


Measuring and Evaluating Determinants of Public Administration Productivity

Bureaucracy Lab

Development Impact Evaluation | Global Governance Practice

October 22-25, 2019, Brussels, Belgium



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
Measuring Productivity Innovatively... ...in Public Procurement

Michael Carlos Best
Columbia University

Bureaucracy Lab

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Public Procurement

- Large Stakes:
 - ~10-15% of GDP in OECD
 - Huge part of what government spends money on
 - Inefficiency is widespread, so potentially huge scope for savings
- Performance measurable(ish)
 - Main goals: Timely purchase, fair process, **price paid**
 - Prices can be used to measure performance for homogeneous goods...
 - ...if you can measure *exactly* what people are buying




Example 1: Big Data approach

- Best, Hjort & Szakonyi (2019) study Russian procurement. 16 million purchases over 6 years.
- *Text* of procurement contracts contains extremely detailed description of the item that has been purchased.
- Apply tools from natural language processing to train classification algorithm to create homogeneous groups of purchases.
- => within groups, purchases can be compared on their price (with suitable controls) to generate performance measures for 55K bureaucrats and 60K public agencies in Russian bureaucracy



Example 1: Big Data




- What happens when an agency changes the bureaucrat doing their procurement?
- Implies enormous scope for savings from improving performance: Moving bottom-25% performers to 75th %ile -> Total savings of 11% of expenditure

Example 2: Detailed Surveying Approach

- Bandiera, Best, Khan & Prat (2019) take a different approach: Gather detailed data of purchases of very homogeneous, off-the-shelf products.
- Use detailed data on 21,000 purchases to construct measures of item type to use as controls. -> Performance measure
- Conduct experiment with 600 offices in Punjab, Pakistan to test
 - Giving greater autonomy to procurement officers
 - Pay for performance scheme as benchmark



Example 2: Detailed Surveying Approach



- Autonomy treatment reduces prices by 8%
- Effects largest where monitoring agencies least efficient
- Intensive monitoring doesn't help if monitors are less effective than the implementing bureaucrats. Instead empower implementing bureaucrats and audit ex post.

Tradeoffs and Future Work

- Big Data approach requires massive data to work. Rely on external data (customs in Russian case) to train algorithms
- Intense surveying is costly, requires monumental effort to clean data without detailed ex ante knowledge of what government buys
- Neither approach:
 - Gap between what end user/citizens want and what offices end up buying
 - Private sector:
 - Direct comparison with private sector performance (Best, Naritomi Szerman 202?)
 - Effect of government's market power (ibid)
 - Government effectiveness and citizen faith in government

