

# **Building the city: urban transition and institutional frictions**

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# Introduction

- How has a developing city grown?
  - The building stock – evolution across space & time
  - Frictions and imperfections
- 1) Theory: build a full dynamic model of investment/ urban growth
  - Formal and informal structures
  - Sunk capital and expectations
  - Land market inefficiencies
- 2) Empirics: Detailed study of Nairobi
  - From aerial photography, 2 time periods
    - Land cover
    - Redevelopment
  - Other data sources
    - Height
    - Land prices, property rents
    - Slum classification

# Introduction

## 3) Calibration:

- Data allows calibration of all parameters of the model

## 4) What is the cost of delayed formalisation of slums?

- Slums at edge and near the centre
- Opportunity cost of land not being in its most efficient use:
  - Close to centre, cost of perpetual delay  $\approx$  \$14,000 per household


# Introduction

Nairobi background:

- Population  $\approx$  3mn city, 6.5mn greater metro
- Growth:
  - Population  $\approx$  3.9% pa
  - Built volume  $\approx$  3.9% pa
  - Reconstruction: 3kms from CBD, 35% of buildings demolished in last 12 years.
- Slums:
  - Kibera:
    - Africa's largest slum:  $\approx$  200k people (some estimates  $>$  1mn)
  - The 'hodgepodge':
    - Monocentricity evident in some aspects
    - Slums and formal settlements side-by-side

# Nairobi in the 2015 cross-section (includes public sector)

## 3-D average height of all buildings by 150x150m grid square



**Kibera**

Mis-classification

Rings at 2 and 4 kms from centre

# Theory

City with places,  $x$  (*distance from CBD*), date  $t$ , development of type  $i$  ( $=$  *Informal, Formal*):

Price of housing (house-rent), quality adjusted:  $p_I(x,t) = \bar{p}_I e^{\hat{p}_I t} e^{-\theta_I x}$      $p_F(x,t) = \bar{p}_F e^{\hat{p}_F t} e^{-\theta_F x}$

- Exogenous price growth, price gradient

Built volume  $v_i(x,t) = h_i(x,t)c_i(x,t)$  product of building height and cover.

Informal sector (slum):

Cannot build tall – but can increase cover

Utility loss from increasing cover: ‘crowding’

Buildings are malleable (lego): – no sunk costs, expectations unimportant

Formal sector:

Volume achieved by height not cover

Sunk costs – ‘putty-clay’:

Expectations matter

Two sorts of decisions:      Volume (either  $c$  or  $h$ )

Timing – formalisation, waves of redevelopment

# Theory

## Informal sector:

Land-rent:  $r_I(x,t) = [p_I(x,t)a(v_I(x,t)) - \kappa_I]v_I(x,t)$

Revenue: price adjusted by amenity loss,  $a(v_I(x,t)) = a_I v_I(x,t)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}$

constant construction cost per unit housing

Maximised land-rent (bid-rent)  $r_I(x,t) = \kappa_I (\alpha - 1) [a_I p_I(x,t) / \kappa_I \alpha]^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}$

NB: Construction costs share  $1/\alpha$  of revenue

Land-rent share  $1 - 1/\alpha$  of revenue

# Theory

## Formal sector:

Land-rent: 
$$R_F(x, \tau_i) = \int_{\tau_i}^{\tau_{i+1}} p_F(x, t) v_F(x, \tau_i) e^{-\rho(t-\tau_i)} dt - k(v_F(x, \tau_i))$$

PV over interval  $t \in [\tau_i, \tau_{i+1}]$ ,  $i$  is index over successive redevelopments,

Construction cost per unit housing  $k(v_F) = \kappa_F v_F^\gamma$

Maximised PV land rent: 
$$R_F(x, \tau_i) = \kappa_F (\gamma - 1) \left[ \frac{p_F(x, \tau_i) \Phi(x, i)}{\kappa_F \gamma} \right]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}}$$

Value-to-rent-ratio (over interval): 
$$\Phi(x, i) \equiv \int_{\tau_i}^{\tau_{i+1}} [p_F(x, t) / p_F(x, \tau_i)] e^{-\rho(t-\tau_i)} dt$$

Flow land-rent (constr. cost amortised over life of building): 
$$r_F(x, t, \tau_i) = [1 - 1/\gamma] p_F(x, t) v_F(x, \tau_i)$$

NB: Construction costs share  $1/\gamma$  of revenue

Land-rent share  $1 - 1/\gamma$  of revenue



# Theory

## Land development

Present value of not yet developed land at place  $x$  and date  $t$ .

$$R(x) = \underbrace{\int_0^{\tau_0} r_0 e^{-\rho t} dt}_{\text{agriculture}} + \underbrace{\int_{\tau_0}^{\tau_1} r_I(x, t) e^{-\rho t} dt}_{\text{slum use, house \& land prices low}} + \underbrace{[R_F(x, \tau_1) - D(x)] e^{-\rho \tau_1}}_{\substack{\text{first formal development} \\ D(x): \text{formalisation cost}}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i=2} R_F(x, \tau_i) e^{-\rho \tau_i}}_{\text{successive redevelopments}}$$

$$\text{Rural to informal, date } \tau_0: \quad \frac{\partial PV(x)}{\partial \tau_0} = e^{-\rho \tau_0} [r_0 - r_I(x, \tau_0)] = 0$$

$$\text{Informal to formal, date } \tau_1: \quad \frac{\partial PV(x)}{\partial \tau_1} = e^{-\rho \tau_1} [r_I(x, \tau_1) - p_F(x, \tau_1) v_F(x, \tau_1) + \rho \{k(v_F(x, \tau_1)) + D(x)\}] = 0$$

$$\text{Formal redevelopment, date } \tau_{2\dots}: \quad p_F(x, \tau_{i+1}) [v_F(x, \tau_{i+1}) - v_F(x, \tau_i)] = \rho k(v_F(x, \tau_{i+1}))$$

# Development across time

Price path:  $p_i(x, t) = \bar{p}_i e^{\hat{p}_i t} e^{-\theta_i x}$

Transition slum  $\rightarrow$  formal if

$$\hat{p}_F \gamma / (\gamma - 1) > \hat{p}_I \alpha / (\alpha - 1)$$


Formal redevelopment

Proposition 1: Time path with perfect foresight:

- The value-to-rent ratio takes constant value  $\Phi$ , and the time interval between successive formal redevelopments is constant  $\Delta\tau$ ,
- Successive rounds of formal sector building have greater volume (height) by constant proportional factor.

$$\frac{v_F(x, \tau_{i+1})}{v_F(x, \tau_i)} = e^{\frac{\hat{p}_F \Delta\tau}{(\gamma-1)}} = \frac{\gamma}{\gamma - \rho\Phi}$$

Figure 1: Urban development with perfect foresight



# Development across space


Proposition 2: (across locations)

If (additionally) the conversion cost is the same for all  $x$

- The distance between successive formal sector redevelopments is constant
- The width of the informal sector is shrinking (constant) as

$$\hat{p}_F > (=) \hat{p}_I$$

Figure 1: Urban development with perfect foresight



# Formalisation costs:

Figure 2: Formalisation costs





Figure 3: The hotchpotch: random variation in formalisation costs



- *High formalisation cost delays development & successive redevelopments*
- *Low expectations delay initial development, reduce building volume, and reduce the interval between redevelopments*


# Empirics: cross-section

- Data on Nairobi
  - Building footprints
    - Aerial photo ( 10-40 cm resolution)
    - Gives building footprints for 2003/4 and 2015 and heights for 2015.
    - Characteristics defined at 3mx3m pixels: aggregated to a grid with 6470 cells of 150m by 150m
  - Height (LIDAR 0.3-1m resolution) data for 2015.
    - For 2004 height
      - Know height of unchanged building
      - Teardowns: assigned based on average heights of neighbouring (queen) unchanged buildings (over-estimate)
    - Overlay building polygons in 2003/4 and 2015 to define redevelopment, infill and demolition
  - Land price: scraping web for advertised prices of vacant lots
  - House-rent: House-rent per m<sup>2</sup>, formal and informal (2012, NORC)
  - Slum classification

## Empirics: cross-section


Building height by distance from centre:

- Formal: tall and gradient
- Slum: uniformly low



Building cover-to-area ratio by distance from centre:


- Formal: low and constant
- Slum: Up to 60%, declining with distance



# Empirics: cross-section


Volume per unit land area: by type

- Slum and formal areas provide about equal building volume per unit area



Total volume by distance


- Total volume provided
- slum greatest share 20% at 5-8kms




# Empirics: changes

- Huge amount of redevelopment:
  - 3 kms from the centre, 35% of buildings replaced in the last 12 years (developed country < 10%).
  - At 3kms from the centre, demolition goes with redevelopment to much taller buildings.
  - Volume per unit area increase by 40%

### Volume per unit area



### Building height







## Empirics: changes

- Further out, increasing densification and volume growth in slums

### Cover to area ratio



### Total volume by distance and sector



## Calibration:

Three steps: Spatial gradients/ intertemporal/ levels

I: Gradients:

- Regressions to find gradients of volume, land-prices, land-rents wrt distance from the CBD:

<b>Panel A. Key gradients used in calibrations</b>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Ln land sales price (USD per sq m.)	Ln formal house-rent per sq m. floor space	Ln slum house-rent per sq m. floor space	Ln Formal Redeveloped Height	Ln Slum CAR
Distance to centre	-0.173***	-0.103***	0.0462	-0.0965***	-0.104***
	(0.0518)	(0.0317)	(0.0300)	(0.00315)	(0.00825)
Ruggedness	-0.0239	0.0263	-0.0383	0.0153**	-0.0335***
	(0.102)	(0.0524)	(0.0690)	(0.00596)	(0.0116)
Elevation	5.373***	1.450	2.964***	-134.9	-1027.0***
	(1.801)	(1.062)	(0.731)	(129.5)	(220.5)
Constant	-1.365	3.947**	-0.0846	2.975***	1.635***
	(3.233)	(1.791)	(1.264)	(0.223)	(0.385)
Other controls	lot size, lot size sq., month FEs, geo-coded	no	no	no	no
Observations	136	372	503	4589	983
R-squared	0.292	0.106	0.084	0.191	0.145

I: Gradients:

- Regressions to find gradients of volume and land-prices, land-rents wrt distance from the CBD:
- Calibrate elasticities of building decisions
- Price gradient centre to edge
- $\alpha \rightarrow$  share of construction in formal house-rent = 74%
- $\gamma \rightarrow$  share of construction in informal house-rent = 56%

II: Growth and present values:

- Value to rent ratio = 25
- Interval between redevelopments, 75 years

III: Levels and price/ cost/ amenity parameters (at 2015, 4.5km)

- House rent m<sup>2</sup>.  $p_I(x,t)a_I v_I(x,t)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha} = \$7.56$   $p_F(x,t) = \$18.73$

## Application: the cost of delayed formalisation

- Numerous reasons for delayed land conversion:
  - Conflicting claims
    - Kibera history
  - Political economy
    - Slum-lords
    - Tenants
- Calculate the opportunity cost of delayed conversion
  - NB: NOT including cost of disrupted social networks/ relocation or benefit of city reorganisation/ agglomeration/ scale
- PV of land rents at place  $x$ , discounted to date  $s$ , if formalisation at date  $z$

$$\begin{aligned}
 PV(x, s, z) &= \int_s^z r_I(x, t) e^{-\rho(t-s)} dt + e^{-\rho(z-s)} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} R_F(x, z + i\Delta\tau) e^{-\rho i\Delta\tau} \\
 &= r_I(x, s) \frac{1 - e^{-(\rho - \hat{p}_I \alpha / (\alpha - 1))(z-s)}}{\rho - \hat{p}_I \alpha / (\alpha - 1)} + r_F(x, s, s) \Phi \frac{e^{-(\rho - \hat{p}_F \gamma / (\gamma - 1))(z-s)}}{1 - e^{-(\rho - \hat{p}_F \gamma / (\gamma - 1))\Delta\tau}} .
 \end{aligned}$$

## Land values: $PV(x,2015,z)$

<b>Table 4. Present value of land-rent: \$ per m<sup>2</sup></b>					
Date of formalisation, $z$	3-4 kms	4-5kms	5-6kms	6-7km	7-8kms
$z = 2015$	766.7	644.7	542.3	456.2	383.7
$z = 2040$	683.9	588.9	507.6	438.1	378.5
$z = 2065$	600.4	524.7	459.1	402.2	352.7
$z = 2015 + \Delta\tau = 2090$	535.3	472.7	417.8	369.6	327.3
$z = \infty$	409.0	368.6	332.2	299.3	269.8
Optimal $z$	2000	2005	2011	2017	2023
PV at optimal $z$	790.0	652.2	543.3	456.6	386.8
Sq. m slum land	1129311	2263428	1946034	1397601	2800755
No. slum households 2009	29070	45810	33100	28390	32690

Present values at  $s = 2015$ .

# The cost of delay

- Perpetual delay vs efficient formalisation date at 3-4kms
  - \$790-\$409 = \$381 per m<sup>2</sup>
  - Equivalent to  $\approx$  \$15,000 per household  
(i.e., this the surplus after fully ‘compensating’ slum-lord)
- Drops off further out: at 5-6kms
  - \$284 per m<sup>2</sup>
  - Equivalent to  $\approx$  \$12,000 per household
- Total loss up to 6kms  $\approx$  \$1.3bn
- Drops off with shorter delays:
  - 25 year delay from 2015 costs \$56 per m<sup>2</sup> at 4-5 km.
  - Cf, annual informal land-rent at 4-5 kms  $\approx$  \$12

## Concluding comments

Research agenda:

- Three elements: firms and jobs /residential/ infrastructure & public:
- Need to build in depth knowledge on each
- Need conceptual framework for whole

Point of departure is standard urban model ++

- **MARKET FAILURES & FRICTIONS:** Land, regulation, labour and capital markets
- **DYNAMICS:** Growth and investment with sunk costs → expectations matter
- **COMPLEMENTARITIES:** Interactions and positive feedback
  - Firm ↔ firm: agglomeration etc.
  - Firm ↔ household: access to markets: access to workers/ jobs:
  - Infrastructure ↔ economic activity:
    - Connectivity
    - Shaping expectations
    - Public finance and source of funds

Collectively → cumulative causation & multiple equilibria