SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is projected to slow to 3.7 percent this year, reflecting forecast downgrades in over 60 percent of regional economies. Price pressures, partly induced by the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, are sharply reducing food affordability and real incomes across the region. At just above 1 percent, per capita income growth in SSA is projected to remain much lower than in other EMDEs. More people in SSA are expected to fall into extreme poverty, especially in countries reliant on imports of foods and fuel. Fiscal space is narrowing further as governments ramp up spending on subsidies, support to farmers, and, in some countries, security. However, the impact of the war will vary across countries, as elevated commodity prices will help soften the damaging effects of high inflation in some large commodity exporters. Among the risks to the forecast, prolonged disruptions to the food supply across the region could significantly increase poverty, hunger, and malnutrition, while persistent inflation could ignite stagflation risks and further limit policy space to support recoveries. An elevated cost of living could increase the risk of social unrest, especially in low-income countries.

Recent developments

Limited direct trade and financial linkages with Europe and Central Asia have helped contain some of the adverse effects of the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine on Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). However, the deceleration of global growth and war-induced increases in food and fuel prices are creating headwinds for the region. Although some large exporters of metals and energy are benefiting from elevated commodity prices, surging prices of staple foods and farming inputs are stoking inflation across the region and sharply reducing food affordability (WFP 2022).

Food insecurity is worsening in SSA, especially in countries dependent on food imports and where the poor account for a large share of net food buying households (Simler 2010; Wodon and Zaman 2008). On average, food imports account for 20 percent of total imports in SSA countries—almost twice as high as in other emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs; figure 2.6.1.A). Almost three-quarters of SSA economies were already classified as food-deficit countries before the current food price surge (FAO 2021).

SSA is facing these shocks as it continues to endure pandemic-induced increases in poverty and food insecurity (figure 2.6.1.B). Even before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, prices were already accelerating rapidly in many SSA countries amid large currency depreciations, conflict, and adverse weather. A recent surge in global food prices has pushed food price inflation in SSA even higher, with annual food inflation exceeding 20 percent in some countries (figure 2.6.1.C). With SSA households spending a disproportionately large share of their incomes on food, the sharp rise in food prices has eroded domestic demand and weakened recoveries in nonresource sectors (FAO et al. 2021; OECD/FAO 2020, 2021; Wodon et al. 2008; World Bank 2022k). Even in SSA commodity exporters, increased living costs and shortages of food and fuel have begun weighing on activity (figure 2.6.1.D).

In the three largest SSA economies—Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa—the boost from favorable commodity prices is being offset by rising inflation and policy tightening. Elevated oil prices are supporting activity in Angola and Nigeria—the two biggest oil producing economies in the region. Growth in Nigeria strengthened in the first half of the year, driven by increased oil revenues and a strong recovery in non-oil sectors,

Note: This section was prepared by Sergiy Kasyanenko.

FIGURE 2.6.1. SSA: Recent developments

The surge in global food prices resulting from the Russia's invasion of Ukraine is weighing on recoveries across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), especially in countries heavily reliant on food imports. Surging living costs are tempering the boost to recoveries from high prices of metals and energy.



Sources: Comtrade (database); Haver Analytics; World Bank.

Note: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; FCS = fragile and conflict-affected situations; LICs = low-income countries; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.

A. Based on a sample of 52 EMDEs, including 32 SSA countries. Last observation 2021 or earliest available year. Vertical lines indicate the min-max range for imports of food in total imports.

B. Extreme poverty is measured as the number of people living on less than $1.90 per day. 2022 extreme poverty projections are based on growth forecasts from April 2022 Macro and Poverty Outlooks. Bars indicate medians; vertical lines indicate the 25-75 percentile range.

C. Unweighted average for the sample of 17 SSA EMDEs.

D. A value above 50 indicates expansion. Composite PMI covers manufacturing and services. Sample includes Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia. Last observation is April 2022.

despite the drag from recurring fuel shortages and power blackouts. High and persistent inflation, however, is starting to weigh on consumer purchasing power, especially of poor and vulnerable households. In Angola, stabilizing oil production and strong activity in agriculture are helping to put the economy on a track of recovery, though persistent inflationary pressures are restraining growth. In South Africa, growth has moderated substantially because of the growth-dampening effects of high unemployment; infrastructure bottlenecks, including recurring power shortages; slow progress with reforms; and weak private investment. Infrastructure damage to the country's main port following severe floods has exacerbated supply chain disruptions related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and mobility restrictions in China in response to pandemic outbreaks. Although the fiscal position has improved somewhat, high public debt constrains public spending, particularly investment.

Elsewhere in the region, tourism-reliant economies (Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Tanzania, Seychelles) are benefiting from returning international visitors, though war-related disruptions to global travel are holding back the pace of recovery. In some countries, elevated levels of violence and insecurity continue to dampen recoveries (Burkina Faso, Eswatini, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Sudan), even though violence has abated somewhat in others (Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia).

Fiscal policy, already constrained by high public debt and tightening global financial conditions, have become even less accommodative. Spending pressures to curb the impact of rising prices have been building in many countries (for example, fuel subsidies in Cameroon, Kenya, and Nigeria; a fuel levy reduction in South Africa), further straining fiscal positions. Sovereign credit spreads have already widened and currencies weakened in countries perceived to be at high risk of debt distress (Ghana). The tightening of monetary policy to combat rising inflation has also gathered pace in several SSA economies (Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa). Moreover, rising core inflation in several countries (Cameroon, Nigeria, Uganda) points to broadening price pressures, further reducing room for accommodative policies.

Outlook

Growth in SSA is projected to decelerate from 4.2 percent in 2021 to 3.7 percent in 2022, as high inflation and policy tightening weaken domestic demand. The growth deceleration in major trading partners is compounding these headwinds. Growth is projected to firm slightly to an average of 3.9 percent in 2023-24, assuming further progress with pandemic containment, favorable terms of trade in commodity exporters, and a gradual easing of global food price pressures.

Although forecasts for both 2022 and 2023 have been unchanged—mainly on account of upward revisions for Nigeria—regional growth excluding the three largest economies (Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa) has been revised down by 0.4 percentage points this year. This reflects slower-than-expected growth in 30 countries, or over 60 percent of SSA economies, which together account for more than one-quarter of the regional GDP (figure 2.6.2.A). Similarly for 2023, excluding the three largest economies, SSA growth has been revised down by 0.4 percent since January.

High inflation is anticipated to depress real incomes and domestic demand across the region. The accompanying increase in poverty is especially concerning in countries where many people are already at high risk of falling into food insecurity (Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone). Slowing reform momentum, elevated levels of violence and insecurity, and policy uncertainty are envisioned to continue to deter private investment in many countries. Lingering pandemic uncertainties are expected to continue to weigh on growth in nonresource sectors, especially in countries with low vaccination rates. Vaccination rates in SSA are anticipated to continue lagging other EMDEs, complicating pandemic management (Agarwal et al. 2022).

The growth slowdown could also intensify pandemic-induced losses in per capita incomes. In about 45 percent of the region's economies and a half of its fragile and conflict-affected countries, per capita incomes are forecast to remain below pre-pandemic levels in 2023. Only about 40 percent of SSA economies and 39 percent of the region's fragile and conflict-affected countries were expected to be in this position in January. SSA as a whole is now expected to remain the only EMDE region where per capita incomes will not return to their 2019 levels even next year.

In *Nigeria*, growth is projected to edge up to 3.4 percent in 2022, but will soften to 3.2 percent in both 2023 and 2024. Stronger growth this year

FIGURE 2.6.2 SSA: Outlook

Growth in SSA is projected to stay below long-term averages as surging food prices dent recoveries in consumer spending, especially in countries with large vulnerable populations. The recovery in tourism is projected to continue, albeit pandemic-related uncertainties will linger. While commodity exporters stand to benefit from higher global prices, growth in some countries is expected to be constrained in the short term by rising prices of farm inputs, such as fuel and fertilizers. Tighter global financial conditions are expected to restrain access to financing for many countries.



Sources: Dealogic; Haver Analytics; Namibia Statistics Agency; World Bank.

Note: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; LICs = low-income countries; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.

A. "Industrial-commodity exporters" represents oil and metal exporting countries. Aggregate growth rates calculated using constant GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates. "Industrial commodity exporters" excludes Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa.

D. Cumulative issuance of international bonds by SSA governments and corporations, excluding Angola and South Africa. Red bar indicates the amount of bonds issued during the first five months of 2021 and 2022.

reflects support from elevated oil prices, the further recovery in agriculture and manufacturing, and structural reforms (for example, the Petroleum Industry Act of 2021). Production challenges in the oil sector are expected to persist, weighing on growth. The recovery in non-oil sectors is envisioned to continue, although shortages of fuel and higher food prices would restrain growth. Four in ten Nigerians live below the poverty line, with many more at risk of falling into poverty and becoming food insecure. Increases in food prices would further erode domestic demand.

Growth in *South Africa* is forecast to fall back to 2.1 percent this year and an average of 1.7 percent in 2023-24. High unemployment, power shortages, and slow reform momentum are expected to continue discouraging private investments. High government debt, along with elevated debt service costs, are expected to constrain much-needed public investment. The policy interest rate has already been raised four times during the current hiking cycle, with further increases likely in order to cool rising inflation.

Growth in *Angola* is projected to pick up to 3.1 percent this year, strengthening further to 3.3 percent in 2023 and 3.2 percent on in 2024. Oil production is expected to increase, as production challenges ease somewhat and investment in the oil sector increases. Higher oil revenues are expected to yield positive spillovers to the non-oil economy, help improve the fiscal position, and support increased spending on social protection. Elevated food price inflation is, however, anticipated to persist, slowing progress in reducing poverty and food insecurity.

Elsewhere in the region, growth is expected to average 5.3 percent in 2023-24—0.4 percentage points below January's forecast. Although increased commodity prices are projected to underpin recoveries in extractive sectors and strengthen export and fiscal revenues in some exporters of energy and industrial metals (Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Guinea, Mozambique, Sudan), other producers are expected to struggle in ramping up mining production because of aging facilities and elevated security risks (Chad, South Sudan). Agricultural commodity exporters stand to benefit from higher global food prices as well; however, agricultural production will be constrained in the short term by surging costs of farm inputs (fertilizer, fuel), irregular rainfall, and high levels of violence in some countries (figure 2.6.2.C). More diversified economies (most WAEMU[1] countries, Rwanda) are nevertheless expected to grow on average by nearly 7 percent annually in 2023-24.

Across the region, surging food and fuel prices are expected to reverse recent progress in poverty alleviation, especially in countries where vulnerable populations are sizable (Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria), and dependence on imported food is high (Benin, Comoros, The Gambia, Mozambique). Food imports represent about one-fifth of total SSA imports and 6 percent of GDP—over 10 percent of GDP in small and tourism-reliant SSA economies—higher than about 4 percent of GDP in other EMDEs.

Over 60 percent of countries in the region are in, or at a high risk of, debt distress following marked deteriorations in fiscal balances and increased indebtedness caused by the COVID-19 shock. Tighter global financial conditions are expected to significantly curtail access to financing in the region, compounding the negative impact of war-induced capital outflows (figure 2.6.2.D). This, together with pressures to improve debt sustainability, is likely to severely limit the scope for fiscal policy to stimulate demand, including support for food availability for vulnerable populations. Several countries already need to accelerate fiscal consolidation to stabilize public debt (Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa).

Risks

Risks to the outlook are firmly to the downside, with much uncertainty emanating from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Further disruption to global supplies of staple crops would lead to even higher food prices in SSA and increased spending on food imports. One in seven SSA countries—including several large economies that already have a high incidence of food insecurity (Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan)—depend on Russia and Ukraine for over 45 percent of their wheat imports, while almost all of the region's economies are net importers of wheat (figure 2.6.3.A).

Higher prices for farming inputs—such as seeds, fuel, and fertilizers—would also prolong food price pressures in the region. The Russia's invasion of Ukraine has already amplified existing supply constraints in global fertilizer markets. Costlier farming inputs could reduce productivity in SSA agriculture and further deepen food shortages.

[1] Members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

Higher fertilizer prices could also worsen fiscal pressures across the region, given that in many countries, government spending on subsidized fertilizers accounts for a large portion of public spending on agriculture (Ghana, Malawi, Zambia; Pernechele et al. 2021).

Reduced food supplies amplify the risk that extreme weather events could cause food prices to soar even further. Farming activities in SSA are already stressed because of climate change-induced shifts in rainfall patterns (Maino and Emrullahu 2022). Delayed and below-average rainfall and above-average temperatures have intensified drought severity in some areas (southern Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda), while planting delays could reduce harvests and livestock (Burundi, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique). Multiple consecutive droughts in some areas (Madagascar) could push even more people into extreme food insecurity. Dry conditions are also threatening cocoa harvests in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.

Levels of violence and conflict remain elevated in SSA, particularly in the Sahel region. A rapid increase in the cost of living could trigger a wave of civil unrest across the region, further dampening growth in many countries (Hadzi-Vaskov, Pienknagura, and Ricci 2021; Weinberg and Bakker 2015).

A faster-than-expected deceleration of the global economy and increased volatility of commodity prices could hurt many SSA commodity exporters. Exporters of industrial metals, crude oil, and ores (Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, South Africa, Zambia) could suffer from a substantial deceleration of activity in China (figure 2.6.3.B). A sharp contraction of growth in the euro area could hurt exporters of agricultural products—such as coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton, and textiles (Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi).

With financial conditions in EMDEs expected to continue to tighten, a sustained period of risk aversion and capital outflows triggered by global geopolitical tensions could sharply raise borrowing costs and rekindle currency depreciations, further elevating debt sustainability risks and fueling inflation in many economies. Higher borrowing

FIGURE 2.6.3 SSA: Risks

Disruptions in global food supplies from the Russia's invasion of Ukraine could significantly worsen poverty and food security in SSA. A sharper-than-expected deceleration of the global economy would have adverse effects on the region's exporters of industrial commodities. High and rising inflation could lead to an accelerated tightening of monetary policies. Low vaccination rates elevate the risk of recurrent outbreaks of new and more dangerous variants of COVID-19.



Sources: Comtrade (database); Global Network Against Food Crises; Haver Analytics; Our World in Data (database); World Bank.

Note: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo.

A. Bars show the number of people in food crisis as classified by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC/CH) Phase 3, that is, in acute food insecurity crisis or worse. Data for 2022 are estimates.

C. Policy rates adjusted for consumer price inflation. SSA aggregates is a simple average of nine countries. Last observation April 2022.

D. Total number of people who are fully vaccinated. Last observation is May 31, 2022.

costs and a decline in donor financing would put a squeeze on public spending, jeopardizing infrastructure and other development needs. Persistent increases in inflation could lead to much faster policy tightening in many SSA countries (figure 2.6.3.C). Accelerated policy tightening could also escalate stagflation risks across the region (World Bank 2022k).

Pandemic-related risks remain high. South Africa has already experienced a fifth wave of COVID-19 infections, though above-average vaccination rates helped keep it much milder compared to previous outbreaks. Recurring outbreaks of new and more dangerous variants of COVID-19 could lead to lasting and more serious disruptions to economic activity in countries where vaccination rates remain low. As of end-May, only 15 percent of SSA's population had been fully vaccinated against COVID-19, compared to an average of over 60 percent across other EMDEs (figure 2.6.3.D). In some of the region's most populous countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria—less than one in 10 people have been fully vaccinated.

TABLE 2.6.1 Sub-Saharan Africa forecast summary

(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)

	2019	2020	2021e	2022f	2023f	2024f	Percentage point differences from January 2022 projections: 2022f	2023f
EMDE SSA, GDP [1]	**2.6**	**-2.0**	**4.2**	**3.7**	**3.8**	**4.0**	**0.1**	**0.0**
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars)	-0.1	-4.5	1.6	1.1	1.3	1.5	0.1	0.0
(Average including countries that report expenditure components in national accounts) [2]								
EMDE SSA, GDP [2,3]	2.6	-2.1	4.2	3.7	3.8	4.0	0.1	0.0
PPP GDP	2.7	-1.8	4.2	3.7	3.9	4.1	0.0	-0.1
Private consumption	1.5	-1.2	3.7	3.3	3.6	3.6	0.2	0.4
Public consumption	4.1	3.0	2.6	3.0	0.9	2.7	3.1	0.8
Fixed investment	4.1	2.0	7.6	5.4	7.2	8.1	-1.4	-1.5
Exports, GNFS [4]	3.4	-12.8	7.2	6.0	6.2	5.8	0.5	0.7
Imports, GNFS [4]	5.1	-10.5	9.7	6.5	6.2	6.2	0.2	0.5
Net exports, contribution to growth	-0.5	-0.3	-0.9	-0.3	-0.2	-0.3	0.1	0.0
Memo items: GDP								
Eastern and Southern Africa	2.0	-3.0	4.4	3.4	3.6	3.8	-0.2	-0.2
Western and Central Africa	3.3	-0.8	3.9	4.0	4.1	4.3	0.4	0.2
SSA excluding Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola	4.3	0.2	4.6	4.5	5.1	5.4	-0.4	-0.4
Oil exporters [5]	2.1	-2.0	3.0	3.6	3.4	3.4	0.7	0.4
CFA countries [6]	4.2	0.5	4.1	4.5	5.3	5.8	-0.4	-0.2
CEMAC	1.8	-1.7	1.0	3.4	2.9	3.4	0.3	-0.2
WAEMU	5.7	1.8	5.9	5.1	6.7	7.2	-0.9	-0.1
SSA3	1.0	-4.1	3.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	0.4	0.2
Nigeria	2.2	-1.8	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.2	0.9	0.4
South Africa	0.1	-6.4	4.9	2.1	1.5	1.8	0.0	0.0
Angola	-0.7	-5.2	0.7	3.1	3.3	3.2	0.0	0.5

Source: World Bank.

Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; PPP = purchasing power parity; EMDE = emerging market and developing economy. World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries' prospects do not differ at any given moment in time.

1. GDP and expenditure components are measured in average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.

2. Subregion aggregate excludes the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, and South Sudan, for which data limitations prevent the forecasting of GDP components.

3. Subregion growth rates may differ from the most recent edition of Africa's Pulse (https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/africas-pulse) because of data revisions and the inclusion of the Central African Republic and São Tomé and Príncipe in the subregion aggregate of that publication.

4. Exports and imports of goods and nonfactor services (GNFS).

5. Includes Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, and South Sudan.

6. The Financial Community of Africa (CFA) franc zone consists of 14 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, each affiliated with one of two monetary unions. The Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC) comprises Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon; the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

TABLE 2.6.2 Sub-Saharan Africa country forecasts[1]

(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)

	2019	2020	2021e	2022f	2023f	2024f	Percentage point differences from January 2022 projections 2022f	2023f
Angola	-0.7	-5.2	0.7	3.1	3.3	3.2	0.0	0.5
Benin	6.9	3.8	7.2	5.9	6.1	6.0	-0.6	-0.4
Botswana	3.0	-8.5	12.1	4.1	4.0	4.0	-1.8	-0.4
Burkina Faso	5.7	1.9	7.0	4.8	5.4	5.3	-0.8	0.1
Burundi	1.8	0.3	1.8	2.5	3.3	4.1	0.0	0.3
Central African Republic	3.1	0.9	0.9	3.2	3.4	4.0	-0.3	-1.1
Cabo Verde	5.7	-14.8	7.1	5.5	6.1	6.0	0.3	0.0
Cameroon	3.7	0.5	3.5	4.0	4.3	4.4	0.0	-0.1
Chad	3.2	-1.6	-1.2	2.8	3.5	3.9	1.0	0.6
Comoros	1.8	-0.3	2.4	2.8	3.1	3.7	-0.4	0.2
Congo, Dem. Rep.	4.4	1.7	5.7	6.0	6.4	6.1	1.2	1.3
Congo, Rep.	-0.1	-6.2	-3.5	3.5	3.0	4.5	0.3	0.0
Côte d'Ivoire	6.2	2.0	7.0	5.7	6.8	6.6	-0.8	0.4
Equatorial Guinea	-6.0	-4.9	-1.6	1.8	-2.6	-2.1	0.3	-1.7
Eritrea	3.8	-0.6	2.9	4.7	3.6	3.7	-0.1	-0.2
Eswatini	2.6	-1.9	3.1	2.0	1.8	1.8	0.2	-0.1
Ethiopia[2]	9.0	6.1	6.3	3.3	5.2	5.9	-1.0	-1.3
Gabon	3.9	-1.8	1.5	3.3	2.6	3.0	0.5	-0.4
Gambia, The	6.2	-0.2	5.6	5.6	6.2	6.5	-0.4	-0.3
Ghana	6.5	0.4	5.4	5.5	5.2	5.0	0.0	0.2
Guinea	5.6	4.6	3.1	4.3	5.9	5.8	-1.8	0.0
Guinea-Bissau	4.5	1.5	3.8	3.5	4.5	4.5	-0.5	-0.5
Kenya	5.0	-0.3	7.5	5.5	5.0	5.3	0.8	-0.1
Lesotho	2.6	-6.5	1.6	2.3	2.1	2.0	-0.7	-0.7
Liberia	-2.9	-3.0	4.0	4.4	4.8	5.2	-0.3	-0.2
Madagascar	4.4	-7.1	4.4	2.6	4.2	4.6	-2.8	-0.9
Malawi	5.4	0.8	2.8	2.1	4.3	4.2	-0.9	-0.1
Mali	4.8	-1.2	3.1	3.3	5.3	5.0	-1.9	0.3
Mauritania	5.3	-0.9	2.4	4.5	5.3	7.7	0.4	-1.1
Mauritius	3.0	-14.9	3.9	5.9	6.0	3.9	-0.7	1.8
Mozambique	2.3	-1.2	2.2	3.6	6.0	5.8	-1.5	-3.6
Namibia	-0.9	-8.5	0.8	2.9	2.1	2.0	0.5	0.6
Niger	5.9	3.6	1.4	5.2	7.1	10.4	-1.0	-2.3
Nigeria	2.2	-1.8	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.2	0.9	0.4
Rwanda	9.5	-3.4	10.9	6.8	7.2	7.4	-0.3	-0.6
São Tomé and Príncipe	2.2	3.1	1.8	2.8	3.0	3.3	-0.1	-0.3
Senegal	4.6	1.3	6.1	4.4	8.5	10.6	-1.1	-0.7
Seychelles	2.0	-13.3	7.9	4.6	5.7	5.0	-3.1	-1.1
Sierra Leone	5.3	-2.0	3.1	3.9	4.4	4.8	-2.1	0.1
South Africa	0.1	-6.4	4.9	2.1	1.5	1.8	0.0	0.0
Sudan	-2.2	-3.6	0.1	0.7	2.0	2.5	-2.8	-3.0
South Sudan[2]	3.2	9.5	-5.1	-0.8	2.5	4.0	-2.0	-1.0
Tanzania	5.8	2.0	4.3	5.3	5.7	6.1	-0.1	-0.2
Togo[3]	5.5	1.8	5.1	5.0	5.8	6.4	-0.6	-0.4
Uganda[2]	6.4	3.0	3.4	3.7	5.1	6.5	0.0	-0.4
Zambia	1.4	-3.0	3.6	3.3	3.6	4.0	0.4	-0.9
Zimbabwe	-6.1	-6.2	5.8	3.7	3.6	3.6	-0.6	-0.6

Source: World Bank.

Note: e = estimate; f = forecast. World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries' prospects do not significantly differ at any given moment in time.

1. Data are based on GDP measured in average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.
2. Fiscal-year based numbers.
3. For Togo, growth figure in 2019 is based on pre-2020 rebasing GDP estimates.

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