
# Setting the stage for a conversation on labor informality in LAC

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Labor markets in LAC are highly informal





Message 1: Not all labor informality is explained by non-compliance. This is in contrast with other behaviors of non-compliance we also call informality.



Social security (SS) regulatory frameworks often exclude self-employed workers from mandatory SS contributions or require conditions to include them that are seldom met.

Other groups are also excluded, with variation across countries.


- All workers: Argentina and Brazil.
- Only salaried workers: Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Mexico and Paraguay.

#### Special cases:

- **Chile**: Salaried workers and *self-employed* workers with taxable income below 4 minimum wages.
- **Colombia**: Salaried workers and *selfemployed workers with earnings at or above the minimum wage*.
- Ecuador: Only urban salaried workers.
- **Honduras**: Salaried workers and *selfemployed workers above the poverty line*.
- Peru: salaried workers in lar THE WORLD BANK small firms and public sector IBRD IDA | WORLD BANK GROUP

Labor informality results from non-compliance with regulatory obligations.

But also from outright exclusion, by regulatory design, from the possibility of working formally.







Evasion explains, on average, only 62% of informality in the region.


38% of informality occurs in compliance with the law.


## Workers obliged to contribute and formal workers (%)














Message 2: Contributory Social Security Systems and labor market regulatory frameworks ignore the reality of labor and output markets.



SS systems and labor market regulatory frameworks are designed under the assumption that self-employment is an exception, and most workers are salaried employees.

But 1/3 of workers in LAC are self-employed.

# Workers by business size, including self-employment (%)





De jure regulatory frameworks protect workers through MW policies.


#### o Single MW:

- Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru: Set once per year.
- Argentina: Monthly adjustments.
- Chile: May be adjusted more than once per year with Congressional approval.
- MW varying across categories:
  - **Brazil**: One federal MW with States authorized to set higher MWs. (5 States have higher MWs varying by sector of activity). 24 MW in total.
  - **Dominican Republic**: Different MWs for government, free zones, free zones in vulnerable areas, and private sector, the latter varying across 3 firm sizes. Special MW treatment for Hotels and Restaurants, also varying across 3 firm sizes. (Updated every two years).
  - **Honduras**: MWs varying across 11 sectors of activity and 4 firm sizes. 33 MW in total.
  - Mexico: One general MW, and a special MW for the Northern from THE WORLD BANK municipalities of 2,446).

## Workers earning less than the minimum wage (%)


SS systems and labor market regulatory frameworks are designed under the assumption that most workers earn at least the (a) minimum wage.

But more than 1/3 earn less.







The earnings distributions are skewed to the left. MWs in LAC are, with few exceptions, close to the median.




Labor informality is not always a synonym for poverty. But informal workers tend to be low-earning workers.







Differential minimum wages are not solving the labor informality problem but may be contributing to "organize" earnings across categories.






Message 3: Mandatory contributions are often regressive and frequently **impossible to comply with**.








Salaried workers earning 1 MW in Mexico are required to contribute more as % of their income than workers with higher earnings.






Source: Correa, A., García de Alba, M., Martínez, A., Martínez, C., and Sulmont, A. (2021). UNDP LAC Working Paper No. 23.

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Self-employed workers in Colombia must pay SS contributions over earnings of 1 MW or more.

Workers with lower earnings may contribute, but...




Source: Meléndez, M., Alvarado, F., and Pantoja, M. (2021). UNDP LAC Working Paper, No. 14.



# Not-obliged workers making voluntary contributions (%)

Only a small share of the not obliged makes voluntary SS contributions.





Message 4: Frequent transits between formality and informality imply that many exit Contributory SS systems with no pension.





Message 5: Non-contributory SS programs compensate (some) informal workers for the absence of protection. But their co-existence with contributory SS programs shifts the cost-benefit balance against it maintaining the formal-informal labor market divide.



#### Final remarks

- Formalization programs won't work.
- Transit to non-contributory or semi-contributory SS systems will solve part of the problem.
- The real challenge for welfare and productivity is the emergence of a segment of small, medium and large businesses that can absorb workers in self-employment and tiny firms. More focus on education systems and lessentrepreneurship programs please!



# Thank you!

