Executive Summary

Commodity prices are expected to decrease by 5 percent in 2025 and 2 percent in 2026, after softening 3 percent this year. This would lead aggregate commodity prices to their lowest levels since 2020. The projected declines are led by oil prices but tempered by price increases for natural gas and a stable outlook for metals and agricultural raw materials. The Brent crude oil price is projected to average $80/bbl in 2024, before slipping to $73/bbl in 2025 and $72/bbl in 2026. Thus, from their 2022 high, annual average oil prices are expected to decline for four consecutive years through to 2026, settling just slightly above their 2021 level. The possibility of escalating conflict in the Middle East represents a substantial near-term upside risk to energy prices, with potential knock-on consequences for other commodities. However, over the forecast horizon, longer-term dynamics—including decelerating global oil demand, notably in China; diversifying oil production; and ample oil supply capacity held by OPEC+—suggest sizable downside risks to oil prices, especially if OPEC+ unwinds its latest production cuts. There are also two-sided risks to industrial commodity demand stemming from economic activity. On the one hand, concerted stimulus in China and above-trend growth in the United States could push commodity prices higher. On the other, weaker-than-anticipated global industrial activity could dampen them.

The state of commodity markets

The early 2020s were characterized by large global shocks—the COVID-19 pandemic recession and subsequent rebound, a sharp runup in inflation, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine—accompanied by highly correlated swings in commodity prices (figure 1.A and 1.B). Over the last year, the economic effects of those outsized shocks have substantially abated, with global economic growth steadying and inflation moving toward targets. Correspondingly, commodity markets appear to be departing from a period of tight synchronization (figure 1.C). Over the last year, commodity prices have been buffeted by a wide range of developments, including shifting expectations about supply management, surges in conflict-related risk, trade restrictions, and weather-related supply shocks.

In energy markets, geopolitical tensions have remained a critical driver of short-term price movements. Oil markets have responded to geopolitical flare-ups, with prices surpassing $90/bbl in October 2023 and April 2024. Anticipated oil price volatility approached its highest levels since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early October 2024, as oil prices surged by 10 percent in just three days (figure 1.D). Prices have tended to subsequently fall back, however, reflecting a confluence of underlying longer-term factors. First, global oil consumption is decelerating, continuing the secular decline in the oil intensity of global GDP. Second, global oil supply continues to diversify, with the market share of non-OPEC+ producers gradually increasing. Third, following successive rounds of output cuts, OPEC+ holds spare oil capacity equivalent to slightly more than 7 percent of current global production (figure 1.E). This amounts to about double the average spare capacity in 2017-19, when the Brent oil price averaged $63/bbl.

Against this backdrop, the price of Brent oil dipped to a three-year low in September due to concerns that OPEC+ might soon increase oil exports, despite an already well-supplied market. A subsequent price spike, while sudden, saw prices peak below average 2024Q2 levels. Contrasting with oil, European natural gas prices have been sharply higher since the middle of the year, reflecting concerns about the availability of gas imports from Russia and increasing global competition for liquefied natural gas supply (figure 1.F).

In metals markets, prices climbed in late September after the announcement of economic stimulus measures in China. The rally lost momentum in October amid ambiguity about the likely scale of China's future policy support. However, in a context of generally tight supply conditions, prices

FIGURE 1 Commodity market developments

Commodity price movements were highly synchronized in the early 2020s, but a greater prevalence of idiosyncratic commodity-specific shocks has seen synchronization fade in the last two years. Geopolitical risk remains a critical driver of oil price volatility, with prices and volatility spiking in early October. However, recent conflict-driven price surges have been short-lived amid ample potential oil supply, notably substantial spare capacity held off the market by OPEC+. In natural gas markets, increased competition for U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports has seen the share shipped to Europe decline significantly.

A. Estimated commodity price variation due to a global commodity factor during selected periods



B. Commodity price indexes, monthly



C. Commodity price changes



D. Oil price volatility



E. OPEC+ spare capacity



F. Destinations of U.S. LNG exports



Sources: Bloomberg; International Energy Agency (IEA); U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA); World Bank.

Note: EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; Mb/d = million barrels per day; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia; UAE = United Arab Emirates.

A. Share of variation in month-on-month changes in 35 commodity prices—3 energy commodities, 6 metal and mineral commodities, 3 precious metals, 4 fertilizers, and 19 agricultural commodities—accounted for by a global factor derived from a one-factor dynamic factor model. Bars show consumption-weighted averages. See Special Focus chapter for more detail.

B. Monthly in U.S. dollar terms. Last observation is September 2024.

C. Rolling 3-month percent change in commodity indexes. Last observation is September 2024.

D. Crude oil volatility index measures market-based expectations of the 30-day volatility of crude oil prices, based on options spanning a wide range of strike prices. Last observation is October 21, 2024.

E. Spare capacity for OPEC+ members from monthly IEA Oil Market Reports. Other OPEC + includes Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, South Sudan, Sudan, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela. Values for Islamic Republic of Iran, Libya, Russian Federation, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela are computed from data on sustainable capacity and actual supply. Data from IEA *Oil Market Reports*.

F. Averages using monthly data of U.S. LNG shipments. Last observation is July 2024.

for base metals—notably aluminum and copper—have remained responsive to shifts in the outlook for global industrial activity and well-supported over the longer term by a sustained demand tailwind from the energy transition. Thus, the World Bank base metals price index was up 10 percent year-to-date in September. In contrast, iron ore prices have sharply underperformed the broader index, reflecting elevated exposure to the persistent weakness in China's construction sector and ample supply prospects. Gold prices, which are particularly sensitive to geopolitical tensions, have marched higher all year, standing 27 percent above their December 2023 level in September.

In agricultural commodity markets, prices for many staple crops—including maize, soybeans, and wheat—have trended lower overall this year, owing to solid harvests and favorable growing conditions. In all, the World Bank's index of food commodity prices was down 4 percent year-to-date in September. However, weather- and disease-related shocks and trade restrictions have seen prices for cocoa, coffee, and rice reach historic highs this year, underscoring sources of supply volatility that could prove endemic to an era of climate change and trade fragmentation.

Outlook

After softening by 3 percent in 2024 (y/y), the World Bank commodity price index is projected to retreat by a further 5 percent in 2025 and 2 percent in 2026 (figure 2.A).[1] This would lead aggregate commodity prices to their lowest level since 2020, albeit still nearly 30 percent above the 2015-19 average.[2] While price projections across individual commodities are mixed, a major factor underlying the overall decline is improving supply conditions. This, coupled with expectations of

[1] Throughout this document "(y/y)" refers to the change in quantity or average price in one year, compared to the previous year, or compared to the same specified period in the previous year; "(q/q)" refers to the change in quantity or average price in one quarter, compared to the previous quarter.

[2] Arteta, C., P. Kenworthy, and M. A. Kose. 2024. "Why Global Growth is Tepid, but Commodity Prices Remain High." *Voices* (blog). July 01, 2024. https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/voices/why-global-growth-is-tepid-but-commodity-prices-remain-high

moderate global economic growth, gives rise to generally modest expected price movements, except where individual markets are responding to commodity-specific developments.

Energy prices

The energy price index is projected to fall by 6 percent in 2024 (y/y), followed by further declines of 6 percent in 2025 and 2 percent in 2026. The forecast assumes that there is no prolonged additional escalation of ongoing armed conflicts, global economic growth remains stable, and oil supply from non-OPEC+ producers steadily expands. In addition, it is premised on OPEC+ countries maintaining elevated spare capacity and delaying the reversal of 2.2 mb/d of voluntary supply cuts. The Brent crude oil price is projected to hover around $75/bbl for the remainder of 2024, averaging $80/bbl for the year overall, before declining to an average of $73/bbl in 2025 and $72/bbl in 2026. Thus, from a high reached in 2022, annual average oil prices are set to decline for four consecutive years through to 2026, settling just slightly above 2021 levels.

Global oil supply is expected to reach approximately 105 mb/d in 2025, up by 2 mb/d from 2024. Most of this increase is anticipated to occur in Brazil, Canada, Guyana, and the United States, with OPEC+ production only edging up. Global oil consumption is forecast to rise by about 1 mb/d per year in 2024-25—an annual growth rate below 1 percent. This would represent a marked slowdown from an increase of 2 mb/d in 2023, continuing a longer-term global deceleration; the growth of global oil consumption averaged 1.4 percent over 2015-19 (figure 2.B). Under these conditions, global oil supply is expected to exceed demand by an average of 1.2 mb/d next year—a degree of oversupply surpassed only during COVID 19-related shutdowns in 2020 and the 1998 oil price collapse. Demand growth in China and India comprises nearly half of the envisioned increase in 2025, while consumption in advanced economies is set to decline marginally. In 2026, growth in global oil consumption is expected to be broadly unchanged from the previous two years.

Despite its recent rise, the European natural gas benchmark is projected to be 18 percent lower, on average, in 2024 than 2023, as gas markets continue to adapt to a reconfiguration of supply following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. After several years of dramatic swings, European gas prices are expected to increase by a moderate 7 percent in 2025 (y/y), before declining by a slightly larger magnitude in 2026 as supply increases. In contrast, the U.S. natural gas price is expected to decline in 2024, reflecting elevated production and large inventories. However, prices are projected to climb markedly in 2025-26, as new infrastructure allows U.S. exports to increasingly serve growing global demand, generating upward pressure on domestic prices. Coal prices are projected to fall throughout the forecast period as global consumption declines, led by China.

Metals prices

The metals price index is projected to drift slightly lower over 2025-26. After rising 6 percent this year (y/y), base metal prices are forecast to hold steady next year before softening by 3 percent in 2026. This reflects only moderate expected growth of industrial activity in major economies, particularly China. In contrast, following a 10 percent drop this year, iron ore prices are forecast to fall further in 2025-26 as major producers expand output and new mines come online. After increasing by 21 percent this year, the precious metals price index is forecast to plateau around record annual levels in the coming years. Sustained elevated price expectations are largely attributable to gold, which has broken price records in 2024 due to strong demand—both official demand from several emerging market and developing economy (EMDE) central banks and private demand, boosted by declining U.S. interest rates and heightened geopolitical tensions (figure 2.C).

Agricultural prices

Agricultural prices, after edging up in 2024, are expected to fall by 4 percent in 2025 (y/y), largely reflecting increasing supplies amid favorable weather conditions, with little change anticipated in 2026. Within the agriculture index, food commodity prices—including grains, oils and

FIGURE 2 Commodity price forecasts, risks, and implications

Commodity prices are expected to decline moderately, overall, in 2025-26. A projected decrease in oil prices stems from steady supply growth set against decelerating global oil demand. Food prices are forecast to continue softening next year, reflecting solid harvests and favorable growing conditions. Gold prices, buoyed in part by strong central bank demand, are likely to remain elevated in 2025. In the near term, heightened geopolitical tensions pose notable upside risks to prices for energy and broader commodities. However, over the forecast period, risks to commodity prices are slightly tilted to the downside, as considerable excess oil supply could emerge if OPEC+ adheres to its current production schedule. In addition, two-sided risks to economic activity globally, and especially in China, are a further source of commodity price uncertainty.

A. Commodity price projections



B. Change in global oil demand



C. Gold purchases by central banks



D. Food price forecasts



E. Brent oil prices in 2025 under risk scenarios



F. Quarterly commodity price changes by quintile of GDP growth in China, 2000-19



Sources: International Energy Agency (IEA); World Bank; World Gold Council.
Note: AEs = advanced economies; bbl = barrels of oil; mb/d = million barrels per day.
A. Commodity prices refers to the World Bank commodity price index, excluding precious metals. Dashed lines indicate forecasts.
B. Bars indicate change in annual global oil demand. Data based on IEA *Oil Market Report*, September 2024 edition. Green line displays the 2010-14 average, and blue line displays the 2015-19 average.
C. Gold purchases by central banks and other official sector institutions for the first half of each year in metric tons. Last observation is 2024Q2.
D. 2024, 2025 and 2026 are forecasts.
E. Blue dashed lines indicate baseline forecasts for the price of Brent oil. Oil prices are depicted as annual average values. Red and orange dashed lines indicate outcomes for the average Brent oil price in 2025 under different scenarios, as described in the text.
F. Bars show average changes in quarterly commodity prices in 2000-19, according to the quintile of China's q/q seasonally adjusted GDP growth rate during that period.

meals, and other foods—are on course to decline by 9 percent this year, then forecast to soften by a further 4 percent next year before leveling off in 2026 (figure 2.D). Over time, this should help improve overall food affordability, particularly in EMDEs. After a 58 percent surge in 2024, beverage prices are forecast to partially fall back in the next two years. Although growing conditions in major cocoa and coffee regions are likely to improve, prices are expected to remain elevated by historical standards. Meanwhile, agricultural raw material prices are projected to remain broadly stable over the forecast period.

Risks

In the near term, the possibility of escalating conflict in the Middle East poses substantial upside risks to energy prices. A conflict-related reduction in the region's energy exports could drive oil and gas prices higher in the closing months of 2024 and well above the forecasts for next year, with knock-on consequences for other commodities. Other upside risks to commodity prices include stronger-than-anticipated economic growth, especially if related to policy stimulus in China, and potential supply disruptions due to climate change-related extreme weather. Even so, over the forecast horizon, risks to the aggregate commodity price forecast are tilted slightly to the downside. This reflects a judgment that the steady unwinding of OPEC+ production cuts—in line with announced policy—could generate abundant oil supply, significantly reducing oil prices and lowering commodity prices overall. In addition, weaker-than-expected global industrial activity could weigh on energy and metal prices.

Upside risks

Geopolitical tensions. The recent surge in Middle East tensions—accompanied by a rapid rise in oil prices—underscores that broader conflicts remain a major risk in commodity markets. If intensifying conflict were to damage the oil and gas infrastructure of major commodity producers, energy prices could rise sharply.

Conflict escalation scenario: To calibrate the potential impact of a geopolitics-driven supply disruption, a scenario is assessed in which global oil supply declines by 2 mb/d due to a conflict-related shock in late 2024. A shortfall of this magnitude—equivalent to about 2 percent of global oil production—would be comparable to such historical oil supply decreases as those caused by the Iraq War in 2003 and the Libyan civil war in 2011, and consistent with events that materially encumber oil exports from the Middle East. In response, oil prices would rise sharply, with the price of Brent crude oil close to $92/bbl at peak impact, similar to last year's monthly high. After a couple of months, unaffected oil producers respond to higher prices by increasing oil production. As such, oil prices gradually decrease over 2025, while remaining above the pre-escalation level. For 2025 as a whole, the price of Brent oil averages $84/bbl, 15 percent above the baseline forecast but only 5 percent above the average 2024 price, reflecting price declines in the second half of this year (figure 2.E).

An energy supply shock comparable to the above scenario could also have repercussions for wider commodity prices, for example, by feeding into higher agricultural and fertilizer prices, as happened in early 2022. These potential knock-on effects reflect the role of energy commodities as key production inputs and of biofuels as crude oil substitutes. Moreover, depending on the specific permutations of conflict escalation, energy market impacts could be larger than envisaged. For example, oil and gas prices might respond particularly sharply if critical energy trade routes were compromised.

Stronger global GDP growth. Global GDP growth is expected to hold steady in 2025-26. As such, the commodity price forecasts do not anticipate any broad demand impetus from fluctuations in economic activity. However, economic growth could turn out higher than expected in both China and the United States—the world's two largest economies—driving significantly stronger commodity demand. If China's policymakers intensify stimulus efforts to bolster output growth prospects, industrial commodity prices could increase substantially. In general, the pace of output growth in China has been a key driver of commodity markets in recent decades. Between 2000 and 2019, quarters when China's GDP growth was in its bottom quintile were typically accompanied by a 5 percent decline in commodity prices, while top-quintile growth was marked by average increases of 7 percent in overall commodity prices and 12 percent in copper prices (figure 2.F). In addition, higher commodity prices could be buttressed by above-trend GDP growth in the United States. Despite an anticipated slowdown, recent indicators of U.S. economic activity remain robust.

Extreme weather events. The global average temperature over the last 12 months exceeded pre-industrial levels by more than 1.5 degrees Celsius, surpassing the threshold that countries committed to stay below under the 2015 Paris Agreement. In this context, climactic shifts and extreme weather events risk supply disruptions for a range of commodities. In agricultural markets, adverse weather events, particularly heat waves, can lead to yield losses by inducing water stress, worsening pest and disease issues, and decreasing labor productivity. By curbing supply in affected markets, such losses could push prices above their forecast levels. In the energy sector, more frequent and lengthy heat waves could compromise hydropower output while stoking energy demand for air conditioning. As a result, consumption of natural gas and coal could be greater than envisaged in the baseline, also implying higher prices.

Downside risks

Increased oil supply. OPEC+ has maintained its agreement, first reached in late 2023, for voluntary oil supply cuts of 2.2 mb/d, in addition to 1.65 mb/d of prior cuts. The duration of the voluntary reductions has been repeatedly extended as oil demand has undershot OPEC+ forecasts. Given this trend, the oil price projections assume that the large majority of OPEC+ output cuts are retained until the end of 2025. However, in view of expanding oil production in non-OPEC+ countries, OPEC+ could instead opt to prioritize market share over price.

Increased oil supply scenario: If the 2.2 mb/d of OPEC+ voluntary cuts were unwound during 2025—in line with announced policy but contrary to the baseline assumptions—global oil production would be expected to markedly exceed demand next year. In a scenario where OPEC+ largely follows the current stated policy and other oil exporters do not reduce production to offset the associated supply increase, global oil production in 2025 would be, on average, about 1.5 mb/d greater than in the baseline. As a result, global oil stocks would build considerably, putting sustained downward pressure on prices. Reflecting ample supply set against modest demand growth, the Brent oil price would be expected to decline to average $66/bbl in 2025, about 10 percent below the baseline forecast and 18 percent lower than the projected 2024 average price.

Weaker global industrial activity. In the context of still elevated interest rates and subdued global trade growth, recent data releases indicate potential downside risks to global industrial activity. For example, despite declining policy rates, euro area industrial production has contracted (compared to 12 months earlier) for most of 2024, while global manufacturing PMIs for output, new orders, and new export orders signaled contraction in 2024Q3. Meanwhile, protracted domestic demand weakness in China has partly stemmed from a persistent drag from the commodity-intensive construction sector. If stimulus measures do not take root and the property sector weakens further, GDP growth in China could undershoot forecasts. The materialization of downside risks to global industrial activity would significantly dampen associated commodity demand, with commodity prices falling alongside.

Broader implications

Implications of the baseline commodity price forecasts

Global consumer price inflation. As past and anticipated declines in energy and food commodity prices pass through to consumer prices—albeit to varying degrees across different products and regions—they should continue to put downward pressure on headline inflation, particularly its non-core components. Lower commodity prices should, therefore, help central banks bring headline inflation back toward targets, especially in EMDEs where food and energy form relatively large components of consumption baskets.[3] Furthermore, given that energy and food prices tend to be particularly salient to consumers, the projected easing of commodity prices could also temper inflation expectations, which could feed back into reduced core inflation pressures.[4]

Food insecurity. Declining food commodity prices are likely to bolster food affordability in EMDEs, helping to alleviate systemic food insecurity in some contexts. However, the relationship between global commodity prices and food insecurity is increasingly complicated by localized food crises related to conflicts, natural disasters, and idiosyncratic economic shocks. As a result, with armed conflict remaining the predominant cause, the global incidence of undernourishment—a key measure of global hunger—has not fallen since 2017, affecting over 9 percent of the global population, or more than 730 million people, in 2023. Moreover, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization is expecting the number of people experiencing undernourishment to rise further in 2025, to 735 million.

Implications of risks to the commodity price forecasts

Conflict-related commodity price spike. A conflict-driven spike in commodity prices would represent a negative commodity-specific supply shock for the global economy. Commodity price increases, like those envisaged in the conflict escalation scenario, could drive headline inflation higher next year through both direct effects on energy and food prices and via the pass-through of

[3] Ha, J., M. A. Kose, and F. Ohnsorge, eds. 2019. *Inflation in Emerging and Developing Economies: Evolution, Drivers and Policies*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

[4] D'Acunto, F., U. Malmendier, J. Ospina, and M. Weber. 2019. "Exposure to Daily Price Changes and Inflation Expectations." NBER Working Paper 26237, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.

commodity input costs into wider consumer prices. While inflation has broadly declined this year, much of this reflects downward pressure from food and energy components. A reversal of this trend could reignite concerns about above-target inflation in many economies at a time when elevated core and services inflation have proved persistent. This would likely result in the paring back of expectations for widespread and substantial interest rate cuts this year, which could weigh on global GDP growth by tightening global financial conditions. Moreover, real household incomes would be curbed by rising prices for essential goods, constraining consumption growth.

Greater oil supply. If a larger-than-expected increase in oil supply were to occur, it would represent a positive commodity-specific supply shock for the global economy in the near-term, although it could also potentially slow the energy transition by incentivizing fossil fuel consumption. All else being equal, reduced energy prices would result in increased real incomes for consumers, reduced industrial input costs, and terms of trade benefits in oil importers, likely boosting global demand. That said, for the envisioned potential price declines, the net benefit to global activity could be marginal, tempered by weaker activity in oil exporters. Indeed, a large decline in oil prices in 2014-16, with a major supply-driven component, failed to generate a material positive global growth impulse. At that time, factors behind the muted response of global demand—all of which could potentially materialize again—included declining U.S. extractives investment, limited pass-through of crude oil price declines to consumers, and pro-cyclical policy tightening in some oil exporters.[5]

Special Focus

The Special Focus analyzes commodity price synchronization from 2020 to mid-2024, a period including the pandemic-related global recession and subsequent recovery, and contrasts it with earlier commodity cycles, including around the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis. The analysis reveals three main findings. First, a common factor has played a significant role in explaining industrial commodity prices, particularly during periods of economic stress. This factor accounted for over 60 percent, 40 percent, and 26 percent of price movements for base metals, energy, and food commodities, respectively, during 2020-24. Second, non-commodity global supply shocks typically have the largest and most lasting effects on commodity prices, followed by commodity-specific shocks—such as weather or geopolitical events—while global demand shocks, such as fiscal stimuli, tend to have more temporary effects. Third, while global supply shocks were dominant in the early 2000s and around the Global Financial Crisis, post-pandemic commodity prices have been substantially shaped by commodity-specific shocks, such as those related to conflict. This has given rise to novel price patterns, such as precious metals moving more in sync with the common factor, due to safe-haven demand. Although the commodity market effects of global shocks earlier this decade have largely subsided, resulting in more varied price movements across commodities, risks remain. Specifically, major supply disruptions in energy and agricultural producing regions could trigger a renewed synchronized upswing in commodity prices. Such synchronized spikes are particularly detrimental for global inflation and economic activity.

[5] Stocker M., J. Baffes, Y. M. Some, D. Vorisek, and C. M. Wheeler. 2018."The 2014-16 Oil Price Collapse in Retrospect: Sources and Implications." Policy Research Working Paper 8419, World Bank, Washington, DC.

TABLE 1 World Bank Commodity Price Forecasts

							Percent change from previous year			Differences in levels from April 2024 projections	
Commodity	Unit	2022	2023	2024f	2025f	2026f	2024f	2025f	2026f	2024f	2025f
INDEXES (in nominal U.S. dollars, 2010 = 100)											
Total [1]		142.5	108.0	104.3	99.0	97.3	-3.4	-5.1	-1.7	-1.0	-2.6
Energy [2]		152.6	106.9	100.8	94.5	92.5	-5.8	-6.2	-2.1	-3.2	-5.5
Non-Energy		122.1	110.2	111.6	108.2	106.9	1.3	-3.1	-1.2	3.7	3.3
Agriculture		119.3	110.9	113.2	108.4	107.9	2.1	-4.2	-0.5	3.8	3.6
Beverages		106.3	107.8	170.7	155.0	150.8	58.4	-9.2	-2.7	38.8	39.2
Food		138.1	125.4	114.8	110.2	109.8	-8.5	-4.0	-0.4	-3.7	-3.7
Oils and Meals		145.2	118.9	105.3	101.2	102.0	-11.4	-3.9	0.7	-4.9	-3.7
Grains		150.4	133.0	112.9	107.6	107.9	-15.2	-4.6	0.2	-5.1	-6.0
Other food		117.7	127.2	129.1	124.4	121.9	1.5	-3.7	-2.0	-0.7	-1.8
Raw Materials		80.3	77.1	80.1	80.4	81.4	3.9	0.4	1.2	4.3	3.3
Timber		80.1	79.1	80.2	81.9	83.2	1.3	2.1	1.6	1.9	1.8
Other raw materials		80.5	74.9	80.1	78.9	79.4	6.9	-1.5	0.7	7.0	4.9
Fertilizers		235.7	153.5	116.9	115.2	117.1	-23.9	-1.4	1.6	-3.3	2.3
Metals and Minerals [3]		115.0	104.0	107.7	106.8	103.7	3.6	-0.9	-2.9	4.3	2.7
Base Metals [4]		122.4	109.0	115.6	116.5	113.5	6.1	0.8	-2.6	5.7	5.0
Precious Metals [5]		136.8	147.3	177.6	178.0	174.3	20.5	0.2	-2.1	18.7	21.2
PRICES (in nominal U.S. dollars)											
Energy											
Coal, Australia	$/mt	344.9	172.8	137.0	120.0	105.0	-20.7	-12.4	-12.5	12.0	10.0
Crude oil, Brent	$/bbl	99.8	82.6	80.0	73.0	72.0	-3.2	-8.8	-1.4	-4.0	-6.0
Natural gas, Europe	$/mmbtu	40.3	13.1	10.8	11.5	10.5	-17.6	6.5	-8.7	1.3	1.0
Natural gas, U.S.	$/mmbtu	6.4	2.5	2.2	3.4	3.7	-13.3	54.5	8.8	-0.2	-0.1
Liquefied natural gas, Japan	$/mmbtu	18.4	14.4	13.0	13.5	12.5	-9.6	3.8	-7.4	0.5	0.0
Non-Energy											
Agriculture											
Beverages											
Cocoa	$/kg	2.39	3.28	6.90	6.00	5.90	110.3	-13.0	-1.7	1.90	2.00
Coffee, Arabica	$/kg	5.63	4.54	5.45	5.00	4.80	20.0	-8.3	-4.0	1.10	0.60
Coffee, Robusta	$/kg	2.29	2.63	4.50	4.20	3.90	71.3	-6.7	-7.1	1.00	1.40
Tea, average	$/kg	3.05	2.74	3.10	3.15	3.20	13.1	1.6	1.6	0.30	0.40
Food											
Oils and Meals											
Coconut oil	$/mt	1,635	1,075	1,460	1,550	1,400	35.8	6.2	-9.7	275	450
Groundnut oil	$/mt	2,203	2,035	1,770	1,750	1,700	-13.0	-1.1	-2.9	-130	-100
Palm oil	$/mt	1,276	886	925	860	850	4.3	-7.0	-1.2	20	35
Soybean meal	$/mt	548	541	445	435	444	-17.8	-2.2	2.1	-35	-25
Soybean oil	$/mt	1,667	1,119	1,030	1,020	1,053	-7.9	-1.0	3.2	-100	-130
Soybeans	$/mt	675	598	455	430	440	-23.9	-5.5	2.3	-45	-45
Grains											
Barley	$/mt	…	…	186	185	184	...	-0.5	-0.5	-9	0
Maize	$/mt	319	253	187	185	188	-26.0	-1.1	1.6	-13	-11
Rice, Thailand, 5%	$/mt	437	554	598	530	518	8.0	-11.4	-2.3	3	-20
Wheat, U.S., HRW	$/mt	430	340	270	265	268	-20.7	-1.9	1.1	-20	-20

TABLE 1 World Bank Commodity Price Forecasts (*continued*)

							Percent change from previous year			Differences in levels from April 2024 projections	
Commodity	**Unit**	**2022**	**2023**	**2024f**	**2025f**	**2026f**	**2024f**	**2025f**	**2026f**	**2024f**	**2025f**
PRICES (in nominal U.S. dollars)											
Non-Energy											
Other Food											
Bananas, U.S.	$/kg	1.49	1.60	1.30	1.25	1.20	-18.6	-3.8	-4.0	-0.40	-0.30
Beef	$/kg	5.62	4.90	5.70	5.90	5.91	16.3	3.5	0.2	0.50	0.60
Chicken	$/kg	1.68	1.53	1.42	1.40	1.38	-7.4	-1.4	-1.4	-0.10	-0.10
Oranges	$/kg	0.92	1.57	2.20	1.70	1.58	39.8	-22.7	-7.3	0.50	0.20
Shrimp	$/kg	13.51	10.19	8.60	9.00	9.50	-15.6	4.7	5.6	-0.90	-1.00
Sugar, World	$/kg	0.41	0.52	0.45	0.46	0.46	-12.9	2.2	-0.2	0.00	0.00
Raw Materials											
Timber											
Logs, Africa	$/cum	369	379	380	390	395	0.4	2.6	1.3	-10	-5
Logs, S.E. Asia	$/cum	228	212	200	210	215	-5.8	5.0	2.4	0	0
Sawnwood, S.E. Asia	$/cum	675	678	700	710	720	3.3	1.4	1.4	20	20
Other Raw Materials											
Cotton	$/kg	2.86	2.09	1.90	2.00	2.05	-9.3	5.3	2.5	-0.30	-0.20
Rubber, TSR20	$/kg	1.54	1.38	1.75	1.80	1.85	26.6	2.9	2.8	0.20	0.20
Tobacco	$/mt	4,270	5,016	5,350	4,900	4,800	6.7	-8.4	-2.0	1050	650
Fertilizers											
DAP	$/mt	772	550	560	510	505	1.8	-8.9	-1.0	-40	-40
Phosphate rock	$/mt	266	322	155	160	165	-51.8	3.2	3.1	-10	-10
Potassium chloride	$/mt	863	383	295	290	295	-23.0	-1.7	1.7	-5	0
TSP	$/mt	716	480	475	425	425	-1.1	-10.5	0.0	25	45
Urea, E. Europe	$/mt	700	358	330	335	340	-7.8	1.5	1.5	-20	10
Metals and Minerals											
Aluminum	$/mt	2,705	2,256	2,475	2,500	2,600	9.7	1.0	4.0	175	100
Copper	$/mt	8,822	8,490	9,250	9,300	8,500	8.9	0.5	-8.6	350	500
Iron ore	$/dmt	121.3	120.6	108.0	95.0	90.0	-10.4	-12.0	-5.3	-2	-10
Lead	$/mt	2,151	2,136	2,100	2,050	2,100	-1.7	-2.4	2.4	0	0
Nickel	$/mt	25,834	21,521	17,000	17,500	18,500	-21.0	2.9	5.7	0	-500
Tin	$/mt	31,335	25,938	30,000	32,000	34,000	15.7	6.7	6.3	3000	4000
Zinc	$/mt	3,481	2,653	2,700	2,600	2,500	1.8	-3.7	-3.8	200	0
Precious Metals											
Gold	$/toz	1,801	1,943	2,350	2,325	2,250	21.0	-1.1	-3.2	250	275
Silver	$/toz	21.8	23.4	28.0	30.0	31.0	19.7	7.1	3.3	3.0	4.0
Platinum	$/toz	962	966	1,000	1,050	1,100	3.5	5.0	4.8	0	0

Source: World Bank.
1. The World Bank's *commodity total price index* is composed of energy and non-energy prices (excluding precious metals), weighted by their share in 2002-04 exports. The energy index's share in the overall index is 67 percent.
2. Energy price index includes coal (Australia), crude oil (Brent), and natural gas (Europe, Japan, U.S.).
3. Base metals plus iron ore.
4. Includes aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin, and zinc.
5. Precious metals are not part of the non-energy index.
f = forecast.