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Operations Evaluation -
Board of Executive Directors (6-11)
June 1973 - October 1975

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Operations Evaluation - Board of Executive Directors

30069307



ROUTING SLIP		DATE November 19, 1975	
NAME		ROOM NO.	
Mr. Christopher Willoughby		G1050	
<i>OE) - Executive Director</i>			
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FOR ACTION		PER YOUR REQUEST	
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INITIAL		RECOMMENDATION	
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REMARKS			
<u>Board Meeting: October 28, 1975</u> <u>Operations Evaluation --</u> <u>Follow-up Check List</u>			
FROM	<i>670</i> G. F. OWEN	ROOM NO. A1232	EXTENSION 3427



Record Removal Notice

File Title Operations Evaluation - Board of Executive Directors		Barcode No. 30069307		
Document Date 19 November, 1975	Document Type Board Record			
Correspondents / Participants				
Subject / Title IBRD / IDA Joint Directors' Meeting - October 28, 1975 Operation and Impact of the Bank's Evaluation System (R75-194) Follow-up : Check List of Individual Suggestions				
Exception(s)				
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		<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Withdrawn by Vlada Alekankina</td> <td>Date 31-Aug-12</td> </tr> </table>	Withdrawn by Vlada Alekankina	Date 31-Aug-12
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OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Robert S. McNamara, President

DATE: June 18, 1973

FROM: John H. Adler, Director, Programming & Budgeting

SUBJECT: Plans for Board Discussion on Operations Evaluation

Mr. Shoaib and I have discussed Mr. Isbister's recent interventions regarding operations evaluation work and his call for a Board discussion. We have had the attached draft memorandum from you to the Executive Directors prepared by Mr. Willoughby. You will note that the memorandum not only describes the OED work program for FY1974 and proposes discussion of OED reports by the Joint Audit Committee, but also implicitly answers four of the five substantive points made about Operations Evaluation at the recent Board budget discussion —

- do country studies (Mr. Isbister)
- scrutinize Bank procedures and time-expenditures (Mr. Sen)
- supervise the supervision (Mr. Mekki)
- have more local participation (Mr. Kastoft).

It does not deal with the fifth point — Mr. Sen's suggestion that the OED should look into selection, appointment and briefing of consultants — because you asked me to do that with Mr. Baum, and so told the Board.

I would recommend distribution of the attached memorandum before the end of the month, with a view to discussion at a Board meeting early in the new fiscal year.

cc: Mr. Shoaib
Mr. Willoughby

CONFIDENTIAL

June __, 1973

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS

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SUBJECT: The Work of the Operations Evaluation Department

1. As I indicated in the FY1974 Budget Memorandum (SecM100-73-100), I have decided to make the present Operations Evaluation Division of the Programming and Budgeting Department a separate department with effect from July 1, 1973, and to place it, along with the recently created Internal Audit Department, under Mr. Shoaib, who would have no operational responsibilities. I think that this move will confirm and clarify the independence of our operational auditing and evaluation work, and that we have now developed sufficient experience in this difficult but important field to warrant taking such a step. As shown in the budget documents I am not proposing at this time to increase the professional staff complement of the evaluation unit above the eight that it has had for most of FY1973.
2. The new Department, like its predecessor Division, will continue to concentrate predominantly on trying to establish whether Bank activities, especially projects assisted, have fulfilled their announced purposes, how they might have contributed more to development, and what lessons they suggest for future policies, practices and procedures of the Bank Group. Completed projects will be the main field of study because it is impact after completion of construction that we need most to know more

about. Prior to completion it is hard to be very much more definitive than the original appraisal report on actual impact. On the other hand it is important that the lessons which emerge in evaluation and audit studies should be related back, as far as possible, to Bank procedures and practices and, in particular, to current procedures and practices rather than those that may have prevailed five or more years ago when a project now completed was originally approved; only in this way can the lessons derived have real operational relevance. In some ways it is more important for us to know about the merits of the Bank's contribution to a project rather than the merits of the project itself, although the first cannot of course be identified without first establishing the second. The Operations Evaluation Division has been trying to increase the proportion of its attention devoted to the Bank's effect on projects studied and to the implications of problems identified for current Bank policies, procedures and practices, and this will be seen in several of the five reports due for completion and distribution to the Executive Directors in the coming months. The Operations Evaluation Department will continue to emphasize, especially in its major studies, both assessment of the Bank's contribution to operations studied and resultant suggestions for improvements on current Bank performance.

3. I outlined to the Executive Directors in April (SecM73-203) a scheme for preparation of simple but systematic audit reports, to be called

* Evaluation Studies of Selected Highway Projects, Bank Lending to Development Finance Companies and the First Kenya Education Project, and Audit Studies of the Calcutta Port Projects and the First Venezuela Highway Project.

Project Performance Audits, on all projects supported by the Bank and IDA about one year after completion of loan/credit disbursement. These reports should help substantially, and on a broad basis, to fill the gap in our knowledge as to whether projects supported by the Bank and IDA have fulfilled the objectives on the basis of which loans and credits were approved.

4. It is my view that it is this broad, if fairly simple, view of the results of a large number of projects in different fields and different countries that we are presently more in need of than further comprehensive studies of Bank performance in country context. The Operations Evaluation Division's study of Bank Operations in Colombia (R72-131) was a most stimulating and useful exercise, and it was economical, given the large number of projects that could be covered there. But there are few, if any, other countries which have seen such a wide range of Bank activity already come to fruition. This situation is changing fast so that I can well imagine further country studies, perhaps more highly focussed on the key issue of project identification and selection, being very appropriate a year or two from now. But our greatest need now is to do comparative project evaluation studies in fields of importance in the Bank's planned future operations, as several Directors suggested in discussion of the Colombia report last year, and to get under way a system for independent reporting on all projects soon after they are completed.

5. In its first year of operation the new Operations Evaluation Department will therefore divide its effort about 50/50 between the Project

Performance Audits and measures to get an effective system going in this area, on the one hand, and major evaluation studies and follow-up to previous studies, on the other. Project Performance Audits will be prepared on each of the 25 projects for which loan/credit disbursements were completed in the first half of FY1973 (see attached list). The main evaluation study will deal with past Bank lending for agricultural credit, focussing on programs supported by the Bank in selected countries where loans/credits for this purpose have been fully disbursed, most likely Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan (or Philippines) and Uruguay. A major effort will also be made on the first phase of a study investigating the spread of administrative, managerial and technical innovations from Bank-assisted projects to other projects and institutions in a country or region, and designed to establish whether and how such 'spread effect' occurs and how it could usefully be strengthened; the projects envisaged as the basis for the first phase of this study are those in the power field in Colombia, agricultural credit in Mexico and/or Uruguay and ports in India and/or Spain.

6. Effective operations evaluation work depends to a great extent on cooperation both from the Bank's borrowers, and other institutions in borrowing countries, and from the operating departments of the Bank itself; and it imposes on the time of each. The Operations Evaluation Division has benefitted from excellent cooperation in almost all cases, and I hope that, in the interest of further strengthening the Bank's overall performance, the new Department will be afforded the same cooperation.

Previous policies of maximizing contacts with entities in borrowing countries and relying as much as possible on them for studies and consultant assistance, within the limits of the crucial principle of independence, will be continued; the major study of highway projects which is now nearing completion has been based to an important extent, as was the Colombia evaluation study, on work contracted with local consultants, and it is envisaged that the same pattern will recur, particularly with the agricultural credit study planned for FY1974.

7. In view of workload considerations I propose that, in the future, evaluation and audit reports, while continuing to be circulated to all Executive Directors for information, should be sent to members of the Joint Audit Committee for discussion, both of the substance of the reports and of the directions of our evaluation work. This would also help to establish an effective link between the Board and the internal, but independent, unit carrying out the studies.

Attachment

Attachment

Projects for which Project Performance Audits are to
be prepared in FY1974

<u>Loan/Cr. No.</u>	<u>Name of Project</u>	<u>Disbursement Period</u>	<u>Amount Disbursed (US\$ mln)</u>
Cr. 49	Bangladesh First Education	1964-72	4.0
Cr. 107	Bolivia Beni Livestock	1967-72	2.2
Cr. 172	Botswana Shashi Engineering	1970-72	1.7
369	Colombia Medellin Power	1964-72	38.9
451	Colombia DFCs	1966-72	24.6
Cr. 84	Ethiopia First Education	1966-72	7.8
557	Guinea Boke Railway/Port	1968-72	64.5
541/Cr. 116	Honduras Rio Lindo Hydro	1968-72	11.8
519	Israel DFCs	1967-72	14.9
Cr. 103	Jordan Agricultural Credit II	1967-72	3.2
Cr. 64	Kenya Tea Development	1964-72	2.4
Cr. 113	Malawi Lilongwe Ag. Dev.	1968-72	6.5
659	Mexico CFE Power	1970-72	125.0
571	Morocco DFCs	1968-72	11.4
597	Pakistan Gas Pipeline (North)	1969-72	8.0
Cr. 106	Pakistan Lahore Water Supply	1967-72	1.9
507	Spain Railroads	1967-72	50.0
284/Cr. 2	Sudan Roseires Irrigation	1961-72	32.2
440	Sudan Railways	1965-72	31.0
455	Thailand Highways	1966-72	31.0
512	Tunisia DFCs	1967-72	9.3
Cr. 109	Uganda Tea Growers' Corpn.	1967-72	3.3
395	Yugoslavia Railways	1964-72	70.0
469	Zambia Highways I	1966-72	13.3
563	Zambia Highways II	1968-72	10.4

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. M. Shoaib, Vice President

DATE: June 15, 1973

FROM: C. R. Willoughby, Chief, Operations Evaluation *CRW*SUBJECT: Points Made About Operations Evaluation in Recent Board Budget Discussions

You asked me to go through the transcript of the Board Budget Discussion and pull out the points made relating to the Operations Evaluation unit and its work. I discuss below the main points that seem to have been made.

A number of Directors simply confined themselves to general support of Operations Evaluation and of the organizational upgrading proposed: Messrs. Artopeus, Bull, van Campenhout and Reynolds. But there were five more substantive points made and these I discuss in turn below.

Mr. Isbister complained that decisions about Operations Evaluation seemed to have gone ahead of the Board, and he called for a general Board Discussion of the subject. (Following further exchanges, Mr. McNamara has asked John Adler to prepare with you a plan for discussion in the Board or the Joint Audit Committee, and John and I have prepared some suggestions for this.) Mr. Isbister pointed out that Operations Evaluation work is taking significant amounts of time, not only of the staff of the Operations Evaluation Division itself, but also of other Bank departments and member Governments. He also found it rather odd for the Operations Evaluation unit apparently to crystalize on the project approach to audit/evaluation at a time when the Bank was reorganizing itself in areas. Also, although his remarks in this respect are unclear, he seemed to be suggesting that some of the reports on individual projects recently prepared have only yielded conclusions that should have been already well known to those in the operating departments concerned with the project. Commenting on the question of the country approach, Mr. McNamara said that the Colombia study was "an extremely complicated, costly, politically delicate operation" and that the Bank had not found a way to duplicating it in any other countries in the forthcoming fiscal year. (While the individual project approach has never been particularly favored by the board, the idea of doing evaluation studies which deal with projects in a single sector in different countries -- such as we are now doing for highways and DFCs and plan next year for agriculture credit -- was strongly promoted by many Executive Directors at the last major Board Discussion, in connection with the Colombia report.)

Dr. Sen urged that the Operations Evaluation unit should look into the whole question of selection, appointment and briefing of consultants for Bank projects and the possibility of making greater use of consultants from developing countries. He referred to an article that he had recently circulated on consultants by Dr. Hochschild. He said that several Bank staff members had complained to him that, with some important exceptions, consultants working directly for the Bank or for borrowers have come to be appointed on an old boy network. Expatriates were being hired to do jobs that local people could do with guidance from one or two outside experts. The foreign consultants were not always being exposed to the ideas about development that Mr. McNamara had been propounding, so that their approach could be at variance

with ours. Many ordinary consultants had an interest in making a simple problem look complicated. On this whole topic Mr. McNamara said that he was going to ask Mr. Baum to join Mr. Adler in a study that the latter had already started on the subject of consultants and to extend the scope of the study to cover many of the points raised by Dr. Sen.

Dr. Sen also suggested that Operations Evaluation work could do more to deal with important questions of Bank efficiency. He thought that a performance audit by the Operations Evaluation unit could help show whether all the detailed work undertaken by the Bank in connection with projects was really necessary and whether some of it might not be reduced, with commensurate cost savings. The Bank should look for simpler procedures, greater delegation of power (especially to resident missions) and less of a perfectionist approach. Among the "special facets" listed in the budget documents, he thought that bid packaging and coordination with other international organizations may be taking too much time in project work. He said that institutional subjects such as fiscal policy and utility tariff structure should probably be considered at a high level and in a general manner rather than taking up excessive amounts of time by piecemeal treatment in connection with individual projects. The Bank should encourage more project preparation within the borrowing countries themselves and help directly to train the people responsible by associating them in Bank appraisals. He also took the view that too many loan conditions were made conditions of effectiveness rather than being left for fulfillment during implementation. (In my view, one of the most important points on which a number of Directors converged in the discussion of the Colombia report was that the Operations Evaluation Division should give more attention to the value of the Bank contribution to the project -- as opposed to the sheer success of the project itself -- and to the details of Bank procedures and practices; we have been trying to increase the emphasis on this aspect, because study of past projects can contribute to answering some aspects of questions such as those Dr. Sen raises even though it cannot establish details of the amounts of Bank staff time that were originally spent on the projects.)

Mr. Mekki felt that the Operations Evaluation unit should supervise the supervision, in the sense of making spot checks on the majority of projects while they were in the course of execution. In his view this would have the advantage of identifying mistakes at an early enough stage that they could be corrected while the project was still in progress; it would at the same time generate information useful for later work. Mr. McNamara did not comment on this suggestion. (Mr. Mekki seemed to feel quite strongly about the need for such a detached 'supervision of the supervision,' and it might be worth establishing more precisely what he had in mind. For Mr. McNamara has been quite firm in keeping us out of projects before they are completed, partly perhaps because of some rather irresolvable arguments that arose in connection with a few of the projects we analyzed in Colombia. I think that the

Central Projects Staff would also consider this its job rather than ours, although of course it does not quite have the detachment that Mr. Mekki may have been most concerned about. There is no question that this would be an extremely delicate function. At one point some of the McKinsey group were suggesting that it should be ours, but this must ultimately have been discarded.)

Mr. Kastoft raised the issue of local participation in evaluation studies, saying that his experience was that participation of local authorities and local expertise greatly enhanced the quality and interest of ex-post evaluations, bringing out valuable facets not identifiable by outsiders. Mr. McNamara referred to the considerable reliance on local people, governmental and non-governmental, contracted and donated, for the Colombia study. As regards the future, he said that whenever the government was willing to have local people participate, we would encourage it, and when consultants were needed, we would use local consultants whenever possible. (We have indeed sponsored and used a lot of locally contracted regional development studies for the comparative highway project evaluation just now being completed and we plan to rely a good deal on local expertise for the surveys that will be necessary in next year's agriculture credit study.)

cc: Mr. J. Adler
Mr. Israel

DOCUMENT OF
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EDS 73-17

June 12, 1973

FROM: The Secretary

ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGETS 1973-74

Attached hereto, as requested by Dr. Sen, is a copy of the statement made by him at the meeting of the Executive Directors held on June 5, 1973.

AD
J.H.A.
~~1/15~~
5 AC
~~2/15~~
~~4/15 (p.3)~~
6 FY 74
Budget
3 CRW (p.3)

*No reason to
clean up, finance
you are just
a "national"....
ugh!*

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Document Date 05 June, 1973	Document Type Board Record			
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Exception(s)				
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Technical Assistance and International Development: A Need for Fundamental Change

Current development strategies of the technical assistance "establishment" perpetuate the Third World's dependency on developed countries and are not responsive to the real needs of underdeveloped societies. Fundamental changes are needed in the present assistance system.

Steven F. Hochschild

Center for Studies in Education and Development, Harvard University

□ The authors of the "end of the decade" development reports (i.e., Jackson, Pearson, Peterson, *et alii*) devoted considerable attention to the technical assistance process. Yet these reports failed to reckon with some very real political, social, and psychological problems which the technical assistance process poses for the Third World.

Basically, the authors of the "end of the decade" development reports reflected a worldview of underdevelopment that perceives underdevelopment as primarily a condition of absolute and relative economic deprivation. This is the view of the conventional technical assistance expert, who attempts to solve what he sees as the specific problems of deprivation. If people have less than enough to eat, he attempts to feed them, or if people are less than well, he attempts to cure or prevent disease. Some experts work at a grander scale. If the economy does not provide a minimum standard of living, then such an economy is designed and implemented. If the economic resources are scarce, as they indeed are, there are planners (and I am one by training) who try to allocate as efficiently as possible what resources there are. In short, traditional technical assistance attempts to solve perceived problems of absolute and relative deprivation through economically-linked, discrete inputs and allocations.

However, a growing number of Third World spokesmen, such as Julius Nyerere, Celso Furtado, Victor Urquidi, and Paulo Freire, observe that the description of the condition of underdevelopment as absolute and relative deprivation is only partially adequate. It does not take into account the most significant dynamic dimension of underdevelopment—the underdeveloped world's interrelationship with the rich and powerful countries of the world. Underdevelopment is a *relational*

condition rather than simply a condition of absolute and relative material deprivation; it is the historical by-product of the dynamic relationship between the poor countries and the rich and powerful "developed" countries. A country is underdeveloped because of its past and present relationship with the developed countries. This interrelationship has economic, political, social, cultural, and psychological components.

Thus I would suggest, along with many of the "new thinkers" in or about the Third World, that we need to focus deliberately and carefully upon the relationship between developed and underdeveloped societies in such a way as to cast light on the full social and human consequences of this relationship, a relationship which has meant, as the sociologist Andre Gunder Frank rightly observes, that ". . . the entire social fabric of the underdeveloped countries has long been penetrated by, and integrated into, the world embracing system of which it is an integral part."¹

One intellectual consequence of this particular worldview has been a growing preoccupation with the role of power in the dynamics of underdevelopment and development—that is, the role of power in the *relational* dimension of underdevelopment. Many Third World spokesmen have been developing the hypothesis that it is the cultural, social, political, economic, psychological, and intellectual *powerlessness* that is, in fact, the most manifest condition of an underdeveloped

STEVEN F. HOCHSCHILD is currently Director of Planning Services of the new Community College of Vermont system. The CCV is a non-campus-based, open access system, which is innovating education delivery systems and educational processes, and which utilizes existing community resources in order to reach rural Vermonters without other access to higher education. Mr. Hochschild expects to receive his doctorate from Harvard University's Center for Education and Development in early 1973.

¹ Andre Gunder Frank, "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology," *Catalyst*, no. 3 (Summer 1967), p. 32.

people. In this view, *powerlessness* over the forces that determine one's personal and historical destiny is a primary condition of underdevelopment and perpetuates the dependency of an underdeveloped people. Denis Goulet, a very articulate philosopher of development ethics, associates the condition of "powerlessness" and "dependency" with the broader concept of vulnerability: "Vulnerability is exposure to forces one cannot control. In the present context it is the inability of underdeveloped societies to determine the outcome to their own responses to pressing social forces."²

Here I would distinguish between two forms of power and control that contribute to the condition of powerlessness, dependency, and vulnerability of the Third World. These are forms of power and control exercised by the dominant "developed" societies over the "underdeveloped" societies:

1. *Normative Control*: psychological, intellectual, and cultural control over "norms" and values that determine behavior.

2. *Structural Control*: political, institutional, legal, and bureaucratic control of actions.

It follows from the hypothesis advanced above that it would be useful to examine the dimension of power in the relationships between the powerless and poor and the powerful and rich people of the earth and how this relationship relates to the condition of underdevelopment.³

An additional consequence (or perhaps cause) of the dissenting worldview of underdevelopment that I have described is an alternative hierarchy of values to guide development actions. The unstated or unwritten values of many conventional technical assistance development strategies are largely material and economic (when they are not simply ethnocentric). The economists took charge of designing development strategies in the Third World after World War II, and since then there has been a growing confusion between the "means" and the "ends" of development strategies. Notwithstanding the lip service given to extra-economic goals, development strategies that may have been designed to attain social and human objectives have become strategies designed to attain economic objectives and have been measured in economic terms. The devel-

opment models as they presently exist are essentially economic growth models. Social and cultural factors have become part of the "means" for attaining economic "ends."⁴

This trend has led, unfortunately, to the perversion of the whole concept of "development"—a situation that some individuals operating within the technical assistance process have begun to recognize.⁵ Modern economists do not seem to have in their professional "toolkits" the tools to design and put into operation development strategies that have essentially social and human objectives. In fact, economists feel uncomfortable in this area.

Nyerere is representative of the Third World spokesmen who have attempted to reverse the trend of defining development objectives in material and economic terms. He has defined development in human and social terms (in terms of social justice, for example). He has reassigned economic strategies to the role of primarily serving human and social objectives. Nyerere has placed highest value upon the intangible human assets such as self-esteem, dignity, self-reliance (independence rather than dependence), and he has emphasized programs that improve the quality of social relationships. Nyerere's current development efforts are efforts at making operational his value priorities. He invests his resources and actions in this hierarchy of values rather than simply investing in the rhetoric of these human objectives.

The point I have attempted to make thus far is that the differences between worldviews and value systems of the conventional technical assistance establishment and of the Third World dissenters are extremely profound. We are speaking of different sets of assumptions and sentiments, of a different "paradigm" of development. We are literally speaking of "two cultures" of development workers.

Conventional development personnel, who serve the traditional technical assistance agencies, exert vast control over the technical assistance process, and thus exert considerable influence over the development process itself. This power is exerted through their virtual monopoly over the following most important "assets" of the technical assistance process:

² Denis A. Goulet, *The Cruel Choice, An Ethical Approach to Development* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), vii. I would recommend another work by Mr. Goulet which relates very closely to many of the concerns expressed in this article: *The Myth of Aid* (New York: IDOK North America, 1971).

³ I have examined this condition of "normative" powerlessness in greater detail in my unpublished doctoral qualifying paper: "An Analysis of Certain Variables That Operated on the Peace Corps-Tanzanian Aid Relationship 1961-1969," Center for Studies in Education and Development, January, 1971.

⁴ A good review of development models since World War II appears in Chapter 29 of Volume III of Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama* (New York: Pantheon, 1968).

⁵ Recent studies (some of which were presented at the last SID Conference, May 1971) indicate that even when GNP in a LDC is increased, a more equitable distribution of income is not necessarily achieved. In fact, it often worsens. The unattained goal of the economist is not economic growth, but economic justice.

1. *Material resources, techniques, and delivery systems.*

2. *Manpower: monopolization of occupational access to technical assistance roles and the social status system of international personnel.*

3. *Worldview and value hierarchy: monopolization of the legitimizing mechanisms that confer validity and credibility to worldviews and value hierarchies.*

Many aid agencies are large bureaucracies and technocracies. These features and the features of monopolization generate an organizational type that is not fully responsive to real needs, is not accountable to its clients, and is self-serving, self-perpetuating, bewildering to those on the outside, and stifling to many who work on the inside.

The trend toward further internationalization and institutionalization of aid is not necessarily a step in the right direction. Although ostensibly it is a move away from unilateral and politicized aid—and this is seen as desirable—this trend can only bring with it more complete monopolization and bureaucratization, further diffusion of authority and accountability, and less flexibility in approaching development problems we still do not understand.

Monopolization of the aid "assets" cannot but contribute to an increasing sense of economic, political, social, cultural, and intellectual powerlessness of the poor people of the world, and, hence, to the dynamic condition of underdevelopment itself. In the next sections, I shall attempt to outline briefly how monopolization of the aid "assets" and control of the technical assistance process contributes to the Third World's sense of powerlessness and dependency.

1. *Monopolization of Material Resources, Techniques, and Delivery Systems*

Technical assistance is a segment of the vicious circle of recipient country dependency. Technical assistance becomes a necessary development input because the prerequisites for obtaining capital aid usually include sophisticated feasibility studies, planning documents, and operational technical advice. The current process of aid-giving merely perpetuates the dependence upon technical expertise (whether or not the technical expertise is provided by a foreign expert or a Western-trained national). The mode of operation of experts is to deal with problems at levels of complexity that only the experts are trained to understand. In addition, experts are preoccupied with highly technical solutions to the problems of development.

One consequence of this approach is the inadvertent transfer of the occupational and social structure and values. As a result, a leader of a developing country whose goals are to gain cultural, social, and intellectual control over his country's historical evolution and to foster egalitarian values and social structures will find that

the technological trend is likely to frustrate the achievement of these goals. The structures of dependency and vulnerability that keep people dependent upon technology's leaders inhibit goals of human liberation. (The industrial nations are beginning to cope with these problems themselves!)

One of the most important criticisms of the current technical assistance establishment is that it is controlled by the rich and powerful nations who have ultimate power over the purse strings. Whether or not technical assistance is further internationalized, it is structurally impossible for the technical assistance establishment to challenge the international vested interests of the donor countries. This fact alone can discount considerably anyone's faith that the current systems of technical assistance will be able to do anything to solve fundamental problems of underdevelopment. Aid efforts are palliatives. We must reckon with this, or we cannot expect technical assistance to contribute to substantive solutions to the problems of underdevelopment.

Moreover, the technical assistance establishment is itself a vested interest quite distinct from the vested interests that support technical assistance efforts. The technical assistance agencies are both bureaucratic and technocratic structures that generate the dynamics of self-aggrandizement, perpetuation, and expansion. The careers, prestige, and positions of the "experts" are vested interests, valuable commodities to be protected. I think more attention needs to be devoted to the examination of the kinds of vested interests that the technical assistance agencies implicitly or explicitly protect and perpetuate. This is a real analytic project beyond the scope of this paper.

Often the recipient country government contributes to the perpetuation of the condition of underdevelopment by its particular use of technical assistance resources. A government can manipulate the direction of a technical assistance program in order to strengthen its own control over its people, or it can direct the efforts so that they will have only a minimal effect upon any positive change that might upset the vested interests of the recipient government and powerful elites in that country. There have been many such undesirable "alliances" between recipient governments and technical assistance agencies.

2. *Manpower: Monopolization of Occupational Access to Technical Assistance Roles and the Social Status System of International Personnel*

The monopolization of occupational access to technical assistance roles tends to inhibit a pluralism of development strategies in the technical assistance process. The "successful" expert gets ahead not because of his performance on behalf of his clients—he is not accountable directly to them—but on the basis of his perform-

ance on behalf of the aid agency he serves, or the professional association with which he may identify. The institutional norms or professional norms that technical assistance personnel must accept are not consistent with norms of reciprocity, risk-taking, and responsiveness to the masses—norms that are absolutely necessary if an effective aid relationship is to be developed.

I believe an argument can be made that the most creative, sensitive, and innovative people are not attracted to the current type of technical assistance agencies and, if attracted, are not kept very long by the agencies. New and young professionals are often so driven by career competition that they join these institutions without fully realizing the extent to which they too have become socialized into accepting the institutional and professional norms. Even if the young professional is very concerned, he may feel he has invested too much in his education and has too much family and personal responsibility to seek alternative employment, simply because the technical assistance establishment maintains a monopoly over technical assistance roles.

Very often young professionals do perceive the tension between their own values and the norms of the technical assistance establishment or are willing to trade these perceived deficiencies for the prestige and upward mobility an international career can provide. Thus technical assistance recruitment acts as a self-selection mechanism, harboring its own kind and rejecting new breeds.

It is often argued that the training of recipient country personnel to perform the traditional role of the outside expert can solve some of the inadequacies of the current technical assistance process. I do not agree. The "local" expert is usually trained under the auspices of the technical assistance agencies and thus picks up all of the negative behavioral, institutional, and professional norms and development strategies of the outside expert. He becomes, in short, co-opted in that international professional orbit. He is rewarded within its professional or institutional association, and, hence, identifies with his peers within these associations. Through this process of socialization the local expert is not likely to increase his identification with the poor and powerless people of his country. He has cast his lot with the external, dominant culture, and is thus alienated from his own people.

3. *Worldview and Value Hierarchy: Monopolization of the Legitimizing Mechanisms that Confer Validity and Credibility on Worldviews and Value Hierarchies*

The most subtle monopoly, but certainly one of the most powerful, is the monopoly over worldview and value hierarchies. The technical as-

sistance establishment is a veritable intellectual and cultural power structure. Its worldview of underdevelopment reality and its hierarchy of values determine the priorities, methodologies, and instrumentalities to be used in dealing with the condition of underdevelopment. This is a monopoly that provides the technical assistance establishment with powerful normative and methodological controls over the "development" process. We could also refer to this particular monopoly as the power to perpetuate a dominant "paradigm" of development."

It is this "paradigm power" that concerns me the most. It is a "paradigm" that has dominated development thinking and approaches for a long time. It is a paradigm backed by the technical assistance institutions and resources. In short, it is a paradigm with a lot at stake and is therefore very difficult to change or challenge.

Nevertheless this dominant paradigm is beginning to break down as many Third World leaders and sympathizers are challenging both the adequacy of this paradigm and the claim of authority that technical assistance experts have to impose their solutions.

These critics have begun to realize how parochial and inadequate this dominant paradigm is. It is rooted in the "objective consciousness" of Western intellectual tradition. The critics are challenging the authority of the Western scientific method of knowing and validating reality. This is a system preoccupied with a method of knowing, with how reality is perceived and validated rather than with what one perceives. Such a rigid methodology excludes important dimensions of human experience.


The dominant paradigm is under attack not only because of the growing theoretical and empirical inadequacy of the approach, but also because the control of the aid process by the technical assistance establishment contributes to the condition of cultural and intellectual powerlessness of underdeveloped people. The dominant paradigm reinforces normative controls over the underdeveloped world.

¹¹ Thomas Kuhn's concept of "paradigm" helps give meaning to my use of that word. In Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, paradigm is defined as "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques shared by members of any given community" (1970 Edition, page 174). A paradigm not only gives direction as to how a particular problem can be solved, but it also defines what the problem is in the first place. A "dominant development paradigm," then, determines not only the methodologies and instrumentalities by which a problem of underdevelopment is solved, but it also defines the nature of the problem of underdevelopment. I should like to suggest that the new worldviews and values generated by many Third World and radical thinkers may eventually contribute to a crisis and breakdown of the dominant development paradigm. There are many parallels between periods of crisis in scientific thinking which precede scientific revolutions, and what can be interpreted as a coming crisis in dominant development theory and practice.


The Third World will have to stumble along in its efforts to articulate and operationalize a new paradigm—its worldview and value hierarchies. But meanwhile the commanding intellectual power structure of the technical assistance establishment suppresses and psychologically oppresses those individuals who generate fundamental alternatives.

I realize that the kind of diagnosis of the technical assistance establishment that I have presented is not at the same time an effort to find solutions to the problems. But a recognition and discussion of the problems is a first step, and perhaps it will encourage others to engage in discussions of fundamental changes in the present system of technical assistance.


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
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
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
As designed by the senior analyst.



As produced by the programmers.



As installed at the user's site.



What the user wanted.

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