Brothers or Invaders?
How Crises-Driven Migrants Shape Voting Behavior

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This Paper
Migration and the rise of the right

→ ↑ Forced Migration = ↑ Right wing support, +/- participation
  Dustmann et al. 2016; Gerdes and Wadensjo, 2008; Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Barone et al., 2016; Harmon, 2017; Halla et al., 2017

Our research questions:

1. Evaluates effects of forced migration on voting behavior inside developing country

2. Tests the following hypothesis →
   • Socio-economic hypothesis (Facchini and Mayda, 2009 and Malhotra et al., 2013)
   • Cultural hypothesis (Card et al., 2012 and Tingley, 2012)
   • Alternative hypothesis → Electoral misinformation hypothesis
Context
Massive Out-Migration from Venezuela

- By 2018:
  - 50% contraction of GDP
  - Unemployment 37%
  - Poverty rate 87%
  - shortages of food and basic services, insecurity, repression

- By Dec 2019:
  - 4.5M Venezuelan migrants
  - 1.8M in Colombia

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Brothers or Invaders?

ABCDE 2021
Data
Data
Municipal-Annual variation 1995-2018

1. **Electoral Data**: Colombian Electoral Agency
   - Presidential Elections: 6 first-round, 5 second-round
   - Mayoral elections: 6

2. **Forced Migration Data**: 
   - Venezuelans Migrants, Colombian Statistics Agency

3. **Previous Migration Settlements**: Pop. Censuses 1993 and 2005
Empirical Strategy
Empirical strategy
Effects of Forced Migrants on Voting Behavior

Pr. Ven. Inflows\textsuperscript{1993}_{mdt} = \left[ \frac{1}{\text{Pop}_{md,1993}} \left( \text{Cum. Ven. Inflow}_t \times \text{Ven. Share}_{md}^{1993} \right) \right]

- **Temporal variation** ⇒ Cum. Ven. Inflow\textsubscript{t}: cumulative number of Venezuelans arriving in Colombia between 1993 and year \( t \)
- **Cross-sectional variation** ⇒ Ven. Share\textsubscript{md}\textsuperscript{1993}: Venezuelans in \( m \) of \( d \) to all foreigners in \( m \)

**Idea:** migrants move disproportionately to places where they have preexisting networks

Card, 1991
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows

Correlation: 0.741***
(0.0350)
Empirical strategy

\[ Y_{mdt} = \theta_1 \text{Pr. Ven. Inflows}_{mdt}^{1993} + \sum_{c \in Z_{md}} [c \times \psi_t] + \phi_{d \times t} + \psi_t + \gamma_m + \epsilon_{mdt} \]

- \( m \): municipality, \( d \): department, \( t \): election
- \( Y_{mt} \): Political participation OR % Votes for left, center, and right political ideologies
- \( Z_m \): vector of municipal characteristics before the beginning of the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis
- \( \psi_t \): election year
- \( \phi_{d \times t} \): department \( \times \) election year
- \( \gamma_m \): municipality fixed effects
Results
Results on Voting Behavior

- **Pr. Ven. Inflows ↑ 1 sd**
  1. **1st Presidential Elections:**
     - ↑ Political participation by 1.1 p.p → (Mean 0.47)
     - ↓ Left-wing 0.9 p.p. → (Mean 0.10)
     - ↑ Right-wing support 0.8 p.p. → (Mean 0.34)
  2. **2nd Presidential Elections:**
     - ↑ Political participation by 1.3 p.p → (Mean 0.53)
     - ↓ Left-wing 1.5 p.p → (Mean 0.07)
     - ↑ Right-wing support 1.6 p.p → (Mean 0.37)
  3. **Mayoral Elections:**
     - ↑ Political participation by 1.1 p.p → (Mean 0.67)
     - ↓ Left-wing 0.7 p.p. → (Mean 0.04)
     - Right-wing support no effect → last mayoral race of our sample took place in 2015, before largest increment of ven. migration.
Mechanisms

1. Economic Hypothesis:
   Pr. Ven. Inflows ↑ 1 sd
   ↑ unemployment by 1.3 p.p
   ↑ hours worked by 1.8 p.p
   ↑ municipal tax revenues by 2.7%
   ↑ transfers from the central government by 4.4%

2. Cultural Bias:
   Not likely to explain results

3. Electoral Misinformation Hypothesis:
   Demonization of the left wing ideology
   Strong qualitative and observational data supporting this hypothesis
Electoral Misinformation Evidence

- Right-wing anti-left propaganda
- *Invamer’s* Political Perceptions Survey
Effects of Venezuelan Migration in Municipalities with Intense FARC attacks in 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable in Shares</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Votes for Left</th>
<th>Votes for Center</th>
<th>Votes for Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A. Presidential Elections (First Round)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pred. Venezuelan Inflows</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
<td>-0.008***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.006**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pred. Venezuelan Inflows × I (90th percentile FARC attacks)</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.007*</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5,772</td>
<td>5,772</td>
<td>5,772</td>
<td>5,772</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel B. Presidential Elections (Second Round)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pred. Venezuelan Inflows</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
<td>-0.014***</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pred. Venezuelan Inflows × I (90th percentile FARC attacks)</td>
<td>0.019**</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.008*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>4,126</td>
<td>4,126</td>
<td>4,126</td>
<td>4,126</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel C. Mayoral Elections</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pred. Venezuelan Inflows</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.007**</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pred. Venezuelan Inflows × I (90th percentile FARC attacks3)</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.032**</td>
<td>0.017*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>4,693</td>
<td>4,693</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Controls (all panels)**

- Municipality FE: Yes
- Year FE: Yes
- Year × Department FE: Yes
- Additional Controls: Yes

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Brothers or Invaders?
Conclusions
Conclusions

- Larger migration inflows are associated with an increase in political participation
- Larger migration inflows are associated with a re-composition of votes from left to right-wing oriented political ideologies
- No support to cultural bias hypothesis
- Effects could be explained by electoral misinformation and economic hypothesis
Appendices
### Effects of Venezuelan Migration on Labor Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables * in logs</th>
<th>Hours Worked*</th>
<th>Wages*</th>
<th>Hours Worked*</th>
<th>Wages*</th>
<th>Unemployed All Labor Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted Venezuelan Inflows</td>
<td>0.018***</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.012*</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adj. R-squared</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.042</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>786,110</td>
<td>786,110</td>
<td>543,730</td>
<td>543,730</td>
<td>1,648,520</td>
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### Controls (all panels)

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<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year - Monthly FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year \times Department FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict and Violence \times Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Finance \times Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutions \times Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Growth \times Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty and Inequality \times Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor Market \times Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Effects of Venezuelan Migration on Fiscal Burden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. (in logs)</th>
<th>Municipal Tax Income Per Capita (1)</th>
<th>Government Transfers Per Capita (2)</th>
<th>Expenditures Per Capita (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predicted Venezuelan Inflows</td>
<td>0.027* (0.014)</td>
<td>0.044*** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-squared</td>
<td>0.957</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>0.959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>19,797</td>
<td>19,395</td>
<td>19,849</td>
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### Controls (all panels)

- Municipality FE: Yes
- Year FE: Yes
- Year × Department FE: Yes
- Conflict and Violence × Year FE: Yes
- Government Finance × Year FE: Yes
- Institutions × Year FE: Yes
- Growth × Year FE: Yes
- Poverty and Inequality × Year FE: Yes
- Labor Market × Year FE: Yes