

Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey

(AWMS)

ROUND 2¹




¹ Report prepared by the World Bank Afghanistan Poverty and Equity team. The technical team included Ghazala Mansuri, Cesar Cancho, Erwin Knippenberg, Zihao Wang, Anais Dahmani-Scuitti, Sardar Ahmadzai, Pariwash Gouhari, and Raihana Tareen. The team is grateful to Andrea Dall’Olio, Carlos Rodriguez Castelan, Sergio Olivieri, Laura Liliana Moreno, Tara Mansouri Moayed, Nandini Krishnan, and Ximena Del Carpio for providing support and critical feedback. Survey collection was administered by ATR Consulting. Sistemas Integrales supported the calculation of sampling weights. Graphic design conducted by Reyes Work.

Introduction

This brief provides the results of Round 2 (R2) of the Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey (AWMS). The World Bank conducted the survey from June to August 2022 to assess changes in basic living conditions in Afghanistan one year after the Interim Taliban Administration took charge of the country. Round 1 (R1) of the survey was conducted from November to December 2021, and the results were published in March 2022.²

The AWMS survey uses a representative sample of Afghan households, covering all regions of the country. Conducted by telephone, the AWMS reinterviewed households that were surveyed previously through Afghanistan's primary multipurpose household survey and through the Income, Expenditure, and Labor Force Survey (IELFS). Those surveys were conducted by the National Statistics Information Authority (NSIA) in 2019–20 and 2021. **Figure 1** provides a summary of the timeline. The AWMS survey methodology and modality are described in the annex.

FIGURE 1 Timeline of key household surveys in Afghanistan



AWMS R2 covers a wide range of welfare indicators. These include employment and labor earnings, food security and access to safety nets, school attendance by boys and girls, and access to health services. This round also includes a full list of household members for individual-level analysis. Additional survey rounds are planned every six months.

² World Bank. 2022. Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey, Round 1. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Highlights

Welfare

- Two-thirds of households in Afghanistan find it difficult to meet basic food and non-food needs.
 - This is worrying because data collection was conducted in the summer, when farm households have typically replenished their grain stores from the spring–summer harvest and employment opportunities across the country are at their highest.
 - Rising food prices and the persistent effects of last year’s drought are highlighted among the main reasons for limited access to and affordability of food.
 - This may signal more significant deprivation in the coming winter months, usually considered the hungry season.
- Almost half of all heads of household report a decrease in earnings.
 - This signals a trend of stabilizing income at a lower level.
- The majority (82 percent) of respondents report that, if they were provided AFN 1,000 (about USD 10) per month, they would use it to purchase food.

Labor Force

- Household heads’ employment levels continue to rise, keeping in mind the seasonal bump in employment over the summer months.
 - There has been a slight uptick in private sector salaried work, and public sector employment remains small, reflecting a smaller government footprint.
 - Most household heads are self-employed.
- There has been a substantial increase in labor force participation in the adult population, which includes those working or looking for work.
 - More young and older men are seeking work but unable to find it, fueling unemployment.
 - In contrast, many more women across all age groups have become economically active, with female labor force participation doubling relative to historical trends.
 - Women work predominantly in home-based self-employed activities.
- Linking households and individuals back to their baseline data shows a high level of churn in the female labor market.
 - Nearly half of women previously employed in salaried work lost their job.
 - Many women who were previously dedicated their time to housework or students are now working on the farm or at home, doing piecework, sewing, and repairing clothes.

- The one exception is teachers, two-thirds of whom have retained their employment.
- Increased labor participation suggests that households respond to declining incomes by economically activating more household members.

Education

- Primary school enrollment is as high as it was in 2016 at the national level.
 - This is driven primarily by increased enrollment of children in rural areas.
 - In urban areas, primary school enrollment for girls and boys remains relatively low and has yet to fully recover from June–August 2020, possibly reflecting a dip in response to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions.
- Secondary school enrollment has either stagnated or decreased.
 - Enrollment rates for boys appear stagnant in rural areas and are worsening steadily in urban areas.
 - Girls' secondary school attendance declined over this period, particularly in urban areas.
 - Girls' secondary enrollment is highest in the West Central and Northern regions.
- The drop in secondary school enrollment for both girls and boys is aligned with an increase in the proportion of teenage Afghans joining the labor force.
 - Among girls who are not able to be in school, nearly half of them become economically active, most working from home or on the family farm.
 - The same increase in employment is evident among teenage boys, but it is more likely that this reflects households' economic distress over the past year rather than secondary school closures.

Health

- The need for medical care has increased; almost nine out of ten households report at least one member requiring medical attention over the month preceding the survey.
- Medical services remain available, with only 8 percent of individuals who needed health services reporting having been unable to access them.
 - Among all individuals who received medical care, around 57 percent did so in a private facility.
 - Public hospitals play a critical role in health provision in urban areas, and basic public facilities are the second most important source of health care in rural areas.
 - Both men and women sought and received health care at the same rates from public and private providers.
- The West-Central region relies most heavily on public health facilities, and the South and Southwest regions rely on them the least.

Perceptions of Safety

- In general, perceptions of safety continue to improve, with most respondents feeling safer compared to one year ago.
- There are significant regional differences, however.
 - The perception of improved safety is more salient in previously contested areas—particularly in the South and the Southeast—where fighting was heaviest in the summer of 2021.
 - Respondents from the central region, including Kabul, and the West-Central region are far less likely to perceive safety improvements.

FIGURE 2 AWMS enumerators




Photo Credit: ATR Call Center Team.

Main Results

Welfare

Just under two-thirds (64 percent) of households participating in R2 of the AWMS continue to find it difficult to meet basic food and non-food needs. The slight decline from 69 percent in R1 (Figure 3) is likely due to seasonal effects. R2 was conducted in the summer, just after the harvest, when food stocks are replenished and employment opportunities are at their highest. By comparison, the share of households struggling to cover basic food needs in R2 was double the share in May–June 2021 (34 percent).³ The high level of reported need, even in the summer, paints a grim picture of welfare in the country.

FIGURE 3 Self-reported household capacity to cover food and non-food expenses




Source: AWMS 2021 (R1) and AWMS 2022 (R2).

Widespread deprivation is evidenced by continued reliance on lower-quality food, the need to borrow to buy food, and food rationing within the household. These coping strategies are indicative of acute food insecurity and are aligned with results

³ Households were asked, “Based on the household income coming from all possible sources and the food and other items produced by the household for your own consumption, how would you evaluate the economic state of your household in the last month?”

from data collected by the World Food Program (WFP).⁴ Figure 4 indicates that four-fifths of households rely on lower-quality food, and three-fifths must borrow to buy food, which may be leading to household indebtedness. Reliance on rationing strategies that reduce caloric intake, such as skipping meals or reducing meal size, has diminished slightly since R1, but remains high. Indeed, all food insecurity indicators are higher than comparable ones collected by the WFP during July–August 2021.

FIGURE 4 Household coping mechanisms and Coping Strategy Index



Source: WFP and AWMS 2021 (R1) and 2022 (R2).

Reasons for continued deprivation include rising food prices and the persistent effects of last year's drought. Two-fifths of households suffered from drought in the past 12 months, with meteorological, agricultural, and hydrological droughts persisting for a second successive year.⁵ This suggests that stocks are low, and assets have been depleted ahead of the winter months, which typically constitute the hungry season in Afghanistan. Food prices have also been rising. For example, 60 percent of households report paying a higher price for wheat flour, one of the country's basic staples.

Almost half of all household heads experienced a decline in earnings. Compared to R1, earnings stabilized for many household heads, possibly due to the timing of data collection. Yet, despite being interviewed in the summer months when seasonal jobs are available, 46 percent of household heads saw their earnings decline. When asked how they would spend a hypothetical inflow of AFN 1,000

⁴ WFP. 2021. Afghanistan Food Security Update. September 10. Available [here](#).


⁵ See FEWSNET [seasonal monitor](#) for details of the drought and corresponding food insecurity.

(about USD 10) per month, 82 percent of household heads indicated that they would use the transfer to purchase food.

Labor Force

Employment among household heads increased between R1 and R2, in line with the expected seasonal bump in employment over the summer months. Figure 5 highlights a 7 percentage-point increase in employment between the winter and summer months. This pattern was sustained over 2019–20, when labor market activity was likely to have been affected by COVID-19.⁶ This increase in employment has been accompanied by a consistent decline in inactivity, which dropped from 16 percent in the summer of 2020 (IELFS) to 11 percent in AWMS R2.

FIGURE 5 Labor market status of household heads, 15–65 years old



Source: Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) 2016–17 for 2016; IELFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS for 2021 and 2022.

Note: Paid private salary includes all nongovernment jobs with a regular paycheck; self-employed includes day laborers and those working from home.


⁶ Available evidence suggests that the impact of COVID depressed labor market activity, which also increased poverty levels. See World Bank. 2021. Afghanistan Development Update, April 2021: Setting the Course to Recovery. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Private sector employment among household heads also increased, surpassing pre-COVID levels. Nearly one-tenth (9 percent) of household heads were salaried in private sector jobs in R2, compared to 4 percent in June–August 2020, according to the IELFS. This is consistent with evidence from the World Bank’s recent Private Sector Rapid Survey, which found that employment among firms surveyed had recovered somewhat.⁷ By contrast, public sector employment remains much lower. There has been a sharp decrease in employment in the police and army. Self-employment in construction also declined, with a corresponding increase in odd jobs, such as street hawkers and sweepers. Educated household heads shifted from the public sector to self-employment and salaried private employment. Uneducated or less educated household heads are still overwhelmingly represented in the self-employed category, but their proportion in salaried private employment has more than doubled. Their jobs in the salaried private sector are mainly in service sectors, working as drivers, security guards, and cleaning staff, among other occupations.

An expansion in labor force participation among all working-age Afghans is evident in R2. A comparison between June–August 2020 (IELFS) and AWMS R2 shows a 19 percentage point reduction in economic inactivity—or absence from the labor force altogether—among working-age adults, fueling an increase in both employment and unemployment between the two periods (**Figure 6**). Overall, employment levels in R2 exceed even those of the 2016 Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) during the same summer months. As with household heads, the incidence of private sector salaried employment doubled for the total working-age population, from 3 percent in June–August 2016 to 6 percent in AWMS R2.

Among men, higher labor force participation has mainly fueled unemployment, reflecting difficulties in finding work. Unemployment increased from 7 and 6 percent in earlier ALCS and IELFS rounds, respectively, to 14 percent in AWMS R2 (**Figure 7**). Among men who do find work, three-fourths are self-employed. This is similar to the trend for household heads. Interestingly, the increase in labor force participation among men is concentrated among younger (15–24) and older (55–65) workers (**Figure 8**). Among men of prime working age (25–54), there is a slight decline in participation.

⁷ World Bank. 2022. Afghanistan Private Sector Rapid Survey: An Assessment of the Business Environment–Round 2. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

FIGURE 6 Labor market status of all adults, 15–65 years old

Source: ALCS 2016–17 for 2016; IELFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS for 2021 and 2022.

Note: Paid private salary includes all nongovernment jobs with a regular paycheck; self-employed includes day laborers and those working from home.



FIGURE 7 Labor market status of men, 15–65 years old

FIGURE 8 Labor force participation rate for men along the age distribution

Source: ALCS 2016–17 for 2016; IELFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS for 2021 and 2022.

Note: Paid private salary includes all nongovernment jobs with a regular paycheck; self-employed include day laborers and those working from home.

The pattern is different for women, among whom the decline in economic inactivity is far more significant and both employment and unemployment have increased sharply. Women's labor participation rate has risen from 19 percent in 2016 and 16 percent at the height of COVID-19 in the summer of 2020 to 45 percent in AWMS R2 (Figure 9). Among women who are participating in the labor market, 32 percent are employed, mostly as self-employed workers, and 13 percent are unemployed and looking for work. Employment gains among women have been somewhat higher among women of prime working-age (25–54), though there is a rise across the age distribution (Figure 10). The increase in employment is roughly the same among women with some education and those without.

Within this expansion of women's labor participation lies a good deal of churn, as women experienced a high level of exit from and entry into the labor market. To anchor the unusual increase in women's labor force participation in Afghanistan at this time, women in R2 were matched back to their source households in the IELFS 2019–20.⁸ This allowed the employment status of 6,046 women to be tracked (Figure 11). Many formerly employed women lost their jobs. Of those women who were previously employed, nearly half are now unemployed or left the labor force altogether. Women who lost their jobs are more likely to have a secondary or post-secondary education and to live in urban areas. However, two-thirds of female teachers managed to keep their jobs. Previously inactive women, on the other hand, largely entered the labor force. Many who previously identified as housewives are now working, mostly as self-employed workers on the farm, tending to livestock, or engaging in small-scale economic activities from home,

⁸ This was done by matching individuals using the rosters from each survey.

for example as seamstresses or mending or sewing clothes.⁹ Among women previously identified as students, approximately one-half have entered the labor force.

FIGURE 9 Labor market status of women, 15–65 years old¹⁰





FIGURE 10 Labor force participation rate for women along the age distribution




Source: ALCS 2016–17 for 2016; IE-LFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS for 2021 and 2022

Note: Paid private salary includes all non-governmental jobs with a regular paycheck; self-employed include day laborers and those working from home.

⁹ As part of the labor force module, all members of the household are asked the following: “In the last week, did you/ [NAME] produce any durable goods—such as clothes, carpets, kilims, furniture, etc.—for own use by household members?” In the past, this category was sometimes included in Afghanistan but was dropped in the most recent complete round from Labor Force Survey statistics and is excluded from the analysis above.

¹⁰ Numbers may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

FIGURE 11 Shift in female Labor Force Participation (panel, 15-65 years old)




Note: Only panel sample restricted to women matched to baseline, N=6,046; 77 percent of women in sample roster were successfully matched

Source: IE-LFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS R2 for 2022

Education¹¹

Household-level trends suggest a recovery in school enrollment levels for boys. Figure 12 compares household-level attendance across years and seasons. Compared to 2019–20, more households enroll all their boys in school. Estimates in R2 are similar to those in 2016, suggesting a recovery in enrollment since the onset of COVID-19 in 2020. There is little evidence of seasonal fluctuations in school enrollment by comparing across seasons in the 2016 ALCS. However, the share of households sending all of their school-age boys to school dropped by 10 percentage points between Oct–Dec 2016 and Oct–Dec 2019, with a more significant fall in the summer of 2020 relative to the summer of 2016, likely due to COVID-19. As such, the overall pattern points to a recovery to 2016 levels and higher.

FIGURE 12 School net enrollment at the **household** level, boys 6 to 18 years old



Source: ALCS 2016–17 for 2016; IELFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS for 2021 and 2022.

Looking at individual-level data, the spatial pattern reveals a more nuanced picture. In R2, information on school enrollment was also collected at the individual level. Among primary school-aged boys, there has been a recovery in enrollment rates to pre-COVID levels in rural areas (Figure 13). However, primary school enrollment lags behind pre-COVID levels in urban areas. This is likely due to a higher perception of security in rural areas and the lifting of COVID-related restrictions.¹²


¹¹ Some education figures in a previous version of this brief reported incorrect magnitudes due to a coding error. The figures have been updated and substantive results are unchanged.

¹² Using enrollment numbers from the partial 2021 IELFS suggests that the recovery in primary school enrollment started post-COVID, while the decline in secondary school enrollment occurred right after the change in administration in August 2021.


In contrast to primary school enrollment, net enrollment levels for boys in secondary school is stagnant; it has barely recovered to pre-Covid levels in urban areas and has decreased in urban areas. Boys' secondary school enrollment in urban areas decreased from 57 to 52 percent between the summer of 2020 and R2 of the AWMS, even though the Taliban's ban on secondary education does not apply to boys'. Boys' enrollment is highest in the West-Central and Central regions and lowest in the Southwest (Figure 14).

FIGURE 13 School net enrollment at the individual level for boys

Primary (6-12 years old)




Secondary (13-18 years old)



Source: ALCS 2016–17 for 2016; IELFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS for 2022.

FIGURE 14 Net enrollment at the **individual** level by region, June–August 2022, boys 6 to 18 years old




Source: AWMS R2.


Consistent with the decline in boys' secondary school enrollment, there is a considerable increase in the share of older boys dropping out of school and joining the labor force. The proportion of employed boys aged 14–18 increased sharply (Figure 15). In R2 of the AWMS, 27 percent of boys in this age group were not in school and were employed, compared to just 14 percent in the summer of 2016 and 9 percent in the summer of 2020. Moreover, the proportion of boys who are working while going to school has risen from 16 percent in 2016 to 28 percent in R2. This increase in youth employment could be one of the drivers behind the reduction in boys' enrollment rates in secondary school.

The regions where youth employment is highest for boys are some of the regions where school enrollment is lowest. Young men, aged 14–18, are mostly absent from the education system and also more present in the labor force in the West, West-Central and Southwest regions (Figure 16). They do not engage in the same occupations as adult males. They are more likely to tend to livestock or work at home on farms or on household-level economic activities. They do not take on work like construction or driving vehicles.¹³ This expansion in labor force participation among non-traditional groups, like women and school-aged boys, has significant longer-term implications for the development of human capital in the country and is another indication of the loss of household welfare, with more household members being pulled into income-earning activities.

¹³ For this analysis of occupations, the sample includes 1,763 employed boys between the ages of 15 and 18 and 7,852 employed men 19 years old and above.

FIGURE 15 Youth employment, boys 14 to 18 years old

Source: ALCS 2016–17 for 2016; IELFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS for 2022.

FIGURE 16 Male youth labor force participation by region, June–August 2022, boys 14 to 18 years old

Source: AWMS R2.


As with labor force participation, school attendance patterns differ across genders. At the household level,

girls' school attendance recovered to pre-COVID levels in R1, and this pattern is sustained in R2 (**Figure 17**). The increase is concentrated among girls attending primary school.

In taking a deeper look at girls' school attendance using individual-level data, AWMS R2 reveals major differences in age and geographic location. Girls' net primary school enrollment rose from 30 percent in July–August 2020, at the height of COVID-19, to 52 percent in R2 (**Figure 18**). This essentially represents a full recovery to pre-COVID levels of school enrollment, as expressed in the 2016 ALCS. Significant spatial differences underlie this aggregate pattern, however. In rural areas, girls' net primary school enrollment in R2 exceeds that seen in the midst of COVID-19 and is higher by eleven

percentage points than enrollment even in 2016. By contrast, net primary school enrollment has plummeted in urban areas, from a high of 80 percent in 2016 to just 62 percent in R2.

FIGURE 17 School net enrollment at the **household** level, girls 6 to 18 years old



Source: ALCS 2016–17 for 2016; IELFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS for 2021 and 2022.


At the secondary school level, girls' net enrollment rates declined from about 21 percent in 2016 to just 14 percent in R2, with apparent spatial differences. In rural areas, girls' net secondary enrollment has remained relatively flat, with only 13 and 15 percent of secondary school-age girls enrolled in school in the summers of 2016 and 2020, respectively, compared to about 13 percent in AWMS R2. In urban areas, girls' secondary school enrollment collapsed from 44 percent in the summer of 2016 and 50 percent in the summer of 2020 to just 16 percent in R2. This is consistent with the closure of secondary schools under the Interim Taliban Administration.¹⁴ Figure 19 provides a more disaggregated regional picture. Girls' secondary school attendance is below 15 percent throughout the country, except in the North and West-Central regions, where enrollment rates are much higher, at 28 and 31 percent, respectively.

As with secondary school-aged boys, many teenage girls who are no longer in school are in the labor force. The share of girls aged 14–18 who are not in school but are either employed or looking for a job has increased from 7 percent in 2016 and 4 percent in 2020 to 40 percent in R2 (Figure 20). The percentage of girls not in

¹⁴ The non-zero enrollment rate for girls in secondary education is consistent with anecdotal evidence that some schools have remained open, due to pre-existing compliance with Taliban rules regarding gender segregation.


school or in the labor force also increased from 24 percent in 2020 to 35 percent in R2. This pattern differs from that observed for teenage boys. Interestingly, youth employment for girls is highest in the South-West Region, where girl's secondary enrollment is low, and lowest in the Central region (**Figure 21**).

FIGURE 18 School net enrollment at the **individual** level, girls 6 to 18 years old




Source: ALCS 2016–17 for 2016; IELFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS for 2022.

FIGURE 19 Net enrollment at the individual level by region, June–August 2022, girls 6 to 18 years old




Source: AWMS R2.

FIGURE 20 Youth employment, girls 14 to 18 years old



Source: ALCS 2016–17 for 2016; IELFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS for 2022.

FIGURE 21 Female youth labor force participation by region, June–August 2022, girls 14 to 18 years old




Source: AWMS R2.

Health

The proportion of households with at least one member who needed health services increased between R1 and R2. In R2, 88 percent of households reported that at least one member needed to go to a health facility in the month before the survey, compared to 76 percent in R1 (Figure 22). This high and increasing health burden could reflect the cumulative negative effects of adverse economic conditions and protracted food insecurity. It is also possible that the timing of R2 played a role, as it coincided with one of the recent waves of COVID-19.¹⁵

FIGURE 22 Access to health services for people needing medical attention in the last 30 days




Source: AWMS R1 and R2.

Most Afghans who needed medical attention could access care, with few differences across urban and rural areas. Access to health services remained high, and only 8 percent of individuals who needed medical attention could not access

¹⁵ See COVID-19 statistics from the World Health Organization at: <https://covid19.who.int/region/emro/country/af>.

it. The private sector is still the most important provider. Of those who accessed a health facility, 57 percent went to a private provider and 43 percent to a public provider (**Figure 23**). Rural residents increased their reliance on private doctor's offices and basic public health facilities instead of public or private hospitals.¹⁶ Across regions, there was greater reliance on public health facilities in the Central-West and Central regions and on private health facilities elsewhere, particularly in the South and Southwest (**Figure 24**). There were no differences according to gender, as women were able to access health care services, public and private, at the same rates as men.


FIGURE 23 Health providers visited by people who needed medical attention in the last 30 days



Source: ALCS 2016–17 for 2016; IELFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS for 2021 and 2022.

¹⁶ The survey does not distinguish between non-profit and for-profit private clinics, a subject which will be explored further in the third round.

FIGURE 24 Access to public and private health facilities by region, June–August 2022




Source: AWMS R2.

Perceptions of Security

Respondents generally feel safer than before, but with wide variations across regions. In R2, 67 percent of respondents reported feeling safer relative to June–August 2021, at the height of the conflict (Figure 25). Improvement is concentrated in areas where fighting was heaviest in the summer of 2021, including the Southwest, Southern, and Eastern regions. Respondents in urban areas were less likely to report feeling safe. Those living in the Central region, which includes Kabul, and in the West-Central region, where the Hazara live, are less likely to report feeling safer than before.

FIGURE 25 Subjective perceptions of security


In the current environment, do you and others in your household feel more or less safe compared to 12 months ago?



Source: AWMS R2.

Perceptions of improved security do not carry over into household sentiment about socioeconomic well-being. Around two-thirds (65 percent) of respondents believe that the economic conditions of their household will worsen over the next 12 months (**Figure 26**). This assessment was confined to just 26 percent of households in the summer of 2020 and was 59 percent in R1, suggesting a widening sense of pessimism regarding the economy.

FIGURE 26 Expectations about changes in household's economic state in the next 12 months



Source: IELFS 2019–20 for 2019; AWMS R1 for 2021, AWMS R2 for 2021.

A N N E X :

AWMS Methodology


Sample

The AWMS relies on a sample of households that had been interviewed previously during two waves of the IELFS. The IELFS, administered by the NSIA, was Afghanistan's flagship nationally representative household survey. The first wave was administered in person from October 2019 to September 2020, and the second wave was administered, also in person, between April and June 2021. This second wave was planned for an entire year, but fieldwork was halted one-quarter of the way through due to insecurity and a lack of resources. Still, the sample collected in this quarter was nationally representative. The IELFS questionnaire included questions on the telephone numbers of the households interviewed, which were used for the AWMS. The sampling frame and the selection method used to select the sample for both waves of the IELFS were the same. This allowed the telephone numbers collected in each wave to be merged into a single listing without losing their connection to the original sampling frame. As a result, the sampling weights of the households with telephone numbers could be adjusted to preserve national representativeness. The total sample of telephone numbers collected included 12,811 unique numbers (Table A.1), covering 318 districts out of 339 visited by the two IELFS rounds and covering all provinces of the country (Figure A.1).

TABLE A.1 IELFS 2019–20 and 2021 samples and telephone numbers collected

	IELFS 2019–20	IELFS 2021
Households with complete interviews	18,139	4,900
Households with telephone numbers collected	9,857	2,954

FIGURE A.1 Distribution across districts of the consolidated listing of telephone numbers from IELFS 2019–20 and IELFS 2021



Source: Elaboration based on IELFS 2019–20 and IELFS 2021.

In AWMS R1, close to half of the attempted interviews were completed, with the main reason for non-response being that the telephone number was not active. AWMS R1 data collection lasted six weeks, between October and December 2021. Overall, 10,130 telephone numbers were contacted, resulting in 4,937 complete telephone interviews. The full list of 12,811 unique numbers was not contacted due to contractual reasons with the firm in charge of the fieldwork; instead, the numbers contacted were randomly selected from the full listing. The protocol for contacting the phone numbers required that enumerators attempt seven calls before classifying an interview as non-response or non-complete. Among the completed interviews, 65 percent were completed at the first attempt, 21 percent at the second, and 14 percent at the third or further attempt (Table A.2). Among those numbers for which an attempted interview was not successful, the most common reason was that the number was not working or not active, followed at some distance by the respondent not picking up the phone or declining the interview (9 percent) or abandoning the interview while still incomplete (1 percent).

TABLE A.2 Results from attempted calls, R1


AWMS Round 1		
Telephone numbers contacted	10,130	100%
Result		
Number not working or not active	4,153	41%
Did not pick up or declined	911	9%
Incomplete	101	1%
Completed interviews	4,937	49%
Attempts needed to complete interviews		
Completed interviews	4,937	100%
1 attempt	3,212	65%
2 attempts	1,025	21%
3+ attempts	700	14%

The sampling weights in R1 had to be adjusted to preserve national representativeness. The resulting R1 sample included some expected biases, given that: (i) not all of the households from IELFS provided telephone numbers; and (ii) not all of the available numbers could be interviewed successfully. An adjustment of the sampling weights was needed, therefore, to preserve the national representativeness of the sample of completed interviews. This required a four-step process. First, the sampling weights for all households interviewed in the two IELFS rounds were harmonized, so that the consolidated sample could match the population size and distribution coming from the original sampling frame. Then, the new sampling weights for the households that provided a telephone number in the IELFS rounds were adjusted, so that this sub-sample could be used to estimate nationally representative estimates. This adjustment was based on the probabilities of each household having provided a telephone number in the IELFS rounds, as predicted by their socioeconomic characteristics (such as region, urban/rural, access to electricity, and household assets). Next, a second readjustment was conducted on only the sample of households with completed interviews in R1, this time based on the probabilities of completing the interview (again, as predicted by sociodemographic characteristics). Finally, a post-stratification of the sampling weights by regions was conducted, and excessively large weights were trimmed to reduce their impact on estimate standard errors.

The adjustment of sampling weights reduced the biases of the R1 sample, although the final sample is still slightly wealthier and more educated than the sample coming from the IELFS 2019–20. To assess how the final weighted estimates coming from the AWMS R1 compared to those coming from the IELFS 2019–20, socioeconomic indicators across surveys was compared. (Contrasts with the IELFS 2021 are not presented, as this survey has not been officially published by the NSIA). In contrast, three variables that were collected in the IELFS and that could be mapped to the AWMS sample via the common telephone number were compared: urban/rural, welfare quintile, and education level of the household head. This contrast presents differences that are attributable to the composition of the sample, even after the weight's readjustment. In addition, a variable that was collected in the AWMS was compared to the same one collected in the IELFS 2019–20: household size. In this case, the difference may be attributable not only to the sample composition, but also to changes in household behavior. For instance, a change in household size may reflect the strategies that families were following to navigate the severe adjustment experienced by the economy in 2021 (for example, household members returning to rural areas from urban ones and moving together to share expenses). The results of these contrasts show that the AWMS R1 sample has a similar urban–rural distribution as the IELFS 2019–20 but

is skewed slightly toward wealthier households and those with more educated household heads (**Figure A.2**). Households in the AWMS R1 are also larger, but this is less indicative of potential sample biases. In any event, the differences in welfare and education levels are not large enough to introduce crippling biases to the results, and every category considered has a substantial representation.

FIGURE A.2 Contrast of IELFS 2019–20 and AWMS R1 sociodemographic variables



Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that differences in means are significant at 1%.

Source: Elaboration based on IELFS 2019–20 and AWMS R1.

An additional robustness check was conducted by cross-checking household heads' information from the AWMS and the IELFS 2019–20. Since more than two years have passed since the IELFS 2019–20 was conducted, there was a chance that the numbers provided could have been disconnected and assigned to new users, or that some households provided a telephone number that belonged to a relative or a neighbor (or even a random number). For the cross-validation, the households in the AWMS that came from the IELFS 2019–20 telephone listing were considered to be matched if the respondent confirmed that the household head's name was the same as that recorded in the IELFS 2019–20. This validation resulted in 82 percent of interviews coming from the IELFS 2019–20 telephone listing being properly matched. (Personal information for the household head was not available from the IELFS 2021). The households that could not be matched were left in the sample for the cross-sectional analysis.

The second round of the AWMS was collected between June and August 2022, with a response rate (45 percent) only slightly lower than that of the first round.


R2 data collection started six months after R1 and lasted for six weeks. The full listing of 12,811 telephone numbers was contacted, regardless of the R1 interview result. The same protocol was followed for contacting phone numbers: enumerators would attempt seven calls before classifying an interview as non-response or non-complete. The share of successfully completed interviews was 45 percent of the full telephone listing, equivalent to 5,800 interviews (Table A.3). This share was only 4 percentage points lower than in R1. The most prevalent reason for interviews not to be completed was, again, that the number was not working or not active (46 percent). The number of attempts needed to complete the interviews increased slightly, but more than half of interviews (56 percent) were still able to be completed in the first attempt. Of the households with completed R1 interviews, 3,318 (67 percent) were successfully contacted again in R2. In addition, 2,482 telephone numbers that were not working, not active, or not responding in R1 were successfully interviewed in R2.

TABLE A.3 Results from attempted calls, R2

AWMS Round 2		
Telephone numbers contacted	12,811	100%
Result		
Number not working or not active	5,946	46%
Did not pick up or declined	932	7%
Incomplete	133	1%
Completed interviews	5,800	45%
Attempts needed to complete interviews		
Completed interviews	5,800	100%
1 attempt	3,273	56%
2 attempts	1,324	23%
3+ attempts	1,203	21%

As in R1, sampling weights were readjusted in R2 to preserve national representativeness, with the final sample distribution being slightly more urban, wealthier, and educated than the IELFS 2019–20. The same methodology was used as in R1. Also, to assess any potential biases introduced by the new sample, a contrast for the same variables analyzed for R1 was conducted. In addition, two new demographic variables that were now available at the individual level from both surveys were added: gender and age. The results show that the R2 sample is slightly more urban than that of the IELFS 2019–20 and shows similar patterns to R1 in terms of household welfare and the education level of the household head. The share of females and the average age of the R2 sample is close to that of the 2019–20 IELFS. The household size for R2 is also much closer to the IELFS 2019–20 than in R1, which probably reflects the introduction of a household roster. In any event, as in R1, the differences in location, welfare, and education are not large enough to introduce crippling biases to the results, and every category considered has a substantial representation.

FIGURE A.4 Contrast of IELFS 2019–20 and AWMS R2 sociodemographic variables



Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that differences in means are significant at 1%.

Source: Elaboration based on IELFS 2019–20 and AWMS R2.

A validation of information collected in R2 on household heads resulted in close to 80 percent of interviews being properly matched between R2 and the IELFS 2019–20 (for the telephone numbers coming from IELFS 2019–20); these households are referred to as the panel sample. Similar to R1, a cross-check was conducted to verify that the households interviewed in R2 were the same ones that were interviewed in the IELFS 2019–20. Again, households were considered

matched if they could confirm that the household head’s name was the same as the name of the household head reported in the IELFS 2019–20. This “panel sample” allows us to track status transitions for critical variables, such as employment status, between the time periods covered by the IELFS 2019–20 and the AWMS R2.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire for AWMS R1 was designed to obtain information on the employment status of the household head and additional indicators related to welfare and access to services at the household level. The R1 questionnaire was designed to be answered by the household head, who would provide information about himself/herself on employment, and for the overall household on other topics. In cases where the household head did not respond to the call or was not available at the moment of the call, the household member responding to the phone call was interviewed; this occurred in 17 percent of completed R1 interviews. In addition to the introductory and concluding sections, the questionnaire included nine short modules: displacement, employment, agriculture, household income, household welfare, basic needs and assistance, market access, education, and health. The employment module was designed to collect information from the household head on his or her employment activities, following verbatim the same battery of questions used in the IELFS 2019–20 to ensure comparability. The other modules collected household-level information on other topics, following closely the wording and structure of questions used in the IELFS 2019–20, when available. Overall, the average length of completed interviews was 22.5 minutes.

The R2 questionnaire was expanded to collect information on employment, access to health, and education for every household member. The R2 questionnaire preserved, to a large extent, the same structure as that used in R1 and was also designed to be responded to by the household head. It repeated the modules on employment, education, health, agriculture, basic needs and assistance, welfare, and market prices. In addition, it included a new module on COVID-19, focusing mainly on collecting information on vaccination. The main innovation was the introduction of a household roster module, through which basic information on each household member could be obtained from the household head. At the same time, the sections on employment, education, and health were expanded so that individual information could be collected about every household member that qualified for each section (14+ years old for employment, 6–18 years old for education, and all ages for health). These changes made the survey longer, as completed interviews lasted for 39.5 minutes, on average.

The questionnaire was designed by the World Bank and administered by ATR Consulting. The survey was administered in Dari and Pashto, using a computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) questionnaire based on an Open Data Kit (OPK) app. All enumerators were female, working remotely from within the country. Households were informed of the reason for their selection and the purpose of the survey, and verbal consent was obtained before proceeding with the interview. The questionnaire follows World Bank data privacy corporate policies. All completed interviews were compensated with a phone credit worth AFN 150 (about USD 1.7) upon completion of the survey.