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TECHNICAL NOTE #1c

Distribution of IBRD/IDA Commitments by Country Income Group
(FY78 $ millions) a/

Country Income Group		Actual FY73 $m	FY73 %	FY74 $m	FY74 %	FY75 $m	FY75 %	FY76 $m	FY76 %	FY77 $m	FY77 %	Estimate FY78* $m	FY78* %	Projected FY79* $m	FY79* %	FY80* $m	FY80* %	FY81* $m	FY81* %	FY82* $m	FY82* %	FY83* $m	FY83* %
GNP per capita b/																							
Over $1135	- IBRD	1000	34	1260	30	1466	28	1312	23	1511	24	1829	30	1574	25	1553	23	1773	25	1801	25	1902	25
	- IDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
$551-1135	- IBRD	1162	40	1729	41	1854	35	2037	35	2244	37	2326	38	2498	39	2653	40	2614	37	2661	36	2786	37
	- IDA	213	11	69	5	64	3	28	1	19	1	28	1	29	1	34	1	22	1	21	1	25	1
$281-550	- IBRD	503	17	953	22	767	14	1031	18	1077	17	839	14	1073	17	1334	20	1327	19	1468	20	1615	21
	- IDA	179	9	151	10	165	8	90	5	103	7	206	9	175	7	222	8	172	7	180	7	205	8
$280 or less	- IBRD	262	9	304	7	1241	23	1348	24	1348	22	1106	18	1199	19	1174	17	1304	19	1385	19	1315	17
	- IDA	1542	80	1223	85	1713	89	1787	94	1279	92	2066	90	2222	92	2360	91	2254	92	2237	92	2190	91
Total	- IBRD	2927	100	4246	100	5328	100	5728	100	6180	100	6100	100	6344	100	6714	100	7018	100	7315	100	7618	100
	- IDA	1934	100	1443	100	1942	100	1905	100	1401	100	2300	100	2426	100	2616	100	2448	100	2438	100	2420	100

a/ FY78 constant dollars calculated by factoring the FY77 deflator so that FY78 = 100.

b/ Based on 1976 GNP per capita figures.

* Preliminary Estimate.

P & B
12/21/77

Poverty Lending Component by Sector [a]
FY77-83 (FY78$ millions)

	FY77[b]				FY78[b]				FY79[b]				FY83				FY79-83			
	Poverty Lending		Total Lending		Poverty Lending		Total Lending		Poverty Lending		Total Lending		Poverty Lending[c]		Total Lending[d]		Poverty Lending[c]		Total Lending[d]	
	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%
Rural Development[e]	1558	70.7	1558	20.6	1680	57.7	1680	20.0	1687	56.5	1687	19.2	2058	52.1	2058	20.5	9144	54.8	9144	19.3
Urbanization[g]	130	5.9	170	2.3	198	6.8	336	4.0	285	9.5	438	5.0	380	9.6	632	6.3	1529	9.2	2591	5.5
Small Scale Industry[g]	8	.3	16	.2	20	.7	84	1.0	24	.8	87	1.0	200	5.1	402	4.0	378	2.3	1350	2.9
Population[f/g]	43	2.0	51	.6	71	2.4	84	1.0	78	2.6	87	1.0	72	1.8	80	.8	401	2.4	452	.9
Water Supply[f/g]	129	5.9	322	4.2	276	9.5	672	8.0	329	11.0	731	8.3	450	11.4	602	6.0	1833	11.0	3234	6.8
Education [f/g]	68	3.0	310	4.0	171	5.9	340	4.0	162	5.4	323	3.7	221	5.6	402	4.0	971	5.8	1867	3.9
Oil, Gas and Coal	-	-	161	2.1	-	-	84	1.0	-	-	89	1.0	-	-	402	4.0	-	-	1662	3.5
Power Generation & Dist.[f/g]	45	2.0	1021	13.5	148	5.1	1260	15.0	139	4.7	1171	13.4	210	5.3	1121	11.2	898	5.4	5717	12.0
Non-fuel Mineral Production	-	-	17	.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	129	1.5	-	-	100	1.0	-	-	725	1.5
Agriculture[e]	-	-	918	12.1	-	-	1260	15.0	-	-	1161	13.2	-	-	1214	12.1	-	-	5856	12.5
DFC[g]	26	1.2	795	10.5	60	2.1	504	6.0	76	2.5	510	5.8	50	1.3	502	5.0	351	2.1	2341	4.9
Industry and Tourism[g]	49	2.2	718	9.5	106	3.6	588	7.0	28	.9	701	8.0	88	2.2	602	6.0	158	.9	3156	6.7
Transportation[f/g]	144	6.6	1124	14.9	175	6.0	1260	15.0	180	6.0	1192	13.6	207	5.2	1182	11.8	1008	6.0	6029	12.7
Communications[g]	4	.2	150	2.0	7	.2	84	1.0	2	.1	195	2.2	15	.4	100	1.0	18	.1	599	1.3
Other	-	-	250	3.3	-	-	164	2.0	-	-	269	3.1	-	-	640	6.3	-	-	2636	5.6
Total	2204	100.0	7581	100.0	2912	100.0	8400	100.0	2990	100.0	8770	100.0	3951	100.0	10039	100.0	16689	100.0	47359	100.0
Poverty Lending as % of Total Lending			(29%)				(34%)				(34%)				(39%)				(35%)	

a/ The table identifies sector-by-sector that part of IBRD/IDA lending which is expected to provide benefits to the poverty target groups.
b/ Based on project data.
c/ Sectoral targets only; not yet supported by project data.
d/ Based on the projections provided in Technical Note 1.
e/ Poverty-orientation of agricultural lending has been assessed on the basis of the established distinction between agricultural projects and rural development projects with the latter being defined as all agricultural projects for which more than half of the direct project benefits accrue to the rural poverty target group. For rural development projects, the entire loan/credit amount has been counted as poverty-oriented lending; conversely lending for agricultural projects, which cannot be designated as rural development projects, has been considered to make no contribution to poverty-oriented lending.
f/ Lending for non-agricultural projects which are expected to contribute to rural poverty alleviation (rural roads, rural electrification, village water supply, non-formal education, etc.) has been assigned a poverty lending component in accordance with the proportion of total primary and secondary benefits (public service improvements, user cost savings and/or employment creation) which are projected to accrue to the rural poor.
g/ For all projects which are expected to have an urban poverty impact, the poverty-oriented lending component has been computed following the current established procedures.

P & B
1/26/78

TECHNICAL NOTE #1 — REVISED

Distribution of IBRD/IDA Commitments by Type of Lending
(FY78 $ millions) a/

	FY72		Actual FY73		Actual FY74		Actual FY75		Actual FY76		Actual FY77		Estimate FY78*		Projected* FY79		Projected* FY80		Projected* FY81		Projected* FY82		Projected* FY83	
	$m	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%
Rural Development b/	192	4	352	7	594	10	1208	17	912	12	1558	21	1680	20	1687	19	1740	18	1757	19	1902	20	2058	21
Urbanization c/	16	-	51	1	149	3	115	2	92	1	170	2	336	4	438	5	479	5	476	5	566	6	632	6
Small Scale Industry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	0	84	1	87	1	187	2	284	3	390	4	402	4
Population	55	1	31	1	22	0	49	1	30	0	51	1	84	1	87	1	93	1	95	1	97	1	80	1
Water Supply	87	2	398	8	229	4	179	2	385	5	322	4	672	8	731	9	653	7	663	7	585	6	602	6
Education	286	6	389	8	202	4	276	4	370	5	310	4	340	4	323	4	373	4	379	4	390	4	402	4
Oil, Gas, Coal	51	1	85	2	-	-	99	1	56	1	161	2	84	1	89	1	404	4	474	5	293	3	402	4
Power Generation & Dist	825	18	458	9	1015	18	621	9	1092	14	1021	14	1260	15	1171	13	1119	12	1136	12	1170	12	1121	11
Non-fuel Mineral Production	79	2	-	-	73	1	152	2	84	1	17	0	-	-	129	1	304	3	95	1	97	1	100	1
Agriculture d/	520±	11	985	21	667	12	1083	14	961	13	918	12	1260	15	1161	13	1119	12	1133	12	1229	13	1214	12
DFC e/	399	8	442	9	456	8	621	9	876	11	795	11	504	6	510	6	560	6	379	4	390	4	502	5
Industry e/ f/ and Tourism	590	13	96	2	541	10	860	12	649	9	718	9	588	7	701	8	560	6	611	6	682	7	602	6
Transportation b/	1186	25	885	18	1261	22	1121	15	1521	20	1124	15	1260	15	1192	14	1198	13	1228	13	1229	13	1182	12
Communications	137	3	353	7	142	2	245	3	74	1	150	2	84	1	195	2	93	1	95	1	116	1	100	1
Other	300	6	336	7	338	6	641	9	531	7	250	3	164	2	269	3	448	5	661	7	618	6	640	6
Total**	4702	100	4861	100	5689	100	7270	100	7633	100	7581	100	8400	100	8770	100	9330	100	9466	100	9754	100	10039	100

a/ FY78 constant dollars calculated by factoring the FY77 deflators so that FY78=100 (i.e. assumes a 7% rate of inflation).
b/ Over the period of FY81-83 an estimated $850 million has been provided to finance 136,000 km. of rural roads as opposed to $810 million for 99,000 km. in FY75-77 and $80 million for 21,000 km. in FY69-71.
c/ The part of IBRD/IDA lending which directly affects the urban poor is expected to rise from $340 million in FY77 to $1200 million in FY83 or from 7% to 12% of all non-agricultural lending. Ten sectors contribute to the urban poverty program as shown below:

Urban Poverty Lending Components by Sector

	FY77		FY83	
	$m.	%	$m.	%
Urbanization	130	38	380	32
Small Scale Industry	-	-	200	17
Population	5	2	8	1
Water Supply	76	22	360	30
Education	21	6	60	5
Power	6	2	60	5
DFC	26	8	50	4
Tourism	49	14	67	5
Transportation	23	7	-	-
Communications	4	1	15	1
Total	340	100	1200	100

d/ Excludes rural development.
e/ Excludes small scale industries.
f/ Excludes mining.

* Preliminary estimates based on tentative work programs.
** Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Note: The numbers in this table are consistent with those circulated to the Board in June 1977 in the "Interim Financial and Operating Plan" which was based on a 5% real annual growth in IBRD commitments after FY78.

P & B
12/21/77

TECHNICAL NOTE #1a

Distribution of IBRD Commitments by Type of Lending
(FY78 $ millions) a/

	Actual										Estimate		Projected									
	FY73		FY74		FY75		FY76		FY77		FY78*		FY79*		FY80*		FY81*		FY82*		FY83*	
	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%	$m.	%
Rural Development	62	2	293	7	807	15	610	11	1232	20	1028	17	984	15	1052	16	1125	16	1238	17	1361	17
Urbanization	23	1	90	2	87	2	92	2	138	2	192	3	381	6	366	5	384	5	468	6	528	7
Small Scale Industry	-		-		-		-		16		27		87	1	50	1	81	2	113	2	118	2
Population	31	1	-		31	1	30	1	46		40	1	35	1	59	1	64	1	66	1	55	1
Water Supply	286	10	197	5	158	3	284	5	281	5	551	9	638	10	534	8	573	8	518	7	539	7
Education	231	8	177	4	156	3	282	5	226	4	240	4	142	2	249	4	267	4	281	4	293	4
Oil, Gas, Coal	85	3	-		99	2	56	1	161	3	47	1	61	1	392	6	442	6	279	4	388	5
Power Generation & Dist.	248	8	997	23	587	11	794	14	842	14	1033	17	936	15	963	14	1033	15	1089	15	1056	13
Non-Fuel Mineral Prod.	-		73	2	152	3	84	1	-		-		124	2	304	4	85	1	90	1	93	1
Agriculture b/	654	22	560	13	700	13	782	13	509	8	882	14	742	12	675	10	721	10	800	11	800	11
DFC	382	13	408	10	579	10	802	14	784	13	489	8	490	8	500	7	358	5	377	5	491	6
Industry c/ d/ & Tourism	-		375	9	706	13	517	9	718	12	470	8	503	8	418	6	576	8	658	8	588	8
Transportation	657	23	967	23	908	17	1226	21	939	15	983	16	1049	17	979	15	1061	15	1086	15	1057	14
Communications	225	8	88	2	118	2	68	1	150	2	34	1	85	1	48	1	52	1	65	1	56	1
Other	43	1	21		240	5	101	2	138	2	84	1	87	1	125	2	196	3	187	3	195	3
Total	2927	100	4246	100	5328	100	5728	100	6180	100	6100	100	6344	100	6714	100	7018	100	7315	100	7618	100

a/ FY78 constant dollars calculated by factoring the FY77 deflators so that FY78=100 (i.e. assumes a 7% rate of inflation).
b/ Excludes rural development.
c/ Excludes small scale industries.
d/ Excludes mining.
* Preliminary estimates based on tentative work programs.

Note: The numbers in this table are consistent with those circulated to the Board in June 1977 in the "Interim Financial and Operating Plan" which was based on a 5% real annual growth in commitments after FY78.

P & B
12/21/77

TECHNICAL NOTE #1b

<u>Distribution of IDA Commitments by Type of Lending</u>
(FY78 $ millions) a/

	Actual										Estimate		Projected									
	FY73		FY74		FY75		FY76		FY77		FY78*		FY79*		FY80*		FY81*		FY82*		FY83*	
	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%
Rural Development	300	16	301	21	401	21	302	16	327	23	652	29	703	29	688	27	632	26	663	27	696	28
Urbanization	28	1	59	4	28	1	-	-	32	2	144	6	57	2	113	4	92	4	98	4	104	4
Small Scale Industry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57	2	-	-	137	5	203	8	277	11	284	12
Population	-	-	22	2	18	1	-	-	5	-	44	2	52	2	34	1	31	1	31	1	25	1
Water Supply	112	6	32	2	21	1	101	5	41	3	121	5	93	4	119	5	90	4	67	3	63	3
Education	158	8	25	2	120	6	88	5	84	6	100	4	181	7	124	5	112	5	109	4	109	5
Oil, Gas, Coal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	2	28	1	12	1	32	1	14	1	14	1
Power Gen. & Dist.	210	11	18	1	34	2	298	16	179	13	227	10	235	10	156	6	103	4	81	3	65	3
Non Fuel Mineral Prod.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	1	-	-	5	0	-	-	10	-	7	-	7	-
Agriculture b/	321	16	107	7	383	20	179	9	408	29	378	17	419	17	444	17	412	17	429	18	414	17
DFC	60	3	48	3	42	2	74	4	11	1	15	1	20	1	60	2	21	1	13	1	11	-
Industry c/ d/ & Tourism	96	5	166	12	154	8	132	7	-	-	118	5	198	9	142	5	35	1	24	1	14	1
Transportation	228	12	294	20	213	11	295	15	185	14	277	12	143	6	219	8	167	7	143	6	125	5
Communications	128	7	54	4	127	7	6	-	-	-	50	2	110	4	45	2	43	2	51	2	44	2
Other	293	15	317	22	401	20	430	23	112	8	80	3	182	8	323	12	465	19	431	18	445	18
Total	1934	100	1443	100	1942	100	1905	100	1401	100	2300	100	2426	100	2616	100	2448	100	2438	100	2420	100

a/ FY78 constant dollars calculated by factoring the FY77 deflators so that FY78=100 (i.e. assumes a 7% rate of inflation).
b/ Excludes rural development.
c/ Excludes small scale industries.
d/ Excludes mining.
* Preliminary Estimates based on tentative work programs.

Note: The numbers in this table are consistent with those circulated to the Board in June 1977 in the "Interim Financial & Operating Plan" which was based on no real annual growth in commitments after FY80.

P & B
12/21/77

D

November 30, 1977

TECHNICAL NOTE #2

A Rationale for Future Real Growth in IBRD Commitments

1. The rate of growth of IBRD lending is normally approved by Executive Directors on a year-by-year basis, taking account of a wide variety of factors such as the capital requirements of developing countries, the outlook for other sources of finance and the availability of suitable projects for IBRD financing. However, in considering the desirable size of the prospective IBRD general capital increase, it is necessary to take a longer-term view of the real growth rate of IBRD commitments. By its nature this real growth rate cannot be determined by precise calculations, but is rather a matter of judgment. The purpose of this note is to describe: (a) the broad framework within which such a judgment can be made; and (b) the range of desirable growth rates implied by that framework.

2. The note first describes why it is appropriate for the IBRD to at least maintain, and possibly increase, its relative position as a supplier of external finance to the developing countries in the years ahead. It then examines the growth in external capital requirements of the countries that borrow from the IBRD. The general conclusion is that the growth rate of IBRD commitments ought to be from 5% to 7%, or more, in real terms.

The Relative Position of the IBRD

3. Why the balance between official and private flows is important. The relative importance of official and private financing in the middle-income developing countries has changed rather dramatically in recent years. As recently as 1970, official sources -- including the IBRD and the other international financial institutions -- provided 45% of the external financing for these countries. In the period 1974 through 1976 this proportion fell to 38%. A further decline in the share of official financing would be unfortunate; on the contrary, an increase in the share of finance provided by official sources is desirable for several reasons:

- the maturity of private finance, especially loans from commercial banks, is generally too short to be appropriate for many types of productive investment.

- the debt servicing burden facing many of the middle-income developing countries is already high and is projected to increase further in the next few years.

- lending by commercial banks and private direct investment are both potentially volatile and unpredictable as sources of finance.

- private capital is unlikely to be available for investments directed toward increasing the productivity of the rural and urban poor.

In considering the balance between official and private flows it is important to emphasize that what is at stake is not a substitution of official for private capital. Expanded official flows which improve the debt profile and the investment pattern of the borrowing country will enhance the security of private lenders and investors and increase the likelihood that an adequate volume of total external finance -- both official and private -- will be available to the middle-income developing countries in the years ahead.

4. Moreover, maintaining an appropriate balance between official and private flows is in the interest of all countries, both developed and developing. Productive investments appropriately financed add to the sustainable level of world economic activity. The benefits to the borrowing countries are self-evident. But there are also benefits for the developed countries through increased purchases of capital goods and consultant services, a point which assumes increased importance when the productive capacity of the industrial countries is underutilized.

5. Why the IBRD is an attractive means of maintaining or increasing the share of official finance. Most official financing is provided either in the form of concessional loans and grants from governments or in the form of loans from the international financial institutions. Concessional loans and grants from governments will almost certainly increase in real terms over the next several years. However, many donor countries plan to allocate an increasing proportion of their concessional assistance to the poorest countries, so it seems reasonable to expect that most middle-income countries will depend increasingly upon the IBRD and the other international financial institutions for significant real increases in official financing.

6. The attractiveness of the IBRD as an instrument for transferring real resources to the developing countries is enhanced by its financial structure. Unlike many types of foreign assistance -- where the entire financing is a claim on the budgets of donor countries -- only 10% of capital subscriptions to the IBRD involves a cash outlay by member governments and that in the form of equity participation. The remaining 90% takes the form of callable capital, a guarantee machanism which enables the IBRD to borrow the bulk of its resources on market terms. Thus, for every dollar actually paid into the capital of the IBRD, a lending capacity of ten dollars is created. The use of this capacity provides attractive investment opportunities for purchasers of IBRD obligations and loan finance on favorable terms for recipients of IBRD loans.

7. Moreover, the IBRD's contribution to development is not limited to the resource transfer achieved through loans. Using its worldwide project experience and country economic and sector analyses, the Bank advises member governments on a range of development policy issues. On the country level, the Bank frequently exercises a co-ordinating role through Consultative Groups and by other means. In this way, the Bank's economic work and policy analysis influence a far broader segment of external finance than the loans which it makes directly. Similarly, the attention paid to sectoral issues and to project design affects the use of resources well beyond what the Bank itself can provide.

8. Furthermore, with the rapid growth in demand for external financing from official sources, governments have been faced with an extensive array of proposals for new lending facilities. In several instances, the decision made has been to utilize the existing international institutions rather than to create new ones. Examples which affect the IBRD directly are the decision not to proceed with a separate International Resources Bank or a separate institution to provide guarantees in support of developing country access to capital markets. The stated or implied assumption behind these decisions was that the IBRD and the other international financial institutions would be provided with sufficient lending capacity to discharge these new responsibilities effectively in addition to their traditional functions.

9. Thus, if one accepts the need for a relative expansion in official finance, particularly for the rapidly growing middle-income developing countries, where is one to look? Presumably not to direct government loans or grants, since the growth in this form of finance should go mainly to the poorest countries. Presumably not to new institutions, since governments have shown definite aversion to the proliferation of institutions except in a few cases where there is clearly a new function to be performed. That leaves the existing international financial institutions. Given the relative importance of the IBRD as a source of this type of finance, the desirability of at least maintaining, and possibly increasing, its share in the overall flow of external finance appears great.

Potential Growth in LDCs Capital Requirements

10. Translating the notion of a steady or increasing IBRD "share" of external finance into a recommended real rate of growth is largely a matter of judgment. The rate of growth of external finance actually supplied by the IBRD to developing countries -- measured by its net disbursements to these countries -- is already determined for the next two or three years by commitments which the IBRD has made in the past or will make in the current fiscal year. The real rate of growth in IBRD commitments beginning in FY79 will affect the level of IBRD finance in the early and mid-1980s. Thus, the notion of a steady or

increasing IBRD share refers to a period in the future for which calculations of total external financing requirements are quite uncertain.

11. Rather than attempting to predict the external financing requirements in detail for this period, it may be sufficient to approach the issue from a broader perspective. The developing countries which borrow from the IBRD have demonstrated a capacity to sustain real rates of growth on the order of 5% to 7% for extended periods. If these countries are to maintain comparable real growth rates in the early and mid-1980s, then even if they manage to reduce dependence on external capital by increasing their domestic savings and/or the efficiency of resource use, it is difficult to envisage how their external capital requirements could grow at less than 5% per annum. Therefore, a constant IBRD "share" in the external capital flows to such countries would probably require real commitment growth of 5% to 7% per annum over the next few years.

12. A real growth rate in IBRD commitments higher than this can be justified in either of two ways. First, successful domestic efforts in the developing countries ought to result not in the same real growth rate and lesser dependence on external capital, but rather in higher growth supported by a higher volume of external capital. Alternatively, for the reasons cited in the first part of this note, the IBRD's share of finance should not remain constant but should increase in relative terms as other forms of external finance (e.g. concessional government loans) decline. This line of reasoning could lead to a recommended real rate of growth higher than 7% per annum. Under this approach, the constraints on real growth in commitments would be largely internal to the IBRD and would be judged in reference to the real growth rate which the IBRD has sustained over the past 10 or 15 years (i.e. about 11% per annum).

E

November 30, 1977

TECHNICAL NOTE #3

Implications of Growth for Administrative Efficiency and Quality of Operations

1. The tables attached to this note show preliminary projections of staff growth and numbers of operations for four different real growth rates in IBRD lending: 3%, 5%, 7% and 9%. While these projections are based on many assumptions which are themselves subject to debate, the general magnitudes shown should be sufficiently reliable to permit a reasonable assessment of the probable implications of continuing IBRD real growth in the range assumed. This note attempts to identify the main factors involved in such an assessment.

Growth and Administrative Efficiency

2. As shown in the following table, preliminary estimates of staff growth in the next few years indicate that it will be substantially slower than in the recent past under any of the four IBRD growth assumptions.

	Numbers of Staff						Annual Rate of Growth (%)				
			Prelim. Est. a/ for 1983 with Real IBRD Growth of:				1973 to 1978	1978 to 1983 with Real IBRD Growth of:			
	1973	1978 Budget	3%	5%	7%	9%		3%	5%	7%	9%
Professional Staff	1657	2321	2623	2695	2758	2855	7.0%	2.5%	3.0%	3.5%	4.2%
Non-Professional	1547	2170	2453	2517	2577	2671	6.7%	2.5%	3.0%	3.5%	4.2%
Total	3224	4491	5076	5212	5335	5526	6.9%	2.5%	3.0%	3.5%	4.2%

a/ Based on the assumptions noted in the attached tables.

In terms of absolute numbers of professional staff, IBRD growth at 9% per annum would appear to require the addition of approximately 500 new staff members over the next five years. Growth at 3% per annum would appear to reduce this figure to 300 new staff. Over the past five years the Bank has taken on about 650 new professional staff. Thus, regardless of whether one considers the issue in terms of growth rates or absolute numbers, there is little reason to anticipate major new problems in relation to staff growth over the next few years, though the Bank will no doubt continue to face the familiar difficulties in recruiting certain specialities and in diversifying its nationality mix and increasing the proportion of female staff.

3. The preliminary estimates indicate that the total size of Bank staff will fall in the range of 5000 to 5500 in FY83. The question has been raised as to whether a Bank this size might not raise especially difficult management problems. The regionalized organizational structure for the Bank adopted in 1972 (when the Bank had 3000 staff) was designed expressly to accommodate future growth. In fact, one of the problems associated with the regionalization was that the scale of operations in certain sectors and certain regions was too small to permit fully efficient utilization of specialized staff. Small units also limit flexibility in scheduling. The notion of "critical mass" is sometimes employed to express the advantages of operating at a higher level in circumstances where specialized skills and specialized functions (e.g. research) are required. Judged simply from the point of view of manageability, it may well be that a Bank of 5000 to 5500 will be easier to manage -- given the Bank's present structure -- than a Bank of 3000 to 4000 staff.

4. The preliminary projections of staff <u>do not assume any further growth in economic or sector work and only very modest growth in support activities including policy-related work</u>. This assumption may not be realistic. To some extent, the growth of policy work is independent of the growth of lending operations and therefore deserves separate consideration. But there is one interrelationship which may be mentioned as relevant to the question of administrative efficiency. A larger Bank is much better placed to carry out general economic and policy work, both because of the experience it can draw upon and because these activities are provided free of charge and must therefore be supported by a substantial scale of revenue earning activity (i.e., lending).

5. Any consideration of the impact of growth on administrative efficiency must take into account economies of scale. Because there are important fixed costs in the Bank's overall cost structure, growth in scale tends to increase output more rapidly than input. One measure of

this effect is shown in the following table, where the number of manyears per lending operation is shown for the various alternative growth rates for the IBRD.

	1972	1978 Budget	Projected for 1983 With Real IBRD Growth at: 3%	5%	7%	9%
Professional Manyears per Lending Operation a/	9.7	7.9	7.5	7.4	7.3	7.2

a/ Total professional manyears excluding manyears spent on supervision over the number of projects presented to the Board during the fiscal year.

6. While growth in size does offer economies of scale, it also poses the risk of certain diseconomies as well. For example, the scale of operations in a particular borrowing country may rise to the point where, under present procedures, it becomes a burden on the administrative and coordinating capacity of the borrowing government. According to current plans -- which correspond to 5% real growth -- annual lending programs in six to eight countries would contain seven or more operations per year by FY83. In some of these countries the Bank has already established resident offices. More rapid IBRD growth within the limits being considered would not change the character of this problem, though it might require that adjustments in the method of Bank operations in the affected countries take place sooner.

Growth and the Quality of Operations

7. In assessing the impact of growth on the quality of operations, it is important to allow for changes in the project mix. Here there are two conflicting tendencies at work. On the one hand, the Bank is continuing to shift the mix of its lending toward projects which increase the productivity of the rural and urban poor. These projects require relatively high inputs of experienced staff and involve admittedly experimental approaches in some cases. It is for these sorts of projects that the concern about pressing ahead too rapidly is most pronounced. But, on the other hand, the Bank is also building upon a steadily lengthening period of experience in borrowing countries. Repeater projects are increasingly common, even in such sectors as rural development.

8. Technical Note #1, which describes the tentative allocation of lending activity by the Bank over the next few years, gives some basis for judging the relative importance of these two tendencies. As compared to the past five years, the shift in lending mix is projected to be significantly less pronounced in the period through FY83. Moreover, some of the components which are projected for expansion -- energy and non-fuel minerals -- should not raise the same type of problem as the new style projects. The increasing number of repeater projects is likely to be significant not merely because it eases the Bank's task in project preparation and appraisal but also -- and more importantly -- because it takes advantage of earlier institution-building efforts on the part of the Bank and the borrowing country.

Table A

TECHNICAL NOTE #3

World Bank Group: Preliminary Estimates of Staff Growth Associated with Alternative Bank Group Commitment Programs a/
($ million, fiscal years)

							3% Real Growth in IBRD Lending							
		1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1964-68	1969-73	1974-78	1979-83
Number of Operations b/	- IBRD	122	141	161	151	160	164	169	174	179	203	374	680	846
	- IDA	68	73	67	89	95	102	96	96	96	80	273	366	485
	- Total	190	214	228	240 j/	255	266	265	270	275	283	647	1046	1331
	- IFC	31	33	34	37	44	47	51	54	57	74	113	167	253
Amount of Commitments	- IBRD to Countries c/	4320	4977	5759	6100	6800	7500	8200	9100	10000	4296	8917	24374	41600
	- IDA Credits	1576	1655	1308	2300	2600	3000	3000	3200	3400	1336	3932	7926	15200
	- IFC Commitments d/	212	245	259	300	375	450	530	610	685	183	569	1219	2650
	- Total in Current $ e/	6108	6877	7326	8700	9775	10950	11730	12910	14085	5815	13418	33519	59450
	- Total in FY78 Comm. $	7531	7914	7861	8700	9127	9555	9568	9840	10032	15182	23224	37948	48122
Commitment Deflator (FY78=100)		81.1	86.9	93.2	100.0	107.1	114.6	122.6	131.2	140.4				
No. of IBRD/IDA Proj. Under Supervision f/		946	1080	1218	1317	1417	1524	1616	1691	1747				
Staff End Year g/	- Professional	1883	2024	2170	2321	2378	2441	2504	2560	2623				
	- Non-professional h/	1820	1968	2072	2170	2224	2282	2341	2393	2453				
	- Total	3703	3992	4242	4491	4602	4723	4845	4953	5076				
	- % Increase	7.4	7.8	6.3	5.9	2.5 i/	2.6	2.6	2.2	2.5				

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a/ These "preliminary estimates" were made using the following assumptions, which probably somewhat understate the manpower requirements:
Number of Operations - Average loan/credit size is assumed to remain constant in real terms at the level assumed in the Interim Plan;
Lending Cost per Operation - Manpower requirements per lending operation are assumed to remain constant at the actual FY77 levels;
Supervision Cost per Operation - Supervision has been projected with a constant requirement of 12.7 manweeks per project and assumes that each project remains under supervision for 6 years;
Economic/Sector Work - This work along with technical assistance and aid coordination activities have been held constant at the levels budgeted for FY78;
Support Work - Support department staff has been projected to grow at half the rate of the operating departments;
Management and Administration - No increase is assumed from the FY78 levels;
Pipeline - Pre-appraisal work has been projected in such a way that the number of projects for which pre-appraisal work is completed at the beginning of a fiscal year increases from 68% of Board presentations scheduled for that year (the situation in FY78) to 90% by FY83;
Contingency - Reflecting the greater uncertainty of projections in the outer years, the contingency has been increased from 1% of total manyears in FY79 to 2.5% in FY83.

b/ IBRD/IDA number of operations is shown excluding loans to IFC and treating operations involving more than one loan agreement or both a loan and a credit as simply one IBRD operation. IFC commitments as shown in Interim Financial and Operating Plan.

c/ IBRD loans to IFC are excluded ($100 million in each of FY67 and FY70, $60 million in FY72, $40 million in FY73, $110 million in FY74, $50 million in FY75, $70 million in FY76, $20 million in FY77 and $722 million in the period FY78-83).

d/ Commitments signed, before cancellation, and including original participations, as shown in Interim Financial and Operating Plan.

e/ The commitment deflator is derived from the disbursement deflator taking into account the normal lag between commitments and disbursements.

f/ Figures for all years except FY75-77 are estimated.

g/ Does not include positions for reimbursable technical assistance programs.

h/ Does not include locally-hired staff in field offices.

i/ The figure is based on a gradual rebuilding of the lending pipeline, as opposed to a concentrated effort in one or two years. For this and other reasons, the manpower requirement for FY79 is almost certainly understated.

j/ Of this total, 7 were processed in the latter part of FY77.

IDA VI shown at "real level of IDA V - a 30% rise in real terms would require 22+ more Prof in '83

P & B
11/30/77

Table B

TECHNICAL NOTE #3

World Bank Group: Preliminary Estimates of Staff Growth Associated with Alternative Bank Group Commitment Programs a/
($ million, fiscal years)

		1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980 (5% Real Growth in IBRD Lending)	1981	1982	1983	1964-68	1969-73	1974-78	1979-83
Number of Operations b/	- IBRD	122	141	161	151	160	169	177	184	192	203	374	680	882
	- IDA	68	73	67	89	95	102	96 125	96 125	96 125	80	273	366	485
	- Total	190	214	228	240 j/	255	271	273	280	288	283	647	1046	1367
	- IFC	31	33	34	37	44	47	51	54	57	74	113	167	253
Amount of Commitments	- IBRD to Countries c/	4320	4977	5759	6100	6800	7700	8600	9600	10700	4296	8917	24374	43400
	- IDA Credits	1576	1655	1308	2300	2600	3000	3000	3200	3400	1336	3932	7926	15200
	- IFC Commitments d/	212	245	259	300	375	450	530	610	685	183	569	1219	2650
	- Total in Current $ e/	6108	6877	7326	8700	9775	11150	12130	13410	14785	5815	13418	33519	61250
	- Total in FY78 Comm. $	7531	7914	7861	8700	9127	9729	9894	10221	10531	15182	23224	37948	49502
Commitment Deflator (FY78=100)		81.1	86.9	93.2	100.0	107.1	114.6	122.6	131.2	140.4				
No. of IBRD/IDA Proj. Under Supervision f/		946	1080	1218	1317	1417	1524	1621	1704	1770				
Staff End Year g/	- Professional	1883	2024	2170	2321	2393	2466	2540	2616	2695				
	- Non-professional h/	1820	1968	2072	2170	2238	2304	2373	2444	2517				
	- Total	3703	3992	4242	4491	4631	4770	4913	5060	5212				
	- % Increase	7.4	7.8	6.3	5.9	3.1 i/	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0				

a/ These "preliminary estimates" were made using the following assumptions, which probably somewhat understate the manpower requirements:
Number of Operations - Average loan/credit size is assumed to remain constant in real terms at the level assumed in the Interim Plan;
Lending Cost per Operation - Manpower requirements per lending operation are assumed to remain constant at the actual FY77 levels;
Supervision Cost per Operation - Supervision has been projected with a constant requirement of 12.7 manweeks per project and assumes that each project remains under supervision for 6 years;
Economic/Sector Work - This work along with technical assistance and aid coordination activities have been held constant at the levels budgeted for FY78;
Support Work - Support department staff has been projected to grow at half the rate of the operating departments;
Management and Administration - The manpower requirement is assumed to increase by 2% over the five year period;
Pipeline - Pre-appraisal work has been projected in such a way that the number of projects for which pre-appraisal work is completed at the beginning of a fiscal year increases from 68% of Board presentations scheduled for that year (the situation in FY78) to 90% by FY83;
Contingency - Reflecting the greater uncertainty of projections in the outer years, the contingency has been increased from 1% of total manyears in FY79 to 2.5% in FY83.

b/ IBRD/IDA number of operations is shown excluding loans to IFC and treating operations involving more than one loan agreement or both a loan and a credit as simply one IBRD operation. IFC commitments as shown in Interim Financial and Operating Plan.

c/ IBRD loans to IFC are excluded ($100 million in each of FY67 and FY70, $60 million in FY72, $40 million in FY73, $110 million in FY74, $50 million in FY75, $70 million in FY76, $20 million in FY77 and $722 million in the period FY78-83).

d/ Commitments signed, before cancellation, and including original participations, as shown in Interim Financial and Operating Plan.

e/ The commitment deflator is derived from the disbursement deflator taking into account the normal lag between commitments and disbursements.

f/ Figures for all years except FY75-77 are estimated.

g/ Does not include positions for reimbursable technical assistance programs.

h/ Does not include locally-hired staff in field offices.

i/ The figure is based on a gradual rebuilding of the lending pipeline, as opposed to a concentrated effort in one or two years. For this and other reasons, the manpower requirement for FY79 is almost certainly understated.

j/ Of this total, 7 were processed in the latter part of FY77.

P & B
11/30/77

Table C

TECHNICAL NOTE #3

World Bank Group: Preliminary Estimates of Staff Growth Associated with Alternative Bank Group Committment Programs a/
($ million, fiscal years)

		1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1964-68	1969-73	1974-78	1979-83
							7% Real Growth in IBRD Lending							
Number of Operations b/	- IBRD	122	141	161	151	160	170	181	192	204	203	374	680	907
	- IDA	68	73	67	89	95	102	96	96	96	80	273	366	485
	- Total	190	214	228	240 j/	255	272	277	288	300	283	647	1046	1392
	- IFC	31	33	34	37	44	47	51	54	57	74	113	167	253
Amount of Commitments	- IBRD to Countries c/	4320	4977	5759	6100	6800	7800	8800	10000	11400	4296	8917	24374	44800
	- IDA Credits	1576	1655	1308	2300	2600	3000	3000	3200	3400	1336	3932	7926	15200
	- IFC Commitments d/	212	245	259	300	375	450	530	610	685	183	569	1219	2650
	- Total in Current $ e/	6108	6877	7326	8700	9775	11250	12330	13810	15485	5815	13418	33519	62650
	- Total in FY78 Comm. $	7531	7914	7861	8700	9127	9817	10057	10526	11029	15182	23224	37948	50556
Commitment Deflator (FY78=100)		81.1	86.9	93.2	100.0	107.1	114.6	122.6	131.2	140.4				
No. of IBRD/IDA Proj. Under Supervision f/		946	1080	1218	1317	1417	1524	1622	1709	1783				
Staff End Year g/	- Professional	1883	2024	2170	2321	2399	2481	2573	2664	2758				
	- Non-professional h/	1820	1968	2072	2170	2244	2320	2406	2490	2577				
	- Total	3703	3992	4242	4491	4643	4801	4979	5154	5335				
	- % Increase	7.4	7.8	6.3	5.9	3.4 i/	3.4	3.7	3.5	3.5				

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a/ These "preliminary estimates" were made using the following assumptions, which probably somewhat understate the manpower requirements:
Number of Operations - Average loan/credit size is assumed to remain constant in real terms at the level assumed in the Interim Plan;
Lending Cost per Operation - Manpower requirements per lending operation are assumed to remain constant at the actual FY77 levels;
Supervision Cost per Operation - Supervision has been projected with a constant requirement of 12.7 manweeks per project and assumes that each project remains under supervision for 6 years;
Economic/Sector Work - This work along with technical assistance and aid coordination activities have been held constant at the levels budgeted for FY78;
Support Work - Support department staff has been projected to grow at half the rate of the operating departments;
Management and Administration - The manpower requirement is assumed to increase by 5% over the five year period;
Pipeline - Pre-appraisal work has been projected in such a way that the number of projects for which pre-appraisal work is completed at the beginning of a fiscal year increases from 68% of Board presentations scheduled for that year (the situation in FY78) to 90% by FY83;
Contingency - Reflecting the greater uncertainty of projections in the outer years, the contingency has been increased from 1% of total manyears in FY79 to 2.5% in FY83.

b/ IBRD/IDA number of operations is shown excluding loans to IFC and treating operations involving more than one loan agreement or both a loan and a credit as simply one IBRD operation. IFC commitments as shown in Interim Financial and Operating Plan.

c/ IBRD loans to IFC are excluded ($100 million in each of FY67 and FY70, $60 million in FY72, $40 million in FY73, $110 million in FY74, $50 million in FY75, $70 million in FY76, $20 million in FY77 and $722 million in the period FY78-83).

d/ Commitments signed, before cancellation, and including original participations, as shown in Interim Financial and Operating Plan.

e/ The commitment deflator is derived from the disbursement deflator taking into account the normal lag between commitments and disbursements.

f/ Figures for all years except FY75-77 are estimated.

g/ Does not include positions for reimbursable technical assistance programs.

h/ Does not include locally-hired staff in field offices.

i/ The figure is based on a gradual rebuilding of the lending pipeline, as opposed to a concentrated effort in one or two years. For this and other reasons, the manpower requirement for FY79 is almost certainly understated.

j/ Of this total, 7 were processed in the latter part of FY77.

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11/30/77

TECHNICAL NOTE #3

World Bank Group: Preliminary Estimates of Staff Growth Associated with Alternative Bank Group Committment Programs a/
($ million, fiscal years)

							9% Real Growth in IBRD Lending							
		1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1964-68	1969-73	1974-78	1979-83
Number of Operations b/	- IBRD	122	141	161	151	160	173	188	204	221	203	374	680	946
	- IDA	68	73	67	89	95	102	96	96	96	80	273	366	485
	- Total	190	214	228	240 j/	255	275	284	300	317	283	647	1046	1431
	- IFC	31	33	34	37	44	47	51	54	57	74	113	167	253
Amount of Commitments	- IBRD to Countries c/	4320	4977	5759	6100	6800	7900	9200	10600	12300	4296	8917	24374	46800
	- IDA Credits	1576	1655	1308	2300	2600	3000	3000	3200	3400	1336	3932	7926	15200
	- IFC Commitments d/	212	245	259	300	375	450	530	610	685	183	569	1219	2650
	- Total in Current $ e/	6108	6877	7326	8700	9775	11350	12730	14410	16385	5815	13418	33519	64650
	- Total in FY78 Comm. $	7531	7914	7861	8700	9127	9904	10383	10983	11670	15182	23224	37948	52067
Commitment Deflator (FY78=100)		81.1	86.9	93.2	100.0	107.1	114.6	122.6	131.2	140.4				
No. of IBRD/IDA Proj. Under Supervision f/		946	1080	1218	1317	1417	1524	1625	1719	1805				
Staff End Year g/	- Professional	1883	2024	2170	2321	2407	2510	2624	2735	2855				
	- Non-professional h/	1820	1968	2072	2170	2250	2347	2453	2558	2671				
	- Total	3703	3992	4242	4491	4657	4857	5077	5293	5526				
	- % Increase	7.4	7.8	6.3	5.9	3.7 i/	4.3	4.5	4.3	4.4				

a/ These "preliminary estimates" were made using the following assumptions, which probably somewhat understate the manpower requirements:
Number of Operations - Average loan/credit size is assumed to remain constant in real terms at the level assumed in the Interim Plan;
Lending Cost per Operation - Manpower requirements per lending operation are assumed to remain constant at the actual FY77 levels;
Supervision Cost per Operation - Supervision has been projected with a constant requirement of 12.7 manweeks per project and assumes that each project remains under supervision for 6 years;
Economic/Sector Work - This work along with technical assistance and aid coordination activities have been held constant at the levels budgeted for FY78;
Support Work - Support department staff has been projected to grow at half the rate of the operating departments;
Management and Administration - The manpower requirement is assumed to increase by 9% over the five year period;
Pipeline - Pre-appraisal work has been projected in such a way that the number of projects for which pre-appraisal work is completed at the beginning of a fiscal year increases from 68% of Board presentations scheduled for that year (the situation in FY78) to 90% by FY83;
Contingency - Reflecting the greater uncertainty of projections in the outer years, the contingency has been increased from 1% of total manyears in FY79 to 2.5% in FY83.

b/ IBRD/IDA number of operations is shown excluding loans to IFC and treating operations involving more than one loan agreement or both a loan and a credit as simply one IBRD operation. IFC commitments as shown in Interim Financial and Operating Plan.

c/ IBRD loans to IFC are excluded ($100 million in each of FY67 and FY70, $60 million in FY72, $40 million in FY73, $110 million in FY74, $50 million in FY75, $70 million in FY76, $20 million in FY77 and $722 million in the period FY78-83).

d/ Commitments signed, before cancellation, and including original participations, as shown in Interim Financial and Operating Plan.

e/ The commitment deflator is derived from the disbursement deflator taking into account the normal lag between commitments and disbursements.

f/ Figures for all years except FY75-77 are estimated.

g/ Does not include positions for reimbursable technical assistance programs.

h/ Does not include locally-hired staff in field offices.

i/ The figure is based on a gradual rebuilding of the lending pipeline, as opposed to a concentrated effort in one or two years. For this and other reasons, the manpower requirement for FY79 is almost certainly understated.

j/ Of this total, 7 were processed in the latter part of FY77.

P & B
11/30/77

F

TECHNICAL NOTE NO. 4
PROJECTED IBRD FINANCIAL RATIOS
WITH ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL INCREASES: FY80-86

	Size of Increase	Portion Paid-In a/	Subscription Period	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86
Net Income ($M)	$30 billion	10%	FY83-85	300	370	420	520	640	760	850
	$30 billion	10%	FY82-86	300	370	440	550	640	740	830
	$30 billion	0%	FY83-85	300	370	420	490	540	600	650
	$40 billion	10%	FY83-85	300	370	420	530	670	820	920
	$40 billion	10%	FY82-86	300	370	450	560	670	790	890
	$40 billion	0%	FY83-85	300	370	420	490	540	600	650
Liquidity ($M)	$30 billion	10%	FY83-85	9,350	9,450	9,950	10,700	11,650	11,400	12,100
	$30 billion	10%	FY82-86	9,250	9,450	10,950	10,800	11,700	11,300	12,200
	$30 billion	0%	FY83-85	9,550	9,950	10,850	11,350	12,000	11,600	12,400
	$40 billion	10%	FY83-85	9,350	9,450	9,950	10,700	11,650	11,400	12,100
	$40 billion	10%	FY82-86	9,250	9,450	10 250	10,800	11 690	11,300	12,200
	$40 billion	0%	FY83-85	9,550	9,950	10,850	11,350	12,000	11,600	12,400
Interest Coverage Ratio	$30 billion	10%	FY83-85	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.17	1.18	1.19	1.19
	$30 billion	10%	FY82-86	1.16	1.16	1.17	1.18	1.19	1.19	1.19
	$30 billion	0%	FY83-85	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.15	1.15	1.15	1.14
	$40 billion	10%	FY83-85	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.18	1.19	1.21	1.21
	$40 billion	10%	FY82-86	1.16	1.16	1.17	1.19	1.20	1.20	1.21
	$40 billion	0%	FY83-85	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.15	1.15	1.15	1.14
Usable Equity to Disbursed Loans (%)	$30 billion	10%	FY83-85	24	21	19	20	20	20	19
	$30 billion	10%	FY82-86	24	21	21	20	20	20	19
	$30 billion	0%	FY83-85	24	21	19	18	16	15	14
	$40 billion	10%	FY83-85	24	21	19	20	21	21	20
	$40 billion	10%	FY82-86	24	21	21	21	20	20	20
	$40 billion	0%	FY83-85	24	21	19	18	16	15	14
Reserves to Disbursed Loans (%)	$30 billion	10%	FY83-85	11	10	10	10	10	10	10
	$30 billion	10%	FY82-86	11	10	10	10	10	10	10
	$30 billion	0%	FY83-85	11	10	10	10	10	10	10
	$40 billion	10%	FY83-85	11	10	10	10	10	10	10
	$40 billion	10%	FY82-86	11	10	10	10	10	10	10
	$40 billion	0%	FY83-85	11	10	10	10	9	9	9
Debt b/ to Usable Equity (Ratio)	$30 billion	10%	FY83-85	4.8	5.3	5.7	5.5	5.4	5.2	5.4
	$30 billion	10%	FY82-86	4.8	5.3	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.4	5.4
	$30 billion	0%	FY83-85	4.8	5.3	5.9	6.3	6.8	7.0	7.4
	$40 billion	10%	FY83-85	4.8	5.3	5.7	5.3	5.0	4.7	5.0
	$40 billion	10%	FY82-86	4.8	5.3	5.2	5.1	5.2	5.0	5.0
	$40 billion	0%	FY83-85	4.8	5.3	5.9	6.3	6.8	7.0	7.4
Usable Equity + Relevant Callable Capital to Disbursed Loans (%)	$30 billion	10%	FY83-85	121	104	90	97	99	103	92
	$30 billion	10%	FY82-86	121	104	103	101	98	95	92
	$30 billion	0%	FY83-85	121	104	90	97	101	102	91
	$40 billion	10%	FY83-85	121	104	90	103	111	117	104
	$40 billion	10%	FY82-86	121	104	107	108	107	106	104
	$40 billion	0%	FY83-85	121	104	90	103	111	114	103
Usable Equity + Relevant Callable Capital to Total Loans Less Liquid Holdings (%)	$30 billion	10%	FY83-85	77	65	57	62	64	67	61
	$30 billion	10%	FY82-86	76	65	65	64	63	62	61
	$30 billion	0%	FY83-85	77	66	58	62	65	67	60
	$40 billion	10%	FY83-85	77	65	57	66	72	76	69
	$40 billion	10%	FY82-86	76	65	68	69	69	69	69
	$40 billion	0%	FY83-85	77	66	58	66	72	74	68

a/ Assumes 70% released for use in IBRD operations.
b/ Funded Debt plus Due to IDA.

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February 2, 1978

TECHNICAL NOTE #5

IBRD Voting Power and Board Representation

Introduction

2/2

1. The Role of the Bank memorandum described the main legal and other issues associated with IBRD voting power and Board representation as they relate to the prospective General Capital Increase.[1/] It also analyzed some of the alternatives that might be used to achieve an appropriate distribution of IBRD voting power and representation. What was not discussed in that memorandum were the specific effects of a General Capital Increase on voting power and the precise way in which the various alternatives might be applied as part of the General Increase. The purpose of the present memorandum is to supplement the earlier discussion with a more specific analysis of the voting power and Board representation objectives that might be pursued and the concrete steps that might be taken to achieve these objectives.

2. In approaching these very sensitive subjects it is worth re-emphasizing the thought expressed in the Role of the Bank memorandum that "the continuation of the Bank as an effective instrument of development will not stand or fall on the specific voting distribution

1/ "Role of the World Bank and its Associated Capital Requirements," R77-18, dated January 31, 1977, paras. 131-139 and Annex 1.

which emerges from the General Increase, but it will depend on maintaining a cooperative atmosphere in which issues concerning both votes and voices are dealt with in a constructive and conciliatory fashion."[1/] In this spirit, the main focus of the discussion of voting power should be on seeking agreement concerning the basic objectives to be achieved in the design of the General Capital Increase. If agreement on this point can be reached, it should not be difficult to find suitable technical means of accomplishing the agreed objectives. The issue of Board representation, on the other hand, should involve little or no disagreement about objectives, though it does raise difficult questions of how to assure practical and effective implementation of those objectives.

A. Voting Power

3. As is pointed out in the Role of the Bank memorandum, the voting power of the developing countries declines whenever there is an increase in IBRD subscribed capital because membership votes are fixed in number (i.e. 250 per country) and hence decline in relative importance as capital subscriptions increase. Since the group of developing countries includes all of the smaller countries for whom membership votes are particularly important, a capital increase has the effect of reducing the voting power of the developing countries as a group and increasing

1/ Role of the World Bank, para. 139.

the voting power of the industrial countries.1/ This problem, which was a source of great concern in the Selective Capital Increase, will be even more pronounced in the General Increase.2/

4. There are two principal issues to be considered in determining what to do about this problem. These are: first, which countries or groups of countries should be protected against this erosion of voting power; and second, in what way should particular voting power objectives be achieved.

Voting Power Objectives

5. During the discussions of the Selective Capital Increase, the relative position of the oil-importing LDCs was a subject of special concern. Specifically, the principle was accepted in the Selective Increase that the doubling of the 13 major oil-exporting countries' share of subscribed capital should not be at the expense of the non-oil LDCs but should come entirely through a corresponding reduction in the share of the Part I countries (excluding Kuwait).3/ Nevertheless, non-oil LDCs' voting power will decline as a result of the erosion of membership votes, as the table below shows. This decline was not intended, and

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1/ Within the group of developing countries, a capital increase also raises the voting power of the larger countries and reduces that of the smaller countries.

2/ Attachment 1 shows the capital subscriptions and voting power that would result from $30 and $40 billion capital increases, respectively.

3/ This principle formed part of the basis for deciding on the allocation of selective quota increases in the IMF, which in turn determined the Bank's parallel selective capital increases. However, China was excluded from the group of "protected" countries in the Fund but included in that group in the Bank during the discussions of developing countries' voting power.

there was considerable support for attempting to maintain these countries' pre-Selective Increase share of voting power of 31.11%, rather than permit it to remain permanently at the level of 29.98% which it will reach once the Selective Increase is fully subscribed.[1/] Permitting the voting power of the non-oil LDCs to decline further as a result of the General Increase would appear to be unacceptable to all member countries and ways should, therefore, be sought to prevent it.

Present and Prospective IBRD
Voting Power by Major Country Group

	Before Selective Increase a/	After Selective Increase
Non-oil LDCs	31.11	29.98
Capital Surplus OPEC /b	1.09	2.67
Other OPEC	3.95	6.47
Total Part II /b	36.15	39.12
Total Part I	63.85	60.88
GRAND TOTAL	100.00	100.00

/a Reflects capital subscriptions as of June 30, 1977 adjusted to take account of initial subscriptions of Sao Tome & Principe and The Maldives.

/b Includes Kuwait, which is a Part I country and Oman which is not an OPEC member.

6. The choice of an appropriate level of voting power for the non-oil LDCs naturally has important implications for other groups of countries. Maintaining the voting power of the non-oil LDCs at its post-Selective Increase level would not require any reduction in the total voting power of the other countries and would not cause any

1/ At the time of the Selective Increase discussions, these figures were 30.82% and 29.92% respectively, but have since changed due to the admission of new members.

significant shift of voting power between the Part I countries and OPEC.[1/] However, restoring the voting power of the non-oil LDCs to its pre-Selective Increase level (or a higher level) would require a reduction in the voting power of the other countries and the question arises, which countries?

7. During informal discussions of voting power in connection with the Selective Increase, suggestions were made to have any such reduction in voting power borne by:

(a) the Part I countries plus all of the OPEC members

(b) the Part I countries plus the capital surplus OPEC members

(c) the Part I countries alone.

8. The first grouping would be simply an extension of the logic underlying the Selective Increase, which singled out the non-oil LDCs as a separate group of countries whose relative position should be protected as other groups become more important in the world economy. This line of reasoning would suggest that restoring these countries' voting power to 31.11% might be considered an appropriate objective for the General Increase. The logic of the second grouping is that it applies the concept of special protection to the capital-importing developing countries, after taking into account the selective increases that were allocated to the oil-exporting countries in order to have their Fund quotas and Bank subscriptions more appropriately reflect their relative economic position. In this case, the objective would

1/ There would, however, be shifts among countries within groups.

be to maintain an appropriate balance of voting power between the countries supplying finance to the Bank and those who are expected to be borrowers. It would seem reasonable to aim for voting power for these countries of 37.58%, made up of the non-oil LDCs' pre-Selective Increase voting power of 31.11% plus the capital-importing OPEC members prospective voting power after the Selective Increase of 6.47%. The Part I/Part II division which is reflected in the third grouping above might be justified by the traditional distinction between the interests of industrial countries and the developing countries. In this case, the logical objective would perhaps be to raise Part II voting power to 40.25%, i.e. the pre-Selective Increase voting power of the non-oil LDCs plus the prospective voting power of the major oil-exporting countries after the Selective Increase.

Methods of Adjustment

9. There are two basic ways of dealing with this problem:
(a) through an amendment to the Bank's Articles of Agreement; or
(b) through special subscriptions by the countries whose voting power is to be protected.

Amendment of the Articles

10. The most direct way of dealing with the problem would be to increase the number of membership votes by amending the Bank's Articles of agreement. Annex 1 to the Role of the Bank memorandum described some of the difficulties that would be involved in undertaking such an amendment. However, if it were decided to solve the voting power

problem in this fashion, the best approach might be to establish membership votes as a ratio to either total votes or total subscription votes rather than simply change the absolute number from 250 per member to some higher figure. The specific ratio would need to be agreed by the members but the acceptable range for membership votes as a percentage of total votes would probably be between 10% and 25% of total votes. The lower end of this range is slightly below that which prevailed from 1965 to 1976, the period when neither the membership nor the subscriptions of the Bank changed as dramatically as previously. The upper end of the range is that which would result from reestablishing the relationship between membership votes per country and total authorized subscription votes that existed at the time the Bank was founded.[1/]

11. The following table shows how various increases in membership votes would affect relative voting power after capital increases of (a) $30 billion and (b) $40 billion.

1/ The original 250 membership votes per country represented 0.25% of total authorized subscription votes (100,000 shares).

IBRD Voting Power with
Capital Increases of $30 b. and $40 b.
(%)

Membership Votes of:	250 per Country	10% of Total	15% of Total	20% of Total	0.25% per Country /a
$30 billion Capital Increase					
Non-Oil LDCs	27.42	29.29	31.27	33.09	37.09
Capital Surplus OPEC /b	2.68	2.70	2.71	2.73	2.76
Other OPEC /c	6.52	6.53	6.54	6.56	6.59
Total Part II /d	36.62	38.52	40.52	42.38	46.44
Total Part I	63.38	61.49	59.47	57.63	53.56
GRAND TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Total Membership Votes	32750	57640	86460	115280	188640
Membership Votes per Country	250	440	660	880	1440
$40 billion Capital Increase					
Non-Oil LDCs	26.98	29.19	31.16	32.97	36.98
Capital Surplus OPEC /b	2.69	2.70	2.72	2.73	2.76
Other OPEC /c	6.52	6.54	6.55	6.57	6.60
Total Part II /d	36.19	38.43	40.43	42.27	46.34
Total Part I	63.81	61.57	59.57	57.73	53.66
GRAND TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Total Membership Votes	32750	66155	98905	131655	215495
Membership Votes per Country	250	505	755	1005	1645

Memo:	Voting Power Before Selective Increase	Voting Power After Selective Increase
Non-Oil LDCs	31.11	29.98
Capital Surplus OPEC /b	1.09	2.67
Other OPEC /c	3.95	6.47
Total Part II /d	36.15	39.12
Total Part I	63.85	60.88
GRAND TOTAL	100.00	100.00

/a This results in membership votes equal to 24.6% of total votes under a $30 billion increase and 24.5% of total votes under a $40 billion increase.
/b Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
/c Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Oman and Venezuela.
/d Includes Kuwait.

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

12. As the above figures show, increases in the number of membership votes would indeed stabilize or increase the voting power of the non-oil LDCs as a group and would not significantly change the voting power of the major oil-exporting countries. However, examination of the more detailed figures shown in Attachment 2 reveals that the effect on the various constituencies would of course be quite uneven, with the greatest increases in voting power going to the largest constituencies. While this would help the more vulnerable Part II seats of large constituencies it would not solve the problem of the Latin American countries whose constituencies are made up of a relatively small number of countries.

Special Increases

13. The main alternative to an increase in membership votes is to authorize special subscription increases for some or all of the developing countries.[1/] Under this approach, the countries whose voting power is to be protected would be permitted to subscribe to additional shares over and above their proportionate share of the General Capital Increase with the total number of additional shares being determined by the specific objective (e.g. 31.11% for the non-oil LDCs) being pursued. As compared with an increase in membership votes, this

1/ As noted in Annex 1 to the Role of the Bank memorandum (para. 13a) this could be done either by allocations out of existing authorized but unsubscribed shares or out of specially authorized capital. In the second case, a waiving of preemptive right by substantially all members would be required.

alternative has the twin advantages of not requiring amendment of the Articles and of being much more flexible in application. Since members would receive one additional vote for each share subscribed, the allocation of additional voting power among "eligible" countries could be tailored to specific objectives (e.g. strengthening the Latin American constituencies). The main disadvantages are the cost to the members concerned -- at least $1200 per vote[1/] -- and the need to agree on a specific distribution of the additional shares among the "eligible" countries.

14. There are, of course, many ways in which the additional shares might be distributed among "eligible" countries. During the informal discussions of voting power connected with the Selective Capital Increase four basic alternatives were considered.[2/] These were:

(a) Equal number per member. Under this approach, each "eligible" member country would be allocated an equal proportion of the total new shares to be subscribed. Thus, this alternative would have approximately the same effect on relative voting power as an amendment of the Articles. For example, suppose that member countries were to agree on a General Increase of $40 billion to be combined with special increases for the non-oil LDCs sufficient to restore their voting power after the General Increase to 31.11%. To do this, the non-oil LDCs as a group would need to subscribe

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1/ In accordance with present practice, shares would be issued at par ($120,635 on the present basis of valuation) and 1%, or approximately $1200, would be payable in U.S. dollars while the remaining 9% would be payable in local currency and could not be used by the Bank without the member's consent.

2/ Combinations of the various alternatives were also considered.

to approximately 41,420 additional shares. An equal distribution of these shares would mean that each country would be allotted 427 shares (41420 ÷ 97) in addition to the General Increase.[1/] Attachments 3 and 4 illustrate this approach (as well as the others discussed below) as applied to $30 and $40 billion General Increases, respectively, with special increases for the non-oil LDCs only.

(b) Distribution in proportion to share of subscribed capital. Under this approach, the total additional shares needed to bring the voting power of the "eligible" countries up to a pre-determined level would be distributed in proportion to each "eligible" country's share of subscribed capital after the General Increase. For example, in the case of a $40 billion capital increase, Afghanistan's new subscription would be $85.9 million, or 0.46% of the total subscriptions of the non-oil LDCs. Afghanistan would be authorized to subscribe an additional 191 shares (0.46% of the total 41420 additional shares needed to bring the non-oil LDCs' voting power to 31.11%). This example is also shown in detail in Attachments 3 and 4.

(c) Distribution in proportion to voting power. This approach is similar to the preceding one except that voting power rather than subscribed capital would be the basis for distribution, so that the

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1/ There are actually 98 non-oil LDCs, but it is assumed that China would not participate in either the General Increase or the special additional increases even though the objective of special increases would be to preserve the voting power of the non-oil LDCs including China.

relative voting power among the "eligible" countries would remain the same as after the General Increase (i.e. each country's voting power would be increased proportionately). For example, after a General Increase of $40 billion, Afghanistan's voting power would be 0.14% out of a total for the non-oil LDCs of 25.86%,1/ or 0.54% of the total. Afghanistan's special increase would be 223 shares (0.54% of 41420 shares). (See Attachment 3 and 4.)

(d) Adjustment of "low" initial subscriptions. When a new member joins the Bank, its initial subscription is determined by applying a standard ratio to its quota in the IMF. This policy of "parallelism" with Fund quotas is intended to ensure that each country's share of total subscriptions in the two institutions is broadly the same. It is the principle that underlies the Bank's practice of making selective capital increases whenever the IMF makes selective quota increases. However, at the Bretton Woods Conference, most developing countries represented there were granted at their request lower initial subscription's in the Bank than in the Fund and have as a consequence lower relative voting power in the Bank. This affects particularly the Latin American countries, nearly all of which were represented at Bretton Woods. Under this fourth alternative, each "eligible" country would be able to raise its capital subscription in 1944 dollars to (e.g.) 167% of its Fund quota (the ratio that would apply if there were a $40 billion

1/ Excluding China.

increase in IBRD capital subscriptions and no further general increases in Fund quotas after the 6th Review).[1/] Only about 14,500 shares could be distributed under this approach, so that it would need to be combined with some other approach if the non-oil LDCs voting power is to be restored to a figure above 27.4%. For example, Bolivia's quota in the IMF after effectiveness of the Sixth review will be SDR 45 million. It corresponding IBRD capital subscription in 1944 dollars would be $75.0 million (45 x 1.67) or $90.7 million in current dollars compared to $64.9 million after the $40 billion increase with no adjustment. In Attachments 3 and 4, this approach is illustrated in combination with the 'share of subscribed capital' approach so as to raise the non-oil LDCs voting power to 31.11%.

15. A fifth alternative, not considered during the Selective Increase discussions but mentioned in the Role of the Bank memorandum, would be to allocate the additional shares with the specific purpose of securing the Board representation of particular constituencies. Under this approach, a major portion of the additional shares would be allocated to countries in constituencies that are particularly threatened with displacement from the Board. The balance of the additional shares would be distributed among all the "eligible" countries according to one of the approaches above.

1/ This ratio is likely to change as a result of prospective IMF quota increases under the Seventh Review.

16. It can be seen from Attachment 1 that the constituencies represented by Messrs. Razafindrabe, Franco and Gutierrez are the most vulnerable of the non-oil LDCs' Board seats. Stabilization of the existing pattern of representation for the non-oil developing countries -- i.e. three Latin American Directors and two Directors representing African countries south of the Sahara in addition to the two Directors representing Asian countries -- would probably require that the voting power of each of the three smaller constituencies mentioned above be raised to between about 2.75% and 3.00%. As Attachments 2-4 show, the constituency represented by Mr. Franco would have at least 2.83% of voting power under any of the alternatives described above. Thus, the "threat" to the existing representation of the non-oil LDCs concerns mainly the constituencies represented by Messrs. Razafindrabe and Gutierrez.

17. As an illustration of this approach, Attachment 5 assumes that an initial allocation of the special increase for non-oil LDCs is made to these two constituencies sufficient to give them each 3.00% of voting power.1/ The remaining shares in the overall special increase are distributed among the other non-oil LDCs according to share of voting power. As Attachment 5 shows, the present representation of the non-oil LDCs would be quite "secure" (although one of the existing Part I seats would become clearly vulnerable).

1/ The increases are distributed among the countries in the constituencies according to share of voting power.

B. Stabilizing Board Representation

18. As the Role of the Bank memorandum pointed out (paras. 136 and 137), there are some respects in which the Board representation of the developing countries is at least as if not more important than their formal voting power. Voting power and Board representation are, of course, inseparable in that the stability of the developing countries' representation depends on their ability to elect an adequate number of Executive Directors. And, as was considered extensively during the informal discussions connected with the Selective Capital Increase, the most immediate threat to the LDCs' representation is the possibility that one or more of the existing seats of the Latin American or African countries might be displaced as a result of the increased voting power of the OPEC countries and the reduction in importance of membership votes.[1/] Since the principle of maintaining a balanced representation of the various country groups is one that is believed to be accepted by the Executive Directors, it would seem reasonable to agree that the objective in the General Increase should be to preserve the present number of seats representing Latin American and African countries.

19. The vulnerability of the three Latin American seats and the two seats representing African countries south of the Sahara can, of course, be reduced by either an increase in membership votes or special subscription increases. The degree of stability gained would depend on the specific adjustment to the LDCs' voting power that is eventually agreed. The following table illustrates how the voting power of these constituencies would compare with the average for all 15 elected Directors under various possible schemes.

1/ It should be noted that the smaller Part II constituencies could also be threatened by a regrouping of constituencies other than those of which the OPEC members are part and by presently unrepresented countries.

Relative Voting Power of Board Seats /a
(%)

	Membership Votes of: 250 per Country	10% of Total	20% of Total	Special Increases to 31.11% Distributed by: Share of Capital	Share of Votes	"Low" Subscriptions/b	3.00% Minimum c/
With $30 billion Capital Increase							
Pesqueira	3.02	3.20	3.57	3.21	3.23	3.93	3.14
Franco	2.79	2.83	2.91	3.22	3.16	3.19	3.03
Gutierrez	2.19	2.26	2.39	2.54	2.51	2.63	3.00
Avg. for 3 Latin American Seats	2.67	2.76	2.96	2.99	2.97	3.25	3.06
Thahane	3.20	3.61	4.46	3.40	3.48	3.35	3.37
Razafindrabe	2.13	2.59	3.52	2.34	2.44	2.32	3.00
Avg. for 2 African Seats	2.67	3.10	3.99	2.87	2.96	2.84	3.19
Avg. 15 Elected Directors /d	3.56	3.67	3.89	3.72	3.72	3.72	3.72
With $40 billion Capital Increase							
Pesqueira	2.99	3.21	3.57	3.21	3.23	3.95	3.14
Franco	2.79	2.84	2.92	3.26	3.21	3.23	3.08
Gutierrez	2.19	2.26	2.39	2.57	2.54	2.66	3.00
Avg. for 3 Latin American Seats	2.66	2.77	2.96	3.01	2.99	3.28	3.07
Thahane	3.13	3.62	4.46	3.36	3.44	3.31	3.33
Razafindrabe	2.06	2.59	3.52	2.29	2.39	2.27	3.00
Avg. for 2 African Seats	2.60	3.11	3.99	2.83	2.92	2.79	3.17
Avg. 15 Elected Directors /d	3.55	3.67	3.89	3.72	3.72	3.72	3.72

/a Percent of total voting power (i.e., includes countries which did not vote in last election of Executive Directors). Detailed figures shown in Attachments 2 to 4.

/b Combined with distribution by share of subscribed capital.

/c The total special increase is allocated initially so as to provide a minimum of 3.00% voting power for all constituencies primarily representing non-oil LDCs, with the balance being distributed in proportion to voting power.

/d Excludes voting power of China and South Africa but includes all other countries not presently represented.

20. As the above table indicates, the only way to make the present representation of the Latin American and African countries fully secure would be through special increases allocated explicitly for that purpose. If it were not possible to agree on such an allocation, then it might be necessary to take some further steps to protect the representation of the developing countries. One such step which was discussed in the Role of the Bank memorandum would be to increase the number of elected Directors.

21. An alternative might be to seek an informal agreement among the relevant countries that no additional constituencies would be formed if it would mean the displacement of any of the existing seats – ~~3 Latin American seats or the 2 African seats representing countries south of the Sahara~~. Such an agreement might be useful in the context of the General Increase if it were accompanied by an understanding that if no such realignment of Board seats could be achieved, then as a last resort the number of elected Directors could be increased.

to save any lines or EEC seat.

Summary

22. The problem of the developing countries' voting power in the Bank is one which arises because the number of membership votes per country is fixed by the Articles of Agreement whereas the number of subscription votes increases every time the Bank's capital is increased. The prospective General Increase will further reduce the voting power of the non-oil LDCs unless steps are taken to prevent it.

23. The first step in solving the problem of the developing countries' voting power is to agree on the objectives to be pursued. These objectives relate to the choice of countries whose voting power and representation is to be protected and the precise nature of the protection to be given. In terms of voting power, the main alternatives would appear to include:

(a) restoration of the non-oil LDCs voting power to 31.11%.

(b) raising the capital-importing LDCs voting power to 37.58%.

(c) raising the Part II countries voting power to 40.25%.

With respect to Board representation, a concensus exists that the present level of representation of the non-oil developing countries should be preserved. What needs to be decided is precisely how to preserve the more vulnerable Part II constituencies.

24. Voting power and representation objectives can both be achieved by action to correct the decline in the non-oil LDCs voting power that results from the erosion of membership votes. Here the need is to make a choice between two alternative courses of action: the first is to amend the Articles of Agreement, a solution which will be difficult to achieve and which runs the risk of delaying approval of the General Increase. The alternative to amendment would be to permit special subscription increases by "eligible" countries. This latter solution will also require that the agreement be reached on a distribution of the special increases among the "eligible" countries.

Finally, if the distribution of voting power that is eventually agreed does not adequately protect the representation of the Latin American and African countries, then some form of commitment may be required to restrict the number of constituencies representing Part I countries and OPEC to the present 13, or if additional constituencies are formed, to increase the number of elected Directors.

Attachments

PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE IBRD CAPITAL SUBSCRIPTION AND VOTING POWER

	Present[a]			After Selective Capital Increase[b]			After $30 Billion General Capital Increase[c]			After $40 Billion General Capital Increase[c]		
	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total
Appointed Directors												
1. United States	7808.7	64980	22.51	9377.6	77985	21.70	16685.5	138564	22.79	19121.5	158757	22.98
2. United Kingdom	3136.5	26250	9.09	3136.5	26250	7.30	5580.8	46512	7.65	6395.6	53266	7.71
3. Germany	1647.0	13903	4.82	2124.6	17862	4.97	3780.3	31587	5.19	4332.2	36162	5.23
4. France	1543.2	13042	4.52	1890.0	15917	4.43	3362.8	28126	4.63	3853.8	32196	4.66
5. Japan	1234.1	10480	3.63	1633.3	13789	3.84	2906.1	24340	4.00	3330.4	27857	4.03
Elected Directors												
6. Rota (Italy)												
Italy	1028.4	8775	3.04	1220.8	10370	2.89	2172.3	18257	3.00	2489.3	20885	3.02
Portugal	96.5	1050	0.36	135.8	1376	0.38	241.6	2253	0.37	277.0	2546	0.37
Spain	406.7	3621	1.25	549.0	4801	1.34	976.9	8348	1.37	1119.5	9530	1.38
Sub-Total	1531.6	13446	4.66	1905.7	16547	4.60	3390.8	28858	4.75	3885.8	32961	4.77
7. Drake (Canada)												
Bahamas	20.6	421	0.15	32.6	520	0.14	57.9	730	0.12	66.5	801	0.12
Barbados	13.4	361	0.13	16.8	389	0.11	29.8	497	0.08	34.1	533	0.08
Canada	1136.1	9668	3.35	1341.7	11372	3.16	2387.2	20039	3.30	2735.9	22929	3.32
Grenada	2.1	267	0.09	2.9	274	0.08	5.2	293	0.05	5.9	299	0.04
Guyana	20.6	421	0.15	24.7	455	0.13	44.0	615	0.10	50.4	668	0.10
Ireland	124.5	1282	0.44	152.7	1516	0.42	271.8	2503	0.41	311.4	2831	0.41
Jamaica	53.8	696	0.24	71.9	846	0.24	127.9	1310	0.22	146.6	1465	0.21
Sub-Total	1371.1	13116	4.54	1643.3	15372	4.28	2923.8	25987	4.27	3350.8	29526	4.27
8. Sen (India)												
Bangladesh	128.7	1317	0.46	149.8	1492	0.42	266.6	2460	0.40	305.6	2783	0.40
India	1085.7	9250	3.20	1367.2	11583	3.22	2432.6	20415	3.36	2787.8	23359	3.38
Sri Lanka	99.8	1077	0.37	115.9	1211	0.34	206.3	1960	0.32	236.4	2210	0.32
Sub-Total	1314.2	11644	4.03	1632.9	14286	3.98	2905.5	24835	4.08	3329.8	28352	4.10
9. Looijen (Netherlands)												
Cyprus	26.8	472	0.16	33.5	528	0.15	59.7	745	0.12	68.4	817	0.12
Israel	133.7	1358	0.47	201.8	1923	0.54	359.1	3227	0.53	411.5	3661	0.53
Netherlands	714.5	6173	2.14	926.4	7929	2.21	1648.2	13913	2.29	1888.9	15908	2.30
Romania	195.5	1871	0.65	241.4	2251	0.63	429.5	3810	0.63	492.2	4330	0.63
Yugoslavia	142.1	1428	0.49	182.0	1759	0.49	323.9	2935	0.48	371.2	3327	0.48
Sub-Total	1212.6	11302	3.92	1585.1	14390	4.00	2820.4	24630	4.05	3232.2	28043	4.06
10. de Groote (Belgium)												
Austria	277.9	2554	0.88	325.2	2946	0.82	578.7	5047	0.83	663.1	5747	0.83
Belgium	668.9	5795	2.01	876.8	7518	2.09	1560.1	13182	2.17	1787.8	15070	2.18
Luxembourg	24.1	450	0.16	35.8	547	0.15	63.7	778	0.13	73.1	856	0.12
Turkey	155.1	1536	0.53	196.8	1881	0.52	350.1	3152	0.52	401.2	3576	0.52
Sub-Total	1126.1	10335	3.58	1434.6	12892	3.59	2552.5	22159	3.64	2925.3	25249	3.65
11. El-Naggar (Egypt)												
Bahrain	10.3	335	0.12	19.7	413	0.11	35.0	540	0.09	40.1	582	0.08
Egypt	171.4	1671	0.58	199.0	1900	0.53	354.2	3186	0.52	405.8	3614	0.52
Iraq	84.2	948	0.33	104.2	1114	0.31	185.4	1787	0.29	212.6	2012	0.29
Jordan	22.6	437	0.15	28.1	483	0.13	50.1	665	0.11	57.3	725	0.10
Kuwait	83.7	944	0.33	289.8	2652	0.74	515.6	4524	0.74	590.9	5140	0.75
Lebanon	10.9	340	0.12	13.9	365	0.10	24.7	455	0.07	28.2	484	0.07
Pakistan	241.3	2250	0.78	303.9	2769	0.77	540.7	4732	0.78	619.6	5386	0.78
Qatar	20.6	421	0.15	39.4	577	0.16	70.2	832	0.14	80.5	917	0.13
Saudi Arabia	137.9	1393	0.48	591.0	5149	1.43	1051.6	8967	1.47	1205.0	10239	1.48
Syrian Arab Republic	50.8	671	0.23	61.3	758	0.21	109.1	1154	0.19	125.0	1286	0.19
United Arab Emirates	15.4	378	0.13	118.2	1230	0.34	210.4	1994	0.33	241.0	2248	0.33
Yemen Arab Republic	10.3	335	0.12	12.8	356	0.10	22.8	439	0.07	26.1	466	0.07
Sub-Total	859.3	10123	3.51	1781.3	17766	4.94	3169.7	29275	4.81	3632.0	33107	4.79
12. Magnussen (Norway)												
Denmark	266.7	2461	0.85	304.5	2774	0.77	541.8	4741	0.78	620.9	5397	0.78
Finland	195.5	1871	0.65	258.2	2390	0.67	459.4	4058	0.67	526.5	4614	0.67
Iceland	22.2	434	0.15	26.8	472	0.13	47.7	645	0.11	54.6	703	0.10
Norway	247.1	2298	0.80	290.7	2660	0.74	517.3	4538	0.75	592.8	5164	0.75
Sweden	334.5	3023	1.05	443.5	3926	1.09	789.1	6791	1.12	904.3	7746	1.12
Sub-Total	1066.1	10087	3.49	1323.6	12222	3.40	2355.2	20773	3.42	2699.1	23624	3.42
13. Thavil (Thailand)												
Burma	61.2	757	0.26	71.3	841	0.23	126.9	1302	0.21	145.4	1455	0.21
Fiji	13.4	361	0.13	17.7	397	0.11	31.6	512	0.08	36.2	550	0.08
Indonesia	265.4	2450	0.85	469.0	4138	1.15	834.6	7168	1.18	956.4	8178	1.18
Korea	82.3	932	0.32	157.5	1556	0.43	280.4	2574	0.42	321.3	2913	0.42
Laos	12.1	350	0.12	14.2	368	0.10	25.3	460	0.08	29.1	491	0.07
Malaysia	191.4	1837	0.64	249.2	2316	0.64	443.5	3926	0.65	508.2	4463	0.65
Nepal	13.5	362	0.13	17.6	396	0.11	31.4	510	0.08	35.9	548	0.08
Singapore	38.6	570	0.20	109.9	1161	0.32	195.5	1871	0.31	224.1	2108	0.31
Thailand	137.9	1393	0.48	178.3	1728	0.48	317.3	2880	0.47	363.6	3264	0.47
Vietnam	65.5	793	0.27	91.1	1005	0.28	162.0	1593	0.26	185.7	1789	0.26
Sub-Total	881.2	9805	3.40	1376.0	13906	3.87	2448.4	22796	3.75	2805.8	25759	3.73

	Present[a/]			After Selective Capital Increase[b/]			After $30 Billion General Capital Increase[c/]			After $40 Billion General Capital Increase[c/]		
	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total
Elected Directors (cont'd)												
14. Thahane (Lesotho)												
Botswana	5.2	293	0.10	8.9	324	0.09	15.9	382	0.06	18.2	401	0.06
Burundi	18.1	400	0.14	21.0	424	0.12	37.4	560	0.09	42.8	605	0.09
Equatorial Guinea	7.7	314	0.11	9.3	327	0.09	16.5	387	0.06	18.9	407	0.06
Ethiopia	13.8	364	0.13	17.6	396	0.11	31.4	510	0.08	35.9	548	0.08
Gambia, The	6.4	303	0.10	7.8	315	0.09	14.0	366	0.06	16.0	383	0.06
Guinea	24.1	450	0.16	28.8	489	0.14	51.3	675	0.11	58.7	737	0.11
Kenya	48.3	650	0.23	66.3	800	0.22	118.1	1229	0.20	135.2	1371	0.20
Lesotho	5.2	293	0.10	7.0	308	0.09	12.4	353	0.06	14.2	368	0.05
Liberia	25.7	463	0.16	31.4	510	0.14	55.9	713	0.12	63.9	780	0.11
Malawi	18.1	400	0.14	22.0	432	0.12	39.1	574	0.09	44.8	621	0.09
Nigeria	139.0	1402	0.49	354.8	3191	0.89	631.3	5483	0.90	723.4	6247	0.90
Sierra Leone	18.1	400	0.14	21.5	428	0.12	38.2	567	0.09	43.8	613	0.09
Sudan	72.4	850	0.29	84.7	952	0.26	150.7	1499	0.25	172.6	1681	0.24
Swaziland	8.2	318	0.11	11.8	348	0.10	21.0	424	0.07	24.1	450	0.07
Tanzania	42.2	600	0.21	53.0	689	0.19	94.2	1031	0.17	108.0	1145	0.17
Trinidad & Tobago	64.5	785	0.27	80.5	917	0.26	143.2	1437	0.24	164.1	1610	0.23
Uganda	40.2	583	0.20	48.0	648	0.18	85.4	958	0.16	98.0	1062	0.15
Zambia	78.2	898	0.31	138.9	1401	0.39	247.1	2298	0.38	283.1	2597	0.38
Sub-Total	635.3	9766	3.38	1013.2	12899	3.59	1803.0	19446	3.20	2066.0	21626	3.13
15. Khelif (Algeria)												
Afghanistan	36.2	550	0.19	42.1	599	0.17	74.9	871	0.14	85.9	962	0.14
Algeria	133.8	1359	0.47	280.7	2577	0.72	499.4	4390	0.72	572.4	4995	0.72
Ghana	88.5	984	0.34	103.3	1106	0.31	183.7	1773	0.29	210.5	1995	0.29
Greece	88.8	986	0.34	114.0	1195	0.33	202.8	1931	0.32	232.5	2177	0.32
Iran	190.6	1830	0.63	627.2	5449	1.52	1116.0	9501	1.56	1278.9	10851	1.57
Libyan Arab Republic	24.1	450	0.16	178.1	1726	0.48	316.8	2876	0.47	363.1	3260	0.47
Morocco	115.8	1210	0.42	147.2	1470	0.41	261.9	2421	0.40	300.1	2738	0.40
Oman	7.2	310	0.11	19.8	414	0.12	35.2	542	0.09	40.3	584	0.08
Tunisia	45.0	623	0.22	56.6	719	0.20	100.6	1084	0.18	115.3	1206	0.17
Yemen, PDR	29.9	498	0.17	40.5	586	0.16	72.1	848	0.14	82.6	935	0.14
Sub-Total	760.0	8800	3.05	1609.4	15841	4.41	2863.5	26237	4.31	3281.6	29703	4.30
16. Johnston (Australia)												
Australia	684.1	5921	2.05	778.1	6700	1.86	1384.5	11727	1.93	1586.6	13402	1.94
New Zealand	207.0	1966	0.68	227.6	2137	0.59	405.1	3608	0.59	464.2	4098	0.59
Papua New Guinea	20.6	421	0.15	29.7	496	0.14	52.8	688	0.11	60.6	752	0.11
Western Samoa	2.1	267	0.09	2.9	274	0.08	5.2	293	0.05	5.9	299	0.04
Sub-Total	913.8	8575	2.97	1038.3	9607	2.67	1847.6	16316	2.68	2117.3	18551	2.68
17. Pesqueira (Mexico)												
Costa Rica	12.9	357	0.12	15.8	381	0.11	28.1	483	0.08	32.2	517	0.07
El Salvador	14.5	370	0.13	17.0	391	0.11	30.3	501	0.08	34.7	538	0.08
Guatemala	14.8	373	0.13	20.1	417	0.12	35.8	547	0.09	41.1	591	0.09
Haiti	18.1	400	0.14	21.0	424	0.12	37.4	560	0.09	42.8	605	0.09
Honduras	10.1	334	0.12	13.1	359	0.10	23.4	444	0.07	26.8	472	0.07
Mexico	275.0	2530	0.88	380.7	3406	0.95	677.4	5865	0.96	776.3	6685	0.97
Nicaragua	11.0	341	0.12	13.3	360	0.10	23.6	446	0.07	27.0	474	0.07
Panama	21.8	431	0.15	26.1	466	0.13	46.3	634	0.10	53.1	690	0.10
Peru	88.7	985	0.34	113.2	1188	0.33	201.3	1919	0.32	230.8	2163	0.31
Venezuela	237.9	2222	0.77	455.5	4026	1.12	810.5	6969	1.15	928.9	7950	1.15
Sub-Total	704.9	8343	2.89	1075.8	11418	3.18	1914.2	18368	3.02	2193.7	20685	2.99
18. Razafindrabe (Madagascar)												
Benin	12.1	350	0.12	14.2	368	0.10	25.3	460	0.08	29.1	491	0.07
Cameroon	24.1	450	0.16	29.7	496	0.14	52.8	688	0.11	60.6	752	0.11
Central African Empire	12.1	350	0.12	14.2	368	0.10	25.3	460	0.08	29.1	491	0.07
Chad	12.1	350	0.12	14.2	368	0.10	25.3	460	0.08	29.1	491	0.07
Congo	12.1	350	0.12	15.1	375	0.10	26.8	472	0.08	30.8	505	0.07
Gabon	14.5	370	0.13	27.7	480	0.13	49.3	659	0.11	56.6	719	0.10
Ivory Coast	44.0	615	0.21	61.6	761	0.21	109.7	1159	0.19	125.7	1292	0.19
Madagascar	26.4	469	0.16	33.1	524	0.15	58.9	738	0.12	67.4	809	0.12
Mali	20.9	423	0.15	24.5	453	0.13	43.5	611	0.10	49.9	664	0.10
Mauritania	12.1	350	0.12	15.2	376	0.10	27.0	474	0.08	31.0	507	0.07
Mauritius	22.7	438	0.15	26.7	471	0.13	47.4	643	0.11	54.4	701	0.10
Niger	12.1	350	0.12	14.2	368	0.10	25.3	460	0.08	29.1	491	0.07
Rwanda	18.1	400	0.14	21.0	424	0.12	37.4	560	0.09	42.8	605	0.09
Senegal	43.7	612	0.21	54.0	698	0.19	96.1	1047	0.17	110.3	1164	0.17
Somalia	18.1	400	0.14	22.8	439	0.12	40.5	586	0.10	46.4	635	0.09
Togo	18.1	400	0.14	22.0	432	0.12	39.1	574	0.09	44.8	621	0.09
Upper Volta	12.1	350	0.12	14.2	368	0.10	25.3	460	0.08	29.1	491	0.07
Zaire	115.8	1210	0.42	149.1	1486	0.41	265.3	2449	0.40	304.0	2770	0.40
Sub-Total	450.8	8237	2.85	573.6	9255	2.58	1020.6	12960	2.13	1170.0	14199	2.06
19. Franco-Holguin (Colombia)												
Brazil	450.3	3983	1.38	651.5	5651	1.57	1159.3	9860	1.62	1328.6	11263	1.63
Colombia	112.6	1183	0.41	141.7	1425	0.40	252.2	2341	0.39	289.0	2646	0.38
Dominican Republic	17.3	393	0.14	21.1	425	0.12	37.5	561	0.09	43.1	607	0.09
Ecuador	21.8	431	0.15	44.4	618	0.17	79.0	905	0.15	90.5	1000	0.14
Philippines	159.5	1572	0.54	206.9	1965	0.55	368.2	3302	0.54	421.9	3747	0.54
Sub-Total	761.4	7562	2.62	1065.7	10084	2.81	1896.3	16969	2.79	2173.0	19263	2.79
20. Gutierrez (Paraguay)												
Argentine	450.3	3983	1.38	567.1	4951	1.38	1009.1	8615	1.42	1156.4	9836	1.42
Bolivia	25.3	460	0.16	31.8	514	0.14	56.7	720	0.12	64.9	788	0.11
Chile	113.8	1193	0.41	149.6	1490	0.41	266.1	2456	0.40	305.0	2778	0.40
Paraguay	7.2	310	0.11	8.4	320	0.09	15.1	375	0.06	17.3	393	0.06
Uruguay	49.6	661	0.23	62.5	768	0.21	111.2	1172	0.19	127.4	1306	0.19
Sub-Total	646.2	6607	2.29	819.5	8043	2.24	1458.2	13338	2.19	1670.9	15101	2.19

	Present[a/]			After Selective Capital Increase[b/]			After $30 Billion General Capital Increase[c/]			After $40 Billion General Capital Increase[c/]		
	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total
Countries Not Represented												
China	904.8	7750	2.68	904.8	7750	2.16	904.8	7750	1.27	904.8	7750	1.12
S. Africa	329.3	2980	1.03	417.8	3713	1.03	743.4	6412	1.05	851.8	7311	1.06
Cambodia	25.8	464	0.16	30.6	504	0.14	54.5	702	0.12	62.5	768	0.11
Guinea-Bissau	3.3	277	0.10	3.3	277	0.08	5.8	298	0.05	6.6	305	0.04
Comoros	1.9	266	0.09	1.9	266	0.07	3.4	278	0.05	4.0	283	0.04
Sao Tome & Principe	1.7	264	0.09	1.7	264	0.07	3.0	275	0.05	3.5	279	0.04
Maldives	0.7	256	0.09	0.7	256	0.07	1.3	261	0.04	1.4	262	0.04
Sub-Total	1267.5	12257	4.25	1360.8	13030	3.63	1716.2	15976	2.63	1834.6	16958	2.45
GRAND TOTAL	30871.6	288660	100.00	39400.6	359361	100.00	69401.4	608052	100.00	79401.0	690945	100.00
Part I Countries	21630.5	184306	63.85	25788.5	218773	60.88	45885.6	385368	63.38	52584.6	440899	63.81
Part II Countries												
Capital Surplus Oil-Exporting	257.7	3136	1.09	1038.4	9608	2.67	1847.8	16317	2.68	2117.4	18552	2.69
Other OPEC	1104.1	11402	3.95	2533.7	23253	6.47	4508.2	39621	6.52	5166.4	45077	6.52
	1361.7	14538	5.04	3572.1	32861	9.14	6356.0	55938	9.20	7283.8	63629	9.21
China	904.8	7750	2.68	904.8	7750	2.16	904.8	7750	1.27	904.8	7750	1.12
Other Non-Oil LDC's	6974.6	82066	28.43	9135.3	99977	27.82	16255.0	158996	26.15	18627.8	178667	25.86
	7879.4	89816	31.11	10040.1	107727	29.98	17159.7	166746	27.42	19532.6	186417	26.98

a/ June 30, 1977: also includes memberships of Sao Tome & Principe and Maldives.
b/ Assumes full subscription of the Selective Increase.
c/ Each country's capital subscription is increased by a proportion of a $30 or $40 billion General Increase, respectively, that corresponds to its share of total capital subscriptions (excluding China's) after full subscription to the Selective Increase. China is assumed not to participate in the General Increase.

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

P & B
2/2/78

POTENTIAL IBRD VOTING POWER AFTER CAPITAL INCREASES OF $30 AND $40 BILLION WITH VARIOUS AMOUNTS OF MEMBERSHIP VOTES

(%)

	$30 Billion Capital Increase					$40 Billion Capital Increase				
Membership Votes:	250	10%a/	15%a/	20%a/	0.25%b/	250	10%a/	15%a/	20%a/	0.25%b/
Appointed Directors										
1. United States	22.79	21.92	21.00	20.16	18.29	22.98	21.95	21.04	20.20	18.33
2. United Kingdom	7.65	7.38	7.09	6.83	6.24	7.71	7.39	7.10	6.84	6.26
3. Germany	5.19	5.02	4.84	4.67	4.29	5.23	5.03	4.84	4.67	4.30
4. France	4.63	4.47	4.31	4.16	3.84	4.66	4.48	4.32	4.17	3.84
5. Japan	4.00	3.88	3.74	3.62	3.34	4.03	3.88	3.75	3.62	3.35
Elected Directors										
6. Rota (Italy)										
Italy	3.00	2.91	2.82	2.73	2.55	3.02	2.92	2.83	2.74	2.55
Portugal	0.37	0.39	0.40	0.42	0.45	0.37	0.39	0.40	0.42	0.45
Spain	1.37	1.35	1.32	1.30	1.25	1.38	1.35	1.33	1.30	1.25
Sub-Total	4.75	4.65	4.55	4.45	4.24	4.77	4.66	4.55	4.46	4.25
7. Drake (Canada)										
Bahamas	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.25	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.25
Barbados	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.22	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.22
Canada	3.30	3.20	3.09	2.99	2.78	3.32	3.20	3.10	3.00	2.78
Grenada	0.05	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.19	0.04	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.19
Guyana	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.18	0.24	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.18	0.24
Ireland	0.41	0.43	0.44	0.45	0.48	0.41	0.43	0.44	0.45	0.48
Jamaica	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.28	0.33	0.21	0.24	0.26	0.28	0.33
Sub-Total	4.27	4.32	4.36	4.40	4.49	4.27	4.32	4.37	4.41	4.50
8. Sen (India)										
Bangladesh	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.48	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.48
India	3.36	3.26	3.15	3.05	2.83	3.38	3.26	3.15	3.05	2.83
Sri Lanka	0.32	0.34	0.36	0.38	0.41	0.32	0.34	0.36	0.38	0.41
Sub-Total	4.08	4.01	3.94	3.87	3.72	4.10	4.02	3.94	3.88	3.72
9. Looijen (Netherlands)										
Cyprus	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.25	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.25
Israel	0.53	0.54	0.55	0.56	0.58	0.53	0.54	0.55	0.56	0.58
Netherlands	2.29	2.23	2.16	2.11	1.98	2.30	2.23	2.17	2.11	1.98
Romania	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.64	0.65	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.64	0.66
Yugoslavia	0.48	0.49	0.51	0.52	0.54	0.48	0.49	0.51	0.52	0.54
Sub-Total	4.05	4.04	4.03	4.02	4.00	4.06	4.05	4.04	4.03	4.01
10. de Groote (Belgium)										
Austria	0.83	0.83	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.82	0.82
Belgium	2.17	2.11	2.05	2.00	1.88	2.18	2.12	2.06	2.00	1.88
Luxembourg	0.13	0.15	0.18	0.20	0.26	0.12	0.15	0.18	0.20	0.26
Turkey	0.52	0.53	0.54	0.55	0.57	0.52	0.53	0.54	0.55	0.57
Sub-Total	3.64	3.62	3.60	3.57	3.52	3.65	3.63	3.60	3.58	3.53
11. El-Naggar (Egypt)										
Bahrain	0.09	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.23	0.08	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.23
Egypt	0.52	0.53	0.54	0.55	0.57	0.52	0.53	0.54	0.55	0.57
Iraq	0.29	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.39	0.29	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.39
Jordan	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.24	0.10	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.24
Kuwait	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75
Lebanon	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22
Pakistan	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78
Qatar	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.21	0.26	0.13	0.16	0.19	0.21	0.26
Saudi Arabia	1.47	1.45	1.42	1.39	1.33	1.48	1.45	1.42	1.39	1.33
Syrian Arab Republic	0.19	0.21	0.24	0.26	0.31	0.19	0.21	0.24	0.26	0.31
United Arab Emirates	0.33	0.35	0.36	0.38	0.42	0.33	0.35	0.36	0.38	0.42
Yemen Arab Republic	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.21	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.21
Sub-Total	4.81	4.99	5.17	5.33	5.70	4.79	4.99	5.17	5.34	5.71
12. Magnussen (Norway)										
Denmark	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78
Finland	0.67	0.67	0.68	0.68	0.69	0.67	0.67	0.68	0.68	0.69
Iceland	0.11	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.24	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.24
Norway	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75
Sweden	1.12	1.10	1.09	1.07	1.04	1.12	1.10	1.09	1.08	1.05
Sub-Total	3.42	3.43	3.45	3.46	3.50	3.42	3.44	3.45	3.47	3.50

	$30 Billion Capital Increase					$40 Billion Capital Increase				
Membership Votes:	250	10%a/	15%a/	20%a/	0.25%b/	250	10%a/	15%a/	20%a/	0.25%b/
Elected Directors (cont'd)										
13. Thavil (Thailand)										
Burma	0.21	0.24	0.26	0.28	0.33	0.21	0.24	0.26	0.28	0.33
Fiji	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.22	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.22
Indonesia	1.18	1.16	1.15	1.13	1.09	1.18	1.16	1.15	1.13	1.10
Korea	0.42	0.44	0.45	0.46	0.49	0.42	0.44	0.45	0.46	0.49
Laos	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22
Malaysia	0.65	0.65	0.66	0.66	0.67	0.65	0.65	0.66	0.66	0.67
Nepal	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.22	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.22
Singapore	0.31	0.33	0.34	0.36	0.40	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.36	0.40
Thailand	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.51	0.53	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.51	0.53
Vietnam	0.26	0.28	0.30	0.32	0.36	0.26	0.28	0.30	0.32	0.36
Sub-Total	3.75	3.90	4.06	4.21	4.54	3.73	3.91	4.07	4.22	4.54
14. Thahane (Lesotho)										
Botswana	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.21	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.21
Burundi	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23
Equatorial Guinea	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.21	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.21
Ethiopia	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.22	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.22
Gambia, The	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.14	0.20	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.14	0.20
Guinea	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.24	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.24
Kenya	0.20	0.22	0.25	0.27	0.32	0.20	0.22	0.25	0.27	0.32
Lesotho	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.14	0.20	0.05	0.09	0.12	0.14	0.20
Liberia	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.25	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.25
Malawi	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23
Nigeria	0.90	0.90	0.89	0.89	0.87	0.90	0.90	0.89	0.89	0.87
Sierra Leone	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23
Sudan	0.25	0.27	0.29	0.31	0.35	0.24	0.27	0.29	0.31	0.35
Swaziland	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.21	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.21
Tanzania	0.17	0.19	0.22	0.24	0.29	0.17	0.19	0.22	0.24	0.29
Trinidad & Tobago	0.24	0.26	0.28	0.30	0.34	0.23	0.26	0.28	0.30	0.34
Uganda	0.16	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.28	0.15	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.28
Zambia	0.38	0.39	0.41	0.42	0.46	0.38	0.39	0.41	0.42	0.46
Sub-Total	3.20	3.61	4.05	4.46	5.35	3.13	3.62	4.06	4.46	5.35
15. Khelif (Algeria)										
Afghanistan	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.22	0.27	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.22	0.27
Algeria	0.72	0.72	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.72	0.72	0.73	0.73	0.73
Ghana	0.29	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.39	0.29	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.39
Greece	0.32	0.34	0.35	0.37	0.41	0.32	0.34	0.35	0.37	0.41
Iran	1.56	1.53	1.50	1.47	1.40	1.57	1.53	1.50	1.47	1.40
Libyan Arab Republic	0.47	0.48	0.50	0.51	0.53	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.51	0.53
Morocco	0.40	0.41	0.43	0.44	0.47	0.40	0.41	0.43	0.44	0.47
Oman	0.09	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.23	0.08	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.23
Tunisia	0.18	0.20	0.23	0.25	0.30	0.17	0.20	0.23	0.25	0.30
Yemen, PDR	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.21	0.27	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.21	0.27
Sub-Total	4.31	4.45	4.58	4.71	4.99	4.30	4.45	4.59	4.72	5.00
16. Johnston (Australia)										
Australia	1.93	1.88	1.83	1.79	1.69	1.94	1.89	1.84	1.79	1.69
New Zealand	0.59	0.60	0.61	0.61	0.63	0.59	0.60	0.61	0.61	0.63
Papua New Guinea	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.25	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.25
Western Samoa	0.05	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.19	0.04	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.19
Sub-Total	2.68	2.70	2.71	2.73	2.76	2.68	2.70	2.72	2.73	2.76
17. Pesqueira (Mexico)										
Costa Rica	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.16	0.22	0.07	0.11	0.13	0.16	0.22
El Salvador	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.22	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.22
Guatemala	0.09	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.23	0.09	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.23
Haiti	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23
Honduras	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.21	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.21
Mexico	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.94	0.92	0.97	0.96	0.95	0.94	0.92
Nicaragua	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.21	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.21
Panama	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.24	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.24
Peru	0.32	0.33	0.35	0.37	0.41	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.37	0.41
Venezuela	1.15	1.13	1.12	1.10	1.07	1.15	1.13	1.12	1.10	1.07
Sub-Total	3.02	3.20	3.40	3.57	3.96	2.99	3.21	3.40	3.57	3.96

Membership Votes:	$30 Billion Capital Increase 250	10%a/	15%a/	20%a/	0.25%b/	$40 Billion Capital Increase 250	10%a/	15%a/	20%a/	0.25%b/
Elected Directors (cont'd)										
18. Razafindrabe (Madagascar)										
Benin	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22
Cameroon	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.25	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.25
Central African Empire	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22
Chad	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22
Congo	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22
Gabon	0.11	0.13	0.16	0.19	0.24	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.19	0.24
Ivory Coast	0.19	0.21	0.24	0.26	0.31	0.19	0.21	0.24	0.26	0.31
Madagascar	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.25	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.25
Mali	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.18	0.24	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.18	0.24
Mauritania	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22	0.07	0.11	0.13	0.16	0.22
Mauritius	0.11	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.24	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.24
Niger	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22
Rwanda	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23
Senegal	0.17	0.20	0.22	0.24	0.29	0.17	0.20	0.22	0.24	0.29
Somalia	0.10	0.12	0.15	0.18	0.23	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.18	0.23
Togo	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23
Upper Volta	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.22
Zaire	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.48	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.48
Sub-Total	2.13	2.59	3.07	3.52	4.50	2.06	2.59	3.08	3.52	4.50
19. Franco-Holguin (Colombia)										
Brazil	1.62	1.59	1.55	1.52	1.45	1.63	1.59	1.55	1.52	1.45
Colombia	0.39	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.46	0.38	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.46
Dominican Republic	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.23
Ecuador	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.22	0.27	0.14	0.17	0.20	0.22	0.27
Philippines	0.54	0.55	0.56	0.57	0.59	0.54	0.55	0.56	0.57	0.59
Sub-Total	2.79	2.83	2.87	2.91	3.00	2.79	2.84	2.88	2.92	3.00
20. Gutierrez (Paraguay)										
Argentina	1.42	1.39	1.36	1.34	1.28	1.42	1.39	1.37	1.34	1.29
Bolivia	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.20	0.25	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.20	0.25
Chile	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.48	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.48
Paraguay	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.20	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.20
Uruguay	0.19	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.31	0.19	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.31
Sub- Total	2.19	2.26	2.33	2.39	2.52	2.19	2.26	2.33	2.39	2.53
Countries Not Represented										
China	1.27	1.25	1.23	1.21	1.17	1.12	1.11	1.09	1.08	1.05
S. Africa	1.05	1.04	1.03	1.02	1.00	1.06	1.04	1.03	1.02	1.00
Cambodia	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.25	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.25
Guinea-Bissau	0.05	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.19	0.04	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.19
Comoros	0.05	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.19	0.04	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.19
Sao Tome & Principe	0.05	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.19	0.04	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.19
Maldives	0.04	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.19	0.04	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.19
Sub-Total	2.63	2.73	2.85	2.95	3.18	2.45	2.59	2.71	2.82	3.06
GRAND TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Part I Countries	63.38	61.49	59.47	57.63	53.56	63.81	61.57	59.57	57.73	53.66
Part II Countries										
Capital Surplus Oil-Exporting	2.68	2.70	2.71	2.73	2.76	2.69	2.70	2.72	2.73	2.76
Other OPEC	6.52	6.53	6.54	6.56	6.59	6.52	6.54	6.55	6.57	6.60
	9.20	9.23	9.26	9.29	9.35	9.21	9.24	9.27	9.30	9.36
China	1.27	1.25	1.23	1.21	1.17	1.12	1.11	1.09	1.08	1.05
Other Non-Oil LDC's	26.15	28.03	30.04	31.87	35.92	25.86	28.08	30.07	31.89	35.94
	27.42	29.29	31.27	33.09	37.09	26.98	29.19	31.16	32.97	36.98

a/ i.e., total membership votes as a % of the total votes (subscription votes plus membership votes). In the case of a $30 billion capital increase, 10%, 15%, and 20% corresponds to 440, 660, and 880 membership votes per country, respectively, and in the case of a $40 billion capital increase, 10%, 15%, and 20% corresponds to 505, 755, and 1005 membership votes per country respectively.

b/ i.e., membership votes per country of 0.25% of total subscription votes. In the case of a $30 billion capital increase, this corresponds to 1440 membership votes per country, and in the case of a $40 billion capital increase, this corresponds to 1645 membership votes per country.

POTENTIAL IBRD VOTING POWER AFTER A $30 BILLION CAPITAL INCREASE WITH FURTHER INCREASES FOR NON-OIL LDCs[a]

	No Special Increase			Increase in Non-oil LDC Voting Power to 31.11%											
				Equal Allotment[b]			By Share of Capital[c]			By Share of Votes[d]			"Low" Subscription[e]		
	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total
Appointed Directors															
1. United States	16685.5	138564	22.79	0.0	138564	21.63	0.0	138564	21.63	0.0	138564	21.63	0.0	138564	21.63
2. United Kingdom	5580.8	46512	7.65	0.0	46512	7.26	0.0	46512	7.26	0.0	46512	7.26	0.0	46512	7.26
3. Germany	3780.3	31587	5.19	0.0	31587	4.93	0.0	31587	4.93	0.0	31587	4.93	0.0	31587	4.93
4. France	3362.8	28126	4.63	0.0	28126	4.39	0.0	28126	4.39	0.0	28126	4.39	0.0	28126	4.39
5. Japan	2906.1	24340	4.00	0.0	24340	3.80	0.0	24340	3.80	0.0	24340	3.80	0.0	24340	3.80
Elected Directors															
6. Rota (Italy)															
Italy	2172.3	18257	3.00	0.0	18257	2.85	0.0	18257	2.85	0.0	18257	2.85	0.0	18257	2.85
Portugal	241.6	2253	0.37	40.5	2589	0.40	58.4	2737	0.43	55.6	2714	0.42	100.6	3087	0.48
Spain	976.9	8348	1.37	40.5	8684	1.36	236.0	10304	1.61	206.2	10057	1.57	132.1	9443	1.47
Sub-Total	3390.8	28858	4.75	81.1	29530	4.61	294.3	31298	4.89	261.8	31028	4.84	232.7	30787	4.81
7. Drake (Canada)															
Bahamas	57.9	730	0.12	40.5	1066	0.17	14.0	846	0.13	18.0	879	0.14	7.8	795	0.12
Barbados	29.8	497	0.08	40.5	833	0.13	7.2	557	0.09	12.3	599	0.09	4.5	534	0.08
Canada	2387.2	20039	3.30	0.0	20039	3.13	0.0	20039	3.13	0.0	20039	3.13	0.0	20039	3.13
Grenada	5.2	293	0.05	40.5	629	0.10	1.2	303	0.05	7.2	353	0.06	0.7	299	0.05
Guyana	44.0	615	0.10	40.5	951	0.15	10.6	703	0.11	15.2	741	0.12	5.9	664	0.10
Ireland	271.8	2503	0.41	0.0	2503	0.39	0.0	2503	0.39	0.0	2503	0.39	0.0	2503	0.39
Jamaica	127.9	1310	0.22	40.5	1646	0.26	30.9	1566	0.24	32.3	1578	0.25	20.0	1476	0.23
Sub-Total	2923.8	25987	4.27	202.7	27667	4.32	63.9	26517	4.14	85.0	26692	4.17	39.0	26310	4.11
8. Sen (India)															
Bangladesh	266.6	2460	0.40	40.5	2796	0.44	64.4	2994	0.47	60.8	2964	0.46	35.9	2758	0.43
India	2432.6	20415	3.36	40.5	20751	3.24	587.5	25285	3.95	504.1	24594	3.84	328.2	23136	3.61
Sri Lanka	206.3	1960	0.32	40.5	2296	0.36	49.8	2373	0.37	48.4	2361	0.37	30.5	2213	0.35
Sub-Total	2905.5	24835	4.08	121.6	25843	4.03	701.7	30652	4.78	613.3	29919	4.67	394.7	28107	4.39
9. Looijen (Netherlands)															
Cyprus	59.7	745	0.12	40.5	1081	0.17	14.5	865	0.14	18.3	897	0.14	8.1	812	0.13
Israel	359.1	3227	0.53	40.5	3563	0.56	86.7	3946	0.62	79.7	3888	0.61	48.9	3632	0.57
Netherlands	1648.2	13913	2.29	0.0	13913	2.17	0.0	13913	2.17	0.0	13913	2.17	0.0	13913	2.17
Romania	429.5	3810	0.63	40.5	4146	0.65	103.7	4670	0.73	94.1	4590	0.72	57.9	4290	0.67
Yugoslavia	323.9	2935	0.48	40.5	3271	0.51	78.2	3583	0.56	72.5	3536	0.55	227.9	4824	0.75
Sub-Total	2820.4	24630	4.05	162.1	25974	4.05	283.1	26977	4.21	264.7	26824	4.19	342.7	27471	4.29
10. de Groote (Belgium)															
Austria	578.7	5047	0.83	0.0	5047	0.79	0.0	5047	0.79	0.0	5047	0.79	0.0	5047	0.79
Belgium	1560.1	13182	2.17	0.0	13182	2.06	0.0	13182	2.06	0.0	13182	2.06	0.0	13182	2.06
Luxembourg	63.7	778	0.13	0.0	778	0.12	0.0	778	0.12	0.0	778	0.12	0.0	778	0.12
Turkey	350.1	3152	0.52	40.5	3488	0.54	84.6	3853	0.60	77.8	3797	0.59	48.4	3553	0.55
Sub-Total	2552.5	22159	3.64	40.5	22495	3.51	84.6	22860	3.57	77.8	22804	3.56	48.4	22560	3.52
11. El-Naggar (Egypt)															
Bahrain	35.0	540	0.09	40.5	876	0.14	8.4	610	0.10	13.4	651	0.10	4.7	579	0.09
Egypt	354.2	3186	0.52	40.5	3522	0.55	85.5	3895	0.61	78.7	3838	0.60	99.0	4007	0.63
Iraq	185.4	1787	0.29	0.0	1787	0.28	0.0	1787	0.28	0.0	1787	0.28	0.0	1787	0.28
Jordan	50.1	665	0.11	40.5	1001	0.16	12.1	765	0.12	16.4	801	0.13	10.1	749	0.12
Kuwait	515.6	4524	0.74	0.0	4524	0.71	0.0	4524	0.71	0.0	4524	0.71	0.0	4524	0.71
Lebanon	24.7	455	0.07	40.5	791	0.12	6.0	505	0.08	11.2	548	0.09	3.4	483	0.08
Pakistan	540.7	4732	0.78	40.5	5068	0.79	130.5	5814	0.91	116.9	5701	0.89	73.0	5337	0.83
Qatar	70.2	832	0.14	0.0	832	0.13	0.0	832	0.13	0.0	832	0.13	0.0	832	0.13
Saudi Arabia	1051.6	8967	1.47	0.0	8967	1.40	0.0	8967	1.40	0.0	8967	1.40	0.0	8967	1.40
Syrian Arab Republic	109.1	1154	0.19	40.5	1490	0.23	26.3	1372	0.21	28.5	1390	0.22	16.9	1294	0.20
United Arab Emirates	210.4	1994	0.33	0.0	1994	0.31	0.0	1994	0.31	0.0	1994	0.31	0.0	1994	0.31
Yemen Arab Republic	22.8	439	0.07	40.5	775	0.12	5.5	485	0.08	10.9	529	0.08	3.3	466	0.07
Sub-Total	3169.7	29275	4.81	283.7	31627	4.94	274.4	31550	4.93	275.9	31562	4.93	210.4	31019	4.84
12. Magnussen (Norway)															
Denmark	541.8	4741	0.78	0.0	4741	0.74	0.0	4741	0.74	0.0	4741	0.74	0.0	4741	0.74
Finland	459.4	4058	0.67	0.0	4058	0.63	0.0	4058	0.63	0.0	4058	0.63	0.0	4058	0.63
Iceland	47.4	645	0.11	0.0	645	0.10	0.0	645	0.10	0.0	645	0.10	0.0	645	0.10
Norway	517.3	4538	0.75	0.0	4538	0.71	0.0	4538	0.71	0.0	4538	0.71	0.0	4538	0.71
Sweden	789.1	6791	1.12	0.0	6791	1.06	0.0	6791	1.06	0.0	6791	1.06	0.0	6791	1.06
Sub-Total	2355.2	20773	3.42	0.0	20773	3.24	0.0	20773	3.24	0.0	20773	3.24	0.0	20773	3.24
13. Thavil (Thailand)															
Burma	126.9	1302	0.21	40.5	1638	0.26	30.6	1556	0.24	32.1	1568	0.24	18.2	1453	0.23
Fiji	31.6	512	0.08	40.5	848	0.13	7.6	575	0.09	12.7	617	0.10	4.2	547	0.09
Indonesia	834.6	7168	1.18	0.0	7168	1.12	0.0	7168	1.12	0.0	7168	1.12	0.0	7168	1.12
Korea	280.4	2574	0.42	40.5	2910	0.45	67.7	3135	0.49	63.6	3101	0.48	38.6	2894	0.45
Laos	25.3	460	0.08	40.5	796	0.12	6.2	511	0.08	11.3	554	0.09	6.2	511	0.08
Malaysia	443.5	3926	0.65	40.5	4262	0.67	107.1	4814	0.75	97.0	4730	0.74	60.4	4427	0.69
Nepal	31.4	510	0.08	40.5	846	0.13	7.6	573	0.09	12.5	614	0.10	7.0	568	0.09
Singapore	195.5	1871	0.31	40.5	2207	0.34	47.2	2262	0.35	46.2	2254	0.35	26.4	2090	0.33
Thailand	317.3	2880	0.47	40.5	3216	0.50	76.6	3515	0.55	71.1	3469	0.54	42.8	3235	0.50
Vietnam	162.0	1593	0.26	40.5	1929	0.30	39.1	1917	0.30	39.3	1919	0.30	21.8	1774	0.28
Sub-Total	2448.4	22796	3.75	364.8	25820	4.03	389.7	26026	4.06	385.8	25994	4.06	225.7	24667	3.85

	No Special Increase			Increase in Non-oil LDC Voting Power to 31.11%											
				Equal Allotment[b/]			By Share of Capital[c/]			By Share of Votes[d/]			"Low" Subscription[e/]		
	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total
Elected Directors (con't)															
14. Thahane (Lesotho)															
Botswana	15.9	382	0.06	40.5	718	0.11	3.9	414	0.06	9.4	460	0.07	2.2	400	0.06
Burundi	37.4	560	0.09	40.5	896	0.14	9.0	635	0.10	13.9	675	0.11	7.8	625	0.10
Equatorial Guinea	16.5	387	0.06	40.5	723	0.11	4.0	420	0.07	9.5	466	0.07	4.0	420	0.07
Ethiopia	31.4	510	0.08	40.5	846	0.13	7.6	573	0.09	12.5	614	0.10	39.8	840	0.13
Gambia, The	14.0	366	0.06	40.5	702	0.11	3.4	394	0.06	9.0	441	0.07	3.9	398	0.06
Guinea	51.3	675	0.11	40.5	1011	0.16	12.4	778	0.12	16.6	813	0.13	8.9	749	0.12
Kenya	118.1	1229	0.20	40.5	1565	0.24	28.5	1465	0.23	30.4	1481	0.23	18.8	1385	0.22
Lesotho	12.4	353	0.06	40.5	689	0.11	3.0	378	0.06	8.7	425	0.07	1.7	367	0.06
Liberia	55.9	713	0.12	40.5	1049	0.16	13.5	825	0.13	17.6	859	0.13	18.1	863	0.13
Malawi	39.1	574	0.09	40.5	910	0.14	9.4	652	0.10	14.1	691	0.11	5.3	618	0.10
Nigeria	631.3	5483	0.90	0.0	5483	0.86	0.0	5483	0.86	0.0	5483	0.86	0.0	5483	0.86
Sierra Leone	38.2	567	0.09	40.5	903	0.14	9.3	644	0.10	14.0	683	0.11	23.4	761	0.12
Sudan	150.7	1499	0.25	40.5	1835	0.29	36.4	1801	0.28	37.0	1806	0.28	24.6	1703	0.27
Swaziland	21.0	424	0.07	40.5	760	0.12	5.1	466	0.07	10.5	511	0.08	2.8	447	0.07
Tanzania	94.2	1031	0.17	40.5	1367	0.21	22.8	1220	0.19	25.5	1242	0.19	15.3	1158	0.18
Trinidad & Tobago	143.2	1437	0.24	40.5	1773	0.28	34.6	1724	0.27	35.5	1731	0.27	19.8	1601	0.25
Uganda	85.4	958	0.16	40.5	1294	0.20	20.6	1129	0.18	23.6	1154	0.18	14.6	1079	0.17
Zambia	247.1	2298	0.38	40.5	2634	0.41	59.7	2793	0.44	56.7	2768	0.43	33.7	2577	0.40
Sub-Total	1803.0	19446	3.20	689.1	25158	3.93	283.3	21794	3.40	344.7	22303	3.48	244.6	21474	3.35
15. Khelif (Algeria)															
Afghanistan	74.9	871	0.14	40.5	1207	0.19	18.1	1021	0.16	21.5	1049	0.16	14.1	988	0.15
Algeria	499.4	4390	0.72	0.0	4390	0.69	0.0	4390	0.69	0.0	4390	0.69	0.0	4390	0.69
Ghana	183.7	1773	0.29	40.5	2109	0.33	44.4	2141	0.33	43.8	2136	0.33	27.1	1998	0.31
Greece	202.8	1931	0.32	40.5	2267	0.35	49.0	2337	0.36	47.7	2326	0.36	165.5	3303	0.52
Iran	1116.0	9501	1.56	0.0	9501	1.48	0.0	9501	1.48	0.0	9501	1.48	0.0	9501	1.48
Libyan Arab Rep.	316.3	2876	0.47	0.0	2876	0.45	0.0	2876	0.45	0.0	2876	0.45	0.0	2876	0.45
Morocco	261.9	2421	0.40	40.5	2757	0.43	63.2	2945	0.46	59.8	2917	0.46	36.6	2724	0.43
Oman	35.2	542	0.09	0.0	542	0.08	0.0	542	0.08	0.0	542	0.08	0.0	542	0.08
Tunisia	100.6	1084	0.18	40.5	1420	0.22	24.2	1285	0.20	26.8	1306	0.20	25.3	1294	0.20
Yemen, PDR	72.1	848	0.14	40.5	1184	0.18	17.4	992	0.15	21.0	1022	0.16	10.0	931	0.15
Sub-Total	2863.5	26237	4.31	243.2	28253	4.41	216.3	28030	4.38	220.5	28065	4.38	278.7	28547	4.46
16. Johnston (Australia)															
Australia	1384.5	11727	1.93	0.0	11727	1.83	0.0	11727	1.83	0.0	11727	1.83	0.0	11727	1.83
New Zealand	405.1	3608	0.59	0.0	3608	0.56	0.0	3608	0.56	0.0	3608	0.56	0.0	3608	0.56
Papua New Guinea	52.8	688	0.11	40.5	1024	0.16	12.8	794	0.12	17.0	829	0.13	7.4	749	0.12
Western Samoa	5.2	293	0.05	40.5	629	0.10	1.2	303	0.05	7.2	353	0.06	0.7	299	0.05
Sub-Total	1847.6	16316	2.68	81.1	16988	2.65	14.0	16432	2.57	24.2	16517	2.58	8.1	16333	2.56
17. Pesqueira (Mexico)															
Costa Rica	28.1	483	0.08	40.5	819	0.13	6.8	539	0.08	11.9	582	0.09	54.0	931	0.15
El Salvador	30.3	501	0.08	40.5	837	0.13	7.4	562	0.09	12.4	604	0.09	54.6	954	0.15
Guatemala	35.8	547	0.09	40.5	883	0.14	8.7	619	0.10	13.5	659	0.10	65.5	1090	0.17
Haiti	37.4	560	0.09	40.5	896	0.14	9.0	635	0.10	13.9	675	0.11	7.8	625	0.10
Honduras	23.4	444	0.07	40.5	780	0.12	5.7	491	0.08	11.0	535	0.08	43.7	806	0.13
Mexico	677.4	5865	0.96	40.5	6201	0.97	163.5	7221	1.13	144.8	7065	1.10	387.8	9080	1.42
Nicaragua	23.6	446	0.07	40.5	782	0.12	5.7	493	0.08	11.0	537	0.08	43.4	806	0.13
Panama	46.3	634	0.10	40.5	970	0.15	11.2	727	0.11	15.7	764	0.12	42.7	988	0.15
Peru	201.3	1919	0.32	40.5	2255	0.35	48.6	2322	0.36	47.4	2312	0.36	124.5	2951	0.46
Venezuela	810.5	6969	1.15	0.0	6969	1.09	0.0	6969	1.09	0.0	6969	1.09	0.0	6969	1.09
Sub-Total	1914.2	18368	3.02	364.8	21392	3.34	266.6	20578	3.21	281.6	20702	3.23	824.2	25200	3.93
18. Razafindrabe (Madagascar)															
Benin	25.3	460	0.08	40.5	796	0.12	6.2	511	0.08	11.3	554	0.09	6.2	511	0.08
Cameroon	52.8	688	0.11	40.5	1024	0.16	12.8	794	0.12	17.0	829	0.13	36.2	988	0.15
Central African Emp.	25.3	460	0.08	40.5	796	0.12	6.2	511	0.08	11.3	554	0.09	6.2	511	0.08
Chad	25.3	460	0.08	40.5	796	0.12	6.2	511	0.08	11.3	554	0.09	6.2	511	0.08
Congo	26.8	472	0.08	40.5	808	0.13	6.5	526	0.08	11.7	569	0.09	7.5	534	0.08
Gabon	49.3	659	0.11	40.5	995	0.16	11.9	758	0.12	16.3	794	0.12	10.9	749	0.12
Ivory Coast	109.7	1159	0.19	40.5	1495	0.23	26.5	1379	0.22	28.6	1396	0.22	40.9	1498	0.23
Madagascar	58.9	738	0.12	40.5	1074	0.17	14.2	856	0.13	18.2	889	0.14	8.2	806	0.13
Mali	43.5	611	0.10	40.5	947	0.15	10.5	698	0.11	15.1	736	0.11	9.9	693	0.11
Mauritania	27.0	474	0.08	40.5	810	0.13	6.5	528	0.08	11.7	571	0.09	7.2	534	0.08
Mauritius	47.4	643	0.11	40.5	979	0.15	11.5	738	0.12	15.9	775	0.12	6.4	696	0.11
Niger	25.3	460	0.08	40.5	796	0.12	6.2	511	0.08	11.3	554	0.09	6.2	511	0.08
Rwanda	37.4	560	0.09	40.5	896	0.14	9.0	635	0.10	13.9	675	0.11	7.8	625	0.10
Senegal	96.1	1047	0.17	40.5	1383	0.22	23.2	1239	0.19	25.8	1261	0.20	13.0	1155	0.18
Somalia	40.5	586	0.10	40.5	922	0.14	9.8	667	0.10	14.5	706	0.11	5.4	631	0.10
Togo	39.1	574	0.09	40.5	910	0.14	9.4	652	0.10	14.1	691	0.11	5.3	618	0.10
Upper Volta	25.3	460	0.08	40.5	796	0.12	6.2	511	0.08	11.3	554	0.09	6.2	511	0.08
Zaire	265.3	2449	0.40	40.5	2785	0.43	64.1	2980	0.47	60.4	2950	0.46	37.3	2758	0.43
Sub-Total	1020.6	12960	2.13	729.6	19008	2.97	246.7	15005	2.34	319.9	15612	2.44	226.8	14840	2.32
19. Franco-Holguin (Colombia)															
Brazil	1159.3	9860	1.62	40.5	10196	1.59	280.0	12181	1.90	243.4	11878	1.85	164.7	11225	1.75
Colombia	252.2	2341	0.39	40.5	2677	0.42	60.9	2846	0.44	57.8	2820	0.44	132.5	3439	0.54
Dominican Republic	37.5	561	0.09	40.5	897	0.14	9.0	636	0.10	13.9	676	0.11	72.0	1158	0.18
Ecuador	79.0	905	0.15	0.0	905	0.14	0.0	905	0.14	0.0	905	0.14	0.0	905	0.14
Philippines	368.2	3302	0.54	40.5	3638	0.57	88.9	4039	0.63	81.5	3978	0.62	49.7	3714	0.58
Sub-Total	1896.3	16969	2.79	162.1	18313	2.86	438.9	20607	3.22	396.6	20257	3.16	418.8	20441	3.19
20. Gutierrez (Paraguay)															
Argentina	1009.1	8615	1.42	40.5	8951	1.40	243.7	10635	1.66	212.7	10378	1.62	136.2	9744	1.52
Bolivia	56.7	720	0.12	40.5	1056	0.16	13.8	834	0.13	17.7	867	0.14	32.3	988	0.15
Chile	266.1	2456	0.40	40.5	2792	0.44	64.3	2989	0.47	60.7	2959	0.46	165.1	3825	0.60
Paraguay	15.1	375	0.06	40.5	711	0.11	3.6	405	0.06	9.3	452	0.07	30.2	625	0.10
Uruguay	111.2	1172	0.19	40.5	1508	0.24	26.9	1395	0.22	29.0	1412	0.22	55.9	1635	0.26
Sub-Total	1458.2	13338	2.19	202.7	15018	2.34	352.3	16258	2.54	329.3	16068	2.51	419.7	16817	2.63

	No Special Increase			Increase in Non-oil LDC Voting Power to 31.11%											
				Equal Allotment b/			By Share of Capital c/			By Share of Votes d/			"Low" Subscription e/		
	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total
Countries not represented															
China	904.8	7750	1.27	0.0	7750	1.21	0.0	7750	1.21	0.0	7750	1.21	0.0	7750	1.21
S. Africa	743.4	6412	1.05	0.0	6412	1.00	0.0	6412	1.00	0.0	6412	1.00	0.0	6412	1.00
Cambodia	54.5	702	0.12	40.5	1038	0.16	13.1	811	0.13	17.4	846	0.13	7.4	763	0.12
Guinea-Bissau	5.8	298	0.05	40.5	634	0.10	1.4	310	0.05	7.4	359	0.06	2.4	318	0.05
Comoros	3.4	278	0.05	40.5	614	0.10	0.8	285	0.04	6.9	335	0.05	0.7	284	0.04
Sao Tome & Principe	3.0	275	0.05	40.5	611	0.10	0.7	281	0.04	6.8	331	0.05	1.1	284	0.04
Maldives	1.3	261	0.04	40.5	597	0.09	0.4	264	0.04	6.4	314	0.05	0.1	262	0.04
Sub-Total	1716.2	15976	2.63	202.7	17656	2.76	16.5	16113	2.52	44.8	16347	2.55	11.7	16073	2.51
Grand Total	69401.4	608052	100.00	3931.7	640644	100.00	3926.3	640599	100.00	3925.9	640596	100.00	3926.2	640598	100.00
Part I Countries	45885.6	385368	63.38	0.0	385368	60.15	0.0	385368	60.16	0.0	385368	60.16	0.0	385368	60.16
Part II Countries															
Capital Surplus Oil Exporting	1847.8	16317	2.68	0.0	16317	2.55	0.0	16317	2.55	0.0	16317	2.55	0.0	16317	2.55
Other OPEC	4508.2	39621	6.52	0.0	39621	6.18	0.0	39621	6.18	0.0	39621	6.19	0.0	39621	6.18
Sub-Total	6356.0	55938	9.20	0.0	55938	8.73	0.0	55938	8.73	0.0	55938	8.73	0.0	55938	8.73
China	904.8	7750	1.27	0.0	7750	1.21	0.0	7750	1.21	0.0	7750	1.21	0.0	7750	1.21
Other Non-oil LDCs	16255.0	158996	26.15	3931.7	191588	29.90	3926.3	191543	29.90	3925.9	191540	29.90	3926.2	191542	29.90
Sub-Total	17159.7	166746	27.42	3931.7	199338	31.11	3926.3	199293	31.11	3925.9	199290	31.11	3926.2	199292	31.11

a/ Special increases are allocated to the non-oil LDCs sufficient to restore their aggregate voting power to 31.11%. The total amount of these increases varies slightly according to the method used to allocate the increases among countries due to rounding.

b/ The total increase of $3931.7 million (32592 shares) has been distributed equally among the 97 non-oil LDCs (excluding China) resulting in increased subscription of $40.5 million per member, or 336 shares.

c/ The total increase of $3926.3 million (32547 shares) has been distributed among the 97 non-oil LDCs in proportion to their share of capital after the General Increase.

d/ The total increase of $3925.9 million (32544 shares) has been distributed among the 97 non-oil LDCs in proportion to their voting power after the General Increase.

e/ The total increase of $3926.2 million (32546 shares) was distributed in two different ways among the 97 non-oil LDCs. Initially a part of the shares were distributed so as to raise their capital subscriptions to 1.4534436 times their respective IMF quota after effectiveness of the Sixth Review. In the calculation one SDR is considered equivalent to one 1944 dollar. The remaining shares are distributed among the 97 non-oil LDCs in proportion to the share of capital which results after the initial special increase.

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POTENTIAL IBRD VOTING POWER AFTER A $40 BILLION CAPITAL INCREASE WITH FURTHER SPECIAL INCREASES FOR NON-OIL LDCs[a]

	No Special Increase			Increase in Non-oil LDC Voting Power to 31.11%											
				Equal Allotment[b]			By Share of Capital[c]			By Share of Votes[d]			"Low" Subscription[e]		
	Capital Subscription	Voting Power		Increase in Subscription	Voting Power		Increase in Subscription	Voting Power		Increase in Subscription	Voting Power		Increase in Subscription	Voting Power	
	(Curr. $ m.)	No. Votes	% Total	(Curr. $ m.)	No. Votes	% Total	(Curr. $ m.)	No. Votes	% Total	(Curr. $ m.)	No. Votes	% Total	(Curr. $ m.)	No. Votes	% Total
Appointed Directors															
1. United States	19121.5	158757	22.98	0.0	158757	21.68	0.0	158757	21.68	0.0	158757	21.68	0.0	158757	21.68
2. United Kingdom	6395.6	53266	7.71	0.0	53266	7.27	0.0	53266	7.27	0.0	53266	7.27	0.0	53266	7.27
3. Germany	4332.2	36162	5.23	0.0	36162	4.94	0.0	36162	4.94	0.0	36162	4.94	0.0	36162	4.94
4. France	3853.8	32196	4.66	0.0	32196	4.40	0.0	32196	4.40	0.0	32196	4.40	0.0	32196	4.40
5. Japan	3330.4	27857	4.03	0.0	27857	3.80	0.0	27857	3.80	0.0	27857	3.80	0.0	27857	3.80
Elected Directors															
6. Rota (Italy)															
Italy	2489.3	20885	3.02	0.0	20885	2.85	0.0	20885	2.85	0.0	20885	2.85	0.0	20885	2.85
Portugal	277.0	2546	0.37	51.5	2973	0.41	74.3	3162	0.43	71.2	3136	0.43	122.9	3565	0.49
Spain	1119.5	9530	1.38	51.5	9957	1.36	300.3	12019	1.64	266.6	11740	1.60	178.1	11006	1.50
Sub-Total	3885.8	32961	4.77	103.0	33815	4.62	374.6	36066	4.92	337.8	35761	4.88	301.0	35456	4.84
7. Drake (Canada)															
Bahamas	66.5	801	0.12	51.5	1228	0.17	17.9	949	0.13	22.4	987	0.13	10.6	889	0.12
Barbados	34.1	533	0.08	51.5	960	0.13	9.2	609	0.08	15.0	657	0.09	5.4	578	0.05
Canada	2735.9	22929	3.32	0.0	22929	3.13	0.0	22929	3.13	0.0	22929	3.13	0.0	22929	3.13
Grenada	5.9	299	0.04	51.5	726	0.10	1.6	312	0.04	8.3	368	0.05	1.1	308	0.04
Guyana	50.4	668	0.10	51.5	1095	0.15	13.5	780	0.11	18.7	823	0.11	8.3	737	0.10
Ireland	311.4	2831	0.41	0.0	2831	0.39	0.0	2831	0.39	0.0	2831	0.39	0.0	2831	0.39
Jamaica	146.6	1465	0.21	51.5	1892	0.26	39.3	1791	0.24	41.0	1805	0.25	25.5	1676	0.23
Sub-Total	3350.8	29526	4.27	257.6	31661	4.32	81.4	30201	4.12	105.4	30400	4.15	50.9	29948	4.09
8. Sen (India)															
Bangladesh	305.6	2783	0.40	51.5	3210	0.44	81.9	3462	0.47	77.8	3428	0.47	48.6	3186	0.44
India	2787.8	23359	3.38	51.5	23786	3.25	747.8	29558	4.04	653.4	28775	3.93	443.3	27034	3.69
Sri Lanka	236.4	2210	0.32	51.5	2637	0.36	63.5	2736	0.37	61.8	2722	0.37	40.4	2545	0.35
Sub-Total	3329.8	28352	4.10	154.5	29633	4.05	893.2	35756	4.88	792.9	34925	4.77	532.4	32765	4.47
9. Looijen (Netherlands)															
Cyprus	68.4	817	0.12	51.5	1244	0.17	18.3	969	0.13	22.8	1006	0.14	11.3	911	0.12
Israel	411.5	3661	0.53	51.5	4088	0.56	110.4	4576	0.62	102.4	4510	0.62	65.4	4203	0.57
Netherlands	1888.9	15908	2.30	0.0	15908	2.17	0.0	15908	2.17	0.0	15908	2.17	0.0	15908	2.17
Romania	492.2	4330	0.63	51.5	4757	0.65	132.0	5424	0.74	121.1	5334	0.73	78.3	4979	0.68
Yugoslavia	371.2	3327	0.48	51.5	3754	0.51	99.5	4152	0.57	93.0	4098	0.56	273.4	5593	0.76
Sub-Total	3232.2	28043	4.06	206.0	29751	4.06	360.2	31029	4.24	339.3	30856	4.21	428.4	31594	4.31
10. de Groote (Belgium)															
Austria	663.1	5747	0.83	0.0	5747	0.78	0.0	5747	0.78	0.0	5747	0.78	0.0	5747	0.78
Belgium	1787.8	15070	2.18	0.0	15070	2.06	0.0	15070	2.06	0.0	15070	2.06	0.0	15070	2.06
Luxembourg	73.1	856	0.12	0.0	856	0.12	0.0	856	0.12	0.0	856	0.12	0.0	856	0.12
Turkey	401.2	3576	0.52	51.5	4003	0.55	107.6	4468	0.61	100.0	4405	0.60	64.4	4110	0.56
Sub-Total	2925.3	25249	3.65	51.5	25676	3.51	107.6	26141	3.57	100.0	26078	3.56	64.4	25783	3.52
11. El- Naggar (Egypt)															
Bahrain	40.1	582	0.08	51.5	1009	0.14	10.7	671	0.09	16.3	717	0.10	6.4	635	0.09
Egypt	405.8	3614	0.52	51.5	4041	0.55	108.8	4516	0.62	101.1	4452	0.61	125.5	4654	0.64
Iraq	212.6	2012	0.29	0.0	2012	0.27	0.0	2012	0.27	0.0	2012	0.27	0.0	2012	0.27
Jordan	57.3	725	0.10	51.5	1152	0.16	15.3	852	0.12	20.3	893	0.12	12.7	830	0.11
Kuwait	590.9	5148	0.75	0.0	5148	0.70	0.0	5148	0.70	0.0	5148	0.70	0.0	5148	0.70
Lebanon	28.2	484	0.07	51.5	911	0.12	7.6	547	0.07	13.5	596	0.08	4.5	521	0.07
Pakistan	619.6	5386	0.78	51.5	5813	0.79	166.2	6764	0.92	150.7	6635	0.91	98.6	6203	0.85
Qatar	80.5	917	0.13	0.0	917	0.13	0.0	917	0.13	0.0	917	0.13	0.0	917	0.13
Saudi Arabia	1205.0	10239	1.48	0.0	10239	1.40	0.0	10239	1.40	0.0	10239	1.40	0.0	10239	1.40
Syrian Arab Republic	125.0	1286	0.19	51.5	1713	0.23	33.5	1564	0.21	35.9	1584	0.22	21.8	1467	0.20
United Arab Emirates	241.0	2248	0.33	0.0	2248	0.31	0.0	2248	0.31	0.0	2248	0.31	0.0	2248	0.31
Yemen Arab Republic	26.1	466	0.07	51.5	893	0.12	7.0	524	0.07	13.0	574	0.08	4.7	505	0.07
Sub-Total	3632.0	33107	4.79	360.6	36096	4.93	349.2	36002	4.92	350.8	36015	4.92	274.1	35379	4.83
12. Magnussen (Norway)															
Denmark	620.9	5397	0.78	0.0	5397	0.74	0.0	5397	0.74	0.0	5397	0.74	0.0	5397	0.74
Finland	526.5	4614	0.67	0.0	4614	0.63	0.0	4614	0.63	0.0	4614	0.63	0.0	4614	0.63
Iceland	54.6	703	0.10	0.0	703	0.10	0.0	703	0.10	0.0	703	0.10	0.0	703	0.10
Norway	592.8	5164	0.75	0.0	5164	0.71	0.0	5164	0.71	0.0	5164	0.71	0.0	5164	0.71
Sweden	904.3	7746	1.12	0.0	7746	1.06	0.0	7746	1.06	0.0	7746	1.06	0.0	7746	1.06
Sub-Total	2699.1	23624	3.42	0.0	23624	3.23	0.0	23624	3.23	0.0	23624	3.23	0.0	23624	3.23
13. Thavil (Thailand)															
Burma	145.4	1455	0.21	51.5	1882	0.26	39.0	1778	0.24	40.7	1792	0.24	25.2	1664	0.23
Fiji	36.2	550	0.08	51.5	977	0.13	9.7	630	0.09	15.4	678	0.09	5.8	598	0.08
Indonesia	956.4	8178	1.18	0.0	8178	1.12	0.0	8178	1.12	0.0	8178	1.12	0.0	8178	1.12
Korea	321.3	2913	0.42	51.5	3340	0.46	86.1	3627	0.50	81.4	3588	0.49	52.1	3345	0.46
Laos	29.1	491	0.07	51.5	918	0.13	7.8	556	0.08	13.8	605	0.08	8.7	563	0.08
Malaysia	508.2	4463	0.65	51.5	4890	0.67	136.3	5593	0.76	124.9	5498	0.75	80.8	5133	0.70
Nepal	35.9	548	0.08	51.5	375	0.13	9.7	628	0.09	15.3	675	0.09	8.8	621	0.08
Singapore	224.1	2108	0.31	51.5	2535	0.35	60.1	2606	0.36	59.0	2597	0.35	35.6	2403	0.33
Thailand	363.6	3264	0.47	51.5	3691	0.50	97.6	4073	0.56	91.3	4021	0.55	57.8	3743	0.51
Vietnam	185.7	1789	0.26	51.5	2216	0.30	49.8	2202	0.30	50.1	2204	0.30	29.6	2094	0.28
Sub-Total	2805.8	25759	3.73	463.6	29602	4.04	496.1	29871	4.08	491.8	29836	4.07	304.4	28282	3.86

	No Special Increase			Increase in Non-oil LDC Voting Power to 31.11%											
				Equal Allotment b/			By Share of Capital c/			By Share of Votes d/			"Low" Subscription e/		
	Capital Subscription	Voting Power		Increase in Subscription	Voting Power		Increase in Subscription	Voting Power		Increase in Subscription	Voting Power		Increase in Subscription	Voting Power	
	(Curr. $ m.)	No. Votes	% Total	(Curr. $ m.)	No. Votes	% Total	(Curr. $ m.)	No. Votes	% Total	(Curr. $ m)	No. Votes	% Total	(Curr. $ m.)	No. Votes	% Total
Elected Directors (con't)															
14. Thahane (Lesotho)															
Botswana	18.2	401	0.06	51.5	828	0.11	4.9	442	0.06	11.2	494	0.07	2.9	425	0.06
Burundi	42.8	605	0.09	51.5	1032	0.14	11.5	700	0.10	16.9	745	0.10	10.3	690	0.09
Equatorial Guinea	18.9	407	0.06	51.5	834	0.11	5.1	449	0.06	11.3	501	0.07	4.8	447	0.06
Ethiopia	35.9	548	0.08	51.5	975	0.13	9.7	628	0.09	15.3	675	0.09	47.9	945	0.13
Gambia, The	16.0	383	0.06	51.5	810	0.11	4.3	419	0.06	10.7	472	0.06	4.9	424	0.06
Guinea	58.7	737	0.11	51.5	1164	0.16	15.8	868	0.12	20.6	908	0.12	11.2	830	0.11
Kenya	135.2	1371	0.20	51.5	1798	0.25	36.3	1672	0.23	38.4	1689	0.23	25.6	1583	0.22
Lesotho	14.2	368	0.05	51.5	795	0.11	3.9	400	0.05	10.3	453	0.06	2.5	389	0.05
Liberia	63.9	780	0.11	51.5	1207	0.16	17.1	922	0.13	21.8	961	0.13	22.8	969	0.13
Malawi	44.8	621	0.09	51.5	1048	0.14	12.1	721	0.10	17.4	765	0.10	7.1	680	0.09
Nigeria	723.4	6247	0.90	0.0	6247	0.85	0.0	6247	0.85	0.0	6247	0.85	0.0	6247	0.85
Sierra Leone	43.8	613	0.09	51.5	1040	0.14	11.7	710	0.10	17.1	755	0.10	29.0	853	0.12
Sudan	172.6	1681	0.24	51.5	2108	0.29	46.3	2065	0.28	47.0	2071	0.28	32.9	1954	0.27
Swaziland	24.1	450	0.07	51.5	877	0.12	6.5	504	0.07	12.5	554	0.08	3.9	482	0.07
Tanzania	108.0	1145	0.17	51.5	1572	0.21	29.0	1385	0.19	32.0	1410	0.19	20.6	1316	0.18
Trinidad & Tobago	164.1	1610	0.23	51.5	2037	0.28	44.0	1975	0.27	45.0	1983	0.27	27.5	1838	0.25
Uganda	98.0	1062	0.15	51.5	1489	0.20	26.3	1280	0.17	29.7	1308	0.18	18.1	1212	0.17
Zambia	283.1	2597	0.38	51.5	3024	0.41	76.0	3227	0.44	72.6	3199	0.44	45.5	2974	0.41
Sub-Total	2066.0	21626	3.13	875.7	28885	3.94	360.5	24614	3.36	429.9	25190	3.44	317.5	24258	3.31
15. Khelif (Algeria)															
Afghanistan	85.9	962	0.14	51.5	1389	0.19	23.0	1153	0.16	26.9	1185	0.16	18.9	1119	0.15
Algeria	572.4	4995	0.72	0.0	4995	0.68	0.0	4995	0.68	0.0	4995	0.68	0.0	4995	0.68
Ghana	210.5	1995	0.29	51.5	2422	0.33	56.5	2463	0.34	55.9	2458	0.34	36.9	2301	0.31
Greece	232.5	2177	0.32	51.5	2604	0.36	62.4	2694	0.37	60.9	2682	0.37	198.2	3820	0.52
Iran	1278.9	10851	1.57	0.0	10851	1.48	0.0	10851	1.48	0.0	10851	1.48	0.0	10851	1.48
Libyan Arab Rep.	363.1	3260	0.47	0.0	3260	0.45	0.0	3260	0.45	0.0	3260	0.45	0.0	3260	0.45
Morocco	300.1	2738	0.40	51.5	3165	0.43	80.5	3405	0.46	76.6	3373	0.46	49.5	3148	0.43
Oman	40.3	584	0.08	0.0	584	0.08	0.0	584	0.08	0.0	584	0.08	0.0	584	0.08
Tunisia	115.3	1206	0.17	51.5	1633	0.22	30.9	1462	0.20	33.8	1486	0.20	31.5	1467	0.20
Yemen, PDR	82.6	935	0.14	51.5	1362	0.19	22.2	1119	0.15	26.2	1152	0.16	13.1	1044	0.14
Sub-Total	3281.6	29703	4.30	309.1	32265	4.41	275.4	31986	4.37	280.2	32026	4.37	348.2	32589	4.45
16. Johnston (Australia)															
Australia	1586.6	13402	1.94	0.0	13402	1.83	0.0	13402	1.83	0.0	13402	1.83	0.0	13402	1.83
New Zealand	464.2	4098	0.59	0.0	4098	0.56	0.0	4098	0.56	0.0	4098	0.56	0.0	4098	0.56
Papua New Guinea	60.6	752	0.11	51.5	1179	0.16	16.3	887	0.12	21.0	926	0.13	9.7	832	0.11
Western Samoa	5.9	299	0.04	51.5	726	0.10	1.6	312	0.04	8.3	368	0.05	1.1	308	0.04
Sub-Total	2117.3	18551	2.68	103.0	19405	2.65	17.9	18699	2.55	29.3	18794	2.57	10.7	18640	2.55
17. Pesqueira (Mexico)															
Costa Rica	32.2	517	0.07	51.5	944	0.13	8.7	589	0.08	14.5	637	0.09	62.9	1038	0.14
El Salvador	34.7	538	0.08	51.5	965	0.13	9.3	615	0.08	15.1	663	0.09	65.9	1084	0.15
Guatemala	41.1	591	0.09	51.5	1018	0.14	11.0	682	0.09	16.5	728	0.10	77.7	1235	0.17
Haiti	42.8	605	0.09	51.5	1032	0.14	11.5	700	0.10	16.9	745	0.10	10.3	690	0.09
Honduras	26.8	472	0.07	51.5	899	0.12	7.2	532	0.07	13.1	581	0.08	53.0	911	0.12
Mexico	776.3	6685	0.97	51.5	7112	0.97	208.2	8411	1.15	187.0	8235	1.12	469.5	10577	1.44
Nicaragua	27.0	474	0.07	51.5	901	0.12	7.2	534	0.07	13.3	584	0.08	52.7	911	0.12
Panama	53.1	690	0.10	51.5	1117	0.15	14.2	808	0.11	19.3	850	0.12	51.8	1119	0.15
Peru	230.8	2163	0.31	51.5	2590	0.35	61.9	2676	0.37	60.4	2664	0.36	150.9	3414	0.47
Venezuela	928.9	7950	1.15	0.0	7950	1.09	0.0	7950	1.09	0.0	7950	1.09	0.0	7950	1.09
Sub-Total	2193.7	20685	2.99	463.6	24528	3.35	339.2	23497	3.21	356.1	23637	3.23	994.5	28929	3.95
18. Razafindrabe (Madagascar)															
Benin	29.1	491	0.07	51.5	918	0.13	7.8	556	0.08	13.8	605	0.08	8.7	563	0.08
Cameroon	60.6	752	0.11	51.5	1179	0.16	16.3	887	0.12	21.0	926	0.13	44.3	1119	0.15
Central African Empire	29.1	491	0.07	51.5	918	0.13	7.8	556	0.08	13.8	605	0.08	8.7	563	0.08
Chad	29.1	491	0.07	51.5	918	0.13	7.8	556	0.08	13.8	605	0.08	8.7	563	0.08
Congo	30.8	505	0.07	51.5	932	0.13	8.2	573	0.08	14.1	622	0.08	8.4	575	0.08
Gabon	56.6	719	0.10	51.5	1146	0.16	15.2	845	0.12	20.1	886	0.12	13.4	830	0.11
Ivory Coast	125.7	1292	0.19	51.5	1719	0.23	33.8	1572	0.21	36.2	1592	0.22	51.9	1722	0.24
Madagascar	67.4	809	0.12	51.5	1236	0.17	18.1	959	0.13	22.7	997	0.14	12.3	911	0.12
Mali	49.9	664	0.10	51.5	1091	0.15	13.4	775	0.11	18.6	818	0.11	13.0	772	0.11
Mauritania	31.0	507	0.07	51.5	934	0.13	8.3	576	0.08	14.2	625	0.09	8.2	575	0.08
Mauritius	54.4	701	0.10	51.5	1128	0.15	14.6	822	0.11	19.7	864	0.12	8.7	773	0.11
Niger	29.1	491	0.07	51.5	918	0.13	7.8	556	0.08	13.8	605	0.08	8.7	563	0.08
Rwanda	42.8	605	0.09	51.5	1032	0.14	11.5	700	0.10	16.9	745	0.10	10.3	690	0.09
Senegal	110.3	1164	0.17	51.5	1591	0.22	29.6	1409	0.19	32.6	1434	0.20	17.5	1309	0.18
Somalia	46.4	635	0.09	51.5	1062	0.15	12.4	738	0.10	17.7	782	0.11	7.4	696	0.10
Togo	44.8	621	0.09	51.5	1048	0.14	12.1	721	0.10	17.4	765	0.10	7.1	680	0.09
Upper Volta	29.1	491	0.07	51.5	918	0.13	7.8	556	0.08	13.8	605	0.08	8.7	563	0.08
Zaire	304.0	2770	0.40	51.5	3197	0.44	81.5	3446	0.47	77.4	3412	0.47	49.7	3182	0.43
Sub-Total	1170.0	14199	2.06	927.2	21885	2.99	314.1	16803	2.29	397.4	17493	2.39	295.6	16649	2.27
19. Franco-Holguin (Colombia)															
Brazil	1328.6	11263	1.63	51.5	11690	1.60	356.4	14217	1.94	315.0	13874	1.89	220.6	13092	1.79
Colombia	289.0	2646	0.38	51.5	3073	0.42	77.6	3289	0.45	73.9	3259	0.44	159.7	3970	0.54
Dominican Republic	43.1	607	0.09	51.5	1034	0.14	11.6	703	0.10	17.0	748	0.10	85.5	1316	0.18
Ecuador	90.5	1000	0.14	0.0	1000	0.14	0.0	1000	0.14	0.0	1000	0.14	0.0	1000	0.14
Philippines	421.9	3747	0.54	51.5	4174	0.57	113.2	4685	0.64	104.8	4616	0.63	67.6	4307	0.59
Sub-Total	2173.0	19263	2.79	206.0	20971	2.86	558.7	23894	3.26	510.8	23497	3.21	533.4	23685	3.23
20. Gutierrez (Paraguay)															
Argentina	1156.4	9836	1.42	51.5	10263	1.40	310.3	12408	1.69	275.0	12116	1.65	183.8	11360	1.55
Bolivia	64.9	788	0.11	51.5	1215	0.17	17.4	932	0.13	22.1	971	0.13	39.9	1119	0.15
Chile	305.0	2778	0.40	51.5	3205	0.44	81.8	3456	0.47	77.7	3422	0.47	199.8	4434	0.61
Paraguay	17.3	393	0.06	51.5	820	0.11	4.6	431	0.06	11.0	484	0.07	35.8	690	0.09
Uruguay	127.4	1306	0.19	51.5	1733	0.24	34.1	1589	0.22	36.6	1609	0.22	68.4	1873	0.26
Sub-Total	1670.9	15101	2.19	257.6	17236	2.35	448.2	18816	2.57	422.3	18602	2.54	527.8	19476	2.66

	No Special Increase			Increase in Non-oil LDC Voting Power to 31.11%											
				Equal Allotment[b/]			By Share of Capital[c/]			By Share of Votes[d/]			"Low" Subscription[e/]		
	Capital Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Increase in Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total
Countries not represented															
China	904.8	7750	1.12	0.0	7750	1.06	0.0	7750	1.06	0.0	7750	1.06	0.0	7750	1.06
S. Africa	851.8	7311	1.06	0.0	7311	1.00	0.0	7311	1.00	0.0	7311	1.00	0.0	7311	1.00
Cambodia	62.5	768	0.11	51.5	1195	0.16	16.8	907	0.12	21.5	946	0.13	10.3	853	0.12
Guinea-Bissau	6.6	305	0.04	51.5	732	0.10	1.8	320	0.04	8.6	376	0.05	1.8	320	0.04
Comoros	4.0	283	0.04	51.5	710	0.10	1.1	292	0.04	8.0	349	0.05	1.6	296	0.04
Sao Tome & Principe	3.5	279	0.04	51.5	706	0.10	1.0	287	0.04	7.8	344	0.05	0.7	285	0.04
Maldives	1.4	262	0.04	51.5	689	0.09	0.4	265	0.04	7.4	323	0.04	0.2	264	0.04
Sub-Total	1834.6	16958	2.45	257.6	19093	2.61	21.0	17132	2.34	53.2	17399	2.38	14.6	17079	2.33
Grand Total	79401.0	690945	100.00	4996.5	732364	100.00	4997.1	732369	100.00	4997.4	732371	100.00	4997.8	732374	100.00
Part I Countries	52584.6	440899	63.81	0.0	440899	60.20	0.0	440899	60.20	0.0	440899	60.20	0.0	440899	60.20
Part II															
Capital Surplus Oil Exporting	2117.4	18552	2.69	0.0	18552	2.53	0.0	18552	2.53	0.0	18552	2.53	0.0	18552	2.53
Other OPEC	5166.4	45077	6.52	0.0	45077	6.15	0.0	45077	6.15	0.0	45077	6.15	0.0	45077	6.15
Sub-Total	7283.8	63629	9.21	0.0	63629	8.69	0.0	63629	8.69	0.0	63629	8.69	0.0	63629	8.69
China	904.8	7750	1.12	0.0	7750	1.06	0.0	7750	1.06	0.0	7750	1.06	0.0	7750	1.06
Other Non-oil LDCs	18627.8	178667	25.86	4996.5	220086	30.05	4997.1	220091	30.05	4997.4	220093	30.05	4997.8	220096	30.05
Sub-Total	19532.6	186417	26.98	4996.5	227836	31.11	4997.1	227841	31.11	4997.4	227843	31.11	4997.8	227846	31.11

a/ Special increases are allocated to the non-oil LDCs sufficient to restore their aggregate voting power to 31.11%. The total amount of these increases varies slightly according to the method used to allocate the increases among countries due to rounding.

b/ The total increase of $4996.5 million (41419 shares) has been distributed equally among the 97 non-oil LDCs (excluding China) resulting in increased subscription of $51.5 million per member or 427 shares.

c/ The total increase of $4997.1 million (41424 shares) has been distributed among the 97 non-oil LDCs in proportion to their share of capital after the General Increase.

d/ The total increase of $4997.4 million (41426 shares) has been distributed among the 97 non-oil LDCs in proportion to their voting power after the General Increase.

e/ The total increase of $4997.8 million (41429 shares) has been distributed in two different ways among the 97 non-oil LDCs. Initially a part of the shares were distributed so as to raise their capital subscriptions to 1.6656382 times their respective IMF quota after effectiveness of the Sixth Review. In the calculation one SDR is considered equivalent to one 1944 dollar. The remaining shares are distributed among the 97 non-oil LDCs in proportion to the share of capital which results after the initial increases.

PSB
2/2/78

PROSPECTIVE IBRD VOTING POWER WITH SPECIAL INCREASES ALLOCATED TO SECURE MINIMUM VOTING POWER FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES a/

	$30 Billion			$40 Billion		
	Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total
Appointed Directors						
1. United States	0.0	138564	21.63	0.0	158757	21.68
2. United Kingdom	0.0	46512	7.26	0.0	53266	7.27
3. Germany	0.0	31587	4.93	0.0	36162	4.94
4. France	0.0	28126	4.39	0.0	32196	4.40
5. Japan	0.0	24340	3.80	0.0	27857	3.80
Elected Directors						
6. Rota (Italy)						
Italy	0.0	18257	2.85	0.0	20885	2.85
Portugal	41.7	2599	0.41	55.0	3002	0.41
Spain	154.9	9632	1.50	206.2	11239	1.53
Sub-Total	196.6	30488	4.76	261.2	35126	4.80
7. Drake (Canada)						
Bahamas	13.5	842	0.13	17.4	945	0.13
Barbados	9.2	573	0.09	11.6	629	0.09
Canada	0.0	20039	3.13	0.0	22929	3.13
Grenada	5.4	338	0.05	6.5	353	0.05
Guyana	11.5	710	0.11	14.5	788	0.11
Ireland	0.0	2503	0.39	0.0	2831	0.39
Jamaica	24.2	1511	0.24	31.7	1728	0.24
Sub-Total	63.8	26516	4.14	81.7	30203	4.12
8. Sen (India)						
Bangladesh	45.6	2838	0.44	60.2	3282	0.45
India	378.7	23554	3.68	505.2	27547	3.76
Sri Lanka	36.3	2261	0.35	47.8	2606	0.36
Sub-Total	460.6	28653	4.47	613.2	33435	4.57
9. Looijen (Netherlands)						
Cyprus	13.9	860	0.13	17.6	963	0.13
Israel	59.8	3723	0.58	79.1	4317	0.59
Netherlands	0.0	13913	2.17	0.0	15908	2.17
Romania	70.7	4396	0.69	93.6	5106	0.70
Yugoslavia	54.4	3386	0.53	71.9	3923	0.54
Sub-Total	198.8	26278	4.10	262.3	30217	4.13
10. de Groote (Belgium)						
Austria	0.0	5047	0.79	0.0	5747	0.78
Belgium	0.0	13182	2.06	0.0	15070	2.06
Luxembourg	0.0	778	0.12	0.0	856	0.12
Turkey	58.5	3637	0.57	77.3	4217	0.58
Sub-Total	58.5	22644	3.53	77.3	25890	3.54
11. El-Naggar (Egypt)						
Bahrain	10.0	623	0.10	12.5	686	0.09
Egypt	59.1	3676	0.57	78.2	4262	0.58
Iraq	0.0	1787	0.28	0.0	2012	0.27
Jordan	12.3	767	0.12	15.7	855	0.12
Kuwait	0.0	4524	0.71	0.0	5148	0.70
Lebanon	8.4	525	0.08	10.5	571	0.08
Pakistan	87.8	5460	0.85	116.5	6352	0.87
Qatar	0.0	832	0.13	0.0	917	0.13
Saudi Arabia	0.0	8967	1.40	0.0	10239	1.40
Syrian Arab Republic	21.4	1331	0.21	27.9	1517	0.21
United Arab Emirates	0.0	1994	0.31	0.0	2248	0.31
Yemen Arab Republic	8.2	507	0.08	10.1	550	0.08
Sub-Total	207.3	30993	4.84	271.4	35357	4.83
12. Magnussen (Norway)						
Denmark	0.0	4741	0.74	0.0	5397	0.74
Finland	0.0	4058	0.63	0.0	4614	0.63
Iceland	0.0	645	0.10	0.0	703	0.10
Norway	0.0	4538	0.71	0.0	5164	0.71
Sweden	0.0	6791	1.06	0.0	7746	1.06
Sub-Total	0.0	20773	3.24	0.0	23624	3.23

	$30 Billion			$40 Billion		
	Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total
Elected Directors (cont'd)						
13. Thavil (Thailand)						
Burma	24.1	1502	0.23	31.5	1716	0.23
Fiji	9.5	591	0.09	11.9	649	0.09
Indonesia	0.0	7168	1.12	0.0	8178	1.12
Korea	47.8	2970	0.46	63.0	3435	0.47
Laos	8.6	531	0.08	10.6	579	0.08
Malaysia	72.9	4530	0.71	96.5	5263	0.72
Nepal	9.4	588	0.09	11.8	646	0.09
Singapore	34.7	2159	0.34	45.6	2486	0.34
Thailand	53.4	3323	0.52	70.6	3849	0.53
Vietnam	29.6	1838	0.29	38.7	2110	0.29
Sub-Total	290.0	25200	3.93	380.2	28911	3.95
14. Thahane (Lesotho)						
Botswana	7.1	441	0.07	8.7	473	0.06
Burundi	10.4	646	0.10	13.0	713	0.10
Equatorial Guinea	7.2	447	0.07	8.8	480	0.07
Ethiopia	9.4	588	0.09	11.8	646	0.09
Gambia, The	6.8	422	0.07	8.3	452	0.06
Guinea	12.5	779	0.12	15.9	869	0.12
Kenya	22.8	1418	0.22	29.7	1617	0.22
Lesotho	6.5	407	0.06	8.0	434	0.06
Liberia	13.3	823	0.13	16.9	920	0.13
Malawi	10.6	662	0.10	13.4	732	0.10
Nigeria	0.0	5483	0.86	0.0	6247	0.85
Sierra Leone	10.5	654	0.10	13.3	723	0.10
Sudan	27.9	1730	0.27	36.3	1982	0.27
Swaziland	7.8	489	0.08	9.8	531	0.07
Tanzania	19.2	1190	0.19	24.7	1350	0.18
Trinidad & Tobago	26.7	1658	0.26	34.9	1899	0.26
Uganda	17.7	1105	0.17	22.9	1252	0.17
Zambia	42.6	2651	0.41	56.2	3063	0.42
Sub-Total	259.0	21593	3.37	332.6	24383	3.33
15. Khelif (Algeria)						
Afghanistan	16.2	1005	0.16	20.7	1134	0.15
Algeria	0.0	4390	0.69	0.0	4995	0.68
Ghana	32.9	2046	0.32	43.2	2353	0.32
Greece	35.8	2228	0.35	47.0	2567	0.35
Iran	0.0	9501	1.48	0.0	10851	1.48
Libyan Arab Republic	0.0	2876	0.45	0.0	3260	0.45
Morocco	44.9	2793	0.44	59.2	3229	0.44
Oman	0.0	542	0.08	0.0	584	0.08
Tunisia	20.1	1251	0.20	26.1	1422	0.19
Yemen, PDR	15.7	978	0.15	20.3	1103	0.15
Sub-Total	165.6	27610	4.31	216.5	31498	4.30
16. Johnston (Australia)						
Australia	0.0	11727	1.83	0.0	13402	1.83
New Zealand	0.0	3608	0.56	0.0	4098	0.56
Papua New Guinea	12.8	794	0.12	16.3	887	0.12
Western Samoa	5.4	338	0.05	6.5	353	0.05
Sub-Total	18.2	16467	2.57	22.8	18740	2.56
17. Pesqueira (Mexico)						
Costa Rica	8.9	557	0.09	11.2	610	0.08
El Salvador	9.3	578	0.09	11.6	634	0.09
Guatemala	10.1	631	0.10	12.8	697	0.10
Haiti	10.4	646	0.10	13.0	713	0.10
Honduras	8.2	512	0.08	10.3	557	0.08
Mexico	108.8	6767	1.06	144.6	7884	1.08
Nicaragua	8.3	515	0.08	10.3	559	0.08
Panama	11.7	731	0.11	15.0	814	0.11
Peru	35.6	2214	0.35	46.8	2551	0.35
Venezuela	0.0	6969	1.09	0.0	7950	1.09
Sub-Total	211.4	20120	3.14	275.5	22969	3.14

	$30 Billion			$40 Billion		
	Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total	Subscription (Curr. $ m.)	Voting Power No. Votes	Voting Power % Total
Elected Directors (cont'd)						
18. Razafindrabe (Madagascar)						
Benin	26.8	682	0.11	32.5	760	0.10
Cameroon	40.1	1020	0.16	49.7	1164	0.16
Central African Empire	26.8	682	0.11	32.5	760	0.10
Chad	26.8	682	0.11	32.5	760	0.10
Congo	27.5	700	0.11	33.3	781	0.11
Gabon	38.4	977	0.15	47.5	1113	0.15
Ivory Coast	67.6	1719	0.27	85.3	1999	0.27
Madagascar	42.9	1094	0.17	53.4	1252	0.17
Mali	35.6	906	0.14	43.8	1027	0.14
Mauritania	27.6	703	0.11	33.5	785	0.11
Mauritius	37.4	953	0.15	46.3	1085	0.15
Niger	26.8	682	0.11	32.5	760	0.10
Rwanda	32.6	830	0.13	39.9	936	0.13
Senegal	61.0	1553	0.24	76.8	1801	0.25
Somalia	34.1	869	0.14	42.0	983	0.13
Togo	33.4	851	0.13	41.0	961	0.13
Upper Volta	26.8	682	0.11	32.5	760	0.10
Zaire	142.7	3632	0.57	182.9	4286	0.59
Sub-Total	754.8	19217	3.00	937.8	21973	3.00
19. Franco-Holguin (Colombia)						
Brazil	182.9	11376	1.78	243.6	13282	1.81
Colombia	43.4	2701	0.42	57.2	3120	0.43
Dominican Republic	10.4	647	0.10	13.1	716	0.10
Ecuador	0.0	905	0.14	0.0	1000	0.14
Philippines	61.3	3810	0.59	81.1	4419	0.60
Sub-Total	298.0	19439	3.03	395.0	22537	3.08
20. Gutierrez (Paraguay)						
Argentina	458.2	12413	1.94	539.8	14311	1.95
Bolivia	38.2	1037	0.16	43.2	1146	0.16
Chile	130.6	3539	0.55	152.5	4042	0.55
Paraguay	19.9	540	0.08	21.6	572	0.08
Uruguay	62.4	1689	0.26	71.7	1900	0.26
Sub-Total	709.3	19218	3.00	828.8	21971	3.00
Countries Not Represented						
China	0.0	7750	1.21	0.0	7750	1.06
S. Africa	0.0	6412	1.00	0.0	7311	1.00
Cambodia	13.0	810	0.13	16.6	906	0.12
Guinea-Bissau	5.5	344	0.05	6.6	360	0.05
Comoros	5.2	321	0.05	6.2	334	0.05
Sao Tome & Principe	5.1	317	0.05	6.0	329	0.04
Maldives	4.8	301	0.05	5.7	309	0.04
Sub-Total	33.7	16255	2.54	41.1	17299	2.36
GRAND TOTAL	3925.6	640593	100.00	4997.4	732371	100.00
Part I Countries	0.0	385368	60.16	0.0	440899	60.20
Part II Countries						
Capital Surplus Oil-Exporting	0.0	16317	2.55	0.0	18552	2.53
Other OPEC	0.0	39621	6.19	0.0	45077	6.15
	0.0	55938	8.73	0.0	63629	8.69
China	0.0	7750	1.21	0.0	7750	1.06
Other Non-Oil LDC's	3925.6	191537	29.90	4997.4	220093	30.05
	3925.6	199287	31.11	4997.4	227843	31.11

a/ Overall special increases of 32541 votes ($30 Billion Case) and 41426 votes ($40 Billion Case) are allocated in the following way: first, sufficient shares are allocated to the constituencies represented by Messrs. Razafindrabe and Gutierrez to raise the aggregate voting power of each constituency to 3.00%. Second, the balance of the overall increase needed to raise non-oil LDCs' voting power to 31.11% is distributed to the other non-oil LDCs according to share of voting power after the General Increase.

P & B
2/2/78

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February 9, 1978

To ED's for discussion
date to be determined

TECHNICAL NOTE #6

Statutory Limitation on Lending under the IBRD's Articles of Agreement

Introduction

1. The purpose of this note is to consider whether or not it would be desirable to amend the IBRD's Articles of Agreement so as to permit a greater volume of lending with a given capital base. The possibility of amendment was examined in some detail just over two years ago in connection with a review of the IBRD's capital structure.[1/] At that time no firm recommendation was made, and no decision was taken, on the issue of possible amendment. Instead it was decided to proceed with the Selective Increase and to leave open the question of whether the Bank's longer term capital requirements should be dealt with through a General Increase, an amendment of the Articles, or some combination of these steps, supplemented perhaps by certain selective changes in financial policies.

2. While no formal decision was made, there did appear to be a general consensus that amendment of the Articles, if done at all, should be undertaken as a supplement to, rather than as a substitute for, a General Capital Increase. The operative policy question therefore would seem to be whether or not it would be desirable in conjunction with a General Capital Increase to amend the IBRD's Articles in order that such an increase might satisfy the IBRD's capital requirements for a more extended period than would otherwise be feasible.

1/ Review of IBRD Capital Structure; R75-215 dated November 5, 1975.

3. In examining this question it may be useful to take as a starting point the principal conclusions reached in the earlier review of the IBRD's capital structure. These conclusions were as follows:

(a) the case for amending the Articles depends upon the economies which might prudently be achieved in the level of unpaid (or callable) capital subscriptions. This is so because economies in the use of paid-in capital can be achieved without amendment of the Articles.

(b) when reasonable allowance is made for the value of all the Bank's assets -- including its loan portfolio -- it appears that the security provided to bondholders under the present Articles is more than adequate.

(c) while the level of callable capital required under the present Articles may therefore be excessive, the low cost of maintaining the required levels makes it far from obvious that amending the Articles would be a desirable step.

<u>What is to be Gained by Amendment of the Articles?</u>

4. To understand the first of these conclusions it is necessary to examine the part of the present Articles which limits the size of Bank operations. Article III, Section 3 (entitled "Limitations on Guarantees and Borrowings of the Bank") provides that "the total amount outstanding of guarantees, participations in loans and direct loans made by the Bank shall not be increased at any time, if by such increase the total would exceed 100 per cent of the unimpaired subscribed capital, reserves and surplus of the Bank." The effect of this provision has been to create a legal ceiling on IBRD lending.

5. In theory this ceiling can be raised either by increasing retained earnings[1/] or by increasing subscribed capital. But in practice the subscribed capital is so much larger than retained earnings that it becomes the primary determinant of the Bank's legal lending capacity. For instance, once the Selective Increase is completed, subscribed capital should be approximately $40 billion, while retained earnings will then be roughly $3 billion.

6. The principal advantage to be gained from amendment of the Articles is that subscribed capital would not have to be increased as frequently or by as large an amount in order to accommodate any given IBRD lending program. It should be emphasized that the legal ceiling on Bank lending is not directly affected by the division of subscribed capital between amounts paid-in and amounts subject to call. There is, of course, a potential indirect effect in that higher amounts of paid-in capital may lead to higher levels of net income and of retained earnings (provided there are no offsetting changes in the Bank's lending charges or in its transfers to IDA). But if it were felt that the present Articles were leading to excessive levels of paid-in capital, this effect could be avoided without amending the Articles by the simple expedient of reducing the proportion of the General Capital Increase which is to be paid in. This is what happened in the last General Increase approved in 1960. By agreement none of that increase was paid in, so that in effect the proportion of total subscribed capital paid in was reduced from 20% to 10%.

7. The real justification therefore for an amendment of the Articles is that it would permit smaller or less frequent increases in callable capital

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1/ The Articles refer to "reserves and surplus of the Bank", whereas the financial statements show both the Special Reserve and the General Reserve. For simplicity, the more familiar term "retained earnings" will be used in this paper.

subscriptions. The benefits to shareholders from reduced callable capital subscriptions are unlikely to be important in a financial sense. These unpaid subscriptions have not led to any expenditures by shareholders in the past and, barring unforeseen developments, should not lead to any expenditures in the future. Even in the extremely unlikely event that some calls were to be necessary in the future, it is almost inconceivable that such calls would be so large as to reach the limit imposed by shareholders' total uncalled subscriptions. In other words, economies in the level of total callable capital would almost certainly not affect the maximum expenditures required of shareholders.

8. As noted in the Capital Structure memorandum (p.39), the "cost" of callable capital cannot properly be assessed only in financial terms. There may also be associated political and legislative costs. Because of the scale of IBRD operations, the absolute size of subscribed capital increase needed under the present Articles to accomodate continued real growth in IBRD lending is large. What may be particularly difficult for governments to accept is not so much the thought that a large capital increase is required but that such an increase may only be sufficient to cover the IBRD's capital requirements for a relatively short period of time. It is in this context that amendment of the Articles might have some advantages.

"Cost" of Amending the Articles

9. If the principal benefit from amending the Articles is likely to be to enhance the political acceptability of IBRD capital increases, what would be the corresponding "costs" of amendment? The Capital Structure memorandum indentified the primary concerns associated with a change in the

statutory limit as being its effect on the Bank's standing in financial markets and its impact on the risk that a call on the Bank's unpaid capital subscriptions might be required. These are really two aspects of the same concern, namely the impact on investor confidence.

10. The Capital Structure memorandum explored in considerable detail the various ways in which the adequacy of the Bank's capital might be assessed by investors. For present purposes it may be sufficient to recall the main points which were made, without repeating the detailed analysis. Three aspects of the Bank's financial position were distinguished: (a) the extent to which its liabilities are secured by the claims it has on others; (b) the adequacy of its net income both in absolute terms and in relation to the interest due on its own debt; and (c) its capacity to deal with liquidity problems generated by interruptions in the borrowing program.

11. Asset Coverage. The adequacy of IBRD callable capital in relation to its liabilities (that is, its funded debt plus amounts due to IDA) has been a subject of concern throughout the Bank's history. In the early days of the Bank it was commonly assumed that IBRD borrowings could not exceed the callable capital of the United States without major risk to investor confidence. Indeed, when the first General Increase in IBRD capital subscriptions was proposed in 1959, the scale and timing of the increase were determined mainly by the perceived need to increase the callable capital -- and especially the callable capital of the United States -- so as to facilitate expanded IBRD borrowings. That situation reflected the strength of the U.S. dollar as well as the fact that the great bulk of Bank borrowings were then taking place in the United States.

12. During the 1960s and 1970s the Bank managed to diversify its borrowings and this, along with the evident increase in the strength of several industrial economies other than the United States, made it natural to draw the attention of investors to the callable capital of a larger group of countries. In FY72 the liabilities of the Bank exceeded the U.S. callable subscription for the first time. There were no adverse repercussions on the Bank's standing in financial markets.

13. The adequacy of IBRD callable capital was reviewed by the Executive Directors in April 1973.[1/] The projections made at that time showed IBRD funded debt reaching 75% of the callable capital subscriptions of Part I countries and New Zealand in FY78. It was suggested that an increase in callable capital prior to that time might be desirable even though it was thought to be "almost inconceivable that the value of the portfolio of loans would then appear so precarious as to make that ratio (i.e. 75%) unacceptable" (para. 23).

14. The Capital Structure memorandum once again emphasized the very generous protection which IBRD bondholders enjoy against erosion of asset values. On the basis of highly conservative assumptions, the memorandum concluded that future losses due to adverse economic developments would almost certainly not exceed 5% of the loan portfolio.[2/] Even if investors were to apply a discount factor to the loan portfolio which is much larger than this figure, the combination of claims which provide security for

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1/ Review of IBRD Financial Policies; R73-55, dated March 27, 1973.

2/ The basis for this conclusion is spelled out in Annex 3 to the Capital Structure memorandum. The most recent review of the quality of the IBRD loan portfolio suggests that even with extreme assumptions, losses in the next decade would not exceed 3.5% to 7% of projected disbursed loans.

IBRD obligations would still be quite substantial. A follow-up note to the Capital Structure memorandum[1/] presented a table summarizing the various sources of investor security. An updated version of that table is shown below.

Sources of Investor Security: FY79-83 [a/]

	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83
Funded Debt & Due to IDA	25.0	28.6	32.8	37.7	42.5
Claims on "Financially Strong Countries"					
Callable Capital of Part I & Capital-Surplus Oil Countries	22.6	24.1	24.1	24.1	31.3
Liquid Holdings	9.1	9.4	9.5	10.0	10.7
Sub-total	31.7	33.5	33.6	34.1	42.0
Claims on Other Countries					
Callable Capital	10.3	11.4	11.4	11.4	14.7
Disbursed Loans [b/]	21.2	25.0	29.3	34.0	39.2
Sub-total	31.5	36.4	40.7	45.4	53.9
Total of All Claims	63.2	69.9	74.3	79.5	95.9

a/ Assumes a General Capital Increase of $35 billion with subscriptions taking place in FY83-85. Other assumptions are as in Table A1. Financial and Operating Data Book.
b/ Disbursed loans include some claims guaranteed by Part I countries.

On the basis of these figures there would seem to be no reason to modify the previously stated conclusion that levels of callable capital implied by continued application of the present Articles provide "more than adequate" protection to bondholders.

1/ IBRD Capital Increase; R75-215/3, dated December 23, 1975.

15. Interest Coverage. The Capital Structure memorandum also examined the implications of alternative capital structures for the adequacy of IBRD net income. Although the adequacy of income is an important aspect of the Bank's overall financial position, it is not directly relevant to the question of possible amendment of the Articles since, as noted in para. 6, it is paid-in rather than callable capital which directly affects net income.

16. Liquidity Position. Even if one accepts the proposition that the level of callable capital required by the present Articles of Agreement is more than adequate in terms of asset coverage, investors will also want to avoid the uncertainty and possible adverse market performance of IBRD bonds which could be triggered by a call on the unpaid portion of members' capital subscriptions. As noted in the Capital Structure paper (para. 100):

> The major threat which could force a call on the Bank's unpaid capital subscriptions is an interruption in the Bank's ability to borrow. This could arise either because of a loss on loans or because of a temporary drop in net income. The real risk is not that the primary events will impair the Bank's ability to meet its obligations, but that the market will overestimate the negative consequences of the events and refuse to support continued Bank borrowing on reasonable terms.

Callable capital is important in relation to this sort of risk because of its impact on investor confidence. The more that investors regard the Bank as effectively a government guaranteed institution the less likely it will be that adverse events may produce a cumulative and self-reinforcing loss of investor confidence. The great virtue of callable capital as an index of government support is that it is clear and unambiguous; its meaning and value can be immediately grasped by investors who may otherwise be ignorant of the Bank's financial strengths.

17. In contrast to the relative simplicity of callable capital protection, it is quite complicated to measure satisfactorily the Bank's internal capacity to avoid a liquidity crisis or to deal with one should it arise. The essence of the issue is that the Bank does not fully fund its undisbursed commitments. In other words, at any point in time the sum of Bank liquid holdings and cash inflows projected for the following three years will be less than the cash outflows (mainly for disbursements and debt service) projected for the same period.1/ In normal circumstances this difference is readily financed by new Bank borrowings. The risk arises because this new borrowing is not absolutely assured.

18. Clearly, there is some trade-off between dealing with liquidity risk by maintaining generous levels of callable capital and dealing with it by maintaining more complete funding of undisbursed commitments. To take an extreme example, if the Bank were to fully fund undisbursed commitments, or if the capital-exporting countries were to underwrite future IBRD borrowings to the extent required to bridge the gap between actual liquid holdings and full funding,2/ then it would be unnecessary to maintain a high level of callable capital in order to protect against a cumulative and self-reinforcing loss of investor confidence.

1/ The present liquidity policy provides that liquid holdings should always be at least 40% of "borrowing requirements" (i.e. the difference between projected cash inflows other than borrowing and projected cash outflows) over the next three years.

2/ The gap between actual liquid holdings and full funding will depend upon the corrective action which the Bank takes in the event of a liquidity crisis. For example, part of the disbursements projected for the next three years are due to commitments which have not yet been approved and are therefore subject to control.

19. Indicator of Shareholder Support. Apart from the "guarantee" role played by callable capital, there is also a vitally important psychological aspect. Few things would be more damaging to the Bank's standing in financial markets than the impression that amendment of the Articles was being undertaken to qualify or limit the commitment of member governments to the continued operation of the Bank or that this amendment was only the first of a likely series of reductions in callable capital coverage. It is the danger of misinterpretation of this sort which underlies the consensus referred to earlier; namely, that amendment of the Articles should be undertaken in the near term, if at all, only in combination with a General Capital Increase which is sufficiently large to demonstrate the strong support of governments for the Bank. Another advantage of combining amendment with a major capital increase is that it could help keep bondholders from feeling that the protection described in IBRD prospectuses was being unfairly withdrawn. Since the possibility of amendment to the Articles is clearly set forth in the prospectus, there is no sound legal basis for bondholder complaint. Irrespective of the legal situation, however, it would be important to minimize the possibility of negative investor reaction.

20. To sum up, the "gains" of amendment would appear to be small if one focusses either on asset coverage or on the Bank's income position. The impact of amendment on the liquidity risk which the Bank faces is much more difficult to assess. A high level of callable capital is one way -- but certainly not the only way -- to guard against a cumulative and self-reinforcing loss of investor confidence. Finally, the "costs" of amendment would be unacceptably high if there were any significant chance that such action could be misinterpreted as indicating lack of strong shareholder support for the institution.

Is Amendment Desirable at this Time?

21. Because a decision regarding the desirability of amendment must take into account such changeable elements as the political environment legislative tactics and the strength of investor confidence, the balance of advantages and disadvantages may shift over time. But in the circumstances as they exist today, there would appear to be a reasonably strong case for not proceeding with amendment of the Articles. The case rests on a number of factors which may individually or in combination make it particularly important to maintain exceptionally strong investor confidence in the Bank over the next few years. The first such factor is the widespread investor concern about the indebtedness of developing countries. Whether this concern is well-founded or not, it cannot but have an influence on investors' perceptions of the quality of the Bank's loan portfolio. Thus, the next two or three years are not likely to be a favorable period for trying to persuade investors to reduce their reliance on callable capital as a source of security and to increase their reliance on other Bank assets.

22. Secondly, the expansion of IBRD operations in the past few years has resulted in a fuller utilization of its capacity as a financial intermediary. In consequence, certain of its financial ratios (e.g., reserves to disbursed loans; interest coverage) have shown downward trends. Our projections show, however, that most of the key ratios stabilize in the next few years, but of course investors quite properly look not at what might happen in the future but rather at what has happened in the past.

23. Third and finally, IBRD borrowings are projected to grow quite rapidly in the next few years. Achievement of these borrowing objectives will require increased penetration of traditional markets, a task which will be easier if the Bank not only is strong financially but is able to demonstrate this strength both clearly and simply. Moreover, the liquidity risk associated with interruption in Bank borrowings has as a major component the fear of investors that a resumption of vigorous private loan demand in industrial countries may lead to a competition for capital which will be resolved not by market forces but rather by restrictions on IBRD access to funds. As experience accumulates to show that this fear is unjustified, it may be expected to fade in importance. For the moment, however, it continues to be a factor to be reckoned with.

24. In light of all these circumstances existing at present, it seems preferable to avoid any policy decision which might call in question investors' traditionally strong confidence in the Bank.