MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AFGHANISTAN and PAKISTAN

Growth in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan (MNA) is estimated to have increased to 3.1 percent in 2025 and is projected to strengthen further to 3.6 percent in 2026 and 3.9 percent in 2027, mainly because of an expansion of activity in oil exporters. Growth in oil importers is expected to rise to 4 percent in 2026–27, supported by easing inflation. However, structural constraints will likely continue to dampen job creation in the region. Downside risks to the growth outlook are a re-escalation of armed conflicts, a tightening of global financial conditions, further increases in trade restrictions and heightened global trade policy uncertainty, more frequent or severe disasters stemming from natural hazards, and, for oil exporters, lower and more volatile oil prices. Upside risks include faster-than-expected expansion of technology-led investment and a stronger commitment to implementing growth-enhancing structural reforms.

Recent developments

Geopolitical tensions have remained elevated in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan (MNA) region, particularly in the Middle East. Since the ceasefire in October 2025, Gaza has seen a return to relative calm, though humanitarian needs remain acute on account of ongoing access constraints and elevated food insecurity. In the Republic of Yemen, reductions in foreign assistance have strained health systems, increasing exposure to famine and disease risks among vulnerable populations. The situation in Afghanistan has remained fragile amid large inflows of returnees from neighboring economies, reduced foreign assistance, and damaging impacts from an earthquake in August.

Activity in MNA has firmed, with growth estimated at 3.1 percent in 2025, with the pickup mainly driven by rising oil production in oil exporters and solid private sector activity in oil importers. Among oil exporters, member countries of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and other affiliated oil producers (OPEC+) have increased oil production at a faster pace than announced in early 2025 (refer to figure 2.4.1.A). Growth in non-hydrocarbon activity, including manufacturing and services, has stayed resilient in member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as their key contributor to growth, as well as in Algeria. However, in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, energy shortages and other supply constraints have disrupted non-oil activity. In Libya, despite persistent political divisions, an agreement was reached in November to unify spending mechanisms aimed at improving the management of public finances.

Growth in most oil importers has also strengthened, reflecting a broad-based improvement in activity (refer to figure 2.4.1.B). Private demand has been boosted in the Arab Republic of Egypt by the easing of import and foreign exchange restrictions, and in Lebanon by the stabilization of the political environment. Favorable weather conditions have contributed to a recovery in agricultural output in Morocco and Tunisia. In Pakistan, a relaxation of import restrictions and an expansion of bank credit, stemming partly from easing financial conditions, have contributed to the strengthening of activity, particularly in the industrial sector.

Note: This section was prepared by Naotaka Sugawara. The region name "Middle East and North Africa" has been changed to "Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan" to reflect the inclusion of Afghanistan and Pakistan following the World Bank's regional reclassification effective July 1, 2025.

FIGURE 2.4.1 MNA: Recent developments

Growth in MNA's oil exporters picked up in 2025, with oil production increasing at a faster pace than initially announced, alongside robust expansion of non-oil activity. In most oil importers, growth strengthened, supported by an easing of macroeconomic policies, a softening of global financial conditions, and credit expansion. With broadly limited exposure to increases in U.S. import tariffs, merchandise exports have grown steadily. Despite generally receding inflationary pressures, inflation has remained elevated in some economies.

A. Crude oil production in GCC countries



B. Gross value added in oil importers



C. Merchandise exports



D. Exchange rates and consumer prices, 2025



Sources: Haver Analytics; International Energy Agency; World Bank.

Note: AFG = Afghanistan; DZA = Algeria; EGY = Arab Republic of Egypt; FCS = fragile and conflict-affected situations; GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council; IRN = Islamic Republic of Iran; IRQ = Iraq; LBN = Lebanon; LBY = Libya; LCU = local currency unit; MAR = Morocco; MNA = Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan; PAK = Pakistan; TUN = Tunisia.

A. Production of crude oil in six GCC countries. Last observation is November 2025.

B. Percent change in real gross value added from a year earlier, with sectoral contributions of the change, expressed in percentage points. The aggregate is computed as a weighted average, using gross value added at 2019 prices and market exchange rates as weights. Sample includes five non-FCS oil importers.

C. Percent change in non-seasonally adjusted merchandise export values, measured in U.S. dollars, from a year earlier. Last observation is October 2025. Sample includes up to four GCC countries and five non-FCS oil importers.

D. Vertical axis shows the percent change in the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar from a year earlier, where positive (negative) values indicate depreciation (appreciation) of the local currency. Horizontal axis shows the percent change in the headline consumer price index from a year earlier. Data are for the second half of 2025 and presented as monthly averages from July to November 2025 in all economies except in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Libya, where data are averaged from July to October 2025.

The region, on aggregate, has continued to record current account surpluses. In GCC countries, non-oil merchandise and services exports, particularly related to travel and transportation, have remained robust, alongside the recovery in oil exports (refer to figure 2.4.1.C). In Algeria, Iraq, and Libya, moderating oil prices and rising imports have led to an increase in external pressures. Libya's currency was devalued in April, though the divergence between official and market exchange rates has persisted (World Bank 2025h). Among oil importers, current account balances have improved in Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia, partly because of increases in remittances and tourism revenues.

Inflationary pressures across the region have receded, with several exceptions. Inflation has remained well-contained in GCC countries. However, among non-GCC oil exporters, inflation in the Islamic Republic of Iran has stayed elevated, alongside a currency depreciation, despite some tightening of monetary policy (refer to figure 2.4.1.D). Among oil importers, inflation has declined, particularly on account of softening food prices. This has led to multiple policy rate cuts, including in Pakistan, though monetary policies have still remained restrictive to tame inflation in several economies. Inflation in Gaza has remained persistently high, driven by acute supply constraints and shortages of essential goods, which have in turn exerted upward pressure on overall inflation in West Bank and Gaza (World Bank 2025i).

Outlook

Growth in MNA is projected to strengthen to 3.6 percent in 2026 and then 3.9 percent in 2027, mainly on account of rising growth in oil exporters, where the expansion of oil production is anticipated to outweigh the impact of lower oil prices (refer to figure 2.4.2.A; refer to table 2.4.1). Growth in the region will be supported by recovering export growth, with the contribution of net exports turning positive in 2026–27, alongside strengthening private investment growth. Nonetheless, forecasts for 2026 and 2027 have been marginally downgraded from June projections. This is primarily because the increase in oil production by OPEC+ countries in 2025 has been larger than previously assumed, suggesting less expansion to come in 2026–27. However, forecast downgrades for oil exporters are expected to be partly offset by upgrades for oil importers.

Crude oil prices are assumed to fall in 2026, given further production increases by OPEC+ countries

and softening oil consumption growth, before a modest recovery in 2027. The growth outlook assumes a continued ceasefire in West Bank and Gaza without escalation in geopolitical tensions involving neighboring economies.

Growth in GCC countries is forecast to increase to 4.4 percent in 2026 and 4.6 percent in 2027, mainly reflecting a steady expansion of non-hydrocarbon activity, in addition to a further rise in hydrocarbon production. The strengthening of non-hydrocarbon activity—accounting for more than 60 percent of GCC countries' total GDP—is projected to be supported by expected large-scale investments, including in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Increases in OPEC+ oil production are expected to continue, contributing to the acceleration of growth, along with the expansion of natural gas production, including in Qatar (Chattha et al. 2025). Aluminum production and exports are anticipated to rise in Bahrain, despite increased U.S. import tariffs, partly reflecting sustained demand related to the energy transition.

Among non-GCC oil exporters, economic activity in the Islamic Republic of Iran is expected to contract by 1.5 percent in fiscal year (FY) 2026/27 (late-March 2026 to late-March 2027) and grow at a subdued pace of 0.6 percent in FY2027/28, mainly reflecting a decline in oil production amid the reintroduction of international sanctions and tighter trade restrictions (refer to table 2.4.2). In Algeria, despite a rise in oil production, dissipating fiscal support is anticipated to moderate growth and soften the pace of job creation (World Bank 2025j). In Iraq, oil production increases are projected to lift growth to an average of 5.2 percent in 2026–27. Growth in Libya is anticipated to stabilize in 2026–27, assuming the maintenance of security and political stability.

In oil importers, overall growth is projected to inch up to 4 percent a year, on average, in 2026–27, but prospects vary by economy.

In Egypt, growth is forecast to strengthen to 4.6 percent a year, on average, in FY2025/26 (July 2025 to June 2026) and FY2026/27, with robust net exports. Additionally, softening price pressures and easing global financial conditions will support private consumption, while private investment is projected to be solid, backed by monetary easing and continued structural reforms. In Pakistan, growth is expected to remain at 3 percent in FY2025/26 (July 2025 to June 2026) and then increase to 3.4 percent in FY2026/27, with a recovery of agricultural production and reconstruction following a series of floods in 2025 (World Bank 2025k). A steady strengthening of growth is anticipated in Jordan, with assumed geopolitical stabilization and lower oil prices outweighing the adverse effects of increased U.S. tariffs.

FIGURE 2.4.2 MNA: Outlook

Growth in MNA is expected to strengthen to 3.6 percent in 2026 and 3.9 percent in 2027, with the strengthening mainly reflecting rising oil production, particularly in GCC countries. Growth in oil importers is also projected to increase, backed by easing inflation. Contractionary fiscal policies will gradually reduce fiscal deficits in oil importers, whereas non-GCC oil exporters are forecast to face heightened deficits, mainly because of subdued oil exports and higher spending needs, alongside higher inflation. Poverty is set to decline in oil importers, with steady per capita income growth.



Source: World Bank.
Note: e = estimate; f = forecast. GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council; MNA = Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
A. Aggregates are calculated as weighted averages using GDP at average 2010–19 prices and market exchange rates as weights. Diamonds for June 2025 refer to the rates computed with data in the June 2025 edition of the *Global Economic Prospects* report.
B. Aggregates are calculated as weighted averages, using nominal GDP in U.S. dollars as weights.
C. Aggregates are calculated as weighted geometric averages, using nominal GDP in U.S. dollars as weights.
D. Poverty is defined using the lower-middle-income poverty threshold of 4.20 international dollars per day in 2021 purchasing power parity. Sample includes six oil importers.

In contrast, growth in Morocco and Tunisia is expected to slow to average 4.4 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively, in 2026–27, with weaker expansion in agriculture and manufacturing, alongside softer employment growth (World Bank 2025l). In Djibouti, steady growth of 6.1 percent, on average, is projected for 2026–27, mainly reflecting the development of large infrastructure projects, which is anticipated to strengthen port and transportation activity.

The outlook for economies in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS) remains highly uncertain. Economic activity in Afghanistan is forecast to expand by 3.8 percent in FY2026/27 (late-March 2026 to late-March 2027) and 3.5 percent in FY2027/28, assuming that the labor market allows the absorption of returnees. In Lebanon, assumed progress in reforms is projected to strengthen growth to 4 percent in 2026. In West Bank and Gaza, growth is expected to rise to 5.1 percent in 2026 and 11.6 percent in 2027, given that reconstruction begins in 2026. However, activity will remain subdued in the Republic of Yemen, reflecting adverse security situations and limited foreign assistance (World Bank 2025m).

Fiscal positions across the region are expected to modestly improve over the forecast horizon. However, deficits will remain large among non-GCC oil exporters, reflecting subdued oil exports and spending pressures in several economies (refer to figure 2.4.2.B). Fiscal deficits in oil importers are set to narrow in 2026–27, partly because of contractionary policies, in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and West Bank and Gaza, among others. In GCC countries, fiscal deficits are anticipated to shrink in 2026–27, as revenues will be boosted by increases in oil production, even though oil prices are expected to be lower, and by tax reforms, including in the United Arab Emirates.

The region, as a whole, is expected to maintain current account surpluses in 2026–27. In several oil importers, including Egypt and Jordan, current account deficits are anticipated to shrink, reflecting rising tourism receipts and remittances. However, in Pakistan, a current account deficit is projected to widen in FY2026/27, with a rise in import demand, alongside the strengthening growth, and post-flood normalization of remittance inflows. In Afghanistan, a reduction in foreign aid and weak remittance inflows will lead to a worsening of the current account balance (World Bank 2025n). In GCC countries, current account surpluses are expected to widen in 2026–27, with improving trade balances on account of increased oil exports.

Headline inflation rates in the region are forecast to be generally stable in 2026–27, at rates slightly higher than long-term averages (refer to figure 2.4.2.C). An expected increase in inflation in non-GCC oil exporters is likely to be accompanied by easing inflationary pressures in oil importers. A decline in inflation in several oil importers is anticipated to lead to an easing of monetary policies, supporting demand and activity. In GCC countries, headline inflation is forecast to remain contained in 2026–27.

Poverty is set to decline in oil importers over the forecast horizon, with steady per capita income growth (refer to figure 2.4.2.D). However, poverty will stay elevated in FCS economies, including the Syrian Arab Republic, and widespread informality will likely hinder poverty reduction in several economies. Job creation in the region is expected to remain weak, partly reflecting limited private sector dynamism, strict regulations, and skill mismatches—particularly among the youth. It is also projected to be outpaced by an increase in young people entering labor markets. In addition, the participation of females in the labor force is anticipated to remain limited, due in part to structural constraints, including legal barriers (World Bank 2025o).

Risks

Risks to the growth outlook are tilted to the downside. A re-escalation of armed conflicts in the region, or heightened violence and social unrest, could disrupt economic activity. Other downside risks include tighter global financial conditions, further increases in trade restrictions and tensions, or higher uncertainty about global trade policies, and more frequent or intense disasters resulting from natural hazards. In addition, in oil exporters, lower-than-expected oil prices or higher oil price volatility could diminish growth. However, there

are also upside risks, including larger-than-expected technology-related productivity gains and a further commitment to structural reforms.

A re-escalation of armed conflicts in the region could cause a significant deterioration in consumer and business sentiment, not only in the economies directly affected but also in neighboring economies. It could spill over into a broader increase in policy uncertainty and a tightening of financial conditions, dampening investment and economic activity.

In economies with weak governance and institutional frameworks, particularly FCS, increases in conflict and social unrest could exacerbate food insecurity, weigh on job growth, and undermine long-term economic development (refer to figure 2.4.3.A; Gatti et al. 2024). Outcomes could be even worse if there is a larger decline in international support from donor countries than expected.

An abrupt decline in risk appetite in global financial markets and associated tightening of global financial conditions could result in substantial capital outflows and currency depreciations, particularly in economies exhibiting elevated fiscal and external vulnerabilities, including Egypt and Lebanon (World Bank 2025p). In oil importers, particularly those considered frontier markets, despite improving current account balances, external financing needs have risen (refer to figure 2.4.3.B). This partly reflects the accumulation of short-term debt, which has increased rollover risk (refer to chapter 4, forthcoming).

Further rises in import tariffs or other trade restrictions, or increased global trade policy uncertainty, could erode business confidence and dampen exports and economic activity in the region. In oil exporters, global demand for oil could weaken, reducing fiscal revenues and domestic investment. In several oil importers, particularly Pakistan and Tunisia, further increases in U.S. tariffs could lead to notable declines in exports (Gatti et al. 2025a). In addition, economies with a more concentrated export destination structure would be more vulnerable to trade-related shocks (Gatti et al. 2025b).

FIGURE 2.4.3 MNA: Risks

A re-escalation of regional conflict in MNA or a worsening of violence could aggravate food insecurity, especially in fragile economies. In oil importers, fiscal and external financing needs have remained high, making them vulnerable to an adverse shift in global financial conditions. Lower-than-expected crude oil prices and heightened oil price volatility could reduce revenues and soften growth prospects in oil exporters. However, the benefits for oil importers could be partly offset by weaker remittances from GCC countries, the major sources of these flows. GCC countries are better positioned to adopt new technologies, in terms of affordability and access, and reap their benefits, which could lead to faster productivity growth than assumed in the baseline.



Sources: Food and Agriculture Organization; International Telecommunication Union; Kose et al. (2022); OPEC; World Bank (2025q); World Bank.

Note: e = estimate. FCS = fragile and conflict-affected situations; GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council; MNA = Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan; OPEC = Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

A. Percent of the population that is undernourished, weighted by population in respective country groups. The numbers are presented as three-year moving averages, with, for example, a bar for 2024 covering data over 2023–25. Sample includes up to 14 economies, consisting of five FCS and nine non-FCS economies.

B. A fiscal financing need is defined as the sum of the fiscal deficit and short-term central government debt. An external financing need is defined as the sum of the current account deficit, principal repayments of long-term external debt, and the stock of short-term external debt at the end of the previous year. Aggregates are computed as weighted averages using nominal GDP in U.S. dollars as weights. Sample includes up to six non-FCS oil importers.

C. Monthly averages and standard deviations, defined as volatility, of daily OPEC basket prices. Last observation is December 2025, based on data until December 16, 2025.

D. The cost of internet service is represented by a fixed broadband Internet price basket, provided by each country's largest operator, and expressed in percent of nominal per capita GDP in U.S. dollars per month (that is, annual per capita GDP divided by 12). Data are averaged over 2023–24. Bars show medians across economies in each group, with vertical yellow lines showing the interquartile ranges. Diamonds show the percent of the population using the internet in 2023, and aggregates are computed as weighted averages using the total population as weights. Oil importers exclude FCS economies.

In oil exporters, weaker-than-expected global demand for oil and resulting declines in oil prices could depress government revenues, leading to reductions in growth-enhancing capital expenditures, diminishing growth prospects, and slowing economic diversification. In oil importers, the

benefits of lower oil prices could be partly offset by weaker remittances from GCC countries. In addition, oil price volatility spiked in the first half of 2025 following surges in trade policy uncertainty and geopolitical stress (refer to figure 2.4.3.C). Any renewed increase in price volatility could raise macroeconomic uncertainty, reducing investment and decelerating job creation (Arroyo Marioli and Vasishtha 2025).

The region is vulnerable to severe weather events, including droughts, extreme heat, and floods. If such events become unexpectedly more frequent or severe, there could be large-scale humanitarian losses and damage to infrastructure, lowering growth and productivity. Food prices could also surge, exacerbating poverty and food insecurity. Other types of natural hazard-driven disasters, including earthquakes, could also impose humanitarian and economic costs.

Conversely, an upside risk to the growth forecast is the potential benefits from further investment in new technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI). For example, in GCC countries, AI investment is a key part of national development strategies, and these economies are better prepared to adopt such technologies (refer to figure 2.4.3.D). The diffusion of AI could raise productivity at a faster rate than expected. However, the materialization of AI-related growth gains hinges on the development of physical and human capital for technological adoption, including investment in digital infrastructure and the reskilling and upskilling of the workforce.

Another upside risk is a further commitment to implementing growth-enhancing structural reforms. In Morocco and Pakistan, the implementation of deeper-than-anticipated regulatory reforms to promote private sector activity could boost growth, reduce informality, and create jobs. In Djibouti, faster-than-expected reform efforts to improve climate resilience and lower energy costs could lead to increases in investment.

TABLE 2.4.1 Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan forecast summary

(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)

	2023	2024	2025e	2026f	2027f	Percentage-point differences from June 2025 projections: 2025e	2026f	2027f
EMDE MNA, GDP[1]	**2.1**	**2.6**	**3.1**	**3.6**	**3.9**	**0.4**	**-0.1**	**-0.1**
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars)	0.4	0.9	1.5	2.0	2.4	0.3	-0.1	-0.1
Excluding Afghanistan and Pakistan	2.3	2.5	3.0	3.6	3.9	0.3	-0.1	-0.2
(Average including countries that report expenditure components in national accounts)[2]								
EMDE MNA, GDP[2]	2.1	2.6	3.1	3.6	3.9	0.4	-0.1	-0.1
PPP GDP	2.3	2.8	3.0	3.4	3.8	0.3	-0.1	-0.1
Private consumption	4.6	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	-0.3	0.0	0.0
Public consumption	2.6	2.6	4.3	2.5	2.9	1.4	-0.3	0.1
Fixed investment	2.9	2.5	3.5	4.0	5.8	2.2	0.1	1.2
Exports, GNFS	2.0	3.2	5.0	5.6	6.7	1.4	-0.5	0.7
Imports, GNFS	5.5	6.1	5.8	5.5	6.8	1.4	-0.1	1.5
Net exports, contribution to growth	-1.0	-0.8	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.1	-0.2	-0.3
Memo items: GDP								
Oil exporters[3]	2.1	2.5	2.7	3.4	3.8	0.2	-0.3	-0.2
GCC countries[4]	1.0	2.5	3.8	4.4	4.6	0.6	-0.1	-0.2
Non-GCC oil exporters[5]	4.4	2.4	0.7	1.7	2.2	-0.6	-0.5	-0.3
Oil importers[6]	2.1	2.9	3.9	3.9	4.1	0.6	0.3	0.2
Excluding Afghanistan and Pakistan	2.8	2.6	4.3	4.3	4.5	0.7	0.4	0.2

Source: World Bank.

Note: e = estimate; f = forecast. EMDE = emerging market and developing economy; GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council; GNFS = goods and non-factor services; MNA = Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan; PPP = purchasing power parity. World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing global circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those in other World Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries' prospects do not differ at any given moment in time. The region name "Middle East and North Africa" has been changed to "Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan" to reflect the inclusion of Afghanistan and Pakistan following the World Bank's regional reclassification effective July 1, 2025.

1. GDP and expenditure components are measured in average 2010–19 prices and market exchange rates. Excludes Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Republic of Yemen because of the high degree of uncertainty. Aggregated growth rates based on data in the June 2025 edition of the *Global Economic Prospects* report are recomputed by including data for Afghanistan and Pakistan and therefore do not necessarily match those reported in the June 2025 publication.

2. Aggregate includes all economies in notes 3 and 6 except Jordan, for which data limitations prevent the forecasting of GDP components.

3. Algeria, Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

4. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

5. Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, and Libya.

6. Afghanistan, Djibouti, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia, and West Bank and Gaza.

TABLE 2.4.2 Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan economy forecasts

(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)

						Percentage-point differences from June 2025 projections		
	2023	2024	2025e	2026f	2027f	2025e	2026f	2027f
Calendar year basis								
Algeria	4.1	3.7	3.8	3.5	3.3	0.5	0.3	0.4
Bahrain	3.9	3.1	3.5	3.1	2.9	0.0	0.1	0.1
Djibouti	6.7	6.0	6.0	6.1	6.0	0.8	1.0	1.0
Iraq [1]	0.5	-1.5	-0.9	6.5	3.8	-2.1	2.1	0.7
Jordan	2.9	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.8	0.3	0.3	0.0
Kuwait	-3.6	-2.9	2.7	2.6	2.5	0.5	-0.1	-0.2
Lebanon [2 3]	-0.8	-7.1	3.5	4.0	..	-1.2	..	..
Libya	10.2	1.9	13.3	3.5	3.9	1.0	-2.9	-1.7
Morocco	3.7	3.8	5.0	4.4	4.4	1.4	0.9	0.8
Oman	1.2	1.7	3.1	3.6	4.0	0.1	-0.1	0.0
Qatar	1.5	2.4	2.8	5.3	6.8	0.4	-0.1	-0.8
Saudi Arabia	0.5	2.7	3.8	4.3	4.4	1.0	-0.2	-0.2
Syrian Arab Republic [2]	-1.2	-1.5	1.0	..	..	0.0	..	..
Tunisia	0.2	1.6	2.6	2.5	2.2	0.7	0.9	0.5
United Arab Emirates	2.9	3.9	4.8	5.0	5.1	0.2	0.1	0.2
West Bank and Gaza	-4.6	-26.6	3.9	5.1	11.6	5.5	1.1	-4.4
Yemen, Rep. [2]	-2.0	-1.5	-1.5	0.0	..	0.0	-0.5	..
Fiscal year basis [4]	**2023/24**	**2024/25**	**2025/26e**	**2026/27f**	**2027/28f**	**2025/26e**	**2026/27f**	**2027/28f**
Afghanistan	2.3	2.5	4.3	3.8	3.5	2.1	1.4	1.0
Iran, Islamic Rep.	5.3	3.7	-1.1	-1.5	0.6	-0.6	-1.8	-1.2
	2022/23	**2023/24**	**2024/25e**	**2025/26f**	**2026/27f**	**2024/25e**	**2025/26f**	**2026/27f**
Egypt, Arab Rep.	3.8	2.4	4.4	4.3	4.8	0.6	0.1	0.2
Pakistan [1]	-0.2	2.6	3.0	3.0	3.4	0.3	-0.1	0.0

Source: World Bank.
Note: e = estimate; f = forecast. World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing global circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those in other World Bank documents, even if basic assessments of economies' prospects do not significantly differ at any given moment in time.
1. Data are reported on a factor cost basis.
2. Forecasts for Lebanon (beyond 2026), the Syrian Arab Republic (beyond 2025), and the Republic of Yemen (beyond 2026) are excluded because of a high degree of uncertainty.
3. Forecast for 2026 was not included in the June 2025 edition of the *Global Economic Prospects* report, and therefore the difference from the June 2025 projection is not computed.
4. Fiscal year runs from March 21 to March 20 in Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and from July 1 to June 30 in the Arab Republic of Egypt and Pakistan.

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