SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) slowed to an estimated 3.4 percent in 2022, as weakening external demand, high inflation, and tightening global financial conditions dampened regional activity. Soaring food and energy prices, stemming partly from the war in Ukraine, triggered sharp cost-of-living increases across the region, leading to millions more people falling into food insecurity and poverty. Global demand for many non-energy commodities softened, adversely affecting the region's exporters of industrial metals. Fiscal space needed to protect the poor has been depleted in many countries, while rising borrowing costs and muted growth prospects have sharply worsened debt dynamics. The regional outlook for 2023-24 is for only a modest pickup in growth and a slow rise in per capita incomes, dimming prospects for a rapid reversal of recent increases in poverty. Risks are tilted to the downside. A more pronounced weakness in major economies, further increases in global interest rates, higher and persistent inflation, fragility, and increased frequency and intensity of adverse weather events could further slow growth across the region, exacerbating poverty and leading to debt distress in some countries.

Recent developments

Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) decelerated to an estimated 3.4 percent last year—0.3 percentage point below previous forecasts (table 2.6.1). The downgrade masks diverse circumstances and the uneven impact of terms-of-trade and cost-of-living developments across the region. Growth estimates were revised down for over 60 percent of countries as a marked weakening of the global economy combined with tightening financial conditions and rising inflation dampened already fragile recoveries and amplified domestic vulnerabilities (figure 2.6.1.A; table 2.6.2).

The cost-of-living increases, intensified by the effects of the war in Ukraine, have reduced food affordability and domestic demand across the region, especially in countries lacking policy space to protect the poor (Rother et al. 2022). Almost 60 percent of the world's extreme poor, who spend a substantial share of their income on food, live in SSA (World Bank 2022j). In 2022, the estimated number of people experiencing acute food insecurity or worse in SSA surpassed 140 million, up nearly 24 million since 2021 (FSIN and GNAFC 2022). Soaring food prices are, therefore, having grave repercussions on food security, poverty alleviation, social cohesion, and growth in many countries. Food price increases, which accounted for more than half of overall inflation, pushed average inflation in SSA to 13 percent—almost three times above its pre-pandemic rate (figure 2.6.1.B; World Bank 2022h). Annual inflation in some countries surpassed 30 percent (Ghana, Rwanda) with food price inflation exceeding 20 percent in over a quarter of all SSA economies. Currency depreciations resulting from unfavorable terms-of-trade shocks, the loss of foreign exchange reserves, capital outflows, and elevated debt levels exacerbated inflationary pressures (Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi).

A sharp slowdown in global growth, especially in China, and weakness in many non-energy commodity prices, have weighed on activity across SSA, particularly in metal exporters. The recent moderation of global energy and food prices has provided some relief, but many countries are still facing a less favorable external environment as import costs remain elevated (figure 2.6.1.C).

Growth in *Nigeria*—the region's largest economy—weakened to 3.1 percent in 2022, a 0.3

Note: This section was prepared by Sergiy Kasyanenko.

FIGURE 2.6.1 SSA: Recent developments

Growth in SSA slowed in 2022 as surging inflation and weaker external demand weighed on regional activity. Inflation rose sharply across the region amid soaring global prices of staple foods and energy, and depreciating currencies. A moderation of global prices of metals, such as copper and gold, exacerbated headwinds for many SSA commodity exporters. Elevated prices of imported fuel, food, and fertilizers led to a deterioration of external balances in non-oil exporting economies.



Sources: Comtrade (database); Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; World Bank.
Note: LICs = low-income countries; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
A. Fragile SSA = SSA countries with fragile and conflict affected situations. Figure shows revisions between latest forecasts and those of the June 2022 *Global Economic Prospects* report.
B. Change in prices from 12 months earlier. Unweighted averages for the sample of 22 SSA EMDEs. Last observation is October 2022.
C. Median across each group. Commodity terms of trade is calculated as changes in real commodity prices weighted by each commodity's net exports share in GDP. An increase indicates improving terms of trade—that is, export prices rising relative to import prices. Last observation is November 2022.
D. Median across each group.

percentage point downgrade from the June projection. Oil output dropped to 1 million barrels per day, down by over 40 percent compared to its 2019 level, reflecting technical problems, insecurity, rising production costs, theft, lack of payment discipline in joint ventures, and persistent underinvestment, partly because of the diversion of oil revenues to petrol subsidies, estimated at over 2 percent of GDP in 2022 (NEITI 2022; World Bank 2022t). A strong recovery in non-oil sectors moderated in the second half of the year as floods and surging consumer prices (annual inflation surpassed 21 percent for the first time in 17 years) disrupted activity and depressed consumer demand. Persistent fuel and foreign exchange shortages, with the naira depreciating by over 30 percent last year in the parallel market, further dampened economic activity.

Oil production stabilized in *Angola*, supporting 3.1 percent growth last year. The currency strengthened by almost 10 percent against the US dollar amid surging oil exports, reducing the country's debt-to-GDP ratio and lessening the impact of higher global prices on domestic inflation.

In *South Africa*, growth in 2022 slowed markedly to an estimated 1.9 percent. The 0.2 percentage point downgrade from the June projection reflects the impact of rising cost of living and weakening of the terms of trade due to falling global metal prices. Power outages have also tempered growth in the region's second largest economy. Capital outflows and shrinking trade surpluses contributed to a depreciation of the rand against the U.S. dollar by nearly 10 percent in 2022, further adding to price pressures. Annual inflation reached its highest level in over a decade, prompting more policy tightening.

Elsewhere, the region's metal exporters suffered from softening metal prices. Excluding oil-exporting countries, current account deficits widened last year because of surging spending on imports as terms of trade generally deteriorated (figure 2.6.1.D). In nonresource-rich countries (Senegal, members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union), monetary policy tightening, costlier imports, currency depreciations, and high public debt all contributed to slower growth in 2022. Several large agricultural commodity exporters (Ethiopia, Kenya) endured prolonged droughts, which further lowered agricultural output—a sector already stressed by high production costs. Activity in the region's small states, which have been struggling with rising import prices, was dragged down by slower inflows of remittances (Cabo Verde, Comoros, The Gambia). In contrast, growth in some tourism-reliant economies (Mauritius, the Seychelles) picked up last year, benefiting from the recovery of global tourism (chapter 4).

Pandemic-related deteriorations in fiscal positions lingered in 2022, with government debt remaining above 60 percent of GDP in almost half of SSA economies. Diverging global prices of energy and metals have, however, led to varying fiscal dynamics across the region. Among SSA's oil-producing countries, government debt fell by nearly 10 percent of GDP on average, due to fiscal surpluses and stronger exchange rates. In contrast, debt sustainability and investor sentiment deteriorated further in many other countries, leading to rising borrowing costs (credit spreads widened markedly in several countries, for example, in Ghana and Zambia), capital outflows, credit rating downgrades (Ghana, Nigeria), and large currency depreciations. Financing deficits also became increasingly challenging, with international bond issuance by governments in the region stalling in the second half of last year.

Outlook

Growth in SSA is projected to edge up in 2023 to 3.6 percent—a 0.2 percentage point downward revision from the June forecast—before picking up to 3.9 percent, in 2024 (figure 2.6.2.A). Even though an expected moderation of global commodity prices should temper cost-of-living increases, tighter policy stances to address elevated inflation and public debt will weigh on domestic demand. Meanwhile, weakening growth in advanced economies and China is expected to pose headwinds for external demand, particularly among exporters of industrial commodities. Constrained access to external financing, tight fiscal space, and high borrowing costs are expected to markedly limit many governments' ability to spur faster growth.

The modest downward revision to regional growth this year primarily reflects small downgrades for the largest economies. Forecast revisions for individual countries are mixed, with downward revisions for almost 60 percent of countries. This includes downward revisions for over 70 percent of metal exporters, which are expected to be affected by the further easing of global metal prices. In more diversified economies, lower prices of imports are expected to have a stronger positive effect by boosting activity in services and

FIGURE 2.6.2 SSA: Outlook

Growth in 2023-24 is projected to remain below long-term averages in several economies as cost-of-living increases and tighter policies continue to dent domestic demand. Subdued growth will make it difficult to reverse increases in food insecurity and poverty. Many commodity producers, particularly of metals, face weakening global demand and lower export prices. Tight global financial conditions are raising borrowing costs across the region, heightening debt vulnerabilities.



Sources: FSIN and GNAFC (2022); Haver Analytics; World Bank.
Note: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; Fragile SSA = SSA countries with fragile and conflict affected situations; LICs = low income countries; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
A. Aggregate growth rates calculated using constant GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates. Other SSA excludes Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa.
B. Bars show the number of people in food crisis as classified by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC/CH) Phase 3, that is, in acute food insecurity crisis or worse. Data for 2022 are estimates as of September 2022.
C. Last observation is November 2022.
D. Last observation is December 8, 2022.

agriculture; nevertheless, for one in three SSA economies, the growth projection for 2023 has been revised down for the second time in a year. This mainly reflects larger-than-expected and more persistent damage to consumer demand from sharp cost-of-living increases, amplified by other vulnerabilities, such as unfavorable weather, high debt, and insecurity.

The ongoing cost-of-living increases are expected to temper the growth of real incomes and domestic demand across the region—especially in LICs, where the number of vulnerable people increased sharply in 2022 (WFP and FAO 2022).

Increased insecurity has worsened fragility and is expected to reduce access to food for many more people across the region (figure 2.6.2.B). The resulting increases in the number of poor, especially in countries where many people were already experiencing acute food insecurity because of violence and conflict (Nigeria, South Sudan) are expected to weigh on economic recoveries.

Per capita income in the region as a whole is expected to grow by only 1.2 percent a year on average in 2023-24, half a percentage point below its trend rate before the pandemic. Such meagre growth is especially concerning in those countries where poverty increased significantly because of pandemic and worsened fragility. Per capita incomes in almost half of the region are forecast to remain below 2019 levels this year.

In *Nigeria*, growth is projected to decelerate to 2.9 percent in 2023 and remain at that pace in 2024—barely above population growth. A growth momentum in the non-oil sector is likely to be restrained by continued weakness in the oil sector. Existing production and security challenges, and a moderation in oil prices are expected to hinder a recovery in oil output. Policy uncertainty, sustained high inflation, and rising incidence of violence are anticipated to temper growth. Growth in agriculture is expected to soften because of the damage from last year's floods. The fiscal position is expected to remain weak because of high borrowing costs, lower energy prices, a sluggish growth of oil production, and a subdued activity in the non-oil sectors.

Growth in *South Africa* is forecast to weaken further to 1.4 percent this year before picking up to a still sluggish 1.8 percent in 2024. Weak activity in major trading partners (China, the euro area, the United Kingdom, and the United States account for over 40 percent of exports), tight global financial conditions, political and policy uncertainty will constrain growth and widen external vulnerabilities. Further domestic policy tightening is bound to temper domestic demand and investment, while high unemployment and worsening power cuts will also weigh on growth. Implementation of much-needed reforms to remove structural bottlenecks has remained slow. Recent improvements in public finances are expected to provide some room for policy support, for example, the extension of COVID-19 relief grants. Nevertheless, fiscal policy is expected to remain a drag on growth as further consolidation measures are required to lower elevated debt burdens, especially given the possibility that the government may take on a large portion of the debt of the state power company Eskom.

Growth in *Angola* is projected to slow to 2.8 percent on average in 2023-24, a downward revision of 0.4 percentage point from the June forecasts. More stable oil production and revenues are expected to support activity in the non-oil economy and help improve the fiscal position, but lower oil prices along with fiscal consolidation measures to reduce public debt are expected to weigh on government spending and constrain growth.

Elsewhere in the region, growth is anticipated to strengthen to 5.0 percent on average in 2023-24, slightly below the June forecast. A delayed recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to pick up steam in many countries as the easing of the cost-of-living pressures boosts domestic demand. Some energy producers are expected to benefit from increasing exports of oil and natural gas (Mozambique, Niger, Senegal). The external environment, however, is anticipated to remain challenging for some countries, with further declines in several global commodity prices dampening export revenues and growth. Most countries are also expected to continue to face elevated prices for imported fertilizers and fuel, albeit somewhat off the highs reached last year (figure 2.6.2.C). Large current account deficits are likely to keep currencies under pressure in several countries, adding to inflation and external vulnerabilities (The Gambia, Ghana). In some agricultural commodity producers unfavorable weather conditions (for example, below-average rainfall in East Africa) are expected to persist, exacerbating the adverse impact of costlier farming inputs on agricultural production. Elevated levels of violence and conflict in many fragile countries are expected to dampen growth, especially among the region's LICs (Burkina Faso, Mali, South Sudan).

Over 60 percent of countries in SSA already in, or at high risk of, debt distress, and with tighter access to external financing, fiscal efforts to support demand and activity are likely to be heavily constrained. Capital flows to SSA are expected to remain weak amid sharply increased credit risks, as soaring borrowing costs exacerbate debt sustainability concerns across the region (figure 2.6.2.D).

Risks

The baseline projections remain subject to multiple downside risks amid continuing uncertainty about the war in Ukraine, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, the degree of global and domestic monetary tightening that will be needed to subdue inflation, and the extent of deceleration of the world economy. Commodity prices may drop further than assumed if growth in major economies falls short of projections (World Bank 2022d). Policy tightening across SSA may have to pick up pace if price pressures persist or if risks of debt distress are increased by higher global interest rates and currency depreciations (figure 2.6.3.A).

If global inflationary pressures intensify further or persist longer than expected, global interest rates may rise by more than assumed, leading to an even greater deterioration of financial conditions in SSA and increased difficulty in regaining access to international borrowing markets. This could trigger financial distress and government debt defaults. Government debt distress would have large adverse spillovers on growth and financial stability in many countries, especially where banks are heavily exposed to sovereign debt (Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone). Increased reliance on non-concessional borrowing in SSA could cause a sharp rise in debt service costs if global interest rates keep rising (figure 2.6.3.B).

Despite the expected moderation of global food price inflation, a sudden disruption in global or local supplies of staple foods could trigger bouts of substantial price rises across the region (Okou, Spray, and Unsal 2022). SSA food markets remain tight because of declines in stocks, limited imports, weather-induced disruptions to production (droughts in Kenya, Somalia; floods in Nigeria, South Sudan), high prices of farming inputs, and the negative impact of insecurity on farming and suppliers' ability to access food markets (Burkina Faso, Mali). These conditions make food systems in SSA particularly vulnerable to various shocks, including volatility of global food prices and climate change (Baptista et al. 2022; Jafino et al. 2020). Costlier farming inputs, a decline in fertilizer use, and persistent droughts could also lead to lasting damage to production of staple crops in SSA, further depleting stocks and worsening poverty and food insecurity (IFA 2022). The current La Niña climate episode is expected to last for an unusual third consecutive

FIGURE 2.6.3 SSA: Risks

Inflationary pressures that are more intense or persistent than assumed could trigger additional policy tightening both globally and within SSA, further constraining growth. A surge in violence and insecurity could cause substantial disruptions to activity. Greater-than-expected policy tightening across the world could sharply increase borrowing costs in the region. Low vaccination rates and constrained fiscal space highlight a limited ability to respond to future public health emergencies.



Sources: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https://www.acleddata.com; J.P. Morgan; Ritchie et al. 2022; World Bank.

Note: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; Fragile SSA = SSA countries with fragile and conflict affected situations; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.

A. Change in policy rates since January 2002. SSA average is the unweighted average for 8 SSA EMDEs. Last observation is November 2022.

B. SSA (median) is a median for 9 SSA EMDEs. Last observation is December 13, 2022.

C. Cumulative number of reported violent events during the first 11 months of each year; violent events include battles, explosions, violence against civilians, riots and protests. Last observation is December 2, 2022.

D. Total number of people who are fully vaccinated. Last observation is December 15, 2022.

year likely prolonging severe drought conditions in the Horn of Africa. In some affected countries (Somalia, South Sudan) half of population is already acutely food insecure. As a result, even more people could be at high risk of starvation and famine.

Though a ceasefire agreement was reached in Ethiopia last November after two years of war, the incidence of violence and conflict in SSA remains elevated, particularly in the Sahel region, but also elsewhere, such as in Mozambique and Nigeria (figure 2.6.3.C). Such violence—a major driver of food insecurity and poverty—could further disrupt farming activities and the flow of humanitarian aid, as well as trigger delays of large-scale investment projects in extractive sectors in some countries. Increased fragility, which is often associated with a severely reduced institutional capacity to address environmental and climate vulnerabilities, could also significantly amplify the impact of climate change on poverty and food insecurity (Maino and Emrullahu 2022).

Although the COVID-19 pandemic is in retreat across the region, vaccination rates in SSA remain very low, while public health systems are still inadequately prepared to mount an effective response to future outbreaks of infectious diseases. As of end-December, just 28 percent of the population in SSA has been fully vaccinated, compared to 65 percent in EMDEs as a whole (figure 2.6.3.D). This is especially concerning considering that the fiscal space needed to address public health emergencies is largely depleted in many countries.

TABLE 2.6.1 Sub-Saharan Africa forecast summary

(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)

	2020	2021	2022e	2023f	2024f	Percentage point differences from June 2022 projections: 2022e	2023f	2024f
EMDE SSA, GDP [1]	**-2.0**	**4.3**	**3.4**	**3.6**	**3.9**	**-0.3**	**-0.2**	**-0.1**
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars)	-4.5	1.7	0.9	1.0	1.4	-0.2	-0.3	-0.1
(Average including countries that report expenditure components in national accounts) [2]								
EMDE SSA, GDP [2,3]	-2.0	4.3	3.4	3.6	3.9	-0.3	-0.2	-0.1
PPP GDP	-1.8	4.2	3.4	3.6	4.0	-0.3	-0.3	-0.1
Private consumption	-1.6	10.1	3.7	3.1	3.4	0.4	-0.5	-0.2
Public consumption	9.0	-2.1	0.7	0.7	2.8	-2.3	-0.2	0.1
Fixed investment	-2.0	6.0	6.8	7.0	7.3	1.4	-0.2	-0.8
Exports, GNFS [4]	-15.7	2.7	6.0	6.6	6.3	0.0	0.4	0.5
Imports, GNFS [4]	-19.5	15.5	8.7	7.2	7.4	2.2	1.0	1.2
Net exports, contribution to growth	1.5	-3.0	-0.9	-0.5	-0.6	-0.6	-0.3	-0.3
Memo items: GDP								
Eastern and Southern Africa	-2.9	4.6	3.3	3.5	3.9	-0.1	-0.1	0.1
Western and Central Africa	-0.8	4.0	3.5	3.7	4.0	-0.5	-0.4	-0.3
SSA excluding Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola	0.2	4.6	4.2	4.8	5.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.1
Oil exporters [5]	-2.0	3.1	3.1	2.9	3.0	-0.5	-0.5	-0.4
CFA countries [6]	0.5	4.1	4.3	5.2	5.7	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1
CEMAC	-1.8	1.2	3.2	3.0	3.2	-0.2	0.1	-0.2
WAEMU	1.8	5.9	4.9	6.4	7.0	-0.2	-0.3	-0.2
SSA3	-4.1	3.9	2.6	2.3	2.4	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3
Nigeria	-1.8	3.6	3.1	2.9	2.9	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
South Africa	-6.3	4.9	1.9	1.4	1.8	-0.2	-0.1	0.0
Angola	-5.8	0.8	3.1	2.8	2.9	0.0	-0.5	-0.3

Source: World Bank.

Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; PPP = purchasing power parity; EMDE = emerging market and developing economy. World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries' prospects do not differ at any given moment in time.

1. GDP and expenditure components are measured in average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.

2. Subregion aggregate excludes the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, and South Sudan, for which data limitations prevent the forecasting of GDP components.

3. Subregion growth rates may differ from the most recent edition of Africa's Pulse (https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/africas-pulse) because of data revisions and the inclusion of the Central African Republic and São Tomé and Príncipe in the subregion aggregate of that publication.

4. Exports and imports of goods and nonfactor services (GNFS).

5. Includes Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, and South Sudan.

6. The Financial Community of Africa (CFA) franc zone consists of 14 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, each affiliated with one of two monetary unions. The Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC) comprises Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon; the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

TABLE 2.6.2 Sub-Saharan Africa country forecasts[1]

(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)

						Percentage point differences from June 2022 projections		
	2020	2021	2022e	2023f	2024f	2022e	2023f	2024f
Angola	-5.8	0.8	3.1	2.8	2.9	0.0	-0.5	-0.3
Benin	3.8	7.2	5.7	6.2	6.0	-0.2	0.1	0.0
Botswana	-8.7	11.4	4.1	4.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Burkina Faso	1.9	6.9	4.3	5.0	5.3	-0.5	-0.4	0.0
Burundi	0.3	1.8	2.1	3.0	4.0	-0.4	-0.3	-0.1
Central African Republic	1.0	1.0	1.5	3.0	3.8	-1.7	-0.4	-0.2
Cabo Verde	-14.8	7.0	4.0	4.8	5.7	-1.5	-1.3	-0.3
Cameroon	0.3	3.6	3.8	4.3	4.6	-0.2	0.0	0.2
Chad	-1.6	-1.2	3.1	3.3	3.3	0.3	-0.2	-0.6
Comoros	-0.3	2.2	1.4	3.3	3.8	-1.4	0.2	0.1
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1.7	6.2	6.1	6.4	6.6	0.1	0.0	0.5
Congo, Rep.	-6.2	-2.2	1.9	3.7	4.5	-1.6	0.7	0.0
Côte d'Ivoire	2.0	7.0	5.7	6.8	6.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Equatorial Guinea	-4.9	-1.6	3.2	-2.6	-3.4	1.4	0.0	-1.3
Eritrea	-0.5	2.9	2.5	2.7	2.9	-2.2	-0.9	-0.8
Eswatini	-1.6	7.9	1.1	2.6	2.7	-0.9	0.8	0.9
Ethiopia [2]	6.1	6.3	3.5	5.3	6.1	0.2	0.1	0.2
Gabon	-1.8	1.5	2.7	3.0	2.9	-0.6	0.4	-0.1
Gambia, The	0.6	4.3	3.5	4.0	5.5	-2.1	-2.2	-1.0
Ghana	0.5	5.4	3.5	2.7	3.5	-2.0	-2.5	-1.5
Guinea	4.9	3.9	4.6	5.3	5.6	0.3	-0.6	-0.2
Guinea-Bissau	1.5	5.0	3.5	4.5	4.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kenya	-0.3	7.5	5.5	5.0	5.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Lesotho	-8.4	1.3	2.6	2.3	2.9	0.3	0.2	0.9
Liberia	-3.0	5.0	3.7	4.7	5.7	-0.7	-0.1	0.5
Madagascar	-7.1	4.4	2.6	4.2	4.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Malawi	0.8	2.8	1.5	3.0	3.4	-0.6	-1.3	-0.8
Mali	-1.2	3.1	1.8	4.0	4.0	-1.5	-1.3	-1.0
Mauritania	-0.9	2.4	4.0	5.1	7.9	-0.5	-0.2	0.2
Mauritius	-14.6	3.6	5.8	5.5	4.2	-0.1	-0.5	0.3
Mozambique	-1.2	2.3	3.7	5.0	8.0	0.1	-1.0	2.2
Namibia	-8.0	2.7	2.8	2.0	1.9	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Niger	3.6	1.4	5.0	7.1	10.1	-0.2	0.0	-0.3
Nigeria	-1.8	3.6	3.1	2.9	2.9	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
Rwanda	-3.4	10.9	6.0	6.7	7.0	-0.8	-0.5	-0.4
São Tomé and Príncipe	3.1	1.8	1.1	2.1	2.4	-1.7	-0.9	-0.9
Senegal	1.3	6.1	4.8	8.0	10.5	0.4	-0.5	-0.1
Seychelles	-7.7	7.9	11.0	5.2	4.8	6.4	-0.5	-0.2
Sierra Leone	-2.0	4.1	3.7	3.7	4.4	-0.2	-0.7	-0.4
South Africa	-6.3	4.9	1.9	1.4	1.8	-0.2	-0.1	0.0
Sudan	-3.6	-1.9	0.3	2.0	2.5	-0.4	0.0	0.0
South Sudan [2]	9.5	-5.1	-2.8	-0.8	2.1	-2.0	-3.3	-1.9
Tanzania	2.0	4.3	4.6	5.3	6.1	-0.7	-0.4	0.0
Togo [3]	1.8	5.3	4.8	5.6	6.4	-0.2	-0.2	0.0
Uganda [2]	3.0	3.5	4.7	5.5	6.1	1.0	0.4	-0.4
Zambia	-3.0	3.6	3.0	3.9	4.1	-0.3	0.3	0.1
Zimbabwe	-5.3	5.8	3.4	3.6	3.6	-0.3	0.0	0.0

Source: World Bank.

Note: e = estimate; f = forecast. World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries' prospects do not significantly differ at any given moment in time.

1. Data are based on GDP measured in average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.

2. Fiscal-year based numbers.

3. For Togo, growth figure in 2019 is based on pre-2020 rebasing GDP estimates.

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