the NGO sector revealed many aspects of the operating environment which hampered the contribution of NGOs and caused mistrust between them and the government. This study, and subsequent workshops for discussions of the findings, helped the government strengthen its relations with NGOs. In Philippines, also, the promotion of NGO-government partnership at the municipal level has been an important feature of a health program. In policy dialogue, too, governments should be involved. Increased interactions with NGOs may be necessary to achieve

maximum poverty reduction. Where governments can be persuaded of the desirability of these measures there is no dilemma and a Bank-Government-NGO "trialogue" can yield constructive results. Where governments are suspicious or hostile, however, the Bank faces very difficult choices. Sometimes the Bank will derive useful advice from bilateral interactions with NGOs; sometimes, where involvement of NGOs would be critical to a project's success and this involvement is blocked by government, it may be most appropriate not to proceed with the project.

(iii) Flexibility in contracts and procurement. Rigid interpretations of business practices and the project cycle are likely to hamper creative partnerships with NGOs. Again there is considerable flexibility within the system, but Task Managers differ both in their awareness and willingness to use this flexibility. For example TMs are able to use simpler procurement rules to ensure more effective community participation (ref). There are many ways in which procurement and disbursement can be made more appropriate to NGO involvement (see Alexandre Marc xxx). OPR has recently established a Task Force bringing TMs, CVPU's and experienced NGOs together to study and advise on how to improve business practices to facilitate Bank-NGO collaboration. Such improvements will be key to deepening cooperation.

(iv) Better listening. The Bank has acknowledged that some ANGO criticism has been valid through changes in Bank policy. In the future the Bank needs to be less defensive, more open to issues they raise, and proactive in seeking the guidance of NGOs with relevant experience. For example the Bank held productive consultations with NGOs in drafting its Forest Policy and again two years later when the implementation of this policy was reviewed. Similarly, an informal Bank-NGO working group on disclosure has greatly helped the Bank identify ways of strengthening the implementation of the new disclosure policy.

(v) Selectivity in dialogue. The Bank cannot interact with every NGO. It needs to give little attention to NGOs which have neither large or influential followings nor important first-hand experience, but it must be prepared to talk with NGOs which are widely perceived (by politicians, journalists or publics) as being a credible commentator on development, however unwelcome are their messages and style. The Bank can, though, greatly influence who it has dialogue with and about what by taking a proactive approach. Actively reaching out to a range of operationally experienced NGOs and asking their guidance on diverse issues would not only provide valuable learning, but would also make the policy dialogue with NGOs more constructive and less dominated by NGOs whose primary mission is to attack the Bank. Careful briefing of key NGOs (perhaps with privileged information) and patient listening to them will help increase their influence within the broader NGO community.

(vi) Divisiveness between Bank members. The new emphasis on participation, public consultation and seeking constructive dialogue with NGOs and critics is not always compatible with confidentiality requirements, achieving specified development objectives with the requisite government ownership, and the maintenance of a close relationship with borrowing governments. The better access ANGOs have to Bank information and top managers, the more they call for, while borrowers see the Bank as more concerned about the views and interests of ANGOs (particularly in Washington) than their own. Often they resent ANGOs who they see as accountable to no-one (other than to their Boards or funders), yet who seek to impose on them the same sophisticated, expensive standards of governance which are required in Part I countries but which not all NGOs adhere to themselves, and which may not be compatible with their individual historical and cultural characteristics. Some Part I governments increasingly consult NGOs and rely on NGO information in formulating their opinions on Bank matters, which is resented by borrowing governments, who think the Bank and some of its members is giving too much attention to discussing policies and projects with NGOs.

PART V - A Framework for Mainstreaming

Through building on existing good practice, and through being better placed to respond to the key issues and opportunities described above, the Bank will be able to develop more fruitful collaboration with NGOs and achieve a more constructive dialogue on controversial policy issues, with only modest resource implications. The strategies set out below all have precedents within the Bank's work. All are based on innovations which have made important advances to Bank-NGO collaboration and dialogue. The mainstreaming approach described here consists of making today's best innovations tomorrow's usual practice.

NGOs are now important partners in many Bank activities, but they are also amongst the Bank's most powerful Bank critics, influencing the institution directly and via donors and the media. Innovative operational approaches often entail a level of collaboration with NGOs which would previously have been rare. And many recent changes in policies or projects involved responses to NGO initiatives or advocacy. Progress depends not so much on managing the Bank's bad press, but on becoming open and flexible enough to listen to well placed criticism and advice, and on incurring greater trust within the wider development community by demonstrating clear results on the ground.

Objectives of Improved Relations:

- (i) To improve the effectiveness of Bank-financed operations, particularly with regard to poverty alleviation, environmental sustainability and popular participation, by forging partnerships with NGOs with proven effectiveness and strong local knowledge.
- (ii) To foster a more enabling environment for NGOs to contribute to such development priorities within borrowing countries.
- (iii) To engage more actively with NGOs in dialogue on the development agenda.

The emphasis of the proposed strategy will be to build on best practice; to gradually move the locus of Bank-NGO interaction to developing countries; to deepen sector-specific interactions; and to address current constraints inhibiting fuller partnership and more constructive relations with NGOs.

1. Promoting Operational Collaboration and Dialogue

NGO involvement in projects is being reviewed more routinely at the IEPS and later stages. Where direct collaboration with NGOs in implementation is to be sought, PIDs should clearly identify such opportunities, the terms of engagement should be made clear, and governments should be fully included. The NGO Unit in OPR will work with OED and CDs to monitor and evaluate the costs and benefits of NGO collaboration, and will disseminate lessons of best practice.

The NGO Unit will also enhance Bank-NGO interactions through providing cross support for innovative or high-risk NGO collaboration; helping organize international and regional policy discussions and sectoral meetings; and helping CDs foster a more enabling environment for NGOs through studying and discussing with governments ways in which NGOs might make a richer contribution to national development.

Each Region and CVPU Departments which interact considerably with NGOs would also be asked to

identify one or more NGO point people who in addition to their normal duties would comprise a Bank-wide network (coordinated by the NGO Unit) for responding to NGO-related issues, evolving the Bank's NGO strategy, and disseminating relevant experience. This network will also exchange experience on NGO issues with counterparts in other official aid agencies.

Strengthening operational staff capacity is a key element of enhancing operational collaboration. Country Departments, especially TMs and Resident Missions, are at the front-line in this. There are three priorities. First, increased operational collaboration should concentrate on national NGOs, community based organizations and experienced local branches of international NGOs (see selection criteria above). Second, implementation of the Bank's disclosure policy must concentrate on providing information to people in developing countries. And third, more effort is needed to engage experienced developing country NGOs in discussion of policy issues.

Strengthening of local capacity in the field is therefore called for. Specifically, CDs should consider appointing local staff in major resident missions with NGO relations as a major (but not exclusive) item in their job descriptions. India was the first resident mission to appoint such a staff member; the Indonesia, Ethiopia, Argentina and other missions have followed suit. These staff would build up relations with and knowledge of key NGOs and CBOs, disseminate lessons of experience regarding collaboration within the Bank, ensure effective distribution to NGOs of Bank information relevant to the country, and arrange country-level Bank-NGO interactions, especially taking advantage of visits of senior Bank staff. The capacity of Regions to work with NGOs may need expanding in other ways, but this should be for each region to determine. The Africa Region has had a fulltime specialist lodged within the TD; other regions might prefer other approaches.

Capacity for collaboration needs to be strengthened elsewhere, besides in operations--including NGO capacity to work with the Bank. The Training Department, EDI, Resident Missions, the NGO Unit and other CVPU's can all contribute to this. For Bank staff--especially TMs--the priorities are: (a) appropriate training, particularly through NGO modules within broader training programs, (b) "how-to" manuals and other resources providing guidance on best practice, and (c) guidance in management of policy dialogue. For NGOs, the priorities are (a) national level workshops describing how the Bank works and the opportunities for Bank-NGO collaboration (as have been pioneered in Tanzania and Argentina), (b) training in Bank procedures, especially procurement and disbursement, to be provided at the outset of projects involving NGOs, (c) "how-to" manuals for such purposes, (d) ensuring that Project Implementation Units are equipped to help NGOs understand the processes involved.

2. Strengthening the Policy Environment for Effective NGOs

In recent years, the Bank has placed emphasis on encouraging "good governance" as central to strong and equitable development and sound public management. NGOs make (or in some countries could potentially make) an important contribution to this. They can: (i) contribute to public sector management; (ii) help governments strengthen accountability of public agencies; (iii) disseminate information to the public about legal rights, new development programs and public laws, and ensure that the information is widely understood; (iv) help ensure the equitable application of the rules of law; (v) facilitate public debate on proposed development initiatives and policy formulation (and hence broaden the consensus on eventual outcomes); (vi) provide supplements to public services in the form of alternative services; and (vii) help the public (especially its weaker members) influence the quality, volume and targeting of government services and benefits.

The contribution NGOs play in these activities varies enormously from country to country. The policy environment for NGOs is a critical determinant. As part of creating a more conducive environment for sound development, therefore, the Bank should aim to foster a healthy NGO-State relationship (see "Governance and Development," World Bank '92). Such a relationship would be one where: (a) there are no arbitrary obstacles to the forming of NGOs; (b) fiscal, registration and other regulations concerning NGOs are enabling, predictable and conducive to local philanthropy; (c) there is ready NGO and public access to information about development plans, and wide dissemination of such information (for example, regarding Environmental Assessments and Action Plans); (d) NGOs are protected by the rule of law; (e) NGOs play a role in helping governments enhance public accountability of state agencies (NGOs themselves should also be expected to be transparent and accountable); and (f) governments and donors work in partnership with and perhaps fund NGOs whose effectiveness is demonstrated, particularly in reaching the poor.

The Bank should approach its relationship with NGOs as an important facet of the way it approaches the broader issues of facilitating the development of the private sector, at times encouraging governments to be more responsive to NGO concerns and programs. The Bank, through its ESW and policy dialogue, can help governments more fully appreciate actual and potential NGO contributions to development efforts. Insights from studies of State-NGO relations can be used to advise borrowing governments on policy measures which could increase resources for and remove obstacles to greater NGO contributions, perhaps in the context of the Country Assistance Strategy. Where the State is over-extended, strengthening the contribution of NGOs can be an important ingredient of enhancing the role of the private sector. For example OPRPG and the Country Department worked with the government of Honduras to hold a major consultation with NGOs, chaired by the President of Honduras. This led to a new level of understanding and to important new instances of collaboration between the government and NGOs.

3. Outreach to NGOs

(a) Making a special effort in developing countries

Without reducing its responsiveness to dialogue with Part I NGOs, the Bank should make strenuous efforts to reach out to NGOs in developing countries (national, grassroots and local branches of international NGOs, particularly those with experience of working with the Bank) to discuss issues of development policy. Such dialogue is likely to be both more informative and less hostile. It is proposed to organize Bank-NGO meetings on a regional or sub-regional basis, especially in the context of the Bank-NGO Committee (as with the recent meeting with African NGOs in Addis Ababa about future IDA priorities, and the meeting in Peru on Bank priorities for LAC). Meeting topics germane to the region would be jointly agreed by NGOs and the Bank. A target of two such meetings a year should be set, rotating between the geographic regions. These meetings (involving OPR, the Regions and perhaps sometimes organized jointly with Regional Development Banks) would be tailored to the specificities of the country in question and would be for information exchange and policy dialogue. Prominent academics and other leaders of development thinking would be invited to participate as well as NGOs.

The Bank-NGO Committee needs overhauling in other ways. In the late 80s it was a useful forum for dialogue with NGOs on operational and policy matters. Now, however, the Bank has a high degree of interaction with NGOs elsewhere. The composition of the committee is unique, comprising a high calibre team of both NGO and Bank participants, but the debate and output of the committee at present does not reflect this calibre, and tends to duplicate discussions held elsewhere. The Bank should, subject to the

agreement of the NGO members, work to modify the functions of the committee, so that - in addition to dialogue on specific policy issues such as the IDA 11 replenishment--it helps guide the Bank's evolving NGO strategy. Rather than being the forum for debate on policy issues, it would help the Bank steer its relationship with NGOs (particularly in developing countries) by constructing the most appropriate fora for such debate, and by helping the Bank monitor and evaluate its experience with collaboration, dialogue and (perhaps) funding.

(b) Proactive dialogue with specialist NGOs

On topics of particular interest to a sizeable body of knowledgeable NGOs, the relevant CVP Departments should ensure active dialogue with influential and knowledgeable NGOs (whether critical of the Bank or not), perhaps through establishing sectoral NGO committees, as has been proposed by the Energy Department. Whilst many of the strongest critics would be included, this strategy would ensure that the Bank is listening to a broader range of NGO opinion--not just to the most vocal.

The present practice of holding consultations on upcoming policies and major new lending initiatives of particular interest to NGOs and others outside the Bank should be expanded and strengthened. These should be at draft policy or early project preparation stage, should be carefully followed up to inspire confidence in the process, and should (in the case of policies) ensure a geographic spread of participation. The value of these has been demonstrated by the consultations on forest and water policies. The purpose of such consultations is to improve the way the Bank does its business. Hence these consultations should be technically, not politically, driven. Good practice encourages TMs of policy papers to draw on expertise on the subject outside as well as inside the Bank. This expertise includes academics, specialists of other agencies and, frequently, specialist NGOs. It is good practice, to underline this, to involve NGOs and other specialists in the same meeting. The Industry and Energy Department now has regular meetings with advisory groups of NGOs on energy policy issues.

(c) Improved communications

Many NGOs, politicians, journalists and members of the public only know of the Bank through what they hear from Bank critics. To convince a broad range of well-meaning NGOs--and through them their supporting publics--that the Bank is serious about reducing poverty, protecting the environment and other development priorities, the Bank needs to tell its own story. This requires a communication strategy tailored to such an audience, explaining, for example, the need for economic policy reform. Most valuable to the Bank and most credible to NGO and other publics are testimonies to the effectiveness of Bank programs and rebuttals to critics' allegations which come from senior development specialists outside the Bank who have no personal axe to grind (such as NGO leaders, academics, development journalists, leading politicians etc). The Bank should both encourage and disseminate such "third party endorsements". For example, in responding to critics of adjustment the Bank usually quotes its own evidence of the efficacy of those programs. It would be more credible to quote the papers of USAID, SIDA, Killick and others which pour doubt on the claim that the poor are systematically hurt by adjustment.

In developing a more proactive communication strategy (with an NGO audience in mind), there is a need for producing excellent materials on the Bank's work in areas of special public interest (poverty reduction, environmental protection, participation, micro-enterprise development etc), on Bank policies in "difficult" areas such as adjustment and resettlement, and on how the Bank works. It also calls for more regular in-house seminars with NGO leaders and more conferences for NGOs on controversial

topics and issues of mutual concern.

4. Strengthened Management of Bank's Response to Criticisms and External Concerns

There is a need for a more collegial approach to determining the Bank's response to controversial issues (including problem projects). Though the most relevant department on the issue in question should retain the lead, other departments must be more fully involved and on-board with the agreed strategy since public controversy has significant implications for the Bank as a whole. This practice is already beginning to emerge. For example AGR, ENV, GEF, EXT, and OPR were all involved in evolving the Bank's position on the Bangladesh Flood Action Program and the Laos forestry project.

Regarding "problem projects," the objective should be to identify possible NGO concerns ahead of time, so that potential problems can be rectified at source and so that negative publicity can be avoided. It is usually possible to predict in advance which projects are likely to be particularly sensitive. It is good practice to discuss these at the earliest possible stage with responsible, knowledgeable NGOs, (as has been the case with the Ghazi Barotha dam in Pakistan). It may also be desirable to include an NGO consultant on identification and preparation missions (for which support from FIAHS may be possible).

In response to NGO attacks, is appropriate to be more robust than the Bank has been in the past, but this must be even handed. Where unsubstantiated or willfully exaggerated claims are made the Bank needs to be emphatic in countering these claims. However management must be equally robust in ensuring that, when serious charges are levelled by NGOs, these are not brushed aside but are fully investigated and responded to.

In the face of a major campaign, a response group should be established, chaired by the EXT Director, and comprising the region in question, OPR, DEC and other relevant CVPUs, to determine the Bank's strategy and follow up on implementation.

5. Financing an NGO Small Projects Window

All major bilateral and many multilateral agencies have NGO funding mechanisms. In the case of IDB the "Microprojects" facility channels some \$30 million per year to NGOs in LAC. Many proposals have been made over the years for Bank funding of NGOs. For many, it has become the acid test of the Bank's seriousness regarding NGOs. However, the fact remains that funding shortages are not always the limiting factor in the growth of good quality NGO programs (except where NGOs have a better track record for service delivery than government departments). Moreover, because the Bank is a centralized organization, focussed on policy issues and large projects, identifying good NGOs to fund is not necessarily the Bank's comparative advantage, neither would it find it easy to administer and evaluate a micro-grants program, unless perhaps there were wholesaling intermediaries.

It is however recommended that the Bank needs a new instrument in its arsenal for tackling poverty at grassroots level. An effective poverty reduction strategy must include carefully targeted measures addressing the specific needs of particularly vulnerable groups as well as economy-wide actions. Many such targeted measures are so specific to the population group or locality in question that they can best be addressed through grassroots initiatives based on sound local knowledge and community involvement. Whilst some such initiatives are possible through government programs (especially through programs which are highly decentralized or participatory in design) and would therefore be financed through regular loans and credit, it is often likely that NGOs and Community Based Organizations will be the initiators.

It is therefore desirable that the Bank should have instruments for supporting such activities where they are well designed, likely to make a significant poverty-reduction contribution and require additional funds.

It is therefore proposed that the Bank develop a small projects "window" for an experimental period to provide grants to NGOs and other intermediaries to enhance their contributions to poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. This should build on the multi-donor Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (a micro-finance program), which was agreed in March by the Board. The CGAPP framework restricts funding in the first instance to micro-finance schemes since these have the clearest track record in helping improve the incomes of the poor. OPR believes that the scheme should be rapidly broadened to encompass a wider variety of purposes. This broadening needs to be borne in mind when considering the structure and staffing of the secretariat responsible for the Fund's administration.

Since the Bank is not well equipped to chose between large numbers of small funding requests, a "wholesaling" approach is suggested in which grants are made to intermediaries (typically respected and larger national NGOs, credit unions and cooperatives). Those intermediaries would either maintain their own programs for poverty reduction or would channel funds to small NGOs and CBOs for this purpose. The models for this wholesaling function would be PHN's funding for population NGOs and IDB's small projects program. The Fund would also provide grants for strengthening NGO capacity and dissemination of experience. This would include funding for training NGOs in management and other key skills, seminars to facilitate strategic planning and improved coordination between NGOs and government agencies, and technical assistance to NGOs to assist them "scale-up" their activities. Grants would also be made to intermediaries to provide training to the ultimate beneficiaries.

CONCLUSIONS

We are confident that the five action areas described above not only provide a firm foundation for building an improved relationship with the NGO sector, including with many of the Bank's critics, but also would help the Bank better fulfill its development objectives.