EUROPE and CENTRAL ASIA

Growth in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) is expected to moderate to 2.4 percent this year, and then firm to 2.7 percent in 2025, supported by strengthening domestic demand and a gradual recovery in the euro area. In the near term, persistently high inflation will prevent a rapid easing of monetary policy in most economies and weigh on private consumption. Projected fiscal consolidation further dampens the outlook. Downside risks continue to predominate. An escalation of the conflict in the Middle East could increase energy prices, tighten financial conditions, and negatively affect confidence. Geopolitical risks in the region, including an escalation of the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, are elevated and could materialize. Higher-than-anticipated inflation or a weaker-than-expected recovery in the euro area would also negatively affect regional activity.

Recent developments

Growth in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) is estimated to have picked up to 2.7 percent in 2023 from 1.2 percent in 2022. This recovery primarily reflects firming private consumption, supported by additional fiscal support, robust labor market conditions, and the resumption of growth in Russia and Ukraine. The 1.3 percentage point upward revision from the June 2023 forecast is mainly due to upgrades for these two countries and Türkiye. Excluding them, growth in ECA in 2023 markedly decelerated, to an estimated 1.8 percent, with particularly weak outcomes in Central Europe. Manufacturing activity remained subdued in the second half of the year, while retail sales continued to soften (figure 2.2.1.A).

In Russia, output expanded by an estimated 2.6 percent in 2023. This stronger-than-expected recovery was fueled by substantial fiscal support, including additional military spending. Oil production and exports contracted modestly, and the authorities announced end-2023 an extension of the export curbs of 300,000 barrels per day as well as a deepening by 200,000 barrels per day starting in January 2024. Exchange rate depreciation led to an inflation uptick, prompting subsequent increases in the policy interest rate. Migration from Central Asia to Russia increased after the invasion, with 43 percent of all entrants migrating for work purposes in 2023 (figure 2.2.1.B).

Growth in Türkiye moderated to an estimated 4.2 percent in 2023. Following the May elections, there were significant hikes in the policy interest rate, from 8.5 percent in May to 42.5 percent in December 2023. Additionally, regulatory changes slowed credit expansion, which started to weigh on growth. Nonetheless, activity expanded more than previously anticipated, thanks to resilient private consumption and substantial post-earthquake fiscal outlays. Inflation exceeded 60 percent in the second half of 2023.

In Ukraine, growth expanded by an estimated 4.8 percent in 2023, following the preceding year's steep contraction. Nonetheless, output remained about 30 percent lower in 2023 than its pre-invasion level (figure 2.2.1.C). Growth was underpinned by improved electricity access, a better harvest, and additional government spending, albeit at the cost of increasing fiscal and current account deficits. While the unraveling of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 continues to exert downward pressure on grain exports, Ukraine has successfully identified alternative routes for grain exports that have supported the sector.

Note: This section was prepared by Marie Albert.

FIGURE 2.2.1 ECA: Recent developments

High-frequency indicators suggest only modest growth in major ECA economies. Following the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, more migrants from Central Asia have entered Russia for work purposes. Ukraine's GDP has declined by about 30 percent since the beginning of the invasion. Tight monetary policies have weighed on regional activity, but several countries have initiated policy interest rates cuts.

A. High-frequency indicators for major economies



B. Migration from Central Asia to the Russian Federation, by purpose



C. Output in Ukraine



D. Changes in policy interest rates



Sources: Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat); Haver Analytics.

Note: PMI = purchasing managers' index.

A. Lines show the average value for PMI manufacturing and new export orders. Bars show the average growth in retail sales from a year earlier. Major economies sample comprises Poland, the Russian Federation, and Türkiye.

B. Number of migrant entries by purpose from Central Asia countries into the Russian Federation for each period. * = 2023 data are available until 2023Q3.

C. Blue line shows real GDP level compared to 2021Q4. The yellow-shaded area shows the GDP loss since the start of the invasion of Ukraine.

D. Bars show the shares of countries for which policy rates have increased, decreased, or remained unchanged in the specific quarter. Last data point is November 2023.

Elsewhere in the region, weak external demand from the euro area affected economic activity, especially in Central Europe and the Western Balkans. Remittance flows to ECA supported demand in remittance-intensive countries such as Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan. In 2023, remittances declined by 1.4 percent in the region, after an increase of 18.5 percent in 2022, which was a record-high year (World Bank 2023c). Fiscal consolidation efforts were limited due to increasing public sector wages, indexed social benefits, and rising interest payments (World Bank 2023d).

Median headline inflation in the region slowed to 5.4 percent in November, alongside easing energy and food price pressures. Amid subdued activity, policy interest rates have likely peaked in many economies, with several central banks, including Poland, starting to lower rates (figure 2.2.1.D). However, Russia and Türkiye embarked on a tightening cycle.

Outlook

Economic activity in ECA is projected to moderate to 2.4 percent this year and then firm to 2.7 percent in 2025. The main drivers of growth include private consumption supported by reduced inflationary pressures, and exports boosted by a gradual recovery in the euro area. The 0.3 percentage point downward revision for ECA in 2024 primarily reflects a forecast downgrade in Türkiye due to further monetary policy tightening (figure 2.2.2.A). Uncertainty surrounding the evolution of Russia's invasion of Ukraine plays an important role in shaping the regional outlook. Excluding these two economies, growth in the region is expected to accelerate to 3.1 percent this year and to 3.7 percent in 2025.

Most ECA countries are likely to continue easing monetary policy, as inflation is projected to decline. However, core inflation exceeds the headline inflation, which remains above the targets in most countries. Fiscal consolidation is projected to gather pace in half of the economies in 2024.

Growth in Russia is projected to slow to 1.3 percent in 2024, and then to 0.9 percent in 2025, near its potential rate. Tightening monetary policy is expected to dampen domestic demand. Trade diversion to China, India, and Türkiye is evident for both exports and imports (figure 2.2.2.B). However, for products affected by sanctions in response to the invasion, the increase in imports from China only offsets about a quarter of the decrease in imports from the European Union (EU) in 2022 (Grekou, Mignon, and Ragot 2023). Capacity constraints, including tight labor market conditions and scarcity of domestic labor due to the invasion, will continue to restrict growth.

Growth in Türkiye is forecast to moderate to 3.1 percent in 2024 before picking up to 3.9 percent in 2025. The outlook considers further monetary policy tightening and gradual fiscal consolidation. It also assumes improving financial stability, rising net exports, larger support for exporters, and rebalancing in economic activity. While inflation is expected to remain elevated in the first half of 2024, it is anticipated to gradually ease off starting in the second half of the year, alleviating the negative impact on private consumption.

In Ukraine, the outlook remains highly uncertain. Growth is projected to be 3.2 percent in 2024 and 6.5 percent in 2025. Active hostilities are expected to continue throughout 2024, with base effects and one-off factors including agricultural harvest which should fade. A partial resolution of uncertainty in 2025 would facilitate a resumption of exports and a gradual increase in reconstruction investment.

In Central Europe, the expansion is set to accelerate to 2.8 percent in 2024 and 3.5 percent in 2025. The outlook reflects firming external demand from the euro area, improving domestic demand on the back of a recovery in real wages, and the absorption of EU funds through the Recovery and Resilience Facility.

In the Western Balkans, output is anticipated to rebound by 3 percent in 2024 and 3.5 percent in 2025. Economic activity in the subregion is expected to be underpinned by firming consumption as inflationary pressures ease, a gradual recovery in the euro area, increasing public spending on EU infrastructure projects, and a continuing but slower demand in tourism earnings. Labor markets will continue to be tight and fiscal space will remain limited due to rigidities in non-discretionary spending, such as pensions and wages (World Bank 2023e).

In South Caucasus, growth is projected to hold steady at 3.3 percent a year over 2024-25. While further unwinding in money transfer inflows from Russia is expected, re-exports and tourism will continue to support economic activity. However, long-term growth will remain hampered by commodity dependence, weaknesses in connectivity and logistics, and possible continuing geopolitical tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

FIGURE 2.2.2 ECA: Outlook

Regional growth is projected to pick up modestly in 2024-25. Trade diversion resulting from Russia's invasion of Ukraine and sanctions in response to the invasion has been significant, with increasing exports from China, India, and Türkiye to Central Asia and the Russian Federation. The pace of convergence towards EU per capita incomes is slowing down. Rapid progress on reforms that narrow labor market gender gaps would increase the pace of human capital accumulation, and therefore growth.



Sources: UN Comtrade; World Bank; World Economic Forum.

Note: CA = Central Asia; CE = Central Europe; CHE = Switzerland; CHN = China; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; EE = Eastern Europe; EU = European Union; GBR = United Kingdom; IND = India; JPN = Japan; KOR = Korea, Rep.; RUS = Russian Federation; SCC = South Caucasus; TUR = Türkiye; UKR = Ukraine; USA = United States; WBK = Western Balkans.

A. Blue bars show real GDP growth forecasts. Diamonds represent the previous forecasts from the June 2023 edition of *Global Economic Prospects* report. Light blue bars shows the value for ECA region.

B. Each axis shows the percent change of the monthly average exports to the Russian Federation and Central Asia for the first nine months of 2023, or 2022 if 2023 data are not available, compared to the monthly average of the first nine months of 2019. EU is the average of the countries of the European Union. Red dots are for countries showing increase in exports to Central Asia and the Russia Federation since 2019.

C. Bars, red dashes, and orange diamonds show the average (median) share of income per capita compared to the EU income per capita value for each subregion for 2022, 2000, 2025, respectively. Light blue bar shows the value for ECA region.

D. Blue bars denote the difference between male and female labor force participation rates as a percentage of the population age 15+, based on the modeled estimates of the International Labour Organization for 2023. Red bars indicate the complement (1 – the value) of the World Economic Forum's Gender Gap Index for 2023. The index examines the gap between men and women across four fundamental categories: Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival, and Political Empowerment; thus, a higher bar means a higher gender gap.

Growth in Central Asia is forecasted to be broadly stable at about 4.8 percent a year over 2024-25, the highest among subregions. Still-high commodity prices, resilient consumer spending amid cooling inflation, and sustained export growth benefiting from rising oil production capacity in Kazakhstan, are expected to support the activity. Trade diversion triggered by the invasion, leading to increased exports to the region from countries that have reduced their exports to Russia, is expected to persist (figure 2.2.2.B). The flow of remittances from Russia will wind down but remain well above pre-invasion levels.

Regional growth is projected to remain below its pre-pandemic trend, reflecting the lingering effects of the pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The pace of income per capita convergence in ECA is expected to remain sluggish, with average income per capita reaching 24 percent of the EU level in 2025 (figure 2.2.2.C). Average income per capita is expected to remain the highest in Central Europe, reaching 41 percent of the EU level in 2025.

Accelerated progress on gender equality could deliver faster and more inclusive growth. Although the ECA region, on average, exhibits a lower gender gap than other EMDE regions, countries in Central Asia and Türkiye still face gender inequality and labor gender gaps. Fast-tracking gender-related reforms could enhance human capital accumulation (figure 2.2.2.D; World Bank 2023f). These reforms involve improving access to quality childcare and safe transport for women, mitigating the double burden of domestic and professional work, and reducing pressure to adhere to traditional gender roles.

Risks

Risks to the baseline forecast remain tilted to the downside. The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, especially if prolonged or spread, could negatively impact the region (World Bank 2023g). A resurgence in energy prices, particularly European natural gas, would make reducing inflation more challenging, while potential benefits would be limited to energy-exporting economies like Russia and countries in Central Asia. Additionally, elevated uncertainty could tighten financial conditions, hampering investment and consumption.

Geopolitical tensions continue to pose downside risks. The year-to-October number of political violence events and demonstrations in the region almost trebled between 2021 and 2023, concentrated especially in Russia and Ukraine (figure 2.2.3.A). Intensifying tensions and conflicts could worsen already-heavy human and economic losses. Other geopolitical strains—such as tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between Kosovo and Serbia —could re-emerge. The high number of presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in 2024 also increases uncertainty about future economic policies.

More persistent inflation than currently envisaged could keep monetary policies tighter for longer and weigh on activity. Most of the countries are not likely to reach their inflation targets by the end of 2024 (figure 2.2.3.B). A wage-price spiral in the Western Balkans, Central Europe, and Türkiye, or higher-than-projected commodity prices—potentially driven by an escalation of the conflict in the Middle East—could fuel such inflation. External vulnerabilities are significant in the region, with almost three-fourths of ECA countries having external debt levels exceeding the EMDEs median level in 2022 (figure 2.2.3.C). If global financial conditions tighten, this could trigger capital outflows and increase borrowing costs. Financial stability risks may arise in Central Asia due to underdeveloped banking systems and increasing credit risk. Delayed impacts of sanctions in response to the Russia's invasion of Ukraine could result in higher costs for international payment settlements in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.

Weaker-than-expected growth in the euro area, the region's main trading partner, would adversely impact ECA via trade channels. Central Europe, the South Caucasus, and the Western Balkans would be particularly affected, given that half of their goods exports, on average, are destined for the euro area. Increasing trade restrictions could also push further trade fragmentation. Additionally, a more significant slowdown in China or a sharper-than-expected reduction in remittances from Russia would represent external headwinds to Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

Further delays in the disbursement of EU funds pose another downside risk for Central Europe, as do delays in reforms tied to EU accession in the Western Balkans. Concerns about governance have hindered disbursements from the EU to Poland, while political instability has affected Bulgaria (World Bank, forthcoming). In contrast, disbursements to other Central European countries have proceeded, following progress in the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility in the categories of smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth and health, economic, social, and institutional resilience (figure 2.2.3.D).

An ambitious implementation of structural reforms poses an upside risk to the growth outlook. The simultaneous implementation of a large set of reforms (market competition and regulation, taxation, skills, labor market, research and development) among EU's member states could yield substantial GDP gains for Bulgaria and Romania (Pfeiffer, Varga, and in't Veld 2023). Additionally, the EU's new growth plan for the Western Balkans allocates six billion euros in non-repayable support and loans to advance economic integration with the European Union's single market and the Common Regional Market, as well as to accelerate fundamental reforms. Strengthening institutions, especially in Central Asia, would create conditions for promoting investment growth (chapter 3). Reducing the state's presence could increase productivity and financial performance. The green transition would be facilitated through reforms improving the investment climate, encouraging financial sector development, and reducing the carbon footprint of financial flows. The energy sector requires a profound transformation to achieve the net-zero emissions target by 2050, potentially strengthening growth and sustainability (World Bank 2023h, 2023i).

FIGURE 2.2.3 ECA: Risks

Risks remain tilted to the downside, with heightened geopolitical tensions. Headline inflation is expected to remain above targets across most of the region, potentially leading to an extended period of higher policy rates. Financial stress could pose notable headwinds, especially for economies with external and fiscal vulnerabilities. In contrast, a faster implementation of structural reforms represents an upside risk. Accelerated disbursement of the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility funds would boost investment.



Sources: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); Consensus Economics; European Commission; Haver Analytics; World Bank.

Note: BGR = Bulgaria; CA = Central Asia; CE = Central Europe; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; EE = Eastern Europe; EMDEs = emerging markets and developing economies; EU = European Union; HRV = Croatia; POL = Poland; ROU = Romania; RUS = Russian Federation; SCC = South Caucasus; TUR = Türkiye; WBK = Western Balkans.

A. Cumulative number of political violence events and demonstrations reported across 22 ECA EMDEs. Includes battles, explosions/remote violence, protests, riots, and violence against civilians. Light blue bar shows the value for ECA region. Last observation is December 15, 2023.

B. For each subregion, blue bars show the average difference between the inflation in November 2023 and the target, and the yellow diamonds show the average difference between the expected inflation in 2024 and the target. Light blue bar shows the value for ECA region.

C. Bars show the share of countries in percent for which the indicator is above the EMDE median. General government debt in foreign currency and short-term external debt are as percent of total debt, total external debt is as percent of GDP.

D. All. = Allocation; DIG = digital transformation; Dis. = disbursement; GRN = green transition; IGR = smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth; NGE = policies for the next generation; RES = health and economic, social, and institutional resilience; SCO = social and territorial cohesion. The bars show the breakdown of the current EU Recovery and Resilience Facility disbursements across the six pillars of the regulation—green transition; digital transformation; smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth; social and territorial cohesion; health, and economic, social and institutional resilience; and policies for the next generation—for each country. Purple horizontal bars show the facility allocation, while the yellow diamonds show the current disbursement, both as a percent of the country's GDP.

TABLE 2.2.1 Europe and Central Asia forecast summary

(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)

Percentage point differences from June 2023 projections

	2021	2022	2023e	2024f	2025f	2023e	2024f	2025f
EMDE ECA, GDP [1]	**7.1**	**1.2**	**2.7**	**2.4**	**2.7**	**1.3**	**-0.3**	**0.0**
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars)	7.1	1.4	2.8	2.3	2.6	1.4	-0.3	0.1
EMDE ECA excl. Russian Federation, Türkiye, and Ukraine, GDP	6.4	4.3	1.8	3.1	3.6	0.0	-0.1	0.2
EMDE ECA excl. Russian Federation and Ukraine, GDP	8.3	4.8	2.7	3.1	3.7	0.3	-0.5	0.0
EMDE ECA excl. Türkiye, GDP	5.9	0.0	2.3	2.2	2.4	1.5	0.0	0.1
(Average including countries that report expenditure components in national accounts) [2]								
EMDE ECA, GDP [2]	7.3	1.0	2.6	2.3	2.5	1.4	-0.3	-0.1
PPP GDP	7.2	0.3	2.7	2.3	2.6	1.5	-0.4	0.0
Private consumption	10.2	4.5	4.6	2.1	2.6	3.2	-0.6	-0.3
Public consumption	3.1	2.7	4.4	2.0	1.6	0.8	0.4	-0.6
Fixed investment	7.7	1.7	5.4	3.9	4.4	2.0	-1.1	1.0
Exports, GNFS [3]	10.2	-0.8	-0.8	3.2	4.1	-1.3	-1.3	-0.9
Imports, GNFS [3]	12.3	0.9	2.8	3.5	5.2	-1.3	-2.4	-0.6
Net exports, contribution to growth	-0.3	-0.6	-1.3	0.0	-0.3	0.0	0.5	0.0
Memo items: GDP								
Commodity exporters [4]	5.5	-2.5	3.0	1.9	1.7	2.4	0.1	0.1
Commodity exporters excl. Russian Federation and Ukraine	5.5	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.4	0.6	0.2	0.4
Commodity importers [5]	8.8	4.8	2.5	2.9	3.6	0.3	-0.6	0.0
Central Europe [6]	6.7	4.9	0.7	2.8	3.5	-0.4	-0.1	0.2
Western Balkans [7]	7.9	3.4	2.5	3.0	3.5	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Eastern Europe [8]	3.6	-20.2	3.9	2.4	4.2	2.4	-0.4	-0.3
South Caucasus [9]	6.7	7.1	3.5	3.3	3.3	0.5	-0.1	-0.3
Central Asia [10]	5.3	4.1	4.9	4.7	4.8	0.9	0.3	0.6
Russian Federation	5.6	-2.1	2.6	1.3	0.9	2.8	0.1	0.1
Türkiye	11.4	5.5	4.2	3.1	3.9	1.0	-1.2	-0.2
Poland	6.9	5.1	0.5	2.6	3.4	-0.2	0.0	0.2

Source: World Bank.

Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; PPP = purchasing power parity; EMDE = emerging market and developing economy. World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries' prospects do not differ at any given moment in time. The World Bank is currently not publishing economic output, income, or growth data for Turkmenistan owing to a lack of reliable data of adequate quality. Turkmenistan is excluded from cross-country macroeconomic aggregates. Since Croatia became a member of the euro area on January 1, 2023, it has been added to the euro area aggregate and removed from the ECA aggregate in all tables to avoid double counting.

1. GDP and expenditure components are measured in average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates, thus aggregates presented here may differ from other World Bank documents.
2. Aggregates presented here exclude Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, the Kyrgyz Republic, Montenegro, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, for which data limitations prevent the forecasting of GDP components.
3. Exports and imports of goods and nonfactor services (GNFS).
4. Includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Kosovo, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
5. Includes Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Türkiye.
6. Includes Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
7. Includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.
8. Includes Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine.
9. Includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
10. Includes Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

TABLE 2.2.2 Europe and Central Asia country forecasts [1]

(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)

	2021	2022	2023e	2024f	2025f	Percentage point differences from June 2023 projections 2023e	2024f	2025f
Albania	8.9	4.8	3.6	3.2	3.2	0.8	-0.1	-0.1
Armenia	5.8	12.6	7.1	4.7	4.5	2.7	-0.1	-0.5
Azerbaijan	5.6	4.6	1.5	2.4	2.5	-0.7	-0.1	-0.1
Belarus	2.4	-4.7	3.0	0.8	0.8	2.4	-0.6	-0.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina[2]	7.4	3.9	2.2	2.8	3.4	-0.3	-0.2	-0.1
Bulgaria	7.7	3.9	1.7	2.4	3.3	0.2	-0.4	0.3
Croatia	13.8	6.3	2.5	2.7	3.0	0.6	-0.4	-0.3
Georgia	10.5	10.4	6.5	4.8	4.5	2.1	-0.2	-0.5
Kazakhstan	4.3	3.2	4.5	4.3	4.5	1.0	0.3	0.9
Kosovo	10.7	5.2	3.2	3.9	4.0	-0.5	-0.5	-0.2
Kyrgyz Republic	5.5	6.3	3.5	4.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moldova	13.9	-5.0	1.8	4.2	4.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Montenegro	13.0	6.4	4.8	3.2	3.1	1.4	0.1	0.2
North Macedonia	4.5	2.2	1.8	2.5	2.9	-0.6	-0.2	0.0
Poland	6.9	5.1	0.5	2.6	3.4	-0.2	0.0	0.2
Romania	5.7	4.6	1.8	3.3	3.8	-0.8	-0.6	-0.3
Russian Federation	5.6	-2.1	2.6	1.3	0.9	2.8	0.1	0.1
Serbia	7.7	2.5	2.0	3.0	3.8	-0.3	0.0	0.0
Tajikistan	9.4	8.0	7.5	5.5	4.5	1.0	0.5	0.0
Türkiye	11.4	5.5	4.2	3.1	3.9	1.0	-1.2	-0.2
Ukraine [3]	3.4	-29.1	4.8	3.2	6.5	2.8	..	..
Uzbekistan	7.4	5.7	5.5	5.5	5.5	0.4	0.1	-0.3

Source: World Bank.

Note: e = estimate; f = forecast. World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries' prospects do not significantly differ at any given moment in time. The World Bank is currently not publishing economic output, income, or growth data for Turkmenistan owing to a lack of reliable data of adequate quality. Turkmenistan is excluded from cross-country macroeconomic aggregates.

1. Data are based on GDP measured in average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates, unless indicated otherwise.
2. GDP growth rate at constant prices is based on production approach.
3. Forecasts beyond 2023 were excluded in the June 2023 edition of *Global Economic Prospects* report.

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