R&D Subsidy and Import Substitution: Growing in the Shadow of Protection

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• Most countries have large R&D subsidy programs

- Policymakers use R&D subsidies to stimulate firms to upgrade technology:
 - * Developing countries
 - * EU's Structural Funds
- Question:
 - \star How an innovation subsidy in a developing country affects innovation and firm growth?

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Brazilian R&D Subsidy Program

V

Setting

- running for over 20 years
- 72 billion dollars

Brazilian R&D Subsidy Program



▼ Setting

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- Example
- large pharmaceutical company
- subsidy to biotechnology lab



Figure: It Made to the News!

Filgrastim biosimilar is first Latin copy biologic, says Brazil

By Fiona BARRY 24-Nov-2015 - Last undated on 12-Jul-2017 at 09:03 GMT





RELATED TAGS United States

Brazilian company Eurofarma claims it has developed Latin America's first homegrown biosimilar.





* Diff-in-diff comparing near-winners to near-losers of R&D subsidy application (Hirvonen et al. (2022), Choi and Levchenko (2021))

- 1. increase low-quality innovation
- 2. large and persistent increases in growth
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Data and Facts

Data



Firm's Labor Outcome:

 \star employer-employee dataset RAIS



Exports and Imports:

 \star panel customs record at the firm-destination-product level



Innovation:

- \star Intellectual property applications to the Brazilian Patent Office
- * Citations from PATSTAT



Innovation Subsidy:

 \star Applications for innovation subsidy


R&D Subsidy is 10 Times Yearly Wage Bill

Table: Statistics on R&D Subsidy

	(1)			(2)		
	Subsidy Applicants			All Brazilian Firms		
	Mean	Median	SD	Mean	Median	SD
Workers	536	70	1970	15	3	136
Avg. Wage	2076	1593	1675	712	579	617
Avg. Yrs. Educ.	10.51	10.41	2.36	9.03	9	2.76
N. Establishment	4.04	1	16.94	1.29	1	4.73
Stock N. Patents	.197	0	1.36	.001	0	.069
At Least One Patent	.072	0	.25	.0003	0	.019


R&D Subsidy Targets Manufacturing Sector

Figure: Subsidy Application by Sector



R&D Subsidy Targets Manufacturing Sector

Figure: Subsidy Application in Manufacturing



- Call for Projects:
 - * The Funding Authority for Studies and Projects opens thematic call for projects
 - $\star\,$ Sectoral funds pre-determined by law, avoiding political interference
 - $\star\,$ Subsidy types: grants or subsidized lending
- Selection Criteria:
 - * Firms are scored by a board of anonymous technicians
 - \star Criteria: degree of inventiveness, quality of the research team, and financial viability
- Enforcement:
 - * Tight enforcement: joint bank account, multiple installments, reports, and fines

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Empirics


• Matched Differences in Difference:

- $\star\,$ compare <u>near losers</u> to <u>near winners</u> in same call
- For each firm *j* that received the subsidy, find another firm *i* such that:
 - 1. j and i applied for the same call for project
 - 2. *j* received the subsidy but *i* didn't
 - 3. same number of employees & value requested (technical development)
 - 4. same number number of citations & number of patents (quality of the research)
- Robustness: text similarity, CEO wage, wage of scientists, text complexity of project

Matching: Intuition

Figure: Matching

CALL FOR PROJECTS



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• Main empirical model:


$$y_{i,t} = \theta \mathbb{I}_{i,t} \{ \text{Innovation Subsidy} \} + \mu_i + \mu_{g(i),t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$
(1)

where

- $\star y_{i,t}$: outcome of firm *i* in year *t*
- * $\mathbb{I}_{i,t} \{ \text{Innovation Subsidy} \}$: dummy after firm receive innovation
- $\star~\mu_{\it i}:$ firm fixed effect
- $\star~\mu_{g(i),t}:$ time-year fixed effect

Identifying Variation: Intuition





Empirics: Validation

i. Concern: treatment and control group are not comparable

i. Validation:

- \star parallel trends
- $\star\,$ treatment and control are similar even in non-matched variables
- ii. Concern: political intervention

ii. Validation:

- $\,\star\,$ R&D subsidy does not correlate with campaign contribution or other subsidies
- iii. Concern: correlation with shocks

iii. Validation:

* placebo test

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
Results

Effect on Innovation: Increase in Low-Quality Innovation

Figure: Effect of Innovation Subsidy on Innovation

(a) Number of Patents in the Next Three Years

(b) Number of Scientists



Effect on Innovation: Increase in Innovation Effort

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	IHS(N. Patent)	$\mathbb{I}(Patent)$	IHS(N. Scientists)	I(N. Scientists)	$\mathbb{IHS}(N. Ph.D.)$	<pre>IHS(N. Trademarks)</pre>
$\mathbb{I}\left\{Subsidy\right\}$	0.105**	0.0659**	0.364***	0.115***	0.109**	0.169*
	(0.0477)	(0.0256)	(0.0929)	(0.0357)	(0.0539)	(0.0877)
N	11403	11403	11403	11403	11403	11403
R^2	0.624	0.526	0.811	0.551	0.859	0.670


Table: Innovation Subsidy and Innovation Effort

Effect on Innovation: Increase in Low-Quality Innovation

	(1) (2)		(3)	(4)	
	$\mathbb{IHS}(Citations)$	IHS (Citation Weighted Patents)	IHS (Inventor Wage Weighted Patents)	IHS (Inventor Educ. Weighted Patents)	
$\mathbb{I}\left\{Subsidy\right\}$	0.000374	0.00161	0.148	0.0895	
	(0.0258)	(0.00158)	(0.149)	(0.0844)	
N	11403	11403	11403	11403	
R^2	0.131	0.120	0.449	0.459	

Table: Effect of Innovation Subsidy on Quality Weighted Patents

Effect on Innovation: Weak Evidence for Leaning in the Long-Run



- 1. Effect on Innovation: Increase in Low-Quality Innovation
- 2. Effect on Firm Dynamics: Large and Persistent Increases in Growth
- 3. Effect on Product Lines: Expansion Towards High-Import Tariff Markets
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- 5. No Spillover or Product Market Rivalry

Effect on Firm Dynamics: Large Increases in Growth







Table: Effect of the Innovation Subsidy on Firm Size

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	log (<i>Workers</i>)	log (<i>Wage Bill</i>)	log (<i>Establishments</i>)	log (N. Municipalities)	$\mathbb{IHS}(Exports)$	$\mathbb{IHS}(Imports)$
$\mathbb{I}\left\{Subsidy\right\}$	0.274***	0.269***	0.119**	0.0602**	1.437***	1.141**
	(0.0924)	(0.0960)	(0.0557)	(0.0281)	(0.514)	(0.528)
N	9358	9358	9353	9358	7059	7059
R^2	0.837	0.861	0.834	0.832	0.814	0.740


Effect on Firm Dynamics: Persistent Increase in Growth

Figure: Effect of Innovation Subsidy on Wage Bill



Heterogeneous Treatment Effect: All Firms Had Sizable Employment Gains

Figure: Distribution of Treatment Effects




Heterogeneous Treatment Effect: Small Firms Increased by More

Figure: Correlation of Treatment Effect with Initial Employment

(a) Effect on Number of Patents

(b) Effect on Number of Workers



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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	$\mathbb{IHS} \{ Product \ Patent \}$	$IHS \{Process Patent\}$	$\mathbb{IHS} \{ \# Pat. Class \}$	$IHS \{ \# Trademark Class \}$	$\mathbb{IHS} \{ \# \text{ Export Products} \}$	$IHS \{ \# Import Products \}$
$I \{Subsidy\}$	0.0852*	0.00826	0.148**	0.0737*	0.451***	0.470***
	(0.0453)	(0.0146)	(0.0742)	(0.0428)	(0.111)	(0.137)
Ν	11403	11403	11403	11403	7059	7059
R^2	0.636	0.383	0.846	0.839	0.853	0.766

Table: Effect of Innovation Subsidy on Product Variety

Firms are Expanding Towards High-Import Tariff Markets

	Table: Ellect of innovation Subsidy on the Direction of innovation								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)			
	IHS {N. Patent High Tariff Prod.}	IHS {N. Patent Low Tariff Prod.}	IHS { Citation to High Tariff Pat. }	IHS { Citation to Low Tariff Pat. }	IHS {Exp. High Tariff Prod.}	IHS {Exp. Low Tariff Prod.}			
$I \{Subsidy\}$	0.0635***	0.00284	0.0736***	0.0212	1.232**	0.335*			
	(0.0239)	(0.0229)	(0.0271)	(0.0300)	(0.493)	(0.201)			
N	11403	11403	11403	11403	7059	7059			
R ²	0.574	0.711	0.430	0.487	0.822	0.745			

Table: Effect of Innovation Subsidy on the Direction of Innovation

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Effect on Trade: Importing Ideas & Inputs f/ Developed Countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	I {Imp. Mercosur}	I {Imp. South America}	I {Imp. Europe}	I {Imp. North America}	$\mathbb{IHS} \{ Citation \ to \ BR \}$	$\mathbb{IHS} \{ Citation \ to \ Foreign \}$
$I \{Subsidy\}$	0.0435	0.0541	0.120***	0.0931**	0.0433*	0.118**
	(0.0366)	(0.0369)	(0.0374)	(0.0403)	(0.0233)	(0.0495)
N	7059	7059	7059	7059	11403	11403
R^2	0.586	0.597	0.670	0.633	0.372	0.440

Table: Effect of Innovation Subsidy on Origin of Input Imports and Citation

Table: Effect of Innovation Subsidy on Exports

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
	I{ <i>Exp. Mercosur</i> }	I{Exp. South America}	$\mathbb{I}\left\{ \textit{Exp. Europe} \right\}$	I { <i>Exp. North America</i> }	
$\mathbb{I}\left\{Subsidy\right\}$	0.101***	0.0825**	0.0224	0.0271	
	(0.0362)	(0.0365)	(0.0388)	(0.0378)	
N	7059	7059	7059	7059	
R^2	0.763	0.759	0.685	0.673	

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Spillover and Market Rivalry Exposure

• Technological proximity (Bloom et al. (2013)):

$$tech_{i,j} = \frac{\left(T_i T_j'\right)}{(T_i T_i')^{1/2} (T_j T_j')^{1/2}}$$

• Technological exposure to treatment and control:

$$Spilltech_{i,t} = \sum_{j} spilltech_{i,j} \mathbb{I}_{j,t} \{ \text{Treatment Applied to Subsidy} \}$$
$$SpilltechControl_{i,t} = \sum_{j} spilltech_{i,j} \mathbb{I}_{j,t} \{ \text{Control Applied to Subsidy} \}$$

Spillover and Market Rivalry Exposure

• Product proximity (Bloom et al. (2013)):

$$SIC_{ij} = \frac{\left(S_i S_j'\right)}{\left(S_i S_i'\right)^{1/2} \left(S_j S_j'\right)^{1/2}}$$

• Product exposure to treatment and control:

$$\begin{aligned} SpillSIC_{i,t} &= \sum_{j} SIC_{i,j} \mathbb{I}_{j,t} \{ \text{Treatment Applied to Subsidy} \} \\ SpillSICControl_{i,t} &= \sum_{j} SIC_{i,j} \mathbb{I}_{j,t} \{ \text{Control Applied to Subsidy} \} \end{aligned}$$

Spillover and Market Rivalry Exposure

• Main specification:

$$y_{i,t} = \lambda^{spill} \log(Spilltech_{i,t} + 1) + \lambda^{SIC} \log(SpillSIC_{ij} + 1) + X'_{i,t} \Lambda + \mu_i + \mu_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

where

- \star y_{i,t}: outcome of firm *i* in year *t*
- $\star X_{i,t}$: exposure to control applications
- \star μ_i : firm fixed effect
- \star μ_t : time fixed effect
- Parameters of Interest: λ^{spill} and λ^{SIC}
 - $\star\,$ identified from comparing firms more exposed to treatment to those more exposed to control

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	log(Workers)	log(Establishments)	log(Wage Bill)	<pre>IHS(Wage Bill Scientists)</pre>	$\mathbb{IHS}(\textit{Patents})$
$\log(Spilltech_{i,t}+1)$	-0.0157	-0.00485	-0.0149	-0.0408	-0.00389
	(0.0268)	(0.0134)	(0.0284)	(0.0674)	(0.0147)
$\log(SpillSIC_{ij}+1)$	-0.0407	-0.00105	-0.0687	-0.0501	-0.0468*
	(0.0451)	(0.0190)	(0.0482)	(0.120)	(0.0252)
N	85748	85745	85748	85748	85748
R^2	0.916	0.960	0.934	0.800	0.662

Table: Spillover and Market Rivalry of Innovation Subsidy

- 1. Effect on Innovation: Increase in Low-Quality Innovation
- 2. Effect on Firm Dynamics: Large and Persistent Increases in Growth
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- Now you know how an innovation subsidy affect laggard firms!
- Innovation subsidy:
 - * Increase in Low-Quality Innovation.
 - $\star\,$ Despite that: Large and Persistent Increases in Growth
 - $\star\,$ Due to: high import tariffs
 - $\star\,$ By: selling ideas from developed countries to developing countries
 - $\star\,$ Without affecting other firms

"can I copy your homework?"

"yeah just change it up a bit so it doesn't look obvious you copied"

"ok"



