




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Strengthening Institutional Trust in Morocco Through Public Policy

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Mathieu Cloutier, Diane Zovighian, and Abel Bove



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1818 H Street NW
Washington DC 20433
Telephone: 202-473-1000
Internet: www.worldbank.org

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ACRONYMS

CATI	Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing
CNEA	<i>Comité National de l'Environnement des Affaires</i> – National Committee on Business Climate
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
GoM	Government of Morocco
INDH	<i>Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain</i> – National Initiative for Human Development
INPPLC	<i>Instance Nationale Pour la Probité et la Lutte contre la Corruption</i> – Anti-Corruption Body
IRES	<i>Institut Royal des Etudes Stratégiques</i> – Royal Institute for Strategic Studies
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIPA	Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis
NDM	New Development Model
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGP	Open Government Partnership
RAMED	<i>Régime d'Assistance Médicale</i> – Public Health Coverage System
SCD	Strategic Country Diagnostic
WHO	World Health Organization
WJP	World Justice Project
WVS	World Value Survey

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Morocco stands out in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region for its social and political stability and its capacity to reform. Over the past decade, Morocco managed to ensure both stability, growth and poverty reduction. Compared to MENA countries, Morocco authorities managed to ensure institutional stability and relative security. Morocco enjoyed the fastest per capita growth in MENA region over 2000-2017 thanks to large public investments and political, institutional and sector reforms, along with measures to ensure macroeconomic stability.¹ This led to dramatic improvements towards eradicating extreme poverty; a sharp decline in the national poverty rate; increased life expectancy; greater access to basic public services, including universal access to primary education; and significant public infrastructure development. Morocco has demonstrated a strong capacity to respond effectively to shocks² in recent years: economic growth is set to increase to 2.8 percent in 2023³, and poverty rate increase mitigated.⁴

In parallel, the Kingdom has made significant reforms in its governance and accountability framework since the Arab Spring. The 2011 Constitution brought forward key governance and accountability dimensions, followed by legal framework change: (i) 2015 Laws on Decentralization, (ii) 2018 Law on Access to information and membership to Open Government Partnership followed by online participatory platforms and open data platform in 2021, (iii) Integrity framework and in particular the creation of the INPPLC (2015 law 113.12) and its Board (2021 Law 46.19). While those are significant reforms, the incremental changes do not translate yet in significant improvements in governance indicators.

However, a still fragile social contract was one of the main drivers for the drafting of a New Development Model. Pockets of instability remain as evidenced by the social and political unrest since 2016 related to redistribution and inequality issues, public services, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The social contract is weakened by high levels of citizen dissatisfaction with public action, including with regards to health care (80 percent of the population), the reduction of regional inequality (57 percent) and control of corruption (70 percent), according to the 2018 Arab Barometer. In his 2019 speech announcing the New Development Model for Morocco, His Majesty the King identified “building trust” as the first challenge.⁵

Building institutional trust is central to the New Development Model and the Government’s strategy. The issue of institutional trust is at the core of the April 2021 report of the New Development Model (NDM) and is centrally featured in the presentation of the newly elected

1 World Bank (2019) Morocco Country Partnership Framework

2 Morocco was hit hard in by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, severe droughts, and September 2023 earthquake in Al Haouz. World bank, Morocco Macro Economic Monitor, Fall 2023

3 World bank (2023) Morocco Macro Economic Monitor, Fall 2023

4 World Bank estimates poverty rate increased slightly, from 5.4 percent to 6.6 percent in 2020, (Macro Poverty Outlook, April 2021)

5 « Premièrement : l'enjeu de consolidation de la confiance et des acquis : confiance entre les citoyens, confiance dans les institutions nationales qui les rassemblent, confiance et foi dans un avenir meilleur. C'est la clé de la réussite et la condition sine qua non pour que se concrétise notre ambition collective. »

<https://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/texte-integral-de-sm-le-roi-mohammed-vi-adresse-la-nation-loccasion-de-la-fete-du>

Government's program in October 2021. The NMD prones to "Free the energies and restore trust to accelerate the march towards progress and prosperity for all".⁶ Acknowledging the necessary paradigm shift to a "Strong State with a Strong Society", the NMD sets a new Trust framework around 5 dimensions⁷ to address the bottleneck identified during the NMD diagnostic. Access to information, citizen engagement, public integrity and user-centric service delivery are elements defined to build trust between the State and the Citizen. Recent efforts to improve and expand social protection schemes during the pandemic shows a concrete application of the NMD, building trust through the welfare state.

The present report is based on a phone survey of 6,000 adult Moroccans in May and June 2021 and subsequent workshops where the preliminary results were discussed. The survey complements data on different dimensions of trust in Morocco that has been collected by others such as, the Afro and Arab Barometers and the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis. The main added value of the World Bank survey is in its larger sample size which adds representativity at the sub-national levels and more robustness to inferences on causes and impacts of trust.

All inferences on trust based on surveys face some empirical caveats. First, when analyzing survey data, it is difficult to determine whether the coefficients measure what they are supposed to measure or whether trust is correlated with other — possibly omitted — determinants of legitimacy, compliance, and so on. Second, surveys do not measure actual behavior, but intentions and are therefore highly subjective. Differences in wording of trust questions need to be interpreted carefully, as it might influence how respondents answer. Finally, two limitations of the analysis are that it only covers a cross-section which does not allow for a time-series analysis, and that it only looks at correlations and cannot infer causality.

Key result 1: Institutional trust in Morocco is multilayered and shows important variations between institutions and across socio-demographic groups. Citizens report varying levels of trust in different components of the state apparatus.⁸ Citizens' trust in institutions that are tasked with ensuring law and order is significantly higher than their trust in judiciary, executive or legislative institutions as well as interpersonal trust. There is geographical divide: institutional trust is higher in rural areas than in urban areas. At the socio-demographic level, men have considerably higher levels of institutional trust than women, institutional trust also tends to increase with age, and low- and high-income groups have higher trust levels than medium-income groups. To provide an illustration on the scale of the impact of these socio-demographic factors, the statistical model approximate that a high-income male age 51-54 has an 81 percent probability of trusting the government, compared to 46 percent for a low-income female age 20-24.

Key result 2: the analysis indicates that policy outcomes and processes both matter for higher trust but that, currently in the case of Morocco, the gain is potentially greatest for improvements in process-based trust. The analysis shows that both satisfaction with outcomes

6 In French : Le Nouveau Modèle de Développement, Libérer les énergies et restaurer la confiance pour accélérer la marche vers le progrès et la prospérité pour tous

7 (i) Judiciary for civil liberties and security, (ii) Public sector Integrity (iii) Independent economic governance institutions, (iv) Accountability, Evaluation and Access to Information, (v) Citizens Participation

8 Since 2020, the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA) and Institut Royal d'Etudes Strategiques IRES have published yearly surveys related to trust. The HCP also published an investigation in 2020 on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on households' economic situation and psychological well-being.

and process are strongly and robustly associated with trust. Citizens with positive perceptions of government performance tend to have higher trust in institutions. However, the quality of public policy and service delivery processes appears to have an even stronger leverage on trust. Citizens who perceive that the government or the administration acts in a transparent, credible and equitable manner are substantially more likely to trust Moroccan institutions. On average, individuals who are satisfied with policy efforts to curb corruption are up to 14 percentage points more likely to trust the government and those who believe that policy announcements are often or always followed by actions are more likely to trust legislative and executive institutions by 16 to 17.5 percentage points. Data also shows that, across these different groups, selected issues appear to matter differently for the strength of citizens' trust in institutions.

Key result 3: citizens' experience with administrative procedures appears to impact institutional trust. A large majority of respondents believe that public agents are on average or for most of them competent (61 percent). On the other hand, citizens' perceptions of the transparency and integrity of public agents are more critical: only about 12 percent of respondents believe that most public agents are receptive to citizens' demands or that they behave in a transparent and accountable way. Higher satisfaction about interactions with the public administration is associated with higher levels of institutional trust. Individuals who report being satisfied with the quality of administrative procedures are 10 percentage points more likely to express institutional trust, while individuals who believe that gifts, bribes, and favors are always or sometimes necessary to obtain a better treatment from the public administration are substantially less likely to trust institutions by more than 15 percentage points.

Key result 4: the findings highlight the positive role of institutional trust for development and public policy efficacy. Institutional trust and compliance with COVID-19 policies go hand in hand. Individuals with higher levels of trust in government are more willing to get vaccinated (85 percent vs 92.4 percent). They also tend to display more social solidarity. On average, individuals with higher levels of institutional trust are more likely to be willing to pay more redistributive taxes by an average of 18 to 23 percentage points.

The policy areas that could be prioritized to improve trust in public institutions include integrity, transparency and policy credibility, and are aligned with Morocco's NDM. Government efforts to improve integrity and policy credibility could have the highest return on building trust. Given the recent increase in access to public services and the middle-income status of Morocco, reforms to improve integrity and policy credibility is the area with the most room for improvement. Those areas are also overall in line with the findings of the 2021 Report on the NMD. More concretely:

- (i) *Delivering the 2011 integrity legal framework:* the adoption of the Law 49.6 in 2021 and the nomination of the INPPLC in 2022 provides an opportunity to deliver on the 2011 Constitution and 2021 NMD momentums and strengthen the legal framework with regards to illicit enrichment, whistleblower protection, conflict of interest or asset declaration.⁹
- (ii) *Consolidating the digitalization of service delivery, both to simplify service delivery and reduce bureaucratic red tape* and opportunities for rent-seeking behavior, is key.


9 Cf. INPPLC (2022) Rapport Annuel 2021

- Morocco made significant progress and efforts could be intensified, especially for social protection services, and justice services, where room for improvements is the highest, and connected to either priority sectors for citizens (health, education) or to integrity reform agenda.
- (iii) *Increased citizens' engagement, especially in health and education, to strengthen both process- and outcome-based trust in public institutions.* Given that health and education are priority sectors and the most associated with higher trust levels, improving access and quality of health and education service delivery would help build trust. Yet, there is a tension to manage between the mediatic short-time (reform announcement) and actual impact (reform implementation). It would be key to combine measures that strengthen the transparency and participation aspects of reform in those sectors.
 - (iv) *Addressing the challenge of government coordination and communication to improve credibility:* effective inter-ministerial coordination of a flagship government multi-sector priority in line with citizens' priority sectors could be key to both show a capacity to deliver on complex commitment and inform citizens, as highlighted in the NMD. The GoM already has experience in fostering inter-ministerial coordination on cross-sectoral reforms¹⁰ that could be harnessed, applied to another flagship reform in health, education or social protection.
 - (v) *Consolidating the Open Government reform to improve transparency, communication and credibility of public institutions:* accelerating the implementation of 2018 Open Government Partnership action plan and 2020 Open Data Readiness Assessment action plan.
 - (vi) *Increased transfers to municipalities – while ensuring their transparent and effective use –* may have a ripple effect on both, trust in public institutions and service delivery: literature and data show a higher trust in local elected government, compared to central elected governments, as decentralization tends to foster a direct interaction between citizens and local governments. Implementing further the Charter of Deconcentration and the Regionalization agenda, as highlighted in the NMD, combined with continued support to municipalities performance and monitoring could help.
 - (vii) *Targeting urban areas, i.e. the pockets of mistrust.* Access to public services substantially improved over the past two decades in Morocco, translating in better socio-economic indicators. More specific attention to service delivery quality for the “median” class in terms of household income, often in urban area, would have the highest return on trust.

I. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

Morocco stands out in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region for its social and political stability, and its capacity to reform. The 2008/09 global economic crisis and the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings challenged the country's stability. Yet, in contrast to other countries in the region that witnessed regime change, protracted political transitions and wars, the Moroccan regime demonstrated its relative resilience. Over the past decade, Morocco managed to ensure both stability, growth and poverty reduction. Compared to MENA countries, Morocco authorities managed to ensure institutional stability and relative security, as illustrated by the WGI (see figure 1) on Political Stability and Absence of Violence in 2011-2021 of 32.4 out of 100 against MENA (18.7). Morocco enjoyed the fastest per capita growth in MENA region over 2000-2017 thanks to large public investments and political, institutional and sector reforms, along with measures to ensure macroeconomic stability.¹¹ This led to dramatic improvements towards eradicating extreme poverty; a sharp decline in the national poverty rate; increased life expectancy; greater access to basic public services, including universal access to primary education; and significant public infrastructure development. Morocco has demonstrated a strong capacity to respond effectively to shocks in recent years.¹² Economic growth is set to increase to 2.8 percent in 2023¹³, and poverty rate increase mitigated.¹⁴

Figure 1. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 2011-2021 (WGI, Percentile Rank)



In parallel, the Kingdom has made significant reforms in its governance and accountability framework since the Arab Spring. It responded to the wave of protests with a mix of

11 World Bank (2019) Morocco Country Partnership Framework

12 Morocco was hit hard in by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, severe droughts, and September 2023 earthquake in Al Haouz. World bank, Morocco Macro Economic Monitor, Fall 2023


13 World bank (2023) Morocco Macro Economic Monitor, Fall 2023

14 Ppoverty rate increased slightly, from 5.4 to 6.6 percent in 2020, (World Bank Macro Poverty Outlook, April 2021)

redistributive policies and institutional reforms. The Constitutional reform in 2011 set the stage for an overhaul of the governance system by, among others, empowering Parliament, enhancing the role of the Head of Government, strengthening the independence of the Judiciary and adopting regionalization as a democratic and decentralized system of governance.¹⁵

Despite these positive developments, there remains some pockets of instability and tensions. While those are significant reforms, the incremental changes do not translate yet in significant improvements in governance indicators (figure 2), Morocco has witnessed a stream of social and political protests and upheavals since 2016. These episodes have ranged from geographically localized protests in lagging regions to issue-based social mobilization by both low and middle classes. The COVID-19 pandemic also led to social unrest and protests including in the spring of 2021 when the government imposed a curfew during Ramadan, in July 2021 when the local police confiscated a food cart of a man from Sidi Bennour who wasn't wearing a face mask, and in late 2021 against the vaccination campaign.

Figure 2. Morocco: Evolution of World Governance Indicators (percentile rank)



Grievances and frictions relating to inequalities remain. Despite substantial growth, the country is constrained by a lack of inclusive development and the persistence of socio-economic vulnerability: 27.5 percent of the population remains at risk of falling into poverty¹⁶; job creation is slow, and unemployment high, particularly among youth and women; and there is room to improve regional and social gaps in public services delivery quality and access (e.g. urban-rural, lagging regions, rich vs. middle class and poor). Evidence shows that inequalities increased in 2021¹⁷ and

15 The 2011 Constitution was followed by legal framework change: (i) 2015 Laws on Decentralization, (ii) 2018 Law on Access to information and membership to Open Government Partnership followed by online participatory platforms and open data platform in 2021, (iii) Integrity framework and in particular the creation of the INPPLC (2015 law 113.12) and its Board (2021 Law 46.19).

16 Macro Poverty Outlook, MENA region, October 2020. World Bank

17 According to the World Inequality Database (<https://wid.world/country/morocco/>), the top 10 percent's share of the total wealth increased from 62.9 percent in 2020 to 63.2 percent in 2021.

Morocco boasts one of the highest Gini-coefficients in the entire North African region ahead of countries such as Tunisia and Egypt¹⁸. Feelings of relative deprivation and social exclusion are particularly strong in lagging regions, which historically stand at the periphery of the Kingdom's centers of power and economic activity.¹⁹

Moroccans reported high levels of dissatisfaction with government performance across a range of areas. According to the fifth wave from the Arab Barometer from October-December 2018, 72 percent of Moroccans were dissatisfied with the Government's capacity to generate employment; 80 percent were dissatisfied with the healthcare system; 57 percent of Moroccans were dissatisfied with the Government's performance in reducing regional inequalities, and the share goes up in lagging regions; and 67 percent were dissatisfied with the education system. There was also indicative evidence that opacity and corruption were breeding defiance towards the country's political and economic institutions. With regards to the public sector, 70 percent of Moroccans were thinking that corruption exists to a medium or large extent within the national state agencies and institutions (Arab Barometer 2018), and in the private sector, Moroccan entrepreneurs reported that corruption was the most important obstacle holding back private sector development in the country (World Bank Enterprise Survey 2019).

It is in this context, Morocco's New Development Model establishes citizen and institutional trust as a central tenant of the country's social contract. In his discourse of the 29th of August 2019²⁰, His Majesty King Mohammed VI announced his decision to establish a Commission to elaborate a New Development Model (NDM). The discourse put emphasis on the need to place Moroccan citizens *at the heart of the development process* and to "strengthen citizens' trust"²¹. The issue of institutional trust is at the core of the May 2021 report of the NMD.

Box 1: Trust in the New Development Model

The NMD prones to "*free the energies and restore trust to accelerate the march towards progress and prosperity for all*". Acknowledging the necessary paradigm shift to a "Strong State with a Strong Society", the NMD sets a new Trust framework around 5 dimensions to address the bottleneck identified during the NMD diagnostic: (i) Judiciary for civil liberties and security; (ii) Public sector Integrity; (iii) Independent economic governance institutions; (iv) Accountability, Evaluation and Access to Information; (v) Citizens Participation. Access to information, citizen engagement, public integrity and user-centric service delivery are elements defined by the NMD to strengthen trust between the State and the Citizen.

The COVID-19 global pandemic initially appeared as both a threat to institutional trust as well as an opportunity to strengthen trust through "building back better" in the post-COVID-19 era. At the time the work for this report was being planned, Morocco had been relatively

18 AUC/OECD. 2018. Africa's Development Dynamics 2018: Growth, Jobs and Inequalities, OECD Publishing, Paris/AUC, Addis Ababa, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264302501-en>.

19 Clementi, Fabio et al. Polarization and Its Discontents: Morocco before and after the Arab Spring. Policy Research Working Paper 9049. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.

20 <https://fr.le360.ma/politique/video-discours-du-20-aout-le-roi-detaille-la-feuille-de-route-du-nouveau-modele-de-developpement-196673>

21 Unofficial translation.

spared by the outbreak of the COVID-19 compared to its European neighbors.²² The Government of Morocco (GoM) had been able to initially contain the pandemic through a series of drastic measures. In January 2020, when the virus had not reached the continent yet, the Ministry of Health had already drafted a strategy to face the upcoming pandemic.²³ A particularly strong lockdown was enforced on March 20, 2020 and the GoM promoted social distancing measures. Fiscal actions were taken to compensate with the challenge of health infrastructures, not sufficiently equipped to face a pandemic.²⁴ Given the results obtained in 2020, the GoM generated high levels of public support and seemingly generated an increase in citizens' trust in public action. Like many other governments, the GoM initially appeared to have benefitted from a "legitimacy windfall" (Khemani 2020) in the first few months of the pandemic.²⁵

What is trust and why does it matter?

Trust is an important concept in the development literature where it is usually defined as a belief that a third party will act in a certain (usually beneficial) way. There are many definitions of trust in the literature (cf. bibliography). The definition that we use in this report comes from the OECD and it defines trust as "a person's belief that another person or institution will act consistently with their expectations of positive behavior."²⁶ The literature, reviewed in a 2020 World Bank report²⁷ by Kumagai & Iorio, usually distinguishes between social trust and political (or institutional trust).

- **Social trust** and the notion of radius of trust represents trust between individuals within society, across a range of social ties. The radius of trust can be measured by asking respondents to assess their degree of trust to a generalized 'other', and to a list of different categories of individuals, starting from those that are close (e.g. neighbors, friends and family) and extending those that are more distant (e.g. people met for the first time, foreigners, etc.).
- **Political/Institutional trust** refers to individuals' trust in different dimensions of a country's political system and a distinction needs to be made between trust in elected representatives and trust in institutions.

Strengthening institutional trust can lay the ground for public support to move forward reforms to which the NDM will hopefully give an impetus. Trust in public action and confidence in the future is a prerequisite to private investment and economic growth.²⁸ In Morocco, previous research estimated that low levels of trust in government created substantial constraints

22 At the time of the concept note, there was less than 5.65 deaths per million inhabitants and 224 infections per million inhabitants and a total of 8,734 infections and 212 deaths, mainly concentrated in urban areas (Casablanca, Tangier and Marrakech).

23 Plan national de veille et de riposte à l'infection par le Coronavirus 2019-nCoV

24 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the country spends 5.9 percent of its GDP in health when Algeria and Tunisia spend respectively 7.2 percent and 7.0 percent of their GDP (www.who.int). In terms of number hospital beds per 1,000 people, Morocco is also lagging behind its two main regional neighbors: The Kingdom offers 1.1 beds per 1,000 people, against respectively 1.9 and 2.3 beds for Algeria and Tunisia (www.databank.worldbank.org; Health Nutrition and Population Statistics, 2015).

25 Cf bibliography.

26 OECD, 2017, Guidelines on Measuring Trust, Éditions OCDE, Paris.

27 Kumagai, Saki, & Federica Iorio. 2020. Building Trust in Government Through Citizen Engagement. World Bank.

28 This literature is aptly reviewed in growth Fukuyama 1995, Knack & Zaccaro 2001, and Algan & Cahuc 2013.

to the country's growth.²⁹ Researchers have also shown that trust can also have a catalytic role for development by enhancing citizens' support to the allocation of public resources to policy goals.³⁰ Finally, trust can play an important role in times of crisis. In a 2020 paper³¹, Khemani argued that trust breeds legitimacy, which can be defined as "the ability of leaders to win compliance with new laws or public orders because people share a widespread belief that everyone is complying". This compliance is especially important in times of crisis, in particular to ensure acceptance of, and compliance with, policy measures that can be stringent, contentious or unpopular, including public health measures during health crisis such as contact-tracing, immunity testing, or quarantining.

Trust facilitates and secures interactions that are essential for development and a well-functioning society. A recent report from the Inter-American Development bank³² offers examples of these interactions: voters choosing candidates they believe will fulfill their electoral promises; firms investing in innovation expecting governments not to impose confiscatory taxes if innovation succeeds; employers paying workers even though they cannot be completely assured of worker effort, and workers exerting effort expecting they will be paid; citizens providing information to police, on whom they rely for protection; etc. The 2020 World Bank report also reviews the literature showing that trust in government — or political trust — is a necessary precondition for representative democracy and that the erosion of trust in government can have direct and severe consequences for the quality and ability of representative democracy, its institutions, and its actors.

Voice and accountability are important dimensions of institutional trust and legitimacy: trust needs to be critical, not blind, to generate positive spillovers for development. Trust should be understood as part of the triad of trust, distrust and mistrust, the three of which have different role in the stability and legitimacy of the political system: "Political trust (...) functions as the glue that keeps the system together and as the oil that lubricates the policy machine. Mistrust, or rather political skepticism, plays an equally important role in representative democracy. Critical citizens are more likely to engage in political activities and to keep office-holders accountable. When mistrust turns into widespread distrust and cynicism, then the quality of democratic representation itself may change."³³ As highlighted in a 2015 World Bank MENA report on Trust, Voice, and Incentives³⁴, the role of critical citizens in voicing demands and demanding accountability is central to enhancing the performance of politicians, public servants, and providers in providing quality public services. Citizens therefore need to "trust but verify" by evaluating the trustworthiness of political actors and agencies based on accurate information about their procedural and policy performance".³⁵

29 See Foa, Liverani & Chauffour 2017 in the bibliography.

30 Marien & Hooghe 2011, Chanley & al. 2000

31 Khemani, Stuti. 2020. An Opportunity to Build Legitimacy and Trust in Public Institutions in the Time of COVID-19 Research & Policy Briefs from the World Bank Malaysia Hub, No. 32. May 4, 2020. World Bank.

32 Keefer, Philip and Scartascini, Carlos, 2022, Trust: the key to social cohesion and growth in Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank

33 See the paper by Zmerli and Van der Meer from 2017 in the bibliography.

34 Brixi, Hana, Ellen Lust, & Michael Woolcock. 2015. Trust, Voice, and Incentives: Learning from Local Success Stories in Service Delivery in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank

35 <https://trustgov.net/aims>

Objectives and structure of the report

This report provides data and insights into the nature, trends and effects of trust in Morocco. It complements data on different dimensions of trust in Morocco that has been collected through global, regional and national survey firms and research centers, including the World Value Survey, the Afrobarometer Survey, the Arab Barometer Survey, the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA), the IRES (*Institut Royal d'Etudes Strategiques*) and the High Planning Commission (HCP). These surveys provided a good overview of the quality and evolution of trust in Morocco.³⁶ The present report aims to provide answers on remaining open questions and blind spots. First, the report aims to unfold the many dimensions of institutional trust at the sub-national level. Previous surveys have not had the sample size and granularity to look at trends within sub-national groups along geographical, social and economic dimensions. Second, given the importance of institutional trust for the government's strategy and the World Bank's engagement, the report substantiates known hypotheses on how policies can strengthen trust institutions, and identifies new promising hypotheses. Third, the report looks into the payoffs of institutional trust, including to facilitate policy compliance or fiscal solidarity – and therefore helps capture the gains related to investments in building trust. The study further explores the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on trust and, vice versa, the effect of trust on the pandemic response.

The structure of the report is organized around these questions related to the dimensions, sources and impact of institutional trust. Before turning to the results, Section II presents the survey's methodology and some summary statistics of the data collected. Section III provides a mapping of pockets of trust and distrust in Morocco by describing the levels of trust for major institutions and across the different geographic, economic and socio-demographic division of the Moroccan society. Section IV explores in depth the drivers of trust including those associated with citizens' satisfaction with the performance of the state, their perceptions of equity and integrity, and their everyday interactions with the public administration. Section V investigates the impact of trust on Moroccan society to further elaborate on the potential gains from strengthening institutional trust. Finally, Section VI concludes by synthesizing the key messages, policy recommendations and potential next steps for the work.

36 Cf. bibliography

II. DATA DESCRIPTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMING

The World Bank survey complements existing surveys and focuses mainly on unwrapping the many dimensions of trust, adding subnational granularity, investigating potential drivers to foster trust and assessing the impact of trust in public institutions on Moroccan society, including within the context of Covid-19. The objective of the survey was to test many existing hypotheses regarding trends in trust in public institutions, potential drivers that could be targeted by policy or projects, and the two-way interaction between trust and the COVID-19 pandemic and the government's response to it. The survey also captured many key socio-demographic information of respondents to assess how the many results disaggregated at the subnational level and across groups. The survey complements other surveys, such as the one from HCP, Arab Barometer, MIPA surveys, and other (cf. Annex 1). The Arab Barometer is used in the report to add perspective and make some observations on cross-country and time-series comparison. Finally, the development of the survey benefited from consultations with Moroccan experts, and feedback from members of the Commission for the NMD. The details of the survey as well as a description of potential limitations can be found in the annexes (cf. Annex 2).


The World Bank survey's main added value is the size of its sample which allows for better sub-national inference. International and regional measures used to assess trust have shortcomings linked to their coverage which is often uneven both across countries and over time. Most survey data come from a small sample (i.e., 1,000 to 1,500 respondents per country), precluding intra-country analysis and sometimes failing to be representative of the whole population. The World Bank's survey took place between the month of May and June 2021 and covered 6,000 respondents creating a nationally representative sample of respondents, age 18 and above, selected using the quota method (age, gender, socio-professional category), following stratification by region. This means that each region, age, gender, and income groups contained a relatively high level of respondents compared to other surveys described above. The survey was administered by phone via a CATI system. It should be noted that the survey was undertaken during COVID-19 pandemic and a few months before national and local elections in Morocco.

Conceptual framework: output vs. process-based trust

The analysis presented in the next section aims to provide insights on a critical question for policymakers: What are the potential drivers of institutional trust? Which dimensions of public action can bolster citizens' trust in public institutions? The existing literature points to three categories of trust drivers (Figure 3):

- **State performance**, including (i) the performance of public policy, in particular as it relates to economic policy (e.g. job creation, poverty reduction) and social service delivery (e.g. public health, public education) and (ii) the performance of public administrative services.
- **Transparency and public integrity**, including the transparent management of public funds, the perceived credibility of public speech, and the integrity of public servants.
- **Equity**, and in particular the equitable treatment of citizens by public institutions.

Figure 3 Potential drivers of institutional trust



Institutional trust can thus be based on repeated positive results (outcome-based) or perceptions of a fair and transparent process (process-based).

- **Outcome-based-trust** is understood as people’s trust in their governments “based on (past) performance and expectations.”³⁷; it stems from perceptions of the *outcomes of public action*, and the capacity of state institutions to deliver results – be they economic policy results or better public services.
- **Process-based trust** is determined by citizens’ satisfaction with *the quality of public processes*. People’s engagement experience with the government and their perceptions that these interactions are ruled by a fair and transparent process can influence the level of political trust. This includes citizens’ perceptions of the transparency of data, information and decision-making, the level, depth, and quality of citizen engagement (e.g., engagement type, frequency, and responsiveness) in the government’s decision-making process, or the fairness of policy-making and service delivery processes. There is a growing literature documenting the factors associated with increasing or eroding institutional trust. The relevance of citizen engagement in decision making throughout the public policy process has been extensively studied in recent years and scholars argue that public participation has a positive effect on the participants’ satisfaction with political outcomes and the legitimacy of procedure (see bibliography). The Inter-American Development Bank report also explores the drivers of trust and the approaches that could be taken to build it in Latin America and elsewhere. The report concludes that accountability, transparency and credibility are core drivers of trust. The report takes an institution-centered approach which emphasizes the emergence of trust when the political and institutional context promotes collective action to curb opportunistic behavior. The basic principle is that trust depends on information, regular interaction, and enforcement, whether moral, social, or grounded in formal accountability institutions.

37 Kumagai & Iorio 2020

Citizens' satisfaction with the outcome or process of public action can diverge. Individuals can be dissatisfied with the outcomes of a given policy while being satisfied with the decision-making process – assuming, for example, that decisions were taken transparently or in a consultative manner – in which case, the quality of the process may allow government to earn legitimacy and the confidence of citizens. Conversely, citizens might be satisfied with the quantity or quality of a given policy or service, while being dissatisfied with the ways in which budget or policy decisions relating to that policy or service were made.

Moroccans' perception of the government's management of the pandemic provides a good illustration of the potential dissonance between outcome-based trust and process-based trust. On the one hand, survey results³⁸ show that citizens were broadly satisfied with the services provided by the GoM during the crisis – e.g. about 2 out of 3 respondents reported being very or quite satisfied with measures taken to mitigate the socio-economic impact of the crisis such as social protection programs like RAMED³⁹ and Daman Oxygène⁴⁰. On the other hand, perceptions of the GoM's management of the crisis were more mixed: 58 percent of Moroccans believe that the resources allocated to the COVID-19 Emergency Fund have not been managed transparently, and about 41 percent doubt the credibility of COVID-19 related information shared by the GoM.

In Morocco, the analysis of the World Bank survey strongly suggests that process matters relatively more than outcomes for institutional trust. As we show below, outcomes do matter: citizens' positive perceptions of government performance are strongly associated with trust in institutions. For example, citizens who are satisfied with the GoM economic policies or with service delivery are more likely to report higher levels of trust in institutions. Yet, the quality of public policy and service delivery processes appears to have an even stronger leverage on trust. Citizens who perceive that the GoM or the administration acts in a transparent, credible and equitable manner are substantially more likely to trust institutions.

Context and recent historical perspective

Historically, 40 percent of Moroccans have expressed a lot of trust in the Government. As shown in figure 2, this number saw a sharp decline in 2018. This drop could reflect the stream of social and political upheavals since 2016. These episodes have ranged from geographically-localized protests in lagging regions (such as in the Rif, the coal mine protests in Jerada or the demonstrations sparked by water shortages in Zagora) to issue-based social mobilization by both low and middle classes (such as during the 2018 social media-led boycott of three market-dominating firms in the dairy, mineral water and fuel distribution sector).


38 Data presented in further detail in box 3 of section IV.c on drivers of trust

39 The Medical Assistance Regime (Régime d'Assistance Médicale - RAMED) is a Government of Morocco's social protection program ensuring access to health service to the poorest.

40 Damane Oxygene is a GoM program aiming at supporting small and medium enterprises during COVID-19 crisis


Figure 4. Trust over time in Morocco

I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them: Government
% saying they have a great deal or quite a lot of trust.



The World Bank survey took place at a specific time of the COVID crisis, and it is important to contextualize this period. The World Bank survey took place during the months of May and June 2021 so at a time around the last survey of Wave 6 of the Arab Barometer. As shown in figure 5 using Arab Barometer data, trust in the government at the time of the survey was down from an initial increase that followed the pandemic crisis and back to levels more in line with the historical average shown in figure 2. The initial increase in trust may potentially be linked to the concept of trust dividend describe by Khemani.

Figure 5. Trust in the government during the Covid-19 crisis



Data source: Arab Barometer wave 6 (2021)

III. MAPPING TRUST IN MOROCCO: POCKETS OF TRUST AND DISTRUST


a. Variations across institutions

Institutional trust in Morocco is multilayered: citizens report varying levels of trust in different components of the state apparatus (

Figure 6). Citizens' trust in institutions that are tasked with ensuring law and order is significantly higher than their trust in judiciary, executive or legislative institutions.

- Law and Order institutions are endowed with very high level of trust:** 97 percent of respondents trust the army a lot or quite a lot, and 73 percent of respondents report trusting the police a lot or quite a lot, indicating high levels of trust in the country's security apparatus. The justice system also fares well, with a 62 percent trust rate – though only 25 percent of respondents report high level of trust.
- In contrast, elected representative institutions, in place at the time of the survey, comparatively suffer from a relative trust deficit:** the executive garners the trust of 55 percent of Moroccans and the legislative 39 percent. Among trustful citizens, a small share report high levels of trust (respectively 15 and 12 percent of respondents for the executive and the legislative). The NMD highlighted the challenge of government's capacity to implement reforms and the Parliament to fulfil its mandate widened in 2011 to control and accountability, "missing the opportunity to strengthen its credibility in citizens' eyes".⁴¹

Figure 6. Variations in institutional trust




Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021)

41 NMD, annex 2, p. 280-281

The estimates of institutional trust presented in this section are broadly consistent with other survey data (including Arab Barometer, Afrobarometer and MIPA), indicating the strong reliability of survey results. The MIPA has tracked institutional trust in its three publications (MIPA 2020, MIPA 2021, MIPA 2022) and its trust estimates are broadly consistent with our findings – though they allow to capture variations across time, arguably related to specific political or electoral developments. MIPA, the Afro Barometers and the Arab Barometers (figure 7) consistently find that in Morocco, the security institutions experience the highest levels of trust followed by the courts and then the representative institutions. In 2020, MIPA found that Moroccans had overall very low levels of trust in institutions that govern them, especially the youngest respondents of the survey, such as 33 percent of trust in parliament, 23 percent for political parties, and 23 percent for the Government. However, they had really high contrasting levels of trust in non-elected institutions such as the police (78 percent) and the military (83 percent), which in the study enjoyed the highest levels of trust or confidence expressed by the surveyed citizens.⁴²

Figure 7. MENA region comparison of institutional trust




Source: Arab Barometer (2018)

From a regional perspective, Moroccans have an above average satisfaction of the overall government performance. Figure 8, produced using Arab Barometer data, indicates that overall government satisfaction in Morocco is third in the region, below Egypt and Jordan. In the figure,

42 The 2021 findings of this report confirm the conclusions that were reached in MIPA’s Trust in Institutions Index 2020, notably the lack of trust in the elected institutions. The MIPA 2022 found an overall increase in trust in elected institutions in the immediate post-electoral period) with around 69 percent of Moroccans reporting trust in government in the immediate aftermath of the election, against 50 percent in 2021 and 23 percent in 2020. This surge in trust in the immediate post-electoral period is likely to recess. It is important to note that while these variations in trust levels are important, they do not interfere with the validity of the inferential analysis of trust drivers and impact presented in the below sections.

we can also see that generally, security services have the highest satisfaction score among the measured state services. The only exception is Lebanon where security services satisfaction is below satisfaction for education services.

Figure 8. MENA region comparison of public performance satisfaction



Data source: Arab Barometer (2018)

b. Variations across groups: how does institutional trust vary along geographic and sociodemographic lines?

Institutional trust⁴³ is slightly higher in rural areas than in urban areas, with respectively 58 and 54 percent of the population reporting trust in government.

Institutional trust also has important sociodemographic correlates.

- **Men have considerably higher levels of institutional trust than women** (14 percent more report trusting executive institutions). This is congruent with women’s lower levels of civic engagement and political participation and could be a reflection of more systemic patterns of social and political exclusion.
- **There is a positive linear relation between age and institutional trust.** Levels of institutional trust increase with age, with about 50 percent 18-35-year-old reporting trust in executive institutions, compared to an average of 60 percent of individuals above 35 years old. This is consistent with the evidence that youth are more likely to participate in protests, vote less and emigrate more.

⁴³ Unless otherwise stated, institutional trust in this report refers to trust in the executive government as defined by the questionnaire question 3.2 (cf. annex 3), alternative specifications and robustness checks included also legislative and judiciary institutions.

- **There is a U-shape relation between income and institutional trust:** low- and high-income groups have higher trust levels than medium-income groups. Levels of institutional trust are disproportionately higher among the highest income group, with 81 percent of individuals earning above 25,000 dirhams per month reporting trust in institutions. Levels of institutional trust among individuals earning less than 3,000 dirhams per month reach up to 60 percent. Institutional trust plunges among individuals in the median income group (3,000-7,000 dirhams), with only 45 percent of individuals in this group reporting trust in institutions.⁴⁴

To provide an illustration on the scale of the impact of these socio-demographic factors, the statistical model approximates that **a high-income male age 51-54 has an 81 percent probability of trusting the government, compared to 46 percent for a low-income female age 20-24**. The graphs in Figure 9 show these socio-demographic variations in the levels of trust.

Figure 9 Geographic and socio-demographic variations in institutional trust




Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021)

44 This resonates with Clementi et al. (2019): while welfare inequalities are declining in Morocco, vulnerable and lower middle-class households have a relatively worse perception of the evolution of their living standards.

c. Variations in social trust and its relation to institutional trust

Low interpersonal trust is a regional trend in MENA countries. According to data collected by the Arab Barometer presented in figure 10, “trust in most people” in MENA varies from 4 to 34 percent, way below trusts in other religion or other ethnicities.

Figure 10. MENA Region Comparison of Interpersonal Trust



Data source: Arab Barometer (2018)


Moroccans place their trust in those close to them and have limited trust for most others.⁴⁵

Survey data indicates that 56 percent of respondents think that Moroccans trust each other. It also shows that interpersonal trust in Morocco is disproportionately geared toward in-groups, such as family, friend, and neighbors, rather than toward more distant groups such as individuals from a different religion, locality or nationality. Specifically, 94 percent report having high or very high levels of trust in their family; compared to 63 percent who report high or very high trust levels for friends, the percentage then decreases gradually for neighbors, for work colleagues, and goes

⁴⁵ Generalized social trust is measured in standard survey items by simply asking whether respondents feel that 'in general, people can be trusted' or whether 'you can't be too careful' whom you trust. This measure of interpersonal trust fails to differentiate between different types of social ties. In contrast, the notion of a radius of trust explores particularized trust, this is the trust that individuals have across a range of social ties. In surveys, the radius of trust battery questions ask respondents to assess their degree of trust not to a generalized 'others', but to a list of different categories of individuals, starting from those that are close (e.g. neighbors, friends and family) and extending those that are more distant (e.g. people met for the first time, foreigners, etc.). The "radius of trust" thus helps assess not only the degree of trust but also the extent to which individuals are willing to extend their trust beyond their narrow community, to embrace individuals on whom they have little prior information or moral claim.

as low as 28 percent for people of other locality or nationality.⁴⁶ This echoes a previous World Bank study (see figure 11).⁴⁷

Figure 11. The Radius of Trust in Morocco



Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021)

There is a strong correlation between social and political trust: 68 percent of individuals who strongly believe that Moroccans tend to trust each other also report trusting political institutions, this percentage is much lower for those who believe that Moroccans don't trust each other at all – a gap of 37 percentage-point. One explanation for that correlation is that interpersonal trust beyond in-group ties creates an environment conducive to the establishment of the rule of law and thus the building of trust in political institutions.

46 These figures are consistent with the survey estimates of MIPA, which has found that family is the most trusted social institution. The Moroccans surveyed feel that family (nuclear and extended) as well as close friends are the most trustworthy people within their entourage: 95.2 percent of Moroccans surveyed saying they trust family while 42.9 percent of respondents said they do not trust other Moroccans. The least trusted part of society is strangers or people whom they have met the first time (only 19.4 percent of respondents said they trust people they've met for the first time). These numbers in 2020 were consistent with those observed in 2021 and in 2022.

47 Foa, Roberto, Andrea Liverani & Jean-Pierre Chauffour 2017. « Chapitre 12 : Confiance, Coopération civique et Association », dans Développer le Capital Immatériel pour une Société plus Prospère, Durable et Inclusive.

IV. DRIVERS OF TRUST: HOW DO PUBLIC PERFORMANCE, INTEGRITY AND EQUITY CORRELATE WITH INSTITUTIONAL TRUST?


a. Taking stock of citizens' satisfaction with the performance, integrity and equity of Moroccan institutions

Satisfaction with public performance

Survey data suggests that the country's reformist drive has not yet fully delivered on citizens' expectations with regards to policy performance: levels of satisfaction with the government's policy performance indeed vary substantially across policy areas⁴⁸ (see Figure 12):

- Levels of satisfaction with security services are high: 60 percent of the population is quite or very satisfied with the maintenance of law and order in Morocco.
- 50 percent of the population reports being quite or very satisfied with water and sanitation services.
- In contrast, satisfaction with economic performance and the delivery of social services is relatively low: 27 percent of respondents are quite or very satisfied with the government's economic performance with regards to job creation or poverty reduction; and 30 percent of the population is quite or very satisfied with the management of public health and 35 percent with that of public education.

Figure 12. Satisfaction with government performance varies across policy areas



48 The caveat of the timing of the survey – during pandemic – is discussed in Box 1. Timing may have influenced the results, even though the methodology tried to mitigate this risk.

Perceptions of public integrity and policy credibility

Corruption and lack of transparency in the management of public resources remain core concerns of Moroccan citizens: 62 percent of respondents perceive that the management of public resources is not trustworthy, and over 91 percent believe corruption is very or quite frequent. In addition, only a third of the population is satisfied with GoM's efforts to fight corruption.⁴⁹

In addition, the perceived lack of credibility of official policy statements is a salient issue. Only 21 percent of respondents think that policy announcements are often or always followed by actions. This lack of policy credibility arguably reflects the gap between the expectations created by Morocco's ambitious reform agenda since 2011 and its effective implementation.

Perceptions of equitable treatment

Finally, feelings of inequity also mar state-citizen relations: 42 percent of respondents report having been treated inequitably by the public administration. In addition, over 81 percent of respondents believe that rich and influential individuals benefit from preferential treatment by the judiciary system. These figures are consistent with popular discourse: feelings of inequity have indeed been central in many recent protest movements (see Box 2).

These trends on inequity perceptions are corroborated by other survey data. According to 2018 data from the Arab Barometer, Moroccans report high levels of dissatisfaction with government's capacity to narrow the gap between rich and poor, and dissatisfaction is highest among the poorer segments of the population: 77 percent of those who have income levels below the median believe that the government is performing badly in that regard vs. 64 percent of those that have income levels above the median. Fifty percent of Moroccans are also dissatisfied with the GoM's performance in reducing regional inequalities. There is also a widely shared belief that institutions are skewed to benefit the well-off: the overwhelming majority of Moroccans believe that a well-off person is more likely to bribe public officials or use personal connections to avoid paying taxes or to escape justice (72 percent vs. 31 percent of ordinary citizens).

Box 1. Feelings of inequity and social protests in Morocco: the case of the Rif

The Rif crisis started off with an outrage against *hogra*, Darija for deprivation of dignity or humiliation associated with officials' abuse of power and corruption (and which has been opposed to *karama*, or dignity).

The crisis was spurred by the death of Mohcine Fikri in October 2016, a fish seller crushed in a garbage truck in Al Hoceima in an attempt to retrieve his 500-kilogram fish load, which had been illegally caught and confiscated by the police.

49 This diagnostic is shared by the *Instance Nationale pour la Probité, la Prévention et la Lutte Contre la Corruption*. Corruption perception figures are also in line with other survey estimates. For example, Afrobarometer survey data indicates that 85 percent believe at least some members of government are involved in cases of corruption, and 73 percent believe that government is doing badly at fighting corruption in the public administration (Afrobarometer Round 7, 2016). In the private sector, Moroccan entrepreneurs report that corruption is the most important obstacle holding back private sector development in the country (World Bank Enterprise Survey 2019). Over 78 percent of Moroccan citizens believe that at least some businessmen are involved in cases of corruption (Afrobarometer Round 7, 2016).

The NMD states that “*Al Hoceima’s events have highlighted fragilities: economic and social challenges exacerbate in small and medium towns, social intermediation crisis, local representatives’ failure, difficulties in building an effective policy dialogue with the evolving local civil society. Despite the widely shared acknowledgement of the fair and legitimate grievances, outburst and public disorder led to many police arrests and significant sentences.*”

b. Analysis of trust drivers in Morocco

How do these different dimensions of public action correlate with institutional trust?


Citizens’ positive perceptions of the performance, transparency and equity of public institutions all positively correlate with their trust in these institutions. Figure 13 reports the coefficients of an ordered logit regression of trust in government on relevant drivers including satisfaction with security services, satisfaction with health and education services, satisfaction with government’s economic performance (both in terms of job creation and poverty reduction), perceptions of the integrity of public institutions (including corruption perceptions, bribery incidence, and perceptions of transparency in resource management), policy credibility and perceptions of equitable treatment by the public administration and the justice system. In order to mitigate the risk of omitted variable, the regression controls for a wide range of geographic and socio-demographic variables including urban/rural location, age, marital status, number of household members, income level, education level, and employment status. The full results are available in Annex 2.

Results suggest that institutional trust in Morocco is tied to different dimensions of state performance, accountability and transparency.⁵⁰ Specifically:

- Integrity appears to play a particularly significant role in feeding trust in institutions.
- Policy credibility, or credible communication around policymaking, is also an important lever of institutional trust.
- Equity matters: perceptions that justice system or the administration treat citizens equitably feed trust.
- Satisfaction with public service delivery and economic performance are also trust generators – though for example the coefficient for economic performance is smaller than for other dimensions of government performance.

⁵⁰ An important caveat of these findings to keep in mind is that causality cannot be proved from regression alone and therefore that these observations are only suggestive evidence. The literature in bibliography also covers some experimental research that aims to document the causality channel.

Figure 13. Effects and Confidence Intervals of Key Drivers of Trust



Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021) Note: the graph plots the coefficients of an ordered logit regression of trust in government on various potential drivers, controlling for relevant geographic and socio-demographic variables. The full regression results are available in Annex 2.


The trust dividend associated with citizens’ positive perceptions of public action (both outcomes and process) is large. In practice, as illustrated by figures 13 and 14, citizens’ positive perception of public action is associated with an increase in the probability of trusting institutions of up to 18 percentage points.⁵¹ Figures 13 and 14 report the predicted probabilities of reporting trust in government for respondents with different levels of satisfaction with public policy performance. Figure 13 reports levels of institutional trust for individuals with different levels of satisfaction with public education services or government’s efforts at reducing poverty. Figure 14 reports levels of institutional trust for individuals with different levels of satisfaction with government’s efforts at fighting corruption and different levels of perceptions of the credibility of policy announcements.

Satisfaction with government performance (outcome) is associated with higher levels of institutional trust. First, as shown in Figure 13, satisfaction with public service delivery has a multiplier effect on institutional trust: individuals very satisfied with education services are more likely to report trust in executive and legislative institutions than those who are not satisfied at all, by up to over 13 percentage points (i.e. 50 percent of individuals who are not satisfied at all with public education services report trusting executive institutions vs. 63 percent of individuals who are very satisfied with these services; for legislative institutions, the gap in citizens’ trust ranges from 34 percent for individuals who are not at all satisfied with public education services to 45 percent for those who are very satisfied). Second, satisfaction with the government’s economic performance is also positively associated with institutional trust: individuals who are satisfied with

51 The estimated predictions are derived from a logit model regressing trust on all drivers and controlling for relevant geographic and socio-demographic variables. All other predictors are held at their mean. Full results are presented in Annex 2.

the government's efforts at reducing poverty are more likely to report trusting executive institutions by up to 8 percentage points (52 percent to 60 percent).


Figure 14 Trust dividends of better government performance



Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021). Note: the estimated predictions are derived from a logit model regressing trust (coded as a binary variable) on satisfaction with education services and controlling for other trust drivers as well as relevant geographic and socio-demographic variables. All other predictors are held at their mean.

Satisfaction with the quality of public processes – and in particular with policy credibility and public integrity – is associated with a higher trust dividend than satisfaction with policy outcomes. As shown in Figure 15, integrity and credibility clearly matter for institutional trust. Efforts at enhancing public integrity have a positive pay-off: individuals who are satisfied with policy efforts to curb corruption are up to 14 percentage points more likely to trust the government. Individuals who believe that policy announcements are often or always followed by actions are more likely to trust legislative and executive institutions by 16 to 18 percentage points, compared to those who do not believe in the credibility of policy announcements. In addition, equitable treatment by the public administration comes out as a critical driver of trust in Morocco: individuals who perceive to have been fairly treated by the public administration are more likely to trust institutions by up to 9 percentage points.

Figure 15 Trust dividends of integrity, credibility and equity




Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021). Note: the estimated predictions in each figure are derived from a logit model regressing trust (coded as a binary variable) on, respectively, satisfaction with government's corruption fight, perceptions of policy credibility and perceptions of equitable treatment by the public administration, and controlling for other trust drivers as well as relevant geographic and socio-demographic variables. All other predictors are held at their mean.

Box 2. Trust during the COVID-19 pandemic: outcome vs. process-based trust

Citizens' perception of the government's handling of the COVID crisis is a good illustration of the possible divergence between satisfaction with performance/outcomes and satisfaction with process. Moroccans are indeed generally satisfied with the performance of public services and programs during the COVID crisis. About 70 percent of Moroccans are satisfied with the overall management of the COVID crisis. Satisfaction is highest for the vaccination campaign (84 percent are very or quite satisfied) and lowest for the management of COVID patients in the public health system (58 percent are very or quite satisfied). Moroccans are also broadly satisfied with the measures taken to mitigate the socio-economic impact of the pandemic: about two thirds of those who expressed an opinion are very or quite satisfied with RAMEd and Daman Oxygène.

Figure 16. A gap between satisfaction with performance vs. process in the management of the COVID crisis



Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021)

In contrast, perceptions of COVID-related communication and resource management are more mixed. About 58 percent of Moroccans believe that the resources allocated to the COVID Emergency Fund have not been transparently managed, and about 41 percent doubt the credibility of COVID-related information shared by the Government. These results align with the warnings of the 2020 report of the INPPLC which highlighted that the exceptional pandemic government measures lack conditions to ensure transparency and oversight, especially with regard to public procurement, the granting of aid and compensation, in addition to exemptions, for which the GoM has not been held accountable.

In practice, these mixed perceptions have translated into stable levels of trust in institutions. While in the initial months of the pandemic, the GoM, much like many other governments⁵², appeared to benefit from a “legitimacy windfall” (Khemani 2020)⁵³ as of the time of this survey (May/June 2021) it appears that this windfall had dissipated. Yet, it remains notable that the government managed to safeguard its trust capital – an ability that sets it apart from other Maghreb countries.

Table 1.. Stability of trust levels during the COVID crisis

Since the beginning of the COVID crisis, would you say that your trust in the following institutions has...		
	Government	Army
Increased	→ 21,5%	19,1%
Decreased	→ 23,5%	7,0%
Remained stable	→ 55,0%	74,0%

Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021)

52 Edelman Trust Barometer (2020), NYU-CIC (2020)

53 In April 2020, the rate of satisfaction with government’s response to the COVID crisis reached 96 percent, compared to a mean of 88 percent in North Africa and 72 percent in Africa as a whole (PERC 2020). Trust in public action surged: in April 2020, 83 percent of Moroccans expressed a complete, or mostly complete, trust in government information about the COVID 19 (compared to 71 and 66 percent, in North Africa and Africa respectively), and 80 percent reported that they were somewhat or very confident in their ability to get help immediately if they fell sick.

c. Competence, integrity or fairness? How citizens' lived experience with the public administration shapes institutional trust

Despite these reform efforts, survey evidence on citizens' perceptions of the public administration is mixed. Over the past decade, the GoM has made substantial progress in rolling out the hard and soft infrastructure required to reform the Moroccan public administration and enhance its performance and efficiency.⁵⁴ Yet, positive perceptions of the public administration's competence and satisfaction with administrative procedures coexist with negative perceptions of transparency and integrity.

- On the one hand, 77 percent of individuals who have completed an administrative procedure in the past three years report their satisfaction with the quality of services.⁵⁵ In addition, a large majority of respondents believe that public agents are on average or for most of them competent (61 percent).
- On the other hand, citizens' perceptions of the transparency and integrity of public agents are more negative: only about 12 percent of respondents believe that most public agents are receptive to citizens' demands or that they behave in a transparent and accountable way.
- Furthermore, informal connections remain central to the relation between citizens and the public administration: 24 percent of respondents stated having relied on an intermediary to facilitate their latest administrative procedure.
- In addition, 59 percent of respondents believe that gifts, bribes and favors are always or sometimes necessary to get a better treatment during administrative procedures. These results are in line with other World Bank survey results, including estimates from the 2019 Enterprise Survey that 38.4 percent of Moroccan firms report being expected to give gifts to public officials to get things done.

Citizens' experience with administrative procedures appears to impact institutional trust (figure 17):

- **Higher satisfaction with the quality of administrative procedures is associated with higher levels of institutional trust:** Individuals who report being satisfied with the quality of administrative procedures are more likely to have higher institutional trust than

54 The 2011 Constitution laid the ground for building the legislative and institutional architecture needed for an open and responsive digital government in Morocco. The principles of transparency, participation and accountability are indeed enshrined in the Constitution and the Constitution's Title XII ("Good Governance") – article 157 – emphasizes the need to ensure an effective and transparent public administration. These provisions have been translated into encompassing legislative reforms, including the 2015 Decentralization Law (Loi Organique sur la Régionalisation Avancée), the 2018 Law on Access to Information (Loi 31-13 relative au droit d'accès à l'information) or the 2020 Law on the Simplification of Administrative Procedures (Loi 55-19 relative à la simplification des procédures administratives).


55 These results are in line with MIPA's Trust Index III (2022) which finds that "67 percent of respondents expressed an overall satisfaction with the performance of the public administration (23 percent are very satisfied and 44 percent are somehow satisfied). Overall, Moroccans are most satisfied with the infrastructure, accessibility and personal of public administration institutions, and least satisfied with the time needed to complete a task as well as the possibility to present formal complaints."

individuals who are dissatisfied (the probability that they report trust in executive institutions is higher by up to 10 percentage points).

- The need to rely on intermediaries to facilitate administrative procedures appears to harm institutional trust:** Individuals who have had to rely on an intermediary to facilitate administrative procedures have substantially lower levels of trust in institutions (-4 percentage points) than those who did not rely on an intermediary – though the difference is not statistically significant.

There is also indicative evidence that petty bureaucratic corruption is a major factor of distrust: Individuals who believe that gifts, bribes and favors are always or sometimes necessary to obtain a better treatment from the public administration are substantially less likely to trust institutions. Fifteen percent more of those who perceive that gifts, bribes and favor are never necessary report trust in institutions, than for those who think they are always necessary.

Figure 17. Citizens' experience with the public administration and institutional trust



Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021). Note: the estimated predictions in each figure are derived from a logit model regressing trust in the executive (coded as a binary variable) on, respectively, satisfaction with administrative procedures, bribery perceptions and reliance on intermediaries, and controlling for other trust drivers as well as relevant geographic and socio-demographic variables. All other predictors are held at their mean.


d. What factors matter most for trust-building across groups?

An important policy question is whether correlates of trust weigh differently across subgroups. In particular, it would be important to know whether some dimensions of public action are more likely to be associated with an increase in trust among groups with lower levels of institutional trust. As illustrated in section II, institutional trust varies across geographic and socio-demographic groups, such as women, youth and individuals with a median income level who report lower levels of trust in institutions. We therefore subset the analysis by gender, age and income groups, and regress trust in government on relevant drivers, controlling for geographic and socio-demographic variables for each group including (similar to the previous ordered logit regression model). The graphs in Figure 18 plot the size of the effect from the coefficients of that regression, subdivided by groups.

Data shows that, across these different groups, selected issues appear to matter differently for the strength of citizens' trust in institutions:

- From a gender perspective, integrity issues appear to matter more for women while economic performance drives institutional trust more forcefully for men.
- In terms of income groups, satisfaction with human development services and integrity weigh more for individuals below median income, while economic performance and policy credibility appear to matter more to those above it.
- From a generational perspective, there is little significant difference in the direction and strength of the relation between trust and different indicators of state performance, transparency, credibility or equity across age groups, except for integrity and economic performance, which appear to matter differently for young people.

Figure 18. Drivers of trust disaggregated by sociodemographic group



Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021) Note: the graphs plot the coefficients of ordered logit regressions of trust in government on relevant drivers, controlling for relevant geographic and socio-demographic variables, disaggregated by groups.

V. IMPACT OF TRUST: WHY DOES BUILDING TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS MATTER?

First, there is indicative evidence that institutional trust is a critical factor for policy compliance. Trust is understood to breed legitimacy, which can be defined as “the ability of leaders to win compliance with new laws or public orders because people share a widespread belief that everyone is complying.”⁵⁶ As such, it is expected to be a precious resource to ensure acceptance of, and compliance with public policy, including stringent, contentious or unpopular policies such as contact-tracing, immunity testing, or quarantining in the context of the COVID crisis management (see annex 1 for detailed literature review).⁵⁷

Second, there is evidence that trust in institutions breeds social solidarity. Trust has been argued to be critical for citizens’ support to the allocation of public resources to policy goals.⁵⁸ In the context of Morocco, institutional trust can play a role in consolidating public support to move forward the reform agenda laid out in the NMD. In particular, it is a critical resource for the strengthening of the welfare state. The financing of this reform, which is at the core of the NMD and of the current GoM’s program, will require expanding the tax base and therefore increasing citizens’ willingness to pay taxes.

Third, the data suggests that institutional trust goes hand in hand with more positive attitudes toward the future. Such attitudes are determinant for economic growth. As argued in the literature, trust in public action and confidence in the future is a prerequisite to private investment and economic growth⁵⁹ - and previous research has shown that an increase in trust in Morocco could yield a trust dividend of about US\$7.4bn over the course of a decade.⁶⁰

Survey evidence provides an opportunity to test these hypotheses In Morocco. This evidence shows that institutional trust in the Moroccan context breeds higher levels of policy compliance and social solidarity as well as more positive attitudes toward individual and collective future.

56 Khemani, Stuti. 2020. An Opportunity to Build Legitimacy and Trust in Public Institutions in the Time of COVID-19. Research & Policy Briefs from the World Bank Malaysia Hub, No. 32. May 4, 2020. World Bank.

57 Arguably, political trust might be more important in the second phase of the crisis than in the first one: during the initial phase of the COVID outbreak, compliance to restrictive measures was in large part motivated by fear (See Stoker et al. (2020) on political trust and compliance in Great Britain and Fukuyama (2020)).

58 Marien, Sofie, and Marc Hooghe. 2011. “Does political trust matter? An empirical investigation into the relation between political trust and support for law compliance”. *European Journal of Political Research* 50: 267–291

59 See: i) Fukuyama, F., 1995, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, New York: Free Press.

ii) Zak, Paul and Stephen Knack. 2001. “Trust and Growth,” *Economic Journal* 111, pp. 295-321.


or iii) Algan, Yann and Pierre Cahuc. 2013. *Trust, Growth and Well-being: New Evidence and Policy Implications*. IZA DP No. 7464

60 Foa, Roberto, Andrea Liverani & Jean-Pierre Chauffour 2017. “Chapter 12: Trust, Civic Cooperation, and Association”, in *Growing Intangible Capital for a more Prosperous, Sustainable and Inclusive Society*

a. Trust and policy compliance

The Arab Barometer survey data shows that **institutional trust, compliance, and COVID-19 policies go hand in hand** (see Figure 19). Individuals with higher levels of trust in government are more likely to abide to social distancing than individuals who do not trust government (92 percent vs 97 percent). Individuals with higher levels of trust in government are more likely to be willing to get vaccinated (85 percent vs 92 percent).

Figure 19. Trust and COVID policy compliance



Data source: Arab Barometer (Wave 6). The estimated predictions are derived from a logit model regressing social distancing and willingness to get vaccinated on trust and controlling for relevant geographic and socio-demographic variables. All other predictors are held at their mean.

b. Trust and social solidarity


Individuals with higher levels of trust in institutions also tend to display more social solidarity. Previous research has argued that tax morale is particularly low in Morocco, and in particular that Moroccans have a much less positive attitude towards paying taxes than other countries in MENA region, considering its level of income, and argued that trust in government could have a positive effect on tax willingness.⁶¹ The data presented here provide empirical evidence that trust matters.

- On average, 35 percent of individuals would agree to pay more taxes to finance a social security system that is universal.
- Individuals with higher levels of institutional trust are more likely to be willing to pay more redistributive taxes by an average of 18 to 23 percentage points, compared to the individuals with no trust, while only 25 percent of individuals who do not report trusting the government are willing to pay more redistributive taxes, but this figure goes up to 46 percent for individuals with high levels of trust.

61 TAFRA. 2019. Pourquoi payer des impôts ? Une analyse quantitative du consentement à l'impôt au Maroc

- As for trust in parliament, individuals who do not trust the institution have a 26 percent probability of being willing to pay more redistributive taxes, versus 49 percent of high-trust individuals (see Figure 20).

Figure 20. Trust and willingness to pay more redistributive taxes




Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021). The estimated predictions are derived from a logit model regressing tax willingness on trust and controlling for relevant geographic and socio-demographic variables. All other predictors are held at their mean.

c. Trust and aspirations

Institutional trust also correlates with Moroccans' attitudes toward their individual and collective future. Overall, about half of the respondents believe that they have the freedom and control over their future and more than 3 out of 4 think that people can change society through their choices and actions. But this varies across groups with low and high trust levels: Individuals with higher levels of trust in government are more likely to believe that (i) they have freedom and control over their own life by up to 24 percentage points compared to individuals with low trust levels and that (ii) people in their country can change society through their individual choices and actions, by up to 16 percentage points. Among with individuals who do not trust institutions, 37 percent believe they have freedom and control over their life and 71 percent think that people in their country can change society through their individual choices and actions, while these figures go up to 62 percent and 88 percent respectively among individuals with high levels of trust (see Figure 21).

Figure 21. Trust and aspirations



Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021). Note: The estimated predictions are derived from a logit model the outcome variables on trust and controlling for relevant geographic and socio-demographic variables. All other predictors are held at their mean.

VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

a. Key findings

The indicative findings of this report validate trends from other surveys on trust in institutions and provide empirical evidence to support standard and new hypotheses on the drivers and impact of trust. Keeping in mind the limitations of the analysis in terms of causality and time coverage, the key indicative results of the report include:

- Institutional trust in Morocco is multilayered and shows important variations between institutions and across socio-demographic groups. Citizens' trust in institutions that are tasked with ensuring law and order is significantly higher than their trust in judiciary, executive or legislative institutions. Individuals living in rural areas, male and older segments of the population have higher levels of trust in all institutions.
- Policy outcomes and process both matter for increased trust, in line with the NMD aiming at putting the citizens at the center of government action, both as users and engaged citizens. However, the gain is potentially greatest for improvements in process-based trust. Citizens who perceive that the government or the administration act in a transparent, credible and equitable manner are substantially more likely to trust Moroccan institutions.
- Citizens' experience with administrative procedures appears to impact institutional trust. Higher satisfaction about interactions with the public administration is associated with higher levels of institutional trust. In contrast, individuals who perceive petty corruption to be prevalent are substantially less likely to trust institutions.
- Institutional trust and compliance with COVID-19 policies go hand in hand and individuals with higher levels of trust in institutions also tend to display more social solidarity.

This report also sets forth some counterintuitive findings related to perceptions of public action and institutional trust across socio-economic groups.

- ***Trust in institutions is not correlated in a linear way with poverty:*** institutional trust according to households' income level follow a U shape, where households with the lowest income and the highest income express the highest trust in institutions.
- ***Improved access to services generates a lower trust dividend than could be expected.*** Trust in government and satisfaction in social and economic sectors are below the levels that could be expected given the objective improvements in infrastructures and access to services over the past two decades.
- ***Law and order institutions benefit from high levels of trust across the board.*** While this is coherent with trends in the MENA region as well as other perception survey trends over time in Morocco, the relative consistency of high trust levels across socio-economic and geographic category is surprising compared to justice sector indicators. Over the past

few years, indicators on judiciary performance have slightly decreased.⁶² According to World Justice Project 2022 indexes, Morocco ranks globally near the average of MENA countries (5/8) and globally 94 out of 140 countries. While some sub-indicators are encouraging, there is room for improvement as Morocco ranks nearly last for example on access to civil justice (7/8 in MENA), corruption in civil justice and criminal justice (6/8 and 7/8 in MENA), and timeliness of criminal justice (7/8 in MENA).⁶³

- **Civil servants are perceived as “competent but potentially suspicious”:** High level of satisfaction with the administrative services provided by civil servants and positive perceptions of their competence coexist with low perception of civil servants’ integrity.

Box 4: Areas for future investigation

Four sets of hypotheses, to be explored further through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, could explain these patterns: expectations, automatic thinking, proximity to power, and social trust:

- **Expectations.** The dissonance between actual improvements in socio-economic indicators over the past two decades and the low level of satisfaction with services and trust in representative institutions could be explained by the gap between expectations and reality. While access to services improved, expectations increased at a higher rate, generating a relative frustration. This interpretation seems to be relevant for the socio-economic groups “moving up the social ladder”: (i) the median class, i.e. households with median income, which has the lowest level of trust. Mistrust could be the result of disappointment due to high expectations, fostered by education, improvement in living conditions compared to their parents or archetypes of success in media.⁶⁴ Similarly (ii) women, who expressed a perception of their life being better than their mother, and youth, could have higher expectations than what they feel they can achieve in the current context.
- **Fast-thinking & historical legacy.** High level of trust and satisfaction in some public institutions could reflect positive automatic associations for institutions charged with symbolic meaning. Depending on their framing, subjective perception questions can be particularly sensitive to “fast-thinking”, as defined by Kahneman.⁶⁵ Fast-thinking is the system of the brain to form thoughts that is automatic, frequent, emotional, stereotypic, and unconscious – while “slow-thinking” is typically effortful, infrequent, logical, calculating, and conscious. Responding to a question on their trust in justice or security institutions “in general”, it is possible that respondents used fast thinking. If the

⁶² According to Economic Freedom Index: after strong improvement since 2015 (40/100), property rights indicators decreased (from 67.5/100 in 2021 to 57.8 in 2022) similar to judicial effectiveness increase since 2016 (41.9/100) to 51.2/100 in 2021 then down to 32.7 in 2022.

⁶³<https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Morocco/>).

⁶⁴ This is consistent with the findings on middle class perceptions on their own situation, in Fabio Clementi, F., Khan, H. A., Molini, V., Schettino, F., & Soudi, K. (2019) *Polarization and Its Discontents Morocco before and after the Arab Spring*, Policy Research Working Paper 9049, October, World Bank.

⁶⁵ Kahnemann, Daniel (2011) *Thinking Fast and Slow*

questions were framed differently, based on actual recent personal experience, and in a manner that would allow them to use slow thinking processes, results may have been more nuanced. History of state-building is often associated with law and order functions, in Europe⁶⁶ as well as in Morocco.⁶⁷

- **Proximity to Power.** The low levels of trust in Rabat/Sale region, despite good development indicators, and the high levels of trust in poor and rural regions could be explained by the proximity or distance to power. In Rabat, citizens are close to public institutions, more exposed to political life and symbolic expressions of ruling authorities (from central government and parliament buildings to public officials in suits) and could be more prone to relative frustration. Alternatively, citizens' perception in regions far away from visible expressions of central government might be more sensitive to the "law and order" and State symbolic visibility in local institutions (security forces, territorial administration).
- **Social trust.** Social trust is very high with family and friends and very low beyond that circle. This would explain the suspicion expressed toward the public administration as well as the perceived need to call on personal networks to get things done, despite perceptions that civil servants are competent and satisfaction in the service delivered. These tendencies might be heightened by the fact that bureaucratic processes and rules are not yet fully impersonal, as they should be according to a Weberian definition of effective bureaucracies. In that context, despite the observed reality of competence and the quality of services delivered, high levels of "social trust" may concur with low levels of institutional trust and affect trust in civil servants.

b. Policy implications

Government efforts to improve integrity and policy credibility could have the highest return on building trust. Given the recent increase in access to public services and the middle-income status of Morocco, reforms to improve integrity and policy credibility is the area with the most room for improvement. Those areas are also overall in line with the findings of the 2021 Report on the NMD, a decade after the 2011 revision of the Constitution, and setting the 2035 development horizon for Morocco. Trust is central in the national compact which the NMD aims to consolidate. Also, the NMD ambitions would require additional financing needs, something that increased trust could help through higher tax compliance and stronger entrepreneurship. Finally, citizens engagement is central to the NMD, recommending increased citizen engagement on service delivery and decentralization.

66 Tilly, C. (2002). War making and state making as organized crime. In *Violence: A Reader*. C. Besteman (Ed.). New York, NY: New York University Press

67 Kably, M. (2011) *Histoire du Maroc: réactualisation et synthèse*, Rabat: Institut Royal pour la Recherche sur l'Histoire du Maroc; Daadaoui, M. (2011) *The Makhzen and State Formation in Morocco*; Rivet, D. (2012) *Histoire du Maroc*, Broché; Hibou, B. & Tozy, M. (2015) *A Weberian reading of the trajectory of the state in Morocco*, *Sociétés politiques comparés*, 37, sept.-dec.

Delivering the 2011 integrity legal framework should strengthen trust in public institutions.

Morocco's indicator on integrity is comparable to Middle Income Countries but has been declining over the past few years. The 2011 revision of the Constitution created a momentum for stronger policy on integrity, responded to citizens' pressure.⁶⁸ The limited implementation of those commitments might explain some of the lower scores on trust. While the law 46.19 revising the mandate of the independent body (INPPLC, *Instance Nationale pour la Probité, la Prévention et la Lutte contre la Corruption*) has been finally adopted in mars 2021, and effective only since the nomination of INPPLC board in October 2022. Similarly, stronger legal framework announced in the past decade with regards to illicit enrichment, whistleblower protection (especially civil servants), conflict of interest or asset declaration have not been adopted yet.⁶⁹

Intensifying digitalization of services to reduce red tape, in addition to improve access and efficiency, would strengthen perceptions of integrity and credibility of public institutions.

Consolidating the digitalization of service delivery, both to simplify service delivery and reduce bureaucratic red tape and opportunities for rent-seeking behavior, is key. Morocco made significant progress (e.g. e-procurement, e-filing and e-payment for tax, e-petitions, personal identification papers). Efforts could be intensified, especially for social protection services, and justice services, where room for improvements is the highest, and connected to either priority sectors for citizens (health, education) or to integrity reform agenda.

Credibility cannot wait for outcomes: increased citizens' engagement, especially in health and education, could help strengthen both process- and outcome-based trust in public institutions. Given that health and education are priority sectors for Moroccans and the most associated with higher trust levels, efforts on improving access and quality of health and education service delivery would help build trust in public institutions. Yet, there is a tension to manage between the mediatic and political short-time (reform announcement) and actual impact on service delivery (reform implementation): credibility cannot wait for outcomes. It would be key to combine measures that strengthen the transparency and participation aspects of reform in those sectors as follows:

- communicate in the short-term on tangible short-term results, building trust in short term that government efforts are delivering, e.g. adoption of measures already matured or renovations of schools and health centers,
- engage citizens in policy-making so that citizens are informed on the on-going government efforts, and the complexity. The objective is to manage expectations and mitigate the relative frustration effects on trust;
- consider reforms that involve citizens further in service delivery, e.g. as parents or users providing feedback or express priorities. Citizens' participation tends to improve service delivery quality thanks to increased accountability and citizens' contribution, contributing to build mutual understanding and trust in public institutions;
- foster change management within public administration to ensure the implementing agencies are pro-active agents of change and resistant to change.

68 In particular the articles 27, 155, 158, 159 and 167 of 2011 Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco

69 Cf. INPPLC (2022) Rapport Annuel 2021

Also, addressing the challenge of government coordination and communication would help improve credibility. Inter-ministerial coordination is a key challenge highlighted by the NMD. Ensuring effective inter-ministerial coordination of a flagship government multi-sector priority in line with citizens' priority sectors could be key to both show a capacity to deliver on complex commitment and inform citizens. The GoM already has experience in fostering inter-ministerial coordination on cross-sectoral reforms⁷⁰ that could be harnessed, applied to another flagship reform in health, education or social protection.

Consolidating the Open Government reform will also help build the pillar for improved transparency, communication and credibility of public institutions and hence trust. While Morocco committed since the 2011 constitution to increased transparency and openness, the momentum is recent. Morocco joined the Open Government Partnership in 2018 with a clear roadmap, and implementation could be intensified.⁷¹ The Law on Access to information has been finally adopted in 2018⁷², and a few participatory platforms initiated (e.g. for public petitions, grievance redress mechanisms, and open data). Those tools are still in their infancy and the legal framework could be improved further to align with best practices. Another next step is the implementation of the 2020 Open Data Readiness Assessment action plan.

Increased transfers to municipalities – while ensuring their transparent and effective use – may have a ripple effect on both, trust in public institutions and service delivery. This survey did not include data on trust in local government, but other surveys (MIPA trust index, Arab barometer index) include citizens' perception of local governments. Those show a higher trust in local elected government, compared to central elected governments. Literature also widely acknowledges the benefit of decentralization enabling a direct interaction between citizens and local governments, enabling local government accountability and feedback loop. In the context of Morocco, implementing further the Charter of Deconcentration and the Regionalization agenda, combined with continued support to municipalities performance and monitoring could help.

Targeting the pockets of mistrust, for improved citizens engagement and service delivery quality would help improving trust. Access to public services substantially improved over the past two decades in Morocco, translating in better socio-economic indicators, with the caveat of COVID-19 pandemic impact. The survey findings showed that improving service delivery, especially in social sectors is associated with higher trust. Thus, improving service delivery and especially the quality of service where the room for improvement is high would foster trust in institutions. More specific attention to service delivery quality for the “median” class in terms of household income would have the highest return on trust.

70 CNEA for improving Doing Business and INDH focusing on Human Capital

71 The OGP 2021-2023 action plan implemented at 34 percent, and covers five pillars: Open justice; Citizen participation; Open local governments; Inclusion and equality; and Transparency and quality of public services

72 Dahir n° 1-18-15 du 5 jourmada II 1439 (22 février 2018) portant promulgation de la loi n° 31-13 relative au droit d'accès à l'information

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ANNEX 1. LIST OF COMPLEMENTARY SURVEYS IN THE PAST 3 YEARS

Table 2. Recent complementary surveys on trust

Institution or Agency	Sample size and coverage	Dates
Afro Barometer	Round 7: 1000 participants, representative nationally, no coverage of COVID-19, in person survey. Round 8: 1,200 participants, representative nationally, in-person, covid coverage.	Round 7 2019 Round 8 2021 (February)
Arab Barometer	Wave VI is composed of three separate parts: Surveys in all Parts I, II, and III have approximately 1,000 respondents per country. Fielding mobile phone surveys permitted to conduct research that was in compliance with local ordinances and social distancing protocols during the COVID-19 pandemic. This way of fielding differs from their long-standing face-to-face approach	Wave 6 Part 1: Q3 2020 Part 2: Q4 2020 Part 3: Q1 2021
Policy Center in collaboration with (Sciences po, Harvard Business School, and Bocconi University)	A series of 3 surveys (of around 1000 participants each). The questionnaire was submitted online or over the phone. Covered COVID-19.	Wave 1: June 2020 Wave 2: July 2020 Wave 3: September 2020
MIPA Trust index I, II, III	MIPA conducted three waves of Trust Index by Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI). The first wave on the parliament and beyond, and covered 1000 people. The second wave on a crisis as an opportunity to build trust covered 1,400 people. The third wave on public administration during the era of pandemic covered 1,500 people.	Trust Index I: Oct. 2019 Trust Index II: July - August 2020 Trust Index III: Oct. -Nov. 2021
Partnership for Evidence-Based Response to COVID-19 (PERC) survey	a telephone survey with two waves of 1,200 people conducted by telephone, focused on the pandemic.	Wave 1: Feb. 2021 Wave 2: Sept. 2021
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung - KAS PoDiMed 2020	Nationally representative public opinion surveys that included approximately 1,800 respondents. On trust in Political Institutions in the Middle East and North Africa	Between October 26 and December 8, 2020
HCP also tracks the Index of Household Confidence	3000 households per quarter focused on household's economic and financial situation.	Quarterly

ANNEX 2: DESCRIPTION OF THE SURVEY AND THE SURVEY SAMPLE

The World Bank survey's main added value is the size of its sample which allows for better sub-national inference. International and regional measures used to assess trust have shortcomings linked to their coverage which is often uneven both across countries and over time. Most survey data come from a small sample (i.e., 1,000 to 1,500 respondents per country), precluding intra-country analysis and sometimes failing to be representative of the whole population. The World Bank's survey took place between the month of May and June 2021 and covered 6,000 respondents creating a nationally representative sample of respondents, age 18 and above, selected using the quota method (age, gender, socio-professional category), following stratification by region. This means that each region, age, gender, and income groups contained a relatively high level of respondents compared to other surveys described above. The survey was administered by phone via a CATI system. It should be noted that the survey was undertaken during COVID-19 pandemic and a few months before national and local elections in Morocco.

All inference on trust based on surveys faces some empirical caveats. According to the World Bank's 2020 report by Kumagai and Iorio, measuring trust through surveys has two major drawbacks. First, when analyzing survey data, it is difficult to determine whether the coefficients measure what they are supposed to measure or whether trust is correlated with other — possibly omitted — determinants of legitimacy, compliance, and so on. Second, surveys do not measure actual behavior, but intentions and are therefore highly subjective. Differences in wording of trust questions need to be interpreted carefully, as it might influence how respondents answer. The Afrobarometer, for example, asks about how much “trust” respondents have in government. The WVS asks about “confidence” in a list of “organizations” including government. In this case, “confidence” may connote competence dimensions more, while “trust” may instead relate more to integrity and value dimensions. Cultural aspects, such as language, of the survey responders and methods need to be taken into consideration. The Afrobarometer measure of trust, as far as the formulation of questions go, is one of the more accurate among international surveys. It asks more specific questions about government performance in various sectors or policy areas. However, the standard Afrobarometer survey instrument collects information only in the interviewer's native language, which may not be the survey respondents' native language. The World Bank's 2021 survey does not allow for time-series analysis and focuses more on unwrapping variation within a fixed cross-section but other surveys can provide information on the evolution of trust in recent years.

Table 3. Trust survey sample

Age range	Data from HCP 2014			Sample data N=6008		
	Percentage Total age group	Percentage Men	Percentage Women	Percentage Total age group	Percentage Men	Percentage Women
18-19 years old	3%	50%	50%	4%	36%	64%
20-24 years old	7%	50%	50%	12%	49%	51%
25-30 years old	7%	49%	51%	19%	40%	60%
31-34 years old	5%	49%	51%	10%	43%	57%
35-40 years old	6%	49%	51%	19%	45%	55%
41-44 years old	4%	49%	51%	9%	65%	35%
45 -50 years old	5%	49%	51%	13%	47%	53%
51-54 years old	3%	49%	51%	6%	69%	31%
55-60 years old	4%	51%	49%	5%	51%	49%
61-65 years old	2%	51%	49%	2%	62%	38%
Over 65	4%	48%	52%	2%	71%	29%
Total	100%	49%	51%	100%	48%	52%

In addition, the sampling ensured representativity between urban and rural populations. According to the HCP 2014, 41.12 percent of the population was rural. In the sample, 41.5 percent classified as rural. This addresses a common criticism of other widely used surveys in the region which disproportionately target urban population.

ANNEX 3: RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Table 4. Drivers of trust (ordered logit regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Institutional trust	Institutional trust	Institutional trust	Institutional trust	Institutional trust	Institutional trust	Institutional trust	Institutional trust
Satisfaction with security services	0.681*** (0.0613)							0.247*** (0.0533)
Satisfaction with social services		1.003*** (0.0760)						0.243*** (0.0860)
Satisfaction with water and sanitation			0.740*** (0.0399)					0.269*** (0.0543)
Satisfaction with economic performance (Index)				0.938*** (0.0788)				0.164** (0.0741)
Integrity perceptions (Index)					1.476*** (0.103)			0.615*** (0.102)
Equity perceptions (Index)						0.538*** (0.0563)		0.181*** (0.0546)
Policy credibility							0.698*** (0.100)	0.331*** (0.0617)
Region	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban/rural	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Gender	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Marital status	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of HH members	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Education	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Employment status	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
/cut1	0.614 (0.420)	0.714** (0.350)	0.658* (0.384)	0.271 (0.437)	1.092** (0.455)	-0.202 (0.376)	0.0786 (0.371)	2.748*** (0.476)
/cut2	1.549*** (0.425)	1.684*** (0.359)	1.611*** (0.395)	1.217*** (0.455)	2.063*** (0.468)	0.657* (0.391)	0.969*** (0.370)	3.812*** (0.497)
/cut3	3.717*** (0.452)	4.006*** (0.390)	3.826*** (0.513)	3.501*** (0.480)	4.349*** (0.471)	2.687*** (0.467)	3.077*** (0.395)	6.317*** (0.483)
Observations	5,916	5,916	5,916	5,916	5,916	5,916	5,916	5,916

Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Data source: World Bank survey on trust (2021). The Satisfaction with Economic Performance Index averages two variables: satisfaction with the improvement of the poor's living conditions and satisfaction with job creation. The Integrity Perceptions Index averages variables measuring satisfaction with the fight against corruption; perceptions that bribe, gifts or favor need to be made to get a better treatment by the public administration; confidence in the government's management of public funds; and perceptions on the frequency of corruption. The Equity Perceptions Index averages variables measuring perceptions of equitable treatment by the public administration and perceptions that wealthy individuals are treated equitably by the court system. The dependent variable "Institutional Trust" presented in this model refers to trust in the executive.

Regression coefficients show the direction and strength of the correlation between different drivers and the level of institutional trust. A positive coefficient indicates a positive correlation: as perceptions of government performance, integrity or equity improves, trust in institutions also increases. Larger coefficients indicate larger increases. The standard deviation in parentheses under the coefficient indicate statistical significance with a lower standard deviation relatively to the coefficient meaning a higher statistical significance. All regression coefficients reported in Table 1 are positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level (except for economic performance at the 0.05 level).

Results are robust to various model specifications, including operationalizing the dependent variable as legislative institutions; or an index of representative institutions (executive and legislative). They are also robust to the inclusion of additional controls, including a control for individuals' intrinsic positive attitude. Interestingly, the coefficients are broadly similar whether the dependent variable is trust in the executive, in the legislative or an index of both. The main difference is that credibility of policy is more strongly associated with trust in the executive than the legislative and that satisfaction of services is more strongly associated with trust in the legislative than the executive.