

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) reached an estimated 3.5 percent in 2021, supported by a rebound in commodity prices and a gradual easing of social restrictions. Nevertheless, recurrent virus flare-ups in several countries and low vaccination rates slowed the pace of the recovery. Growth is forecast to firm to 3.7 percent a year on average in 2022-23—somewhat above last June’s projections but insufficient to reverse increases in poverty and losses in per capita income. Slow progress with vaccinations is expected to underpin only a gradual recovery of domestic demand, with substantial downside risks clouding the outlook. The fading tailwinds from commodity prices, the unwinding of policy support, and a shift to austerity in some countries to tackle rising debt levels could slow growth. Amplified by the pandemic, previous weaknesses, such as vulnerabilities to climate change, poverty, food insecurity, and violence, weigh heavily on recoveries across the region as well.

Recent developments

Output in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) increased by an estimated 3.5 percent in 2021—a 0.7 percentage points upward revision from the June 2021 forecast but still well below the region’s longer-term average growth rate. The revision reflects a better-than-expected pickup in activity in the first half of the year amid an improved external environment, including a strong rebound in commodity prices (World Bank 2021g). Nonetheless, the recovery lost some momentum as many non-energy commodity prices stabilized and resurgent COVID-19 outbreaks—exacerbated by lagging vaccine rollouts in the region—caused some countries to reintroduce lockdown measures (Namibia, South Africa, Uganda; figure 2.6.1.A, B). In some countries, the services and manufacturing sectors again reeled from the adverse impact of the pandemic, while high unemployment and elevated inflation dented consumer confidence. Rising social unrest, insecurity, and civil conflicts, especially in the Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and northeastern Nigeria) and Ethiopia, further restrained investment and consumer spending.


Incoming indicators for major SSA economies point to renewed improvement in economic activity towards the end of 2021 (figure 2.6.1.C). Mobility indicators continued to recover as many economies eased social-distancing restrictions following a decline in new COVID-19 cases from the peak reached in mid-2021. However, the Omicron variant detected in late November is now contributing to COVID-19 flare-ups across the region, particularly in Eastern and Southern Africa. More than 70 percent of SSA countries reported at least a 50 percent increase in new COVID-19 cases during the last two weeks of 2021.

As a result, the recovery remains fragile amid the lingering threat of recurrent COVID-19 outbreaks and the possibility of new restrictions. As of end-December the number of fully vaccinated people stood at only 6.2 percent of SSA’s population compared to an average vaccination rate of over 44 percent across other emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). In some of the region’s most populous countries, such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Tanzania—only about 2 percent or less of the population have been fully vaccinated. Tanzania, for example, started administering COVID-19 vaccines in July 2021 only. Eight out of ten countries with the lowest vaccination rates are in

Note: This section was prepared by Sergiy Kasyanenko.

FIGURE 2.6.1 SSA: Recent developments

New COVID-19 infections in Sub-Saharan Africa have declined from their mid-2021 peaks amid tighter restrictions and a gradual pickup in vaccinations. Economic activity and international tourist arrivals have increased, but this modest rebound remains fragile due to lingering uncertainties about the course of the pandemic.



Sources: Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford; Haver Analytics; Johns Hopkins University (database); Namibia Statistics Agency; World Bank.

Note: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.

A. Figure shows 7-day moving average of new COVID-19 cases. Last observation is December 31, 2021.

B. Seven-day moving average; 100 represents toughest lockdown policies. SSA index is calculated using real GDP weighted stringency indices for the sample of 44 SSA EMDEs. Last observation is December 31, 2021.

C. A value above 50 indicates expansion. Composite PMI covers manufacturing and services. Sample includes Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia. Last observation is November 2021.

SSA including the Democratic Republic of Congo—the third most populous SSA country with only 0.1 percent of its 90 million people being fully vaccinated.

Growth in 2021 in the three largest SSA economies—Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa—is estimated at 3.1 percent—an upward revision from previous forecasts. Growth in Nigeria, the region's largest economy, is estimated at 2.4 percent last year, primarily driven by the recovery in non-oil sectors. Oil production remained below pre-pandemic levels, held back by disruptions to maintenance work and declining extractive investments. Social unrest and violence continued

to weigh on consumer and business confidence. Growth in South Africa is estimated at 4.6 percent in 2021—more than a full percentage point above June projections—reflecting a strong rebound in mining, manufacturing, and services sectors. The recovery slowed in the second half of 2021 owing to severe COVID-19 outbreaks, power outages, and a rise in social unrest. Angola's economy is estimated to have grown by only 0.4 percent in 2021, as a strong recovery in non-oil sectors was offset by declining output from aging oil fields.

Elsewhere in the region, tourism-reliant economies (Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles) saw some improvement in international arrivals thanks to the rapid progress with vaccinations and a partial reopening of international borders. For example, tourism is recovering rapidly in Mauritius following a full reopening in October 2021 (figure 2.6.1.D). However remaining travel restrictions as well as the reintroduction of curbs on international travel to contain the spread of the Omicron variant held back the recovery of tourism to pre-pandemic levels in many SSA economies (Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa). In some countries, resurgences of social unrest, insecurity, violence, and conflict (Eswatini, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan), continue to temper the pace of recoveries.

Policy space has narrowed further owing to increasing public debt levels, lost fiscal revenue, and rising inflation in some countries. Several large SSA economies tightened policy in 2021 over concerns about rising energy and food prices (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe). In some countries, inflation has remained in double digits (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Angola), partly as a result of large currency depreciations. Constraints on financing, particularly in low-income countries, has also limited fiscal support. In some countries, expenditure on pandemic-relief programs was offset by declining spending on infrastructure and development projects. Average general government fiscal deficits improved only marginally in 2021 to 4.6 percent of GDP from 5.2 percent of GDP in 2020, with government debt rising in nearly 60 percent of all countries last year.

External pressures eased across the region last year, with some countries posting substantial improvements in the current account balances reflecting more favorable terms of trade and continued growth of remittances (Angola, Kenya, Nigeria). Foreign exchange reserves positions strengthened as well following the allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in August 2021 and international bond placement by several countries (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Rwanda).

Outlook


Growth in SSA is projected to firm to 3.6 percent in 2022 and 3.8 percent in 2023 (figure 2.6.2.A). The near-term recovery is expected to persist supported by elevated commodity prices as activity continues to rebound in the region’s main trading partners (China, the euro area, and the United States), albeit at a slower pace than last year. The outlook is also predicated on a gradual recovery in tourism, with vaccinations in some tourism-reliant economies already proceeding at a much faster pace than in the rest of the region.

Projected growth in the region in 2022-23 is, however, still nearly a full percentage point below its 2000-19 average, partly reflecting the lingering adverse effects of COVID-19, while the pace of vaccinations is also expected to remain slow in many SSA countries (figure 2.6.2.B). In addition, the speed of recovery is to be constrained by elevated policy uncertainty in many countries, a high incidence of social unrest and conflict, rising poverty and food insecurity, and delays to investments in infrastructure and mining, as well as a slow implementation of structural reforms.

The pandemic has reversed at least a decade of gains in per capita income in some countries—in almost a third of the region’s economies, including Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa, per capita incomes are forecast to be lower in 2022 than a decade ago. After barely increasing last year, per capita incomes are projected to recover only at a subdued pace, rising 1.1 percent a year in 2022-23, leaving them almost 2 percent below 2019 levels. In South Africa and Nigeria, per capita incomes are projected to remain more than 3

FIGURE 2.6.2 SSA: Outlook

Growth in SSA is expected to firm in 2022-23 but to remain below its long-term average rate in most cases, with lagging vaccination rates holding back the recovery. Per capita income growth in 2022-23 will be insufficient in many SSA countries to reverse the severe setbacks caused by the pandemic in 2020-21.



Sources: Our World in Data (database); World Bank.
 Note: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; FCS = EMDEs with fragile and conflict situations; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
 A. "Industrial-commodity exporters" represents oil and metal exporting countries. Aggregate growth rates calculated using constant GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates. "Industrial commodity exporters" excludes Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa.
 B. Total number of people who received all doses prescribed by the vaccination protocol. Last observation is December 31, 2021.
 C. Chart shows the evolution of real per capita GDP in constant U.S. dollars at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates, rebased to 2019 = 100. "SSA" sample comprises 47 countries.

percent below pre-pandemic levels in 2023 (figure 2.6.2.C).

In Nigeria, growth is projected to strengthen somewhat to 2.5 percent in 2022 and 2.8 percent in 2023. The oil sector should benefit from higher oil prices, a gradual easing of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) production cuts, and domestic regulatory reforms. Activity in service sectors is expected to firm as well, particularly in telecommunications and financial services. However, the reversal of pandemic-induced income and employment losses is expected to be slow; this, along with high food prices, restrains a faster recovery in domestic

demand. Activity in the non-oil economy will remain curbed by high levels of violence and social unrest as well as the threat of fresh COVID-19 flare-ups with remaining mobility restrictions being lifted guardedly because of low vaccination rates—just about 2 percent of the population had been fully vaccinated by the end of 2021.

Growth in South Africa is forecast to revert to its pre-pandemic trend, with the economy projected to grow by 2.1 percent in 2022 and 1.5 percent in 2023. Improved control over virus outbreaks along with more widespread vaccinations—about 27 percent of the population had been fully vaccinated by the end of 2021—are expected to continue to support the recovery in services sectors, including tourism. In fact, the government is easing mobility restrictions as the Omicron wave ebbs and the levels of vaccination increase. Private consumption and investment are projected to firm somewhat, recovering from last year's virus restrictions and social unrest. However, persistent large-scale unemployment, high inequality, and structural impediments to growth will continue to weigh on economic activity. Many constraints on long-term growth in South Africa predate COVID-19, including the legacy of weak public finances and slow implementation of reforms needed to boost productivity and employment growth. Rising government debt and debt service costs will continue to constrain policy space and curtail public spending, leaving gaps in essential public services and infrastructure as a major obstacle to stronger potential growth.

Growth in Angola is projected to strengthen to 3 percent on average in 2022-23. Higher oil prices and the easing of OPEC production cuts will support a gradual recovery in oil investments and output. Non-oil sectors will benefit from increasing vaccination rates—12 percent of the population had already been fully vaccinated by the end of 2021, structural reforms, and improving price and exchange rate stability amid a tighter policy stance.

Elsewhere in the region, growth is projected to return to its 2000-19 average rate, rising to 5.2 percent a year on average in 2022-23. Among agricultural commodity exporters (Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania), growth will be supported by

increasing agricultural production encouraged by high prices of agricultural commodities (coffee, cotton), investments to raise yields, intensification of land use, and an assumed continuation of favorable rainfall patterns in some countries (Zambia, Zimbabwe). In some countries, however, the expansion of agriculture is likely to be constrained by various sources of uncertainty, such as droughts and below average rainfall (Burundi, Comoros, Madagascar, Tanzania), and the intensification of armed conflicts (Ethiopia, Mali).

In some commodity exporters (Guinea, Mozambique, Sudan), elevated commodity prices are projected to both underpin a recovery in extractive sectors and can help boost export and fiscal revenues, thus easing some pandemic-induced fiscal pressures and external financing needs (figure 2.6.2.D). Some producers may, however, struggle to ramp up production in mining because of ageing facilities and infrastructure (Chad, Republic of Congo, South Sudan), and disruptions to existing and new investment projects, whether because of the pandemic or elevated security risks.

Many SSA countries saw a marked deterioration in fiscal balances because of deployed relief measures, depleting already-narrow fiscal space (Ghana, Mozambique, Rwanda). This, together with constraints on financing and pressures to improve debt sustainability, will lead to a much less supportive fiscal stance across the region over the forecast horizon. Fiscal adjustments are expected to predominantly happen on the expenditure side with a bigger reduction in fiscal deficits in resource-rich countries, partly reflecting revenue boosts from higher commodity prices and consolidation efforts in some countries. Elsewhere in the region, fiscal space is expected to remain tight with below-trend recoveries restraining revenue growth.

Risks

Risks are tilted to the downside. The region's low COVID-19 vaccination coverage rates markedly elevate the threat of renewed outbreaks as well as the spread of more transmissible or vaccine-resistant variants of the virus as, for example,

recently discovered Omicron variant (figure 2.6.3.A). Despite earlier evidence from South Africa indicating that the Omicron wave led to less severe increases in deaths and hospitalizations compared to the previous COVID-19 surges, it remains to be seen whether that will be the case in the rest of SSA.

If the distribution of vaccines proceeds at the current low rate the extended duration and severity of the COVID-19 pandemic could still delay recoveries in many countries across the region. Persistent vaccine supply and distribution challenges risk making COVID-19 a recurrent public health problem in the region (Wilkinson et al. 2021).


Another downside risk to the regional outlook is the possibility that the global recovery could moderate further than expected, leading to a significant reversal of the gains in commodity prices recorded in 2021—to the detriment of the region’s oil and metals producers.

Persistence of pandemic-induced longterm damage is a significant risk to the baseline growth forecast as well. Disproportionate losses to incomes, employment, and human capital accumulation experienced by vulnerable groups of population, especially in low-income countries and countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS), could hinder poverty alleviation and lead to lasting increases in inequality across the region (chapter 4).

Higher food prices could amplify the negative impact of increased poverty on economic growth. Last year, nearly 110 million people in SSA were in situations characterized by food crisis or worse—40 million more than at the start of the pandemic, with over 60 percent of these in just four FCS countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan; figure 2.6.3.B). Supply disruptions, extreme weather events, or armed conflicts could trigger surges in food prices, with vulnerable groups suffering the most (figure 2.6.3.C). A further rise in food prices would squeeze households’ purchasing power and erode consumer confidence, causing more subdued growth and hindering poverty reduction.

FIGURE 2.6.3 SSA: Risks

Downside risks to the forecast predominate. Low vaccination rates facilitate the spread of more transmissible or vaccine-resistant variants of the virus. Pandemic uncertainty, persistent poverty and food insecurity along with increasing food prices, rising conflicts, and violence against civilians could all dampen the economic recovery.



The level of violence against civilians in SSA has remained elevated, with the security situation being particularly fragile and unstable in the Sahel and Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region (figure 2.6.3.D). Armed conflicts and insecurity could weigh heavily on the outlook, including by increasing uncertainty and deterring private investment. Social unrest (as in South Africa last July) and heightened political tensions (Burkina Faso, Chad, Eswatini, Guinea, Mali, Sudan) could also erode confidence, slow structural reforms, and undermine effective COVID responses and the distribution of vaccines.

Global financial conditions have remained broadly accommodative, enabling some SSA countries to access international financial markets in 2021 (Nigeria, Rwanda). A sharp deterioration in global investor sentiment or a faster-than-expected withdrawal of policy support by major central banks could trigger capital outflows, currency depreciations, and sudden increases in borrowing costs across the region. For SSA countries that borrow internationally and are increasingly dependent on nonconcessional loans (Comoros, Rwanda), the loss of access to external funding on

favorable terms or a sharp increase in interest rates could lead to disruptive fiscal retrenchment, surging debt service costs, and debt distress. Several countries have been facing debt sustainability challenges (Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda) and may need additional fiscal adjustments involving sharp slowdowns in public investment. Slower-than-expected recoveries, less favorable terms of trade, and spending pressures could, however, thwart fiscal consolidation efforts in some countries further delaying debt stabilization (South Africa).

TABLE 2.6.1 Sub-Saharan Africa forecast summary

(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)

	2019	2020	2021e	2022f	2023f	Percentage point differences from June 2021 projections		
						2021e	2022f	2023f
EMDE SSA, GDP¹	2.5	-2.2	3.5	3.6	3.8	0.7	0.3	0.0
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars)	-0.1	-4.7	0.8	1.0	1.3	0.6	0.3	0.1
(Average including countries that report expenditure components in national accounts) ²								
EMDE SSA, GDP ^{2,3}	2.5	-2.2	3.5	3.6	3.8	0.7	0.3	0.1
PPP GDP	2.6	-2.0	3.4	3.7	4.0	0.6	0.4	0.1
Private consumption	1.3	-1.5	2.5	3.1	3.2	0.6	0.5	0.6
Public consumption	4.7	3.2	2.1	-0.1	0.1	1.0	-2.2	-2.1
Fixed investment	4.7	0.0	3.7	6.8	8.7	2.0	3.5	3.0
Exports, GNFS ⁴	3.0	-12.1	8.8	5.5	5.5	2.0	0.1	0.0
Imports, GNFS ⁴	5.0	-10.7	9.3	6.3	5.7	6.2	2.9	2.2
Net exports, contribution to growth	-0.6	-0.1	-0.3	-0.4	-0.2	-1.2	-0.9	-0.7
Memo items: GDP								
Eastern and Southern Africa	2.0	-3.2	3.7	3.6	3.8	0.5	0.0	-0.1
Western and Central Africa	3.2	-0.8	3.2	3.6	3.9	0.9	0.7	0.3
SSA excluding Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola	4.3	0.0	3.9	4.9	5.5	0.6	0.5	0.2
Oil exporters ⁵	2.1	-2.1	2.3	2.9	3.0	0.8	0.7	0.3
CFA countries ⁶	4.1	0.4	4.3	4.9	5.5	1.0	0.7	0.0
CEMAC	1.8	-1.8	2.1	3.1	3.1	0.5	1.6	0.2
WAEMU	5.7	1.8	5.6	6.0	6.8	1.3	0.2	-0.3
SSA3	1.0	-4.1	3.1	2.4	2.3	0.8	0.2	0.1
Nigeria	2.2	-1.8	2.4	2.5	2.8	0.6	0.4	0.4
South Africa	0.1	-6.4	4.6	2.1	1.5	1.1	0.0	0.0
Angola	-0.6	-5.4	0.4	3.1	2.8	-0.1	-0.2	-0.7

Source: World Bank.

Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; PPP = purchasing power parity; EMDE = emerging market and developing economy. World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries' prospects do not differ at any given moment in time.

1. GDP and expenditure components are measured in average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.

2. Subregion aggregate excludes the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, and South Sudan, for which data limitations prevent the forecasting of GDP components.

3. Subregion growth rates may differ from the most recent edition of Africa's Pulse (<https://www.worldbank.org/africaspulse>) because of data revisions and the inclusion of the Central African Republic and São Tomé and Príncipe in the subregion aggregate of that publication.

4. Exports and imports of goods and nonfactor services (GNFS).

5. Includes Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, and South Sudan.

6. The Financial Community of Africa (CFA) franc zone consists of 14 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, each affiliated with one of two monetary unions. The Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC) comprises Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon; the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

TABLE 2.6.2 Sub-Saharan Africa country forecasts¹

(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)

Percentage point
differences from June
2021 projections

	2019	2020	2021e	2022f	2023f	2021e	2022f	2023f
Angola	-0.6	-5.4	0.4	3.1	2.8	-0.1	-0.2	-0.7
Benin	6.9	3.8	6.0	6.5	6.5	1.0	0.5	0.0
Botswana	3.0	-8.5	8.5	5.9	4.4	1.6	1.6	0.3
Burkina Faso	5.7	1.9	6.7	5.6	5.3	3.6	0.6	-0.4
Burundi	1.8	0.3	2.0	2.5	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Central African Republic	3.1	0.8	-0.8	3.5	4.5	-1.5	0.7	0.1
Cabo Verde	5.7	-14.8	4.0	5.2	6.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Cameroon	3.7	0.7	3.4	4.0	4.4	1.3	1.3	0.6
Chad	3.2	-0.9	0.9	1.8	2.9	-0.1	-0.7	0.0
Comoros	1.8	-0.1	1.3	3.2	2.9	1.1	1.0	-1.3
Congo, Dem. Rep.	4.4	1.7	3.6	4.8	5.1	1.1	1.8	1.0
Congo, Rep.	-0.1	-7.9	-1.2	3.2	3.0	-1.1	0.9	-0.1
Côte d'Ivoire	6.2	2.0	6.2	6.5	6.4	0.5	0.5	-0.1
Equatorial Guinea	-6.0	-4.9	3.8	1.5	-0.9	1.4	7.1	1.4
Eritrea	3.8	-0.6	2.9	4.8	3.8	0.9	-0.1	0.0
Eswatini	2.6	-1.9	1.5	1.8	1.9	0.2	0.7	0.4
Ethiopia ²	9.0	6.1	2.4	4.3	6.5	0.1	-1.7	-1.0
Gabon	3.9	-1.8	1.5	2.8	3.0	0.0	0.3	-0.6
Gambia, The	6.2	-0.2	4.0	6.0	6.5	0.5	0.5	-0.5
Ghana	6.5	0.4	4.1	5.5	5.0	2.7	3.1	1.4
Guinea	5.6	7.1	5.2	6.1	5.9	-0.3	0.9	0.7
Guinea-Bissau	4.5	-1.4	3.3	4.0	5.0	0.3	0.0	0.0
Kenya	5.0	-0.3	5.0	4.7	5.1	0.5	0.0	-0.7
Lesotho	2.6	-6.5	3.2	3.0	2.8	0.3	-0.1	-0.4
Liberia	-2.5	-3.0	3.6	4.7	5.0	0.3	0.5	0.3
Madagascar	4.4	-6.2	1.8	5.4	5.1	-0.2	-0.4	-0.3
Malawi	5.4	0.8	2.4	3.0	4.4	-0.4	0.0	-0.1
Mali	4.8	-1.6	4.0	5.2	5.0	1.5	0.0	0.0
Mauritania	5.8	-1.8	2.7	4.1	6.4	0.0	0.4	0.4
Mauritius	3.0	-14.9	5.1	6.6	4.2	1.5	0.7	-0.1
Mozambique	2.3	-1.2	2.3	5.1	9.6	0.6	1.0	3.3
Namibia	-0.9	-8.5	1.2	2.4	1.5	-0.6	0.6	0.0
Niger	5.9	3.6	5.5	6.2	9.4	0.8	-2.7	-2.7
Nigeria	2.2	-1.8	2.4	2.5	2.8	0.6	0.4	0.4
Rwanda	9.5	-3.4	10.2	7.1	7.8	5.3	0.7	0.3
São Tomé and Príncipe	2.2	3.1	2.1	2.9	3.3	-0.6	-0.6	-0.7
Senegal	4.4	1.5	4.7	5.5	9.2	1.6	0.6	0.3
Seychelles	2.0	-13.3	6.9	7.7	6.8	5.1	3.4	2.6
Sierra Leone	5.3	-2.0	4.2	6.0	4.3	1.2	2.3	0.3
South Africa	0.1	-6.4	4.6	2.1	1.5	1.1	0.0	0.0
Sudan	-2.2	-3.6	0.1	3.5	5.0	-0.3	2.4	2.4
South Sudan ²	3.2	9.5	-5.4	1.2	3.5	-2.0	-0.3	0.5
Tanzania	5.8	2.0	4.3	5.4	5.9	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1
Togo ³	5.5	1.8	5.1	5.6	6.2	1.7	1.0	1.2
Uganda ²	6.4	3.0	3.4	3.7	5.5	0.1	-1.0	-0.9
Zambia	1.4	-3.0	2.2	2.9	4.5	0.4	0.0	0.7
Zimbabwe	-6.1	-4.1	5.1	4.3	4.2	1.2	-0.8	-0.8

Source: World Bank.

Note: e = estimate; f = forecast. World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information and changing (global) circumstances. Consequently, projections presented here may differ from those contained in other Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries' prospects do not significantly differ at any given moment in time.

1. Data are based on GDP measured in average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.

2. Fiscal-year based numbers.

3. For Togo, growth figure in 2019 is based on pre-2020 rebasing GDP estimates.

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