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NO

Notes for?
RSM years

For Julian Granfell
Notes on early days
of Suez
———
Brandt Comm
notes.

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Notes from Robert S. McNamara Years - Notebook

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Breakdown of Cabinet

Defeat is an option.

UK still held Africa
Empire still held eg Alex H

11 Bomb explosion,

White House & Army

US 'anti colonialism'.

Eder looks a Nasser as the modern Arab
who is not corrupt but explains a lot

Tripolitan Decl: ever handed?

H. McC. airt journal no war

The first of all 'oppression'

Temple visit & Bag Pict feature.

Glubb, Selim, Nasser Mar 56

AE's views on Algeria - Spaak.

May '56 Fouchet start speech of Nasser =
Hitler.

(i.e. the Nasser unit on this
& threat to fight.

on Suez = Vietnam but we fail.

Moussadek on day Nasser

(I had met Nasser & knew he was no Communist)

Cancellation of Polaris of a loan
vs. Nasser's use of aid for p.d.
purposes - and suits us.

This is really basic point.

Asw Dam is essential and to poorest.

N.B. Press very anti-Nasser in July,
e.g. Herald - No more Hitlers (20th)

Music of opposites vs. non-app. e.g.
AE vs. Rab. Rab.'s sense of urgency
A.E. had ended war in Vietnam in
54 & polls wd not show

Edin, 1914. 1936 Phund
anti communist
Clairse

We had no real defense policy except
anti soviet & anti Mac Mac.

US was in election year so useless
& Ike was standing for peace.

H. Mac's fear that UK would become 'another
Netherlands'. [on context for context]

Mixon says Dulles policy was a declaration
of independence.

Had UK become 'Third Rate Power'
as AF & Schyn fear to US Dulles etc

'Escapers Club' Times leader wasn't
this in part time?

Helic & Kruschev

we solve riddles. 'Clark's work'

"I had rather than the British Empire fell in
one great stroke but it will be away"
A.E. to Lay H.

On use of UN. opposed of US & Canada

N.B. lack of support Fr & Portugal
Express & Y. Post.

Small role of UN.

Ho. Lab party entirely pro

Oct 2. ^{reference to} ^{crowd} ^{power} SCVA & not showing fully break
m.b. Israel is still thought of as "US oriented".

H. McC. had rather than the pix at West
to be humiliated of Messer

But H.M. remains very pro Am. & security

H.M.

N.B. Common Market & plan b. in play.

UN. is seen partly as a pretext.

importance of pretext in new world

Israel is prepared to strike first then

If Messer gets away with it we shall
lose Ch. & Arab (a Perone)

my own role as secure whether is open

So much emphasis on the plot, not the reasons for the plot.

"Britain is not accustomed to receiving advice from small Balkan countries" Kitz

What really stopped us?

What did we learn.

Cabinet & Civil Service messages?

Minded country (inc me)

MCC. 1st in 1st out.

NB. Eden's popularity fell in Nov.

U.S. Lated. Pressure at IMF.

cf result of Suez in France - is de G.
& more intervention.

effect on UK's reputation.

Our understanding of vet. action/council

How do you meet it (U.S. & others)
Nelson Pleske back to

on 26th the ship in the face.

So much emphasis on the plot & lying
and so the secrets that truth is lying
on the table ignored.

I was at No 10 & am constantly asked
to spill the beans, pulled diary. Great
disadvantages of this. It is not the truth
of Dick C. but personal idiosyncratic
view of an episode in a historic
to open.

It was a very historic occasion.
open & close a war in 8 days. More
important '56 climactic of century, the
end of the imperial attitude, end of the
special relationship & the peculiar
cypriote entry into Europe. That is
all clear in retrospect - but what
did it seem like at the time. That
is real secret history of Suez.

Written as recollection not as gossip
and is so often rather wrong.

The scene of July 26.

Cyprus

Benaimi Glubb: *Templer & Bey. Pect.*

Daily Mail / Telegraph. Smacked of fine fact.

Eden responsible for withdrawal Suez.

Led to bringing in US.

Understood Arab nationalism?

yes: No real change of Power. *self govt.*

Indep. Self govt under tutelage. *Eden's view of Nasser, or can work.*

Not French. Arab all not Russian.

Close to UK. e.g. Glubb.

* Spheres of influence replace Empire.

Based on bases & real power.

Cyprus replaces Suez. (Keightley's remarks)

AE made it clear in wd fight for it in M.E.

Then came non-aligned conferences

hard to understand. *No: disc of Third world.*

esp. Nehru & Cms: (good ^{Comm} ~~Comm~~ ^{ment})

Thought of Cms as sphere of influence

& as voting bloc in UN. hence

antipathy to K. Numan.

In opp. to this Nasser's Soviet arms deal & now public rebuff

* We held all of Africa & still have head of the British Cms. with Cms of the under Ld Home.

Partly result of FOR. but US. At night to X except spheres.

The B & K. meetings. *where we were but of latter.*
n.d. Iran. *But H.M. said about some de no war.*

3.

How to react?

(i) Gradualism: try to keep relations going & get maximum good rels while recognising autonomy. Macton, Trenchan Inc: ec. rels e.g. Arwan Dam. NB. Was Pulls no

with our full consent cut off aid for purely political purposes.*

(ii)

Hostile.

(2) Either to prove it not worth while & better to get on with US, UK etc.*

(B) To restore status quo ante of overthrow of present Govt. But was s.g. possible? Could you turn back history? That was much less apparent then than now. We've never discovered because failed.

But this was what Eden/McC/S'key decided to do. Indicrous plan for after. Their background & attitudes to Empire & being first class power.

4.

Hydrogen Bomb.

Analogy Nasser - Hitler.

e.g. UK Press in Feb. 1956
Kidd "No more Hitler"

Also Muro (Nasser) Hitler (Nazi)

Chambers & Churchill
slid down

The old guard 1914. 1936.

Eden & Rhineland
Rob. not a member, ditto fait d'armes

Natural belief that U.S. wd help

∴ Indo China.

So play down colonial attitude
(hence long time anti-Israel, anti Fr. Algeria)
stress anti Soviet attitude

at home stress 'national interest' oil
'life line' castigation.

This is what was done July 26 -
Nuri's advice

TV in Aug.

Popular in UK. ^{see press down} Gypos. Suez Group

Get back our own (of Reagan & Pomarene)

Third rate power. Another N. Lands. I'd rather see Empire ^{fall} in one great tank ^{with the}

Could we do it alone?

I'd rather pour the pictures in the net. jolly than be humiliated
of NASSER.

cd or do it done?

Miscary of 5/26 evening.

not of force immediate.

So bluff & puff.

I bluffed. Schreier, Clark's war.

Belief that this wd do it.

or at worst an aero-psycho move.

M.B. Belief still had power.

N.B. also unrecognised we must lose in direction of UN. It was part of pretexts necessary in New World could not plant world opinion.

Since importance of exact striking first. Now Britain is not used to getting advice for a small Balkan powers. Sweden & neutral. (amogence)

Did not need help

but must appear solid

so we got ourselves into trap.

threats of force led to use of force or humiliation.

M. McC's view. or old by another N/lands.

The Dulles problem:

Eisenhower convinced there was a special relationship with U.S. & with Ike (not Nixon) Foster was unrelievable, moralist etc.

Mostly true. Above all incompetent.

(& got U.S. into Vietnam)

(Kippling)

all we asked was Take Care of the Rear

& keep quiet

But

had modified policy except anti Soviet + Nato & anti Mao Mao

The defence review done after B & K. visit records this.

Had quarrelled over Vietnam since J.F.D. was the only.

But

Muller used the Spec. Rel. ^{H.M.C. & A.E. lost v. support of US.}

e.g. Scaia (n.b. Selwyn's doubts, Eden's
announcements & H.M.C.'s announcements)

and then broke ranks:

for election reasons?

not "backing the colonial powers"

not "putting teeth in Scaia"

This drove Eden mad.

out of illness

The other advertised weakness was domestic.

The Press: R.B.C. (Gen: Jacobson, son of K.M.) public
opinion of intellectuals & various impact. <sup>did not support Post
supplied info. of Post
Express of P.</sup>

so we really had to act.

H.M.C.'s in cinema

& attention humiliation.

(annexed India: but K.M.)

Looked for allies & [↑] Sepoys.

Fr & Israeli's -

algebra et non with Arabs

would lose office & office
if Messer gets away
with it.

That's the end.

Forced into false position

Thought we were stronger, independent.

& aiming at the unattainable post.

Had to seek undesirable allies.

To make our coup de psyche credible
our bluff was called & we lost

We acted uncharacteristically - secretly
& so incompetently.

Mythic twist tears & lengthen

No end of a lesson but what? ^{Lost our reputation for wisdom.}
_{in next 5 years}

We learnt about winds of change *

Our American teacher had to
learn over two decades in a much
harder school of hard knocks.

* in a free world.
of Europe.

* Cannot stand capt nationalism. Many said we shouldn't
act without US. (e.g. 'success' in Lebanon). We recognised quickly
that we were ruined in M.E. & came out of Gulf in debacle.
HML 1st in 1st out. Festival learner? We got out of Africa
& we letained the Gmo link.

↳ into Europe, out of Gmo?

What did France learn? De faulx je vous ai compris.

↳ Perhaps really we learnt that you can't suppress
nationalism in a free world, but must get along with it

History & Empire & Consensus

What are duties of a great power
to choose the rules?

The hyperal issue ends in 1912
the European begins for Consensus

1912 group saw the tendency to decline in
power rules on Empire & tried to keep
it for League

They see America as the enemy of Consensus

lame of the attention because it is not
not it's all about

It was twenty years ago this week that Nasser tweaked the lion's tail and was amazed to find the whole lion skin came away in his hand leaving Great Britain naked and roaring like a mouse.

The Suez episode, which began with the nationalisation of the Canal on July 26th 1956, was genuinely ~~a~~ climactic in our Imperial history; it did mark (not make) the end of the British Empire. But it was also a political scandal of watergate proportions because of the conspiratorial response that the Eden Govt ~~was~~ was forced into making to Nasser's open defiance. As a result ~~the Suez~~ ~~affair~~ public interest in the Suez affair has centred on the secrets of the conspiracy rather than on the open truth of the historical event.

At the time of Suez I was the Press officer at 10 Downing Street, (only resigning after the hostilities had ceased) and consequently I have been urged for two decades to tell all or at least to publish my diaries. At

It was about 1926 that I was asked to find the work
that Messrs. [?] had done in the
and was asked to find the work
*as the twentieth anniversary came near
and in response to a request from
the Observer, I had

The first episode, which began with
the restoration of the Canal in July
1826, was generally a dim
in our imperial history; it did mark
(not make) the end of the British
Empire. But it was also a political
symbol of the [?] of the
because of the [?]
response that the [?]
was [?] the [?]
open defiance. As a result [?]
affair public interest in the [?]
affair has centered on the [?]
the conspiracy [?]
open that of the [?]
At the time of [?]
[?] at 10 [?]
[?] of the [?]
and [?] [?]
for the [?]
last to [?]

(for whom I had received many kindnesses)

first I refused out of a sense of obligation to a Prime Minister for whom I had (and have) considerable respect and affection. Then ~~after some years~~ I did ~~read over my diaries~~ ^{*read over my diaries} to see if they were worth publishing; they were not. Luckier than some of my friends I discovered what a warped and often false account a diary ~~of events~~ gives even ~~when~~ ^{when} written by someone at ~~the~~ near the centre of a crisis. But what ~~did emerge~~ ^{did} ~~from those diaries~~ ^{was} did give me was a picture, unblurred by hindsight, of ~~the~~ political attitudes ^{during} the last days in which Britain's leaders regarded her as a Great Power - in the Victorian sense. And that is the real secret history of Suez.

(or perhaps
perhaps)
particular)

X X X X

I was dining with Sir Peter Poole, then Chairman of the Conservative Party, at the Turkey Club when a call from Frank Ten asked me to return "because Nassor's Humphrey ^[Travels on] says that Nassor's going to pinch the Canal". I told Sir Peter Poole who simply said "Anthony has got to win this one". He was

absolutely right and spoke for the whole
Conservative Party. ~~and much of the~~ The
Prime Minister could not afford to yield
an inch to Nasser, whom he was already
accused of appeasing, by his withdrawal
from the Canal base in 1954.

When I got back to Number Ten I made
a dash for the secretaries' ^{office} ~~room~~, next to
the Cabinet Room, but was caught half
way down the passage by the cortege
emerging from a state dinner for the
King of Iraq. I slipped into the bay
which housed a bust of some earlier
Prime Minister as the procession marched
by, and was embarrassed when Nuri
Said (the Prime Minister of Iraq) stopped
and stared at me and said to his
companion (Selwyn Lloyd, I think) "that's
the old Jew who got you into all this
trouble". I glanced at my marble
companion and saw it was ^{indeed} Disraeli.

A few moments later a very motley
crowd met in the Cabinet room, clad
in anything from Court Dress to a
~~beard~~ Mazer and pink slacks. There
were a few Ministers, all the Chiefs of

staff, ^a ~~and~~ representative of the ~~Suez Canal~~
~~Company~~ and of the ~~French~~ American
Embassy, and a French Director of the Suez
Canal Company (the British Sir Alexander Cedogan
who directed the Suez Canal Company, ^{as well as} ~~governed~~
the BBC sent a message that he was chuffed
in bed).

It was a deeply humiliating meeting.
In effect the Prime Minister said there had
been an act of aggression against us, and,
while asking the Foreign Office to look into
our legal remedies, he wished to respond
forcefully & immediately; what could the
Chiefs of Staff recommend. Their answer
was ill thought out, confused but perfectly
clear: we could do nothing immediately.

It ^{thing was made obvious} ~~became clear~~ (incidentally also to two
foreign powers France & the U.S.) that Britain
was prepared to participate in a nuclear
armed aggression with the Soviet Union, or in
^{colonial} guerrilla wars where we had troops e.g.
against EOKA in Cyprus, and against
Mao Mao in Kenya; but we had no
capacity for conventional small wars.

The next day reports from the legal
Dept of the Foreign Office began to leak
upward: we had no legal basis

for undoing the nationalisation of the Canal, unless the Egyptians closed it to shipping which (with the exception of Israeli ships) they had no intention of doing.

These bleak facts were known to the Prime Minister, but ~~the public mood was~~ not to the public whose mood was one of angry belligerence reflected in Press headlines "NO more Hitlers" (Daily Herald), and in an almost unanimous denunciation of Nasser in Parliament. Eden had no difficulty whatsoever in getting the Cabinet to agree that Britain would recover control of the Canal "by force if necessary"; though one minister whispered to me that it should have been "by force if possible".

It was this yawning gap between what was possible & what was necessary that Britain and its Govt still had to comprehend. British ~~and~~ policies in all the private exchanges of this time between Ministers, (if minutes were kept), between Ministers & their private offices, between private offices preparing briefs for their ministers, in all this

(which we learned about only if)

for sending the rest of the...
under the Egyptian...
which (with the exception of...)
had no intention of doing.

The...
Minister...
the public...
intelligence...
"No more letters" (Daily Herald)...
on almost unanimous...
Nasser is...
difficult...
to expect that Britain...
cost of the Canal...
"in face of..."

X order - that was why Britain had extra
tested its own hydrogen bomb a few months
earlier. Of course we were not strong enough
to defeat Russia alone, but here

was possible...
that Britain...
comprehend...
all the private...
between the...
later private...
for the...
(...)

network which makes up the fabric of Govt,
there was always the unmentioned assumption
that ^{Britain} Imperial interests overrode ~~the rights~~
any other rights. Britain and ^{help} ~~the~~ Empire
had saved the world for Hitler, with
the belated help of others, & both must be
preserved to save the world again from
latter day ~~the~~ dictators, however. Mind America was
to the left in Britain or the Right in
America might be to the latest threats.

The ~~Commonwealth~~ Empire was seen
by most Conservative ministers, and by
many on the Labour side as 'the best
world wide guarantor of law and order'.
← ~~of course it was not strong enough~~
~~to stand up to Russia by itself,~~
but here surely America could be
counted on to help preserve ^{itself and} its most
dependable ally — that was why America
was called to the meeting on July 26th.

But almost immediately after that
meeting we learnt from Washington
that the Administration was deeply
disturbed at Britain's belligerence.
Within a week we had visits from Ambassadors

Murphy, then for ~~the~~ Dulles himself followed by
polite but firm warning letters from
Eisenhower. By mid August there could be
no doubt that America would not
support the ^{for British imperial interests} use of force in the Middle East.
~~Though Dulles had said Nasser should~~
~~be made to 'disgorge' his ill gotten gains.~~

I confess that this attitude very
much surprised me because, though I
had known American anti-imperialism
when I was at the Washington Embassy
in the Roosevelt days, it seemed
incredible that Dulles should continue
this line when he had been begging
Eisenhower two years before to join in
a war to save the French colonies in
Indo-China. Yet it was clear to
me that the Administration was adamant
and many of ~~us~~ in its opposition
to Britain's imposing ^{her} will on a
country which she had long regarded
as part of the life line of Empire. ~~Like~~
[Many of the 'weak sisters' (as doubters
about the use of force were characterised
by the Prime Minister) were rather relieved
at this evidence of opposition from
an unexpected and powerful source,

~~but the Cabinet leadership which was now~~
~~in the hands of Eden & Macmillan~~
but the "Suez Committee" of the Cabinet ignored
the warning signs. They managed to do
this by some odd pretences: Eden in particular
blamed it all on Nasser, whom he detested,
and always maintained that "Ike would
never let us down; after all he's ~~known~~ a
~~about~~ soldier who knows about war".

Macmillan, who had worked with Eisenhower
in North Africa, also maintained to the
very end that Ike would never really
'lie doggo' if Britain ~~attacked~~ used force;
but he also shared with the Suez Group
in the ^{consequence} Party a profound belief that
the Empire must act to defend
itself even if America did not see
at once that ~~its~~ ^{their} interests coincided (this was part
of the leadership that Greeks gave to
Romans).

Anyway the die was cast and the
"srah sisters" were reminded that on
August 2nd the Cabinet had decided to use
force if necessary; all its members were
locked into their collection cage, and
new members (such as the First Lord of the

Admiralty, Quintin Hogg, had to reconcile themselves to this discomfort which they only learned about when they were on the inside. There could not be any public flettering because it was as important to be seen to be ~~ready~~ ^{prepared} to use force, as it was to be capable of using force. Few of the inner circle doubted that Nasser would fall or be overthrown when he saw the might of Britain turned against him.

For this reason there was a well orchestrated campaign of sabre rattling. I was in charge of rattling it in the direction of the Press, and at least can claim that I had some success in that Nick Crossman started warning his colleagues in Parliament & the Press that the future was dark with the threat of "Clark's War". But ~~the Cabinet~~ also Ministers were also huffing & puffing to blow down NASSER. The Prime Minister in his August T.V. broadcast set the tone by proclaiming that we could not allow foreigners to control a canal that was vital to our oil supply. This theme that foreigners (which became

G4 Gyppo's in common parlance) must be brought their place and not interfere with the life line of Empire, ~~because~~ he was widely used in private diplomatic exchanges, with disastrous results. Britain would become another Netherlands if it yielded, Macmillan was fond of saying (the Dutch Ambassador didn't much like it, but thought it funny).

'I would rather paint the picture in the National Gallery than be humiliated by Nasser' was another of Macmillan's dinner time remarks; while the Prime Minister told a visitor "I would rather see the Empire fall in one crash than be nibbled away by mice". He had a lot of foreign visitors in that long hot summer (if only for the ~~two~~ Concl. Thurs Conferences) and they got some very odd treatment. A Yugoslav who expressed doubts about the use of force was told by the head of the Foreign Office "Britain is not used to getting advice from small Balkan Powers" and a Swede was simply asked "What did your country do in the last war?".

Such foreign representatives often talked to their own newspapermen in

town; ~~he talked to their British journalistic~~
~~colleagues~~ so that I soon got a stream
of worried calls from European & Commonwealth
correspondents enquiring solicitously ~~whether~~
~~we were all going off our rockers~~
about the mental health of the Govt
of Great Britain.

King Lear-like,

As we continued to breathe threats
against NASSER the British Press began
to hear second thoughts also, and in
the absence of Parliament during the
summer recess the national debate
took place in the Press, ^{and was} reflected in
the B.B.C. The Prime Minister tried to
reel the Press by a couple of almost
unprecedented ^{of the regard} meetings with editors,
which altered nothing. He was even
more worried about the B.B.C. because
of its overseas services which were
extensively heard in Egypt and
"gave aid & comfort to the enemy" by
reporting on British domestic divisions
and thus destroying some of the
credibility of our threats. From
this resulted innumerable schemes to
discipline the B.B.C. and eventually

spell. 7

produced the ludicrous Black Propaganda station of Shark el Adna to pour into Egypt the Goebbels-type stuff the BBC would never accept (I note with relief that this whole rattle was kept a complete secret from me).

The credibility of the Empire's war of news was also somewhat undermined by the opposition of Krishna Menon speaking publicly for India (though Nehru had originally reassured the Prime Minister that he had known nothing of Nasser's intentions though he was a state guest of Egypt in the 4 weeks preceding the nationalisation). Even the Australian Foreign Minister expressed strong doubts about the use of force, though Menzies, his Prime Minister, went on BBC at the Eden's request to reiterate Australia's solidarity with Britain. But the Anglo-French threats (for France this was an extension of their existing Algerian war) depended for any credibility on the acquiescence of the United States.

It was this which Muller


withdrew in October when in the shadow of the American election he declared ^{to a press conference} that he would not ~~see~~ agree to the use of force to reopen the Canal if hypothetically it was closed by Egypt. Turning the knife in the wound he said he would not back associated with "the Colonial Powers."

That was the moment of truth for the Cabinet. There was no longer a possibility of overturning Nasser without the ^{actual} use of force; we must go forward with such allies as we could find, or turn back and compromise, with all the humiliation that would involve. There was a lot of pressure to get the best compromise we could; I certainly warned that support ^{from "war"} from the British Press would be meagre, and the Foreign Secretary was made aware of how little support we would find amongst nations, even allies. Amazingly when Ugd at the United Nations did work out an extraordinarily good compromise. But the die had been cast earlier; the Prime Minister had got the Cabinet to pledge the use

of force, if necessary, and now, ~~the~~ in a Faustian scene, Macmillan reminded the Cabinet of this and said he could not continue his association with an administration that failed to live up to its pledges. First in he was to be First out a few weeks later, ^{when} he discovered belatedly that sterling, of which he was the official guardian, was the weakest spot in our imperial armour.

There is no reason to go into the details of the Suez fiasco; I have nothing significant new to tell. But Aulton, writing ^{labels} his account "No end of lesson"; what was the lesson ~~to~~ to be learnt from the summer of 1956?

(more)



Notes on Part IV
The McNamare years.

Needs an intro that takes in OMI.
(? Shd this be linking, chptr? yes).

Start with meeting with Bob & George
in Port of Jan '68.

Note on earlier meeting TV. Feb 67.
Before or after Montreal?

Barbara had told me of Bob's interest.

'67 meeting produced this. (M.B. came
after an L.B.J. meeting & interview of Rusk)

So anxious to get job in '68.

Also bored of OMI. & lack of impact
of ODM. Narrowness of Civil
Service. Mchen & Unesco.

I felt that Dev was a
global topic not a
national political
one. Even after
my experience with
UNDP. Hence
interest in Mahen
Unesco & Pearson
& Tidewater

Meeting at Edward Boyle's house
Geo W. & R. Mahen & Barbara.

Origins of the Pearson Cttee.
(Shirley Franks designated).

G.W. asks me to do the Stockholm speech. BU does
+ G.W. advise

First day at Bank or spend
hours with O.F.

Much talk of RSM (2 me) about global effort

2.

Quite determined to get the job
George & body chemistry.

The Germans were the new thing.
becos of had many. G-U. cd not
raise it in U.S. Hence cut backs in
Bank program.

I claimed to know Germans becos
of Konigsinter
and stressed urgency of Rev. on
big scale.

Tried humor. F licker of a smile.
M^cN. watches me so steadily.
on trial & accepted. 19th Feb:

\$285.
(Salary at M^cN level: ~~changed~~ down.)

Going home mid Feb: write to Times
about Westmoreland. Get in becos out
of hand.

3.

Not had I got.

Interested and job which I really wanted
after the failure of No 10. At the top of
Britain. IPRD has got prestige.

RMCN. was a great figure

but adverse reports for Denis H. & the
Refugee Secy's. (Denis says with his speeches).
(Marked reports on me to Bdi & to me
on Bdi. Wary).

Stewart A. a flawed genius.

Paul Douglas said he lied.

Walt Rostow was patronising; he
doesn't know about Dev. you must keep
him right.

I was sure he was a very big man
very powerful. Really interested in Dev. ('67).
of my feelings on joining Eden.

Much less my senior but that doesn't
matter; he was my superior & a better
figure. I was determined to
avoid an Oedipus situation

and so determined to be satisfied at his beck & call, not to try & make a separate reputation. (I felt content with the praise of job see column in Times).

Also to win his favour & so be made a school prefect.

I believe in arranged friendships.
There was a certain good basis

- ① My credentials in Press & Dev.
- ② The very fact that I too was not a Bank man. At first P.C. meeting the only newcomer; having an outside

5.

The New Headmaster

Meeting of P.C. on April 1st.

All hold overs of G.W. (inc Rainer)
I was invited (had called G.W.)
Was this the seat of power

Who met: Knapp, Alderwood, Brocks,
Remitt, Friedman add: Rosen, Pipman
Clark, Shoair

Complaints about Capgen, the Board,
& Woods. The attitude of the P.C.
to the Bank's operations, perfectionist
patternist (W.V. has no business to be
into development) dedicated. Public
rel's were to Wall Street on triple
AAA rating on good. The right to
be based on excellence of our
projects. Inclined to borrow due
to bell it & that seems fine; also
Capgen looks up I.O.A. - perhaps
R.M.C.N. cd help there.

6.

Who did P.C. see in President's chair.

Aging white kid.

Egg on his face over Vietnam

"Socked" by C.B.S. who had

himself now given up ("not
altogether a surprise") and was
suing for peace ("of course obvious
negotiation and way out for two
years" said to Adnan Melik)

He was at the
dinner previous
week.

But clearly a great name will
be given in Washington. (not in Wall St
of Blacks, Woods)

P.C. was afraid of him, who
(LDS expect to go) would be prominent, what might he
do to Bank's reputation & policy

He wanted brief. I.F. under. Ref to H.H.H. He became much too
brisk & decisive.

was he really interested. Most thought
no (News week reports) and tend
to stake out their territory.

("Moment of frustration" I did not
have to be a banker". Offer of Penn
RR).

RSM Shocked to find we don't help the poorest because Bankable projects not suitable for them. None Egypt because of Congress. None Algeria because of French pressure.

(RS)

7.

What I sensed (over early days esp with O.F.*)
was that he thought Bank was grossly
underutilised, tho excellent. Held
back by fears about finance. Inefficient
way to run a planet.

Wasteful & inefficient (more important
than march) ^{a dangerous}

* Thanks to G.W. included in meeting with O.F. (who had warned don't go back
to him) Pres Article)

I adapted to this & found myself
like Col. Blimp God sir...

~~my acts with~~

Second Meeting of P.C.

The Five Year plan. to secure 20% I.F.
without constraint

Also from me (Politics is 25% of the job)
^{political will - my name.}

to break on curves.

I remain behind (so get a lift)
^{which he offers}

Talk about P.C. did they get the
message?

Problems of communication. Use of me
as fellow newscaster.

Got the dammy at side

Next I checked (our copy says 0.7) was that the North Bank was good and utilized, the excellent. Held back by fears that the... will be in a...
a diagram

worked a coefficient (more important than...)
* The... included... and... (see... in...)

I checked to this a...
the Col. Blip... in...

~~... ..~~

Second Meeting of P.C.
The Fin... plan to...
with... constant
also from me (P... is...)

we break on...
I remain... (at...)
Talk about P.C. did...
... ..

Also note that Population (not derived for experience but figures features in 3 early spectra)

... ..
... ..

Within a month it was apparent we would have a rapid expansion. Bob keeps on finding countries ^{& sections} we have neglected, so new directions too.

(Tidewater: Colon. Management)

At a time of declining interest in Aid & Third World backing the tide. Inspiration for Third World allegiance ("progression to a halt") - his passion for chicks - even his own. Perhaps saved 5 years of N/S split.

But it had to be sold. The Annual Meeting speech already being planned by end April. This was to be instrument for selling to Govts. We would not make any speech before it.

Now this speech was written & publicised. By me. Pollect. Aug. 1968. No stats. (Becos of N.Y. law art)

What it said. (read the speech)

Just what I wanted set out targets for 5 years & get them on the record.

9.

The later speeches:

Maddox. his merits. H.M.V.

Not Bob intended of the speeches.

series of lectures: to be read.

Directed primarily to donors

but also to senior planners. CDC's

intuition followed by statistical

underpinning. Enormous amount

of work. Cherry. McClure

They were not good speeches.

NOR even good chapters in a book.

They were necessary guides to
what RSM was up to & where
he wanted support, & not behind him.

They show the unfolding of his
perception & his education.

origins of LDR. is residue of
notes for speeches. "Don't mind if
all DPs done for six months is
produce background for spel".

+ bench marks.

The cost/benefit

Permission.

2. The staff.

Surprisingly resistant to the progress.
Feeling ~~that~~ implied criticism.

Also too much emphasis on the AID as opposed to investment Bank both unpopular in US etc and demeaning. Old Bank idea of trickle down (unconscious still accepted by RSM but his intuition against)

Felt overworked & undervalued.
Bob's capacity to do everything a little better & knew more detail

I learn all matters of statistical detail to the President of this Bank.

Slowness vs perfectionism.

RSM wants perfect at once

How to communicate with staff.

He had the managerial style of the tycoon; line of command sees only Top people (in countries too). & P.C. is a face.

It didn't work - never in 12 years.

11.

Regular attempts to get him to meet
Repts (my memo of April!)

He always believed people must be
as devoted to dev. as he was. They
weren't because their career etc depended
on something quite else - the Bank's rules.
How can you alter this in vast org.
(decent decline? RSM always opposed)

Squalor continued through 12 years.
Whenever staff arose saw RSM all
was good but rest of time the
US caused trouble.

In 1968 strong opp. to 'move'
and ruin our credit rating etc.
Cavanagh resigns goes to Bahamas.

Staff gossips to Press.
which is always ready.

Marty Rosen goes next. IFC bent
towards NW.

12.

Persuading the Host Country.

a. Press b. Congress c. Admin.
see p 16

Clearly was going to be difficult:
discredited regime, angry congress that
wants nothing to do with outside or Third
World. A leader who was part of the
discredit. But who felt sure he could
manage Congress. Desire to do so
himself. Bank & I oppose.

But RSM was part of the Amer. Pol.
scene. He had played a large part in
defecting gold water. He'd been asked to
be V.P. He'd appeared before Congress
exp over Tonkin.

1

The film interview for Bobby K.
Indiana Primary. Loyalty to Kennedy's
Clapperguidick & the 1980 Primary.
He was close to J.C.'s cabinet not to
him. & v. close to Kissinger.
(knipped badly over Cambodia & Middle
East)

Launches
the J.F.K.

Congress.

He'd learnt his politics from L.B.J. Used to tell about his telephoning for the lunch table.

Always the mirage of getting things right. During 12 years never a time when funds were not pending in Congress.

How this influenced the Bank.

RPM forgot hard, IOA defected twice & always late. He learnt that we had had margin of about 5 votes & if they were lost we were dead.

At first thought it was a dip & was deficient (e.g. Egypt & IOA). Later came to fear that US. wd drop out or doubt the Bank as it did in '72 with Schweizer & Fund.

Supposed to be dealt with by Treasury (post RPM refused for JFK)
No good Secy's; no good reports for I.A. (tho BO wd deny this)

Bill Simon an enemy. RPM forget him & outmanoeuvred him over

14.

Development Cttee. (2 over IDA) 2 over pay.

But with the Democrats back in "power"
he was closer to Treasury & saw their real
problems & tried to help.

Hence Vietnam letter
& P.L.O.

But n.b. the Long Cttee

which he handled beautifully.

Perhaps he shd really hv dealt with Congress
directly.

World Bank (AID) & over 100

Emphasise here that he was anxious to provide a Bank that stood for international, global war on poverty not western, not southern but a Govt of all the peoples. (one reason why he was determined to get East Europe & China in).

But in the end the Bank was not to be. He had to be satisfied with the fact that he had helped to establish the World Bank.

15:

Sum up. RSM & USA.

He fought his own Turf.

stopped White House using Bank

It was independent under him, and that did not mean it was European, Third World etc dominated.

But he was an American

sympathises with Admin vs Congress
reads only US papers.

At ease in Europe. Not in US.

At ease with US. senior staff?

Anxious to be respected in US.

(hence Chicago honour)

So does things in American way.

Brings enormous credit to US. in Third W.

& leans over backwards to keep

US in the fold. (Is just as rough
with Millar as with Geoff Howe).

The sad thing is the decline of the
US. second rate E.D's. A Congress run by
Pawman or Long. no real leadership
as in Vandenberg (excellent) or Rayburn. NO
public political will (shd we have done
more?)

ARM & MTR ga map

21

RSM's reputation with the Press e.g. Louis Howe

Leak of confidences. See p 18. RCH in hand

It was in the past but under him and
that did not mean it was European. This would be the
But he was an American
apparently with Admin in papers
reads out of US papers.
All at ease in Europe. Admin in
at ease with US. minor staff?
Americans to be respected in US
(have Chicago lesson)

So does things in American way.
Principles in our own credit to US in thinking
a lesson we look towards to keep
US in the past. (is just a rough
with Wilson or with Jefferson)

The sad thing is the decision after
US. second vote E.O. A. Company and
Pomeron and Lord. no real leadership
as in Vandenberg (ex-KNH) or Pearson. No
rather p. National will (and in some cases
inverts)

16.

The Press.

At the end of first week I started to prepare program for Press etc. It was very thorough & really got nowhere. Why? The Info Dept. Lars Lind ~~capable~~ and used to low profile. RSM dis liked him.

myself used to the Press Attache's job expected to find people interested in my news. No: interested in McNamara and his past; not his future. "Why have you kept so much out of Press?" Sen by had kept him out.

He was determined not to talk about it - not to justify or recriminate. Even "Essence of Security" was turned into a Development pamphlet.

What I learned was that he was always taking a critical path analysis seeing step by step to his chosen end - but that chosen end was not always clear & reached to others.

An example education & my idea of Dev. Policy Studies. waits till he has got a new Dir. ~~or~~ a new set up etc. By third

The Press

Secrecy. A new concept in Bank e.g. the C.P.P.'s & the first few W.D.R.'s (Prospects) publicist about not be wanted and secrecy about the rest. A challenge to Watergate Washington.

I never knew what he was doing of Eden, McIliffe.

He always lunched in his own dining room because he did not want to be seen (cf de la R. or Dag)

What I learned was that he was always taking a vitrol both on his way in and out of the door and that he never stepped in the door and out of the door and never out of the door and never out of the door.

On the other hand, I was told that he was always taking a vitrol both on his way in and out of the door and that he never stepped in the door and out of the door and never out of the door and never out of the door.

time I was nothing to do with me.
Because publication & Press was a separate
step.

They ludicrous
conditions.

He used the Press to get his message
across. What's there in it for the Bank
(identify self & bank). Secrecy about the rest.

I don't see why I shd write their
stories for them. *The adversarial relationship.*

Was this what managing the news
meant. *Insistence on response to all attacks. (or.)*

It didn't suit my style & I was
glad to pass it on to Merriam.

(Reflections on his very tight
management style. Makes for misery
or squirming, but if you get somewhere
& cd in his support which was not
unreasonably withheld he wd give fully.
I was much too compliant.)

He knew & was known to all the Press.
in Washington

(Difficulty of dealing with Europe
through the back correspondents so much
more to do).

Respected by the columnists, not of
the cons. Lewis Kern, etc. Feel that
he was never candid with them.

(He should be truth) Used them.

These people did not forget easily,
but by 1970 it seemed to ease

Then Pentagon Papers.

How I learnt.

Not Bob said of them. <sup>and his talk to
Scotty.</sup>

How they were used.

A sort of overture to President's Tapes.
Symbolise breakdown of trust in U.S.

Bob as caged lion.

It slowed him down but did not
deflect.

Gain Congress & Press chance to look
further, what skullduggery?

e.g. the anti semite ProOps scandal.

see papers
on these

Lost his temper. (Dined with Kay)

The Clergy scandal.

The Pay row.

The view is not known to all the press
 in Washington
 (with a lot of dealing with Congress)
 through the back channel so much
 more to do)
 Proposed by the administration not
 the Congress. Louis Brandeis etc. feel the
 he was more confident with them
 (He should be treated) Wood
 These people did not forget easily
 but in 1970 it seemed to ease
 The Part 10 - 10 papers
 Nov 1970
 That Bob said of them.
 Nov 1970
 A sort of reaction to President's tapes
 Republican reaction of trust in US
 Bob on a copy of his
 He showed him down but did not
 affect.
 Gen Carter a firm class to look
 further, what should happen?
 The out come of 1970's could

Foreign Aid was always a matter of domestic
 politics (less a part of propaganda) & so the role
 M.N. concept was an allusion.

19.

goes in Latin

based on dislike of over-
powerful IMB

origins of Pay now in Treasury.

Mike Blumenthal thinks he can appease
Cepres. RPA knows better

Kafka etc.

Flames get out of hand.

Fanned by daily Press reports of I.P.A.
(Then Arabs take part)

Effect on Bank staff morale.

"Explain to them!!"

my failures & Bob's support.
Contempt for U.S. as it declined
in power ungracefully.

^{OECD}
The European Press & UDC's.
much better esp UK.
but then UK drops off.

How important is the Press.

Bob quite right to be aware it can
wreck reputations (AID) hence extreme
cautious to stories. But U.S. press
has not learnt how to deal with

Mr. Dick Post's
attempt

Third world economics ^{stories}. So it doesn't
have a policy, or know whether it is shown.

Decline of U.S. Press on many matters esp. the secondary. T.V. takes over
& does not deal with these items at all.

20

Press.

The Third World with a focus on the Caribbean.
A world where the common people are the focus.
The common people are the focus of the world.

2227

2

The Third world int v. govt. ex c Kochman.

Board wants to discuss policy but can't get a hold
So discussing and get a detail. on the whole critical of govt

Telling & selling the world.

There was a much bigger world than US to deal with.

Concentrated in Board. ^{describe meetings perhaps first X}

R.S.M. made aware by G.W. of its awkwardness. First meeting. Technical paper on devaluation adjustments. withdrawn. Never let himself go in unbriefed. Secretary debriefs Board & Preboard meetings.

Like P.Q.'s extraordinary amount of trouble taken on the side for the good.

But R.S.M. determined he will run Bank with advice & consent of board. Policy then: execution Monetary. Keiftinck & Stone challenge this, over doubling & 5 year plan & the speech. Annual Report is Boards.

R.S.M.'s mastery of argument of board. Protects his staff. (inc. me).

But Board changed ^{fast} / a was not high level even in their reporting. Britain good US. poor

Telling & selling the world

The row a much bigger world than
 to deal with.
 Concentrated in Board.
 RSM needs cover by 1/2 of it
 and members. First meeting Technical
 paper on derivatives adjustments.
 Little known. Now let himself go in
 unbridled. Several debates Board
 & Board meetings.
 Like P.D. is extra ordinary amount
 of the world taken on the Board for the
 good.
 But R.M. determined he will run
 Board with advice & consent of Board
 giving their execution 11 weeks out.

Perhaps board was most influential as budgetary.
 Always used as threat to hold down. The McKinsey
 review was put forward as an efficiency ^{economy} gimmick
 & central direction but not so that they could pursue
 their own regional prejudices. Large Americans at
 very top. Note on Hollis; emphasis on economics
 & figures. (None got on well with Board)

Bob feels that advice Bank gives is more
 important than money. Hence DPS & LDR.

22.

"If you have a good horse don't sleekle it?"

Brief period of good board Derek & Claude.
Critical of R.S.M. but trying to push forward.

This is the great function of board.

Coincides with his first reelection
(tell that story) Nixon quite pro R.S.M.

but the Palace Guard wants to replace

(I'll have call for Unit 40 in camp days)

Tony Thomas of Times starts this

we get it through in 71 before election
fever - but also hurts P.P.S.

BdW. never really consulted. no publicity
spite of my warnings! (of leaks).

(Third Term Peing went till '65. no real
doubt but Board in a tizzy. ^{love that out} The U.S.
late again. Tony Solomon tells R.S.M. to
see Carter.

my own doubts about the wisdom; think of retiring. Ned offered to
do so in 71.

Reorganisation.

~~Aid~~ Really done by M. Graves who'd worked
in Tanzania. The top were frightened
of M. Namara & he made quite
sure that he got what was wanted.
Recent discussion with Wash. and
under him. D.P.S. was established.
His nets to Clevery.

"If you have a good bar don't check it"

Kind period of good board work & class

In spite of all this care the teaching problem never gets less.

Some people found it led to fill in 37 forms & such

Consider with his first re-election

(All that to say) Nixon on quite far R. W. 1971

but the policy board wants to replace

(I have call for this No in my days)

Top Team of Times start this

we get it through in 71 before election

four - but also that 9.2.

Bob, very well controlled in 1971

(spit of my own mind of looks)

(Third Term being over 1972 no real

date but Board in - 1972. The U.S.

late again. Top 2000 or there R. W. to

see Carter.

my own choice was to replace that of Carter. The office is

The organization.

And help done by M. Green had worked

in Times since. The top one finished

of M. Newman & he made quite

sure that he got what was wanted.

He went into it with work. and

in the time. D. G. 2. was at United.

his idea to change.

Met continued was the extremely strict budgeting both setting & spending. And v. tight personnel. The paper tiger of the board refusing it. Real need to show extreme efficiency (Giscard's candid remarks that multi-nets are more expensive)
 Some momentaries put in to hold the line.

^{like the R.V.P.s}
 Board needed very strong hand to bring the diverse interests together. But as they came to rely on it that they continued to fight for their corner. RSO's stopped board polarising (e.g. the vote eqpt paying air fares of New Co) But there was not the sense of unit one hoped:
 jealousy of Part I for their own programs;
 Part II want larger share of power & money.

^{on global base}
 But Board hardly sees itself as a mirror of the biggest & best New Inst. Now this lie ahead. OR will it be the best's new best, or worse still the south's

That continued was the extent of that
 had gotten that extent a spending and
 v. the person. The paper says of the
 board referring it. Had need to show
 extreme efficiency (pin card's card remarks
 that month not in more extensive)
 some momentaries put in to hold the line.

Case 2022

Board needed very strong lead to
 hang the diverse interest together. But as
 it came to rest on that it continued
 to fight for this cause. Risk of appeal
 board program (e.g. the vote got
 going in favor of the Co). But this
 was not the case of unit one asked:
 policies of Part I for the on program;
 Part II about large line of part program.

But Board hardly see itself as
 interested of the biggest a part in that
 was the the lead. or will it be

Loyalty to JFK & all K's, also to
 LBJ. Flight Acna-Texas to
 open library.

24.

The world outside.

Early on talked about visiting an parish* (my companion's advantage knew W. III) delighted when asked to accompany him, surprised that it shd be one of very few countries I hadn't gone to. Indonesia.

* Suggested travel to all 3 ^{new} continents by 69, and call in on Part I on way e.g. Japan. accepted, but not practised. "My place is in Third World," can see W.I. in annual meetings etc.

Around we shd not be lending to 5th largest country. (Habit of filling vacuums; no shirking of responsibility or feeling that's someone else's job)

The global ranch.

We were to go via Europe becos of Frankfurt loan ^{and}
I was lecturing to Comw. Club & went to UK.

Bobby's death. R.S.M. stricken tears at board. (emotion always just below surface). Does the loan and the funeral. I watched on TV as they lost the grave, becos I had to return & take over

The World outside

Early on talked about visiting on
point* (my computer checks how W.I.I.I.)
delighted she asked to accompany him surprised
that it was in one of my free countries!
didn't go to. Unknown.

* suggested to go to all 3 continents by
pd and call in on part I or way r.f.
2 years. occupied but not interested.
The place is in Third World con
the W.I. in annual meeting etc.

Abroad we did not have to
at least country (Kitt of filling
revenues; no thinking of independence
or feeling that
Met Chrissie

we were to go via Cape Town
of Frankfurt from London
I was returning to Texas. This
went to N.Y.

Bobbing back. R.S.M. situation
then at board (understanding you
also surface). Over the door and the
funch. I watched a TV on the boat
the ocean, here I had a water table

25

from Rainer.

So turned up very somber on June 9 about 4 hours after end of funeral. Bob & Mary huddling. Brilliant day. Trip around San Fran. on to H.K.

Endless energy but no feeling of being driven. The sounds of Vietnam & two assassins did not show. I found the happy father relationship - later so little done, so much to do. Shadows of the prison house.

(How far internal to me; did he feel I had not done well or was it me?). I lose the tickets - how wildly inefficient. (? Mary has them exc mine).

Impressed by his knowledge - derived from prepared papers, & desire to acquire knowledge. Easy terms with all ministers (esp the Berkeley Mafia) but deferential to Head of State. But not over impressed e.g.

by his anti-communism
All I wanted was to see that he was not over the top & reasonably efficient. (Needs the powerful office & Bernie Bell). He does not mind altering for circumstances. This was case where he was quite determined to control himself.

Impressed by potential wealth & popularity

The visit to Bangladesh on Day 5 of Revolution.
Visit to Mexico in 78. See RioG, as NTS leader

Possible note on the benefit
of lots of top conversations.

It is stamina on the journey usually Tenurest,
and not 3 sects to himself

eg. to Manila for United May 79. The visit
Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand (populets a
clinic at Banpruk) - Got back Monday 1 a.m.

P.C. 9.30 Board Tuesday. To Chicago for
speech, crowd & buses. Beck a bed with
no voice & bed alert. Provide over crucial
board on Kefke Thurs.

26.

This was the beginning of the great education at first I was something of a tutor, but of course soon cut stopped.

Other heads of states of note. Bokassa
Julius, Senghor, Kaunda, Nasser, Sekou Toure

(What problems!) The remarkableness of the African leadership. Some merits of Kings e.g. Shah, Jordan, fathers of their country.

Thai.

~~14.~~ Lots of v. funny things happen, but really impressive is of people doing an immense difficult task with energy but not always skill.

These trips are meant to educate both ways. To show Bank interest (esp new ones e.g. Egypt, Indonesia, Francophone Africa) & what sort of a Bank it is.

And to find out what sort of Bank is needed.

RSM is quite naive about Dev. & Third World e.g. India or Pund Dev, & putting more people off hand & more horse power into their heads. Also v. critical of India as Bank traditionally was. So I wrote airport statement full of praise. Flew in in PIA plane. (First to Afghan, watched "polo"; the one Khyber Trucean story)

I believe I was useful (planning) these trips - outside the Metropoles

This is how to sell to world and what.

Evolution of the Parent Program

5/2

Preparation on the Black books. He after knows
far more than the Cabinet. But not the
second time. Paper No. brilliant presentation by
ODIN. But Bob tries to check aqnt officials
in the field.

Not a happy trip. His refusal to speak to Press. Not a
free press enquiry. Airport statements.

NB. Brazil's stop reaction. Ruffin

bearing in mind Guy Hunter. Always one day of travel on land outside towns & towns see National monuments (sad about Museums).

Seeing Bank projects often made us feel some irrelevance. esp. in agriculture & education. & income distribution.

Q.

East Af: trip (? 71?) met late & explode about education.

Bruce McKenzie & new African farming at medium level.

5 Julius, cabinet meeting, idea of making the small holder more productive. Break through of the century.

RMCN questions the (Brit) Min of Ag. gets no great enthusiasm - he wants loans for his affairs (gt difficulty of Bank's reputation for Big)
But talks about it.

It seems easier to another problem the skewing of income. Where we had seen this (S. America ^{Brazil/No. E.} & India).
Tis not really a filthy rich vs awful poor, but more a by passing of the many, & the expanding money.
Trickle down ok. if no urging of Pop expro

Pearson was better than just more, but his
radical suggestions (e.g. pay interest on Bank
loans into I O A) were not accepted (see opp)
Europeans e.g. New Lane think it is all intended
for U.S.

No follow up exc. with Amstburg.

Bdr's refusal to run a UD Council.

(My proposals for a Summit 18 rich 7 poor)

Bdr believed that New Co would slow things
down. So keeps Bank free of attempt

How far did R.S.M. succeed

Copenhagen meeting was a climax & confrontation
Notes on the preparations. Talks to Galt & police. IMF would
to ignore. Speak to Danish students; get Janed to do so
& he says you are attacking the wrong man. Equally
the speech is addressed to wrong audience. Finance Ministers
are very un concerned & non G10 business.

* See Oct 23
70 memo.

[a lot of Barbara in Copenhagen speech. Emotional]

After Copenhagen "things can never be the
same" see Nov 4 '70

28.

in the direction of bottom up

Another line of Pressure was the left.

Began really straight after Pearson which was accepted as MORE of RSM (note any real changes like separate IOA Bank opposed because he wants to ensure that Bank is really developmental. L.B.P. & Arthur Lewis thought Bank never could be. (of Klock. too)

This of course was Teresa line. Not quite wrong esp about Lat. Am. as we had found.

Picked up of 5th etc at Williamsburg developed by Hollis Re distribution with growth. Not just clearing credit back but developing at bottom quantile.

I try to explain this to Bank staff & find considerable scepticism.

The militants in Europe & student revolt Heidelberg Tidenwater - climax in Copenhagen. So Vietnam & Bank get mixed again.

I proposed that we shd deal with left at Copenhagen; But out did that by ^{as alternative to world bank} producing a war on poverty. Turning point see Memo of NOV 4. 70.

N.B. how these memos operate. No formal response, often very, very late.

The run up to Nairobi.

All sorts of pressures to do more for poor.
 We take this into our sails; but question
 is how do we help poor. Answer is
 by making them more productive; since
 majority are in rural areas first
 attention there. RSM asks Monty can we
 go ahead at 5% p.a.? M.Y. reluctant at
 first. Speed & program are equal
 shedding. After wards RSM keeps v-careful
 eye on all Rural Dev. projects; report
 every six months. Puts ex P.A. leaf ch. in
 charge

I tried to do some physical building in
 Nairobi report. But ignored this as a
 hind. So I suggest a Part II book
 get it out. I had one at a P.2. but
 very small with little more on hand.
 Still think of speeches on new
 work was for night, the w.p. his first
 review in 75, little in 80

The run up to Nov 80

All sort of rumors to do with
the fact that the Board is
in how to do the report, which is
by making the more productive; vice
vice versa in a much more
attention than the other. The
go back to 2/80. M. X. etc. etc.
even. Spend a program on
building. After words to keep
up on all the other projects; report
every 2 weeks. Part 2. etc. etc.
change

I tried to do some philosophy building in
Annual Report. Bob ignored this as Boards not
his. So I suggest a Part II but he says
get it out. I play every at a D.P.S. but
very small until Hollis comes on board.

Still thinks of speeches as main instrument
& won't use for anything else e.g. his first term
review in 72, ditto in '80.

Between Copenhagen & Nairobi. 71 & 72.

Collapse of the U.S. \$

Rising organization of W. III. (OPEC)

Bank has to find itself a new position.
It is giving both IDA & IBRD, banking
outside US. Needs to be independent of
Nixon's U.S.

Bdr. reelection was in spite of U.S.

1971 I spent some time in Europe (Memo's
Jan 71) found that many countries now
realized Bank mattered more than they
wanted to influence it.

Assumed if they failed that it was
because RSTH was still run by US. - he really
wanted to seize center ground & be
independent of both.

Also this was period of building
a philosophy & practice of development
and selling it through the speeches. Both
71 & 72 get little attention because of
nature of meetings. See Memo's

d concern
with I.M.F.

But it are set by Santiago/Unctad
Speech. Bottom 40%. Short cuts to

* Impatient that at this time Council was Secy of Treasury. Mutual loyalty.

"We need to show that we are enemies of poverty, not just friends of the poor"

"World anti Poverty League" (like Anti Slavery)

R.M.M. agrees but it is not his style (e.g. Productivity of the Poor; = increasing the productivity of the low production elements in society).

But absolute POOR is his.

quoting way in which he is attacked by the idiot left for not reaching the poor (and Long)

He does it with care on the roads. But he is so eminent and he can speak for the Bank.

The Paris office & all its problems. Swiss referendum. alliance of R & L.

high development. (basic human needs e.g. fortified nutrition)

Recognise it is end of period of infinite growth

and of \$ supremacy. ^{also} (see memo). ^{is count}

Adapt to this.

Need to get on with UN. ^{See p 32}

Hence visit to United III

Global position

Try to gain a lead as with Part I
in or G-77.

I. Urge a new Pearson principle Part II.
Failure of UNCTAD creates danger but
also R.S.M. thinks they are barking
up wrong tree.

Need to show ~~and~~ mutual interest for
rich world. Both B.W. & I urge this
on '72 speech. But he is concerned
with income skewing in poor world.
(I put out the speeches as book; it
fails). Note that all Part I's in
U.K. among way for AID in '72
I urge reliance on Top & Gen let US
find its level.

Perhaps as well becos
mutual interest esp
w. Gen dest. eyed
by oil price in '72.

R.S.M. determined that we can't have a Bank
with out full American participation

highly developed (economic growth) needs e.g. purified water

the way it is end of period of infant
growth
end of expansion (see para)

Personal Nets with UNEP. M. St. aug.
Stockholm speech.

Need to get on with UN
three visit to UNCTAD III

Try to give a lead on with Part I
in our 277

Wright
Keston

I. Hope a new person principal Part II
Forum of UNCTAD create change but
also R.M. think they are looking
up every line

Need to show ~~some~~ wanted interest for
and world. R.M. R.P. & I are the
on 75 speech. But he is concerned
with income speaking in poor world.
(I put out the question on books; it
fails). Not that all Part I is
OK except one for AID in 75
I hope release a top & co. let us
find it best.

Patents on new drugs
need to be
in the
hand
of the
state

R.M. determined that in countries a bank
will not give money for a project

U.N. on crippled Remelt position was arms length
 UN did not delay with new

Very aware of importance & limitations of UN. Always tries to show that Bank is member of family. I arranged a year's lunch with U. Thant. Bank's tradition was to be at arms length.

exc close relations with UNDP & worked out rels with FAO, Unesco etc.

C.G.I.A.R. because of interest in Agric.

sees it as the basis of Rev. "If I am going to invest \$5 bn. in Agric in next ten years, I would like to spend 1% on knowing all there is to be known about the frontiers of its science. FAO should be doing it, but it is not" (Bellegio meeting) Ford & Rockefeller could not go on with it.

Green Rev. seen as wonderful opportunity for Bank investment - but on the whole we do notice skew.

Trouble with rels with UN is that Bank has the advantage of its own budget & critical mass. Hence the Jackson report warns that Bank will take over if UN does not improve its mind.

With ID II strategy our offer of help

RMEN does not want to speak on subject unless he knows more than anyone else.

Fail to show Bank is not a US or West institution.

the original bank parts was done in 1970

Very course of importances & limitations
of Mr. Chrup's trip to the Bank's
members of family. I arranged a special
lunch with V. T. out. Bank's to date
was to be at some length.
exc. those related with V. T. & worked
out with FAO, UNESCO etc.

C.I.A.R. because of interest in Cyprus.
see it as the home of Rev. N. P. I am
going to visit for a while in next
few years, I would like to spend
if on knowing all the other known
about the practices of the course. FAO
should be doing it, but it is not
(Pallego meeting) for a Rockefeller
could not go on with it.

PM-10 bank
not the
which
the
it
the

your Rev. see on working appointment
for Bank is important - but on the side
or do not see.

e.g. Mr. Bendaenke tracks off nets after
a campaign against us & the next minutes
& critical man. There is 2 other reports
around that Bank will take over if
don't improve it mind.
with NO II & copy on all of help

think
or is
with

rather on whom they stand behind
the result. & P. de Seynes supports us.

Real trouble is ^{committee methods} slowness of U.N. & Bob
gets bored, & feels it is not the institute
to get things done. (But is Cooper?)

But very sensitive to U.N. criticism.
Elabrado plans to report on & reply
strongly. e.g. his response on Chile at
Ecosoc blew him out of the water.
Shocked the Chinese.

I felt being aided was always
painful & newly indep. countries resented
any interference. But Bob never changed
because he wished to make point that we
were part of the Third World. Hence his
rhetoric on travels "you pay my salary..."

Global.

Sekou Toure' beats him by 1 1/2 hour lecture
on faults of Bank & then dinner. Lots
shouts of Vive...

72-73.) At this time Bank seems overwhelmingly
main source of funds & friendly disposed
to U.III so it goes easy.

But no doubt that U.III wanted
to flex its muscles outside the U.N.
(Nick Nemeth I don't think U.N. shd be involved in Dev)

either or when it was at that time
the result of a P. de...
that there is a... of W. & B.

* Tidewater - Possibility that it was
downhill with DAC because of U.S. claim ownership
& decline of U.S. Ed Monti, Maurice L... 5 Am...?

E labor of... to report on a reply
strongly... in response to this
E color... in out of...
Shaded the Chinese.

I felt being... was changed
pointed a... &...
any... But B...
because he... to...
over part of the...
rubic or... "you..."

S...
on... of...
State of...

At this time...
main... of...
to... so it...
But no...
to...
(...)

Nairobi to OPEC.

Quote Memos of Sept & Oct on Political
kill

Then the troubles at Tidewater.

OECD sees recession. ∴ oil boycott
strong anti Arab feeling so Third ^{world} _{out.}

R.S.M. this reason, let's get the figs.
& use very small percentage of Arab
funds for Aid/Rew.

Warning of anti Arab feeling is
turning anti Third world.

* Went home for Christmas worried but
determined. Promised Bob a paper on the
campaign for next century before we set
off for Fiji mid month!

Hear the news with MumiR at Red
Neck. on B.B.C.

Number to 0950

of the former of set a out on political
bill

Then the number of T: dearest.

0950 see revision: oil report

stay out of oil field so that industry
out.

RSM. This reason, let out the paper
& we can call for a copy of our
funds for oil/rev.

4. N.B. feeling ^{RSM/ABC} at Clal of Rome time that price of
stop commodity trust - so it seems legit
en denide.

* but how for Christmas received but
determined. Provided B&B a paper on the
campaign for next century before we set
off for life and world!

How do you will power of R-ol
Mark on P.P.C.

Jan 74. The OPEC shock

A lot of discussion. Bob doesn't show his hand. What emerges is:

1. D.P.S. shows the enormous surplus OPEC will have.

2. But West has monopoly of investment opportunities. So recycling can work.

3. Can we get our share of OPEC funds for development (a minor can we get IDA type). Bob favours v. large increase for OPEC in S.C.I. + votes.

(for more in Bank than IMF. one of Raven's points).

4. Is this cartel legit.? Strong view that it was not in U.S. (it led arise out of embargo). In Bank sense of outrage at what it wd do to LDC's (Cargill on India). Soon discovered that we could not split the '77.

5. Two D.P.S. articles! show that you can't replicate the oil situation with other commodities: Clergy wd be far easier to pay up, a quite possible.

2 on 24. The OPEC check

A lot of discussion. Bob doesn't share his lead. What emerges is:

1. O.P.C. share the money on supplies. OPEC will lose.
2. But that has a magnitude of investment opportunities. So negotiating can work.
3. Can we get an share of OPEC funds for development (a minor case get 10A type). Bob favours v. large increase for OPEC in S.C.I. + v. etc.

(for more in Bank then IMF on OPEC funds)

p. 12 this could legit? strong view that it was not in U.S. (it had some sort of embargo). The Bank some of outrage at what it not do to OPEC's (could a bank). For his covered that we could not get the 17.

The trouble about this strategy is that you cannot disclose it. Hence staff morale suffers as we fight blind. So does mine as I propose great strategies & receive only a nod. Probably R. G.M. did play cards too close to his chest & concentrated too much on the familiar battle in Congress & Simon/M.K.

Set off on Fiji/N.Z./Aus. visits. Give us some leisure to talk (regret that he doesn't see the Pringles & intellectual leaders as he tried to do in LDC's. But did go to ANU)

Looking back & over notes I can now see pattern emerging.

Bob determined to keep up Bank's work, quality first, but quantity essential if you feel responsible for Third World not just for good relations, which means being seen to do 'your share' however inadequate.

For quantity he needs Funds ex DAC & OPEC. How to remain independent of donors; and capable of doing best quality work for recipients.

he was remaining independent of U.S.

Struggle for next few years was against take over by UNCTAD + OPEC** and U.S. with its new weapon of the Petro Co.

Bob seeks a global consensus on the role of the various parts. (Hence Brandt)

While also perfecting the instrument for the war on poverty which was the Bank.

* OPEC & PCO & Press Clips in 78-79.

First OPEC.

Flies Australia to Iran to see Shah.
Arranges a multi billion deal with quite different voting power. Continue to lend to Iran etc, but they will buy bonds to cover.

Reported to Board which fleebargained

But strong opposition from US.

only policy was to break the cartel or ban it declared illegal.

(only way wd have been to reduce oil consumption and they did not).

The US. line for oil and was go & see OPEC if are cause of you to call let them beat. (Remember this was also Tidewater Watergate period). N.B.

US. not close Egon Bahr at DAC.

(see memo) Dec 74.

Attacks on Bank for this.

The Clergy affair

The Oppenheimer/Bart Rowan.

Like IBC. even if religious world we agree that OPEC was root of all evil?

What was our view.

Independent rels with G.77 OPEC.

Bill Simon "the Shah is a nut" a US. policy
and this plan.

We try the Third Window (is any of these open)
and help with Prehisch fund. But our relations
with OPEC (a Laid OPEC) never got really good.
exck wait.

OPEC as alternative source of funds gave
more power to UNG77 (with IFAD is clay
lines of voting RSM/ Shch; it is partly
to replace Bank but most of its
work is done by Bank) our philosophy is
to grow food by small holders + capital.
Don't blame it all on OPEC & petro-
fertiliser shortage.

finding out about W III strategy.

My visit to UNEP annual meeting (see memo
X of Mar 26) the mood of G.77 on top of the
world with plans for MEO; essentially
based on OPEC style. We think it may be
more goods more elastic

Mitto Beclant. BR didn't go
because of doubts about his ^{own} policy
& grave doubts about theirs. (Memo Sept 3)
Very pessimistic about this & build up
for UNSGA in 75.

So get Julian there in time. There is NT.
Bob has no
objection

39.

What can Bank do.

See Memo Sept 25. Deep public scepticism - doubt possibilities. Is it 1947 or 1940. Bdr convinced we are the big battalions. *He was then determined to expand again. Divert recycled money into new.*

But the U.S. is determined to control us by the New Co. Why did LDC's go along? They too thought they could control Bdr better.

See Litterer's bitter comment on U.S. & New Co

Yet RSM and person at Tidewater, Canada to urge it or else try to make New Co work

1975.

In a year of deepening depression we go ahead with IDA & G.C.I. I propose big campaign & Bdr says 'no'; work thru board & private channels. Keep the prestige of Bank high in Part I & Part II. Success at Jamaica.

So we get support for Part II's for Bank & IDA in UN. as part of the ME0 package. Very little real attack on Bretton Woods - luckily Mayraker beginning to be Parish of UN.

Next can Bank do.

see memo page 22. New papers

referred to that possibility. It is

1977 or 1970. Bob convinced me we

had bottlenecks. He was the

But the US is determined to control

+ Part of trouble with Bob is that he is so quiet & commanding that if he doesn't do everything personally it is felt not to be done. Particularly important in Ernest. One is just like Bob but without his charisma or charm.

1972

Duke & RSM are both inclined to deal with outside the Bank by official channels - not thru staff informal talks. In respect this is a mistake.

But Bob aware that the support for IBRD by our friends in WTH is weak. Problem is over Tanzania see Memo reflects differences between RSM & IBRD.

My plea for education of staff

R.S.M. does not deal easily downwards & thwart his terms this is cause of trouble. ^x Discontent of staff & double voice in field. Belief that he has U.S. only near to him (my own habit of distancing myself, why - partly politics partly real distaste for Nixon/Siman regime & partly loyalty to R.S.M. who is fighting them though he is deep American.)

I suggest paper "all the Bank staff ^{wants} needs to know about the Bank but was afraid to ask". Dave Sommers tries his hand, and suggests that I.P.A. be put in charge. Duke not really keen & so it is treated as a management problem of communication. Indicrous results & no improvement. Bob. always believed that people were dedicated to Dev. & so did work for it with his sort of devotion. Part true: they often were dedicated in front line,

continue 1973-77

but those further back were more conscious of the struggle for career, and the very tight budgeting of time, money, etc. Feel driven

(Probably absolutely essential but never well explained.) Explanation in the Bank was but very weak. There were rules and plans but they usually emerged from Mt Olympus which was cloud covered.

Everything was blamed upwards to R M N. and his motives were suspected as being appeasement of the US Treasury which had come out against real growth of Bank and particularly against Bank salary increases in line with C of L.

Indicuous episode of Sin a raising his colleagues to get them to vote against. Bob did a lobbying job 'for' which almost none knew about & won.

This began a long battle that almost dominated relations between the US & IBRD at end of 70's.

but the further back we are conscious of
 the struggle for power and the very tight
 X US is always trying to pick up Ellis
 which they check Cooper was so important
 that he drove Europeans off.

Everything was planned in advance
 R.M.N. and his activities are unexpected
 as long as agreement of the US Treasury
 which had been set against real
 growth of Bank and part of which
 kept Bank solid in view of this
 with capital.

but now approval of the
 his collection to get them to vote
 But did a lobbying job for Dick
 now was about a year.

This began a long battle that
 almost dominated the history of the
 1980 at end of 70s.

originally under Simon a real attempt to cut down Bank & bring RSM under control by means esp of New Co. "Because the E.D.'s won't stand up to him".

← X Note Japan joins in with Mori farewell address. WSS is used.

1. R.S.M. turned the NewCo round by using Part II & liberal Europe as a coalition w/pt U.S.; secondly & essentially doing its secretariate research for it.

He still hoped it wd not be removed & was irritated that Third World voted for it. It limps.

2. Budget he fought each year but U.S. caught him on the ^{loom} ceiling & with lots of support e.g. for UK. tried to hold down the capital or at least not let the commitments rise too fast.

3. Admin budget. R.S.M. tries to prove there is no fat. Hard to do without hunting. e.g. no admin expense in 'support' and Travel...

The trouble this caused in staff morale. Coincided with travel becoming worse

... of ...
... of ...
... of ...

Not great expectations re Carter
seems to prove RSM's nominees at
State Refuge, HEW. Carter promises
to double US aid.

...
...
...

I told the ED's only they could remedy this
serious situation & got them to speak to
groups.

Must have used up thousands of senior
man hours dealing with issues to staff it
was a major operation without immediate

...
...
...

43.

The Treasury has to sell Bank to Congress
But low level^{on} kept down salaries resent
the Bank. So they feed Congress & Press
with their grumbles, and then say we
can't move Congress because the Bank.

The naive Blumenthal decides to promise
Congress that he'll do something about
Bank salaries which he agrees are too
high. Then ^{B.W.} sets up Kafka to examine
without prejudice how much too high!!

The U.S. Press ^{and} intimidated by anti Foreign
aid lobby ^{and service} attacks the Bank, foreigners
still in Washington feel really disliked.

They complain to their E.D's. They
complain to R.S.M. about my work
(rightly; we had not thought a
Carter pro aid admin could manage this).
There is a deep breed between Bank
staff and U.S.; and a great deal
of dislike of R.S.M. who is thought
(quite wrong) to have caused it.

Two years later Kafka reports.
Salaries roughly ok except for bottom
20% overpaid, and U.S. citizens who

44.

are roughly over compensated for tax they had not paid.

R.S.M. had kept his cool but did mutter on this occasion.

Meanwhile what was the U.S.G. doing about its involvement with Bank finance. It steadily reduced its share of IDA; picked up by Gen & Japan, quite rightly - but it was a disappointment for those who believed Carter's pledge to double U.S. aid. (Note the fault of system in Congress). On Capital increase U.S. hedged & wavered. Always believed that they could convince Congress by making the Bank make some concessions.

Eventually said they would ~~submit~~ vote for it in board if

1. Reduce salaries
2. Help the Civil Rights Program.

PTO.

one roughly on computer for tax
the had the good
RSM. had kept his cool but did
matter on this occasion.

Member who went over the U.S. doing
about its involvement with Bank finance.
It steadily reduced its share of 10A; probably
up by 20% on quite right - but

* this was compromise i.e. appeasement of Congress. It
made U.S. look really ridiculous.

U.S. aid. (Not the front of system in
Congress). On Capital of U.S.
ledged a reward. Group believed that

* American post 1964. Demand that all countries
old man it wants i deals of 1784 at once;
it took U.S. 180 years.

Eventually said the world
Vote for it in board of
1. Reduce income
2. Help the Civil Rights Program.

45.

Civil Rights & Aid.

Had rummled away through Bank's history. The clause about ~~political~~ economic considerations only put in by Russians. Used vs Chile in 75/76. Kleckenberg & entirely Europe (Hart)

we are not political experts. Do not want to politicise the Bank.

Cannot accept IDA money that is earmarked. So ^xExec Dir is to vote against e.g. India: atom.

Other areas of commodities that compete with U.S. farmer.

To this Carter added Human Rights. A really admirable program, but an ^xAmerican not international. Board is fierce against esp the Part II; see it as U.S. imperialism.

R.S.M. refuses to waver. So long period in which U.S. asks to abstain for unstated reasons.

He dislikes Vietnam

Then Vietnam pushed thru of R.S.M. How far bravado, penitence?? Surprised his staff & imitated some

Then he blinked. The Long episode. Who was to blame? R.S.M.'s fault

46.

was that he understood the problems of
an Admin with Congress & wished to help.
Also desperately fears losing the American
participation and might be forever.

The row that Ben New up - with
no U.S. in on alt. Anti American, anti
RSM as collaborator.

Deepent of trouble.

Continues throughout rest of his term

Capital increase ctd. pto.

How far we can go

... the ...
The RSM ... is that
we should ... critical man
to lead.

The ...
US ...
RSM ...
report of ...
Continues ...

Capital ...

No one but us can do it

47.

Capital Increase. ^{ctd.}

Never stopped pushing,
and getting the nations to push.
All done quietly.

But got more than any of Part I
we have suggested.

on Bank Finance. Excellent paper I wanted published
but was not - rightly.

Talk about \$400 causes vertigo
(unless for weapons systems)

Eventually U.S. votes for it in board
but says will not introduce
till after 1980 election.

Will UK accept this? ^{increased budget} insufficient to trigger
RSM not sure. So does the
impossible. 75% nec to pass, U.S.
has 23%. Gets it by.

No celebration no announcement.

Later that week he told me about
China & need to change gearing.
Unremittling pressure to expand, and
improve quality. (That's what the
later trips were about).

my memo of July '79 was plea for redesch
instead of retail in Bank. Prussner turned down

Towards a Global Compact.

Moving all this with Congress and USG.

I suggest that we pay as much attention to UN. as to Congress.

Because it is the place where W. III is producing its form of Dev. theory & practice.

Bob tried e.g. ACC Tech force an attempt to have the same sort of reward as went into UDR. But he was not at ease there (like Europe) and did not follow up. Likes to control (even with Congress)

But NIEO for all its absurdities (land locked islands) is the response to the insecurity of western aid. Not the worst choice all is dev. assistance as a right not a concession. So wish to re-order the world's economy & markets. Do they have the strength in political terms to do this? No but do

have votes in impotent UN. & want equal votes in potent IBRD. ^{superior} ^{supporters}

The confrontations called a N.S. dialogue. UNSGA ^{May 75} luckily Moynihan does all the fire, but it was a disaster. U.S. in particular wants to separate Energy for rest. Hence the CIEC

49.

was started as Energy coal but 77 refuse to split. Result was very rigid stance by P.G. who cannot deviate for his compromise.

Under a long meeting in which 77 stick by their self side proposal I.C.F. & try to ram it through. Gamini & Mag. The G.P.B. were negotiable with them but not with each other & are much more unyielding than necessary. Finance Mins are at back (esp. Simon/K) saying no.

CIEC continues afterwards.

Bank stance is not to take sides, (did is why RRM didn't speak, in part. It was a mistake.) ^{pot3} shd hv put on neoclassical side but to offer help to all about statistics experience etc.

Secondly we emphasize M.I.C. (see Memo)

But it all comes to nothing. (Except that hopes of Center & buy it up) So at Manila the Global Compact

was started on Camp of the 77th
the night. There was very little
done by P.C. who cannot be
his company.

Wanted a long meeting in which
to discuss their new proposal
I.C.F. a trip to run it through.
The P.C. was very helpful
with them but of will read other

I felt it was the only way out of an interminable
diologue des sords. But I knew it wd be popular
with middle side who enjoy the struggle & like
gamblers expect to win the next crucial trick.

Text see memo Dec 20 76.

But it all came to nothing.
(Except that paper of [unclear] [unclear])
20 of 11 [unclear] [unclear]

The Global Compact to Brandt.

A lot of discussion before Manila. Bob's X-ray eyes see thru the political frills to economic reality.

But the pol. frills are the breath of life to most people. They do not have the rifle shot precision; nor the pure interest in Rev.

He is not too keen on the idea and did not feel it caught attention of audience; but I got some Press attention for it. Still not much.

Then it reemerges ~~two~~ month later. "Not I'll call the Brandt Commission". I had spoken of this at time of LB's resignation, at Barbara's suggestion. Our idea was to find someone who wd close N/S (or E/W) gap.

I believe Bob's idea was different. Good housekeeping seal on our theory (UDR) and practice (project) of Rev. which would result in each partner playing his part - Bank's part being

The Global Compact to Present

A lot of discussion before Manila
Bob's X-ray says we have the political
skills to economic reality.

R.S.M. lunch with Waldhain & get his
support and he never will draw.

He is not too keen on the idea
and did not give it a thought
attention of audience; but I got
some from outside of it. Still
not much.

The it remains too small
later "What is the call to Present
Commission". I had spoken of this
at time of Mr's resignation, at Bob's
suggestion. An idea was to find someone
who not close Mr's (or E/D) gap.
I think Bob's idea was different
good bookkeeping lead on our strategy
(over) and practice (project) of Ben.
Which would result in real partner
Happy his part - Bob's part here!

57.

transfer of resources in skilled manner.

Send a message to Brandt & get a nod without a wink. mid December

Prepare ^{public} response to the speech (Jan 14 77)
Get co-sponsors (Prank, Kopper, James
Mansell Plan)

Above all get good response from
W. III & G 77 which may regard it as
attempt to escape from MEO/CIEC.

Use of Mahlab. (sketch)

Traffic with P.G. & Akhund (who later
told me he expected Brandt to tell him
to pull up his socks & get moving). They
all admire R.S.M. but regard him as
adversary to M.E.O. They are far more for MEO
than new lines. They think MEO can be permanent

Brandt indicates he will only do it
if Third World shows good will.

CIEC is a long time in dying esp
with new Admin in U.S. on the way.

Nicke & Looijen advise to give up.

My visit to Prank & Brandt.

Transfer of resources in skilled manner.

Send a message to Board & get a word without a link, with breaks

Prepare response to the Board (David JJ)
Get co-sponsors (Frank, Hopper, James Marshall plan)

Obtain all get good response f -
H. III & C. JJ which may report it as
attempt to escape f - MEO/CIC.
Use of Marshall (sketch)

Travel with P.C. & Oakland (no lot)
For me to expect Board to tell him
to pull up his socks & get moving. They
all admire P.C.M. but regard him as

This is like cabinet building - said WB
11 hours of conversation with Fritz Fischer

It will be difficult to pull off at
if Third World has your feet will
CIC is a long time in doing up
with new Chairman in U.S. or H. III
Fischer & Cooper advise to get up.

Try visit to Frank & Board.

Visiting Brandt; he virtually agrees, pressed by Egon Bahr. I think it he has agreed. Bob dubious. (Also Brack agreed to finance; bit of my vague announcements & Bob's dinner with him & van Gorkum tying down)

Brandt says: he must have it in Europe, a larger non-American Secyete shd be a majority of Third World Commissioners. Very independent of World Bank "Some things your boss won't like" tho we share real objectives. Looking for points in common (return N&S) as I did with E & W.

Understand the desire of will not to be dependent on US. I know...

I urged M.I.C. & Bahr said our self interest wd sell it to Germans.

Then we talked of personalities. In stat agreement on Heath. (relief) Palme, Frei, Botero (young & old) Sha Arthur, Lewis & Raphael - two among British. U.B. suggests H.K.

M. Strong

Secretariate. I suggest Ken Benill or Andrew Stanfield. He agrees & writes to Collegen straight away. Also didn't work & Secretariate was weak & divided.

Visit, Brant, he visited open, named
by Eric Bohn. I think it he has agreed. B.B.

So Brant agree to postpone till after CIEC ends.
RSM worried at delays & so press on with
L.D.R. W2 Owen.

Brant says: he wants to see it in
E map & help in - Owen can help
I'd like a report of Tinkler
Commissioners. It is a report of work done
"Some things you have not like" etc.
we have real objectives. Looking for
point in common (between 102) and
did with E & W.
I urged M.I.C. & Bohn said ok
self interest not sell it to you one

Handwritten notes on the right margin, partially illegible.

Then we talked of your activities.
last the experiment on health. (revised)
Palmer, Eric, Bohn (you & old) / 20
Arthur Lewis & Raphael - the money
Part 1 of US. suggest H.K.

Handwritten notes on the right margin, partially illegible.

re-orientation. I suggest the Penick one
Under the field. He agrees & wants to
collect on straight away. Also didn't
work & re-orientation was never a divided

53.

Brandt still sure he should not start until he had G. 77 support. But clear it would not come as long as CIEC continued so negotiations with Akhund, visit to Wash. ~~Annual Meeting~~ (U.S. not keen on it, fear it will press for 0.7%) Note to Vance of RSM states attitude see Memo of May 9.

disparaging
of RSM.

N.B. McNamara is following up the W.D.R. via Kerry Owen & Summit. Got what he wanted though I found the Brits absolutely in dark as to what it was all about. Example of how R.S.M. knows how to play the American machine (again with energy plan) but it has its disadvantages in cos he appears as an American at time when that was not a popular thing to be

Eventually (see memo Aug 26) ^{Brandt} we have to be content with going ahead on risk. Note no real support.

Kisinger drops out. (Ohlin aghast at his choice). Barbara J. Amal refuses. I press Sonny Prank losing his post. And utterly fails to get real support for like minded group.

N.B. R.S.M. always hoping he'll go. ^{Brandt} Brandt fears relapse which wd wreck his hopes of effectiveness.

54.

Early Sept I address the SPD & spend the afternoon with U.B. see Memo Sp 6.

The launching is a damned near run thing. News not yet announced.

Get manoeuvring. Brandt suggests two U.B. H.K. & H.H.H. But Hubert is too ill.

Then H.K. drops out. We suggest Peterson and Kay. (need for a woman).

Manoeuvring by Raphael etc to get NICO advocates - little balance in Secretariate, trying to particularly for Secy head of secretariate suggest Mahler (who doesn't want it). Suspicion that R.M.N. was trying to rig it.

What were we really doing? Hoping that this group of fallen Titans could concentrate their minds on a single neglected issue poverty & suggest a pact of cooperation based on mutual interest.

Certainly R.S.M. Hoped that it would endorse what Bank was doing and urge us forwards without serious question.

But he agreed with my memo (Nov 25) saying that B.C. shd do a re-bid knew that it would not have a really supportive because we had not picked it.

The opening at Gynmich. Admire the speed by Brandt (my draft used but tailored because it was a little rich for my poor English) I watched WB's methods, much more of a listener etc.

Heard from Yaker & Samal some of the doubts about IPRD. which were repeated a lot in their travels.

But I left after opening ceremony - leaving my room to Ted Kelt.

Do not know at first hand how it all went.

But we heard a great deal of criticism of Bank & Fund. And one Secretariate paper that seemed to be writing us off.

Q. my memo of Oct 25. 78. about Brandt's meeting with RSM on his Wash. visit.

But that meeting never took place.

left till Mond ~~is~~ 79. (see Memo)

Don't quote but give gist.

21
* Prasad & his crew were essentially political, so was
the Secretariate, and the people they saw in W^{III} were
political too. Hence they heard much more about defects
of Bank

R.S.M.'s real view comes out in this talk.
Neither donors nor recipients are but
judges of new priority because their view is
national (or regional) and political.

"There is far too little study of international
Dev. economics". (NB his outrage
at ODA going to Middle Income, pure politics)

Noted that UN. Dev is run by foreign offices & is purely political
as is the whole MEO movement.

My Memo of 5th July 79 is an attempt to
deal with this and I press for an answer
& for almost the first time get a rough
reply. "baste it on those inefficient
little regional organisations".

This just before his shingles

I believe he was right, but how far has he got in the
political will to a truly global effort

Prasad before
visit to
Tito

56.

Main point is that they basically agree on disarmament, the East & the need for a massive flow of resources with urgency. But Brandt rather shyly point to strong pressures to decentralise Bank & reduce its overmighty power.*

Bodo's response was partly the critical mass theory (explain this) and partly the danger of delay in change, and also greater inefficiency, of other institutions, e.g. Regional Banks - he knew the origins of Asian Dev Bank.

I didn't feel he was convincing because really only he could run the W.B. as he did.

Confirmed a month later when I was at ACC & Konigsbrunn & met Brandt several times. And at both meetings U.N. Agn, Leeds & Gen/Brit M.P's. complain at overmightiness of "the American Bank".

57.

Belgrade & after

G. 77 ministerial meeting just before Annual Meeting. Pressure on us to conform to G-77 approaches. P.L.O. is symbolic - divides U.S. & West. We urge R.S.M. to lean the issue to Board & Govs. He does so & crisis passes without real trouble but the currency & other solutions under Muldoon does not work, and so it recurs in '80 accompanied by OPEC in cooperation + another vast oil price hike. Annual Meeting has speeches complaining about failure of Bank/Fund to adapt. Excepts R.S.M.

Yet Bank is trying to deal methodically with Energy & structural adjustment. Rather than revolutionary.

Belgrade: 1977

6.77 ministerial meeting
before Council Meeting, Geneva on 20.10.77
before the 677 conference, P.L.O. 20.10.77

It was well received in III with all
emphasis on the LDF in future.

He has so a very personal view on the
but the outcome of the 1977
The door has not yet been
rewards in 70 accompanied by

or cooperation + could work
like. Council Meeting has
complaining about failure of
to adapt. Except R.S.M.

Met Bank is trying to deal
with oil crisis. Energy & structural
adjustment. Rather than

How the ^{Brandt} report was received.

? How was it written. A split headed Ted/Sonny
Brandt works through the UN.
presents to Waldheim.

(Bad P.R. arrangements)

Then to R.S.M.

Not at his best.

Superficially irritated by the criticism of the Bank,
and by the going in to G77 MEO
demands. Especially demands for more
votes for W.III and decentralisation.

Feels they are irrelevant to real issues:

That they will cause him to wrangle with Part I
& stir up Part II to ask for
independencies instead of dealing with
their very real problems. Goes for Sonny

Love done in Bank feeling that the
Brandt Report was trying to second
guess Bank's economics - did it
really wasn't, only question its politics.

^{and Bob}
I felt that really the report said "all
power to Bank now, let it do more & more
till there is a more equitable economic
order when some economic self govt
by LDC's can begin to emerge

59.

Very typically a few days later he warmly commended report & set about considering all the recommendations (as with Pearson). "There's one excellent idea in there, the change of loan/capital ratio." He could always find a couple of words for his suits.

Remains to be seen whether Report will create the support for Bank or Development that is necessary. But to some extent it marks the passage of power from U.S. to Europe. At least there is an opportunity for Europe to take up more of the burden preferably not provincially but globally.



For Report: Moral Islam
HM critic,

Kocle to 7405, for Am Mety
Get appt with Dentist

Thermal underwear.

Reynolds Wrap.

Newsweek

Susan

Send the two papers on WDR.

Dates of UN speech

& Florida. Sld in send

Seek C.

? Any notice of Grand, Hovey
Tell U.P.I.

Duke:

Publicity of WDR.

Colt & P.B.S.

Mike Hoffmann for pamphlet

Sy

BBC World Service.

Get the Peter W. outline

Bank & UN, born about same time
Prevent at the creation.

What were they about.

UN = Peace & E-W. accord

Bretton Woods = Reconstruction & prevention
of economic war

Both essentially trying to prevent 1929-39.
Quite successful.

In the next 15 years, emergence of
the Third World (between E & W)
to a majority role in UN.

Their interest is in Economic Development

Same time Bank has been moving
for Reccon to Dev.

primarily of the non-colonial countries
mostly middle income.

Primarily a financial intermediary
between less credit worthy countries
and the financial centres of
Wall St. the City etc. Lends

for carefully appraised projects only; mostly Foreign Exch
Dev. Theory stages of growth.
Take off.

But from 1949 onwards there was criticism in UN. led by India in Eco Soc that Bank was too strict for them

1. High interest shd be grant
i.e. Govt money.

of "sterling balances"

2. Too short, New long term

3. Too controlled. Project not Program
& controlled by the Rich (weighted votes)

This got modern because the main supply of capital was the private markets which wd only lend to a "credit worthy institution for ~~with~~ creditworthy projects"

That is to say climb up our ladder
Who shd say it is not successful
Figures for Morcovitz etc on ~~the~~
Middle Income countries.

P But by 1957 poorer nations begin
to crowd in.

Ghana followed by Africans

India. after sterling balances finished.

They faced the Bank with the question:

How do you deal with the Poorest of the Poor?

~~What was wrong with Bank's program~~

~~Too high interest~~

~~Too short term. Now need more long term~~

~~Hence idea of I.D.A.~~

~~But also idea of Sunfed.~~

In the UN. ~~the~~ proposals put forward
by the LDC's. was SUNFED.
essentially a grant institution
for program loans under control
of the UN. There a clear majority
of recipients was an horizon.

This was Mocked by US & OECD.

by refusal to put up money for
Private money markets or Texpagers.
(VN gets UNDP. & in '66 VN Capital
Development Fund with almost no capital)

But OECD powers do recognise that
they can't deal with the poorest along
to credit and Bank lines because that's not
where ^{private} investors would put their money
to get a good return on their
money.

So there has to be:

Grant OR Interest Free long term money
This has to come from Grants

IBRD decides:

Loan not grant.

Project not Program

As like IBRD as joint staff can make
Hence IDA.

This pleased the Donors

Disappointed the recipients who
wanted control & autonomy.

Hence NIEO.

Bank now has to seek to please the LDC's

NOTE this is the essential basic policy
To find Mutual Interest
between Donor & Recipient.

In a non sovereign association ^(in every)
you cannot vote yourself or the people
(No taxation without representation)
(but in a sovereign unit the majority
can tax the minority)

This is really the function of the
weekly board meeting
Consensus

To please the LDC's Bank has to
help development process
in a manner appropriate to country's
economy & aims. A way
which works, using individual
productive projects

Is it for the recipient or Bank
to choose? ^{is self} NB. Most Development is by country
clearly sovereign powers cannot be
conceded but nor can lenders.
There has to be a dialogue /
agreement

Bank regards itself as a consultant
Hence first task is Economic Survey
This is to see what the country can
build its development on.
i.e. What is underdeveloped?
How do you develop it?

Since 1960's there has been a shift
in our understanding of the
development process:

The old idea of take off largely
based on industrialisation/modernisation
It had its real successes
e.g. the industrial sector in India
Power sector in Mexico.
Akosombo Dam in Ghana

But it left out the bottom 40%
RSM's Santiago speech, 1972
Meaning of Absolute Poverty
Abolition by Year 2000
(Relation to Basic Needs)

If that our goal has to achieve it.

Nairobi 1973

Rural Development (that's where poor are)

Direct to poor not Trickle down

Making poor more production.

Make wealth not take wealth.

How else will tell you.

Is this all that is done?

How on abandoned infrastructure etc?

No not all

Also looking at urban poor.

This is very hard to do

N.B. Developing poorest is far harder

e.g. on Sahel projects

(used to be almost none in Africa

because they could not prepare projects)

We do not let standards go down

The Economic rate of return is

still there (10%) even though

social benefits may be greater

Many projects which are not purely

profit oriented have poverty slants

e.g. education programs take schools
to poor & to females

1
Es In a country like Brazil we do not regard the industrialistic program (and ^{help to} efficiency) as sufficient. We also divert some resources off course of Brazil's to North East part area. This is Bank not IDA money.

Relevance to Population policies.

Bank has long regarded this as important. We regard recognise the "Bucharest Principle" that "Population is a factor of poverty". That only a rise in standard of living will reduce fertility rates for various psychological reasons.

But what to do about Bangladesh?

?

It's rate of population growth is $x\%$

Its GNP per head is $\$x$

To get the GNP to a level at which the fertility rate will fall and take x years & by then the over population will be insupportable.

So what you need to do is to discover the determinants of fertility. They are roughly the birth marks of absolute poverty: (malnutrition, disease etc)

Meet these first, urgently
(Pure water, better food, education etc) shelter)
~~At same time~~

Hence our projects to bring public services to
the poorest, including villages.

To sum up: Bank's policy:

Bank's

Loans not grants

Projects carefully appraised & supervised
Interference by agreement

The program behind the individual projects
is ① to help poorest by making them
more productive

② in agriculture

③ in industries of labour intensive

④ to help the middle income by
spreading the wealth.

⑤ by access to capital markets

⑥ & to trade markets.

To do all this we need adequate flows
of resources; to us for pilot projects;
& to other IFI's; & to LDC's.

How is this to be raised?

It does not really matter

Global Compact, Mutual Interest

Brandt Commission / N.S. Dialogue



Finance

Bols early difficulties with sell off
(spoke to David R + Barbara)

But he was absolutely self-confident
that he could raise the money (of course)
& keep ratings.

? | Speed in Feb(?) 69 to sell off
Realising that it is not just the
Banks prudence but its guarantees
that matter

(Exeter warns me that the street
is only interested in US\$ guarantees)
Similarly Bank pension fund is all in
US markets.

Pearson

Thought esp of Aire Laire to be aimed
primarily at U.S.

I urged LDC's & Europe

& that Pearson should address Chaired MTJ
who would get its demand for more
aid made effective. DAC Summit^{p 25}
Eventually reply of the Bank responded
& it did not speak for Govts
(RSM's choice). The Board considered
it & our papers were pretty conservative

Real problem is how to change donors.

My idea of Summit is 18 LDC's 7 LDC's

Japan.

Really very inward turned to SEAP project
Respect R.S.M. but not America
Worry about China

5 c. kron
cepend
report

N.B. Tinbergen Plan. (Tidecode II T & Pearce speak)
There were several at this time. R.S.M. thought
them all very loose.

all concentrate on the political will
I want to bring Hamilton in for D.P.S.
a Dept of Six. Education my problem

Note that Pearson always wanted a World
New Council. R.S.M. feared this wd be
clouded by politics & keeps the W.B. in fact
(of WDF in Brandt). Trudeau anxious to
collaborate with R.S.M. & middle powers + M. Stroy
U.N. Civil Effort.

Techrow study meant to put Paul Hoffman's
UNDP at centre, but rivalry of de Sygnes,
DAC, Bank. Bank has finance & economic

Copen Hagen

Make Bank's European base felt.
Deal with the complaints of Teresa
Hayler reflected in student revolt
That Bank is U.S. & even Vietnam oriented
Run by rich
excludes 'Progressives'

V.N.

Worried of attacks similar to V.N.
R.S.M. wants very tough response.
I want more Bank presence there
but don't get it till Demelt goes
Treat it as extension of the Third
World.

Bob hates wasting his time

LODC's

Worried of the Ceylon revolt of MMB
& get the Bank. How do we
improve on this in LODC's & explain
our "conditionality"

Shd use the ED's who do resent
the Bank & aid

And use some staff for P.R.
v. slow.

Annual Meetings.

Quote Oct 23 '70 memo
Shows the problem Bob faced in
holding the attention of Fin Min's

Annual Reports

Bob pays no attention
Idea of L.A.R. arises in 1970 Oct-memo
to replace Part II. This he accepts

The Copenhagen Speech 1970

Quote this on meaning of speech
note how difficult it is that he never
really replies to these memos, tho
they reappear later.

Separate IOA. for Bank

This was part of Pearson's original report
but got removed of on pressure (I'd
rather put Bank under IOA) but in Dec/5
70/71 I go around world & birds &
find belief that Bank cannot be a
Development agency because it is based
on prudent finance. Kledarby, sees it
as IOA as liberation movement
and anti poverty - anti industrial

This also a problem for Eppelen.

I think RSM did want to outflank them by his emphasis on poverty.

All very pro Mao - China has solved the problem of poverty (1970) by substituting labor for capital.

70-71.

Net's with Donors

Note in 70/71 that Bank has become so much larger with doubling of IDA that it overwhelms the Aid Ministers & they want to influence it their way.

RSM did not want to be influenced.

Note. European say that both independence is dependence on US

Redistribute with Growth.

Hollis talking in late 70 about this.

My notes for '71 spread in Jan 71 are full of it & RSMN is struggling with it.

Also Net is now called basic needs

i.e. short cuts

At this period also RSM interest in Agric and CGIAR, should be took care of

Leaks/Pakistan 5 of 76

Obviously a political leak of a
critical report.

How open can the Bank be

71 Speed coverage.

72 speed
I beg him to
say something
about his first
five years.

In Aug (see Memos) I say speed is too
irrelevant. In Oct: I cover his complaint it
was badly handled & covered by saying it
was too idiosyncratic. Was damned nearly all
time for the speed

The Dollar debacle

15% cut in American aid,

End of US dollar supremacy

End infinite growth.

Large letting America find it hard
get Gen & Top to feel Bank is theirs.

Memo of
Nov 71.
Q.V. Q.V.

D.D. II.

We seemed more or less committed to
this 6% plus 1% of GNP. 0.75 ODA.

Bank leadership.

Memo of May 72 after United III, shows why Bank is sole leader vice USA DAC, G-77 etc in aid effort.

It shd' stress an unique role as not Part-I or II but both

Again I propose 'Pearson report II' principal of LDC's. No response for RSM.

1972 Annual Speech - Income Shering.

Barbance & I doubt it will catch attention beca unconnected to any self-interest in rich countries. So want more about

N.B Social side of Rev. was his speech to BW's Colonial Conference in response to Pearson

See Sept 72 on need to follow up in LDC's about Bank policies.

Nov 27 '72 Britain is many ways for AID & even IDA.

UN?
Preparing for Nairobi.

How to get liberals & UN. sets on our side.

"We need to show that we are enemies of
parents not just friends of the poor."

RSM speaks but never uses end phrases
shy of appearing unlike himself - very
guarding of his image

"Create a World Anti Parent League"

Perhaps Quote Sept 4, '73 Paper 1 Oct 15.

But Bob wanted to lead & show the way
he believed others wd follow. Perhaps this
was Brandt's role (also leadership from
UNSG, always so notably lacking)

The degrading slide from Nairobi to OPEC

At Ti deote 73. Bob tried to get
members (still part-I) to consider how to
make aid long term, for at least rest
of century. But all said same of
anti OPEC's started by oil boycott &
consequent slump bleed (The no BOJ
problem lies in monopoly of investment
in West)

R.S.M. suggests lets set out figs
& put them before all parties.

See Memo Dec 10 '73.

The new DER

Ministry of Permania

p2 Memo of Jan 3 '74.

written during the OPEC bombshell

U.N.

See Memo of March 26 74

on UNEP. Mood of '77 post OPEC.

They plan to take over Dev. as they
to take over United

Beclarest

His failure to go to Beclarest
due to doubts about his policy & about
suitability of U.N.

Memo of July 14. 74.

How to deal with U.N. pretensions,
esp. Dev. Council.

Why U.N. is anti Bretton Woods
because it derogates for the rest

The New Co:

Witterman sees as attempt of U.S. to
reassert control. (Board a la Burnard)

N.B. so does G-77.

Bob seeks to keep independence

Buchanan

Part of the build to an N7EO

See Memo Sept 3 1974

Annual Meeting '74

See Memo Sp 25.

Deep Perinism about any cure

Our needs insufficient (esp Fund)

Blame it all on OPEC

Club of Rome

Note on its eschatological pull
I advocate meliorism!

Food Conference '74

our time was you can't feed the
world without food grain in UN's
can't do that without capital.

Don't blame it all on OPEC

Dev Co.

NSM at Tidewater '74 speaks up for it
lets try to make it work.

1975: Old Farnes Clark's Almanack is quite good.

Nels with W. III (Tanzania)
v. clear exposition of our nels with Julius
& Socialist Africa

(Julius, Samuel etc always believe that since
R.S.M. supports them he must be theirs; the
Brits do the same. Fact is he is his own man)

Recommends educating loan officers
not to be District Officers with
colonial mentalities (R.S.M. in fact
tries to change the R.V.P's instead)

UN/OPEC/DAC. & the UNSA of '75
Preparation at DAC level shows that
UN. will be run by Four Offices (OPEC or B)
and not aid.

US is becoming the Pariah of UN. Mayrithan
(W.E. Europeans look back to the enlightened
liberalism of J.F.D.)

Third his dos 5 ops don't understand.
(Finance always treated like sex & so not
publicised)

1975.

Capital increase & IDA

Preparations for this crucial affair, I want
gt campaigns & publicisation of the Financial
Papers. We prefer to work through Board
& quietly thru Govts. Let reputation of
Bank speak for self. Nitto in squabbles
with M. etc.

A lot of Roy d Cousins stuff +
P. Conill arguing at official level
Pushy all the time for larger real
budgets & just running.
Americans main objectors

I suggest a paper "All the Bank staff
want to know about the Bank but was
afraid to ask" because of staff
impatience in putting on case.

Yet Bd will never talk to senior staff

1976. I get Jack Clarke's post just approved

all of this & Unctad leads to Manti
speech & social compact & so to Brundt

My insistence on very general wide
support but always turned to Top & so
we lost Swiss & now Brits

A lot of left anti American in Europe
e.g. Chile

1976/ Europe.

Team of Right winging coz for
UN. Third world Aid. They rallied round
Swiss & schadenfreude et old anti colonial
UB. Long talk with W III.

Support in W III.

See p3 of Sept 20 memo

1977/ NOV 28,

5 year Plan

Speaks of M.I.C. & Brandt's part in it

N.B. Shirley's worry.

See p.3. Bank can help before Millennium
of M.E.O.

1978

BoR favours deriding critics. I am
quiete (of his attack on Chile in Eco Soc)
Memo of NOV 27 to P.C.

Mar 15 '78 Discussion with E.D.'s &
Bank in eye

RSM. for would fax to Willy B. (Mar 12 79)
His responses to criticism of Bank

Willy believes there will have to be a NIFI doc of size of task (Apr 9 79)

Europeans anti US dominance of Bank

June 25 '79.

RSM shd explain why bankers are not always best judges of their priorities
(because political not economic. see RSM complaint to Credit that there is too little international economic study of Rev - too much national & political)

July 9 '79

Imp at at memo on how to increase power of Bank by whodisaling instead of increasing staff.

What is not concerned with oil/energy
and the refusal to break up commodities
& Europe goes along with this

