



What have we learned from impact evaluations of economic inclusion and graduation programs, and what else do we most need to learn?

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# The basic premise

Cause of poverty is complicated


Which is why singular-approaches usually have mixed at best results

So work on many problems at once



# The Multi-Faceted Approach

("Graduation" or "Productive Inclusion" or "Livelihood Plus" or "Cash plus")



# Can it work?


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# Eight Sites of Original Graduation Tests




# Impacts on Many Dimension




# Cost-Effective?

(from 3-year analysis)

## Total Benefits / Total Costs by Country



# ...But it is expensive... Political Economy challenge




Banerjee, et al. 2015; Bandiera, et al. 2016 (Bangladesh)





# And average results may mask considerable variability

## Quantiles: Income and Revenues



How can we design programs such that these people benefit?

The program had large positive impacts on some



# Two “policy” challenges

1. How can this be done more cheaply
2. How can this be done more inclusively

But let's reframe the question...



# Why does it work?

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# More cheaply

## Policy-frame

1. Capital grant needed?
2. Household visits needed?
3. Group livelihoods work?
4. Group meetings work?
5. Pay-it-forward lowers cost?

## Theory-frame (why)

1. Capital constraints binding?
2. Behavioral/social constraints binding?
3. Economies of scale for livelihoods?
4. Peers to enhance aspiration, information?
5. Pro-social preferences teachable?



# More inclusively?

1. Adding mental health good?

1. Mental health a barrier to seizing opportunities?

- Direction? Test order, and short-term data

2. In conflict zone?

2. Market access & safety key for success? Or substitutes?

3. In natural or epidemiological disasters?

3. Improved shock resistance? Or creates competing demands, risky investments, thus works less well?



# I'll focus here on two questions

Is capital a key constraint?

(we know they are “relaxable”)

Are “capabilities” a key constraint?

(are they “relaxable”?)



# Are assets sufficient? Or Savings?



# Unpacking: Ghana Goat Drop

Intervention	GUP w/ savings (N=333)	GUP w/o savings (N=333)	SOUP (N=733)	Asset only (N=164)	Pure control (N=1299)
Productive asset transfer (e.g., livestock)	•	•			
Transfer of four goats				•	
Consumption support, training, coaching	•	•			
Access to savings deposit collector	•		•		
Savings deposits matched at 50%			•		
No services provided to household					•


*NOTE: There were 642, 510, 163 within village control households in GUP, SOUP, and Asset-only villages, respectively*

- **Sample:** Location is Ghana's Northern and Upper East Regions. There were 78 GUP villages, 77 SOUP villages, 45 asset only villages, and 76 control villages.
- **Two-stage randomization:** First at village-level and then at HH-level within a village.
- **Data:** Endline data; 3 years after the baseline.
- **Paper:** [here](#), Banerjee, Karlan, Osei, Trachtman and Udry (2020)





# More goats, but fewer other animals



Are assets necessary?



# AVSI Uganda, Refugee + Host Communities


Intervention	T1: Full program individual coaching (N=2,200)	T2: Full program group coaching (N=2,200)	T3: Individual coaching, no asset (N=2,200)	Control (in treatment villages) (N=2,200)
Consumption support (12 months)	•	•	•	
VSLA, FFBS, more	•	•	•	
Individual coaching	•		•	
Group coaching		•		
Asset Transfer	•	•		

- **Sample:** Kamwenge refugee settlement (50% of sample) and host communities
- **Data:** Midline data; ~12 months after beginning of the program including consumption support; ~6 months after asset transfer



# AVSI Uganda: Mid-line Results

Treatment effects on key outcome indices at midline



Control group: mean = 0, SD = 1.



# “Capabilities”

Psychological ability to do more without more resources

Similar to human capital

But different: not about knowledge, more about life skills



# Increased “Capabilities” from Ghana Graduation program?

## Does Poverty Increase Labor Supply? Evidence from Multiple Income Effects and 115,579 Bags

Banerjee, Karlan, Trachtman and Udry (2022)

- Basic setup: “manufacturing” operations as measurement
- Implemented on top of Ghana site from *Science*
- Does Graduation → increased productivity in new opportunity?



# “Bags” Add-on: Key results

## Graduation Program

- Worked more on bags
- More effort per hour
- More capable of completing complex bags

## No negative income effect

- Overall labor supply increased!



# Three more pieces suggesting “capabilities” are important

## 1. Bayesian re-analysis of 6-site data from *Science*

Bigger effect for those with *lower* mental health at baseline

Implication: Capabilities a constraint, and Graduation relaxes

## 2. VSLA+ Cote d'Ivoire results

Striking results, given no capital infusion

Alternative, peer-based path to “capabilities”?

## 3. Sahel ASP Niger results (next slide summary)





# Niger: Program built on Cash Transfer program


4-country Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program (ASP)

Intervention	Full package (N=1169)	Capital package (N=1166)	Social package (N=1080)	Control (N=1193)
Monthly cash transfer (\$45PPP)	•	•	•	•
Coaching	•	•	•	
Village savings groups	•	•	•	
Training: Social norms / aspirations	•		•	
Training: Life skills training	•		•	
Entrepreneurship training	•	•	•	
Lump-Sum Cash (\$320 PPP)	•	•		

- **WB Partner: Africa Gender Innovation Lab and DIME**
- **Implementation:** Government run; Sep. 2017-Jan. 2019
- **Design:** 325 villages. Mostly women. Village-level randomization.
- **Scale/Sample:** Part of large scale program: 20,600 beneficiaries (4608 HHs measured); >100k in cash transfer program
- **Data:** Follow-up 2; 3 years after baseline
- **Cost:** ~\$300USD per beneficiary, not including cash transfers




# Niger Results (1.5 years)



# Does order matter?

## Ghana: CBT-first Outcomes



# Implementation: How to Deliver Better?

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# Challenge

A = Designing the right program or policy

B = Implementing the chosen program or policy well

Success = A x B



# What goes into “B”?

Staff charisma and knowledge

Staff motivation (and incentives)

Quality of underlying training/information

Beneficiary perception of implementer (trust?)

Timing in the year, month, day

Household dynamics & logistics

Match of livelihood




# One example: DOLE Philippines

Intervention	T1: Group livelihoods and group coaching (N=600)	T2: Individual Livelihoods and group coaching (N=600)	T3: Individual livelihoods and individual coaching (N=600)	Control (N=600)
4Ps	•	•	•	•
Individual Asset transfer (\$300 per individual)		•	•	
Group Asset transfer (\$6,000 per group of 20 individuals)	•			
Individual coaching			•	
Group coaching	•	•		
Skills training	•	•	•	
Savings facilitation	•	•	•	
Community mobilization	•	•	•	

- **Phone survey:** August 2020, 63% response rate (balanced)
- **Implementation:** started mid 2019
- **Asset delivery delays:** T2 and T3 started asset distribution in mid 2019, but only finished end of 2019, T1 only started end of 2019, finished early 2020
- **Program attrition:** 40% (T3), 30% (T2), 25% (T1) due to delays



# DOLE Philippines: Results





# Further “how” questions

- People!
  - Labor to deliver program is real constraint
- Solutions?
  - Technology?
  - Also provides homogeneity of info / delivery
  - Organizational incentives (sub-contract? on what deliverables?)
  - Group rather than individual (leverage)
- “General equilibrium”
  - Market prices, wages, sharing, competition, institutional crowd-in/out
  - Usually not happening with enough localized intensity to realize/detect. But what is that threshold?
- Livelihood selection & value chain logistics
- Add-ons: leverage channel & trust



# Further “how” questions

- “General equilibrium”
  - Market prices, wages, sharing, competition, institutional crowd-in/out
  - Usually not happening with enough localized intensity to realize/detect. But what is that threshold?
- Livelihood selection & value chain logistics
  - How to choose which livelihood?
  - Do participants know the costs, returns & risks?
- Add-ons: leverage channel & trust
  - e.g.: Gender (women plus model, eg), Health, Information (eg COVID-19, Uganda)



# Caseworker-with-a-Budget Approach

For Urban Settings (?)

Urban:

Problems more varied

Paths for higher income also more varied

Resources often already available, just not used (?)

Caseworker-with-a-budget approach instead?

Household-level customization

Technology-based too, lower coordination/transport costs?



# Iteration / Timing Challenge

Long-run lure. Compelling!

Don't ignore. But much could be learned in short-run.

Short-run Example #1: livelihood choices & short-run visits

→ selection

→ immediate take-up

→ three month livelihood engagement?

Short-run Example #2: lump-sum cash transfer

→ short-run expenditure survey, treatment vs control

(can NOT just ask people what they did with the \$)



# Concluding Thoughts

1. Poverty complicated (no surprise)
2. No one study is end-all holy grail  
Instead: share & replicate & iterate & share etc...
3. Data quality & comparability matters (IPA & GPRL initiative)
4. Capital and Capabilities: Both movable, both important
5. Politics & Financing
  - + Long-term results matter
  - + Lowering costs
  - + Improving performance of cash transfers alone
  - = Viable public finance



# Thank you!

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