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# Can insurance markets build resilience and reduce the cost of social protection? Theoretical hypotheses and empirical methods for moving forward

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
# Theory of Insurance Markets & the Cost of Social Protection

- Quickly review key insights from the Janzen-Carter-Ikegami (2020) empirically-calibrated theoretical analysis
- The model assumes that households are forward looking & maximize expected stream of utility:
  - ▷ Face credit constraints and risk;
  - ▷ Have the option to purchase asset insurance that pays off in bad states of the world;
  - ▷ Have full trust and understanding of insurance; and
  - ▷ May face a poverty trap technology (focus here on poverty trap case only)

# Theory of Insurance Markets & the Cost of Social Protection


- The analysis highlights three avenues by which insurance can change poverty dynamics & reduce the cost of social protection:
  - ▷ By braking the downward economic descent of households, insurance can create a vulnerability reduction or *Resilience* effect
  - ▷ By enhancing investment incentives for poor and vulnerable households, insurance creates a *Resilience Dividend* effect
  - ▷ Because it can be offered with a partial subsidy, insurance can create a budget match effect that allows government expenditures to go further
- Together, these observations suggest insurance can alter poverty dynamics AND reduce total costs of social protection

# Impacts on Poverty Dynamics



- Illustrate 3 policy scenarios:
  - ▷ Autarky (no insurance);
  - ▷ Insurance at market price generates improvements driven primarily by Resilience effect;
  - ▷ Insurance with targeted subsidy offers further improvement, driven primarily by Resilience Dividend effect.

# Impacts on Social Protection Expenditures



- Under autarky, government reactively issues cash transfers to all poor households; Cost of social protection is the cost of these transfers
- Unsubsidized insurance market lowers the present value cost of social protection by almost 20%
- Under subsidy program, public expenditures are needed cash transfers plus cost of 50% insurance subsidy loosely targeted to poor and near poor households
- While more expensive the no subsidy program, this program has larger poverty reduction effects & reduces present value of social protection expenditures by 6% compared to autarky case

# Aside on Insurance as a Form of Shock-responsive Social Protection

- Insurance is only one form of shock responsive social protection as governments can directly implement scalable or shock responsive social protection programs (see Kenya's HSNP-2 program)
- However, gains illustrated above depend on two things:
  - ▷ Reliability (only get Resilience dividend if protection is fully anticipated & trusted *ex ante*)
  - ▷ Speedy disbursements
- We have yet to see evidence if government programs can meet these criteria
- There is a related and important discussion on whether government (or NGO) provided scalable social protection should be financed with Sovereign insurance (e.g., ARC contracts) or funded from other fiscal sources. See Carter & Martínez-Sugastti (2023)

# From Theoretical to Real World Resilience

- While the theory is suggestive:
  - ▷ Can insurance really bolster resilience in the real world
  - ▷ And, if it can, how do we empirically measure resilience in the first place?
- So is it possible to move these ideas from the safe confines of economic theory and actually implement them in the real world?

# Definition & Measurement of Economic Resilience

- Economic resilience is the ability to manage a shock with “minimal” compromise of current & future economic well-being
- While this definition is imprecise, it does suggest measuring resilience by looking at the degree to which shocks compromise current and future well-being
- From this perspective, resilience measurement requires two things:
  - ▷ Observation of the time path of economic well-being during and after a shock; and,
  - ▷ A counterfactual measure of what current & future well-being *would have been* without a shock
- Propose here a resilience measure based on these two elements that can be implemented using longitudinal living standards data such as that generated by LSMS, field experiments, etc.
- Show that this measure can be used to answer the policy demand to see if efforts to promote resilience generates a demand for measures that can determine if indeed “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”



# Economics of Sensitivity to Shocks

- The empirical measurement of resilience has unfortunately been distracted by a large-ish literature intent on measuring resilience “capacities” without a conceptually founded measure of resilience itself
- Fortunately, there is a literature that explore the impact of shocks on households’ consumption and asset holdings over time that suggests ways of measuring resilience.
- Alloush & Carter (2023) build on that literature and suggest a coherent measure of resilience
- After reviewing that measure, we will illustrate its use to gauge the Resilience & Resilience Dividend Effects of an insurance intervention in Mozambique & Tanzania

# A Resilience Metric that Measures What We Mean

- Using a dynamic programming model, we create a simulated data set of 10,000 households observed over 14 seasons
- Households are heterogeneous, endowed with different levels of productive capital and different levels of entrepreneurial skill
- We initially assume that all households are converging toward the same equilibrium income level by building up their assets
- Advantage of this approach is that we randomly introduce shocks so that we can clearly define resilience with a counterfactual measure based on the time path of those not shocked.


# A Resilience Metric that Measures What We Mean

- In season 4, a random sample of 50% of the households in the data set are “treated” with a severe shock that destroys between 40% and 60% of their productive assets:
  - ▷ Denote the average or expected income of these shock-treated households in year  $t$  as  $E[y_{it}^S]$
- The other 50% of households serve as the counterfactual of what current and future well-being would have been without the shock
  - ▷ Denote the average or expected income in year  $t$  of these control households as  $E[y_{it}^C]$
- Can estimate these objects using a standard shock-sensitivity regression framework:

$$y_{it} = (1 - Post_t) \times \left( \sum_{t=1}^T \beta_t^C d_t + \beta_t^S (S_i \times d_t) \right) + Post_t \times \left( \sum_{t=1}^T \beta_t^C d_t + \beta_t^S (S_i \times d_t) \right) + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where  $S_i$  is binary variable indicating assignment to the shock treatment

# Graphical Measure of Resilience



- Graphically, define average resilience as:

$$\bar{R} = 1 - \left( \frac{L}{L + R} \right)$$


- Note that this measure captures the fraction of the initial income loss that is mitigated
- $\bar{R} = 0$  for a household that never recovers from the shock ( $R = 0$ ), and will approach 1 for a household that recovers immediately ( $L = 0$ )
- In this case, resilience measure  $\bar{R} = 43\%$

# Individual Resilience

- Define individual resilience as:

$$R_i = \left( \frac{\sum_{t=4}^{14} (y_{it}^T(y_{i0}, \alpha_i) - y_{i4}^T(y_{i0}, \alpha_i))}{\sum_{t=4}^{14} (\hat{y}_{it}^C(y_{i0}, \alpha_i) - y_{i4}^T(y_{i0}, \alpha_i))} \right)$$


where  $\hat{y}_{it}^C$  is the matched counterfactual estimate for person  $i$ .  
In our simulated data, we use exact matching



# Evaluating a Resilience-promoting Intervention

- The government buys every household a catastrophic insurance policy with the following characteristics:
  - ▷ Insurance pays nothing for shocks that destroy less than 40% of household assets
  - ▷ Insurance pays half the value of any losses over 40%
- Using the probabilities in our underlying model, we can calculate the actuarially fair price of this insurance policy
- In the analysis to follow we assume that the policy is marked up 25% over the actuarially fair price
- We ignore behavioral consequences of insurance (but see Janzen *et al.*, 2021)

# Impact of Resilience-promoting Intervention



- Note that area  $\Delta$  is the average resilience gain.
- For each individual  $i$  we can calculate the discounted present value of this resilience gain, which simply the difference between  $\tilde{R}_i$  with and without insurance. Summing these across individuals gives the total social benefit

# Measuring the Efficacy & Cost-effectiveness of Intervention

- To measure the cost of the intervention, we assume that the government has been buying the contract for the entire population for a decade. Given that the severe loss events happen about 5% of the time, this gives a fair representation of the cost of the insurance program relative to its benefits (with half the population receiving a shock once in 10 years)


	No Poverty Trap		Poverty Trap	
	<i>Autarchy</i>	<i>Catastrophic Insurance</i>	<i>Autarchy</i>	<i>Catastrophic Insurance</i>
Mean Resilience	43%	70%	41%	72%
Benefit Cost Ratio		1.8		2.2

- In other words, accounting for the cost of money, every dollar spent promoting resilience through insurance returns \$1.8 in benefits
- Let's transition to a real world example



# Using this Resilience Metric to Evaluate a Real World Resilience Intervention

- Boucher et al. (2023) report on an experiment designed to study the impact of a bundle featuring a genetic technology (drought tolerant maize) and a financial technology (fail-safe index insurance) on small holder farmers in Mozambique & Tanzania
- Study was spatially diversified, within and between countries, to maximize the probability of observing the impact of climate shocks on farmers and the efficacy of the technology bundle




# Identifying the Impact of Shocks & Counterfactuals

- Basic ANCOVA regression approach:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{ist} = & [\beta_1^y d_{ist} + \beta_2^y z_{ist}] + [\beta_3^y d_{is(t-1)} + \beta_4^y (d_{is(t-1)} \times E_t) + \beta_5^y z_{is(t-1)} + \beta_6^y (z_{is(t-1)} \\ & S_{is} \times [\delta_0^y + \delta_E^y E_t + \delta_1^y d_{ist} + \delta_2^y (d_{ist} \times E_t) + \delta_3^y (d_{is(t-1)} \times E_t)]] + \\ & I_{is} \times [\gamma_0^y + \gamma_E^y E_t + \gamma_1^y (z_{is(t-1)} \times E_{ist})] + \\ & [\alpha_0^y y_{is0} + \alpha_E^y E_t + \alpha_1^{y'} x_{is0} + v_s^y] + \varepsilon_{ist}^y \end{aligned}$$


- Using this regression, we can identify a series of predicted outcomes under predicted treatments and exposure to different shocks.

# Resilience Measurement for Experimental Control Group



- Immediate impact of a “composite” shock caused a drop of farmer net income from maize from \$1500 to about \$700
- Recovery is slow, with reduced investment at the intensive and extensive margins the year following the shock
- The resilience measure  $\bar{R} = 18\%$ , assuming linear recovery trajectory in the post-survey year

# Gains from the Genetic/Financial Technology Bundle



- Resilience rises from 18% to 82% (using control group as counterfactual)
- If we value the resilience dividend, we find a benefit-cost ratio of 6.5, where this number comes from assuming that the technology is purchased for 5 years before the shock occurs, and the technology is paid for another 5 years after the shock
- Clearly an ounce of prevention can pay!

# Conclusion

- While some prior approaches to resilience measurement seem to confuse resilience with poverty and income distribution dynamics, we have shown here that it is possible to create a resilience measure that captures the what we mean by economic resilience
- The method is also robust to poverty trap dynamics
- Subject to the usual identification concerns, this measure can be used to explore the determinants of resilience and, or measure the impact of interventions on resilience
- A combination controlled/natural experiments illustrates the large resilience gains from a risk management intervention based on insurance
- Many real world challenges to assure that index insurance is really up to the task, but see my discussion tomorrow morning on insurance quality for WB Disaster Risk Finance series

## For Further Reading

- Alloush, Mo and Michael Carter (2023). “On the Definition and Estimation of Economic Resilience using Well-identified Counterfactuals,” Working Paper, UC-Davis.
- Boucher, S., M.R. Carter, T. Lybbert, J. Malacarne, P. Marenya and L. Paul (2023). “Bundling Genetic and Financial Technologies for More Resilient and Productive Small-scale Farmers in Africa,” *NBER Working Paper no. w29234* (revised).
- Carter, Michael R. and Marcos Martínez-Sugastti (2023). “The Economics of Sovereign Index Insurance in Low and Middle Income Countries,” Working Paper, UC-Davis
- Janzen, Sarah, Michael R Carter and Munenobu Ikegami (2021). “Can insurance alter poverty dynamics and reduce the cost of social protection in developing countries?” *Journal of Risk and Insurance* 88:293-324.