Social Fragmentation, Electoral Competition and Public Goods Provision

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Motivation: Social Structure and Public Goods I

- A broad literature in political economy has studied how social structure influences economic and political outcomes.
- There is an emerging consensus that fragmentation along ethnic, linguistic, caste and religious lines leads to lower public goods provision and worse development outcomes.
- Common channels: heterogeneity in preferences and collective choice (common pool) problems.

Motivation: Social Structure and Public Goods II

- Conventional explanations focus on bottom-up processes in which communities are responsible for the choice and funding of public goods.
- However, in most developing countries, public goods are provided by elected politicians who rely on transfers from higher levels of government.
- How does social fragmentation shape the incentives of politicians to provide public goods as opposed to targeted or private transfers to some groups of the population?

Social Fragmentation and Political Competition

- An often overlooked channel through which social structure may shape politician incentives is political competition.
 - When members are concentrated in a relatively small number of groups, leaders of larger groups have high bargaining power and can demand private, targeted, excludable transfers in exchange for the electoral support of its members.
 - Social concentration increases the likelihood of elite capture which can potentially undermine politicians' incentives to provide public goods
- As society becomes more fragmented, the redistributive strategies adopted by politicians to attract voters may shift towards greater – rather than lower – public goods provision.

In this paper, we

- Study these questions in the Philippines where:
 - public goods provision is the responsibility of elected mayors whose budgets depend mostly on transfers from the central government
 - clans or extended families are the relevant political unit
- Graph full family networks for 15,000+ villages using community detection algorithms to identify clans
- Show how social fragmentation across clans correlates with political competition and public goods provision

Preview of Findings

- Public goods provision is higher in more fragmented villages.
- We argue that this is partly explained by an increase in electoral competition and and a more even distribution of political influence in fragmented villages:
 - Win margins are lower
 - A larger number of individuals run for public office
 - Voters mention a larger set of politically influential individuals in their community

Related Literature

- Elite Capture: Bardhan (2002); Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006); Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson (2014); Anderson, Francois and Kotwal (2015).
- Family and Kinship Ties: Padgett and Ansell (1993); Padgett and McLean (2006); Alesina and Giuliano (2013); Bertrand and Schoar (2006); Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009); Moscona, Nunn and Robinson (2017, 2018).
- Social Networks and Electoral Strategies: Auyero (2000); Calvo and Murillo (2009); Szwarcberg (2012); Cruz (2013); Larson and Lewis (2017); Cruz, Labonne and Querubin (2017).
- Ethnic Fragmentation and Favoritism: Easterly and Levine (1997); Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999); Miguel and Gugerty (2005); Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005); Burgess et al., (2015) and Munshi and Rosenzweig (2018).
- Political Competition and Public Goods Provision: Besley and Burgess (2002); Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010); Crost and Kambhampati (2010); Khemani (2015); and Rosenzweig (2015).

Background

Network Fragmentation

Results

Outline

1 Motivation

2 Background

- 3 Network Fragmentation
- 4 Data and Measures



Background

Network Fragmentation

Data and Measures

Results

Some things you should know about the Philippines...





Background

Network Fragmentation

Data and Measures

Results

Some things you should know about the Philippines...

- Weak parties
- Political networks matter



Background

Network Fragmentation

Results

Some things you should know about the Philippines...

- Weak parties
- Political networks matter
- Family is the basic unit of politics



Clans and Elections I

- Politicians competing in municipal and barangay elections must often seek the support of clans (extended families).
- Families are effective political units:
 - Reputation, loyalties, and alliances are transferable (Fegan, 2009).
 - Behavior regulated by ethics and norms of reciprocity such as utang na loob and hiya that are not limited to an individual-to-individual relationship but are rather seen as operative from family to family (Corpuz, 1965, Hollsteiner, 1963).

Clans and Elections II

- Politicians can often secure a large number of votes by brokering deals with the heads of clans who can commit to deliver the votes of all clan members in exchange for access to private transfers and services including:
 - Money
 - Jobs
 - Medical, educational and funeral expenses
 - Construction materials
 - Preferential access to government programs
 - Business and building permits.
- These private transfers often come at the expense of the provision of public goods that would benefit all village residents equally.

Electoral Strategies and Social Fragmentation I

- In villages in which the population is concentrated, clientelistic transactions between politicians and clan heads become more likely.
- Bargaining power of each individual clan head increases as they can deliver the votes of a relatively large number of village residents.
- Candidates also favor these strategies since the concentration of voters in a relatively small number of clans decrease the transaction and monitoring costs involved in the distribution of private transfers.


Background

Network Fragmentation

Data and Measures

Results

High Concentration



Clans/Extended Families

Electoral Strategies and Social Fragmentation II

- In highly fragmented villages the provision of targeted transfers becomes relatively less attractive as clan leaders control relatively small numbers of voters and enforcing several individual transactions becomes infeasible.
- Politicians may thus opt for adopting policies with more diffuse benefits and provide more public goods in order to attract the electoral support of a large number of voters.


Background

Network Fragmentation

Data and Measures

Results

Low Concentration



Clans/Extended Families



2 Background

3 Network Fragmentation

4 Data and Measures



Measuring Social Fragmentation I

- Empirical challenge: identifying the different clans or extended families in every village since boundaries are hard to define.
- A clan is a set of families:
 - Connected to each other by marriage
 - Where mutual norms of cooperation and reciprocity are enforced by all its members
- An enumeration of every clan in every village based on survey data is unfeasible so we propose to use network analysis to address this issue.

Measuring Social Fragmentation II

- Consider a social network in which a node is a family (identified with a unique family name) and edges between nodes imply that a marriage has occurred between members of these families.
- One intuitive approach would be to identify each different clan with the different components in the marriage network.
- This approach, while appealing, can be quite restrictive in practice since family networks in real life (and in our Filipino context, in particular) rarely feature neatly distinct components.


Background

Network Fragmentation

Data and Measures

Results

Clans as Components



Measuring Social Fragmentation III

- An alternative is the concept of *communities*.
- In a social network, communities are groups of nodes with dense connections internally (i.e. within the group) and sparser connections between groups (Jackson, 2010).
- We associate different clans with the different communities detected in the social networks.
- The community structure in a network is a latent feature that needs to be uncovered.


Background

Network Fragmentation

Data and Measures

Results

Clans as Communities



Girvan-Newman Algorithm I

- Girvan and Newman (2002) developed a powerful algorithm to detect communities.
- If two groups of nodes are only loosely connected with each other, removing links between those two groups will generate components in the restricted networks.
- Edges with high *betweenness* centrality are precisely the ones that we expect to connect communities.

Background

Network Fragmentation


Results

Edge Betweenness

Edge Betweenness

Extent to which the edge serves as a link between different groups.

Calculated using the number of shortest paths between nodes in the network that pass through that edge



Girvan-Newman Algorithm II

The Girvan-Newman algorithm proceeds as follows:

- **1** Calculate the betweenness for all edges in the network.
- 2 Remove the edge with the highest betweeness
- 3 Recalculate betweenness for all edges affected by the removal.
- 4 Repeat from step 2 until no edges remain
- **5** From resulting dendrogram, pick partition that maximizes network modularity.

For robustness we also implement the walktrap algorithm (Pons and Latapy 2005)

Community Fragmentation

The algorithm delivers a partition of C communities (indexed by c = 1, ..., C), each containing a share s_c of nodes.

Once we've identified communities we compute social fragmentation with a standard Herfindahl-Hirschman index:

$$SF = 1 - \sum_{c=1}^{C} s_c^2 \tag{1}$$



2 Background

3 Network Fragmentation

4 Data and Measures



Our data

- Survey data for 20 million individuals (700+ municipalities, 15,000+ villages)
 - Demographic information
 - Full names: important because of naming conventions
- Census data (2010) on public goods available in every village, as well as shares of different ethnic and religious groups.
- Detailed household survey data for 2013 (n = 3,408) and 2016 (n = 3,476) in two provinces: influential individuals, public goods preferences, collective action
- Precinct-level results for the 2010 municipal elections and 2010 and 2013 village elections

Family Names Data

Three convenient features of Philippine naming conventions:

- 1 names are difficult to change
- 2 each individual carries two family names

firstname midname lastname

- firstname: given first name
- midname: mother's maiden name (father for married women)
- lastname: father's surname (husband for married women)
- 3 within a municipality, a shared family name implies family connections

Tracing Relatives Using Family Names

- In 1849 Governor Narciso Claveria y Zaldua became frustrated with the arbitrary naming conventions in the Philippines and the difficulties for administrative purposes (especially tax collection)
- Created a catalog with a list of 61,000 official Spanish surnames and ordered local officials to assign different surnames to each family within municipalities
- As a result a shared last name is a strong indicator of a family tie, even for relatively common last names



- Each node is a **family**
- Ties are intermarriages with other families, and established whenever we observe a marriage between two families

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


NoyNoy Cojuangco Aquino

- Each node is a family
- Ties are intermarriages with other families, and established whenever we observe a marriage between two families




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Each node is a family

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


Motivation

Background

Network Fragmentation


GOT: An Example I



Motivation

Background

GOT: An Example II





2 Background

3 Network Fragmentation

4 Data and Measures



Empirical Strategy

Our analysis is based on cross-sectional regressions of the form:

$$y_{\textit{vm}} = \alpha + \beta SF_{\textit{vm}} + \gamma X_{\textit{vm}} + \delta_{\textit{m}} + \epsilon_{\textit{vm}}$$

 y_{vm} is the outcome variable in village v in municipality m (public goods provision and political competition)

 SF_{vm} is our measure of social (family) fragmentation

 δ_m is a full set of municipality fixed-effects (important given mayor's decision)

Results: Public Goods

Fragmentation is **positively** correlated with public goods provision, even when controlling for a wide range of village characteristics:

- Age
- Length of stay in the village
- Gender ratio
- Population
- Number of distinct families
- Rural dummy
- Population in each of 17 educational and 11 occupational categories
- Per capita income
- Poverty incidence

Community Fragmentation and Public Goods

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Elem. School	High School	Market	Health Centre
Panel A: No Con	trols			
Fragmentation	0.01**	0.08***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	15,449	15,449	15,449	15,449
R-squared	0.001	0.027	0.020	0.014
Mean Dep. Var.	0.806	0.209	0.190	0.639
Panel B: Full Cor	ntrols			
Fragmentation	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***
-	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Observations	15,432	15,432	15,432	15,432
R-squared	0.075	0.172	0.139	0.049
Mean Dep. Var.	0.806	0.209	0.190	0.639

Reverse Causality: Restricted Network

- Public goods provision may also influence network structure
- Results are similar when we construct village networks based on individuals 45 or older, or use this as instrument for the whole network

Community Fragmentation and Public Goods: Over 45

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Elem. School	High School	Market	Health Centre
Panel A: OLS				
Fragmentation (over 45)	0.01**	0.08***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	15,449	15,449	15,449	15,449
R-squared	0.001	0.027	0.020	0.014
Mean Dep. Var.	0.806	0.209	0.190	0.639
Panel B: IV				
Fragmentation	0.06***	0.04***	0.03***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	15,428	15,428	15,428	15,428
Mean Dep. Var.	0.806	0.209	0.190	0.641

Robustness Tests

Our estimates are robust to:

- Weighting edges by family size or using alternative community detection algorithms • Weighted
- Dropping outliers: villages with network fragmentation in the bottom 1, 5 and 10% Cutliers
- Dropping villages in ARMM
- Controlling for characteristics of the incumbent and challengers' families in the village
 Cand. Chars
- Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation

Ruling Out Traditional Channels

- Our results contrast with previous findings that show a negative correlation between ethnic and religious fragmentation and public goods provision.
- A key difference in our setting is that politicians and not communities are responsible for providing public goods.
- Moreover, fragmentation across clans (as opposed to across ethnic or religious groups) may not have the same implications for preference heterogeneity and collective action documented by previous studies.

Motivation

Results: Preference Heterogeneity and Collective Action

- Social fragmentation is not robustly associated with more or less heterogeneous preferences over public goods
- No major differences in collective action (social capital) either

Heterogeneity in Public Goods Preferences

Dependent variable is standard deviation of % of budget that respondents would allocate to:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Health	Education	Emergencies	Water	Road	ComFaci	EconProg	Agriculture	Peace	Festivals
Panel A: No Cont	trols									
Fragmentation	-0.05	-0.29	-0.21	-0.50**	-0.00	0.15*	0.19	-0.33	-0.14	-0.04
	(0.53)	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.07)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Observations	283	283	283	283	283	283	283	283	283	283
R-squared	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.020	0.000	0.005	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.000
Mean Dep. Var.	11.19	11.19	8.285	7.425	6.836	5.526	7.798	15.14	5.855	4.064
Panel B: Full Cor	ntrols									
Fragmentation	0.05	-0.20	-0.09	-0.51**	-0.03	0.12	0.28	-0.29	-0.12	-0.03
	(0.51)	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.07)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Observations	283	283	283	283	283	283	283	283	283	283
R-squared	0.082	0.066	0.118	0.057	0.023	0.043	0.065	0.071	0.049	0.011
Mean Dep. Var.	11.19	11.19	8.285	7.425	6.836	5.526	7.798	15.14	5.855	4.064

Collective Action

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
	Baya	nihan	Group		
Fragmentation	0.09*	0.08	-0.05	-0.05	
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Observations	283	283	283	283	
R-squared	0.008	0.092	0.002	0.128	
Mean Dep. Var.	0.751	0.751	0.658	0.658	

Political Competition and Concentration of Political Influence

- Social fragmentation across clans may trigger greater political competition and shift politicians towards the provision of public (as opposed to private) goods.
- We explore the correlation between social fragmentation and standard measures of political competition.
- Social fragmentation undermines the ability of a handful of clan leaders to exercise disproportionate influence on the political choices of village residents.
- We also consider a non-electoral measure of political competition defined as the number of politically influential individuals mentioned by village respondents in our 2013 survey.

Results

Results: Concentration of Political Influence

- More fragmented villages exhibit a higher number of individuals running in village elections
- Village and municipal elections are also more competitive in more fragmented villages
- Survey evidence confirms leadership less concentrated in more fragmented villages

Robustness Checks

Background

Results

Number of Candidates and Political Competition in Village Elections I

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
	# Can	didates Bg	y. Cpt.	Win	# Candidates	
	Raw	Laakso	Golosov	Margin	Bgy. Councilors	
Panel A: No Controls						
Fragmentation	0.06***	0.04***	0.03***	-1.73***	0.72***	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.28)	(0.09)	
Observations	31,344	30,985	31,344	30,593	31,344	
R-squared	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.012	
Mean Dep. Var.	2.175	1.875	1.667	36.89	16.84	
Panel B: Full Cor	ntrols					
Fragmentation	0.05***	0.04***	0.03***	-1.68***	0.59***	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.32)	(80.0)	
Observations	31,306	30,947	31,306	30,555	31,306	
R-squared	0.012	0.009	0.008	0.007	0.054	
Mean Dep. Var.	2.175	1.875	1.667	36.89	16.84	

Political Competition in Municipal Elections

(1)	(2)	
	(4)	
Win Margin		
-1.94***	-0.63*	
(0.35)	(0.33)	
No	Yes	
17,023	17,021	
0.006	0.021	
33.60	33.60	
	-1.94*** (0.35) No 17,023 0.006	

Survey Evidence: Number of Influential Individuals

	(1)	(2)	(3)		
	# Influential Individuals				
	Raw	Laakso	Golosov		
Panel A: No Controls					
Fragmentation	0.74***	0.47**	0.45**		
	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.15)		
Observations	269	269	269		
R-squared	0.017	0.014	0.014		
Mean Dep. Var.	9.137	5.900	5.157		
Panel B: Full Cor	ntrols				
Fragmentation	0.80**	0.54***	0.53***		
	(0.27)	(0.16)	(0.14)		
Observations	269	269	269		
R-squared	0.054	0.073	0.075		
Mean Dep. Var.	9.137	5.900	5.157		

Conclusion

- Our correlations should be interpreted cautiously biases from unobserved village characteristics are a concern.
- We do not question the relevance of previous work on ethnic and religious heterogeneity and public goods provision: rather, we highlight ways that social fragmentation may have different economic and political consequences, depending on the institutional context.
- Clans and norms of reciprocity are important in many other societies (see, for example, Finan and Schechter, 2012 and Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson, 2014).
- Important to understand how a community's social structure shapes elite capture, electoral competition and the incentives of politicians to provide public goods.

Motivation

Family Names Example

name	nickname	province	municipality	office
FABELLON, ALBERTO FANER	ALBERT	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FABELLON, PERSHING FABROA	PERSHING	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FABIALA, ISMAEL FESALBON	MAING	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FABRERO, BERNADETH FETALCO	NADETTE	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FADRI, ISMAEL FADALLAN	MAENG	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FAIGAO, ABNER FADRI	DUTCHIE	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FAINSAN, ROLO FONTANOSA	ROLLY	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FAJILAN, CHERRY FETALVERO	CHERRY	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FAMILARA, RICARDO FERRANCO	BARON	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FEDELIN, CHRISTOPHER FEGAL	IPE	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FEGALAN, LOI JORGE FEGALQUIN	LOI	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FETALCORIN, FELICITO FORTU	FLECIT	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FETIZANAN, CRESENCIANO FESALBON	CANONG	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FIECAS, JIMMY FONTE	JIM	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FIECAS, LEONARDO FADERON	NARDING	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FIETAS, AGUINALDO FADERAN	GUINAL	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FLORES, PATRICIO FABROA	PAT	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FONTE, BEMBOY MAGSINO	EMBOY	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR
FRUELDA, PERLA FABICON	PING	ROMBLON	BANTON	COUNCILOR

Robustness: Weighting Edges and Using Walktrap Algorithm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)				
	Elem. School	High School	Market	Health Centre				
Panel A: Edge removal, weighted by family size								
Fragmentation	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***				
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)				
Observations	15,432	15,432	15,432	15,432				
R-squared	0.076	0.172	0.139	0.049				
Panel B: Walkt	rap algorithm							
Fragmentation	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.04***				
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)				
Observations	15,432	15,432	15,432	15,432				
R-squared	0.077	0.172	0.139	0.051				

Robustness: Dropping Outliers and ARMM

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elem. School	High School	Market	Health Centre
	cent		
0.03***	0.04***	0.03***	0.06***
(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
15,287	15,287	15,287	15,287
0.076	0.174	0.140	0.050
	cent		
0.03***	0.06***	0.04***	0.07***
(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
14,669	14,669	14,669	14,669
0.077	0.176	0.141	0.047
e bottom 10 pe	rcent		
0.02**	0.07***	0.05***	0.08***
(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
13,897	13,897	13,897	13,897
0.080	0.174	0.143	0.045
e ARMM			
0.04***	0.03***	0.02***	0.05***
(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
13,147	13,147	13,147	13,147
0.095	0.180	0.148	0.053
	Elem. School e bottom 1 per 0.03*** (0.01) 15,287 0.076 e bottom 5 per 0.03*** (0.01) 14,669 0.077 e bottom 10 pe 0.02** (0.01) 13,897 0.080 re ARMM 0.04*** (0.01) 13,147	Elem. School High School e bottom 1 percent 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03 0.076 0.174 e bottom 5 percent 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.03** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.03** 0.06*** 0.01 14,669 14,669 0.07* e bottom 10 percent 0.02*** 0.07*** 0.031 (0.01) (0.01) 13,897 13,897 0.3897 0.080 0.174 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** (0.01) 13,897 13,897 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** (0.01) 13,147 13,147 13,147	Elem. School High School Market e bottom 1 percent 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.076 0.174 0.140 e bottom 5 percent 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) e bottom 5 percent 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) 14,669 14,669 14,669 0.07 0.176 0.141 e bottom 10 percent 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.020 0.077 0.174 0.143 0.020 0.174 0.143 13,897 0.890 0.174 0.143 143 e ARMM 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 (0.01) (0.00) 13,147 13,147

Robustness: Controlling for Candidate Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Elem. School	High School	Market	Health Centre
Panel A: Control	lling for Incumb	ent Characteri	stics	
Fragmentation	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	9,697	9,697	9,697	9,697
R-squared	0.078	0.179	0.149	0.054
Panel B: Control	ling for Incumb	ent and Challe	nger Chara	octeristics
Fragmentation	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	8,739	8,739	8,739	8,739
R-squared	0.091	0.184	0.153	0.061
Panel C: Control	ling for Ethnic	and Religious I	ragmentat	tion
Fragmentation	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Observations	15,432	15,432	15,432	15,432
R-squared	0.076	0.175	0.139	0.050

Robustness: Weighting Edges and Using Walktrap Algorithm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
	∉ Can	# Candidates Bgy. Cpt.		Ŵin	# Candidates	
	Raw	Laakso	Golosov	Margin	Bgy. Councilors	
Panel A: Edge removal, weighted by family size						
Fragmentation (over 45)	0.04***	0.03***	0.03***	-1.38***	0.51***	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.31)	(0.07)	
Observations	31,306	30,947	31,306	30,555	31,306	
R-squared	0.012	0.009	0.008	0.007	0.052	
Panel B: Walktrap algorit	hm					
Fragmentation	0.04***	0.03***	0.02***	-1.46***	0.53***	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.32)	(0.06)	
Observations	31,306	30,947	31,306	30,555	31,306	
R-squared	0.011	0.009	0.008	0.007	0.054	



Robustness: Dropping Outliers and ARMM

$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$									
$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c } \hline Raw & Laakso & Golosov & Margin & Bgy. Councilors \\ \hline Panel A: Remove bottom 1 percent \\ \hline Fragmentation & 0.07^{***} & 0.05^{***} & 0.04^{***} & 2.08^{***} & (0.01) \\ \hline (0.01) & (0.01) & (0.01) & (0.45) & 0.84^{****} & (0.10) \\ \hline Observations & 31,011 & 30,661 & 31,011 & 30,280 & 31,011 \\ \hline R-squared & 0.012 & 0.009 & 0.008 & 0.007 & 0.054 \\ \hline Panel B: Remove bottom 5 percent \\ \hline Fragmentation & 0.09^{***} & 0.05^{***} & 0.55^{***} & 1.95^{***} & 1.03^{***} & (0.20) & (0.01) & (0.56) & (0.13) \\ \hline Observations & 29,760 & 29,436 & 29,760 & 29,079 & 29,760 \\ \hline R-squared & 0.012 & 0.009 & 0.008 & 0.007 & 0.055 \\ \hline Panel C: Remove bottom 10 percent \\ & 0.10^{**} & 0.06^{***} & 0.55^{***} & 1.42^{**} & 1.15^{***} & (0.25^{***} & 0.07^{***} & 0.05^{***} & 0.07^{***} & 0.05^{***} & 0.07^{***} & 0.07^{***} \\ \hline Observations & 28,193 & 27,904 & 28,193 & 27,561 & 28,193 \\ \hline R-squared & 0.011 & 0.008 & 0.008 & 0.007 & 0.055 \\ \hline Panel D: Remove ARMM \\ \hline Fragmentation & 0.05^{***} & 0.05^{***} & -2.28^{***} & 0.72^{***} \\ \hline \end{tabular}$		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
Panel A: Remove botton 1 percent Fragmentation 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.08*** 0.84*** Go.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.45) (0.10) Observations 31.011 30.661 31.011 30.280 31.011 R-squared 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.054 Panel B: Remove bottom 5 percent Fragmentation 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -1.95*** 1.03*** Gbservations 29,760 29,436 29,760 29,079 29,760 R-squared 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel C: Remove bottom 10 percent 0.012 0.009 0.08 0.007 0.055 Panel C: Remove bottom 10 percent 0.01** 0.06*** 0.05*** -1.42** 1.15*** (0.02) (0.01) (0.61) (0.68) (0.15) 0.05* Observations 28,193 27,904 28,193 27,561 28,193 R-squared 0.011 0.008 </td <td></td> <td colspan="3"># Candidates Bgy. Cpt.</td> <td>Win</td> <td># Candidates</td>		# Candidates Bgy. Cpt.			Win	# Candidates			
Fragmentation 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.08*** 0.84*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.45) (0.10) Observations 31,011 30,661 31,011 30,280 31,011 R-squared 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.054 Panel B: Remove bottoms 5 percent 0.05*** -1.95*** 1.03*** (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.56) (0.13) Observations 29,760 29,436 29,070 29,0760 R-squared 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel C: Remove bottom 10 percent 0.05*** -1.42** 1.15*** (0.02) (0.01) (0.68) (0.15) 0.055 Observations 28,193 27,904 28,193 27,561 28,193 R-squared 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.28*** 0.72****		Raw	Laakso	Golosov	Margin	Bgy. Councilors			
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Panel A: Remove bottom 1 percent								
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Fragmentation	0.07***	0.05***	0.04***	-2.08***	0.84***			
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.45)	(0.10)			
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $									
Panel B: Remove bottom 5 percent Fragmentation 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -1.95*** 1.03*** Observations 29,760 29,436 29,760 29,079 29,760 R-squared 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel C: Remove bottom 10 percent 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -1.42** 1.15*** Observations 28,193 27,904 28,193 27,561 28,193 R-squared 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM 0.05*** -0.4*** 0.72***	Observations	31,011	30,661	31,011	30,280	- /-			
Fragmentation 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -1.95*** 1.03*** Observations 29,760 29,436 29,760 29,079 29,760 R-squared 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel C: Remove bottom 10 percent 0.011 (0.01) (0.68) (0.15) Observations 28,193 27,904 28,193 27,561 28,193 Observations 28,193 27,904 28,193 27,561 28,193 R-squared 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.028*** 0.72***	R-squared	0.012	0.009	0.008	0.007	0.054			
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.56) (0.13) Observations 29,760 29,436 29,760 29,079 29,760 R-squared 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel C: Remove bottom 10 percent 0.012* 0.001 (0.01)* (0.68) (0.15) Observations 28,193 0.011 (0.01)* (0.68) (0.15) Observations 28,193 27,904 28,193 27,561 28,193 R-squared 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.28*** 0.72***									
Observations R-squared 29,760 0.012 29,436 0.009 29,760 0.008 29,760 0.007 29,760 0.055 Panel C: Remove bottom 10 percent 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 1.42** 1.15*** (0.02) Observations R-squared 28,193 0.011 27,904 0.008 28,193 0.008 27,561 0.005 28,193 0.055 Panel D: Remove Fragmentation 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** -2.28*** 0.72***	Fragmentation	0.09***	0.06***	0.05***	-1.95***	1.03***			
R-squared 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel C: Remove bottom 10 percent (0.02) 0.06*** 0.05*** -1.42** 1.15*** Observations 28,193 27,904 28,193 27,561 28,193 R-squared 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM Fragmentation 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.28*** 0.72***		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.56)	(0.13)			
R-squared 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel C: Remove bottom 10 percent (0.02) 0.06*** 0.05*** -1.42** 1.15*** Observations 28,193 27,904 28,193 27,561 28,193 R-squared 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM Fragmentation 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.28*** 0.72***									
Panel C: Remove bottom 10 percent 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -1.42** 1.15*** 0.02 (0.01) (0.01) (0.68) (0.15) Observations 28,193 27,904 28,193 27,561 28,193 R-squared 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM Fragmentation 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.28*** 0.72***	Observations	29,760	29,436	29,760	29,079	29,760			
0.10*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -1.42** 1.15*** (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.68) (0.15) Observations 28,193 27,904 28,193 27,561 28,193 R-squared 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.055 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM - - - - 0.22*** 0.72***					0.007	0.055			
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.68) (0.15) Observations 28,193 27,904 28,193 27,561 28,193 R-squared 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM Fragmentation 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.28*** 0.72***									
Observations 27,904 28,193 27,561 28,193 R-squared 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM Fragmentation 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.28*** 0.72***		0.10***	0.06***	0.05***	-1.42**	1.15***			
R-squared 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM Fragmentation 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.28*** 0.72***		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.68)	(0.15)			
R-squared 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.055 Panel D: Remove ARMM Fragmentation 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.28*** 0.72***									
Panel D: Remove ARMM Fragmentation 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.28*** 0.72***	Observations	28,193	27,904	28,193	27,561	28,193			
Fragmentation 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -2.28*** 0.72***	R-squared	0.011	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.055			
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.36) (0.07)	Fragmentation	0.06***	0.05***	0.04***	-2.28***	0.72***			
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.36)	(0.07)			
Observations 27,267 27,185 27,267 26,864 27,267	Observations	27,267	27,185	27,267	26,864	27,267			
R-squared 0.019 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.071	R-squared	0.019	0.012	0.011	0.009	0.071			



Results

Robustness: Controlling for Candidate Characteristics

$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$									
Raw Laakso Golosov Margin Bgy. Councilors Panel A: Controlling for Incumbent Characteristics 5 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -2.11*** 0.51*** Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -2.11*** 0.51*** Observations 19,703 19,440 19,703 19,197 19,703 R-squared 0.025 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.077 Panel B: Controlling for Incumbent and Challenger Characteristics Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -1.99*** 0.50*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.40) (0.09) Observations 17,777 17,543 17,777 17,330 17,777 R-squared 0.032 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.084 Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** <td></td> <td>(1)</td> <td>(2)</td> <td>(3)</td> <td>(4)</td> <td>(5)</td>		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
Panel A: Controlling for Incumbent Characteristics Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -2.11*** 0.51*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) 0.09) Observations 19,703 19,440 19,703 19,197 19,703 R-squared 0.025 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.077 Panel B: Controlling for Incumbent and Challenger Characteristics Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -1.99*** 0.50**** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.40) (0.09) Observations 17,777 17,543 17,777 17,330 17,777 R-squared 0.032 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.084 Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.08) -1.75*** 0.53***		# Candidates Bgy. Cpt.			Win	# Candidates			
Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -2.11*** 0.51*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.39) (0.09) Observations 19,703 19,440 19,703 19,197 19,703 R-squared 0.025 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.077 Panel B: Controlling for Incumbent and Challenger Characteristics Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -1.99*** 0.50*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.40) (0.09) Observations 17,777 17,543 17,777 17,330 17,777 R-squared 0.032 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.084 Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.08) 0.08)		Raw	Laakso	Golosov	Margin	Bgy. Councilors			
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.39) (0.09) Observations 19,703 19,440 19,703 19,197 19,703 R-squared 0.025 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.077 Panel B: Controlling for Incumbent and Challenger Characteristics Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -1.99*** 0.50*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.40) (0.09) Observations 17,777 17,543 17,777 17,330 17,777 R-squared 0.032 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.084 Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.08) 0.08)	Panel A: Controlling for Incumbent Characteristics								
Observations 19,703 19,440 19,703 19,197 19,703 R-squared 0.025 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.077 Panel B: Controlling for Incumbent and Challenger Characteristics Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -1.99*** 0.50*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) Observations 17,777 17,543 17,777 17,330 17,777 R-squared 0.032 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.084 Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.08)	Fragmentation	0.05***	0.04***	0.03***	-2.11***	0.51***			
R-squared 0.025 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.077 Panel B: Controlling for Incumbent and Challenger Characteristics Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -1.99*** 0.50*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) Observations 17,777 17,543 17,777 17,330 17,777 R-squared 0.032 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.084 Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.08)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.39)	(0.09)			
R-squared 0.025 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.077 Panel B: Controlling for Incumbent and Challenger Characteristics Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -1.99*** 0.50*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) Observations 17,777 17,543 17,777 17,330 17,777 R-squared 0.032 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.084 Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.08)									
Description Display information Display informatinformation <thdisplay informatinformatio<="" td=""><td>Observations</td><td>19,703</td><td>19,440</td><td>19,703</td><td>19,197</td><td>19,703</td></thdisplay>	Observations	19,703	19,440	19,703	19,197	19,703			
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	R-squared	0.025	0.018	0.016	0.015	0.077			
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) Observations 17,777 17,543 17,777 17,330 17,777 R-squared 0.032 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.084 Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.08)	Panel B: Controlling for Incumbent and Challenger Characteristics								
Observations 17,777 17,543 17,777 17,330 17,777 R-squared 0.032 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.084 Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.08)	Fragmentation	0.05***	0.04***	0.03***	-1.99***	0.50***			
R-squared 0.032 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.084 Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** Fragmentation 0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.08)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.40)	(0.09)			
R-squared 0.032 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.084 Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** Fragmentation 0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.08)									
Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation Fragmentation 0.05*** 0.03*** -1.75*** 0.53*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.08)	Observations	17,777	17,543	17,777	17,330	17,777			
Fragmentation0.05***0.03***0.03***-1.75***0.53***(0.01)(0.01)(0.00)(0.32)(0.08)	R-squared	0.032	0.025	0.022	0.023	0.084			
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.08)	Panel C: Controlling for Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation								
	Fragmentation	0.05***	0.03***	0.03***	-1.75***	0.53***			
Observations 31,306 30,947 31,306 30,553 31,306		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.32)	(0.08)			
Observations 31,306 30,947 31,306 30,553 31,306									
	Observations	31,306	30,947	31,306	30,553	31,306			
R-squared 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.062	R-squared	0.014	0.011	0.009	0.008	0.062			

