

## **Reviving Growth**

## East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, April 2023



## Structure

- 1. Recent developments
- 2. Prospects for 2023
- 3. A long view of growth
- 4. Looming challenges




### **Recent developments**



#### Most major EAP economies have recovered and are growing, but output in most Pacific Island Countries is still not back to pre-pandemic levels






Source: World Bank, Haver Analytics


Note: right panel: Bars show the latest quarterly or annual GDP in 2022 relative to 2019 level



### Domestic demand was strong but is now moderating; goods exports were robust but are now declining




#### Goods exports (2019=100)



Source: Haver Analytics **THE WORLD BANK** ant Asia & Pacific - Chief Resemuts Office Note: left panel: Philippines refers to auto sales

# Fiscal policy became less expansionary in most countries, and monetary policy began to tighten in 2022




THE WORLD BANK<br/>East Asia & Pacific - Chief Economic ToticeSource: World Economic Outlook Database, October 2022, Haver Analytics

### **Prospects in 2023**



## Three linked international developments will shape economic performance in the EAP countries




Source: World Bank staff illustration

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## China will grow faster in 2023 than in 2022 but much of the rest of the region will slow down

GDP growth in 2022 and 2023 forecast




THE WORLD BANK East Asia & Pacific - Chief Economist Office Source: IMF, World Bank

## A long view of growth and structural change



# EAP countries have seen two decades of higher and more stable growth than other economies

GDP growth and GDP growth volatility



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Note: Bar height shows average annual growth rate; whiskers show average standard deviation over the period.


### Consequently, EAP countries have all transitioned either to lower or upper middle-income status

Income group mobility 10 **UMIC** in 2019 2019 log GNI per capita (\$, Atlas method) MYS CHN 9 TUV LMIC in 2019 WSM **NDN** PHL FSM MNG **2019 UMIC** 8 KIR threshold **SLB** PNG TLS KHM 7 2019 LMIC threshold 6 2002 2002 UMIC LMIC threshold threshold 5 7 8 5 6 9

2002 log GNI per capita (\$, Atlas method)



# But EAP convergence with high income countries, which was faster than in other countries, has recently stalled




Note: x-axis denotes initial year.  $\gamma$  represents the marginal effect of convergence in developing EAP while  $\gamma + \beta$  represents the total effect.

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
### And productivity growth has been declining

#### Labor productivity growth and drivers






Source: APO Productivity Database; Penn World Tables World Bank Note: EAP excl. China shows weighted average of ASEAN-4 countries. In recent years, the share of manufacturing in GDP declined in EAP economies (other than Cambodia and Vietnam), and the share of services in GDP increased



Source: GGDC/UNU-WIDER Economic Transformation Database Note: Other EMDE shows 25 -75 percentile of 20 major EMDEs outside EAP



#### New digital technologies could boost productivity growth in services




### Correlation between website use and labor


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
Source: ILOSTAT, UN National Accounts, World Bank Enterprise Surveys, Nayar et al. (2021). Note: Website data for 2016 or most recent available year.


#### But countries will need to address the reform gap in the services sectors


Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (2021; 1=most liberalized)












#### **Professional Services**



#### Distribution Services (Wholesale and retail trade)

### Looming challenges

**Decoupling?; Aging; Adaptation** 




**Decoupling?** 



# Decoupling? Some developing EAP economies have reaped the export benefits of US-China trade tensions

Sectoral decomposition of changes in the share of US and China's imports during 2018-2022

Changes in share of China's imports, 2018-2022



Changes in share of US imports, 2018-2022

#### **Decoupling?**

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## Uncertain politics rather than reliable economics are now molding trade patterns

 Friend-shoring may lead to a less predictable environment for third-countries than rulesbased trade

*Divergent standards* for goods and services; e.g., different approaches to data governance in China and the US, could segment markets...


 Segmentation of large markets prevents third country exporters from reaping economies of scale

*Export restrictions* on ultimate destination as well as import restrictions on ultimate source, can disrupt GVCs and third country trade

 EAP countries differ in how they participate in GVCs, but most are significantly integrated with the world and with China, especially in electronic products

#### Policy-induced innovation decoupling?

Measures taken after 2018 adversely affected innovation of Chinese firms which had prior collaborations with the US,



Notes: Event study plots of the patent applications of US (Chinese) firms with collaborations before 2018 with inventors in China (US).


#### Bilateral restrictions on technology flows and collaboration between large countries could reduce the global availability of knowledge

Impact of innovation decoupling on third countries?

## The US and, increasingly, China are important sources of knowledge for other East Asia and Pacific countries

#### 1996-2001






Notes: The chart shows the source of backward citations (on the left-hand scale) for patent applications to EPO/USPTO/WIPO patent offices by assignees in EAP countries (on the right-hand scale)

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#### The adverse effects of a trade and technological rift between large countries can be reduced by third countries forming (separate) trade agreements that ideally include each large country



#### Third countries benefit from being "hubs" rather than "spokes" or members of exclusive trade blocs

Source: Drawing on Petri and Plummer (2020)

Note: "Business as before" assumes a return to a pre-trade war path. "Sustained trade war" assumes path defined by post-phase one tariffs. Bars show incremental effects of adding each policy to all previous policies. The policy denoted "India" involves adding India to the RCEP15 agreement to form RCEP16









Aging

## EAP countries are aging faster than rich countries did, and the working age population will peak at lower levels of income per capita

Transition from aging to aged societies (i.e., from population 65+ reaching 7% to 14% of total)



GDP per capita at peak working age population relative to US



**THE WORLD BANK** East Asia & Pacific - Chief Economist Office UN Population projections, 2022, medium fertility variant

#### Aging will impact economic activity, fiscal balances and health services

Lower share of the conventional "working age" population, unless older people (especially women) continue to work

Higher burden of pensions, unless the gap is narrowed between actual and actuarially fair contribution rates

Higher burden of age-related non-communicable diseases, unless efforts are made to prevent, control and manage these diseases across the life-cycle




### Adaptation




## Adaptation EAP countries are highly exposed to climate change impacts

Global Climate Risk Index: Ranking 2000 – 2019



#### **Adaptation**

#### Investing in adaptation will deliver a triple dividend



## **Policy priorities**



### Four types of policy action are needed



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## **Thank You!**

