

NCBP Countries: FY14 Eligibility to the Different Options ^{1/}

		Debt Vulnerability							
		Lower	Higher						
Capacity	Lower	<p><i>Minimum concessionality requirement based on loan-by-loan approach, but with added flexibility on nonconcessional external debt (e.g., higher and untied nonzero limits, if consistent with maintenance of low debt vulnerabilities).</i></p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;"> <p>Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Central African Republic Côte d'Ivoire Gambia, The ^{2/} Guinea ^{3/} Guinea-Bissau Kyrgyz Rep. Lao PDR ^{4/} Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi</p> </td> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;"> <p>Mali Mauritania Nepal Nicaragua Niger Sierra Leone Solomon Islands South Sudan ^{6/} Tanzania Togo Tonga Uganda Zambia</p> </td> </tr> </table>		<p>Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Central African Republic Côte d'Ivoire Gambia, The ^{2/} Guinea ^{3/} Guinea-Bissau Kyrgyz Rep. Lao PDR ^{4/} Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi</p>	<p>Mali Mauritania Nepal Nicaragua Niger Sierra Leone Solomon Islands South Sudan ^{6/} Tanzania Togo Tonga Uganda Zambia</p>	<p><i>Minimum concessionality requirement based on loan-by-loan approach, likely higher than 35 percent, with limited or no room for non nonconcessional external borrowing debt.</i></p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;"> <p>Afghanistan Burundi Chad ^{7/} Comoros Congo, DR Haiti Kiribati Maldives Marshall Islands ^{8/} Micronesia, Federated States of ^{9/} Samoa ^{10/} São Tomé and Príncipe Tajikistan Tuvalu</p> </td> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;"> <p>Yemen, Republic of</p> </td> </tr> </table>		<p>Afghanistan Burundi Chad ^{7/} Comoros Congo, DR Haiti Kiribati Maldives Marshall Islands ^{8/} Micronesia, Federated States of ^{9/} Samoa ^{10/} São Tomé and Príncipe Tajikistan Tuvalu</p>	<p>Yemen, Republic of</p>
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Higher	<p><i>Minimum average concessionality requirement applied to total external or total public borrowing. For most advanced IDA countries, no concessionality requirements and overall nominal debt limit if needed.</i></p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;"> <p>Ethiopia Mozambique ^{5/}</p> </td> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;"> <p>Senegal Rwanda</p> </td> </tr> </table>		<p>Ethiopia Mozambique ^{5/}</p>	<p>Senegal Rwanda</p>	<p><i>Overall limit on the Present Value of external or total public debt. For most advanced IDA countries, ceilings on nominal external or public debt.</i></p>				
<p>Ethiopia Mozambique ^{5/}</p>	<p>Senegal Rwanda</p>								

1/ Limited to active IDA-only countries that are subject to the IDA NCBP and excludes countries in nonaccrual status as of June 30, 2013 (Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe).

2/ The Gambia's risk of debt distress has improved from "high" to "moderate." This improvement is due to an upgrade in its quality of policies and institutions from "weak" to "medium", as well as the inclusion of re-exports in the external debt indicators. However, external debt dynamics are still vulnerable to adverse shocks.

3/ Guinea's risk of debt distress has improved from "high" to "moderate" due to a substantial reduction in its external debt stock after the country reached the completion point under the HIPC's initiative in September 2012.

4/ Lao PDR's risk of debt distress has improved from "high" to "moderate", as all external debt distress indicators stay below policy-dependent indicative thresholds during the forecasting period under baseline assumptions, although thresholds are breached in the presence of certain shocks.

5/ Mozambique moves from low to moderate risk of debt distress as the result of (i) a lower discount rate, (ii) a significant increase in debt contracted in the last two years related to an ambitious public investment program aimed at narrowing the infrastructure gap, and facilitating the development of natural resources, and (iii) large movements in the underlying balance of payments with the onset of coal exports and significant commercial investments in natural gas exploration and liquefaction.

6/ No DSA is available for South Sudan. Its traffic light is based on static debt indicators. Although at the time of independence, South Sudan had no official external debt, its public debt has increased and is likely to reach 17% of GDP by June 2013 while its policies and institutions remain weak. Given the oil shut-down and only a recent resumption of oil production, external debt to exports ratio is estimated to be 442% by end-June 2013, and total debt to revenue ratio (excluding grants) is estimated to be 491%. With the resumption of oil revenue, external debt is expected to drop substantially to 9% of GDP, 19% of exports and 47% of revenue in FY14. All debt is due in the next fiscal year (i.e. FY14).

7/ Chad's risk of debt distress has worsened from "moderate" to "high" because its debt indicators have worsened since 2010, including the large amount of non-concessional borrowing contracted in 2011.

8/ No DSA available. Traffic light based on nominal debt-to-GDP ratio in 2010 (69.6%). Source: IMF (2011), Republic of the Marshall Islands: 2011 Article IV Consultation. Report No. 11/339.

9/ Federated States of Micronesia's risk of debt distress has worsened from "low" to "high". Previous risk assessments for the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) were based on static indicators, such as the nominal debt-to-GDP ratio. The current assessment is based on a new DSA that takes into account the planned cessation of grant funding under the Compact of Free Association (the Compact) with the U.S..

10/ Samoa's risk of debt distress has worsened from "moderate" to "high" due to a large and protracted breach of the present value (PV) of debt to GDP threshold in the baseline scenario.

