

Are gender norms systematic to caste institutions?
Examining preferences through a social experiment in
North Indian villages

Aparajita Dasgupta (Ashoka University)

and

Ashokankur Datta (Shiv Nadar University)

May 12, 2022

Introduction

- Relationship between norms, personal preferences & actual labour market outcomes not well understood
- Social norms & institutions not only influence preferences & beliefs it also generate constraints for optimizing households
- In the context of India, restrictions on female autonomy is presumed to be a function of caste hierarchy (Bidner et al., 2015; Chakravarti, 2003; Deshpande, 2002; Eswaran et al., 2013; Field et al., 2010; Jayachandran, 2015)
 - Empirically challenging to infer systematic variation in gender norms across castes by simply observing differences in *outcomes*
 - For example, does high FLFP of lower castes indicate stronger gender egalitarian preference?
- We study the presence of systematic relationship between gendered preferences, caste & class in contemporary society
- In addition, we check the presence of 'pluralistic ignorance' (a situation where individuals systematically overestimate or underestimate peer support) for FLFP

Introduction

- Relationship between norms, personal preferences & actual labour market outcomes not well understood
- Social norms & institutions not only influence preferences & beliefs it also generate constraints for optimizing households
- In the context of India, restrictions on female autonomy is presumed to be a function of caste hierarchy (Bidner et al., 2015; Chakravarti, 2003; Deshpande, 2002; Eswaran et al., 2013; Field et al., 2010; Jayachandran, 2015)
 - Empirically challenging to infer systematic variation in gender norms across castes by simply observing differences in *outcomes*
 - For example, does high FLFP of lower castes indicate stronger gender egalitarian preference?
- We study the presence of systematic relationship between gendered preferences, caste & class in contemporary society
- In addition, we check the presence of 'pluralistic ignorance' (a situation where individuals systematically overestimate or underestimate peer support) for FLFP

- We use novel data about preferences collected using vignettes based primary survey
- Unlike previous papers, we are able to *directly* test the validity of the hypothesis that lower castes have more egalitarian gender norms & lower acceptance of restrictions on female autonomy
- In the specific context of support for FLFP, we conduct a social experiment to test for 'pluralistic ignorance'

Background: Caste & Preferences on Gender

- Chakravarti (1993), Jayachandran (2015) : More stringent norms on upper caste women's mobility due to greater importance placed on women's 'purity'
Purity of Castes → Purity of Women → Restricted Autonomy
- Eswaran et al. (2013): 'Sanskritisation' : Lower castes adopt restrictive upper caste gender norms in an attempt to acquire higher social status
- Deshpande (2002): *Not* the case that Dalits have more egalitarian spousal relationships or autonomy than upper castes

Background: Role of Peer Effects

- Emerging literature shows how *beliefs* about one's peer group's support toward FLFP can influence their actual behavior
 - Bursztyn et al. (2020) married men privately support women working outside underestimate support by other men around them
→ this belief when corrected ↑ FLFP
 - Costly to make choices at odds with majority views (Bernhardt et al., 2018; Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017; Bursztyn et al., 2020)
 - Particularly in societies with barriers to female mobility
- Further, social connections/community networks are especially important in developing countries
→ as they substitute for the absence of markets (credit, information)
→ organized along caste/*jati* lines in India (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2006; Munshi, 2019)

Background: Land Ownership & Gender Norms

- Land ownership → adverse impact on gendered outcomes:
 - ↓ schooling for girls (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003)
 - ↑ fertility & sex-ratio (Bhalotra et al., 2019, 2020; Lal, 2019; Schultz, 2006)
- Girl children of land-rich households are more likely to be in work than children of land-poor households
- Since land is an immovable asset & Indian marriages are characterised by patrilocality, land owning castes are expected to have stronger son preferences → gender attitude

Research Questions

- To what extent are gender norms in general & on female work in particular, systematic to the institution of caste & economic status?
- Is pluralistic ignorance (tendency to overestimate societal opposition to FLFP) related to the institution of caste & class?
- How do the results change when we use land ownership as opposed to asset ownership?
 - Investigate the role of different indicators of economic well being: consumer assets & land, on individual attitudes & perception of peer attitudes

Contribution & Overview of Results

- Using third-party vignettes:
 - No evidence of SC's having less conservative gender attitudes
 - Opposite results seen in some context
 - Also, not the case that richer households have more conservative attitudes
- Using the social experiment:
 - Evidence of overestimation of conservative attitudes among peers
 - Some degree of variation in mismatch by caste & class status
- Sensitivity of results wrt indicators of econ well-being → land ownership as an indicator of wealth has different dynamic with gender norms vis-a-vis other assets for rural households

Data

- We use primary data from a field survey:
 - 960 households from two districts: Pilibhit (Western Uttar Pradesh) & Jhajjar (Eastern Haryana)
 - Western U.P & Eastern Haryana similar agro-climatic, cultural & economic variables
- Vignettes-based questions (brief descriptions of hypothetical situations about people's lives on a specific domain of interest)
- Info on one's own as well as second-order beliefs (beliefs about peer's beliefs) in the social experiment
- Information on demographic details, asset ownership, labour participation, education levels etc.
- We collect detailed time use data to study various components of work activities (wage/salary work, farm work, animal care & non-farm business)

Vignette Themes

- We administer 16 vignette based questions covering five broad themes including social norms around women's mobility and work participation, practices of sanskritisation, attitude towards gender roles
 - Social norms around women's mobility & work participation
 - Perception on what constitutes work
 - Attitude towards gendered roles
 - Sanskritization practises
 - Perception about Jati Hierarchy

Example of Vignette: Mobility & Women's Work

Shreya teaches in a community school in Delhi. Her husband asked her to leave her job when was promoted at a senior level in his company with a 40% hike in his salary. Do you agree with husband's decision? On a scale of 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree) rate if you agree that her husband's decision is right

Example of Vignette: Mobility & Women's Work

Smriti was severely scolded by her in laws when she forgot to take permission to meet her friend who lives nearby? Do you agree that their action is justified?

Example of Vignette: Attitude towards Gendered Roles

Riya works as a nurse in community hospital in Rajkot. She rejected a marriage proposal in a rich family because they did not allow her to work after marriage. Her family is disappointed with her because of her decision. Do you agree with Riya's decision?

Vignette Validity

- Vignette represents a fixed level of the latent variable (eg. women's mobility), so any systematic variation in the rating by a sub-group can be causally attributed to that group
- The vignette exercise requires two key assumptions King et al. (2003)
 - **Response Consistency** (individuals use the same response category for a third party as they do while evaluating themselves)
 - **Vignette Equivalence** (respondents understand the vignettes in the same way)

Key Variables

- Overall '**Conservative Score**' index
 - We apply PCA to the 16 vignette responses, from five themes, that measure gender norms regarding division of work, outlook towards gender roles, culturalization practices, social norms around women's work participation, and attitude toward gender discrimination
- Measure of **Pluralistic Ignorance**
 - We ask each respondent to indicate how many out of 30 households from their village would allow women to work outside
 - We compare this estimate with the village level average (using response on private beliefs on FLFP) to construct the 'overestimation' indicator

Empirical Strategy

$$y_{ivd} = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=2}^5 \alpha_j WQ_{(j)ivd} + \beta_1 SC_{ivd} + \sum_{j=2}^5 \gamma_{(j)} (SC_{ivd} \times WQ_{(j)ivd}) + \beta_2 OBC_{ivd} + \sum_{j=2}^5 \theta_j (OBC_{ivd} \times WQ_{(j)ivd}) + \gamma X_{ivd} + \delta Z_{vd} + \phi_d + \varepsilon_{ivd}$$

- y_{ivd} is the outcome variable (vignette rating/ underestimation dummy) of individual i in village v of district d
- ϕ_d district fixed effects
- SC_{ivd} (OBC_{ivd}) indicator for Scheduled Caste (SC) (Other Backward Class (OBC))
- $WQ_{(j)ivd}$ indicator for j^{th} quintile of asset (land) distribution
- X_{ivd} household size, total number of children aged 0-5 years & 6-14 years old &
- Village-level controls: average daily wage rate for male & female casual agricultural labourers, labour shortage & seasonal migration

Descriptive statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Conservative score (Males)	-0.00	2.13	-4.55	4.23
Conservative score (Female)	0.00	2.27	-4.68	3.94
Overestimation score for males	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
Overestimation score for females	0.46	0.50	0.00	1.00
General Caste	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00
SC	0.34	0.48	0.00	1.00
OBC	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Poorest	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Poor	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Middle	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
Rich	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Richest	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Land Quintile: Smallest	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Land Quintile: Small	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
Land Quintile: Medium	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00
Land Quintile: Large	0.19	0.40	0.00	1.00
Land Quintile: Largest	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Primary	0.63	0.48	0.00	1.00
Children(0 to 5 years)	0.46	0.78	0.00	4.00
Children (6 to 14 years)	0.76	0.99	0.00	5.00
Household size	5.19	2.19	1.00	20.00
Agricultural Wage for Male	332.99	136.93	133.33	611.11
Agricultural Wage for Female	279.61	135.76	77.78	555.56
Outward Migration	0.71	0.45	0.00	1.00
Labour Shortage	0.66	0.47	0.00	1.00
Observations	944			

Caste, Wealth Quintile and Conservative Attitudes

	Male Responses		Female Responses	
	Without Controls	With Controls	Without Controls	With Controls
2nd Wealth Quintile	-0.167 (0.428)	-0.253 (0.459)	0.106 (0.524)	0.0877 (0.516)
3rd Wealth Quintile	-0.361 (0.557)	-0.483 (0.556)	-0.142 (0.607)	-0.104 (0.625)
4th Wealth Quintile	-0.834* (0.477)	-0.950* (0.517)	-0.797 (0.660)	-0.744 (0.666)
5th Wealth Quintile	-0.730 (0.456)	-0.755 (0.524)	-0.919 (0.592)	-0.879 (0.602)
SC	0.104 (0.450)	0.0958 (0.457)	1.264** (0.587)	1.375** (0.616)
2nd Wealth Quintile X SC	0.290 (0.506)	0.311 (0.500)	-0.206 (0.649)	-0.234 (0.652)
3rd Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.265 (0.644)	-0.0918 (0.610)	-1.047 (0.743)	-1.063 (0.746)
4th Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.220 (0.651)	-0.109 (0.662)	-1.257 (0.909)	-1.412 (0.935)
5th Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.115 (0.655)	-0.215 (0.718)	-2.055** (0.920)	-2.105** (0.934)
OBC	0.707 (0.510)	0.555 (0.537)	0.984* (0.498)	0.918* (0.496)
2nd Wealth Quintile X OBC	-0.0404 (0.468)	-0.00738 (0.483)	-0.394 (0.549)	-0.318 (0.592)
3rd Wealth Quintile X OBC	0.0656 (0.736)	0.199 (0.711)	-0.388 (0.705)	-0.373 (0.713)
4th Wealth Quintile X OBC	-0.156 (0.623)	-0.254 (0.605)	-0.383 (0.771)	-0.489 (0.797)
5th Wealth Quintile X OBC	-1.598** (0.656)	-1.750** (0.665)	-1.164 (0.800)	-1.266 (0.828)
Observations	841	841	841	841
Mean of Dep. Variable	0.018	0.018	0.080	0.080
R-squared	0.047	0.081	0.140	0.156
F-statistic	5.856	9.912	7.559	6.879

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ Standard errors are in parentheses

Caste, Land Holding Quintile and Conservative Attitudes

	Male Responses		Female Responses	
	Without Controls	With Controls	Without Controls	With Controls
2nd Land Quintile	-0.942* (0.519)	-0.776* (0.429)	-0.529 (0.549)	-0.466 (0.443)
3rd Land Quintile	-0.519 (0.325)	-0.515 (0.344)	-0.747 (0.484)	-0.709 (0.472)
4th Land Quintile	-1.124*** (0.408)	-1.126*** (0.378)	-1.134*** (0.405)	-1.157*** (0.390)
5th Land Quintile	-1.445*** (0.380)	-1.387*** (0.364)	-1.270*** (0.377)	-1.261*** (0.360)
SC	0.0151 (0.434)	0.103 (0.426)	0.389 (0.448)	0.438 (0.464)
2nd Land Quintile X SC	-0.277 (0.616)	-0.460 (0.623)	-0.964 (0.753)	-1.052 (0.700)
3rd Land Quintile X SC	0.163 (0.675)	-0.0332 (0.685)	1.150 (0.685)	1.099 (0.689)
4th Land Quintile X SC	0.0378 (0.855)	0.0784 (0.833)	1.832** (0.765)	1.771** (0.759)
5th Land Quintile X SC	1.021* (0.590)	0.998 (0.646)	2.266*** (0.490)	2.220*** (0.490)
OBC	0.0918 (0.530)	0.136 (0.525)	0.225 (0.426)	0.102 (0.424)
2nd Land Quintile X OBC	-0.664 (0.620)	-0.936 (0.583)	-0.653 (0.732)	-0.611 (0.693)
3rd Land Quintile X OBC	0.177 (0.585)	-0.00659 (0.595)	0.284 (0.643)	0.326 (0.678)
4th Land Quintile X OBC	0.752 (0.742)	0.534 (0.727)	1.059* (0.582)	1.164* (0.626)
5th Land Quintile X OBC	1.041 (0.915)	0.648 (0.920)	0.796 (0.780)	0.842 (0.888)
Observations	842	842	842	842
Mean of Dep. Variable	0.022	0.022	0.077	0.077
R-squared	0.056	0.085	0.129	0.144
F-statistic	2.054	3.388	12.660	11.983

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ Standard errors are in parentheses

Caste, Wealth Quintile and Estimation of Conservative Attitude of Peers


	Male Responses		Female Responses	
	Without Controls	With Controls	Without Controls	With Controls
2nd Wealth Quintile	0.0751 (0.0769)	0.0787 (0.0818)	0.124 (0.123)	0.109 (0.114)
3rd Wealth Quintile	-0.0554 (0.0815)	-0.0617 (0.0828)	0.128 (0.108)	0.136 (0.105)
4th Wealth Quintile	-0.0829 (0.0875)	-0.0895 (0.0928)	0.130 (0.0858)	0.137 (0.0856)
5th Wealth Quintile	-0.0427 (0.0843)	-0.0346 (0.0971)	0.0211 (0.0913)	0.0318 (0.0916)
SC	0.203** (0.0911)	0.202** (0.0943)	0.150 (0.0884)	0.140 (0.0829)
2nd Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.327*** (0.101)	-0.333*** (0.109)	-0.137 (0.141)	-0.122 (0.134)
3rd Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.0811 (0.149)	-0.0686 (0.153)	-0.234 (0.143)	-0.228 (0.138)
4th Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.146 (0.172)	-0.127 (0.178)	-0.109 (0.116)	-0.104 (0.115)
5th Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.181 (0.154)	-0.195 (0.162)	-0.0481 (0.148)	-0.0527 (0.142)
OBC	0.0317 (0.108)	0.0381 (0.112)	0.198** (0.0960)	0.169* (0.0882)
2nd Wealth Quintile X OBC	-0.126 (0.145)	-0.140 (0.149)	-0.163 (0.178)	-0.141 (0.168)
3rd Wealth Quintile X OBC	0.0331 (0.140)	0.0391 (0.139)	-0.200 (0.140)	-0.199 (0.137)
4th Wealth Quintile X OBC	-0.158 (0.151)	-0.161 (0.150)	-0.335*** (0.121)	-0.352*** (0.118)
5th Wealth Quintile X OBC	-0.184 (0.144)	-0.206 (0.145)	-0.311*** (0.106)	-0.319*** (0.0999)
Observations	841	841	841	841
Mean of Dep. Variable	0.545	0.545	0.463	0.463
R-squared	0.034	0.041	0.020	0.034
F-statistic	5.596	5.721	2.818	3.956

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ Standard errors are in parentheses

Caste, Land Holding Quintiles and Estimation of Conservative Attitude of Peers

	Male Responses		Female Responses	
	Without Controls	With Controls	Without Controls	With Controls
2nd Land Quintile	-0.0773 (0.102)	-0.0700 (0.0993)	0.0858 (0.116)	0.0965 (0.125)
3rd Land Quintile	-0.0819 (0.101)	-0.0832 (0.103)	0.0596 (0.0984)	0.0628 (0.0975)
4th Land Quintile	-0.0756 (0.0772)	-0.0724 (0.0799)	0.0156 (0.0801)	0.0106 (0.0849)
5th Land Quintile	-0.247*** (0.0769)	-0.242*** (0.0784)	-0.0823 (0.0796)	-0.0709 (0.0857)
SC	-0.0304 (0.0999)	-0.0256 (0.0952)	-0.0505 (0.106)	-0.0588 (0.103)
2nd Land Quintile X SC	0.0838 (0.155)	0.0698 (0.158)	0.0634 (0.155)	0.0645 (0.153)
3rd Land Quintile X SC	0.0405 (0.147)	0.0352 (0.143)	0.00130 (0.147)	-0.0309 (0.141)
4th Land Quintile X SC	-0.0921 (0.167)	-0.0900 (0.173)	-0.0352 (0.171)	-0.0154 (0.181)
5th Land Quintile X SC	0.271 (0.201)	0.271 (0.203)	0.0957 (0.205)	0.124 (0.197)
OBC	-0.0928 (0.0814)	-0.0755 (0.0836)	0.0433 (0.0717)	0.0350 (0.0737)
2nd Land Quintile X OBC	0.0303 (0.123)	0.00626 (0.119)	-0.108 (0.139)	-0.120 (0.150)
3rd Land Quintile X OBC	-0.0514 (0.154)	-0.0663 (0.151)	-0.200 (0.133)	-0.246* (0.126)
4th Land Quintile X OBC	0.0380 (0.0828)	0.0266 (0.0804)	-0.0760 (0.0922)	-0.107 (0.0931)
5th Land Quintile X OBC	0.0832 (0.126)	0.0515 (0.124)	0.00164 (0.103)	-0.0260 (0.111)
Primary		-0.0251 (0.0364)		-0.0804* (0.0434)
Observations	842	842	842	842
Mean of Dep. Variable	0.544	0.544	0.462	0.462
R-squared	0.034	0.040	0.014	0.030
F-statistic	3.613	7.199	2.392	5.333

Caste Specific Relationship between Land Ownership and Wealth Index



Results: Caste, Asset Ownership & Gender Norms

- For the *most asset-poor* group,
 - SC women & OBC women have *higher* conservative attitude than GEN women
 - No differences across caste groups for men
- Wealth effect within caste \times gender:
 - For SC Men, SC women & OBC Men and OBC Women \uparrow wealth associated with \downarrow conservative attitude, especially in highest quintiles
 - No effect for GEN Men and GEN Women at 5% level of significance
 - Wealth effect substantial for SC/OBC women
 - wealthiest SC/OBC women are no less or no more conservative than wealthiest GEN women
 - Similarly wealth effect for OBC men substantial to ensure richest OBC men are less conservative than richest GEN men

Results: Caste, Land ownership & Gender Norms

- For the most land poor households, there is no difference between the three caste groups for both men and women
- Negative land ownership effect for GEN men & GEN women. However no such robust relationship for SC Men, OBC Men and OBC Women
→ These groups show a slight dip in conservative attitudes for second quintile
- Land effect has a U shape for SC women. Fifth quintile SC women are more conservative than first quintile SC women, but second quintile SC women are more conservative than first quintile SC women,
- Land-richest SC women (men) *more* conservative than land-richest GEN women (men) at 1% (10%) level of significance.
- Land ownership & wealth ownership very different effect on the conservative attitudes of SC women

Results: Caste, Asset Ownership & Second Order Beliefs on Gender Norms

- Within the lowest wealth quintile, SC men (OBC Women) are likely to *overestimate* conservative attitudes amongst peers more strongly than general category. (5% and 10% respectively).
- Within GEN men or women, wealth has no impact on an individual's intensity of overestimation of conservative attitudes among his/her peers
- Within SC Men, OBC Men OBC Women, intensity to overestimate declines at high levels of wealth ownership.

Results: Caste, Land ownership & Second Order Beliefs on Gender Norms

- No caste or land ownership effect on the likelihood of overestimation for women. Within OBC women, the third quintiles shows a dip in overestimation compared to first quintile, but it is only significant at 10%
- For GEN men and OBC Men, the highest quintile is least likely to overestimate conservative attitudes
- However such a wealth effect is not seen for SC men.

Conclusion

- In this study we examine how caste & class identities interact in the driving preferences & beliefs of the optimizing households
- In the presence of pluralistic ignorance, providing information can be a cost-effective way of changing labour market behaviors
- Low-hanging fruit in terms of policy action → updating second-order beliefs can speed-up changes
- How gender norms vary by caste & class indicators → effective policy design to improve labour market outcomes

Thank you!

Wealth Effects and Caste Effects

	General		SC		OBC	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
2nd Quintile	-0.253 (0.585)	0.088 (0.866)	0.058 (0.859)	-0.146 (0.728)	-0.260 (0.558)	-0.230 (0.523)
3rd Quintile	-0.483 (0.391)	-0.104 (0.869)	-0.575 (0.115)	-1.167** (0.018)	-0.284 (0.482)	-0.477 (0.189)
4th Quintile	-0.950* (0.076)	-0.744 (0.273)	-1.059** (0.033)	-2.156** (0.015)	-1.204*** (0.004)	-1.233** (0.017)
5th Quintile	-0.755 (0.159)	-0.879 (0.155)	-0.971* (0.076)	-2.983*** (0.000)	-2.506*** (0.000)	-2.145*** (0.001)

(a) Wealth effects in gender×caste sub-populations

	Men		Women	
	1st Quintile	5th Quintile	1st Quintile	5th Quintile
SC - GEN	0.096 (0.835)	-0.119 (0.816)	1.375** (0.033)	-0.730 (0.287)
OBC - GEN	0.555 (0.309)	-1.195*** (0.002)	0.918* (0.073)	-0.348 (0.589)
SC-OBC	-0.460 (0.377)	1.075 (0.051)	0.457 (0.359)	-0.382 (0.631)

(b) Caste Comparisons for gender× asset quintile sub-populations

Land Ownership Effects and Caste Effects

	General		SC		OBC	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
2nd Quintile	-0.776*	-0.466	-1.237**	-1.518**	-1.712***	-1.077*
	(0.080)	(0.301)	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.004)	(0.094)
3rd Quintile	-0.515	-0.709	-0.548	0.390	-0.522	-0.383
	(0.145)	(0.143)	(0.268)	(0.433)	(0.315)	(0.391)
4th Quintile	-1.126***	-1.157***	-1.047	0.614	-0.592	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.189)	(0.328)	(0.365)	(0.989)
5th Quintile	-1.387***	-1.261***	-0.389	0.959**	-0.738	-0.419
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.474)	(0.023)	(0.405)	(0.589)

(a) Land ownership effects in gender \times caste sub-populations

	Men		Women	
	1st Quintile	5th Quintile	1st Quintile	5th Quintile
SC-GEN	0.103	1.101*	0.438	2.65***
	(0.810)	(0.073)	(0.352)	(0.000)
OBC-GEN	0.136	0.784	0.102	0.944
	(0.797)	(0.254)	(0.811)	(0.214)
SC-OBC	-0.033	0.316	0.336	1.713**
	(0.953)	(0.718)	(0.357)	(0.027)

(b) Caste Comparisons for gender \times land quintile sub-populations

Land Quintile-Asset Quintile Transition Matrix

		Land Quintiles					Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Asset Quintiles	1	10.82	0.83	4.28	1.90	0.95	18.79
	2	5.95	2.26	3.69	3.57	2.50	17.95
	3	5.23	5.11	3.92	4.52	2.62	21.40
	4	1.55	4.04	2.85	4.99	6.42	19.86
	5	0.00	5.59	2.50	5.83	8.09	22.00
Total		23.54	17.84	17.24	20.81	20.57	100.00

(a) All Households

		Land Quintiles					Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Asset Quintiles	1	17.55	2.66	4.26	1.60	2.13	28.19
	2	11.70	4.26	4.26	4.26	1.06	25.53
	3	2.13	13.83	2.13	1.06	2.66	21.81
	4	0.00	9.04	2.13	0.53	1.06	12.77
	5	0.00	10.64	1.06	0.00	0.00	11.70
Total		31.38	40.43	13.83	7.45	6.91	100.00

(b) SC Households

Land Quintile-Asset Quintile Transition Matrix Continued

		Land Quintiles					Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Asset Quintiles	1	10.65	0.38	7.98	3.80	1.14	23.95
	2	5.70	3.04	4.94	4.18	4.18	22.05
	3	7.22	2.28	5.32	5.32	1.52	21.67
	4	1.90	3.04	3.04	5.32	5.70	19.01
	5	0.00	4.18	1.14	4.18	3.80	13.31
	Total	25.48	12.93	22.43	22.81	16.35	100.00

(c) OBC Households

		Land Quintiles					Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Asset Quintiles	1	7.69	0.26	1.79	0.77	0.26	10.77
	2	3.33	0.77	2.56	2.82	2.05	11.54
	3	5.38	2.82	3.85	5.64	3.33	21.03
	4	2.05	2.31	3.08	6.92	9.49	23.85
	5	0.00	4.10	4.10	9.74	14.87	32.82
	Total	18.46	10.26	15.38	25.90	30.00	100.00

(d) GEN Households

Asset Ownership Effects and Caste Effects

	General		SC		OBC	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
2nd Quintile	0.079 (0.343)	0.109 (0.349)	-0.254*** (0.003)	-0.014 (0.864)	-0.062 (0.592)	-0.033 (0.691)
3rd Quintile	-0.062 (0.461)	0.136 (0.205)	-0.130 (0.338)	-0.091 (0.364)	-0.023 (0.846)	-0.062 (0.533)
4th Quintile	-0.090 (0.342)	0.137 (0.119)	-0.217 (0.127)	0.033 (0.779)	-0.251* (0.053)	-0.214* (0.058)
5th Quintile	-0.035 (0.724)	0.032 (0.731)	-0.230* (0.084)	-0.021 (0.895)	-0.241* (0.063)	-0.287*** (0.003)

(a) Asset ownership effects on overestimation propensities in gender \times caste sub-populations

	Men		Women	
	1st Quintile	5th Quintile	1st Quintile	5th Quintile
SC-GEN	0.202** (0.040)	0.007 (0.953)	0.140 (0.101)	0.088 (0.427)
OBC-GEN	0.038 (0.736)	-0.168* (0.075)	0.169* (0.065)	-0.150*** (0.007)
SC-OBC	0.164 (0.103)	0.175 (0.234)	-0.029 (0.684)	0.238 (0.062)

(b) Caste Comparisons of overestimation propensities for gender \times asset quintile sub-populations

Land Ownership Effects and Caste Effects

	General		SC		OBC	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
2nd Quintile	-0.070 (0.486)	0.097 (0.447)	-0.000 (0.999)	0.161 (0.220)	-0.064 (0.520)	-0.024 (0.812)
3rd Quintile	-0.083 (0.425)	0.063 (0.524)	-0.047 (0.677)	0.032 (0.784)	-0.149 (0.250)	-0.183** (0.023)
4th Quintile	-0.072 (0.372)	0.011 (0.902)	-0.162 (0.296)	-0.005 (0.976)	-0.046 (0.423)	-0.096 (0.107)
5th Quintile	-0.242*** (0.004)	-0.071 (0.415)	0.029 (0.886)	0.053 (0.795)	-0.191* (0.062)	-0.097 (0.250)

(a) Land ownership effects on overestimation propensities in gender×caste sub-populations

	Men		Women	
	1st Quintile	5th Quintile	1st Quintile	5th Quintile
SC-GEN	-0.026 (0.790)	0.245 (0.159)	-0.059 (0.573)	0.065 (0.619)
OBC-GEN	-0.076 (0.373)	-0.024 (0.839)	0.035 (0.639)	0.009 (0.926)
SC-OBC	0.050 (0.642)	0.269 (0.158)	-0.094 (0.349)	0.056 (0.745)

(b) Caste Comparisons of overestimation propensities for gender× land quintile sub-populations

Perception on what constitutes work

- Radhika lives in a village in Haryana with her husband and two kids. Her daily activities include cooking for all meals, cleaning her home, collecting water from a well, and teaching her kids in the evening. She does not purchase processed flour for cooking rotis, instead she grinds food grains herself. She also makes clothes for her family using sewing machine at home. Do you agree that Radhika is *birozgar*?
- Rakesh lives with his family in Jabalpur, MP. Last year, after failing in 10th class board exams, he dropped out of school and now manages his father grocery store. Do you agree that Rakesh is *birozgar*?
- Rohit works with his family of 10 on their family farm. They own a small plot of 5 acres of land and grow wheat in rabi season. The whole family works in the wheat production. Do you agree that Rohit is *birozgar*?
- Sheetal puts up food stalls during festivals in mela and malls to earn living. Her daily routine majorly comprises of reading cookbooks and learning cooking from her mother. Do you agree that Sheetal is a working individual?

Attitude towards Gendered roles

- Rajesh takes care of his daughters at home and does all other household chores while his wife works as a teacher and earns for family. Rajesh's life choices are shameful.
- Rita lives in a small town in Haryana. She loves to play cricket after school. She is good at the sport. She hopes to become a professional cricketer. Her mother Asha is worried because She thinks sports is not an ideal career choice for a woman. Asha's concern regarding her daughter's ambitions is justified.
- Akash is 6 years old. He loves to play with dolls and kitchen sets. No one in his locality play with him. His father Raj has asked him to stop playing with dolls and play bat-ball with the locality kids. Do you agree with Raj advise?
- Riya works as a nurse in community hospital in Rajkot. She rejected a marriage proposal in a rich family because they did not allow her to work after marriage. Her family is disappointed with her because of her decision. Do you agree with Riya's decision?

Sanskritization practises

- Rishabh, migrated from slum areas of Ranchi to Varanasi after he got a job of a clerk in the post office of the town. Most of his peers in the office are Brahmins, who are vegetarian. Rishabh however lives in a mixed neighbourhood of Varanasi. However to blend into the social milieu at his office, Rishabh he left non vegetarian food and turned vegetarian. During his last visit to Ranchi, Rishabh tried to influence his family to give up meat consumption. Do you agree with his decision?

Perception about Jati Hierarchy

- Ram belongs to an affluent Brahmin family in Dewas. At the last community gathering, he returned within two minutes since front seats (where he usually sits) were occupied by manual scavengers of the area. Do you agree with Ram's decision?
- Sarita Sharma lives in Ujjain in a joint family. At her niece wedding, she got furious with his sister's when she was made to eat lunch together with house caretaker Rekha Yadav. Do you agree that Sarita's anger was justified?

Social norms around women's mobility and work participation

- Shreya teaches in a community school in Delhi. Her husband asked her to leave her job when was promoted at a senior level in his company with a 40% hike in his salary. Do you agree with husband's decision?
- Smriti was severely scolded by her in laws when she forgot to take permission to meet her friend who lives nearby? Do you agree that their action is justified?
- Pooja lives with her husband and his family in Lakhimpur. She got a job offer of a teacher in a private school in Bareilly. Her in laws have prohibited her to migrate to a new city for a job. When she insisted, she was subject to physical abuse. Pooja's in laws actions are justified.

Other

- Last year, Pradeep suffered a huge loss in business. Same year, his son got admission in a private engineering college. To pay for the college fees, he removed his daughter from her fashion designing course. Do you agree with her decision?
- Rohit left his well paying job at an MNC to open his own food cafe in the hills of Manali. To do so, he utilised all his savings and took a loan from the bank. His family is skeptical as he (as well as anyone else in his family) has no prior experience in running a business. They feel it is too risky and reckless. Do you agree with Rohit's family?

Female Time Use Regression Results

- Richest SC Women spend less time on farm work and animal care. At the same time, rich GEN Women spend more time on the same work (also true for large land holders).
- Rich GEN Women spent less time on wage work. Rich SC & OBC Women, however, spent more time on wage work.
 - In terms of land holding, similar to wealth quintile, large land holders from the GEN group spent less time on wage work.
 - In contrast to Rich SC Women, large land holding SC Women spent less time on wage work.
- Large land holding OBC Women spent less time on child care.

Descriptive Statistics of Time Use

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Time spent on farm work	1.09	1.81	0.00	8.00
Time spent on animal care	1.50	1.86	0.00	8.00
Time spent on wage/salary work	0.58	1.74	0.00	9.00
Time spent on child care	2.15	2.01	0.00	12.00
Time spent on non-farm business	0.22	0.84	0.00	6.00
Observations	944			

Caste, Wealth Quintile and Time spent on Farm work

	Time use on Farm Work	
	Without controls	With controls
2nd Wealth Quintile	0.434 (0.293)	0.319 (0.326)
3rd Wealth Quintile	0.211 (0.348)	0.120 (0.334)
4th Wealth Quintile	1.052** (0.409)	0.918** (0.408)
5th Wealth Quintile	1.081*** (0.371)	0.964*** (0.338)
SC	0.179 (0.261)	0.192 (0.246)
2nd Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.0699 (0.340)	0.00731 (0.375)
3rd Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.498 (0.350)	-0.414 (0.331)
4th Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.454 (0.640)	-0.479 (0.633)
5th Wealth Quintile X SC	-1.162*** (0.375)	-1.071*** (0.362)
OBC	0.325 (0.318)	0.290 (0.312)
2nd Wealth Quintile X OBC	-0.155 (0.386)	-0.0860 (0.423)
3rd Wealth Quintile X OBC	0.482 (0.461)	0.564 (0.464)
4th Wealth Quintile X OBC	-0.154 (0.712)	-0.194 (0.652)
5th Wealth Quintile X OBC	-0.591 (0.629)	-0.522 (0.554)
Observations	841	841
Mean of Dep. Variable	1.158	1.158
R-squared	0.049	0.061
F-statistic	5.203	10.274

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Caste, Land Quintile and Time spent on Farm work

	Time use on Farm Work	
	Without controls	With controls
2nd Land Quintile	0.587 (0.351)	0.444 (0.365)
3rd Land Quintile	0.368 (0.303)	0.332 (0.303)
4th Land Quintile	1.228*** (0.307)	1.159*** (0.297)
5th Land Quintile	0.735** (0.292)	0.662** (0.296)
SC	0.173 (0.275)	0.186 (0.293)
2nd Land Quintile X SC	-0.917** (0.416)	-0.773* (0.407)
3rd Land Quintile X SC	0.487 (0.595)	0.469 (0.596)
4th Land Quintile X SC	0.206 (0.635)	0.318 (0.644)
5th Land Quintile X SC	0.397 (0.437)	0.414 (0.437)
OBC	0.266 (0.316)	0.310 (0.275)
2nd Land Quintile X OBC	-0.210 (0.579)	-0.0923 (0.595)
3rd Land Quintile X OBC	0.553 (0.512)	0.489 (0.509)
4th Land Quintile X OBC	-0.237 (0.542)	-0.328 (0.539)
5th Land Quintile X OBC	0.263 (0.577)	0.154 (0.571)
Observations	842	842
Mean of Dep. Variable	1.157	1.157
R-squared	0.077	0.087
F-statistic	7.245	10.302

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Caste, Wealth Quintile and Time spent on Animal Care

	Time use on Animal Care	
	Without controls	With controls
2nd Wealth Quintile	0.388 (0.307)	0.436 (0.301)
3rd Wealth Quintile	0.442 (0.263)	0.490 (0.306)
4th Wealth Quintile	1.721*** (0.341)	1.765*** (0.344)
5th Wealth Quintile	1.045*** (0.303)	1.115*** (0.314)
SC	0.280 (0.261)	0.375 (0.241)
2nd Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.419 (0.392)	-0.467 (0.395)
3rd Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.412 (0.463)	-0.429 (0.480)
4th Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.112 (0.490)	-0.216 (0.469)
5th Wealth Quintile X SC	-0.849** (0.404)	-0.935** (0.394)
OBC	0.738** (0.344)	0.810** (0.354)
2nd Wealth Quintile X OBC	-0.512 (0.501)	-0.553 (0.518)
3rd Wealth Quintile X OBC	-0.603 (0.436)	-0.646 (0.469)
4th Wealth Quintile X OBC	-1.056* (0.523)	-1.118* (0.537)
5th Wealth Quintile X OBC	-0.990** (0.422)	-1.129** (0.467)
Observations	841	841
Mean of Dep. Variable	1.584	1.584
R-squared	0.109	0.119
F-statistic	9.442	21.512

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Caste, Land Quintile and Time spent on Animal Care

	Time use on Animal Care	
	Without controls	With controls
2nd Land Quintile	0.495* (0.279)	0.470 (0.305)
3rd Land Quintile	0.345 (0.353)	0.342 (0.354)
4th Land Quintile	0.903*** (0.264)	0.855*** (0.263)
5th Land Quintile	0.914*** (0.275)	0.852*** (0.285)
SC	0.241 (0.301)	0.325 (0.309)
2nd Land Quintile X SC	-0.534 (0.413)	-0.580 (0.436)
3rd Land Quintile X SC	-0.328 (0.580)	-0.357 (0.589)
4th Land Quintile X SC	-0.565 (0.354)	-0.554 (0.359)
5th Land Quintile X SC	-0.252 (0.500)	-0.358 (0.519)
OBC	-0.133 (0.246)	-0.148 (0.240)
2nd Land Quintile X OBC	0.901* (0.529)	0.947* (0.517)
3rd Land Quintile X OBC	0.655 (0.437)	0.693 (0.440)
4th Land Quintile X OBC	0.237 (0.331)	0.272 (0.354)
5th Land Quintile X OBC	-0.202 (0.356)	-0.264 (0.377)
Observations	842	842
Mean of Dep. Variable	1.582	1.582
R-squared	0.089	0.102
F-statistic	8.696	20.085

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Caste, Wealth Quintile and Time Spent on Wages/Salary Work

	Time use on wages/salary work	
	Without controls	With controls
2nd Wealth Quintile	-0.899 (0.548)	-0.866* (0.499)
3rd Wealth Quintile	-0.834 (0.518)	-0.815 (0.517)
4th Wealth Quintile	-1.140** (0.449)	-1.158** (0.440)
5th Wealth Quintile	-0.976* (0.483)	-0.933* (0.483)
SC	-0.347 (0.539)	-0.367 (0.565)
2nd Wealth Quintile X SC	0.561 (0.596)	0.528 (0.600)
3rd Wealth Quintile X SC	0.687 (0.647)	0.681 (0.664)
4th Wealth Quintile X SC	1.174* (0.656)	1.243* (0.659)
5th Wealth Quintile X SC	0.623 (0.597)	0.616 (0.641)
OBC	-1.032** (0.429)	-0.960** (0.455)
2nd Wealth Quintile X OBC	1.022 (0.629)	0.933 (0.588)
3rd Wealth Quintile X OBC	0.735 (0.559)	0.701 (0.602)
4th Wealth Quintile X OBC	1.265** (0.512)	1.309** (0.521)
5th Wealth Quintile X OBC	1.168** (0.528)	1.124** (0.533)
Observations	841	841
Mean of Dep. Variable	0.581	0.581
R-squared	0.030	0.041
F-statistic	3.337	3.632

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Caste, Land Quintile and Time Spent on Wages/Salary Work

	Time use Wages/salary work	
	Without controls	With controls
2nd Land Quintile	0.236 (0.273)	0.163 (0.281)
3rd Land Quintile	0.556** (0.221)	0.546** (0.219)
4th Land Quintile	-0.0249 (0.173)	-0.0327 (0.180)
5th Land Quintile	-0.00721 (0.201)	-0.0118 (0.198)
SC	0.243 (0.339)	0.218 (0.362)
2nd Land Quintile X SC	0.340 (0.461)	0.384 (0.508)
3rd Land Quintile X SC	-0.750 (0.740)	-0.704 (0.736)
4th Land Quintile X SC	-0.610** (0.273)	-0.586** (0.285)
5th Land Quintile X SC	-0.523 (0.387)	-0.468 (0.428)
OBC	-0.203 (0.259)	-0.149 (0.279)
2nd Land Quintile X OBC	0.253 (0.466)	0.295 (0.483)
3rd Land Quintile X OBC	-0.437 (0.424)	-0.473 (0.423)
4th Land Quintile X OBC	-0.0455 (0.375)	-0.0119 (0.363)
5th Land Quintile X OBC	-0.188 (0.370)	-0.214 (0.388)
Observations	842	842
Mean of Dep. Variable	0.581	0.581
R-squared	0.034	0.043
F-statistic	4.337	4.175

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Caste, Land Quintile and Time Spent on Child Care

	Time use on Child Care	
	Without controls	With controls
2nd Land Quintile	0.254 (0.299)	0.538 (0.342)
3rd Land Quintile	0.492* (0.273)	0.545* (0.312)
4th Land Quintile	0.242 (0.263)	0.351 (0.268)
5th Land Quintile	0.322 (0.315)	0.439 (0.306)
SC	-0.189 (0.284)	-0.240 (0.255)
2nd Land Quintile X SC	0.375 (0.417)	0.00773 (0.446)
3rd Land Quintile X SC	-1.095* (0.577)	-1.064* (0.561)
4th Land Quintile X SC	-0.247 (0.545)	-0.386 (0.466)
5th Land Quintile X SC	-0.0639 (0.513)	-0.0642 (0.448)
OBC	0.792** (0.329)	0.648** (0.298)
2nd Land Quintile X OBC	-0.721 (0.493)	-0.995* (0.540)
3rd Land Quintile X OBC	-1.334*** (0.406)	-1.171*** (0.391)
4th Land Quintile X OBC	-1.391*** (0.336)	-1.257*** (0.381)
5th Land Quintile X OBC	-1.281** (0.512)	-1.208** (0.539)
Observations	842	842
Mean of Dep. Variable	1.988	1.988
R-squared	0.119	0.182
F-statistic	13.326	44.480

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$