### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACU</td>
<td>Aid Coordination Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>Advisory Services and Analytics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Benadir Regional Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Central Bank of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIP</td>
<td>Capacity Injection Modality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSP</td>
<td>Somaliland Civil Service Strengthening Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMU</td>
<td>Country Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLI</td>
<td>Disbursement Linked Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCV</td>
<td>Fragility, Conflict and Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGC</td>
<td>Financial Governance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDEP</td>
<td>Financial Institutions Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Federal Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDPN</td>
<td>Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Implementation Status Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAF</td>
<td>Mutual Accountability Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOPIC</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOPW</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>Multi Partner Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTO</td>
<td>Money Transfer Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>New Partnership for Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFM</td>
<td>Public Financial Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFMMPRP</td>
<td>Public Financial Management Reform Project</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PIU  Project Implementation Unit
PPD  Private/Public Dialogue
PREMIS  Public Resource Management in Somalia
RCRF  Recurrent Cost & Reform Financing Program
RE  Recipient Executed
SCD  Systematic Country Diagnostic
SCORE  Somali Core Economic Institutions and Opportunities Program
SDRF  Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility
SEA  Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SFF-LD  Special Financing Facility for Local Development
SFMIS  Somalia Financial Information Systems
SMP  Staff-Monitored Programme
SRFS  Supporting Remittance Flows to Somalia
SSF  Somali Stability Fund
SUIPP  Somalia Urban Investment Planning Project
SURP  Somalia Urban Resilience Project
TA  Technical Assistance
TTL  Task Team Leader
UCS  Use of Country Systems
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
WBG  World Bank Group
Table of Contents

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. 6
1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 11
  1.1 Purpose and scope ................................................................................................. 11
  1.2 Background ........................................................................................................... 11
  1.3 Context .................................................................................................................. 12
2 MPF Performance .......................................................................................................... 14
  2.1 Vital statistics ........................................................................................................ 14
  2.2 General performance ............................................................................................ 16
3 MPF Management and Governance ............................................................................ 28
  3.1 Fund governance and coordination ....................................................................... 28
  3.2 Risk management approach .................................................................................. 31
  3.3 Preventing GBV risks ........................................................................................... 35
4 Recommendations and Lessons of MPF MTR ............................................................ 36
  4.1 Strategic contribution of the MPF in IDA environment .......................................... 36
  4.2 Recommendations ............................................................................................... 37
  4.3 Lessons from the MPF for other FCV contexts ....................................................... 41
Annex 1 – Methodology ...................................................................................................... 43
Annex 2 – Review Questions ............................................................................................ 46
Annex 3 – List of respondents .......................................................................................... 47

Table of Figures, Boxes and Tables

Figure 1– Somalia aid architecture .................................................................................... 11
Figure 2: SDRF Trust Funds ............................................................................................ 12
Figure 3 - MPF and IDA as financing instruments ............................................................ 13
Figure 4: MPF Portfolio by Pillar .................................................................................... 14
Figure 5: Pledged vs. Paid Contributions to the MPF (millions USD) .............................. 15
Figure 6: MPF yearly disbursement .............................................................................. 15
Figure 7: Evolution of MPF disbursements and achievement of SMP targets ............... 19
Figure 8: Evolution of the MPF funding by region ......................................................... 20
Figure 9: MPF knowledge Fund .................................................................................... 25
Figure 10: Breakdown of knowledge Fund budget 2016-19 .......................................... 26
Figure 11: How far have the SDRF and MPF leveraged development aid behind Somali priorities ...... 28
Figure 12: Use of the SDRF to channel development aid 2018 ...................................... 28
Figure 13 – Average risk rating for all risk categories (Comparison of risk profiles) ....... 32
Figure 14: MPF Somalia MTR Methodology ................................................................. 43
Figure 15 - Breakdown of respondents by type .......................................................... 47

Table 1: MPF portfolio structure over the years ......................................................... 14
Table 2: Performance against operational indicators ................................................. 16
Table 3: Timeliness and disbursement rates across MPF projects .............................. 17
Table 4: Rating of projects by year against development objectives ......................... 21
Table 5: Rating of projects by year on implementation progress .............................. 21
Table 6: Success factors and obstacles to delivery of MPF projects ......................... 27
Table 7: Comparison of World Bank MPF spend on Monitoring Agent in fragile contexts ........ 34
Table 8: MPF Somalia MTR Sampling ....................................................................... 44

Focus Box 1: Pushing for technical reforms through robust performance management mechanisms in fragile contexts – Lessons from the RCRF .............................................................. 22
Focus Box 2: Sustainability and exit plan .................................................................. 25
Focus Box 3: Double Payment of PIU Staff ............................................................... 33
Focus Box 4: Somalia Financial Governance Committee .......................................... 42
Executive Summary

Somalia is one of the world’s most fragile states. After nearly half a century of conflict and instability, compounded by drought and natural shocks, it is grappling with an ambitious programme of state reconstruction based on a new partnership between its Federal leadership and the international community. Somalia’s long period of instability has resulted in deep-seated and mutually reinforcing challenges to recovery. Weak delivery of public services, including vital security and justice safeguards, has sapped public trust in state institutions. This has been exacerbated by recurring cycles of political crisis which have undermined both the ability of the Government to collect revenues and the motivation of the citizen to contribute. The overall effects have been to curb capacity for public service recovery and thus further reinforce low levels of public confidence – a ‘development trap’, preventing Somalia from moving forward.

Restoration of citizens’ trust in institutions by boosting service delivery is a key aim of the new partnership with the international community. That requires, amongst other things, strengthening systems for raising revenue and for spending it wisely.

This mid-term review focuses on the performance of the World Bank-administered Multi-Partner Fund, set up under the new partnership to strengthen Somalia’s core economic institutions and economic opportunities and now at the middle of the 10 years initially allocated for its work.

The review was framed around three core questions, based on criteria of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency:

1. How has the MPF performed in achieving its development objectives?
2. Has Fund management and governance been both effective and efficient?
3. Is the design of the MPF still fit for purpose?

We designed a unique research framework to help address these questions. Our approach included a thorough desk and literature review and interviews with over 75 key stakeholders in Somalia and Kenya.

Performance against development objectives

A review of the MPF’s performance indicators and project delivery showed that both the Fund and its projects are well managed and delivering against their objectives, in spite of the challenging environment. They outperform the global World Bank portfolio for progress on implementation and towards achievement of objectives. Nevertheless, a cross-cutting challenge for the delivery of MPF projects has been slow and prolonged start-up phases, with adverse impacts on the trust of client counterparts, particularly in Federal Member States (FMS).

In its first five years of performance, the MPF had some major successes in mobilising donor resources to strengthen Somalia’s core state institutions. In particular, the Fund has built and implemented country systems to deliver much more reliable services to pay public servants in all the Federal Member States (FMS): $156.2 million of aid was channelled through the MPF and onto the FGS treasury through recipient-executed grants between 2015 and 2018. This meets the strategic aim of the Fund to develop sustainable institutional capacity with Somalia in the lead. The achievement is impressive given the relatively very high risk environment presented by Somalia and the weakness of its government institutions. We found that the MPF has also achieved some significant state-building progress through its work on civil service management and public financial management, for example in recruitment and in fidelity to planned budgets.

On the Fund’s aim to enable economic development, there have been some good outcomes for businesses in Somalia with technical assistance and grants for private enterprises leveraging additional private and family finance. Some key legislation has been drafted and approved, although there are

---

1 Abyrint, World Bank Somalia Portfolio Risk, 2019, p. 6.
delays in completing the parliamentary process. Encouragingly, a Private/Public Dialogue (PPD) has been opened between the Government and the private sector, surveying opinions and helping prioritise reforms to support economic growth.

There have been generally positive results for developing urban infrastructure. Five regional administrations are engaged in project design and implementation and four sub-projects are delivering tangible services to communities amounting to more than 0.5 million people. An initial Urban Resilience Programme has been negotiated and will expand to Kismayo and Baidoa. Civil works procurement is underway in Mogadishu and Garowe.

Improvements in Somalia’s public finances management and in the use of its associated national systems, supported directly and indirectly by the Fund’s work, have moved Somalia close to re-engagement with the international financial institutions, a major MPF strategic objective. Access to related initial funding from the International Development Association (IDA) is already helping finance upscaling of ongoing MPF activities. A range of senior external stakeholders confirmed that these shifts are highly significant to Somalia’s reconstruction, and that the MPF has been instrumental in bringing them about.

A paid civil service, IMF benchmarks, improved budgeting and financial accountability are all vital to the Bank’s engagement in Somalia but do not necessarily deliver impact on the ground for the citizen. That is what is needed to demonstrate the value and purpose of the Federal and Member State governments to ordinary Somalis and thus help cement the state-building effort. Helpfully, there has been a development in strategic emphasis of the World Bank in Somalia with the advent of the Country Partnership Framework (FY19-22). That provides a sharper focus on strengthening relations between the federal and state government in order to deliver emergency relief and infrastructure projects. This allows the MPF to help Government deliver more tangible results for ordinary Somalis and thus pursue peace and state-building priorities more directly.

Progress on the Fund’s macro-economic and fiscal outputs is jeopardised by failures to resolve difficult political questions concerning equitable resource-sharing across States. Answers are needed not only to free up crucial dialogues at portfolio and project levels but also to achieve lasting stability in Somalia. Most stakeholders believe that the Fund must follow and not lead state-building. But they think that it should focus more systematically on these critical issues and do more to help unblock progress and counter ongoing perceptions of unfairness that some of the FMS continue to feel in relation to resource-sharing.

**Knowledge management**

This review looked at the quality and effectiveness of the MPF’s efforts to fill some of the many gaps in statistical and other information about the health, wealth and productive capacity of Somalia. It finds MPF knowledge products to be of a very high standard, and noted particular appreciation for the economic reports, and for a recent publication on security and justice expenditure.

However, there is scope for changes to the MPF’s policies and procedures to optimise the MPF’s contribution in this area. The Fund needs to move up a gear in knowledge production and dissemination and to ensure that government counterparts, donors and international partners benefit to the maximum possible extent.

**Monitoring Agent**

The review finds that the Monitoring Agent (Abyrint) has been a costly but necessary tool in supporting the delivery of the MPF portfolio and mitigating some of its main risks. Given the quality of its analytical outputs and the role it plays in mitigating fiduciary risks, the investment in the Monitoring Agent

---

2 Somalia Economic Updates series, Somalia Poverty Profile.
3 Somalia Security and Justice Public Expenditure Review, link.
represents value for money. The Agent has played a crucial role in delivery and appears ready to broaden the monitoring focus, for example to incorporate beneficiary views and better understand how projects are perceived by affected communities. Most of the Monitoring Agent’s analysis to date has been focused on the governance pillar but it recently started producing valuable monitoring reports on infrastructure projects. Recurrent concerns from donors include high costs and the failure to share monitoring reports.

Managing risk

The MPF is managing risk satisfactorily according to the WBG measurements. Nevertheless, the review questions whether the risk management structure and system is sufficiently granular and reactive for Somalia, where sub-national systems are still very weak and collusion has emerged as a procurement issue. The review finds that some of the tools to manage higher-level risks at portfolio level require remedial attention (such as the moribund Risk Management Group established under the Joint Risk Management Strategy for the three Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) Funds). The review also finds that the management of risks is undertaken mainly at the project level with little formally in place at portfolio level. Coordination between the Monitoring Agent and the financial advisory team could also be improved.

Coordination and collaboration

The review finds that the MPF has succeeded in retaining donors involved in setting up the Fund, and kept them focussed on a common set of priorities. Key informants compared the situation favourably to the chaotic donor landscape in Mogadishu immediately prior to the setting up of the SDRF in 2013. Pooling resources has reduced the fragmentation of donor efforts. Though the value of the Fund is still low as a proportion of the overall aid flows, it has contributed to an improved aid landscape for Somalia.

However, donor engagement is still less than envisaged in the documents establishing the Fund. Some consultation and coordination fora have been paralysed for want of attendance and there are signs that the Fund is not delivering the genuinely collaborative approach required. The proportion of aid flowing through the SDRF has remained just above 20% of the total, with the MPF accounting for around 10%. This interim outcome is disappointing given the ambition and performance of the Fund. In addition, donors are continuing to ‘earmark’ funds, which goes against the basic concept of pooled funding and hampers effective, flexible management of the Fund. It was not clear to us that the SDRF or MPF commands sufficient aid business to fulfil the original ambition to ‘serve as the centrepiece for the partnership between the government and international community’. Failure to achieve that ambition is the development trap in which the MPF finds itself. The MPF can and must now work determinedly with international partners to ‘go for gold’.

One important obstacle to be overcome is that the Fund governance and operations have in practice left most of the donors consulted in this review unsure that they have meaningful engagement, either in terms of the volume and timeliness of information they receive or as regards the quality of consultation and inclusive planning. This must be addressed. Pooled funding arrangements based on government systems are vital in combating the donor fragmentation typical in States afflicted by fragility, conflict and violence (FCV). However, ongoing effective co-ordination and engagement requires more than merely bureaucratic or box-ticking arrangements to be in place. In the context of a pipeline of grants from the International Development Association (IDA), the MPF could represent a key window into IDA programmes for donors through co-financed projects - but this will place a premium on collaboration and engagement. As the nature and size of the projects evolve, new and unknown challenges to delivery and integrity are likely to emerge. It is vital to maintain the confidence of investors and to ensure that they are fully engaged in identifying risks and helping to shape the strategic management process.
Recommendations and lessons learned

In general, the Fund has performed very well in extremely difficult circumstances. However, the review has identified some areas where performance could be improved in the light of experience and the developing context. In particular, the expected opening of an IDA pipeline of funding onto MPF projects is likely to intensify the need for more effective communication, coordination and consultation between the Fund, its donors and other international stakeholders. This makes it very important that the Fund’s collaboration arrangements are made optimal and that its administration and operations secure the full confidence of all stakeholders. Also, the excellent relationship built with the Government of Somalia over the first five years could be broadened and deepened so as to help make better progress on outstanding state-building issues. The changing context requires all stakeholders to work even more closely and collaboratively to meet their shared objectives to ensure the reconstruction of Somalia.

Aleph Strategies makes detailed recommendations divided into five thematic areas. They call for action from donors and the Somali authorities as well as the WBG and should be pursued collaboratively on that basis.

In summary:

1. The WBG and donors should work together to prioritise and promote a step change for the MPF from stakeholder management to a more open collaborative culture, incentivising donor engagement and actively seeking out new partners. The FGS should encourage donors to make a full-hearted commitment to use of the Fund and so far as possible to avoid preferencing or ‘ear-marking’ contributions to it.

2. The WBG should work with international partners and potentially synergetic programmes to clarify expectations on the key strategic and political issues requiring negotiation and agreement. In parallel, the MPF should create opportunities for greater outreach to FGS and FMS leadership on such issues where it is placed to incentivise and enable greater dialogue with Government. This process should build further on the FGC model of targeted technical work combined with analysis and open discussions to help drive progress.

3. The MPF should arrange more collaborative and engaging approaches to risk and ensure that risk management includes cross-portfolio risks, analysis of residual levels of risk, plus escalation processes for when risk rises above acceptable tolerances. GBV risk prevention should be strengthened as well as precautionary responses to such issues.

4. The MPF should work with all stakeholders to improve evidence available on substantive project level outcomes and the quality of the indicators used to monitor progress. Where practicable, beneficiary views should be incorporated into monitoring reports to help understand how projects are perceived by affected communities.

5. The MPF should enhance the utility and value of knowledge products by improved codification, dissemination and by building an analytical component into every project. In parallel, it should work closely with donors and other stakeholders to identify lessons, including from Monitoring Agent reports, and integrate them into existing and future programming. The MPF should improve the timeliness of knowledge product publication to ensure the high-quality reports being produced are as effective and useful as possible for informing strategy and guiding policy dialogue. Close monitoring of delays in government approvals should be put in place.

Strategic contribution of the MPF in IDA environment

IDA funding will mean that donor contributions to some major Fund projects will form a smaller share of the World Bank’s budget. It will also give the FGS greater control over allocation of a substantial pipeline of funds. This could impact in unknown ways on existing incentives for the deeper ongoing policy dialogue needed to secure a more stable state-building trajectory.
The review finds that, contrary to a prevalent supposition, IDA co-financing will not necessarily mandate less intensive supervision and operational monitoring than is currently the case. Nor does it see that the predicted $140 million IDA will remove the need for pooled resources: the whole international community must continue to use all available means to boost the value of the aid it can offer to relieve Somalia’s massive problems. The review finds that the MPF has a vital continuing role to play as a proven framework for coordination and influence in a fragmented donor context — a role which will extend to the IDA programme when the MPF is used alongside for co-financing.

As the findings and recommendations show, there are lessons to be learned from the first five years of operation especially regarding the quality of consultation and policy dialogue the MPF has sometimes provided. This should not be allowed to mask the impressive achievements of the Fund nor its important ongoing value. The history of the Fund shows an appetite for programming risk and experimentation as well as adaptation in response to learning. The Fund is also driven by the principle of ‘working with and through’ Somalia’s country systems, an approach on which it has amassed considerable experience, especially in the application of effective risk management techniques. As has been pointed out, use of country systems has been notoriously absent from most international interventions, but is axiomatic to sustainable state building.

Our general conclusion is that the principles and features of the MPF continue to position it as a uniquely valuable platform for discussing and funding the reconstruction of Somalia. The need for such a platform is likely to increase not decrease as the total funds under FGS allocation expand and a premium is placed on incentives for the deeper ongoing policy dialogue Somalia so badly needs.
1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose and scope

This is the Mid-Term Review of the Multi Partner Fund for Somalia (MPF). The Review covers the Fund’s:

1. Track record of delivery against development objectives;
2. Effectiveness and efficiency of management and governance; and
3. Relevance of its design in a changing operational and donor context.

The terms of reference require recommendations for stakeholders as well as the World Bank Group (WBG). The review will highlight any lessons relevant to other trust Funds operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts and to the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDPN).

The methodology and list of respondents can be found in Annexes 2 and 3.

1.2 Background

Established in 2014, the MPF forms part of a financing platform intended to deliver sustainable development for Somalia, working with and through the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The new platform was part of the Somalia Development Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) and was agreed in the context of a fresh strategic partnership between the newly recognised government and the international community. It aimed to align aid to Somalia more closely with the development priorities of the FGS and to improve donor co-ordination and oversight. The hope was that it would, over time, establish itself as a preferred channel of financing.

![Figure 1—Somalia aid architecture, Source: SDRF Establishment arrangements for the revised aid architecture under the NDO, Sept. 2017](image)

---


5 i.e. the Somali Compact, a set of peace-building and state-building goals alongside a framework of partnership principles intended to reflect the 'New Deal' approach to development policy and practice in fragile and conflict-affected countries agreed at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness at Busan, South Korea, in November 2011, [link](https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/the-humanitarian-development-peace-initiative).
The WBG, the United Nations (UN) and African Development Bank (AfDB) respectively manage three trust Funds under the SDRF. The governance structure is shared, including for approval of proposed projects, but there are separate Fund administrations allowing each institution to focus on thematic areas of comparative advantage.

The MPF’s thematic focus was set on core state functions and socio-economic recovery for the reconstruction and development of Somalia. Key thematic priorities identified for its first phase were strengthening core economic institutions, expanding economic opportunities, and facilitating policy dialogue. Coupled with its preferred approach of building and working through core Federal and Member State systems, the MPF offered the prospect of substantial ongoing investment to government-implemented reconstruction projects.

1.3 Context

MPF performance and strategic contribution need to be considered against an evolving political context and donor landscape, and in the light of Somalia’s changing relationship with the International Development Association (IDA).

Progress in the use of country systems and in Somalia’s public finances management is already boosting development financing. These include IDA pre-Arrears Clearance grants to strengthen capacity and incentives for the FGS to advance still further to financial normalisation.

In tandem, the WBG has approved a comprehensive Systematic Country Diagnostic on tackling Somalia’s problems at root and a Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Somalia providing a four-year strategy on extreme poverty and shared prosperity. This embraces the MPF and its ambitions to scale up activities. The European Union also made its first round of budget support disbursements, with many indicators linked to those monitored by the WBG and IMF.

Key informants consulted in this review judged there to be a realistic prospect of access to a pipeline of IDA funding as early as February 2020. This is expected as a result of achieving a point defined as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country initiative (HIPC). The benchmarks are largely technical but include requirements to evidence some progress in defining fiscal responsibilities and building

---

7 In 2017, an additional trust Fund managed by the International Finance Corporation Trust Fund (IFCTF) was set-up with a focus on private sector development. That Fund is outside our terms of reference.
8 See WBG Interim Strategy Note (FY14-16), p.20.
9 See WBG Systemic Country Diagnostic, May 2018, link.
11 The Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative is designed to ensure poorest countries are not overburdened by unmanageable debt, link. As set out in the status-relief update, the three criteria required to reach decision point are i) at least 6 months satisfactory performance under the UCT-quality SMP, ii) delivery of an approved interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, iii) clearance of arrears to the international financial organizations and mobilization of adequate financing assurances to cover the IMF’s share of HIPC debt relief.
capacities. At the same time, the approaching elections in 2020 increase incentives for the current government to show tangible progress on jobs, inclusive growth and services for ordinary Somalis on the ground.

![Diagram of Multi Partner Fund (MPF) and IDA as financing instruments]

IDA funding is not expected to dispense with the need for pooled resources – including of the UN and AfDB Funds. However, it will give the FGS more control over allocation of a substantial pipeline of Funds, with greater predictability and longer timeframes.

Meanwhile, the general political context remains complex and difficult. Concerted international efforts to help settle relationships between the FGS and the emergent Federal Member States (FMS) have still to find traction. Relations are currently stressed by FMS elections. There are doubts among some stakeholders that the political consensus supporting the 2016 Government possessed enough reach and depth to generate substantive state-building progress. Tensions between the FGS and the International Community were also raised after the expulsion of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General early in 2019. That followed concerns raised by the UN about an FGS intervention in the presidential elections of South West State. During Aleph’s field mission, there was a formal suspension of political dialogue between the FGS (apparently including three other Member States). Thoough technical and administrative meetings between the FGS and FMS seem largely to have continued, they lack political weight and outcome. These difficulties were dismissed by FGS representatives as ‘teething problems’, which may be correct, but it is also true that a constitutional settlement remains both absent and elusive. This is a challenging situation for initiatives focussed on re-building the core institutions and services of the State – such as the MPF.

---

12 Key informants agreed that several pieces of legislation that are required as part of the benchmarks have not been signed due to a political deadlock which is currently afflicting relations between the FGS and FMS in the Upper House of Parliament.

13 See for example the recent postponement of the Somali Partnership Forum in July 2019.

2 MPF Performance

2.1 Vital statistics

Aleph reviewed the size and shape of the MPF portfolio and the outline statistics collected by the WBG on the effectiveness and efficiency of Fund management and governance. We found that the MPF portfolio has grown and diversified over the years, with a clear acceleration from 2016 onwards, but its first focus remains on governance. This accords with its founding aim.

2.1.1 The MPF portfolio at the mid-term point

At the end of 2018, the Fund was financing 21 projects (18 active, three being developed). Of the active projects, 12 are investment projects and six are analytical/advisory. The large majority of projects (83% of project grants) are recipient-executed, against 12% for Bank-executed grants on behalf of the recipient and 6% for Bank-executed projects.

In 2018, following a Systematic Country Diagnostic carried out by the WBG\(^{15}\), the MPF consolidated its interventions into three pillars: a) effective, accountable government, b) enabling economic growth, and c) urban infrastructure. The evolution of the portfolio (see table 1) shows a rapid mobilisation of projects in the governance pillar and slower start-ups for the economic growth and urban infrastructure pillar. This is in line with the MPF’s strategy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MPF Pillars - # of active projects per year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective, accountable government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling, economic growth</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban infrastructure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of active projects</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: MPF portfolio structure over the years

Nevertheless, there is evidence of an increased focus on economic growth and urban infrastructure and greater balance between the economic and the governance portfolio in terms of number of projects. However, the MPF portfolio is still very focused on governance: 75% of disbursements supported the governance pillar. Six years on, the balance between recurrent costs and investment financing still

\(^{15}\) See link. The Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) for Somalia helps detangle complex assumptions linking institutional reform and socio-economic recovery in the context of consistent external shocks exacerbating vulnerability and exclusion. The SCD diagnoses a ‘fragility trap’ where a historical lack of trust in state institutions (exacerbated by conflict, and endemic corruption), undermines reform efforts where actors have a vested interest in continued institutional weakness, resulting in inadequate political solutions and financial decisions further weakening public confidence. Co-incidentally, a ‘resilience trap’ is diagnosed where natural disasters (notably drought), and trade or geopolitical shocks, undo development gains and deepen exclusion, impacting the most vulnerable, and generating high levels of forced displacement and unplanned urbanization.
leans in favour of the recurrent costs workstream as defined in the original MPF design paper (approximately 68% of disbursements). By year 6, the plan was originally to have channelled a higher proportion of funding towards investment.\(^{16}\)

At this mid-term point, the MPF has pooled over US$350 million from 11 donors: Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the World Bank’s State and Peace-Building Fund.

This has provided core financing for WBG re-engagement in Somalia after more than two decades of disengagement and has helped catalyse Somalia’s normalisation of relations with International Financial Institutions.

Disbursements in 2018 were US$ 75.5m. The year-on-year increase in disbursements, up from US$ 10.4m in 2014, and over an increasing range of investments indicates that the Fund has helped build government capacity to absorb both recurrent cost financing and investment financing.

\[^{16}\text{Establishment of a Programmatic Multi-Partner Fund for Somalia, 2013, p.11 and 15.}\]
2.2 General performance

2.2.1 Efficiency and quality of operations

The MPF is well managed but suffered from a slow start. The MPF measures the efficiency of its management using a series of operational indicators synthesised in the portfolio results framework that is shared with the MPF donors and published on a bi-annual basis. The review of these indicators confirms that the MPF is performing well against them at the mid-point.\(^\text{17}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Operational indicators</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of operations</td>
<td>Commitment ratio of paid-in donor contributions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disbursement ratio of signed project grants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>Av. # of months between SDRF endorsement and 1(^{st}) disbursement</td>
<td>&lt; 4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Av. # of months between project effectiveness to 1(^{st}) disbursement</td>
<td>&lt; 2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>% of MPF projects that have been consulted with PSG WG during design</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of projects endorsed by SDRF</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of MPF Consultative group meetings</td>
<td>10/y</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Management</td>
<td># of risk management group meeting (2018)(^\text{18})</td>
<td>6/y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor engagement</td>
<td>Limited donor preferencing</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pledge predictability</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender mainstreaming</td>
<td>% of MPF projects with WB gender flag</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>% of active projects with a capacity building component</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict sensitivity</td>
<td>% of MPF projects that utilise conflict analysis to inform management</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Performance against operational indicators, Source: MPF Progress Report June 2019

The MPF outperforms in terms of its alignment and consultation with the SDRF, its integration of cross-cutting issues such as gender and conflict sensitivity and the currently strong disbursement ratio of its active projects.

The MPF is underperforming against three of its main operational indicators:

- In 2018, some of the consultation and coordination fora fizzled out for want of donor attendance, as shown in the number of MPF risk management group meetings;
- Donor preferencing, which goes against the model and the logic of pooled Funding, has actually increased to 45%. This reduces the overall flexibility of the Fund and creates practical problems for Fund managers;
- Indicators of timeliness show a longer-than-expected timeframe between SDRF endorsement and the first disbursement. Those indicators are based on averages, tending to mask severe delays for some individual projects (see Table 3 for detail).

We were troubled by the indicators on donor engagement. We explore this topic in section 3.1.1 below. Regarding timeliness, key informant interviews with project teams and project case studies confirmed

\(^{17}\) Source: MPF Progress Report, June 2019.

\(^{18}\) Source: MPF Progress Report, December 2018. This indicator is not presented in the June 2019 progress report.
that project start-up phases were slow. Indicators of timeliness and disbursement ratios were noticeably less positive in 2015-16 when most projects in the current portfolio kicked-off (see Table 3). Several project managers confirmed that the design of the earlier projects had under-estimated the time needed to start up new projects in Somalia, especially for recipient-executed projects like SCORE or CIP, and even for a project supporting drought relief like the SSF-LD. This impacted the efficiency of the MPF in the early years and is acknowledged by Fund managers as an ongoing challenge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>MPF Grant (US$)</th>
<th>Time between SDRF endorsement and 1st disbursement (months)</th>
<th>Disbursement rate 2016</th>
<th>Total Disbursement (as of May 2019)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effective, Accountable Government</strong></td>
<td>RCRF II</td>
<td>$88.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RCRF I</td>
<td>$14.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PFM</td>
<td>$30.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIP</td>
<td>$20.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSSP</td>
<td>$7.7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGC</td>
<td>$4.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge Fund</td>
<td>$5.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health ASA</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education ASA</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enabling Economic Growth</strong></td>
<td>SCORE</td>
<td>$28.1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SRFS</td>
<td>$3.1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>$14.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>$3.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>$1.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEAP</td>
<td>$5.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCALE-UP</td>
<td>$13</td>
<td>&gt;7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>SUIPP</td>
<td>$8.6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SURP</td>
<td>$9.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urbanization Review</td>
<td>$0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SFF-LD</td>
<td>$6.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3: Timeliness and disbursement rates across MPF projects, Source: MPF financial data (as of May 2019) and MPF progress report 2016.*
2.2.2 Overall performance against development objectives

This section analyses the MPF’s performance against development objectives, including a) the Fund’s contribution to strengthening country systems and reforms; and b) the Fund’s ability to support the process of fiscal federalism.

We reviewed the MPF’s basic overall performance against the key objectives set five years ago:\n
‘to provide a platform for coordinated financing for the sustainable reconstruction and development of Somalia, with a focus on core state functions and socio-economic recovery’

‘build the capacities of Somali institutions over time to deliver critical services and infrastructure, at both federal and regional levels’ [with] use and strengthening of country systems\n
The Fund succeeded in mobilising donor funding to develop and use Somali country systems. As Figure 4 and Figure 6 demonstrate, the MPF has achieved over US$350 million in paid contributions from 11 donors\(^\text{21}\) and has already succeeded in applying US$ 216 million of this to bolster core state functions (such as the wage payment of teachers and civil servants) and to help economic recovery. Importantly, $156.2 million of aid was channelled through the MPF and onto the FGS treasury through recipient-executed grants between 2015 and 2018, showing the MPF’s sustained use of country systems\(^\text{22}\). That represents 83% of all the MPF project grants in that period. Country systems have required extensive support and monitoring\(^\text{23}\) but appear to be sufficiently robust to handle increasing disbursements to the required standard. This conforms with the aims of the Fund made in 2014, that it would develop sustainable institutional capacity with Somalia in the lead. This review finds substantial and persistent progress towards the primary aim of strengthening core state institutions, focusing on the budget framework and PFM systems. With the support of the MPF’s governance pillar, the FGS has carried out the agenda of reforms and performed well on a series of benchmarks established and monitored by the IMF through the SMP (see Figure 8) and by the World Bank through the RCRF, the PMF and CIP projects.

Some of the highlights in terms of PFM and governance include:

- **Improved fiscal discipline, revenue generation and cash management** as evidenced by more regular civil service salary payments: at the end of 2018, the FGS had zero month of outstanding civil service payments and an average of 29 days between salary payments;
- **Reduced variance between actual expenditure and originally budgeted expenditure**, through reforms in budget planning and execution. The variance was down to 6% in 2018 from 31% in 2017;
- **Increased share of non-security civil servant salaries financed by the government** with the FGS covering 77% of the salary cost up from 0% in 2015;
- **The FGS regularly hit RCRF reform benchmarks**, achieving 12 out of 12 benchmarks in 2018 in various sectors including revenue reforms, fisheries or education.


\(^{20}\) See MPF Board paper, p. 9.


\(^{22}\) Source: Aid Flows in Somalia, 2019, [link](#).

\(^{23}\) Key informants have agreed that without the close support from the PIUs and the Monitoring Agent on procurement, auditing and other financial processes the use of country systems would not be possible.
Figure 7: Evolution of MPF disbursements and achievement of SMP targets, Source: MPF financial data, May 2019 and SMP III Review

The review also finds a focus in the first years of the MPF on front-loading financing for its governance portfolio. This is consistent with the strategic aim to support the core government functions necessary for delivering Recipient-executed projects in other sectors. That activity is plainly vital to the Bank’s engagement in Somalia. However, a paid civil service, IMF benchmarks, improved budgeting and financial accountability lack immediate perceived impact for the citizen. They do not constitute the impactful changes in service delivery that are needed to demonstrate the value and purpose of the FGS and FMS to Somalis and thus help cement the state-building effort.

The review noted a development in strategic emphasis towards the mid-term of the Fund and with the advent of the Country Partnership Framework (FY19-22). Increasingly the focus is on strengthening relations between the federal and state government in order to deliver emergency relief and infrastructure projects (notably through the SFF-LD project). This allows the MPF to help position the FGS and FMS to deliver tangible results for Somalis and thus pursue peace- and state-building priorities more directly.

Through MPF-supported country systems, an increasing share of Funds reaches the FMS but the overall picture remains inequitable, and there is no agreed or transparent formula or model for distribution in place.

The regional breakdown of MPF funding between the FGS and the FMS has evolved positively over the past 5 years with transfers through the MPF benefitting the FMS increasing between 2014 and 2018 significantly, from just over US$ 2m in 2014 to over nearly US$ 29 m in 2018. As of May 2019, an estimated 56% of the MPF grant disbursements went to the FMS or for activities that benefit the FMS against 44% for the FGS. One of the original goals of the MPF was to support increasing transfers to the FMS. Given that many FMS were non-existent or not reachable when the MPF commenced this gradual rise represents an achievement.
Figure 8: Evolution of the MPF funding by region, Source: MPF financial data, May 2019

However, the wider fiscal transfers between States – another indicator of performance for the MPF – presents a more complex picture. Although overall transfers have increased over the years, there was a strong slow-down in 2018 in the increase of transfers to the FMS: +6% compared to +115% in 2017, as RCRF transfers went from US$13 million to the FMS to US$ 28 million in 2017 and nearly reached US$ 30 million in 2018. While total transfers only increased by 6% over the past year, RCRF transfers to FMS increased by 48%. The inequity is mostly driven by the allocation of domestic resources (outside RCRF). In its annual review of the MPF, DFID notes that “the allocation between states remains ad hoc and inequitable, with Benadir receiving more Funds than all other FMS combined.” We learned that the notably high share of transfers towards Benadir reflected mainly the return to that State of revenues from Mogadishu port. However, it was less obvious why Jubaland and Galmudug received less overall in 2018 than the previous year (though both received more from the MPF itself). Confirming DFID’s analysis, the review team found no transparent clear set of criteria, or rules-based approach for managing fiscal transfers or revenue sharing across FMS at the Fund level. It is not clear that any are in prospect. Thus, allocations depend upon criteria developed at project level. Most FMS representatives engaged in this review perceived the system as unfair.

The MPF has pushed forward various processes across different sectors to try to improve the approach and support policy dialogue on this fundamental resource allocation issue, for example:

- The MPF-supported Financial Governance Committee (FGC) joined several FGS/FMS meetings in 2018, with practical recommendations on the topic. These were reflected in an initial Fiscal Transfers Policy Paper by the FGS, discussed with FMS in November 2018, but that seems to have lacked sufficient support to produce a tangible outcome;
- On revenue sharing, for petroleum, the MPF supported a consultative process that led to an agreement. Achieving consultation and ordered dialogue on this topic is a result in itself but unfortunately it did little to shape the legislation put earlier this year to Parliament – which is now stuck in the lower house and, we heard from key informants, generally criticised as incapable of implementation. The FGC have already underlined the risks associated with inappropriately designed revenue-sharing agreements, particularly in the petroleum sector;
- Agreement has been reached on fisheries, but this is limited to one year.

---

24 Source: RCRF final data 2018
25 Ibid
26 Source: SERS Annual Review 2019. DFID Annual Review notes that this is explained by an existing agreement to allocate 15% of Mogadishu Port collections to Benadir
The picture has been one of poor progress on a subject of fundamental importance. Plainly the topics of revenue sharing and fiscal transfers are highly sensitive and pose engagement problems for all the international actors we interviewed. Current FGS-led discussions appear stalled and in any event seem unlikely to dispel perceptions of unfairness. It remains to be seen how far the requirements for agreements and system-building included in the benchmarking for HIPC decision point will achieve breakthrough.

2.2.3 Performance of the MPF at project level: achievements and challenges

The Fund is delivering very well with all of its projects rated satisfactory or moderately satisfactory in 2019 in terms of progress against development objectives. Implementation progress was less satisfactory during the first few years of the Fund, a reflection of the challenges noted above, but there has been a marked improvement since 2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Progress Against Development Objectives</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately unsatisfactory</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Rating of projects by year against development objectives, Source: ISR, aide mémoire and team calculations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation Progress</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately unsatisfactory</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Rating of projects by year on implementation progress, Source: ISR, aide mémoire and team calculations

Overall, the outputs are impressive, particularly given the relatively high-risk environment presented by Somalia. Though it may be true that the output and outcome measures are not always easy to distinguish, most observers engaged in this review agreed that the Fund’s approach was part of a paradigm shift in aid to Somalia and that it was vitally necessary to help address the development trap there.

Strengthening core state functions – Effective Accountable Government

The MPF performed well under its governance pillar as it managed to establish, use and monitor country systems in a short amount of time while pushing for a range of PFM and governance technical reforms. It struggled, however, to support progress on political agreement on fiscal responsibilities or distributive rules and it fell short of its aims to establish synergies between its core governance projects. Nor has much yet been done on strengthening accountability to the Somali public.

---

27 See IMF Staff-Monitored Programme IV, 2019, link.
The MPF supported important progress on all aspects of fiscal and public Financial Management (PFM) including:

- Predictable payment of civil service salaries in all FMS through a functioning payroll, synergising with parallel EU/UK programmes on public resource management in Somalia (PREMIS and EU budget support) and through a consolidated Somalia Financial Information System (SFMIS), now applied to all non-security public sector payments;
- FGS taking over an increasing share (now approaching 80%) of its non-security wage bill and including responsibility for Capacity Injection Modality (CIM) recruits. The FGS has recently stopped recruitment of additional CIM recruits to relieve pressure on the wage bill, demonstrating understanding of the need for fiscal affordability and foreshadowing important discussions about fiscal sustainability likely to take place under the IMF Staff Monitored Programme and other WBG-supported fora;
- Support and guidance to the national procurement process through a Financial Governance Committee (FGC), who have been directly advising on implementing a new regulatory regime, approved by the Council of Ministers, as well as the re-tender of key concessions such as the Port and Airport, and Somali National Army rations contract.

Since 2017, the RCRF has been using a robust performance management system to monitor the FGS’ progress on reforms, through reform benchmarking and tracking. In 2018, it built on that system to introduce “disbursement linked indicators” (DLI) with the aim to further incentivise reform. This new mechanism links financing to reforms, especially in the areas of domestic revenue mobilisation and expenditure management. The definition of DLI was done in dialogue with the FGS and in close collaboration with the EU team to define joint milestones between the EU budget support and RCRF DLI. This approach to technical reforms is promising in that a) it is based on a clear definition of problems; b) it provides a clear and transparent framework to plan and deliver reforms; c) it redefines the structure of incentives to push for reforms.

Focus Box 1: Pushing for technical reforms through robust performance management mechanisms in fragile contexts – Lessons from the RCRF

The Capacity Injection Project (CIP) builds civil service capacity and works to improve transparency and efficacy in public service recruitments. While CIP struggled to get off the ground, the project is now performing better and has:

- Completed recruitment, filling critical positions across the FGS and FMS, with pay in line with an approved, harmonised pay scale;
- Catalysed significant improvements, e.g. new technical team in FGS to review developed policies and develop rules and procedures for cabinet approval, new HR rules and procedures rolling out in Puntland and only slightly less advanced in Somaliland;
- Ensured successful delivery of HR audits in Somaliland and Puntland with FGS following and initiating a Public Sector Reform Strategy on the back of the audit;
- Aided key Civil Service training institutions for the FGS and for Somaliland and Puntland.

In some important areas, governance projects performed less well:

- Despite various technical ground-clearing, no political agreement on revenue-sharing or rules-based resource allocation is in sight. This mainly reflects stuttering and now stalled FGS/FMS

29 During 2018, the RCRF project paid salaries for nearly 2,500 civil servants in the four emerging FMS plus over 100 Capacity Injection Modality (CIM) recruits in Puntland. RCRF II has also paid over 2,000 teachers in Puntland, plus nearly 300 teachers in Jubaland and only slightly fewer in Benadir.

30 The MPF is providing analytical support for a forthcoming Public Expenditure Review also a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework under the National Development Plan which will address fiscal affordability in the light of low revenue collection and a growing wage bill.
political relations at the higher level - though the review team heard several suggestions that the MPF, through the WBG, could have used the leverage of the Fund to influence progress;

- **The core governance projects – RCRF, PFM and CIP – were originally designed (and identified) as a “troika” of projects with key synergies between them.** However, evidence shows that the assumption that projects from the same WB practice would ‘naturally’ collaborate did not hold true. The design of the projects did not build in mechanisms to identify and build on synergies. If anything, the design created dependencies between projects that were not properly managed. For example, delays in the delivery of CIP civil service reform outputs impacted the implementation of RCRF and a lack of communication between project teams led to some contradictions for PIUs and clients on the ground;

- **Limited progress made on transparency and accountability to Somalis.** In January 2019, the FGS, with MPF support, launched an online portal which supports greater transparency of fiscal performance31. However, in 2018, the FGS did not meet targets on the only performance indicator that tracks transparency – the publication of payroll reports and fiscal summary reports on the MOF website. More generally, transparency and accountability to the public are not front and centre in the overall reform agenda and the current PFM system does not provide many opportunities for the public to exercise oversight or to engage.

**Enabling Economic Growth**

The Fund has developed a portfolio of projects aimed at creating an enabling environment for economic growth, spurring growth in productive sectors, and increasing access to finance and sustained remittances. Supporting development of urban infrastructure and inclusive resource sharing arrangements are increasingly important associated aims. The review team heard that the portfolio had **delivered some good outcomes for businesses** in Somalia, which would be built on by the new SCALED UP/FIDEP programmes, especially in relation to economic marginalisation issues. However, key legislation and processes are still not in place which is affecting progress in this sector, such as the enactment of Company law and the establishment of the One Stop Shop business registration process. Currently, as a result of this portfolio:

- **Private enterprises have been given technical assistance**32 and grants, leveraging additional private and family finance33;

- **The Central Bank has issued licenses to the Banking Sector and Money Transfer Businesses**, carrying out independent supervisions;

- **Some key legislation has been drafted and approved** (though there are delays in completing the parliamentary process for more34);

- **A Private/Public Dialogue (PPD) has opened between the Government and the private sector** (initially in Mogadishu and in Hargeisa) surveying opinions on ease of doing business and helping prioritise reforms to support economic growth. In Hargeisa, the PPD is reported to have facilitated an agreement between the public and private sector on electricity supply reform, though it is too early to take a view on the impact of the PPD’s initial activity;

---

31 [http://mof.gov.so/fiscal/](http://mof.gov.so/fiscal/)

32 For example, between July 2016 - April 2019 the SMEF helped 30 SMEs win grant finance from the SBCF. It also helped over 500 people get skills training in basic agricultural techniques as well as mobile phone repairs and fishnet mending.

33 For example, the Somalia Business Catalytic Fund (SBCF) operated from July 2016 - January 2019 and approved 82 enterprises for US$6.5m grants. Of these, 67 projects were completed prior to 2019. SBCF grants were mixed with direct matching financing, private loans and loans from Somali financial institutions.

34 For example, the Mobile Money Draft Regulation was completed in December 2018 and is expected to come into force in June 2019. The FGS Companies Bill awaits approval by the Upper House. The Somalia Bureau of Standards Bill is still absent even a first reading in the Lower House. The Investment Law and Electricity Act are not yet published.
The SCORE project exceeded by 11% its target for direct job creation in the businesses it supports\(^\text{35}\); Lessons from experience of grant applications from start-ups and women were learned via a scoping study on women entrepreneurs’ access to microfinance\(^\text{36}\), impacting the design of SCALED UP and other programmes.

In some areas, the Economic Growth portfolio has progressed less well:

- **Concern was raised that the Economic Growth pillar has expanded beyond the traditional focus of the WBG institutional strengthening** and in doing programmes that have been less effective. This was a particular critique raised by the SCORE Mid Term Review\(^\text{37}\);
- **Weak regulatory environment has affected implementation of roll out of the One Stop Shop process and led to tax underpay to the treasury by telecommunications companies.** While regulation of telecommunication improved with the passing of the Communications Act, telecommunications companies are still negotiating contributions to the treasury rather than being held to a tax regime, resulting in potential loss of revenues. Furthermore, the very weak regulatory environment is having substantial impact on business compliance and administrative procedures for new businesses, which has impacted the roll out of the One Stop Shop solution being implemented by projects to streamline procedures;
- **The Financial and Private Sector Development Forum (November 2018)** found that there was a clear lack of coordination between international partners in the sector, with risk of significant duplication of activities, such as for example between USAID and the MPF SCORE grants schemes\(^\text{38}\).

### Urban Infrastructure

The main components of this expanding category of MPF activity are the Somali Urban Investment Planning Project (SUIPP), the Somalia Urban Resilience and Recovery Project (SURP) - Phase I. The next phases of these projects will be combined in the upcoming SURP II. The Special Financing Facility for Local Development (SFF-LD) was extended with the aim to close in June 2019. Overall the **pillar has been successful**, with effective sectoral coordination taking place at local level and procurement and safeguarding risks being managed well by the task teams. The urbanisation pillar has also successfully piloted a new implementation model through SFF-LD.

The outputs include:

- **Four sub-projects that are delivering tangible services to communities** amounting to more than half a million people;
- **An energy master plan and six municipal power plans;**
- **An initial Urban Resilience Programme** negotiated and set to expand to Kismayo and Baidoa;
- **Civil works procurement underway in Mogadishu and Garowe:**
- **Five regional administrations engaged in project design and implementation** (consultation, identification, procurement and implementation);
- **A major urbanisation review is being conducted** (due in early 2020). This work is multi-disciplinary and includes a political economy analysis of seven urban centres. It should provide a firm basis for defining a MPF portfolio for investment in urban infrastructure.

\(^{35}\) The statistics are without external verification.
\(^{37}\) SCORE Mid Term Review Aid Memoire
\(^{38}\) Ibid.
The urbanisation portfolio faces some implementation challenges:

- **The required level of support to and monitoring of the Project Implementation Units (PIUs) to ensure transparent procurement processes are significant.** This has been possible in the current pillar size, but may not be possible for the planned scale-up, which might increase the risks of inefficiency and corruption;

- **Due to access challenges, the supervision of civil works construction by the project teams has been limited.** Technical monitoring requires subcontracting an engineer, which has limited project team oversight over construction activities;

- **Funding allocations across cities for infrastructure projects is highly contentious.** A lack of clear criteria on decision-making around funding allocations may compound existing FGS-FMS tensions on roles and responsibilities;

- **Local sensitivities have prevented some infrastructure projects being badged appropriately at local, road-side, level**. This is understandable but undermines the overarching theory of change, which requires the Federal role to be manifested to the ordinary Somali.

**Aleph Strategies met a Mayor for one of the areas benefiting from urban infrastructure work under the MPF. Though generally very pleased with this major spur to local regeneration he worried about sustaining the good work with around US$ 500 to offer as monthly salary compared with the US$ 5,000 received by local consultants provided by the World Bank. Neither he nor the leading consultant could envisage anyone ready to step up to the plate, or otherwise likely to take over responsibilities from local consultants at local rates.**

**Focus Box 2: Sustainability and exit plan**

### 2.2.4 Quality and effectiveness of knowledge products

The MPF produces high quality knowledge products but they are not always shared promptly or as widely as stakeholders want and need. That limits their strategic value and exacerbates a sense of disconnect from planning, decision making and strategic discussions.

The Knowledge Fund is the means by which the MPF seeks to fill some of the many gaps in statistical and other information about the health, wealth and productive capacity of Somalia. The products include:

**Figure 9: MPF knowledge Fund**

---

39 For example, in Puntland the Review Team saw that the FGS was not mentioned at all on some road-side signs, the project advertising appeared to focus on the role of the FMS and the World Bank
The Fund also supports key dialogues to help operationalise the knowledge agenda and support the policy dialogue:

- Intergovernmental fiscal forums;
- Public Private Dialogue (PPD);
- Agreements on fisheries, extractives, energy.

This work represents a sizeable investment:

![Figure 10: Breakdown of knowledge Fund budget 2016-19](chart)

Beyond the Knowledge Fund, the MPF funds the production of knowledge products through some of its Analytics and Advisory Projects. For example, through the Petroleum Inclusive Development project, the WB produced a suite of highly valuable knowledge outputs to support the consultation for a resource-sharing agreement.

The review found the MPF knowledge products to be of a very high standard, and noted strong appreciation especially for the economic reports. A recent major piece on the security and justice sector\(^\text{40}\) was also mentioned favourably by numerous stakeholders interviewed. However, most thought that there was scope for more and faster dissemination to influence policy dialogue and decisions. Examples were:

- Delayed publication of the Urbanisation Review;
- Delays in sharing the reports from the Monitoring Agent\(^\text{41}\);
- The MPF Knowledge Fund (SKOPE) had initially planned annual high frequency surveys: but since 2016, there has been only two waves of high frequency surveys, and only one public report based on these data, the 2017 Somali Poverty Profile\(^\text{42}\);
- Biannual Somalia economic updates (SEUs) has also been announced, however we could find only three published economic updates since 2015\(^\text{43}\);
- Delays in engaging the donors on the analytical work produced on the education sector (which we heard had greatly reduced the impact of the report and its recommendations).

\(^{40}\) Somalia Security and Justice Public Expenditure Review, [link](#).

\(^{41}\) As of June 2019, all but two reports from the Monitoring Agent had been shared with the MPF donors.

\(^{42}\) Somali Poverty Profile, 2017, [link](#).

\(^{43}\) See SEU 1 Transition Amid Risks, SEU 2 Mobilising Domestic Revenue to Rebuild Somalia; SEU 3 Rapid Growth in Mobile Money – stability or vulnerability available under “Somalia Economic Updates” on the MPF website, [link](#).
There was also significant concern at the absence of a codified approach to share and use knowledge given the massive knowledge deficits in Somalia and the need for international investments to be better targeted. The Knowledge Fund agenda appeared not to be regularly updated. Multiple depositories and dissemination channels are not in use and there is a lack of clarity on what is being done actively to encourage government ownership and distribution. Also, in addition to formal World Bank knowledge products, an analytical suite could usefully be built into projects to make sure knowledge products are used as a resource over time and across teams.

‘Little codified knowledge is a structural problem’ (MPF Monitoring Agent)

‘We know so little about Somalia’ (Academic Somalia expert)

Generally, there is scope for much better use of the excellent work being produced. A clear definition of such products and stronger, more transparent, guidance on production and dissemination could also aid internal contributions from project teams. Whilst the policy is to publish all publicly available documents on the MPF website there have been serious delays and frustrations (e.g. the vital high-frequency survey results) which do not seem to have been actively or successfully managed. Donors expressed repeated dissatisfaction about slowness to share internal analytical pieces by the Monitoring Agent. Whatever the precise explanations for particular issues, the general atmosphere and perceptions of transparency need to be addressed as openly and positively as possible. The production, sharing and policy discussion of knowledge products is an important part of the strategic value of the MPF going forward. Recommendations are offered at the end of this report.

2.2.5 Factors contributing to success and underachievement

Based on interviews with WB project teams, including PIUs, FGS and FMS officials and project reviews, the Review team identified a number of cross-cutting success factors and obstacles to delivery. These are summarised below and pursued as appropriate in section 4 (lessons and recommendations):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success factors</th>
<th>Obstacles to delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ability to disburse rapidly on recurrent costs, helping to build trust with government and donors;</td>
<td>Absence of core government systems when MPF started at federal level; currently still largely absent in the FMS;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated team managing projects and portfolio from the region;</td>
<td>Gaps in legislative frameworks and procedures to support reforms;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of experience and low turnover of CMU staff;</td>
<td>Low capacity and human resources in government;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusted relationship with the FGS;</td>
<td>Low capacity of government to manage contracts, including when contracting for expertise;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to pilot projects and rapidly scale them up (e.g. RCRF I to RCRF II);</td>
<td>General lack of access in Somalia; security costs and logistical constraints to get access;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time and resources invested in closely supervising and managing projects during implementation, beyond the intensive phase of design;</td>
<td>Lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities across government (both horizontally and vertically) causing implementation delays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in a specialised Monitoring Agent based in Mogadishu and able to access most places where the MPF operates.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Success factors and obstacles to delivery of MPF projects
3 MPF Management and Governance

3.1 Fund governance and coordination

3.1.1 Coordination and collaboration

**Progress against high-level development objectives and indicators has been mixed.** For example, the WBG Board paper setting up the MPF expressed the hope that:

“over time, international financing may increasingly transition towards the SDRF framework as a preferred channel, based on the facility’s track record” as well as “information sharing on existing activities through its governance framework”

The predicted benefits included:

‘increase the transparency and accountability of the delivery and management of international assistance in Somalia’ and to ‘reduce transaction costs by pooling funds and through harmonized results reporting.’

However, the proportion of aid flowing through the SDRF has remained just above 20% of the total, with the MPF accounting for around 10%. This interim outcome is disappointing given the ambition and performance of the Fund.

It is relevant that new funding mechanisms, which pool resources for similar state-building purposes, have been established alongside the SDRF. Whilst these may operate in a complementary fashion, they nevertheless tend to detract from the ‘funding platform of choice’ status that was envisaged at the inception of the Fund.

![Figure 11: How far have the SDRF and MPF leveraged development aid behind agreed Somali priorities, Source: Aid Flows in Somalia report 2019](image1)

![Figure 12: Use of the SDRF to channel development aid (2018), Source: Aid Flows in Somalia report 2018](image2)

Despite disappointing overall investment levels, compared to other trust funds, the MPF has been efficient in getting funding into programmes, with a sub-total of roughly US$ 335.2m in paid-in donor

---

44 For example, the US$16m UK/EU Public Resource Management in Somalia programme set up in early 2017 with aims broadly similar to the MPF, and Phase 2 of the US$65m-US$100 multi-donor Somalia Stability Fund which aids state-building and peace-building through targeted investments in infrastructure in the FMSs.
contributions through the SDRF for 2014 to 2018, compared to 274.8m for the UN MPTF and 55.4m for the AfDB SIF.

The review saw that the MPF has retained its initial set of donors and continued to achieve focus on a common set of priorities. Key informants compared the situation favourably to the chaotic donor landscape in Mogadishu immediately prior to the setting up of the SDRF in 2013. Pooling resources has reduced the fragmentation of donor efforts. Though the value of the Fund was still low as a proportion of the overall aid flows, it had contributed to an improved aid landscape for Somalia, alleviating to some degree the problem of competing donor priorities and providing FGS with budget Funding channels.

The MPF has been helpful in supporting coordination between the partners working with Government and within Somalia’s private sector. In some cases, strong partnerships have been forged that have led to the development of joint/ synergised policy/programming work, notably on SCALED UP and the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Financial Institutions Development Program (FIDEP)\(^{45}\). The good collaboration between the MPF and the IFC’s Trust Fund, established in 2017, is generally seen as an appropriate and efficient division of roles and responsibilities in the work with the private sector.

There is clear evidence that the MPF has provided strong coordination on governance with other key programmes, for example through RCRF’s collaboration with the PREMIS programme. The RCRF team has worked closely with the Somalia Stability Fund to help the emergent member states meet eligibility criteria. When developing the current system of disbursement-linked indicators, the RCRF team coordinated very closely with the EU to develop joint milestones with the EU budget support. Joint monitoring with the EU is underway to inform the HIPC process. There is effectively a shared fiscal reform agenda between the MPF, EU and DFID which is a good basis for further coordination. The review team also saw evidence of good coordination on the urban portfolio, especially at the local and municipal level. For example, in Baidoa, there are bi-monthly meetings with all donors working on urban infrastructure and forced displacement issues with the presence of the mayor. These meetings have been particularly helpful given the high level of programming covering IDP issues. Through regular coordination, team leaders working on the urban sector have identified operational overlap and adapted programming accordingly to ensure a higher degree of complementarity.

WB/UN collaboration was described by more than one key informant as ‘the best in the world’, partly due to the joint aid architecture and to personalities involved. There is also evidence that, aside from the SDRF itself, the collaboration led to additional joint ventures, such as analytical work, including important analysis of aid flows to Somalia (published annually between UNDP and WB). On the other hand, the Review found that even greater UN/WB programme collaboration had been anticipated at the beginning of the Fund, with talk of joint programming on effective institutions and economic recovery, and joint working on civil service reform. This was to involve shared performance indicators and a joint steering committee. The review team was informed that projects became preoccupied with internal issues and failed to communicate effectively with each other. The Fund and UNDP could usefully generate a report on the experience to capture lessons from that initiative and help guide future collaborations and ambitions.

A key MPF aim was to attract donors by

‘information sharing on existing activities through its governance framework’

cognate with another aim, to

‘increase the transparency and accountability of the delivery and management of international assistance in Somalia’

\(^{45}\) SCALED-UP is designed in close coordination to the IFC’s FIDEP Support to Somalia Financial Institutes, which aims to strengthen and expand financial institutions
Most donors said they were dissatisfied with achievements against these high-level aims and felt insufficiently informed or engaged in meaningful policy dialogue. The evidence from the Fund’s Pillar working groups and other key fora (such as those addressing risk) seem to bear this out as they have been poorly attended and seem to have functioned most effectively as means of securing bureaucratic endorsements and necessary project approvals. None of the stakeholders engaged in this review considered them strong platforms for substantive policy dialogue.

Many of the criticisms illustrate mutually reinforcing concerns. For instance, how far is the lack of sufficient policy dialogue in the pillar working groups and other key fora a cause or consequence of repeated weak attendance and commitment by the donors and/or by Government? How far is the reported lack of insightfulness a consequence of sub-optimal information sharing? How far does the lack of sharing with donors by project teams reflect well-founded concerns about inappropriate use of such data? We recognise the reality of these concerns but consider that the Fund must prioritise the need for greater transparency and more depth of consultation. Improvements in these are vital if the MPF is to provide the quality of co-ordination vital for success as the operating and donor landscape changes.

The review team attended a meeting of the SDRF steering committee and witnessed lively participation by FGS and several FMS representatives regarding some central topics. However, it remains unclear that the SDRF commands a sufficient proportion of relevant aid business to ‘serve as the centrepiece for the partnership between the government and international community’46. It therefore cannot achieve the strategic coordination aims set at its inception. That is the development trap for the Fund.

The compounding challenge is that the Fund governance and operations have in practice left most of the donors engaged in this review unsure that they have meaningful engagement, either in terms of the volume and timeliness of information or as regards the quality of consultation and inclusive planning. In an IDA context and through co-financed projects, the MPF will represent a key window into IDA programmes for donors: but this will place a premium on engagement and collaboration of the kind that has been lacking. This is explored further at 4.1 below.

3.1.2 Use of country systems

The MPF fulfils its mandate of using country systems. The MPF remains the main instrument delivering aid on treasury in Somalia: in 2018, it disbursed US$ 66.6 million on Treasury, the equivalent of 60% of total external grants47. The MPF has offered early and consistent support to Somalia’s country systems since 2014. Only now are other instruments being set up, like the EU budget support signed at the end of 2018.

However, conversations with donors and key stakeholders pointed to continuing concerns about the risks inherent in using country systems in Somalia, consistently ranked at or near the bottom of the world’s most corrupt environments48. On the other hand, the Fund appears to have in place extensive measures to mitigate such risks, including detailed supervision and checking of all transactions49. Moreover, as the WBG has pointed out,50 parallel delivery systems cannot be a sustainable solution for sectors and activities that will be provided by the state in the long-term. Also:

---

46 Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility, Establishment arrangements for the revised aid architecture under the NDP, September 2017, p. 2.
48 See Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, link.
49 The terms of reference of Abyrint, the Monitoring Agent of the MPF, include the verification, monitoring and review of expenditures, disbursements, procurements, human resource and financial management, covering recipient-executed activities under the MPF.
50 For example in Strengthening Somalia’s Systems Smartly: a country systems risk benefit analysis – December 2017, link.
‘Donor focus on fiduciary risk may overshadow the ultimate goal of supporting state-building.’

MPF experience of using country systems – and especially sub-national systems – raises continuing and unavoidable concerns about residual fiduciary risk. Observers such as the UN Monitoring Group and academic experts confirmed that corruption remained endemic and highly problematic. The Review also notes that the WBG itself had highlighted collusion as a key issue for procurement in projects they had funded as well as increasing and new risks as the portfolio moves away from systems building and focuses more on investment in people and assets. This suggests the need to consider fresh approaches to risk management and to ensure that donors are fully engaged, as contributing stakeholders, in deliberating mitigation measures and assessments of residual risk.

Corruption is changing, not going away. It’s learning how to tick compliance boxes whilst looking for new ways to steal’ – Monitoring expert

3.1.3 Management of client relations

The performance of the Fund in managing client relations is mixed.

The MPF’s aims to enhance coordination included:

‘ensure coordination across funding instruments and between development and political actors’

Finally, MPF high-level aims included

‘Facilitate policy dialogue between international and national actors and ensure mutual accountability through the integration of the MPF within the SDRF governance’.

This is vitally important because international efforts to help settle relationships between the FGS and the FMS have foundered. Despite various technical ground-clearing no political agreement on revenue-sharing or rules-based resource allocation is in sight. Inter-governmental technical and administrative meetings lack political weight and outcome.

Most donor stakeholders want the Fund to remain neutral but thought that the World Bank leadership could broaden the focus beyond narrow macro-economic and fiscal reforms. They saw scope for a stronger role in political governance issues, where these have a direct bearing on the agreed objectives of the Fund.

Some key informants called for targeted technical work combined with analysis and open discussions (as modelled by the FGC) to help drive progress on key outstanding strategic issues such as agreeing to a rules-based fiscal transfer mechanism or other workable model. There is certainly value in the Bank working even more closely with international partners and potentially synergetic programmes to prioritise and agree the key strategic issues requiring negotiation and agreement. However, partners must take account of the non-political standing of the Bank and the limitations of the Fund in incentivising and enabling a broader political dialogue with Government.

3.2 Risk management approach

3.2.1 Risk management

It is common ground that Somalia presents a highly fragile risk environment in which corruption is endemic, management access impossible in significant parts of the country, and where operational, reputational, financial and political factors frequently jeopardise project achievements.
By WBG measurements, the MPF carries relatively very high-risk ratings but outperforms comparable programmes for progress towards development project objectives. An analysis of the risk profile of the Somalia portfolio produced by Abyrint confirms that Somalia delivers against higher risks:

![Figure 13 – Average risk rating for all risk categories (Comparison of risk profiles), Source: Abyrint Portfolio Risk analysis, 2019](image)

Fewer problems are reported in the Somalia portfolio than compared to the Africa portfolio. However, the observation refers only to what is tracked by the WBG systems, necessarily just a part of the web of risk that exists in-country. With extensive monitoring arrangements, it is possible to verify transactions and outputs; much more difficult is to get an accurate or balanced picture of what is going on beyond those events and what it signifies.

There is evidence that the MPF deploys the full WBG repertoire of policies and procedures for managing fiduciary and other risks related to implementing the Fund’s projects\(^{51}\). The high risks of financing directly through country systems are managed through careful policy design and tightly integrated systems and procedures. Enhanced controls, such as use of a Monitoring Agent and detailed ex-post reviews of transactions are in place to help mitigate the risks. Through its thorough verification work, for example on payroll exceptions, the MPF Monitoring Agent played a key part in enabling the RCRF and PFM projects to operationalise and quickly embed themselves as major recipient-executed reforms in Somalia.

Some of the tools to manage higher-level risks at portfolio level seem to be either absent, not fully fit for purpose in a context like Somalia, or non-functional. For example, the Risk Management Group established under the Joint Risk Management Strategy for the three SDRF Funds was set up to coordinate on the identification and management of high-level and strategic risks, including, for example, sustainability. The group suffered from surprisingly low levels of attendance and has effectively been abandoned for over two years due to inquorate meetings. The management of risks is first and foremost done at a project level and, for the MPF, there is no formal system of risk management at portfolio level - though it is worth noting that the MPF management could not find any example of Fund-level risk management systems operated by other World Bank Trust Funds globally.

In May 2019, the MPF ran a ‘risk week’ in which the Monitoring Agent and others shared information and pooled thinking over several days on various risk realities and challenges facing the Fund. This commendable event succeeded in generating higher levels of engagement than the formal Working

---

Group or other forums. Emergent questions are to be taken forward into the MPF monthly consultative group meetings with donors and others.

There are five questions meriting significant managerial consideration and action:

1. **Is the risk management structure and system (based on the World Bank’s Systematic Operations Risk Tool (SORT) at project level) sufficiently granular and reactive enough for Somalia, where sub-national systems are still very weak and collusion has emerged as a procurement issue for MPF physical infrastructure projects?** Such challenges will increase as projects scale up and increasingly focus on physical assets and people.

2. **Could the administration of the Fund do even more to fight corruption and address fiduciary risks, for example by modelling the ‘zero tolerance’, ‘name and shame’ responses called for by the FGS and international community when serious dishonesty comes to light within Government?**

Following a payment analysis carried out in May 2019, 3 PIU team members were found to be drawing their PIU pay at the same time as remuneration from the Ministry of Finance for work as advisers appointed by the Minister. The World Bank and the UN have been working to improve coordination and counter the risk of double-payment but the task is difficult in Mogadishu’s expanding adviser market requiring action by all international partners. In this instance, the wrongdoing was raised at WBG Country Representative level and the Auditor General was involved as well as the Minister of Finance. In consequence, the WBG PIU salaries were repaid to the World Bank and remedial actions were proposed. However, the opportunity was not taken to help bear down publicly on this further instance of Somalia’s culture of corruption and impunity52, for example by denouncing the individuals at fault in public, or by taking formal action against them.

**Focus Box 3: Double Payment of PIU Staff**

3. **Why are projects continuing to front-load most risk, which is then classed ‘initial’ and weighed off against mitigation measures?** This approach gives little clarity on what is left after mitigation, nor when tolerance levels may be exceeded – both key tools for active management of the residual institutional and technical risks during implementation. Worryingly, this significant finding had been made three years previously53 but no evidence was found of corresponding remedial action.

4. **What can be done at portfolio level to track and mitigate dependency and delivery risk, especially for institutional development projects?** In some cases, this may simply be a matter of looking for synergistic opportunities54. In others, the risk may be to catch and address breakdowns before the repercussions on strategic goals. For example, the so-called “troika” of MPF institutional reform projects effectively became siloed according to the Monitoring Agent but the Country Management Team did not seem to be receiving timely enough information on the issue as part of their portfolio management tool to address it early enough.

5. **What can be done to continue policy dialogue during project implementation so as to respond flexibly to Somalia’s complex and changing environment?** While some projects have advised on the implementation of programmes, this is not standard and appears to be constrained by the WBG operating model.

---

52 See UN Monitoring Group report, 2016, [link](#).
53 Abyrint Report 160428 Q2 RM (main delivery)
54 E.g. The MPF’s CIP project and UNDP’s Institutional Reform Strengthening project (though this fell short of expectations).
3.2.2 Performance and effectiveness of the Monitoring Agent

The review finds that the Monitoring Agent has been a costly but effective and essential tool in supporting the delivery of the MPF portfolio and mitigating some of its main risks.

The MPF benefited from the support of a Monitoring Agent, Abyrint, in place from the very beginning. The Monitoring Agent reviews and clears every transaction paid into the government system through MPF money. It also provides quarterly ad hoc analyses on various topics to support the delivery of the portfolio, such as, for example, a study on how to move away from cash payments in government in 2017 or assessment of education sector payrolls in the FMS in 2018. Most of Abyrint’s analysis has been focused on the governance pillar thus far but it recently started producing valuable monitoring reports on infrastructure projects, with a review of the SFF-LD progress and potential for scale up.

Key informants acknowledge that the Monitoring Agent plays a crucial role in delivery, particularly given the significant challenge of access in Somalia, which makes on-the-ground work of the Monitoring Agent highly valuable. Additionally, Abyrint’s reports and presentations are widely felt to be of high quality and to provide invaluable insights on the operating context. The review of these outputs confirm that they have provided thorough and targeted analyses along with practical recommendations from the beginning of the MPF. They have been instrumental in identifying roadblocks to reforms and key delivery challenges and bringing them to the attention of the CMU.

The cost of the Monitoring Agent is significant, which has been raised by some donors as an issue given that not all monitoring reports are systematically shared with donors. The WBG calculates the total cost of the Monitoring Agent as 3.4% of total contributions to the MPF and 2.6% of total endorsed portfolio. The review team benchmarked the cost of the MPF Monitoring Agent with Monitoring Agents supporting other WBG trust Funds in other conflict-affected states, looking at current disbursement levels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Bank Multi Partner Funds</th>
<th>Total disbursements for Monitoring Agent (US$)</th>
<th>Total Fund paid-in Contribution (US$)</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>MA cost: % of total contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund</td>
<td>119.2m</td>
<td>11,449.4m</td>
<td>2003-2019</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan Multi Donor Fund</td>
<td>9.5m</td>
<td>548m</td>
<td>2005-2011</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia MPF</td>
<td>8.9m</td>
<td>353m</td>
<td>2014-2019</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Comparison of World Bank MPF spend on Monitoring Agent in fragile contexts

The cost of the Monitoring Agent in Somalia is indeed higher than in comparable difficult settings but not out of scale. The security costs of operating in Somalia are very high, even in comparison with contexts like Afghanistan and South Sudan.

Given the strategic choice of working through country systems, the Monitoring Agent represents value for money and has been effective in providing granular, consistent and reliable monitoring, including in the FMS, as well as strategic advice. The VFM of the Monitoring Agent will increase at it develops its services to monitor non-governance projects in the country.

The evaluation of the role of the Monitoring Agent within the wider WBG team, led the review team to question the organisational and working relationships between the Monitoring Agent and the WBG Finance and Procurement team. Whilst both the Finance and Procurement team and the Monitoring Agent carry out reviews of procedures at task team level, there are limited opportunities for

---

coordination and risks of a siloed approach. The complementary nature of their work does not appear to be reflected in the current organisational structure and in the current ways of working.

3.3 Preventing GBV risks

We found that the MPF had increased its efforts to prevent Gender Based Violence (GBV) and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) risks in its portfolio but that more needed to be done to implement changes at the project level.

In Somalia, the World Bank is implementing strategic and operational recommendations coming from the centre to prevent and mitigate sexual exploitation and abuse and gender-based violence in its operation.

We saw evidence that a significant amount of work has been done to understand and identify areas of risk in the Somali context and design processes to prevent these risks at project and portfolio levels and mechanisms of response. The World Bank partnered with UNICEF and UNDP to conduct analytical work and fill the data gap on GBV. It has identified some of the key areas of GBV risks in Somalia, such as the increased vulnerability of IDPs.

The MPF portfolio is gender and conflict-sensitive with 75% of its projects being flagged for gender and 100% of the MPF projects using conflict analysis to inform management. A specific report on “mitigating the risk of sexual exploitation and abuse and gender-based violence” was produced for the Somalia portfolio\(^5^6\). It includes concrete recommendations and tools, such as for example a risk assessment tool to identify SEA/GBV risks at project level. Furthermore, the MPF projects and analytic activities are reviewed and assessed by the Bank to systematically consider and address gender inequalities. The World Bank is currently conducting a GBV risk portfolio review to consolidate all available data on country contextual risks.

It is unclear at present the extent to which this important analytical and preparatory work has brought concrete change in the way the MPF projects are managed. For example, the review of project monitoring documents (including recent ISR and aide-memoires) do not show evidence that SEA/GBV risks are currently being monitored and could easily be identified by the CMU when reviewing the ISRs\(^5^7\). In the current MPF portfolio, there is no project that tackles GBV but the World Bank started separately a pilot on community resilience and GBV.

The review team heard about an allegation of sexual harassment associated with one of the MPF’s governance projects in Puntland, which triggered an “integrity investigation” from the World Bank, showing that the mechanisms to report SEA claims functioned adequately and that it was taken seriously by the World Bank. However, interviews in Puntland showed that several areas could be improved when it comes to preventing and responding to SEA risks:

- timeliness of the response;
- significant training of PIUs is needed to ensure that awareness about the gravity of these issues and the necessity to adopt a survivor-centred approach is raised;
- better communication with World Bank and recipient teams on the ground is needed to make sure the conclusions of the investigation and the measures taken are communicated back to the teams;
- granular processes are in place to identify problematic – but less visible – issues of GBV, e.g. assigning female staff with tasks outside their role (e.g. note taking for communication specialists).

\(^{56}\) Mitigating the risk of sexual exploitation and abuse and gender-based violence in World Bank funded project in Somalia, World Bank Group

\(^{57}\) As per recommendation from the SEA/GBV risk mitigation report, p. 12
4 Recommendations and Lessons of MPF MTR

4.1 Strategic contribution of the MPF in IDA environment

Re-engagement with international financial institutions is a major MPF strategic deliverable but raises questions about impact on the Fund itself and its future contribution. The position already achieved is helping finance upscaling of ongoing MPF activities such as the RCRF and, for example, financing a major new “Biyoole” project for desperately needed agro-pastoral water investments (approved during our field visit). What ongoing role is there for donor contributions?

The advent of IDA funding will mean that donor contributions to some major Fund projects are likely to represent a much smaller share of the scaled-up budget. However, IDA funding is not expected to dispense with the need for pooled resources – including of the UN and AfDB Funds. It will give the FGS greater control over allocation of a substantial pipeline of funds, with greater predictability and longer timeframes. This could impact in unknown ways on existing incentives for the deeper ongoing policy dialogue needed to secure a more stable state-building trajectory. Some informants said that it could also impact the WBG’s incentive to coordinate policy dialogue with other donors.

It was also suggested by some key informants that IDA co-financing will impact the Fund’s methodology and could mandate less intensive supervision and operational monitoring than is currently the case. Such thinking, compounded in some cases by disappointments over perceived failings in the Fund’s consultative arrangements with donors, led a few key informants to wonder if the Fund had an ongoing purpose, or if its governance arrangements should be radically revised for the next phase of the Fund.

These questions need to be addressed in the light of the massive ongoing needs presented by Somalia and the finite contribution IDA can make, which may amount only to around US$140m according to some stakeholders. Though significant, multi-year and predictable, such funding is best viewed as complementary. It does not remove the need for pooled resources, including of the UN and African Development Bank Funds. It certainly does not negate the need for the whole international community to continue to use all available means to work together to increase the value of the aid it can offer to Somalia and to ensure effective coordination. In this context, the MPF has a vital role to play as it provides a framework for coordination in a fragmented donor context – an opportunity which will extend to the IDA programme when the MPF is co-financing.

Despite comments by donors and Task Team Leaders, there is little evidence to support the idea that IDA funding would automatically preclude the intensive levels of supervision and monitoring plus high security costs which have been needed for the MPF projects to operate effectively in Somalia. The “Biyoole” project already mentioned suggests otherwise. Differences between the two funding modalities seem to lie mainly in the method of approval and typical magnitude of budget and timescale rather than in rigid rules about operational overheads. Even so, approval for MPF projects over US$5m follows the same procedure as for IDA projects, except for the fact that IDA projects will need approval from the WB Board, when MPF projects do not. Some key interviews also underlined the remoteness of IDA decision makers from the local risk environment: how far is the IDA modality placed to take risks shaped by experience and on the ground assessments? The MPF is well-placed to fill some of these gaps to ensure IDA Funding is well targeted, whether through its ability to pilot projects or through its knowledge products. The question then becomes: how far would MPF donors be comfortable with using MPF resources to enable IDA-only projects?

‘This is about complementarity and creativity, not competition’ WBG senior manager

On this analysis, the question raised by IDA funding is not whether the MPF should be preserved in order to subsidise projects by providing desired levels of supervision and monitoring. Such costs can in
principle be built into purely IDA funded projects on a case-by-case basis. It is true that they may be problematic, especially for pilots but those are unlikely to be candidates for IDA which is supporting longer-term large scale projects. The query is really about the strategic advantages the MPF offers, or potentially offers, especially:

- Structures incentivising and facilitating ongoing, collaborative and creative policy dialogue between donors to explore and maximise synergies between related initiatives and to better leverage comparative advantages;
- A concerted and relatively systematic means of incentivising the ongoing policy dialogue between FGS and FMS representatives needed to secure a more stable state-building trajectory;
- Proven ability to test and pioneer substantive institutional interventions using country systems;
- Comparative flexibility in terms of shorter timescales.

The qualification about potential is important because, as discussed in the previous section of this report, there are lessons to be learned from the first five years of operation especially regarding the quality of consultation and policy dialogue which has sometimes been provided. While this report makes several recommendations in this area, this should not mask the impressive achievements of the Fund nor its important ongoing value.

Though the MPF is sometimes criticised for bureaucratic inflexibility in its methodologies, its history demonstrates an appetite for programming risk and experimentation as well as adaptation in response to learning. The Fund is also driven by the principle of ‘working with and through Somalia’s country systems, an approach on which it has amassed considerable experience, especially in the application of effective risk management techniques. As has been pointed out, use of country systems has been notoriously absent from most international interventions, but is axiomatic to sustainable state building.

The Review Team heard from some donors that they needed more time to assess whether the Fund was an efficient and effective tool to support the development of Somalia, as well as to test other forms of support, before increasing their contribution. Five years on, this mid-term point provides a good opportunity and the evidence necessary for donors to take stock and review their strategic engagement with the MPF. Our finding is that the principles and features of the MPF continue to position it as a uniquely valuable platform for discussing and funding the reconstruction of Somalia. The need for this is likely to increase, not decrease as the total funds under FGS allocation expand and a premium is placed on incentives for the deeper ongoing policy dialogue Somalia needs.

4.2 Recommendations

The Fund has performed very well in extremely difficult circumstances. The review has identified some areas where performance could be improved even further.

The expected opening of a significant pipeline of IDA funding onto MPF projects is likely to intensify the needs for communication, consultation and co-ordination. Those are the key collaborative qualities the Fund was created to supply. This makes it even more important that Fund administration and operation are made optimal and secure the full confidence of all stakeholders.

Our recommendations fall into five thematic areas:

---

58 E.g. the IDA-funded Water for Agro-pastoral Productivity and Resilience approved in June 2019 has supervision costs built into the project budget to allow for FRS to engage a suitably qualified and experienced international independent firm to provide quality enhancement and implementation support to the project.

59 E.g. RCRF reform benchmarks and DLI approach.
1. Improving engagement between the Fund, donors and the international community;
2. Improving engagement with the political leadership of Somalia;
3. Risk management;
4. Monitoring and Evaluation;
5. Knowledge management.

The recommendations call for action from donors and the Somali authorities as well as the WBG. The changing context means that all stakeholders will need to work closely and collaboratively to meet their shared objectives to ensure the reconstruction of Somalia.

4.2.1 Improving engagement between donors and the international community

The challenge for the Fund is that most donors feel that they do not have sufficient meaningful engagement with the Fund, either in terms of the volume and timeliness of information or as regards the quality of consultation and inclusive planning. This must be addressed without compromising client relationships. There is also a concern that increased IDA funding could dis-incentivise improvements. That concern is misplaced. On the contrary, the WBG and donors should work together to prioritise and promote a step change from stakeholder management to a more open collaborative culture, incentivising donor engagement and actively seeking out new partners. They should first take stock of the current state of the relationship and clarify what is required of each party for effective delivery of projects and strategic objectives.

Specifically;

⇒ **The WBG should engage donors in programming review and design much earlier than currently**, for example through early presentation and discussion of emerging project proposals (including those funded through IDA) and regular substantive programme reviews. A specific forum, such as a quarterly sectoral meetings in Nairobi or Mogadishu, should support these discussions and complement the work of the PWG.

⇒ **At portfolio level, consultative group meetings should focus on frank and open discussion of strategic priorities** - including difficult political issues, who is best placed to actively push for their resolution and how - and delivery options as well as lessons learned.

⇒ **The WBG and donors should make more use of the project-level donor focal point system scheduling** information flows and technical liaison between individual donor focal points and task team leaders.

⇒ **The WBG and donors should undertake joint visits to projects** where security conditions allow.

⇒ Donors should take steps to improve their active participation in the revitalised MPF meetings, and maintain good attendance rates, so as to ensure discussions are meaningful and representative. There should be one focal point and a deputy focal point per donor, to help ensure regular attendance at meetings and readiness to engage across sectors.

⇒ **The FGS should re-state its policy commitment to the Fund as a means to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the international effort to support state-building in Somalia. It should actively discourage donors from fragmentary arrangements and, so far as possible, from preferencing or ear-marking contributions to it.**
4.2.2 Improving engagement with the political leadership of Somalia

The challenge is that progress on the Fund’s macro-economic and fiscal outputs is jeopardised by failures to resolve difficult political questions concerning equitable resource-sharing across States and around fiscal federalism generally. Answers are needed not only to free up crucial dialogues at portfolio and project levels but also to achieve lasting stability in Somalia, which is what the MPF is chiefly seeking to bring about. Most stakeholders believe that the Fund must follow and not lead state-building but also consider that it should focus more systematically on these critical issues and do more to help unblock progress. The review team agrees. In particular;

⇒ The MPF should further elaborate and disseminate to staff and stakeholders the linkages between outputs and outcome level goals and ensure systematic monitoring and regular reporting and discussion of assumptions that underpin transmission from outputs to outcome.

⇒ The WBG should work with international partners and potentially synergetic programmes to clarify expectations and to determine the key strategic and political issues which are relevant to achieving the Fund’s aims. The inclusion of the WBG in UNDP-led discussions on the constitutional review is a good example that should be replicated.

⇒ In parallel, the MPF should create opportunities for greater outreach to FGS and FMS leadership on key outstanding strategic issues where it is well-placed to incentivise and enable greater dialogue with Government. This could build further on the FGC model of targeted technical work combined with analysis and open discussions to help drive progress.

⇒ The donors and the WBG should work together to establish a systematic link between the development dialogue supported by the MPF (e.g. meetings between FGS and FMS representatives on sectoral resource allocation) and the wider political dialogue happening in parallel. That includes deciding on who is best placed to convene events gathering senior representatives leading on development and political issues.

⇒ The MPF should promote better understanding of resource allocations between states by distributing clear and simple information at Federal and FMS levels so as to help address perceptions of unfairness and support informed debate.

4.2.3 Managing risk

The challenge is how to ensure that the Fund’s risk management arrangements learn the lessons of the first 5 years of operation and are optimally positioned for the scaling up of activity and expansion into areas carrying new threats. The recommendations are designed to promote a more open, active and collaborative dialogue on risk as the nature and size of the projects evolve and new and unknown challenges to delivery and integrity emerge. It will be particularly important to maintain the confidence of investors and ensure that they are fully engaged in identifying risks and helping to shape the management process.

⇒ The MPF should arrange more collaborative and engaging approaches to risk such as the May 2019 ‘risk week’ where the Monitoring Agent and others shared information with donors and others and together brainstormed risk challenges facing the Fund. Agreed findings and recommendations should be followed up. Administrators of aligned Funds and donors with suitable resources should also consider hosting such events.

60 For example, the assumption that local-level service delivery under SFF-LD will create greater public trust in the government
The CMU should ensure that risk management plans always include specific analysis of ongoing residual levels of risk following initial mitigation and specify escalation processes for when risk rises above acceptable tolerance.

The CMU should strengthen its approach to coordination on cross-portfolio delivery risks, particularly in relation to political risks and co-dependencies.

WBG internal organisational structures should be reviewed to ensure that risk advice to the CMU is properly coordinated as between the Monitoring Agent and financial advisory team, and to ensure that the Monitoring Agent is used to its full potential.

World Bank management should use the opportunities presented by the troubling GBV issues encountered in this review to heighten awareness and strengthen GBV prevention. It should consider a significant increase in training of PIUs to raise perceptions of the gravity and relevance of the issue and to promote a survivor-centred approach.

The MPF should also strengthen GBV response through improved communication on response to allegations. The CMU should ensure better communication between World Bank and recipient teams on the ground so that conclusions of any investigations and follow up measures taken are communicated back to the teams.

The administration of the Fund and donors should do more to reduce the risks of ‘double payment’ of staff by establishing closer collaboration and coordination and by denouncing publicly instances of corrupt behaviour, whatever level they occur.

4.2.4 Monitoring and evaluation

The challenge is the relatively weak evidence available on substantive project level outcomes and the mixed quality of the indicators used to monitor progress towards to outcomes, for example impact of teachers paid, real jobs created or service delivery. Improvement is not straightforward but needs to be prioritised as the Fund increasingly seeks to deliver substantive and tangible progress in service levels received by ordinary Somali citizens.

The MPF should review the design of the project-level evaluation cycle with a view to moving it beyond the current activity-based output monitoring. Priority should be given to including assessments that focus on progress at outcome level at mid-point and which capture the emerging impact of interventions (or lack of it) before the project closes. This should serve as a basis to review the Fund’s results framework so that it captures the outcome level better.

Where targets or metrics are changed in the results framework of the Fund, this should be flagged in clear and transparent explanations and where possible discussed beforehand with donors and stakeholders.

When appropriate, feedback from beneficiaries should be incorporated into monitoring reports to provide more systematic understanding on how projects are perceived by affected communities.

Monitoring approaches should be tailored to project contexts. For example, urbanisation projects that require community-consultation on safeguarding issues, should include an appropriate monitoring mechanism for that level of consultation.
⇒ The WBG should review the organisational and working relationships between the Monitoring Agent and the WBG Finance and Procurement team to ensure that any risk of a siloed approach is minimised.

4.2.5 Knowledge

The challenge is the substantial and ongoing gaps in knowledge required to work effectively in Somalia and the need for changes to the MPF’s policies and procedures to help address these more effectively. The Fund cannot afford to miss opportunities and should adopt a robust agenda going forward and a clear policy to step-up knowledge production and dissemination. Specifically;

⇒ In fragile and conflict-affected contexts such as Somalia, where data is scarce and access difficult it should be a higher priority than elsewhere to produce codifiable knowledge and create multiple depositories and dissemination channels. The MPF should improve the organisation, categorisation and retrieval values for its knowledge products and pursue these ideas with the Somalia authorities, building and using their systems so far as possible.

⇒ The MPF should consider building an analytical component into every project and consolidating the results at Fund level. In parallel, it should work closely with donors and other stakeholders to identify lessons, including from Monitoring Agent reports, and integrate them into existing and future programming. Drawing and sharing internally a clear sketch of the learning loop – from processes to harvest lessons learned to dissemination channels and processes to integrate learning into design – from the project to the Fund-level (and not only within sectoral teams) would be a useful step. The requirements and mechanisms to produce and disseminate knowledge at project level to feed into Fund-level learning should be clearer for project teams.

⇒ The MPF should engage key stakeholders, including donors, much more systematically in the design and delivery of its knowledge products to ensure that their impact is optimised. This should include requesting feedback on the terms of reference of analytical products as well as using partners to peer-review draft versions of products.

⇒ The MPF should improve the timeliness of knowledge product publication to ensure the high-quality reports being produced are as effective and useful as possible for informing strategy and guiding policy dialogue. Close monitoring of delays in government approvals should be put in place.

4.3 Lessons from the MPF for other FCV contexts

The review highlights some possible lessons for other FCV contexts:

⇒ Actively develop and maintain a collaborative and incentivising culture for coordination. Pooled Funding arrangements based on government are very important in combating the donor fragmentation typical of FCV contexts but ongoing effective co-ordination requires more than merely formal, bureaucratic arrangements to be in place.

⇒ Design interventions that take full account of co-dependencies. The successes - and challenges - of the Somalia ‘troika’ of MPF governance programmes (support to civil service, teachers’ and health workers’ wage payments; reinforcing domestic revenue mobilization; and civil service reform) both point to the value of prioritising effective management of an integrated and interdependent set of broader governance solutions and incentives.
Work in integrated partnerships as part of a collective reform programme set by the international community (e.g. in the Somalia case through the IMF Staff Monitored Program, and EU Statebuilding and Resilience Contract). A strong common platform for dialogue with government and common vision is key to reduce fragmentation within the international community.

Design robust performance monitoring framework to support and incentivise reforms. The FCV context – and the host of delivery challenges that comes with it – do not reduce but increase the need for ambitious and strict performance management. It also calls for a fine calibration of targets and a need to build reform incentives into the programme. Plan and resource long-term sustained engagement to build trusting relationships. In low capability environments, intensive dialogue and engagement is essential to building trust and sustaining reform momentum.

Consider establishing a high-level body such as the Somalia Financial Governance Committee (FGC), which brings together international and government institutions with a flexible agenda to advise on Government contracts and concessions above $5m in value and to support its state building agenda. Before the creation of the FGC, the FGS leadership had no established fora to seek advice or guidance on sensitive issues, nor the international community to raise particular financial governance concerns.

“You can make a difference to procurement in Somalia without a big stick or a magic wand”. FGC adviser

The FGC is mainly funded by the MPF, with support from the EU, the IMF and the African Development Bank. It provides technical advice on Government procurement contracts worth more than US$5m. The FGC has no powers as such, but it would be mistaken to see it as a mere talking shop: its advice has led to re-negotiation of major government contracts and its support is becoming indispensable in practice. The FGC is an interesting initiative with potential applications in other FCVs. Key to success may be its multi-institutional nature, which lends it wider impact and more political traction. Other models for international assistance on procurement contracts have tended to rely wholly on technical assistance – for example in South Sudan.
Annex 1 – Methodology

Overview of the methodology

Given security constraints on research in Somalia, the review made extensive use of data supplied by the World Bank, but included a number of elements of triangulation. The methodology was based on four main components. The following figure shows how the components interact and the levels at which they apply.

![Figure 14: MPF Somalia MTR Methodology](image)

**Literature review**

A review of literature on the country context and its recent evolution in relation to the New Deal Framework helped us assess the relevance and effectiveness of the World Bank’s strategic approach to Somalia. We considered evidence from the literature to help us understand key features of the changing Somalia context, including political stability, fiduciary risk, stakeholder goals and programming. We gauged positive and negative impacts of external assistance over the Review period and the cohesiveness of international intervention, including in relation to federal/local government dynamics.

The Literature Review included broad consideration of key Aid instruments such as the New Deal Compact as well as the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility and the Humanitarian Development Peace Initiative (HDPI). It considered published and unpublished academic and official literature and commentary, and any lessons learned for programming in fragile state contexts.

**Desk review**

This component comprised a review of available documentation of the Fund portfolio of projects and spend as well as scrutiny of relevant World Bank strategies, policies and results frameworks. We used this to map programming, spending and performance and to better understand the strategic context. We reviewed the evidence provided by the Monitoring Agent contracted under the MPF. Finally, we reviewed evidence on the effectiveness, efficiency and economy of the current aid architecture for the Fund and its alignment with other relevant coordination structures.
Project reviews

We checked the performance of all 18 active strands of work and supplemented that assessment with a more detailed examination of several projects, chosen purposively to help shed light on our work. These more detailed probes took the form of project case studies focusing on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the selected individual projects. They were based on a desk review of design and results documents, especially monitoring data, plus, where possible, some additional in-depth interviews with implementation teams and, when possible, recipients. Based on the research framework developed for the case studies, our Data Analyst reviewed and analysed relevant documents and, when possible, data to extract meaningful data points against indicators at Fund level and at the investment and project level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Portfolio Category</th>
<th>Budget ( Millions USD)</th>
<th>Federal/Regional Split</th>
<th>Implementer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Somalia Core Economic Institutions and Opportunities (SCORE)</td>
<td>Enabling Economic Growth</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>38% Federal Government, 22% Somaliland, rest shared equally</td>
<td>Recipient and Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Somalia Urban Resilience and Recovery Project - Phase I (SURP) and Planning Phase (Somali Urban Investment Planning Project (SUIPP))</td>
<td>Urban Infrastructure</td>
<td>9.0 + 9.0</td>
<td>100% in Benadir Regional Administration; for SURP; Shared between BRA; Jubaland, Puntland and South West for SUIPP</td>
<td>Recipient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Special Financing Facility for Local Development (SFF-LD)</td>
<td>Urban infrastructure</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>53% Federal Government, 20% Puntland, 10% Galmudug and Hirshabelle; 7% Jubaland</td>
<td>Recipient</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: MPF Somalia MTR Sampling

This selection constitutes over half of currently active MPF projects, by current budget. It includes at least one significant project from each of the three thematic categories into which the Portfolio is currently divided. It ensured that we probe the performance of projects that are wholly implemented by the World Bank, those that are implemented by the recipients and those where the responsibility is shared. We have also chosen so that we can consider projects that are spread evenly between the Federal Member States as well as those targeted on a single administration and those focussed mainly on the Federal Government.

---

61 We excluded from our sampling frame programmes still in inception or at an earlier stage.
Stakeholder consultations and key informant interviews

We used qualitative research methods to probe the performance of the Fund against desired outcomes, the efficiency and effectiveness of its management and governance and the relevance of its design moving forward, and to triangulate findings from the desk review. At the centre of our strategy to collect qualitative data plan was a two-week visit to Kenya and Somalia. This enabled detailed consultations with World Bank staff working on Somalia in Nairobi and interviews with donors and other key stakeholders and observers based in Kenya. The team visited Mogadishu and Garowe to gather feedback from Somali counterparts and view implementation arrangements on the ground. We complemented these visits with remote interviews with government officials from two member states (Galmudug and Jubaland) and from Somaliland.

A list of our interviews and consultations is at Appendix 3. The number of proposed interviews reflects a balance between the needs of the Review for detailed insight from diverse perspectives and the constraints of the timeline.

We facilitated three group consultations:
- One with government officials at federal level (in Mogadishu) to better understand their views on the MPF and its approach to country systems, on federal/state dynamics, and enthusiasm for the reforms and policies.
- The second group session was held with government officials in Garowe to get their views on the MPF and its achievements/challenges.
- Finally, we held a group session with donors to get their perspective and dynamics.

Limitations to the methodology

- **Limited access to the FMS**: We had planned to visit Puntland and Jubaland to get views from an older and from a more recently-established federal member states. However, due to logistical constraints, we could not travel to Jubaland. We conducted remote interviews with officials from Jubaland, Galmudug and Somaliland but this is still a limitation of the methodology given the importance of the FGS/FMS dynamics to assess the Fund.

- **Sustainability and Impact**: The Review explores potential contributions to sustainability and impact to inform recommendations on strategy and future direction. However, the mid-term nature of the review means that it was not possible reach wider conclusions about sustainability and impact.

- **Results data**: In assessing the effectiveness of the Fund’s projects in Somalia, we relied primarily on monitoring and evaluation data generated by the projects themselves. We managed the resulting risk of bias by triangulating in a number of ways. We will also reviewed the quality of the World Bank’s independent monitoring data and used this data as an added source of triangulation. We interviewed counterparts and other development partners on programme effectiveness, and consulted programme implementers at the working level on how implementation challenges have been addressed. This enabled us to reach some conclusions about the accuracy of the World Bank’s results data. However, in the event that the data is inaccurate, we have limited capacity to reach independent conclusions about programme effectiveness. Consequently, we highlighted any data gaps and areas where it is not possible to draw robust conclusions about programme effectiveness.

Quality assurance

The review was carried out under the general supervision of Aleph Strategies Director, Daniel Skillings, who is responsible for quality assurance of all outputs.
## Annex 2 – Review Questions

### How has the MPF performed in achieving its development objectives?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Where have the MPF investment and TA projects performed well? Which factors contributed to the success of these interventions? (FCV lens: what role have partnerships played?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where has the MPF underachieved and why? What specific obstacles to improvement exist and how might they best be overcome or reduced?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent have the knowledge products and activities of the MPF fostered and contributed to policy dialogue?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How has the MPF contributed to strengthening country systems and national ownership of policies and reforms? What adaptive measures were taken to use country systems in the Somali context (FCV lens)? What more could be done?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Has Fund management and governance been both effective and efficient?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How effectively has the Monitoring Agent been deployed (FCV lens)? What options should be considered for monitoring, going forward?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are risks adequately and efficiently managed, (including the use of the Monitoring Agent)? (FCV Lens: Have fragility risks been identified and mitigated – programmatically and at project level?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has the MPF as a Funding instrument provided value for money (VfM)? Will VfM factors need to be considered differently in the next phase of the MPF?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the current governance structure (the SDRF) effective and efficient?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the challenges and opportunities for enhancing the coordination and alignment of the MPF with other instruments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is the need to mitigate risks of Gender Based Violence (GBV) being addressed, going forward?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Relevance: Is the design of the MPF still fit for purpose?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How effectively has the MPF managed client relations, including managing federal/local government dynamics, in a rapidly evolving political context (FCV lens)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the Fund flow arrangements – the mix of Bank and Recipient executed projects – appropriate for the context (FCV Lens)? Were partnerships set up for recipient-executed projects appropriate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given the increasing IDA envelope, what strategic function does / could the MPF perform for the WBG’s engagement in Somalia?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has the design of the MPF been sufficiently flexible (or conversely too flexible) to adapt to the evolving context in Somalia?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Recommendations & Lessons Learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What innovations can be learned from the MPF that could potentially be applied in other FCV scenarios/in other Trust Funds/Bank operations and policy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What lessons can be extracted to inform the broader ‘New Way of Working’ or Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on the findings of the review, what are key recommendations for the WBG, government counterparts, and MPF donors?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 3 – List of respondents

### Figure 15 – Breakdown of respondents by type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>WBG, 39%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Management Team Representatives (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme management representatives from across MPF portfolio, including; RCRF, SCORE, SURP, SUIPP, SFF-LD, Petroleum, Social Services, CIP and FGC (12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPF Monitoring Agent (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-project Technical Advisers, including financial management, procurement, and safeguarding and GBV (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIU Coordinators from across deep dive projects, including coordinators from Mogadishu, Garowe and Kismayo and coordinators specialising in M&amp;E and procurement (9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional World Bank Programme Coordinators (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Portfolio projects of specific donor oversight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danida (2)</td>
<td>Petroleum, FGC and Urbanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID (2)</td>
<td>Urbanisation portfolio and SCORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Commission (4)</td>
<td>SCALED-UP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish Embassy (1)</td>
<td>PFM, governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany Embassy (2)</td>
<td>Urbanisation portfolio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Embassy (1)</td>
<td>Petroleum and RCRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Development Cooperation (2)</td>
<td>FGC and DRM/PFM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID (1)</td>
<td>CIP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister’s Office Key Advisers (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Finance (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Galmudug Ministry of Finance (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jubaland Ministry of Finance (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somaliland Ministry of Finance (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somaliland Civil Service Commission (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Breakdown of consultations by location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **75 Respondents**
- **51 Key Informant Interviews**
- **5 Thematic donor workshops observed**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Stakeholders</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank Somalia Infrastructure Fund Representatives (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOM Senior Representatives (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRCIS Consortium (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Observers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley Institute (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Monitoring Group (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE International (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDRC (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>